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, THIS DISSERTATIONENTITLEDs ( > ~ { C ct- je:,J t i . UX'lr-r t . ( ) tJ:'l;:j l ~ l i ' ~ 1 ' t ) ~ i . = L ! , ~ \ ; , ; J t : - . L : : ' . 2 { ~ ~ t:tCJ-i(l:L' [ J 1 ' 1 : . ( 1 : : : ~ SC: :Jtll:S

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. , . ! / . . 'Signed : _ ~ ~ ~ ~ _ . : ~ } : - = __ __ ~ ~ _ ~ ~ = : . . . ~ . : ~ _ : . . . _ . Major Professor.

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Nete to Va.Aldate. Fill in the blank 8 p ~ e s on thi8 form and Include on e copy of i t In eachbound COllY of the dissertation. It 18 to be inserted a8 th e ftr.t 8heet following front cover._-.. ......... ... _ _


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I

INTRODUCTION. . ..

TABLE OF CONTENTS

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. ..Page

. . 5

Cha.pter1. The Objections Against the Formal Distinction . . 8Objections Against Any and All Uses ofthe Formal DistinctionParticular Objections Against the FormalDistinction

I I . The Doctrine On the Formal Distinction . 20Identi ty: Thomistic and Scotistic DoctrineNotion and Division of Distinction: Thomistioand Scotistic DoctrineThe Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus

I I I . Conclusion: The Objections Answered in the Lightot the Doc trine .......... . . . . . . .. . . .. .. . .. .. . .. . . . . . . . 36

, BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . .. .. . 49

I.J,


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INTRODUCTIONThe philosophy of Duns Scotus has been cri t icized in the works

of !homistic scholars during the several centuries since the MiddleAges and the Golden Age of Scholastic philosophy. A glance a t thehistory of those centuries shows that they have not always been idealfor a proper study of Duns Scotus' doctrine. Recently a bet terunderstanding of the philosophy of the subtle doctor has been madepossible through the cr i t ica l research of the Scotist ic Commissiona t Rome and of other scholars throughout the world. Their studies onScotus throws additional l ight upon his contribution to ScholastiothOUght. Nor has Sootus alone been investigated. Alexander of Hales,John de l a Roohelle, St. Albert, St. Bonaventure, Ookham and PeterAureoli are but a few of those whose 6ontribution to the developmentof Scholastioism oan be better appreciated today. The o u t l i n ~ o t thehis torioal evolution of theological and philosophioal ideas duringthe golden age of Scholastioism are beooming clearer . Moreover,even to the inoipient soholar i t Boon becomes evident that no oneauthor has made a completely independent oontribution to the body otSoholastioism. The Thomistio oritioism made against Sootus oan beanswered and should be angwered from the bet ter insight made possibleby this reoent soholarship.

In the revival of Scholasticism, promoted by the reoent Popes,beginning with Leo XIII, the followers ot St. Thomas have often heldthat the teaohings of Duns Scotus are dangerous to the structure of


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-6true philosophy. Their objections, i f valid, are indeed serious. I tseems, now, that the seriousness of some of these objections stemsfrom a lack of a complete and clear exposition of the evolution ofScholasticism in general and the teaching of Duns Scotus in particu

\t l a r . Whatever the reason may be, i t is certain that many, it not a l l ,of these objeotions made against the formal dist inct ion in the pastby the Thomists need not now be made.

Our specifio aim is to reply to the objections to the formaldist inct ion raised by the neo-Thomists of the early 19th and the f i r s tpart of the present century. To this end we have attempted to enum-erate the general objeotions found in the Scholastic manuals of thisperiod, inclUding in some cases the older sources from which theauthors of these manuals admittedly drew their objections. The secondpart of this essay i s devoted to a short exposition o t the formaldist inct ion with special reference to the so-called t radit ionalVirtual dist inct ion. In conclusion oUF thesis wil l be an attempt to

~ s w e r the objections presented in the f i r s t section in the l ight ofthe doctrine as explained in the second section.


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CHAPTER ITHE OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE FORMAL DISTINCTION

Objections against any and a l l uses of theFormal DistinctionFor many centuries Catholic philosophers have charged Duns

Scotus and his formal dist inct ion in part icular with many grave errors.Many cri t ics condemn it as an empty subtlety. Others condemn i t as aradical departure from the Scholastic t radi t ion. Not every cr i t i cmakes the same objections nor do they agree always as to the generaltrend of Scotist ic errors . Yet among the crit icisms of the formaldis t inct ion there are classes of crit icism that may be termed generalinasmuch as they do not attack anyone application of the tormal

..dis t inct ion but the entire notion. These cri t ics point out that theformal dist inct ion i s a radical innovation and. as such, i s foreignto Scholasticism. Others dismiss the dis t inct ion as too di f f icu l tto understand or that i t adds nothing to our knowledge. These l a t te robjectors argue that the formal dist inct ion puts in a more dif f icul tform the same 'concepts which are explained in the clearer Thomisticsystem.

One group finds the use of formalities of Duns Scotus a kind ofempty vanity. The leading exponent of this school of thought i s JohnGerson. John Gerson was one of the group of orthodox mystics o t the14th and 15th centllries who became disil lusioned with the philosophy

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1 Gerson, John, Omn1a Opera, (Antverp1ae, 1706), 5to cons1derat10ne secunda lect10ne contra vanam cur1os1tatem, I , PP. 99-101.2 Vocabular10 Theolog1ae, (a Joanne Alteneta1g ed1to, Vindel1cl,1517), fo1. LXX.

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two opposing sohools of cr i t ics . For one school this dist inct ion istoo rea l is t ic while for the other school i t i s too much a logicaldist inct ion. These schools are united in that they oan see no meandist inct ion between the vir tual and real dist inct ion. As they seei t the formal dist inct ion must be equated with either a real or anon-real distinction which would be the logical or vir tual dist inct ionof the Thomists. I f the formal distinction is actually only anotherformulation of the vir tual dist inct ion, then such a dist inct ion issuperfluous and unnecessarily adds to the philosophical dictionary ofterms. A group of the cr i t ics reduce the formal dist inct ion to thereal dis t inct ion. Since Scotus places the formal dist inct ion betweenthe at t r ibutes of God, these l a t t e r cr i t ics fear for the simplici tyof God.

Among the or i t ies who reduce the formal dist inct ion to ei thera Virtual or a real distinction we find such men as Cardinal Mercier,Sanseverino, Vacant and Signoriello. -Mercier says that there is nomean between the rea l and vir tual dis t inct ions.3 And i f the formaldistinction is vir tual then i t is superfluous. Actually Mercierinterprets the formal distinction as being basical ly a real dist inct ion and cr i t ic izes i t as SUCh. We pass over his remarks on theformal distinction to consider them l a te r in the paper. Sanseverinoholds tha t the formal distinction cannot be a true dist inct ion. 4

3 Mercier, Cardinal D., Cours de Philosonhie, (SeptiemeEdition, Archeveaue de Malines, 19l8T:" pp. 348-351.4 Sanseverino, Caietanus, Elementa philosophiae christ ianae~ antigua ~ ~ comparata, (Neopoli, 1867) vol. I p. 492 n. 606.iI

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He contends, however, that the formal distinction as explained byScotus is a vir tual dis t inction. This, he says, would lead to theabsurd conclusion that the common nature and the specific differencesof created beings, formally dist inct in Scotus, are the same thing.Signoriello after explaining the formal dist inction objects thatthis dist inction must be either vir tual or real since a dist inctionthat precedes the act ivi ty of the mind is real since otherwise i twould be of reason. 5 Other philosophers, he explains, use thevir tual dist inction where Scotus would place the formal d i s t L ~ c t i o n . Vacant holds that i t would be a contradition to place a mean dist inc-t ion between the JOeal and formal dist inction. 6 To say tha t such adist inction is more than a virtual distinction so that the partsdistinguished are actually dist inct before the action of our mindand yet to maintain that this is not a real dis t inction is a contra-diction.

