IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE IN AND FOR SUSSEX COUNTY

LAWRENCE J. CONNELL, :: C.A. No. 11C-

Plaintiff, ::

v. : Jury Trial Demanded:

LINDA L. AMMONS, : :

Defendant. :

COMPLAINT (Defamation)

1. This is a civil action for compensatory and punitive damages for common law

defamation. Defendant Ammons in bad faith and out of ill will, intentionally, recklessly,

willfully and wantonly created almost two dozen false and pretextual statements and widely

published these defamatory falsehoods without privilege in an attempt to destroy plaintiff’s

professional reputation and violate his academic freedom in the classroom as a respected

criminal law professor.

THE PARTIES

2. Plaintiff Lawrence J. Connell is a member of the Delaware Bar, a citizen and resident

of Delaware and a 26 year tenured faculty member at the Delaware campus of the Widener

University School of Law (the “Law School”).

3. Defendant Linda L. Ammons is a citizen and resident of Delaware and at all times

relevant hereto was the Dean of the Law School.

FACTS

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4. Plaintiff was admitted to the Delaware Bar in 1979. He is currently and always has

been an attorney member in good standing of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the State of

Delaware.

5. Upon graduation from law school, plaintiff clerked for the Supreme Court of

Delaware in Georgetown from 1978 to 1979. He practiced law in Sussex County with the Law

Office of James C. Sabo until 1984, when he joined the faculty of the Law School as an

instructor.

6. In 1986 plaintiff was appointed to a tenure track position as an assistant professor at

the Law School and secured tenured status in or about 1992. With tenured status his

employment was permanent absent just cause to terminate him.

7. Plaintiff’s career consisted of supervising students enrolled in various Law School

clinical programs, including the Delaware Postconviction Relief Clinic, the Delaware Civil

Clinic, and the Clinical Externship Program. Plaintiff also has taught courses in criminal law,

criminal procedure, evidence, interviewing, counseling and negotiation.

8. While supervising the Postconviction Relief Clinic, plaintiff volunteered to represent

James Riley, an African-American male sentenced to death after being convicted of murder by

an all-white jury from which the prosecutor wrongfully had excluded all African-Americans.

After more than a decade of plaintiff’s volunteer legal efforts on his behalf, Mr. Riley eventually

was awarded a new trial on the ground of racial discrimination in his jury selection.

9. Defendant Ammons knew of plaintiff’s efforts to achieve racial justice for his client

James Riley.

10. The Law School has a reputation as a liberal law school. There are only two known

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conservative faculty members out of over 60 faculty members, one being plaintiff.

11. Defendant Ammons is of the liberal political and legal persuasion.

12. Plaintiff is of the conservative political and legal persuasion.

13. Plaintiff is Caucasian and a male.

14. Ammons is an African-American female.

15. Ammons is proud and thin skinned.

16. Plaintiff’s conservative political and legal persuasion was well known within the

Law School community and by Ammons.

17. Ammons was offended by plaintiff’s conservative political and legal viewpoints in a

law school which she wanted to be totally of the liberal persuasion.

18. After she became Dean of the Law School in 2006, Ammons set out to find and

create pretextual reasons to destroy plaintiff’s professional reputation and to violate his academic

freedom in the classroom.

19. As part of a nationwide teaching methodology often used for criminal procedure and

substantive criminal law, plaintiff in the classroom has used the Dean of the Law School as an

example while teaching criminal law principles to grab the attention of his students and to help

them remember the legal principles involved. He has done this when the Dean was Caucasian

and when the Dean was African-American.

20. Professors from other law schools have testified as expert witnesses for plaintiff that

this teaching methodology is within the pedagogical mainstream of U.S. law schools.

21. For example, in trying to teach students the law of attempts and murder, plaintiff

would use an example where, in retaliation for Ammons’ threat to fire him for stealing her

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parking space at the school, plaintiff would rush to her office to shoot her and discover, to his

surprise, that he had shot instead of the actual Dean a manakin with a pumpkin head.

22. In 2010 Ammons learned plaintiff had used various examples involving her in

teaching his classes.

23. Ammons was infuriated and angered that she had been used in such teaching

examples. She felt her dignity was impugned and that she had been called “a pumpkin head.”

24. She set out to retaliate against plaintiff for using her in his classroom teaching

examples and also for his conservative political and legal views.

25. Ammons set out to destroy plaintiff’s professional reputation and to deny his

academic freedom in the classroom by creating pretextual factual assertions about his character

and job performance.

26. One such false assertion which she decided to use was a false claim that since

plaintiff had used violent examples in teaching criminal law, such as criminals shooting other

persons, he himself must be a violent person.

27. She falsely claimed that plaintiff wanted to shoot her with a weapon.

A. First Defamatory Acts

28. In December 2010 Ammons knowingly and recklessly had plaintiff falsely charged

in writing with being a racist, a sexist and a threat to the physical safety of persons on the Law

School campus.

