country gender analysis egypt -...

Country Gender Analysis

Egypt

June 2014

Country Gender Analysis-Egypt June 2014

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Content

1. List of Abbreviations ………………………………………………………………………………………….....3

2. Objective ............................................................................................................... 4

3. General Information .............................................................................................. 4

3.1 FRAMEWORK CONDITIONS ................................................................................... 4 3.2 TRADITIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF GENDER ROLES ....................................... 6 3.3 GENDER IN POLITICS ............................................................................................ 7 3.4 GENDER EQUALITY AT THE LEVEL OF THE FAMILY ........................................ 13 3.5 GENDER IN EDUCATION AND THE ECONOMY .................................................. 20

4. Resources ........................................................................................................... 29


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1. List of Abbreviations

CAPMAS Central Authority for Public Mobilization and Statistics

CESR Center for Economic and Social Rights

ECESR Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights

ECWR Egyptian Center for Women's Rights

(E)DHS (Egypt) Demographic Health Survey

ETF European Training Foundation

FGM Female Genital Mutilation

FIDH International Federation for Human Rights

GEDI Gender Global Entrepreneurship and Development Index

GET Global Employment Trends

GGG Global Gender Gap Index

GII Gender Inequality Index

HDI Human Development Index

HDR Human Development Report

NCSR National Center for Social and Criminological Research

NCW National Council for Women

SCC Supreme Constitutional Court

SIGI Social Institutions and Gender Index

SRC Social Research Center

SYPE Survey of the Young People in Egypt

TI Transparency International

UN United Nations

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

VAW Violation Against Women

WB World Bank

WDI World Development Indicators

WGI World Governance Indicators

WHO World Health Organization

WJP World Justice Project

WWR World’s Women Report


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2. Objective BMZ/GIZ policy states a clear commitment to gender equality which it considers an objective for development programmes. The objective of gender analysis is to ensure gender sensi-tivity in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of GIZ Egypt pro-grammes, projects and activities. The objective of gender analysis also seeks to provide understanding of the current situation of gender equality in Egypt. 3. General Information

3.1 Framework Conditions

According to the Human Development Index (HDI), Egypt falls in the middle of human devel-opment category index. Egypt has witnessed major improvements in its HDI value from 0.47 in 1980 to 0.662 in 2012, a value higher than the regional average in the Arab States (0.652). Its value is also above average in comparison to middle-income countries (0.640). Com-pared to other rapidly emerging economies such as the CIVETS1, Egypt performs slightly better (0.661). The mean annual growth in HDI has steadily declined from an above average value at both regional and middle-income levels of 2.12% (1980/1990) to a below average level of 0.92% (2000/2012). Moreover, despite the continued improvement in HDI levels, when adjusted for inequality, Egypt's HDI falls to 0.502 (i.e. a loss of 24.1 percent). This is slightly better than the average loss for medium HDI countries (24.2 percent) and for Arab States (25.4 percent) (HDR 2013).

There are also disparities in development between rural and urban governorates and espe-cially between Lower and Upper Egypt with the latter governorates and rural areas achieving lower levels of human development. Sixty-seven per cent of the country’s defined poor live in Upper Egypt as well as 83% of the extreme poor (World Bank 2012) while 78% of the poor live in rural areas. The poverty rate among children was 45.3% in rural Upper Egypt com-pared to 7.9% in urban Lower Egypt (CESR 2013). Virtually all health indicators and literacy rates are worse in Upper Egypt than in Lower Egypt and worse in rural areas than in urban areas.

Table 1 - General Indicators

Egypt's Gender Inequality Index (GII) attributes the decrease in human development to ine-quality between women and men in reproductive health, empowerment, and economic activi- 1 Columbia, Indonesia, Viet Nam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa

Lower Middle Income (US$1006 -3975)

Population growth (%) 1.75 GDP (US$ billions) 160.26 GDP (PPP) per capita 5,544 Urban population (% of total population) 44 Population between 0-14 (%) 31 HDI Rank 112 /186 HDI Value 0.662 Health: life expectancy at birth (years) 73.5 Education: expected and mean years of schooling 0.53 Income: GNI (PPP, US$) per capita 5,401 Inequality: inequality adjusted HDI 0.503 Poverty: Multidimensional poverty (%) 6 Population below national poverty line (%) 34.4 Sustainability: adjusted net savings (%GNI) 1.4


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ty. Egypt’s GII was valued at 0.59 in 2012, ranking 126 out of 148 countries in the 2012 in-dex. Egypt's GII was below that of Arab States (0.555) and Medium HDI countries (0.457).

Although Egypt improved its Global Gender Gap Index (GGG) ranking of 126 in 2012 to 125 in 2013, its overall score decreased from 0.5975 in 2012 to 0.5935 in 2013. Among 33 similar lower-middle income countries, Egypt ranked 27, while it came in 10th place among 15 MENA countries. Health and education indices reflect more favorable rankings and scores, indicating the improvement in women's social indices over the past two decades2. Low eco-nomic participation and political empowerment indices are mirrored in the very low represen-tation of women in parliament and low labour force participation of women. These poor val-ues further reflect the existing barriers that confront women in politics and labour. Egypt's low SIGI gender indexe

delineates the underlying social institutions which influence gender roles and forms of discrimination against women (SIGI 2012).