A few words must be said about ~ h o s e authors who speak aboutthe difficulty of understanding the formal dist inction. Turnermentions the formal dist inction in connection with i t s use by Scotuebetween the divine attr ibutes.? He says that this Scotistic dist inc-tion i s d if f icul t to understand. He does not try to evaluate i t ,

5 Signoriello, Nuntii, Lexicon Peripateticum Phi1osophico-I ) Theologicum (edit io 1906 facta), PP. 135 ff .6 Vacant, Etudes comparees sur la Philosophie ~ St. Thomas ~ Our c e l l ~ d ~ ~ u n s Scot, (Paris: Beauehesne, 1891)7. Turner, William, Historx 2t Philosophl, (Boston: Ginn andCompany, 1929) pp. 388-389. .


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but is sat isf ied to mention that some authors find in such adistinction a contradiction. One of the strongest expositions ofthis position is that of James Brukerus. He sees the Scotis t icsubtlet ies , especially with regard to the formalities, as a

, (f- philosophical monstrosity which are insoluable to the student. 8A f inal general objection to the formal distinction is tha t

i t is radical innovation and contrary to the doctrine of St. Thomas.Marcone writes that Scotus departs from the Thomistic posit ion inthat doctrine fundamental to his whole system, viz: the doctrineon the formal dist inction. Where St. Thomas places the vir tua l

,dis t inction bebTeen a universal nature and i t s numerical differences,Scotus places a formal dist inction. 9 Dorholt holds tha t the Scotist ic

. formally dist inct plural i ty of forms is opposed to the Thomisticdoctrine on unity of forms and such a pOsition is an insupportable

. innovation. lO

Part icular Objections Against theFormal DistinctionOne of the consequences of the formal dist inct ion when i t is

interpreted to be a real distinction i s pantheism or monism. Severalof the cr i t ics of Duns Scotus put this interpretation u l ~ n his

J'i. 8 Brukerus, JacobUs, H i s t o r i ~ c r i t i c ~ P h i l o s o ~ h i a , (Lipsiae:'/ 1743), tom. I I I , P. 825 f f .9 Marcone, Ramirus, O.S.B., Philosophia aetat is ~ a t r i s t i c a , mediae, recentis usque ad saeculum xix, (Ramae: Desclee e t Socii ,1914) Pp. 239-258. -

10 Dorholt, Adm. R.P. Bernardus, ~ Predigerorden gn s e i n ~ Theologiae, (Schoning-Pao.erborn, 1917), pp. 26 ff .

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explanation of the Metaphysical composition of being. Three authorswho make such a crit icism are John Capreola, Marcone and CardinalMercier. Capreola shows that Hus was condemned for postulat ingsome rea l eternal enti ty common to God and creatures. I l Wycliff, hegoes on to say, used material trom Duns Scotus in formulating asimilar error . ScotUB holds that when an enti ty is destroyed, theuniversal ot that enti ty is not destroyed. Wycliff, trom this opinionof Scotus, believed that God could not simply create anything norsimply annihilate anything. This leads to a second false conclusion.Since ens is univocal when predicated of God and creatures there issomething which is the same in both God and creatures. From whichi t follows that i f God created or annihilated an ass He would create

12 Mercier, op.ci t .f1


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error of monism. 13 ,He interprets ScOtUB to mean that the specificnature is dist inct from the numerical differences and must be thesame in a l l things. This must be extended even to the notion ofbeing, since being is univocal and ought to be considered as asupreme genus. By such a process a l l things flow into a simplemonistic being common to al l . Du Plessis D' Argentre d.oes not levelthis charge against Scotue direct ly, but accuses the followers ofScotus with being real is ts with regard to universals because oftheir formal distinction between essence and existence.14 Here thecommon nature is regarded as a singular ent i ty which somehow i spresent under the separate things of which it is predicated.

Of the same serious nature as the charge of incipient pantheismis the one which sees in the formal distinction as applied to Godand His attributes something which destroys the simplicity of God.A number of authors can be named who make this criticism. DionysiusRykel ca l l s the Scotistic formal d i s ~ n c t i o n between the divineat t r ibutes inadmissible because the formal distinction could only bea real dis t inct ion.15 Hyacinthus de Rugeriis attacks the formal

. dis t inct ion as i t is found in the works of the Scotist , Vulpes.16

13 Marcone, op.ci t .14 Du Plessis D'Argentre, Carolus, Collectio judiciorum ~ novis erroribus, PP. 337-342.15 Dionysius Rykel, Opera Omnia, (Monstolii, 1846-99) tom. 33, PP. 247 f f .16 De Rugeriis, Hyaointhus, O.P., D e f e n ~ o r i u m dootrinae diviThomae, (Neapoli, 1655), p. l .

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Vulpes, he contends, is wrong because he rejects the vir tual dist inct ion between the divine at t r ibutes and instead places the formaldist inction. Since this distinction is one found in divinis beforethe act of the in te l lec t i t must be a real dist inction. GilbertPorretanue was condemned at the Council of Rheims for making a realdistinction between the divine at t r ibutes and the divine essence.Barbedettel7 , Carolus Du Plessis D'Argentre18 and other authors classDune Scotus with Gilbert and condemn him for holding the same opinion.

For those who maintain that the formal dis t inct ion i s a realdis t inct ion the fact that Scotus places a formal distinction betweenthe Divine Essence and the Divine Supposites is cause for alarm.Dionysius Rykel eays that Scotue upholdS a distinction that is absurd

. in the eyes of many in this regard since then the Supposites and theDivine Nature would be dist inct through some absolute propert ies .19In 1651 a certain P. Fulgentius Stel la and certain Scotist ictheologians dedicated a long controversy to Pope Innocent IX. Inthis controversy the Scotists are said to hold that the relat ion ofthe Persons in the Trinity is constituted by certain absoluteproperties and absolutely incommunicable. ent i t ies . Thomas Anglicuscharges that Scotue wae forced publicly to revoke this opinion aboutthe formal distinction in divine things. 20 This is not surprising,

)). , 17 Barbedette, D., H i s t o ~ r e ~ ~ Ehilosophiae, (Paris: Bercheet Pagis, 1938), p. 316 f t .18 D'Argentre, op.ci t .19 Dionysius, op.ci t . Opera Omnia20 Nomenc1ator (ed. Hurter B.J., 1903) vol. I I fol. 100, p. 462.

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he oontinues, sinoe i f the Persons are dis t inc t by some absolutereal i ty then these things are true things or not. I f they are truethings then they are dist inot natures, quiddit ies or essences. Thusone Person would be one nature and Another would be a differentnature. The Father and the Son would not be the same which is theerror of Arius. I f , on the other hand, these real i t ies are notformally true things are are not real ly dis t inot but only formally,then Sootus fa l ls into the error of Sabellius who held that theFather as well as the Son died on the cross.

Besides the uses of the formal dist inct ion already mentioned,Duns Scotus places the formal dist inct ion between the soul and i t sfacult ies . The cr i t ics of Sootus extend the i r fears about theimplications of the separate real i t ies which they oontend resul t

~ o m the use of the formal distinotion. In our section on the generalobjections to the formal dist inotion we mentioned that Vaoant heldthat i t i s a oontradiction to plaoe a . ~ e a n distinotion between therea l and vir tua l Thomistic distinotion. 21 Using this as a premisehe argues that with regard to plaoing the formal distinotion betweenthe soul and the facul t ies suoh a distinction would either be a rea ldist inot ion or a vir tua l distinotion. I f i t i s a Virtual dist inotionthen Scotus would approaoh nominalism beoause the distinotion of thefacul t ies of the soul would be no greater than that between the

divine at tr ib t l tee . On the other hand, i f ' SeottlD meane h ie formal

21 Vacant, op.oi t .


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I -17dist inct ion to be a rea l distinction he is an exaggerated rea l i s twith regard to the nature of God. since the distinction would then bepresent before the operation of the mind.

