Société québécoise de science politique

Consociational Democracy and Canadian FederalismAuthor(s): S. J. R. NoelSource: Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol. 4,No. 1 (Mar., 1971), pp. 15-18Published by: Canadian Political Science Association and the Société québécoise de science politiqueStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3231440 .

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Consociational Democracy and Canadian Federalism

S. J. R. NOEL University of Western Ontario

It is only natural that Canada should most frequently be compared with the United States, and that models, metaphors, and theories of the political system that are applicable to the one should be assumed to be applicable to the other. That there are certain close similarities is obvious: both are federations, both span the North American continent, both are affluent Western democracies, and both exist within the common economic framework of modern capitalism. These and other similarities, however, too often obscure the significance of those differences which do exist, or cause similarities which exist with other countries to be neglected. This is particularly true of European countries, even though it would appear to be the case that Canadians, with their strong linguistic and cultural differences, have a good deal in common with at least some Europeans. This is not to say that Canada is more European than American. It is merely to suggest that there may be some advantages to be gained from occasionally viewing Canadian politics from a European perspective.

First, however, it is necessary to discuss briefly the political culture of the Canadian federation. Canada, it is often said, is a country without a strong national identity; indeed, as John Meisel has put it, Canada "is almost totally lacking in a genuinely shared set of symbols, heroes, historical incidents, enemies, or even ambitions."I Implicit in such a view is a comparison with the United States: what is missing north of the border is an equivalent of the American national myth. Yet this comparison, while indisputable, can also be seriously misleading. For, among the countries of the world, Canada is by no means unique in its deviation from the American pattern and, moreover, excessive attention to the question of national identity obscures the fact that within Canada there are a number of strong regional and provincial identities, a recognition of which is vital to a proper understanding of the country's nature. As the historian J. M. S. Careless has pointed out, what Canadians have "sought, and to some degree achieved, is not really unification or consolidation, but the articulation of regional patterns in one transcontinental state."2

By what means, therefore, has the Canadian federal system been able to achieve the minimum level of harmony between its regional components which, despite the lack of a strong national identity, has allowed it to maintain itself and function with relative effectiveness for more than a century ?

Perhaps the commonest response of political scientists to this question is to attribute to the national political parties in Canada the same role of "consensus-building" as that performed by national parties in the United States - even though in the case of Canada the content of the alleged consensus cannot be empirically identified.3 A non-American but possibly more promising approach is to enquire instead into the basis of the political order in other economically advanced but culturally divided societies, particularly in Western Europe, where a number of countries resemble Canada in their lack of an over- riding national identity, yet possess distinct "limited" identities of region and culture. A theory which attempts to explain their operation should therefore be of considerable interest to the student of Canadian politics. One such theory is that of "consociational democracy" advanced by Arend Lijphart.4

1"Canadian Parties and Politics," in R. H. Leach, ed., Contemporary Canada (Durham, NC, 1968), 135. 2'"Limited Identities' in Canada," Canadian Historical Review, L, no. 1 (March 1969), 9. A parallel view may be found in the field of literary criticism: "When we speak of a recognizably Canadian poet we usually mean a regional poet who uses the distinctive objects and actions of his locality as poetic materials." Milton Wilson, "Other Canadians and After," Tamarack Review, IX (1958-9), 89. 3For a more extended discussion of consensus and the role of parties, see my paper "Political Parties and Elite Accommodation: Interpretations of Canadian Federalism," Canadian Political Science Association, Winnipeg, June 1970. 4For a more extensive presentation of the theory than that contained in the preceding article in this JOURNAL, see Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," World Politics, xxI, no. 2 (Jan. 1969), 207-25.

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16 S. J. R. NOEL

American pluralist theory, Lijphart points out, is unable to explain the politics of "fragmented but stable democracies" (such as The Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, and Switzerland) other than by treating them as "deviant" cases. In none of these societies is there a situation of "cross-cutting cleavages," or national consensus, such as pluralist theory holds to be necessary for the successful functioning of democratic government, yet each must be regarded as a functioning and relatively effective democracy. The explanation, he suggests, is to be found in the role played by political el1ites in each of these countries in deliberately overcoming the effects of cultural fragmentation. Given the existence of strong limited identities or subcultures, and the absence of a national consensus on symbols and goals, it becomes the task of the political leaders of these separate subcultures to practise accommodation at the el1ite level in order to maintain the national political system and make it work. In other words, bargains can be made and compromises reached among political leaders which would not be possible if they required popular ratification. This type of government Lijphart refers to as "consociational democracy."5

For it to function successfully, those who occupy positions of political leadership must understand the perils of political fragmentation and be committed to the maintenance of the national system; they must also be able, within their respective subcultures, to accom- modate divergent interests and demands. For the masses, on the other hand, all that is required is that they be committed to their own subcultures and that they trust and support their respective el1ites. Since the more contact and interaction there is between the masses of the subcultures the greater the likelihood of friction between them, Lijphart suggests, "it may be desirable to keep transactions among antagonistic subcultures in a divided society ... to a minimum."6 In theory there is no reason why a consociational democracy could not function satisfactorily even if among the masses of the different subcultures there was absolutely no attachment to the national political system and no sense whatever of a national identity. In actual systems, however, some degree of popular national sentiment is invariably present. The distinguishing feature of a consociational political system is the relative weakness of popular national sentiment and the overcoming of this weakness through a process of el1ite accommodation.