Table 2 - Gender Indicators

Rank Score

Gender inequality index (GII)3 (2012) 126 0.590 Maternal mortality ratio 66 Seats in parliament 2.2% With secondary education 43.4% Labour force participation 23.7%

Global Gender Gap Index (GGG) (2013) 125 (out of 136) 0.5935 Economic participation and opportunity 125 0.4426 Educational attainment 108 0.9199 Health and survival 51 0.9768 Political empowerment 128 0.0348

SIGI Gender Index (2012) 65 (out of 86) 0.35784

Urban/ rural living conditions

Stark gender disparities exist between rural and urban governorates, as well as, between Lower and Upper Egypt. Illiteracy rates among young women in Upper Egypt are twice that of their male counterparts, currently measured at 24%,. The 2009 Survey of the Young People

in Egypt (SYPE) showed that more than five times as many females (22.1%) have never at-tended school in rural Upper Egypt (CESR 2013) than males (4%). The majority of girls not enrolled in schools lived in rural settings. According to the SYPE findings, girls from rural areas formed 80.4% of the girls who did not attend school at all. Moreover, only 72% of rural women gave birth with the assistance of qualified health professionals as compared to 90% of urban women (DHS 2008). Female participation is limited in self-employment and micro and small enterprise ownership. Only 18% of Egyptian women are involved micro and small enterprises. Informal employment is dominated by women from rural Egypt, where 93% of the 1.1 million women working in the informal sector reside in rural areas (UNDP 2012). Furthermore, 71.6% of women working in rural areas are engaged in informal sector work as compared to 13% in urban areas (Ezzat 2012). Near 70% of rural women working informally are employed by unpaid family businesses compared to 58.6% of urban women. Finally, while 8.7% of Egyptian women enjoy paid positions in urban areas, only 3.2% of women in rural areas receive pay for their work. (Ezzat 2012).

2 Egypt has made significant progress in the fields of primary and secondary education; however, technical education re-

mains a real challenge for girls and is a contributing factor to their lack of success in the labour market (USAID 2010). 3 The GII captures the loss of achievement due to gender inequality in three dimensions: reproductive health, empower-

ment and labour market participation. The higher the GII value the greater the discrimination. 4 0= low discrimination 1= high discrimination


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3.2 Traditional understanding of gender roles

Egyptian society largely subscribes to the notion that men and women should have distinct roles. Egypt's new 2013 constitution, approved in January 2014, emphasizes, the equality between women and men in “civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights in accord-ance with the principles of the Constitution" in Article 11. Article 53, emphasizes principles of equal protection and the equality of all citizens irrespective of factors like “religion, creed, sex, origin, race, color, language, disability, social status, political affiliation, or geographical identity”. Despite Article 52’s strong declarations on equality, Article 11, refers to the State's role in harmonizing women's family duties with their work, which is seen to imply that child rearing and domestic responsibility are the sole burden of women not shared by men. This reaffirms Egypt’s traditional definition of the family that has historically put the burden on women and marginalized men from the child-rearing process. Although the realities of Egyptian women may contradict traditional gender norms, women are still generally defined as dependants, and are expected to be subordinate to men. Reproduction and childcare are generally seen as womens’ primary responsibilities. Particularly during times of high unemployment, there is an implicit understanding that women should stay at home, ceding their places in the labour force to men, especially in the private sector (ETF 2009). Women generally do not enjoy the freedom to make independent decisions about their general or reproductive health. Social norms and values often give husbands and other family members the right to interfere in such decisions and coerce women into conforming to certain patterns of behavior (Tadros 2010). These gender perceptions affect decisions regarding access to and control over economic resources, par-ticularly as related to investments in children’s health and schooling; the physical mobility and the labour-force participation of women; and the reproductive behavior and the family relationships (Mensch 2003). In rural areas in Upper Egypt, where traditional values are adhered to more closely than in urban areas and in Lower Egypt, boys’ education is generally prioritised over girls’. Boys are expected to seek paid employment and provide for their parents and their families, while girls are expected to take care of their home and their family. While women do participate actively in some community affairs, they mostly participate in gender segregated areas. This is seen as a way to preserve a woman’s modesty, and therefore, the family’s honour. Because of this strict prescription of social roles, girls and women do not have the same life opportunities as boys and men. Girls are less likely to stay in school and are often married at a young age. Girls generally have fewer chances to participate in sports, social and community activities within the public domain and have a smaller number of options for paid employment (Save the Children 2012).


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3.3 Gender in Politics

Aspect

Political programmes and strate-gies

Egypt ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1981. It placed reservations on Arti-cle 9(2), regarding the right of women to pass citizenship to their children. Article 16, related to equality within marriage. Article 29(2), addressed the resolution of disputes related to the conven-tion, and Article 2, called for the implementation of policies designed to eliminate gender discrimina-tion on the grounds that, in some cases, this could violate Shari'a. The reservation to Article 9(2) was lifted in 2008 after the nationality law was amend-ed to allow women to transfer citizenship to their children. However, the other reservations remain.

The new 2013 Constitution approved in January 2014, states in Article 11, in what is seen by some women's groups as a paradigm shift, that the state commits to protect women from all forms of vio-lence. The constitution stipulates for the first time ever, that the state is committed to women holding public and senior management offices as well as offices in judicial bodies and authorities without discrimination. It also ensures equality between women and men in “civil, political, economic, so-cial, and cultural rights in accordance with the principles of the Constitution". Overall, the new constitution is seen to provide greater guarantees for women's fundamental rights and personal freedoms, especially compared to the 2012 con-stitution. The 2012 constitution, approved by a predominantly Islamist Constituent Assembly, raised serious concerns that it would not only im-pede women from accessing greater rights, but could even end up reversing gains and overturn-ing laws that protected women and children. Women’s groups' demands for a parliamentary quota for women in the amended constitution did not materialize, but Article 180 allocated a quarter of local council seats to women, which is seen as an important step on the road to women’s political participation. Another important step is Article 93 which approves the state’s commitment to the International Conventions and Charters on Human Rights. Article 6, denotes equal citizenship, by granting Egyptian women married to foreigners the right to transfer their nationality to their offspring, a right women's organizations have long fought for.

Article 53 criminalizes discrimination on the basis


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of religion, belief, gender, origin, race, colour, language, disability, social status, political affiliation, geographical location or any other reason, and obliges the state to eliminate all forms of discrimination. Additionally, the law regulates the establishment of an independent commission for this purpose, which has been a long standing demand of rights groups and CSOs.

The National Council for Women (NCW), estab-lished in 2000, is Egypt's national women's machinery mandated "to propose public policy matters for society and its constitutional institutions on development and empowerment of women to enable them to play their economic role, and to integrate their efforts in comprehensive development programmes." NCW is also mandated to advise on draft laws and de-crees related to women, to monitor and evaluate the implementation of governmental policies and laws pertaining to women, to draft a National Plan for the advancement of women, to advise on agreements relating to women and to represent women in international fora. The NCW has also been responsible since 2002, for mainstreaming gender in Egypt's five year national development plans. The NCW has played a key role in introduc-ing important legislative reforms in areas related to women’s political participation such as the quo-ta law, personal status laws like the khul’ (no-fault divorce) law, the nationality law. The NCW has also successfully lobbied for a law against sexual harassment.