Another author, P. Antonius Goudin, assumes that the formaldist inct ion multiplies real i t ies . 22 I f you use the formal distinctionand you admit, a.s you must, that form and formality are the samething then you would have many forms making up humanity which i sabsurd (and we might note, heret ical) . Mercier in regard to thissame problem of the form of man also sees that man would be acomposite of aggregates i f the formal dist inct ion be equated with areal dis t inct ion. On the other hand, i f i t i s actually a vir tualdist inct ion, i t would only be superfluous to Thomistic terminology.Rousselot, in this connection, does not hesitate to cal l Scotus theapostle of realism since Scotus disagrees with St. Thomas in makingthe faoulties of the soul formally dis t inct . 23 For Rousselot, then,the formal distinction i s even more real than the distinotion ofSt. Thomas between the soul and i t s facult ies .

Gonzalez condemns the formal dist inct ion as being too real is t icwhen i t is placed between a specific essence and i t s individustion. 24

22 Goudin, P.Antonius, Philosophia ,1uxta inconcussstutisslmague Dlvl Thomae dogmata, (editio Coloniae, 1724), t . IV,) I it. q. 2, p . 255.I' 23 Rousselot, Dictionnaire l li sciences ~ h l l o s o P h i g u e s (DuxiemeEdition, Paris: Librairie Haehette et. Cie, 187 ) , p p . ~ 1 9 - 4 2 1 .

24 Gonzalez, Zeferino, D.P., Historia de ~ Filosophia,(segundaedicion, Madrid, 1886), PP. 296-309.

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I t is nonsense to make a being an individual by the ad.dition of someent i ty to i t s essence. This approach is a crit icism of the Scotisticdoctrine on haecceitas.


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CHAPTER I IJ

THE DOCTRINE ON THE FORMAL DISTINCTION

Thomistic and Scotistlc Notions ofIdentityBefore we attempt to angwer the objections to the formal dis -

t inction of Duns Scotus some treatment of the philosophical frameworkin whioh this notion f i t s must be made. Such a background n e c e s s a r i l ~will include a comparison of the Thomistic and Sootistio notions onthe sUbjeot.

Briefly, the framework spoken of in the l a s t paragraph wil linclude the Thomistio and Scotistio notion of identity, unity, rea ldistinotion and logioal distinotion.

Sinoe distinotion, generally speaking, i s a denial of identi tybetween beings, a olear notion of a philosopher's dootrine on i d e n t i t ~ i s the f i r s t step towards understanding his matter on dist inot ion.I t is well to introduce the philosophioal notion of identi ty byreferr ing to a oommon notion of identi ty. Thus we speak of John andJim as ident ical twins or Mr. Brown and the man next door as being

) identical . I t is eVident from these examples that identi ty involvesa comparison b e ~ ~ e e n two beings whether logioal or real . This com-parison resul ts in a perception that two concepts somehow representonly one object. Thus in the second example given above the concept"Mr. Brown' and the concept ' the man next door' are seen to representa single person.1


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The formal Thomistic definit ion of identity is the affirmabi l i tas unius de a l te ra . In other words ident i ty is a comparison ofbeing with i t se l f . "Identi ty of being is expressed in a l l affirmativecategorical propositions.- 25

Identity is divided into logical and real ident i ty . Logicalidentity resul ts from the representation in the mind of two or morereal i t ies by the same formal concept. As example would be the sameformal concept of animal which is abstracted from two separate dogs.Real identi ty is the same real i ty as i t is represented in the mindby many different concepts which are seen to be predicated of thesame real i ty . In real and numerical identity, then, the comparisonof one being with another implies a logical relationship.

I f the Thomistic position on identity i s viewed from a metaphysical standpoint two important aspects are found to be present.Firs t , identi ty i s complex in that i t presupposes plural i ty ofcompared concepts. Secondly, ident i t t is not unity.

The analysis of the f i r s t aspect of identity gives the modesof ident i ty of a substance. The compared concepts may be concernedwith the same numerical object, or with the same nature as conceptual ly represented from several real things or f inally with the samera t io and number.

Secondly, the relat ionship of identity and unity should be

2S Grajewski, Maurice, O.F.M., The Formal Distinction of DunsScotus, (Washington, D. C.: Catholic University Press, 1 9 4 4 ) - P . ~ --In the commonly accepted notions on our subject we have rel iedconsiderably on Fr. Maurice's work which is one of the more modernand. extensive treatments on the formal dist inct ion.


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mad.e clear . Identity is opposed to dist inct ion within a unity .Unity, taken in i t s e l f , is the consideration of a being as indivisiblein i t se l f and divided from a l l others. I t is viewed as opposed tomUltiplioity while identi ty adds to the notion of unity a comparisonof the being with i t s e l f . I t is to be noted that the various kindsof unity such as essential or accidental are respectively thefoundation for such a comparison. Hence the relat ionship implied byident i ty w i l l be, for example, one essence that is ident ical withi t s e l f and so on.The Thomistic notion of identity is primarily a logical notion:

the affirmabili ty in the mind of one thing of another. The rea lidentity of the Thomistic school, as we saw, is concerned with twoconcepts of a single thing or single nature. Scotus, on the otherhand, may be said to t reat identity as eadem plurium ent i tas26 whichmight be t ranslated as a plural i ty in a single ent i ty . By th isnotion Scotus does not mean plural coftcepts but ra ther plural meta-physical sections of being seen to be present in a single ent i ty .This metaphysical approach is different from the Thomistic 10g1calapproach and is the key to understanding the formal dis t inc t ion.

For Scotus there is no question of real identity i f there arenot at l eas t two rea l i t i es or ent i t ies which are so present 1n asingle being that i t would be a to ta l contradiction for the thing

26 Grajewski, ~ ~ ~ ~ . p. 30Bridges, Geoffrey, O.F.M., Petrus Thomae: Ident i ty andDistinction (St . Bonaventure, N. Y.: Franciscan Inst i tute , 1930>p. 72 . .Fr. Geoffrey denies that such a definit ion may actually be foundin the works of Duns Scotus.


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to exis t without ei ther ent i ty . Such an ident i ty preserves therelat ionship connoted by the very notion of ident i ty . However, itis not a logical relat ionship but a real relat ionship . Scotusapplies the Aristotel ian notion of real relat ionship here. ForAristotle a real relat ionship demands 1) that the foundation andterm both be rea l , 2) that there be a real dist inction of extremesand 3) tha t the nature of extremes i s Buch that the re la t ionnatural ly resul ts without the active operation of a comparing

27in te l lect .

The question arises as to the jus t if icat ion for predicatingsuch a s t r i c t notion of real ident i ty . How can the mind know thatthere can be such a thing as somehow separate rea l i t i es present ina thing anter ior to the action of the mind. This diff icul ty is bestanswered i f we real ize that Scotns begins his investigation byconsidering the revealed nature of God. The re la t ion between thePersons of the Trinity is a real relat ' ion in which there i s a trueunity ~ natura re i . At the same time the Persons are somehowdist inct from each other and their relat ionship fu l f i l l s theAristotel ian reqUirements for a real re la t ion. This example alsoshmrs us that Scotue adds to the Aristotelian notion of a rea lrelat ionship by demanding that i t resul t in unity ~ n a t u r ~ ~ 2 8

- - - - - - _ . _ - - ~ - -27 Scotus, Joannee Dans, Dyera Omnia (Vives Edition, Paris:1891-1895) Onus QK. I . d. 31, q. unica, X. 489-499.28 Ibid. n. 5 x., 493-494 a.


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r -24In summary we may sta te that the Scotist ic real ident i ty i s

founded on a unity ~ n a t ~ re i . There is a certain relat ionshipof at l eas t two metaphysical ent i t ies which are both necessary toa being and seen to consti tute a rea l identi ty in that being. Theseent i t ies of Scotus wil l be explained further when we t rea t of theformal distinction but we would l ike to point out now that they inno sense resl l l t in composition in being.