Thus, not only does Lijphart's model suggest parallels between Canada's experience and the experience of a number of other countries, it also offers a possible explanation of the way the Canadian political process operates. First, in broadest terms, it suggests that the lack of a pan-Canadian identity combined with strong regional subcultures is not necessarily a dysfunctional feature in terms of the successful operation of a federal political system, as long as within each subculture demands are effectively articulated through its political el1ite. Secondly, it suggests that in the relative absence of a national mass consensus Canadian federalism has been maintained and made to work mainly through a process of accommodation at the el1ite level.

It is necessary, however, to make certain adjustments in Lijphart's consociational model before it can be applied to Canada. The term "subculture" could be interpreted in a number of ways - it could be taken, for example, to refer to English Canada and French Canada, or to a number of distinct regions such as the Maritimes, Quebec, Ontario, and the West - but most usefully perhaps as "province." Moreover, because of the federal constitution of Canada, a distinction should be made between federal and provincial political "61ites" (defined simply as the holders of the most important offices in federal and provincial political institutions). Federal and provincial bureaucratic el1ites could be simi- larly identified. To employ Lijphart's term, 61ite accommodation in Canada could therefore be said to take place at several levels: in the numerous federal boards, commissions, and councils which, through convention, have provincial representation as their basis of membership; in the patterns of communication and consultation which have developed among senior provincial civil servants; in the meetings of such interprovincial bodies as the Council of Ministers of Education; in federal-provincial conferences; and, above all, in the federal cabinet. These are the institutions which are central to the day-to-day maintenance and operation of the Canadian federal system.

5This usage follows David E. Apter, The Political Kingdom in Uganda: A Study in Bureaucratic Nationalism (Princeton, 1961). 6"Consociational Democracy," 220-1.

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Consociational Democracy and Canadian Federalism 17

The representative character of the cabinet, and particularly the emphasis placed on provincial representation, is well known. What is uncertain is the practical significance of this fact in the functioning of the political system. Since constitutional convention ensures that the proceedings of cabinet are secret, it is possible only to surmise about provincial influences on decision-making. If, however, the cabinet is viewed in the broad framework of consociational theory, it can be seen as a mechanism of el1ite accommodation quite apart from the specific decisions it makes. Its importance, in other words, can be seen to lie more in its function of bringing together political leaders from the provinces and maintaining their continuous involvement in the decision-making process than in the actual outputs of that process. And one of the most important roles of the prime minister is to maintain among cabinet members drawn from the various provinces a degree of commitment to the national political system which does not exist to nearly the same extent at the popular or mass level within the provinces themselves; in other words, he must be able to maintain and operate successfully a system of el1ite accommodation.

Canadian political history contains ample confirmation of such a view. Two cases may be briefly mentioned. First, the inability of the Diefenbaker government to involve a Quebec political el1ite in a process of accommodation at the federal level was surely one of the major factors contributing to its downfall. Its policies and decisions were not anti-Quebec; its failure to appreciate the importance of l1ite accommodation was.7 Secondly, as P. D. Stevens has shown in his study of the collapse of the Liberal party in Ontario in 1911, the failure of Laurier was not so much a failure of policy as a failure to maintain the involvement at the federal level of an Ontario political el1ite. After Sir Oliver Mowat's resignation in 1897 the Laurier cabinet increasingly lacked effective representa- tion from Ontario, a deficiency which contributed largely to its electoral defeat.8

Interprovincial conferences and, since 1906, federal-provincial conferences have also provided an important institutional framework for the process of el1ite accommodation. Even more than in the case of the cabinet, their mere existence is more important than the agreements which they produce. Moreover, they dramatically illustrate a prime ministerial role of considerable consequence in the operation of the federal system: the presenting of a national viewpoint to provincial political leaders whose positions within the system are even more crucial than those of federal cabinet ministers. A federal-provincial conference, therefore, has a dual symbolic function: it symbolizes the vitality of the provincial fact in Canada and also the prime minister's unique position as the personification of inter-61ite accommodation. It is politics as theatre, highlighting for a brief moment the prime minister's role in extracting the necessary national commitment from provincial 61ites (grudging and minimal though it may sometimes be) without which the federal system could not work.