During Morsi's tenure, the NCW was under threat of being side-lined when it was accused by Islam-ist groups of implementing a foreign agenda. Is-lamists said the NCW aimed to destroy the family and society, and called for replacing it by a na-tional organization for the family. However, under the new 2013 Constitution, National Councils (in-cluding the NCW) have been included for the first time under a specific article (Article 214) which underlines their independence and neutrality. Un-der the Morsi regime, NCW issued strong and unequivocal statements against sexual violence and FGM among other issues and sharply criti-cized the MB's stance on the UN's declaration on violence against women. Since the ousting of president Morsi, the NCW has continued to play an important role, in cooperation with women's groups, fighting women's rights in the 2013 Con-stitution. However, some women's groups have been critical that the NCW has not been sufficient-ly impartial in the post June 30 period. These


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women’s groups demand that NCW concentrate on women's conditions, regardless of their political affiliation, and work to issue policies that enhance general rights and freedoms, for women, in partic-ular (Nazra 2013).

Rule of Law and Access to Justice

Women in Egypt have made great strides in ad-dressing discriminatory laws. The country's per-sonal status legislation, which had been a source of gender discrimination since its inception in the 1920s, has undergone reform, especially, with respect to, its procedural elements. In 2000, amendments were introduced to the law granting women ‘Khul’ or no-fault divorce, where women exchange their financial rights – forgoing alimony and returning their dowry – for a divorce. The cus-tody of their children was extended to 15 years of age after it had been 7 years for boys and 9 years for girls. In 2008, amendments to the child law included crucial steps toward gender equality, such as, an increase in the minimum age of mar-riage to 18 and the criminalization of female geni-tal mutilation (FGM). In 2000, the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) ruled that women no longer needed the permis-sion of their husbands or fathers to obtain pass-ports and travel. In 2004, one of the main de-mands of women's rights groups was finally met, when changes were introduced to the nationality law that would enable Egyptian women married to foreign men to pass on their nationality to their children. In 2008, the Supreme Judicial Council allowed women to become judges and sit on the bench for the first time in the country's history. Despite these advances, gender discrimination remains widespread in the legal system with many obstacles preventing equal access to justice. Dis-crimination against women with respect to funda-mental rights is one of the main factors5 contrib-uting to Egypt's low rank (89 out of 97), in the World Justice Project (WJP) Rule of Law Index 2012 -2013. The penal code offers lenient sentences for men convicted of committing honour killings, while the crime of adultery is defined differently for male and female perpetrators. Despite reforms in the personal status law, which regulates issues in-cluding marriage, divorce, and child custody, the law is believed to discriminate against women and to deny women many of the rights protected under

5 Other factors include discrimination against minorities and violations to freedom of religion, privacy

and due process.


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International Human Rights law (Tadros 2010). Personal status laws have been the most resistant to change, because in Egypt, “women are per-ceived as the bearers and perpetuators of cultural values and social mores,” which “increases the resistance to any change in their status or the laws that govern their lives” (Guenena & Wassef 1999). What’s more, due to conservative interpre-tations of Shari'a (Islamic law), a woman's testi-mony in family courts is considered to be half that of a man's (Tadros 2010). Even the reforms that have been passed in recent years could be undermined in practice by en-trenched societal norms and a lack of effective enforcement mechanisms. For example, FGM is illegal, but it is still widely practiced, particularly in rural areas. During the Morsi’s presidency, conservative groups and MPs attempted to reverse family laws, as well as, the law criminalizing FGM. Currently, there has been a greater movement to enforce the law.

Political Participation

Conservative social frameworks discourage wom-en's participation in the public space as it is seen to be a man’s domain. Out of 136 countries, Egypt's ranking in terms of women's political em-powerment is very low at 128 (GGG 2013). Wom-en were granted the right to vote and run for elec-tions in 1956. The electoral law was amended in 1979, setting a quota of 30 seats in parliament for women. However, this quota was revoked in 1986 as it was deemed unconstitutional due to its gen-der-based discrimination. In June 2009, the par-liament passed legislation establishing a quota system for women in the People's Assembly per-mitting the allocation of additional seats (64 seats) for women. However, this again was revoked fol-lowing the Jan 25th uprising. Although women groups' demanded a parliamentary quota for women in the new 2013 constitution, this did not happen. Instead, Article 180 allocated a quarter of local council seats to women. The post Jan 25 uprising period witnessed a con-siderable increase in the political participation and activism of women in the public sphere, whether as demonstrators or as candidates for parliamen-tary elections or as voters waiting in long lines to cast their votes. In 2012 alone, women organized over 50 rallies and protest marches related to women's rights or other national issues (ECWR 2013). Large numbers of women also participated in demonstrations which ultimately led to the over-throw of former President Morsi. The number of


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female candidates in Egypt's first parliamentary elections after the revolution in 2011 was unprec-edented and was the largest since women were given the vote in 1956. In 2011, 984 candidates were women, compared to only 404 women can-didates in the 2010 elections and 133 in the 2005 elections (ECWR 2013). These advances however, have not been reflect-ed in women's representation in parliament. Women's sat in only 2% of parliamentary seats following the 2011 elections, down from 12% in 2010. This decrease came as a result of abolish-ing the female quota in parliament. Moreover, women have largely been excluded from post-revolution cabinets, and have not exceeded 1-4 female ministers, despite the fact that Egyptian women have acted as cabinet ministers since 1962. Women have also remained excluded from posi-tions, such as state governor, head of syndicates or president of a university, which are largely seen as strictly male territory. However, in December 2013 Mona Mina, a prominent figure in the Janu-ary 25 uprising, a fierce campaigner for doctors’ rights and improved healthcare and a founding member of Doctors without Rights, was elected as Secretary General of the Doctors Syndicate. In Feb-

ruary 2014, Hala Shukrallah, another longtime activist, was elected as head of the Dostour Party, becoming the first woman to lead a major political party in Egypt. Women make up only 11% of legislators, sen-ior officials, managers which has caused Egypt to drop in rank from 99 to 101 out of 114 countries (GGG 2013). Although the portion of women in leading government positions has increased from 7.3% in 1988 to 24.1% in 2008, their share in leading positions is still modest compared to their male counterparts. Moreover, the larger portion of this percentage falls within the grade of director general (the lowest position in the governmental hierarchy) at 26%, while the portion of women in top positions, such as ministers and deputy minis-ters in 2008 was 2.5 % and 18% respectively (CAPMAS). Women’s representation in local popular coun-cils has been improving from 2% in 2002 to 6% in 2007, but is still considered low. In 2008, the first female marriage registrar was appointed, de-spite severe challenges from conservative Islamic jurists. In 2003, the first woman in Egypt was