Besides real ident i ty , Scotus speaks of a formal ident i ty . Thedenial of this formal identi ty is the basis for the formal dist inc-t ion. Scotus defines formal ident i ty as one "wherein something saidto be the same includes that to which i t is the same in i t s formalra t io, and therefore primarily and per ~ 29 Formal identi ty i sthat ident i ty found between two things, one of which is included inthe definit ion of the other. The ' formal r a t io ' of the defini t ionrefers to the quiddity or whatness by which a thlng is what i t i s .The Scotist ic notion of unity is introduced here. The most perfectunity - per ~ and primo ~ - is the basis for predicating formalident i ty . Such a unity goes beyond the Scotist ic unity of ident i -f icat ion which is the basis for rea l ident i ty . This grade of unityis a unity of simplicity. I t refers to a single being. But in auni ty per ~ and primo !!!Q.QQ the two terms are formally the same. Inother words the two concepts are not only ident ical in the real i tybut also in their logical content.

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29 Scotus, Ibid. ~ x . , I , d. 2, q. n. 44, VIII, 603b: "Vocoautem identitatem formalem ubi i l lud quod dic i tur sic idem, includi tillttd ctti sic est i d e ~ ) i n ratione sua fo rmal i , e t per.consequens perse primo modo."


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The notion and division o ~ dist inct ionin St. Thomas and Duns ScotusDistinction is the relation between two beings in which two

concepts are seen somehow to represent not one object but two.Distinction, then, may be defined as the absence of identi ty betweenmany beings. I t is important to understand tha t one must relatekinds of identity with kinds o ~ dist inct ion. You cannot say thatone thing is not another unless you already know how one thing isanother and vice versa.

Distinction, then, i s opposed to ident i ty and not unity eventhough various grades of unity are the basis for various kinds ofident i ty .

Just as in identi ty the general scholastic t radi t ion dividesdist inct ion into logical and rea l . A logical distinction i s made bythe mind alone,while rea l d i s t i n c t i o n . ~ s found to exist 1n real beingas i t i s . I t may be assumed that the reader has a grasp of theThomistic members of the further division o ~ dist inct ion. Hencethere is no need f o r a complete exposition of this division. A briefrecapitulat ion shows us that the Thomistic real distinction is dividedinto a major real distinction involving ent i t ies usually separableby divine power and a minor real distinction which involves theabsence o ~ identity between an enti ty and i t s modifications. Laterwe wil l contrast the doctrine of St. Thomas and that of ScotUB onreal id_enti ty .

The Thomistic logical dist inct ion is divided into purely logicalor d1stinct1q ra t ionis ~ a t i o c i n a n t i s and the vir tua l d1stinction or

Sl BONAVENllJRE UBIARY1'1') , , , 1 ' ~ n r W : r \ I T U R f' J , ' d . H Y .


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dist inct io r a t i o n i ~ ratiocinatae. The purely logical dist inct ion isone made by the mind between different concepts of one and the samereal i ty .

There is a disagreement among the Thomists as to the exactnature of the vir tual dist inct ion. For this reason and because ofi t s importance as contrast for the formal distinction we wil l explainone of the accepted defini t ions a t some length. For Garrigou-Lagrangethe vi r tua l distinction " is a logical dist inction and refers toobjective concepts which are identical in the object in which thedist inct ion is made but which are made real ly different in otherobjects of a lower order." 30 Thus we see that i t is a logicaldist inct ion, one formed by the mind and an ~ rat ionis . I t has incontrast to the purely logical dist inction a foundation in the thing.A thing is seen to contain eminently many objective concepts. Theseobjective concepts are seen as mUltiple by the mind in virtue of thefact that there are multiple perfections which are separated in lessperfect beings. These multiple objective concepts must representthe whole real i ty in such a way that they are seen to arise from thesame formal cause. The cause of the vir tual dist inct ion is not anykind of multiple metaphysical composition in the object but is dueto the knowledge the mind has of the lower orders and the perfectionof the object which cannot be grasped in a single notion by our

f ini te minds.

30 Garrigou-Lagrange, Reginald O.P., G ~ : His Existence andHis Nature, (Herder, St. LoUie, 1941), vol. I I , P:-196 , n. ~ - - -


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G a r r i g o u ~ L a g r a n g e divides the vir tual dist inct ion into a major31vir tual dist inct ion and a minor vir tual dist inct ion. The major

, vir tual dist inct ion refers to vir tual perfections found in the created

' order. For example, there is a real foundation for consideringanimality as being capable of further perfection by the addition ofI ra t ional i ty. The minor vir tual distinction i s uBed to explaindist inct ion in the attr ibutes of God. Since the divine nature cannotbe conceived as containing potential i ty for further perfection thisdivine nature is conceived as containing a l l attr ibutes implicit lyin Pure Act rather than in the relat ion of a genus to a difference.

Real distinction for the Thomiets is naturally a denial ofThomistic rea l ident i ty . In this real identi ty many concepts arepredicated of the same real i ty . The denial of such identi ty is theaffirmation of the presence of two real i t ies rather than one. Thebasis for such a denial are actual separation in time and space,causal dependence of one being upon a n o ~ h e r or real composition inwhich the parts are dis t inc t by nature. The important point to benoted is that the Thomistic concept of real dist inct ion includescertain dist inctions where there is not separabil i ty of the parts ,e .g. Prime matter is really dist inct from substantial form.

By contrast Duns Scotus' real identi ty involves plural i ty inr e a l i t i e ~ not different logical concepts of one real i ty . These1 real i t ies are so joined that they cannot be separated - for they arethe real i ty.32 In keeping with this different approach, with the

31 Ib id . , The ~ ~ {Herder, St. LoUiS, 1941)pp. 169-17032 Grajewski, op.c i t . PP. 59-64.


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exception of the real distinction of the Persons of the Trinity, thetes t of separabi l i ty is an important cr i ter ia for Scotue. Thingsare real ly dist inct only i f they can be separated at leas t by divinepower. He cal ls such a distinction rea11s s implici ter . ))

Besides the rea1is simpliciter Scotus speaks of a dist inct iorea1is secondum qUid. This second real distinction is l ike the f i r s tin that plural rea l i t ies must be actually exist ing and not simplyin potency; they must have formal eXistence, not just Virtual . Theymust not have confused existence such as found in mixtures. Therea1is secundum quid is different from the rea l i s simpliciter in thatthe ent i t ies are inseparable even by divine power. In other wordsthe rea1is secundum qUid preserves real identi ty .

The rea l i s dist inct io s e c u n d ~ qUid is divided into adequatenon-identity and non-ident1tas formalise A posit ive statement of theD.Q!l-identltas formalis is the t'ormal dis t inct ion. Such a formalidentity exists wherever one identi ty i s not ident ical with the formalnotion of another.34

The formal dis t inct ion ofDuns ScotusHaving considered the real distinction of both St. Thomas and

Duns Scotus, the virtual dist inct ion and the purely logical dist inc33 Scotus, op.ci t . ~ 2, d. 2, q. 2, n. 3, XI, p. 249

Mastrius, B., ~ p e 8 6 Omnia (Venice, 1520), vol. IV. Disp. II ,q. 8, n. 188 f f . pp. 28 -2 34 Scotus, op.ci t . Rep., I , d. 45, q. 2, n. 9, XXII, 502-503

1


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t ion, we have now set the stage for a treatment of the formal dist inct ion i t se l f . In this treatment i t is very important to understandJust what Scotus means by the term formality. How can formali t iesbe real and not destroy the simplicity of God when predicated !Udivinis as the cr i t ics fear?

There is a relation between the Scholastic form as understoodby Duns ScotUB and his concept of formality. Form in the works ofDuns Scotus has various meanings. Most often Scotus uses form in thewide sense to denote any quality whether physical or spiri tual ,perfect or imperfect, in creatures or in God. In this sense even

35the divine attr ibutes are forms of the divine essence.Form and formality do not mean the same thing. Form in the

general sense of a quali ty is very near to the meaning of formalitybut i t would be wrong to say that formality may replace the termform when i t occurs in Scotue.