Successful federal leadership in Canada requires an attention to provincial political 61ites which is matched only by the need for similar accommodation in the consociational democracies of Western Europe. Canadian political history reveals a pattern of elite accommodation which must be taken into account in any attempt to explain the longevity of the federation. From Joseph Howe, who moved from the leadership of the Nova Scotia secessionists to a seat in the federal cabinet, to Donald Jamieson, the present minister of transport, who in 1948-9 was one of the leading figures in the campaign to keep Newfound- land out of Confederation,9 the pattern has been the same. Time after time, provincial politicians with no more attachment to the federal system than the mass of their con- stituents become transformed in Ottawa into cabinet ministers intent on making the system work. The two cases cited are but the extreme examples of how the process of elite accom- modation in Canada has provided a workable substitute for mass national integration.

As Arend Lijphart rightly points out, his theory of consociational democracy also contains certain normative implications. Hence, if a consociational perspective is adopted towards some recent trends in Canadian politics, a number of conclusions would appear to follow. First, a decline of "elitism" in Canada and its replacement by a general accept- 7For a glimpse into the origin of this failure, see Dalton Camp, Gentlemen, Players and Politicians (Toronto, Montreal, 1970), 238-52. 8See Stevens, "Laurier, Aylesworth, and the Decline of the Liberal Party in Ontario," Historical Papers, Canadian Historical Association, 1968, pp. 94-113. 9See Richard Gwyn, Smallwood: The Unlikely Revolutionary (Toronto, 1968), 102-3.

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18

ance of the Jacksonian myth of popular or "participatory" democracy may be detrimental to the maintenance of Canadian federalism if it leads to a situation in which the mass of the people are unwilling to accept the inter-61ite accommodations made by their political leaders. If inter-61ite accommodations must be popularly ratified they may be impossible to achieve. Secondly, "national" policies aimed at promoting bilingualism and bicultur- alism may be misguided in the sense that they may increase friction between separate communities which previously had little direct contact with one another. It may be that a system of consociational federalism works best when the "two solitudes" are preserved. Thirdly, if there were to emerge within any one of the provinces an el6ite who for national- istic, economic, ideological, or any other reasons are unwilling to provide "overarching cooperation at the elite level with the deliberate aim of counteracting disintegrative tend- encies in the system," the system would become inoperable. It may be, therefore, that the ultimate precept of consociationalism as a normative theory is that new el1ites must either be accommodated or suppressed. On the other hand, it must be noted that consociation- alism combined with federalism creates at least the possibility of a conflict between competing federal and provincial el1ites within the same provincial subculture (as would presumably be the case if, for example, Quebec were to elect a Parti qu6b6cois government provincially yet continue to give a majority of its federal seats to the Liberal party). It would appear that the duality of political elites in a federal system makes the outcome of subcultural conflict more uncertain than it would be in a unitary state.

For the student of Canadian politics, however, the value of consociational theory lies less in its normative implications than in its capacity to provide a framework for historical explanation. What it offers is a way of viewing the Canadian political process which ac- counts for its successful maintenance yet requires no dubious assumptions about the role of political parties and posits no chimerical notion of an "underlying" national identity.

GERARD BERGERON

Commentaire de la communication du

professeur Arend Lijphart

GERARD BERGERON Universitd Laval

Pendant << les 6v6nements >> que nous vivons au Canada depuis une douzaine de jours1, c'est d'une involontaire ironie de la conjoncture que nous soyons r6unis pour discuter de 1'<< integration >> avec application au cas canadien - meme sous l'angle theorique...

Il y a deux parties dans la communication du professeur Lijphart : (1) la position du probleme theorique de l'int6gration; (2) la contribution propre qu'il y apporte par l'id6e de consociationalisme. Et je me permettrai de dire que, bien que moins personnelle, la premidre partie de l'expos6 est aussi remarquable que la seconde. Sont bien poses au d6part les d6finitions pr6alables, les niveaux d'analyse, le r81e de l'int6gration comme variable ind6pendante ou active (independent ou intervening variable). II a bien note chez

1Allusion aux jours enfi6vr6s qui suivirent les enl6vements du diplomate britannique, James Cross, et du ministre qu6b6cois, Pierre Laporte, par deux groupes de ravisseurs du Front de Lib6ration du Quebec. Quelques heures apr6s la tenue de ce colloque, ce meme jour du 17 octobre, on apprenait le meurtre du ministre Laporte. L'attach6 commercial allait 8tre

relatch6 apr6s deux mois de d6tention au debut de d6cembre 1970. Le colloque se tint dans une ambiance politique trouble, alors que les autorit6s f6d6rales venaient de proclamer la loi dite des Mesures de Guerres, quelques heures apr6s qu'on ait eu recours aux forces arm6es pour preter main forte aux effectifs policiers.

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