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appointed as judge of the SCC, a precedent that paved the way for the appointment of 30 other female Egyptian judges. While the new 2013 Constitution stipulates the State’s commitment to the appointment of women in judicial bodies and

authorities, the State Council HAS refused to ac-

cept job applications from female graduates. The State Council justified itself using Sharia law and accused the President of the National Council of Women (NCW) who had condemned this refusal, as being in violation of Article 11 of the new con-stitution, of "blatant interference in the affairs of State Council judges, which represents a crime under Article 184 of the new constitution". These actions reflect the challenges that confront wom-en's participation and representation in a society still governed by conservative social and religious norms.

Civil Society Engagement

Women's organizations and NGOs, particularly those that are rights-based, have played an im-portant role over the past few decades in raising awareness concerning women's rights and com-bating forms of gender discrimination. They have lobbied and have exerted serious efforts towards the enactment of more equitable legislation for women during the past three decades. A plethora of NGOs, women's organisations, informal groups and coalitions were formed after the uprising and they continue to play an important role in defend-ing women's rights and responding to those who seek to revoke these rights. Most recently, groups have campaigned against the increasing sexual harassment of women and have called for a law on harassment, which would augment the ac-countability of perpetrators.


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3.4 Gender Equality at the Level of the Family

Aspect

Life expectancy and health

According to the Global Gender Gap (GGG), in 2013 Egypt ranked 51 (up from 53 in 2012) out of 136 countries in health and survival. The rank-ing assessed differences between women's and men's health and gave a score of 0.9768 indicat-ing Egypt has closed 97% of its gender gap. The EDHS 2008 shows that progress has been made in a number of reproductive health indicators. There has been an increase in the proportion of women receiving prenatal care, from 70% in 2005 to 74% in 2008 (although the percentage is still below the MENA rate of 85% )(WDI 2012). Skilled birth attendance has also risen from 37% in 1990 to 79% in 2010 compared to 81% for the MENA region. Finally, maternal mortality rates indicate that Egypt has succeeded in decreasing ,mortality from 84 per 100,00 live births in 2000 to 66 per 100,000 in 2010 (WDI 2013 and GGG 2013) On the other hand, Egypt ranked a low 65 out of 80 less developed countries in the Mother's Index - which evaluates the status of women's health, nutrition, education, economic well-being and po-litical participation - in the State of the World's Mothers (SWM 2012). Women living in rural areas have much less ac-cess to health services, including reproductive health services, and over half the Egyptian popu-lation still lives in rural areas. Just 72% of rural women are tended to by a qualified health profes-sional during birth, compared to 90% of urban women. The disparities are particularly visible in Upper Egypt’s rural areas, where just 59% of women receive appropriate health care during childbirth. This is an indication that class, more than gender, is the main determining factor in ac-cess to health care, as soaring poverty rates, es-pecially in rural Upper Egypt, lead many women to prioritize the health of their children over their own (Tadros 2010). Data in Egypt has indicated that a large proportion of women may have problems accessing health and family planning services due to a lack of fi-nancial resources (EDHS 2008). Moreover, wom-en often do not have the autonomy to take deci-sions regarding their general or reproductive health. Social norms and values often give hus-bands and other family members the right to inter-


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fere in such decisions and coerce women into conforming to certain patterns of behaviour. Women are often pressured to have children im-mediately after marriage, and to continue having children until they give birth to a boy (Tadros 2010). Reports indicate gender inequality in health care and treatment. Girls in poor families are more like-ly to suffer from malnutrition and be victims of infant and child mortality, a result of gender dis-crimination in the family. Egyptian boys are more likely than girls to be taken to a medical provider or to be given antibiotics for an acute respiratory infection or for pneumonia (CESR 2009). In Egypt, for example, girls born in rural areas to mothers who have little or no education are especially at risk. For girls whose mothers have less than a primary school education, the mortality rate among infants and children under age 5 is almost twice the rate for boys. In comparison, the rate for girls of mothers who have a secondary or higher level of education is 80 percent of the rate of boys (World Bank 2004).

Labor migration

Egypt is considered one of the top countries in terms of emigration. In 2005, Egypt ranked, number 12 in world emigration, with 2.4 million migrants (Ghoneim 2010). Migration is largely male dominated and temporary in nature. Research in Egypt has shown that in two thirds of households with male migrants, women became the head of the family after their husbands left and made important decisions relating to the welfare and maintenance of the household. However, this de facto empowerment is reversed upon the return of the husband. Not only is the ability to make decisions on the part of the wife reversed when the husband returns, it is even reduced compared to households that never experienced migration. It has also been found that attitudes about gender roles are more socially conservative in households that have experienced migration than among those that have not. These results should be interpreted in light of the dominant pat-tern of migration from Egypt to more socially con-servative societies like Saudi Arabia and Libya, where migrants are often influenced by the cultur-al norms of the host country. The results could also be explained by husbands asserting the male prerogative after a period of absence (Assad 2010). For these households, remittances represent an


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important source of income. In some cases, remittances can account for 43% of total family income. Almost 50% of wives decide independently on how to spend the money they receive. Other women decide with their husbands through mutal consultation, and thereby retain some autonomy in deciding how to use remittances. Only in 11% of cases were wives excluded entirely from the decsion making process (IOM n.d.). Another study has indicated a decrease in women's paid employment in both rural and urban areas as a result of migration and remittances. In fact, women who live in rural areas and are part of migrant-households are much more likely to be employed in non-wage activities (i.e. unpaid family work) and subsistence work compared to women in non-migrant households. Furthermore, this labor supply response is driven by the households’ need to replace the migrant's labor. Households where a member has migrated but does not send back remittances experience an increase in labor supply as the remaining adults strive to make up for the migrant member’s lost income. Thus women who shift to non-wage work may lose access to and control over income (Binzel & Assaad 2011)