I t is best to approach the study of formalit ies as understoodby Duns Scotus by an inductive l i s t ing of i t s character is t ics .Formalities are aspects o t real beings which are present in thosebeings before any operation of the in te l lect . They cannot be saidto be entia rat ionis such as are found in the vir tua l dis t inction.Nor should one view formalit ies as plural things. Their unity issuch that the divine power is incapable of separating them. We seethese formalit ies which are found in real beings to be dist inct in

35 Ibid. Ox I , d. 8, q. 4, IX, 665


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that the definit ion of one is not the def ini t ion of the other. Fromthese character ist ics Fr. GraJevlski formulates th is defini t ion: "aformality i s a positive ent i ty ~ n 1 i c h antecedently to the operationof the in te l lect is inseparable and real ly conjoined with the beingor essence within in which i t i s found." 36 I t might be well to notethat a l l Scotists have not agreed upon a def ini t ion of formali ty.For example Francis Mayronis called formality a quiddity of anythingwhatsoever be i t definable or not.37 The merit of such a def ini t ionis that i t includes the transcendentals which are formalit ies butnot s t r ic t ly definable. Yet, in spi te of the divers i ty in definit iona careful evaluation shows that , basically, different authors agreeon the actual meaning of formality.

As already indicated a thing ( r e ~ ) i s not synonymous with aformality. The term rea l i ty when i t is found :tn the works of Scotusi s convertible with formality and is not a separate and real lydis t inc t ~ .

Some di f f icul t ies with regard to the formal dist inct ion ar isefrom a misunderstanding of What Scotus means by intr insic modes.For him, being is a univocal concept which is indifferent to God andcreatures. In order to contract this concept to God and creaturesScotUB makes use of intr insic modes. The concept being when i t isreferred to God has the in tr insic mode of infinitude and when referred

-_ .__ . _ . _ - _ . _ - - - ~ .. ~ . _ - - - - -36 Grajeuski, op.ci t . p. 76.37 Ma,yronis, FranclscuB, O.F.H., ,!ractatus 9. f o r m a l i t ~ e s , (Venetiis, 1520) p. 30 .


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to creatures i t has the intr insic mode of f ini tude. Being, here, mustnot be understood as a genus to which the specific differences ofinf ini tUde and finitut'ie are aClded. One might express this notionthus: God's being or existence is inf ini te . I t is a being whoseI,t inner nature is simply inf in i te . A specific difference perfects agenus but an intr insic mode is already included in a f i r s t dis t inc tnotion of either God or creature. An in t r ins ic mode does not introduce composition into the real i ty in which i t is found. I t seemsproper to dist inguish between formalit ies and in t r ins ic modes fromwhat has been said. A formality is a definable aspect of real i tywhile an intr insic mode is the entire real i ty as i t has i t se l f whetherthis be as inf ini te or f ini te .38

The f inal part of the doctrine on the formal dist inct ion wil lnatural ly be an investigation of the precise meaning Scotus givesto the formal dist inct ion. Scotus as we have mentioned before usesthe formal dist inct ion in treating of t ~ e mystery of the BlessedTrinity. In fact i t is probable that he f i r s t formulated his doctrineto help explain this mystery. Accordingly we wil l quote the passagewhere he discusses the question of the difference in God that precedesa l l operation of the in te l lect .

Scotue has this to say:Secondly we must see just what kind of differencei t is which is assumed to precede every act of thein te l lect .I say that as in things, so also in the in te l lectthe greater difference i s manifest, and from i t one

38 Grajewski, op.ci t . pp. 81-87.


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frequently infers a lesser difference that is notmanifest, even as we infer a difference of ideas inthe divine in te l lect from the difference of creatures,as i s clear from Augustine in ~ i g h t y - t h r ~ Questions,question 46. In the thing, however, there is manifes t a dis t inct ion of things, and this is twofold,namely of suppositesand of natures; in the in te l lec tthere is manifest a twofold difference, namely ofconceptual modes and of formal objects .From what has been said the difference here intended is inferred. I t is not a manifest dist inc-t ion, for i t is the l eas t of i t s class i . e . of a l lthe dis t inct ion prior to the act of the in te l lect .

We infer i t from the real difference, however,in this fashion: The distinction of the divinesupposites i s real ; therefore we argue to someessent ial difference or distinction between whatis common to the Persons on the one hand and theproperties by which they are distinguished on theother. The reason is th i s : What i s formally oneand the same cannot be real ly identical with something belonging to i t ( in the sense that i t i s notdistinguished from the other) and yet be real lydifferent from the second (in the sense that i t isdistinguished from the la t te r) . For i f i t i sentire ly the same ~ Rarte re i , how i s this thing aprinciple of ident i ty and non-identity or nondis t inct ion and at the same jime a principle ofdis t inct ion or non-identity? 9

In commenting on this quote we point out that we know fromfai th that the persons of the Trinity are real ly ident ical in theessence of God or as Scotus puts i t there i s a unity ~ natura ~ in God. Yet in this v ~ i t y the Persons are real ly dis t inc t beforethe operation of the in te l lect . To just i fy this mystery Scotusspeaks of a minor non-manifest difference by which we in fer that theessence of God is such that there are formally different aspects inthis essence. These aspects fu l f i l l the character of formalities

39 Scotus, Joannes Duns, Opera Omnia (Vatican Edition, VaticanPress, Rome, 1950-54), 3 vols. pUb. Opus ~ , d. 2, q. 7, par.396-398.We have t r ied to make use of the Vatican cr i t ica l edit ion wherepossible. The t ranslat ion is from that prepared by Fr. Rene Maynard,O.F.M., of. the Franciscan Ins t i tu te .


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in that they are present before the operation of the mind but areinseparably and real ly conjoined with the essence within which theyare found. Scotus ca l l s the distinction he places here formal nonident i ty ra ther than a formal distinction. 40 Formal non-identityhas a greater extension than formal dist inct ion. As example toclar i fy this point would be that a house and a stone are not formallyident ical and yet they are not quite formally dist inct . There mustbe some basis for positing the relat ionship implied in a s t r i c t formaldist inct ion. I f one understands i t correct ly , however, formal dis-t inction and formal non-identi ty may be used interchangeably.

From the use Scotus makes of the formal distinction we can nowgive a definit ion of a formal distinction as "a dist inct ion from thenature of the thing occurring between two or more real ly ident icalformalit ies, of which one, before the operation of the in te l lect , i sconceivable without the other though inseparable from them even bydivine power 41

The definit ion taken part by par t shows us that the dist inct ionis a real dist inct ion since i t is found in the nature of being buti t differs ~ o m the simply real dist inct ion since the dis t inc tformalit ies are the same thing and consti tute a real ident i ty . Theformalit ies are present before the operation of the in te l lec t and atthe same time are inseparable even by divine power. To use an example

- - ~ - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -40 Scotue, op.ci t" Ox., d. 2, q. 7, par 404, "But then mustwe not admit some distinction between the two? I reply that i t isbet ter to use the negative formulation: ' th is is not formally thesame' than to say i t is dis t inc t in th is or that way.41 Grajewski, op.c i t . , p. 93.


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f -34the justice and mercy of God are present in God even before the actof the in te l lect . Yet, though the definit ion of one is not thedefinit ion of the other they are real ly identical in the divineessence. Scotus shows that justice and mercy are contradictoryat t r ibutes and the i r definit ions di f fe r not because of a Virtualdifference seen only by the mind but because there is something inthe rea l i ty that the mind discovers.

The Thomistic position commonly holds that there is no createdthing which is not created af te r an exemplar found in the DivineIdeas. To argue that God is vir tual ly a l l created things is to rejectthis fact . A vir tual dist inct ion, one must remember, is to predicateplural objective concepts of a single enti ty which are real ly differ-ent in objects of a lower order. A knowledge of the lower orders isnecessary in order to form such a dist inct ion. But in eternity thelower orders did not exis t . Is i t not bet ter to say that God containsa l l formalit ies i . e . real i t ies so p r e s ~ n t pr ior to thought but onlyseparable by means of the mind?