Gender-based violence

With respect to domestic violence, Egypt's De-mographic Health Survey (EDHS 2005)6 indicated that about 50% of married or previously married women have experienced violence at some point since the age of fifteen, the main perpetrators being the husbands and to a lesser extent moth-ers, fathers and brothers. About 36% of married or previously married wom-en have experienced some form of spousal vio-lence whether emotional, physical and/or sexual (EDHS 2005). Other national survey findings indi-cate that 62.6% of married women reported psy-chological violence, while 17% reported having been forced into sexual relations (NCW 2009). This violence is further exacerbated by the low level of awareness of rights among women, and by their acceptance of violence. The 2008 DHS illustrates that 39% of married women believe that their husbands are justified in beating them. A common social practice that severely harms women in Egypt is Female Genital Mutilation (FGM). It is estimated that 91% of all women

6 The Egypt Demographic Health Survey is based on a nationally representative sample of ever-married women

age 15-49


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aged 15-49 have been circumcised. However, there is evidence that the practice may be declin-ing, where rates among women under the age of 25 (>80%) are lower than rates in the 25-49 age groups (94-96%) (EDHS 2008). In June of 2008, the Egyptian Parliament agreed to criminalize FGM in Article 242 of the Penal Code. Nevertheless, under Morsi, ultra conserva-tives attempted to revoke the law, citing religious traditions to decriminalize FGM. In the end, Egypt's Constitutional Court struck down the ap-peal in February 2013. Following the expulsion of Morsi, the current interim government has moved to enforce the anti-FGM law. For the first time in Egypt’s history a doctor will stand trial on charges of FGM after a 13-year-old girl died following an alleged operation in his clinic in June 2013 Egypt has been witnessing a steady increase in the age at which women marry. The current median age of marriage among women is 21.2 years (EDHS2008). Forced or temporary marriag-es however, constitute a serious problem in Egypt. Early marriage may be favoured as a result of cultural values or traditions. Women may be mar-ried young by their families because of social pressure, greater fertility, economic reasons, but most often to protect the young woman’s virtue (WHO 2007). It is estimated that 14% of women aged 15-19 years of age have been married early (GGG 2013). Early marriage is occurs most often most in rural and less educated communities. Eleven per cent of married women in rural areas were married before the age of 16, and 30% be-fore the age of 18. Early marriage is even more pronounced in rural Upper Egypt, where 15% of married women were married before the age of 16, and 38% before the age of 18 (SYPE 2010). Early marriage is more prevalent in impoverished rural areas and may take the form of human traf-ficking. Studies have revealed the forced nature of marriages involving girls between the ages of 14-18 years to men 10 to 60 years their senior. Thirty per cent of these marriages involve men from the Arabian Gulf region in what have become known as "summer" or "tourist" marriages (NCSR 2010). Children involved in these temporary mar-riages are subjected to both sexual servitude and forced labour at the hands of their “husbands”


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(TIP 2013). Egypt's new 2013 Constitution is an improvement over the 2012 Constitution particularly in its inclu-sion of a definition of a child. A child is defined as any person under 18 years of age and Article 80 obliges the state to ensure children’s protection against all forms of violence (including sexual vio-lence). Article 89 puts an explicit ban on human trafficking and all forms of slavery and sex trade. Despite this however, some critics have pointed out that the article fails to set a minimum age for marriage. The United States Department 2013 Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP 2013) has indicated that Egypt is an origin, transit, and destination country for women and children subjected to conditions of forced labour and sex trafficking. Some of Egypt’s estimated 200,000 to one million street children—both boys and girls—are subjected to sex trafficking and forced begging. Child sex tour-ism—the commercial sexual exploitation of chil-dren by foreign tourists—occurs in Egypt, particu-larly in Cairo, Alexandria, and Luxor. A national study also indicated that 40% of individuals con-victed of prostitution were recruited through coer-cion or fraud or rape (NCSR 2010). Women are also victim of honour crimes. Alt-hough it is hard to find accurate statistics in Egypt since many crimes go unreported, studies have indicated that 10% of crimes committed in Egypt in 1999 were honour related crimes (Salah El Din 2006) and that 79% of honour killings were based on suspicion (Khafagy 2005). Patriarchal control over women, rising social and religious conserva-tism, and the tribal system that remains prevalent in rural areas and among urban people of rural origin, are factors that contribute to honour crimes (Tadros 2010). Moreover, legislation and the judi-ciary system have helped perpetuate this form of violence through the laxity shown to the perpetra-tors. Community or social violence against women has become increasingly prevalent in Egypt, the most common of which is sexual harassment, sexual assault and rape. The latter two are more difficult to monitor since they often go underre-ported due to the social stigma of the "violated woman". Experience has indicated that sexual violence is the only crime in which the victim is usually more stigmatized than the perpetrator. Women who report such crimes are often


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shunned by their families and communities. In the case of Egypt, less than 10% of all acts of sexual violence are reported, which is one of the lowest rates globally (WWR 2011). Sexual harassment, whether verbal or physical, has become increas-ingly prevalent in Egyptian public spaces (i.e. streets, work place, and public transportation). A study on sexual harassment in Egypt indicated that 83% of women surveyed had been harassed by men. At the same time, 62.4% of the male au-dience surveyed confirmed that they had engaged in and/or continue to engage in one or more of the forms of harassment (ECWR 2008). A recent 2013 report by UN Women concluded that 99.3% of Egyptian women have experienced some form of sexual harassment. The study indi-cates that 96.5% of women surveyed said that sexual harassment came in the form of touching, which was the most common manifestation of sexual harassment. Verbal harassment was the second most common form of harassment experi-enced. Researchers in Egypt have also estimated that as many as 98% of rape and sexual assault cases are not reported to authorities due to the social stigma of the "violated woman". However, 13% of respondents to a survey reported knowing cases of a female who was raped while 9% reported knowing cases of females sexually molested (NCW 2009). Sexual harassment and assault in public places is a long-standing and systemic problem in Egypt. For several years, national and international or-ganizations have been labeling it an “epidemic”. Such violence is generally met with complete im-punity, contributing to a climate of tolerance (FIDH 2014). In many cases, police officers usually fail to intervene. 93% of women interviewed in the 2013 UN Women study said that their requests for help from police officers at the scene of harass-ment were unanswered. The post January 25, 2011 period witnessed in-creased levels of gender based violence against women, especially sexual harassment and vio-lence which has been seen as a serious threat to women's access to public spaces and participa-tion. A report published in April 2013 by feminists and human rights groups (FIDH 2014) presents over 250 cases that took place between Novem-ber 2012 and January 2014 in which women pro-testers were sexually assaulted and in some cas-


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es raped by mobs of men. The report stresses that no perpetrators were brought to justice con-tributing to the repetition of these crimes and so-cial tolerance of VAW. A study has also indicated how the deep polarization in society that started during Morsi's tenure and intensified following his ouster has led to increased violence, including sexual harassment. Women are judged by their outward appearance and dress, and are often harassed if they aren’t considered to dress or be-have modestly enough (NAZRA 2013).

The issue of sexual assaults and gender-based violence has gained greater media attention with greater pressure from numerous movements, po-litical groups, women's rights groups and from individuals condemning this violence and vowing to take legal and social stands against the perpe-trators. Women’s groups, NGOs and citizen’s ini-tiatives such as ECWR, Task Force for Combating Sexual Violence, OpAnti-SH (Operation Anti Sex-ual Harassment) Harassmap, Shoft Taharosh (I saw Harassment) among others have played an important role in highlighting the issue. The NCW had prepared a draft law on violence against women under the Morsi regime that was set to be adopted by Parliament. In May 2013, the Ministry of Interior created a violence-against-women department which includes women psy-chologists, psychiatrists, neurologists, and police officers (ECESR 2013). The former Morsi government had formed an initi-ative to support Egyptian women’s rights and freedoms. The initiative discussed issues includ-ing sexual harassment and women’s social and economic rights. The initiative failed to produce results and this has been blamed vague and non-binding recommendations, restrictive terms, and focusing on Egyptian “cultural specificity” without defining what it is (ECESR 2013). The absence of legislation criminalizing sexual harassment and inadequate legal definitions of the various forms of sexual assault has created confusion as to the type and gravity of the offence (FIDH 2014).

In January 2014, a significant step towards fighting violence against women was taken through the adoption of Article 11 in the new Con-stitution. In March 2014, a new anti-sexual har-assment legislation drafted by the NCW was submitted to Cabinet following a highly publicized incident where a female student at Cairo University was sexually attacked by tens of her


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colleagues. The new draft legislation provides, for the first time in Egypt, a definition of sexual harassment with punishments that include fines and prison terms. However, some women groups and activists have been critical of the law for not being comprehensive enough in covering all forms of sexual harassment, assualt and rape. Critics called for a national strategy to combat VAW that brings together human rights groups, women's groups, relevant government bodies, national councils and ministries.

Egypt's interim President Adly Mansour approved a new anti-sexual harassment law. The law imposes jail terms of no less than six months and/or fines of LE3,000 to LE5,000 ($419 to 700) on those who are found guilty of sexual harassment in public or private areas, with harassment defined as gestures or words or any modern means of communication, or any other action that carries sexual or pornographic hints. If the harasser continues the action, essentially stalking the woman, before they are apprehended then he will be punished with no less than one year in jail and a fine from LE5,000 to LE10,000. In case the offense is repeated over time, the maximum penalties of imprisonment and fines are doubled. Another amendment of the law states a punishment of one year in jail and a fine of LE10,000 to LE20,000 for soliciting sexual conduct. Even stricter penalties will be imposed on those who use their authority in settings of family, work or education to commit sexual harassment, who will face a jail sentence of two to five years in jail and a fine of LE20,000 to LE50,000. The same penalty applies to harassment conducted by two persons or more, or under the threat of a weapon.

3.5 Gender in education and the economy

Aspect

Education

There has been marked progress in education indices in Egypt where the gender gap in educa-tion has been closing, with 96 girls for every 100 boys enrolled in primary schools in 2010, a signifi-cant improvement over the 66 girls for every 100 boys in 1975 and 68 in 1980 (World Bank Statis-tics). Literacy among young women 15-24 has also im-proved, rising from an average of 54% (1985-94) to 82% (2005-2010) but is still behind the 88% literacy rate for male youth (2005-2010). The fe-


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male literacy rate is also below MENA rates. Egypt has the second highest rate of female youth illiter-acy among lower-middle-income countries in the MENA region, at 20%. The literacy rate among adult women was 66% compared to 82 % of for adult men (GGG2013). Women are still far more likely than men to have no schooling, and the disparities are much wider in rural areas than in urban. 28.2% of females aged six and over have had no education compared to 14.9% of males (DHS 2008). Illiteracy rates among young women in Upper Egypt are 24%, twice the rate of their male counterparts. Poverty remains a major barrier to schooling. When poor parents need to make a choice about which of their children to send to school, girls tend to be excluded. A lack of nearby schools and the conservative nature of societies in rural Upper Egypt are the main factors for the low female en-rolment rates in secondary education. In rural Egypt, early marriage also constitutes a problem for women’s education, despite the fact that the minimum age for marriage has been increased to 18 years (ETF 2009). In tertiary education, female enrolment tends to be concentrated in the fields of study that are tradi-tionally considered appropriate for girls (such as the arts, humanities, home economics and nurs-ing), while their representation in natural scienc-es, engineering, computer sciences and medicine is relatively low (ETF 2009).