The diff icul ty concerning the vir tual and formal dist inct ion isthe lack of evidence about real being. I t is much simpler to makea dist inct ion with the mind i . e . a vir tual distinction so that mani s seen to be vir tua l ly animal and vegetable. To predicate formali t ies differing in definit ion within a single thing posits thequestion of just how a higher grade contains lower grades of perfect ion before the i r discovery by the mind. And in th is l ie s thediff icul ty for we do not know how they are contained. Hence thereis a temptation to re ject the formal distinction as unclear.


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CHAPTER I I I

THE OBJECTIONS ANSWERED IN THE LIGHTOF THE DOCTRINE

A great many of the objections against the formal dist inct ionof Duns Scotus have been implicit ly answered by our exposition of hisdoctrine. The final section of our thesis wil l cal l explici t a t ten-t ion to those answers. There are two objections, however, that meritspecial attention. Marcone rejects the formal distinction simplybecause i t is in fundamental disagreement with the Thomistic posit ion.Almost a l l of the authors cited have adopted the Thomistic viewpointand consequently tend to reject the formal dist inct ion because i tdoes not f i t into the Thomistic system. In this same vein are thecharges of such men as John Gerson that the distinction i s a radicalinnovation and hence in no way f i t s into the Scholastic t radit ion.Our f i r s t task, then, wil l be to show 1) that the Church does notmean to res t r ic t Catholic philosophers to s t r i c t Thomism and 2) thatthe formal distinction does indeed f i t into the Scholastic t radit ion.

Can i t be said that there is such a thing as a Catholic systemof philosophy? From the direct ives of Canon Law, Pope Leo XIII andPope St. Pius X we know that the system of St. Thomas is to beconsidered as the norm for Catholic philosophers. I ts fundamentalprinciples anct principal assertions have been pronounced II safe" orfree from theological error. Does this mean that Catholics cannot


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-uIliversTty anEJ1'rers -th-is question in the negat ive. 40 The Holy Fatherstresses that the source of t ruth in the Church is the Holy Spir i t .St. Thomas is indeed a worthy model to be followed. His philosophycontains t ruths which have "been tested by ancient and Christianphilosophy from the f i r s t days of the Church. l i la The Pope l i s t samong such t ruths those that "pertain to the nature of our knovtledge,the proper meaning of t ruth, the metaphysical and transcendentalprinciples founded on t ruth, the teachings on God as inf ini te andpersonal, the creator of a l l things, on the nature of man, the immort a l i ty of the soul, the dignity of the human person, the duties whichthe natural moral law reveals to man and imposes on him by his verynature. n42 The Holy Father makes i t ~ l e a r that a certain la t i tude ispermissible to Catholic professors provided the i r school adheres tothese baSic t ruths: "For every professor i t is legi t imate, within thel imits la id down (which are not to be overreached), to adhere to anyschool which possesses the r ight of domicile in the Church providedthat he completely distinguish the truths which must be held by a l lfrom those things which are the dist inct ive and. character ist ic

40 Allocutio 17 Oct. 1953, A f t ~ 45 (1953), 685.41 Ibid. We have used the t ranslat ion as i t appeared in:franciscan StUdies, vol. 14, 1954 pp. 204-309.42 ;I:bid.. p. 205


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elements o ~ that school, and note these distinctions in his teachings, 8.S becomes a well balanced professor. II l.!3 In accordance l1Tith thisstand, the Pope, although he names St. Thomas as the model to befollowed in the search for t ruth , does not hesi ta te to includeFrancis Suarez and Cardinal Franzelin as true followers of St. Thomasand the scholast ic method. St. Thomas, in other word.s, is not !rutdoctor of the Church. In the words of the Holy Father, "No doctor,no matter how holy and outstanding he may be, has the Church used

1.14or does she use today as the primary ~ o u n t a i n of t ru th . 'Fr. Pelster S . ~ 5 i n commenting on th is allocution of the Pope

clearly includes the system of Duns Scotus as possessing "the r ightof domicile in the Church.' "Er zeight ferner, wie Thomas und ScotUBnicht nur in den Glaubenslehren, sondern auch in den Fundamentalwahrheiten einer gesunden Philosophie - pronuntiata maiora nennen s iedie Papste - uberelnetimmen. Beiden philoeophischen Systeme d U r ~ e n in der Kirche gelehrt werden. Welches die volle Wahrheit order einengrossern Teil derselben bes i tz t , das i s t durch Vernunftbeweise zubestimmen. Die Kirche gibt Gesetze nicht fUr die Philosophie an sich,sondern fUr die Philosophie, insofern sie in Beziehing zur geoffenbarten Wahreit steht . I s t nicht es so, dass wir in bezug auf vieleDinge nicht nur in praktischen Fragen, sondern auch in speculativenmehrere Ansichten haben, die in bezug auf die kirchliche Lehre gefahr

43 Ibid. p. 20844 Ibid. p. 20645 Spholaetik 30 (1955), 593.


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I

los (tutae) sind und die sich auf gute Grunde stutzen, die aber nichtuber Wahrschein1ichkei t en hinaus reichen ft"L!-5{

An answer to the objection made against the formal dis t inct ionas to whether i t f i t s into the scholastic t radi t ion may be found inthe history of that t radi t ion. Such a history reveals that the formaldistinction in sUbstance, i f not in name, is used by many of theScholastics before the time of Scotus. This fact is commonlyrecognized today. Among those who held such a dist inct ion beforeScotUB under different names with sl ightly different uses of i t areSt. Bonaventure, Matthew of Aquasparta, Peter 01ivi, Roger Marston,William of Ware and William of Nottingham. 46 Scotus, himself,acknowledges that the formal distinction as he interprets i t in theTrini ty is sUbstantially the same as Bonaventure IS "d.istinction ofat tr ibution., ,47 Scotus refers to St. Bonaventure in the p1aee wherehe cal ls his dis t inct ion a "differentia ra t ionis ' : "potest dicisecundum a1ium doetorem antiquum ( s c i 1 ~ . Bonaventuram), quod nee 48di f fe r t tantum ratione nec omnino rea1iter , se quaei medio modo."

45 Scho1astik 30 (1955), 593.46 See Bernard Jansen, S.J. "Beitrage zur geshicht1ichenEntwick1ung der Distinctio Forma1is "Zei tschr i f t fur katho1ischeTheo10gie 53 (1929), 317-44; 517-544; idem, IDie 'd1Stinctio formal is ,beiden Serviten und Karme1iten des 17 Jahrhunderts, ibid. 61 (1937),596-601; De Raemaeker, Philosophy of Being (St. Louis, Herder, 1954),p. 68; Copleston, S.J . , History of P h i 1 0 s o ~ h y , vol. 2 (Westminster,

Md., NetiMan 1950), p. 508; De Wu1f, Histoire de 1a phi1oGophiemedieva1e, ed. tom. 2 (Paris, Vrin, 1936 ) , pp. 348-49; Grajeweki,op.cit .pp. 102-123; Longpre, La phi1osophie gg ~ . ~ Scot (PariS,1924), 240-256.47 St. Bonaventure, Omnia ~ (Quaracchi, Florence: 1882-1902)I Sent. d. 13, a. unicue, q. 3, I 235-236.118. Scotus, op.c i t . (Vatican edit ion) Ox., d. 2, q. 7, par. 401." I t can be called a difference of reason as a certain doctor said;not that ra t io designates a difference created by the in te l lect butin so far .as rat io designates the qUiddity of the thing to the extenttha.t this qUiddity is an object of the in te l lect ."


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Another aspect o ~ the charge that the formal dist inct ion i s aradical innovation i s the argument of the Thomists we cited in thef i r s t section of our thes is viz: that a true philosophy can admit nomean distinction between the real dist inction and the vir tua l dis-t inct ion. Such an argument neglects to take into account the historyof the origin of the vir tua l dist inct ion. While St. Thomas speaks ofan intermediate dist inction between pure reason (tantum ~ parteintel lectus nostri) and a distinction which is Simply rea l we coulddiscover no instance where he cal ls i t a vir tua l dist inct ion. In hiscommentary on the Sentences, St. Thomas in speaking on the questionof the dist inct ion of the attr ibutes in God uses a dist inct ion inwhich the number of ra t ios is not due only to the in te l lec t but alsoto the nature of God since there is something in God which corresponds to these concepts: "plural i tas istarum rat ionis non tantum exparte intel lectus nos tr i sed etiam ex parte ips ius Dei inquantumdixi t sc i l . est aliquod in Deo correspondens i s t i s conceptionibus 49Such a dist inction acknowledges a mean dist inct ion between a realdist inct ion and one of pure reason. I t is called a "dis t lnctiora t ion i s ' not in the sense of a 'd is t inct ion of reason" but in thesense of a rat io founded on the very property of the thing. The wordsof St. Thomas are: "haec rat io non est tantum ex parte ipsius ra t io

I cinant is , sed ex proprietate ipsius. u50 Moreover, "rat io dic i tur esse in re inquantum in re extra animam es t a1iquod respondet

I

49 St. Thomas, Omnia oPSra, (Parma ed. , 1948) In I Qilll!. d. 2,q. 1, a. 3 corpus, vol . VI, 2 a.50 Ibid . 23b.I


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conceptioni animae sicut significatum signo . . e t hoc contingentproprie quando conceptio intel lectus es t similitudo re i . u51 WhatSt. Thomas means by ~ proprietate ipsius is not great ly differentfrom what Scotus means by ~ natura re i , part icularly i f we take intoconsideration the development of thought regarding this intentionaldist inct ion during the intervening period. From what we have quotedi t i s evident that St . Thomas t reats of the basic elements of a meandist inct ion between the rea l distinction and the purely logicaldis t inct ion. In things there is a plural i ty which causes a dis t inc-t ion of concepts in the in te l lect .

Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaine t rea t of the questionraised by St. Thomas as to how the Divine Attributes are dist inct andadd to his exposition the i r own notions as to jus t what i t is thatgives r ise to such a dis t inct ion. They agree that such a dist inct ioncannot be real ei ther actually or potential ly in the divine simplic i ty . They dispute as to whether such ~ . n o n - i d e n t i t y is somehowactual on the part of the thing even though not actually real butonly secundum qUid or i f i t is only potential ~ parte ~ and actualin the in te l lect .52

I t is here that Scotus contributes his opinion that there is anactual non-formal identi ty ~ parte re i ~ actuum intellectum. Hedoes not question the fact that such a dist inct ion is dependent on

51 Ibid. 23b.52 Henry of Ghent, Quoo.l.(Paris: 1518) V, qq. 1 et 6.

Godfrey of Fontaine, (Les Philosophes Belges, Louvain: 1914),Quodl. V I I ~ q. 1, PP. 264 f f .


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the in te l lec t . The development of Scotus' treatment on such a dis-t inct ion in divinis which we have already quoted is as follows:

There is also a second way or proof. From thedifference of formal objects neither of which i scontained eminently in the other, and this in anin te l lect Imowing them intui t ively, we infer somedifference prior to the intel lectual act by which they are known intui t ively.But can this dist inct ion be called rea l 'I answer: i t is not the real actual dist inct ion according to the common interpretation whichdefines this as a difference in act between thing;and just as there is not a real distinction thatis potent ial , because nothing is there in potencywhich i s not there in act . I t can be called a difference of reason (d i ffer-entia relat ionis) as a certain doctor said; not that ra t io designates a difference created by the in te l -l ec t but in so far as ra t io designates the quiddityof the thing to the extent that this qUiddity is anobject of the in te l lect . To put i t another way, i t can be called av i r tual distinction" because whatever has such adistinction in i t s e l f does not have one thing andanother thing, but i t i s only one thing, haVing asi t were, two real i t ies vir tual ly or preeminently.For each of the real i t ies as i t exists in the thinghas i t s own proper principle just 'as i f i t were a

dis t inc t thing. For one r e a l ~ t y distinquisheswhereas the other does not, just as i f the two weredifferent things. 53I t is from Scotus that Cajetan might well have taken the term

"virtual" as i t is found in the passage quoted above. But for himsuch a dis t inct ion is a ndistinctio formaliter vi r tua l i t e r e t nonactllali ter" . Cajetan' s point of view emphasizes the part of thein te l lect in formulating his interpretation of the distinction underdiscussion. Thus, he iA the f i r s t to introduce the vir tual dis t inct ion as we L ~ O W i t today.54

- - - ~ - - - - - ~ - - . _ - - - - - - - _ . -53 Scotus, op.ci t . , Ox d. 2, q. 7, par. 399-400.54 Caietanl, Ccmmentaria in Sum. theol. (Leonina ed. IV.)I , q. 39, a . 1, 397.


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From th is br ie f look a t the origin of the formal and vi r tua ldis t inct ion we can conclude that 1) the position of St. Thomas can beinterpreted to support Scotus and 2) Scotus does not introa.uce theformal dis t inct ion as a mean between the real and the vi r tua l . Although St. Thomas does not have the same problem in i t s fu l l develop

r ment as la te r commentators have 'what he doe.s say need not be takenin the sense that Cajetan interprets him. In any event the positionof Scotus merits attention because of his contribution to thedevelopment of a mean dis t inct ion between the real d i s t i ~ c t i o n anda purely logical dist inct ion.

Having shown that Scotus has a place in the his tor ica l development of a mean dist inct ion we wil l now try to relate his doctrine onident i ty and dis t inct ion with the Thomistic doctrine on the samematter. I t can be shown that Scotus cannot be charged with theextreme opinions that we saw many objectors task him with. In thebroader view of Scholasticism nov possible Scotus' views certa inlyare a contribution whether one shares his opinions or not.

A great many objectors to the formal dis t inct ion object to i ton the grounds that i t is too real is t ic a dist inct ion. When theymake this objection they understand any real dis t inct ion from theThomistic point of view. Our argument to support this statement is

,I

based on the doctrine of St. Thomas as we explained i t . In hisreal dis t inct ion there is some sor t of composition implied in everyreal dis t inct ion although there need not be separabi l i ty . In theThomistic explanation of ident i ty we saw that ident i ty is primarilya logical notion in which two concepts are formed of the same realbeing. From such a framework i t is only natural that a Scotist1c


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dist inct ion which claims to be real is s e c u n d ~ qUid could not f i t .I f a distinction is in any way real the identity taken away by sucha distinction would necessarily be an identity in nature or number.Hence we have the fear of Thomists that the formalit ies of ScotueI

"I multiply beings whether i t is placed between the nature of God and[I the principle by which the Divine Supposites are dis t inc t or betw'een

a common nature and i t s specific differences or between the soul andi t s facul t ies or between the at t r ibutes of God or between ~ as i tis predicated of God and creatures. But i f one views the doctrineof Scotue in the framework in which i t was formulated i t does notsuffer such an interpretation. Scotus' explains ident i ty from amore metaphysical standpoint in which he attempts to give thein te l lec t an insight into the richness of the various beings inperfection. To speak of the formalit ies of animality and ra t ional i tyin man only asserts that man i s such before viewed by an in te l lect ;that he is a single, simple enti ty whieh yet somehow can by his verynature show forth perfections that are understood by the mind not tobe the same.

As we saw the consequence of the Thomistic Viewpoint is thecondemnation of Scotue as pantheistic either in fact or in germ., orpredicating a false composition in the human soul, or as destroyingthe simplicity of God. Such authors as Mercier55 see in the formall, distinction bebTeen the common nature and a specific difference somemonistic element that is actually separable from the specific

' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 55 Mercier, op.c i t .

iI


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differences. Others carry th is a step further and re jec t Scotus onthe grounds of univocity of being. A being common to God andcreatures would be in the nature of a genus which would mean thateverything contains something of the inf in i te . To place a formal dist inct ion between the attr ibutes of God, say such cr i t ics as V a c a n ~ ~

r lead to compo sot ion in God.I t is surprising that no cri t ic attacks the formal dist inction

on i t s own grounds. Scotus, as we have shown, specifically deniesthat the formal distinction brings about composition in a being. ForScotus, rea l i t i es which are formally dis t inc t consti tute a realident i ty . His position i s that a real ident i ty contains in i t s veryessence real i t ies which when discovered by the mind must be conceivedseparately. Scotus does not attempt to explain just hmT a realidentity is of such a nature that one real i ty is discovered to beformally different from another.