Participation in economic life

Today more women now hold jobs than ever be-fore, and female unemployment figures have de-creased. Despite these advances, women remain significantly underrepresented in the labour force. Cultural barriers, such as the identification of women as mothers and wives, as well as, labour market barriers, impede a large fraction of women in Egypt to achieve employment, even if it is de-sired. Thus, even though women's participation rates have risen from 18.48% to 24% during the period 1994-2004 (Euromed 2006) and are now 25% compared to 78% for males (GGG 2013), Egypt has one of the lowest female labour participation rates in the world and ranks a dismal 130 out of 136 countries (GGG 2013). The share of women in non-agricultural employment is 18% compared to a rate of 20% in Arab countries which is already among the lowest in the development world (UNDP 2011).


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The female unemployment of 23% is four times that of the male unemployment of 5% (GGG 2013). Female youth unemployment (15-24 years of age) was 48% compared to a 17% unemploy-ment rate among young men. This compares to a general MENA rate for female youth unemploy-ment of 36% of the female labour force (WDI 2012). Almost 82% of non-studying female youth are out of the labour force, compared with only 13.6% of nonstudent male youth. The fact that 59% are married, may account for their absence from the labour force. The remaining 41% face barriers to labour force participation such as lower mobility and restricted movement fewer network-ing opportunities that can help find jobs, poor working conditions and discrimination in the pri-vate sector (Sieverding 2012). The hiring freeze in the government and public sector, traditionally major employers of women, has also contributed to increased female unemployment. A large proportion of women, approximately 29% in 2010 of the total female labor force, are en-gaged in unpaid family work. This percentage is much higher than the corresponding percentage of male workers in unpaid family work (6.4%). On the other hand, the percentage of males as employers (17.58%) far exceeds women employ-ers, which represents only 3.12% of total female employment (SRC). Data also indicate that women in rural areas have a higher chance of working in unpaid family-run operations, where 71.1% of women workers in the informal sector in the coun-tryside are employed in unpaid family businesses versus 58.6% of city women (Ezzat 2012). Difficulties in finding employment in government or the private sector have pushed women to become self-employed, many informally. However, be-cause they lack the necessary skills, experience and connections or finance, they usually end up working in marginal retail micro-trades or service activities (EUROMED 2006).

Professional development and career

Gender segmentation has been a longstanding characteristic of the Egyptian labor market where occupational segregation limits choices for women and constitutes an obstacle for equality of oppor-tunity. Women are squeezed in a limited number of occupations in the lowest as well as the high-est level of the occupational ladder. In 2010 about 43% of female workers were employed in farming, fishing and hunting occupations. About 23% of


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women were employed in professional occupa-tions, and 14% were employed as technicians and professional assistants (SRC) (GET 2013). In both 1998 and 2012 more than half of employed wom-en worked in health and social work, education, or public administration (Assaad & Kraft 2013). However, women's contribution remains low in some occupations where it represents only 2.27% in production and 3.91% in legislature, administra-tive and managerial occupations. (SRC). The number of women in leadership positions has re-mained very low. Women only sit on 7% of boards and hold only 34% participation in ownership of companies (GGG 2013). The public sector has traditionally absorbed an important part of female graduates. In the early 1980s, more than 80% of secondary and higher educated females obtained their first job in the public sector (Assaad & Kraft 2013). The public sector has remained the sector of preference for females because of the availability of social securi-ty schemes and equal opportunities. Currently, 37% of employed female youth work in the public sector, compared to only 10% of employed male youth (Sieverding 2012). However, privatization and economic reform pro-grammes that began in the 1970s led to a shrink-ing of the public sector and diminished the role of government as an employer. This has resulted in a large number of women losing their jobs, and at the same time not finding appropriate alternative employment in the formal private sector. With the decline in public sector jobs, the number of infor-mal private sector jobs increased. Informal pri-vate sector jobs involve a higher level of job inse-curity and an absence of social protection measures such as maternity leave and social in-surance. Informal jobs also allow for the persis-tence of traditional gender divisions of labour, in which women are compelled to seek forms of work that are compatible with their traditional domestic role. The share of vulnerable employment for fe-males (% of female employment) is estimated at 45% in 2010 (WDI 2014 ).

Balance between work and family

A study establishes that among those employed in 1998, women were much more likely to have left the workforce by 2006, and to a greater extent if they were working in a non-government job. It also indicates that women working in the government are significantly less likely to perceive a conflict between married life and work, which suggest that


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they are less likely to stop working after marriage (World Bank 2010). Relative to those whose mari-tal status remained the same in 1998 and 2006, marriage reduced labor force participation by 28 percentage points among private sector employ-ees, and only 6 percentage points among public sector employees. The study results suggest that among the reasons women are more likely to leave private jobs after marriage is that such jobs are less flexible in ac-commodating the needs of married women, espe-cially regarding child care. It has been asserted that work in the public sector is more compatible with women’s “reproductive role”, offering “shorter hours, more access to childcare, and greater tol-

erance for maternity leave” (World Bank 2010). Egypt’s maternity leave policy compares favorably to international standards in its generosity to work-ing mothers, mandating paid maternity leave of up to three months and requiring large employers to provide a nursery for childcare. However, studies have indicated that as many as 86% of public sec-tor workers who had a baby while working were given paid maternity leave of at least six weeks, in contrast to only 47% of those working in the formal private sector. Data from the recently concluded Survey of Young People in Egypt show that the public sector ap-pears to be particularly attractive to married fe-male youth who are working, 52% of whom are in this sector. The percentage of working women aged 15-29 years who complain of long working hours is significantly higher in the private sector (50% versus 32% in the public sector) (Sieverding 2012).

Remuneration

The majority of women working in Egypt suffer from discrimination in wage, receiving less than their male counterparts. Wage discrimination oc-curs in the majority of professions but especially in economic sectors run by the private sector. In 2006, the median wage of women working in the formal private sector in Egypt was 24% lower than that of their male counterparts. This gender wage gap was even larger—at almost 50%—in informal sector jobs (WB 2010). Official statistics for aver-age monetary compensation in all sectors (private, public, public business), indicate a wage gap of 20.3% in favor of men (Ezzat 2012), while the GGG 2013 indicates a gap of 23%. A study indi-cated that among women and men who came from similar areas with similar experiences, illit-erate women earned about 70% less than illit-


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erate men, while college educated women earned 57 % less than their male counterparts (World Bank 2010). Meanwhile, Egypt has a very low rank of 126 out of 134 countries with respect to the female to male earned income ratio (GGG 2013) 7, indicating women earn 74% less than males.