Some of the objections to the fOPIDal distinction as being tooreal is t ic are made with reference to the placing of the dist inct ionbetween the principle by which God is one nature and the principleby which God is tr iune. We saw that Thomas Anglicus57 even accusesScotus of Arianism because, in his eyes, Scotus makes the Father andSon different by absolute propert ies. Here there is a question ofa misunderstanding.Scotus emphatically holds that God is one simpleident i ty . To hold that GOdls essence gives r ise to different form

56 Vacant, op.c i t .57 Thomas Anglicus, op.c i t .


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al i t ies present there because of God's nature does not deny God'ssimplici ty. I t only attempts to s tate that there is something inthj,s simplicity before the act of a kno'!-Ter by which God is one andsomething by which God contains real ly dis t inc t Persons for i t wouldviolate the principle of contradit ion to say that God is one andtriune in the sense tha t God is one iaenti ty and contains non-identityby the same principle. There does not seem to be anything w1orthodox in such a posit ion.

Some crit.ics would exclude the formal dist inct ion from usebecause i t may be equated with a vir tua l dis t inct ion. Why add to theterminology of philosophy without need" they ask. John Gerson s58charge that formalit ies are a vain curiosity also contends that weare bet ter off without a formal dis t inct ion. We have already arguedthat as a part of philosophical history the formal dist inct ion hasa place. From our explanation'of the vir tua l dist inct ion as explainedby Garrigou-Lagrange i t is clear that the vir tual dist inct ion arisesfrom the fact of lower orders and the imperfection of the mind whichneeds must know a complex real i ty in separate and simpler notions, ","i t is c lear that Scotus means something qUite different when he usesthe eypression "ante actuum intellectum". Beyond this i t may safelybe held that the doctrine of Scotus with regard to the formal dist inction may provide the tool which wil l unlock some of the factsof the world not yet understood by man. For example a question maybe raised as to the inner nature of elements in compounds whichacquire new character is t ics in the compound and yet retain the abi l i ty

- - - - - - - - - - - - - _ .._---58 John Gerson, op.ci t .


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-47to reacquire their original propert ies. The formal distinction admitsthat a being may contain real i t ies within a single enti ty. Admittedlythis is a crude example but i t does serve to suggest our point .

The argument that the doctrine on the formal distinction is toodiff icul t has been answered, we hope, by our exposition of thedoctrine on that dist inction. In any event i t is no real argumentsince intel lectual advancement sometimes demands the most complexand precise of tools. Who would condemn Einstein because hisre la t ivi ty theory is diff icul t to understand'

We feel sat isf ied in view of what has been said that the formaldist inct ion has shown i t s e l f to be not only an integral part of theScholastic doctrine on dist inct ion but also represents an in teres t -ing solution to certain theological and philosophical problems. I thas equal, i f not in some respects, superior merit to otherScholastic and Neo-Scholastic theories of ,dist inction.


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BIBLIOGRAPHYPrimary Sources

Scotus, Joannes Duns. ~ c o t ~ Opera Omnia, Vives Edition, 26 vols.Paris , 1891-1895 OperA Omnia, Vatican Edition, Vatican Press.- - ~ 3 ~ v - o ~ 1 - s - . - r ( O ~ r ~ d ~ i ~ n - a ~ t i o d. I , I I and III) Rome, 1950-54.

Thomas Aquinas, St. Opera Omnia, Parma ed. vol. VI, 1948.Scotist ic Commentators

Bridges, Geoffrey, O.F.M. Petrus Thomae: identi ty and dis t inct ion.Saint Bonaventure, N.Y., Franciscan Ins t i tu te , 1956 Vii, 268 PP.Unpublished thesis (Ph.D.) in Philosophy, Franciscan Inst i tuteof St. Bonaventure University, 1956.GraJewski, Maurice S ., O.F.M. The F o r m ~ Distinction of Duns Scotus.The Catholic University Press. Washington, D.C., 1 9 ~ Maestrius, B. Opera Omnia. vol. IV. Venice, 1708.Mayronis, Franciscus. Scripta. Venice, 1520.Van de Woestyne, Z. Cursus Philosophiqus. I I . Mechlin, 1933.Wolter, Allan B., O.F.M. The Transcendentale ~ Their Function 1lithe Metaphysics of Duns Scotus. Franciscan Inst i tute .St. B o n a v e n t u r e , ~ . Y . 1946.

General SourcesAltenstaig, Joannes. Lexicon theologicum, 1583Barbedette, D. Histoire de ~ P h i l o s o p h i ~ ~ , 1923Bitt le , Celestine, O.F.M. Cap. ~ Domain of BeinE, OntologIe

I Nei'f Yor}:, 1941 I Brukerus, Jacobus. ill:....'tor1,e, c r i t ica Philosophia. Lipsiae, 1743.Capreola, Joanne, O.P. In defeneione t h e o l o ~ i a e S1Y1 Thomae Aauinatis~ ter t io sententiarum. Turonibus, 190 ' .Copleston, S.J . , History Qf P h i l o s o ~ . Westminster, Md. NerrmanPress. 3 vols. 1950.


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De Rugeriis, Hyacinthus p.O. Defensorium Doctrinae divi 1 h Q p ~ . Dionysius a Rykel, Opera Omnia, tom. 33Dorholt, Adm. R.P. Bernardus, Der Predigerorden und seine Theolqgie.Schoning-Paderborn, 1917.Du Plessis DIArgentre, Carolus. Collectio ludiciorum de noviserroribu...Garrigou-Lagrange, Reginald O.P. G o d , ~ Existence and ~ a t u r ~ , Thomistic Solution of Certain Agnostic A n t i n o m i ~ . t rans. by

Dom Bede Rose, O.S.B., Herder, St. Louis, 1941.__ ~ _ ' = = " " __ - - = ~ _ , ~ One God, A CommentarY .Q.!l the f i r s t part 2i:St. tnomas ~ h e o l o g i c a l Summa. trans. by Dom Bede Rose O.S.B.,

Herder, St. Louis, 1941.Gerson, John. Omnia Opera. Antverpiae, 1706.Gonzalez, p. Zeferino O. p. Hlstoria ~ la Filosophia. Segunda. Edicion. Hadrid, 1886.Goudin, p. Fr. AntoniUS. Philosophia juxta 1nconcussa tutiss1maque~ Thomae dogmata. edit io Coloniae, 1724.Gredt, Josephus O.S.B. Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisicae.Friburgi Brisgoviae, 2 vols. 1937.Marcone, Ramirus, O.S.B. Philosophia aetat is part ist ica , mediae,recentis usque ad saeculum xix. Romae, Desclee e t Socii , 1914.Mercier, Cardinal D. Cours 9&. Philosophie. vol. IV, Archeveaue deMalines, Septieme Edition, 1918.Rousselot, Dictionnaire des sciences philosophigues. DuxiemeEdition: Paris, 187; : -Sanserverino, Caietanus. Elementa P h i 1 0 s o ~ h i a e christ1anae Ymantique ~ nova comparata. Neopo11, 1867.Signorie110, Nuntii . Lexicon Peripateticum Phi1osophico-Theo1og1cum.Turner, William. History Qf P h i 1 0 S 2 ~ . Ginn and Company, 1929.Vacant, Etudes, comparees sur la Philosophie de St. Thomas e t ~ celIe de Duns Scot. Par1S:--Beauehesne, 1 ~ 1 : -Vocabulario XJ'leologiae, a Joanne A1tenstaig edi to. Vindelici , 1517.

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