Equal treatment at work

The Egyptian government has enacted a number of laws guaranteeing equal treatment of men and women in the workplace, such as mandated equal pay for equal work, and gender-neutral regulation of working hours in the private sector. In addition, it has passed laws intended to increase the com-patibility between work and family life, through maximizing maternity leave and requiring firms with more than 100 female workers to provide nursery facilities. In the private sector, women face barriers to em-ployment and forms of discrimination such as mal-treatment by employers, long working hours and heavy workloads (Sieverding 2012). Employers prefer to hire men over women to avoid having to respect the legal rights of female employees like childcare, maternity leave and protection against sexual harassment (SYPE 2010). Despite gov-ernmental protection of women’s rights in the workplace, laws are not being enforced. There appears to be no overarching state policy on end-ing discriminatory practices (ECESR 2013). La-bour laws even bar women from certain types of jobs (e.g. bakeries, bars…) and from working at night except under certain circumstances and in certain sectors.

Entrepreneurship

Helping women start their businesses and become employers rather than job seekers has been rec-ognized as a crucial strategy for improving wom-en’s economic participation in Egypt. Running one’s own business can make it far easier for women to achieve a balance between work and marital life. Sadly, entrepreneurship among Egyp-tian women has progressed little beyond self-employment. Only 3% of Egyptian women working in the non-farm sector report being an ‘employer’ while the figure for men is 10%. Difficulties in find-ing employment with the government or in the pri-vate sector have pushed women to become self-employed. However, because they lack the nec-essary skills, experience and connections or fi-nance, women usually end up working in marginal retail micro-trades or service activities (EUROMED 2006).

7 For estimated earned income, the maximum value is 40,000 US dollars; this is the benchmark used in the

calculation of the Index.


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The Gender Global Entrepreneurship and Devel-opment Index (GEDI 2013), a 17-country pilot analysis of the conditions that foster high-potential female entrepreneurship8, ranked Egypt 15 among the 17 countries with a low score of 34 out of the 100 point scale. Access to higher education is considered the foundation for high potential female entrepreneur-ship while managerial experience provides women with additional skills, experience and networks that facilitate female entrepreneurship success. How-ever, the pool of female managers in Egypt is very small at 11% (GEDI 2013). Moreover, the inverse relationship between educational attainment and formality is more defined form women than for men. As a woman becomes more educated, the probability of her registering her business increas-es (EUROMED 2006). Data indicates that about 25% of female entrepre-neurs are either widowed or divorced, meaning they may have to entirely support themselves and their children (EUROMED 2006). This may reflect the phenomenon of women headed households in Egypt. Estimates of their magnitude vary signifi-cantly where some official studies indicate that they represent 23% of Egyptian households while other studies give estimates between 16% and 22%. Female-led households might even reach 25% in poorer segments of society, where a large number of these women are illiterate. Studies and field surveys by several civil society organizations estimate that women-headed families in Egypt range between 30% and 40% and no less than 75% inside slums (Ezzat 2012). Women are viewed as key beneficiaries for NGOs-Microfinance Institutions (MFIs). Approximately 55% of the microcredit borrowers in Egypt are women (Mix 2013). They are often responsible for the well-being of the family, and thus seen as a conduit for conferring income and consumption, able to disperse benefits to the greatest number of people. Facilitation of access to finance supports female economic empowerment as it creates op-portunities for business expansion and productive investment at the household level, bypassing many socio-economic barriers that prevent women from participating in the formal economy. There-

8 The Gender GEDI captures the interaction between five factors or layers: Institutional Foundations, Gendered

Institutions, Gendered Access to Resources, Entrepreneurship Culture, High Potential Female Entrepreneurship Characteristics


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fore, enhancing women’s access to finance and providing them with equal opportunities is crucial (WB 2013). While access to finance is reported as a major constraint by both male and female entrepreneurs in Egypt, evidence from firm surveys suggests that women face more hurdles than men. Women run-ning firms are twice as likely as men to complain about stringent collateral requirements (WB 2010). Moreover, access to a formal bank account is criti-cal for high potential female entrepreneurs, espe-cially since it's a necessary precursor to financing–bank loans, credit lines, etc.—that will fuel their growth. Unfortunately, few women in Egypt have access to bank accounts (only 7%) (GEDI 2013). In general women employers are at a disad-vantage, when compared to men, regarding edu-cation, training, access to markets, finance and adequate infrastructure (EUROMED 2006).

Corruption

Corruption has a noticeable impact on the lives of women. Findings clearly show that corruption is not even-handed in its impacts. Unequal power relations between women and men make women more vulnerable to the impact of corruption. The abuse of entrusted power for private gain, corruption is likely to exacerbate uneven power dynamics between men and women, particularly in access to resources, decision-making and information. Corruption serves to reinforce social, cultural, political and institutional discrimination that women confront in their daily lives. Corruption is also likely to exacerbate gender inequalities further as a result of its correlation with poverty. Corruption represents a tax on the poor, under-mining efforts to break the cycle of poverty and further distorting how income, resources and ser-vices are shared between men and women, boys and girls (TI 2014). Athough there are laws against corruption, ratified international treaties, and anti-corruption bodies, corruption is percieved as a serious problem in Egypt (Puddephatt 2012). Egypt ranked 114 out of 177 countries worldwide in the Corruption Perceptions Index 2013 of Transparency International. Egypt ranked 12 among Arab countries, scoring a low score of 329. The World Bank's World Wide Governance Indicators (WGI 2013) point to extremly low levels of accountability and control over corruption in Egypt.

9 A a country’s perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0-100, where 0 signifies high corruption

and 100 represents a very clean system.


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Forms of corruption such as bribery, nepotism, patronage, and political corruption are widespread due to a lack of law enforcement, weak institutions, and political instability (U4).

According to the The Global Competitiveness Re-port 2013–2014, corruption was cited as one of the five most problematic factors for doing business in Egypt (the other four being political instability, government instability/coups, crime and theft and access to financing).


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0202الزواج في إطار االتجار بالبشر، المركز القومي للبحوث االجتماعية والجنائية،

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