29. Ammons published these written false statements without privilege within the Law

School community.

30. On December 10, 2010 plaintiff was confronted with these written false statements

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which left him speechless and stunned. Unnecessarily, the head of campus security, in plain

clothes, was in the room during this confrontation.

31. Unnecessarily, the head of campus security was told at that time of each of these

written false statements.

32. Unnecessarily staff in the office of the registrar also were told of these written false

statements.

B. Second Defamatory Acts

33. Ten days later on December 20, 2011, Ammons purposefully humiliated plaintiff and

had him physically banned from campus as a threat to the physical safety of herself and others in

the campus community. She also denied him access to his office.

34. She informed staff that he was not permitted on campus because he was a threat to

the physical safety of persons in the campus community.

35. The news that plaintiff had been thrown off campus spread like wildfire, destroying

his profession reputation because this action was symbolic speech which communicated a clear

message that plaintiff, a 26 year employee of the Law School, had committed some grave

misdeed and he was a threat to the physical safety of persons in the Law School community.

C. Third Defamatory Act

36. Ammons also told James Harris the president of Widener University that plaintiff

was a threat to her physical safety and the physical safety of other persons in the Law School

community.

37. As a means of self defense, in an effort to protect his reputation from permanent

damage, plaintiff had to secure legal assistance and he was compelled to publicly reply to the

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tenured law school faculty and in media forums concerning the false charges which Ammons had

caused to be placed against him and to explain his absence from the Law School community.

38. As a person who successfully had spent ten years voluntarily fighting for the life of a

condemned African-American on death row, he denied he ever could be a racist and that the

claims by Ammons that he was a threat to anyone and a sexist also were false.

D. Fourth Defamatory Acts

39. On February 24, 2011 Ammons knowingly initiated false and reckless formal written

charges against plaintiff with tenured faculty of the law school to dismiss him for cause. The

untrue charges are attached as Ex. A.

40. These knowingly false and reckless written statements include but are not limited to

the following.

41. Ammons stated as a fact, which she believed to be true, that plaintiff uses a well

known offensive racially derogatory term to refer to African-Americans to demean them by

calling them “black folks.”

42. The falsity of claiming that this is a well known offensive racially derogatory term

for African-Americans is established by the following widely known general facts found on a

respected academic freedom website -http://thefire.org/article/12996.html.

43. President Barack Obama himself uses the term "folks" to describe all sorts of people,

including African-Americans. (Entering "President Obama folks" into Google amply

demonstrates this.)

44. The first African-American to earn a doctorate at Harvard, W. E. B. Du Bois, used

the term in his classic work The Souls of Black Folk as well as The Gift of Black Folk and Black

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Folk, Then and Now.

45. In the past 45 days, the term "black folks" has been used by columnist Arlene Jones

in the Austin Weekly News, columnist Charing Ball in The Atlanta Post, scholar Boyce Watkins

at the website thyblackman.com, and many others.

46. The widespread use of the term is strong evidence that it is not, as far as most people

are concerned, a negatively loaded term. In fact, it usually signifies some sense of familiarity or

friendliness.

47. As stated by the Foundation For Individual Rights in Education, this is "a ubiquitous

term that has no necessary relationship to discriminatory or harassing behavior."

48. The fact Ammons saw fit to include the term three times in her false statements

declaring as a fact that plaintiff is a racial harasser is proof of defendant’s defamatory purpose,

ill will, malice and reckless behavior.

49. Plaintiff also was falsely accused of referring to women as “bitch”and “honey.”

50. The untruth of all of Ammons’ statements was later pointed out to defendant in two

sworn affidavits which plaintiff submitted to Ammons.

51. But she did not print or circulate any retraction for any of her false statements

regarding plaintiff.

52. Each of the statements in these written charges was widely published and

disseminated both within and without the Law School community in bad faith, out of ill will,

intentionally, recklessly, willfully, wantonly and without privilege.

53. Each of the factual assertions made by Ammons in this four page document is

knowingly false, reckless and pretextual for Ammons’ true motive, which was to destroy

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plaintiff’s professional reputation and deny his academic freedom in the classroom.

54. At this time Ammons dropped and abandoned her previous false statement that

plaintiff was a threat to the physical safety of students, faculty or administrators.

55. But she still denied plaintiff access to campus and thus reiterated her prior symbolic

speech about his dangerousness.

56. She published no retraction in this regard and her actions and plaintiff’s continued

absence from his office and from campus still communicated the same message that plaintiff was

a threat to the general public.

57. In this writing, now Ammons falsely claimed plaintiff was a racist and a sexist and

refused to cooperate with her in her vendetta against him.

58. Under his contract plaintiff was entitled to various substantive procedural protections

before he could be terminated for cause. These included the right to the assistance of legal

counsel, the right of his attorney to cross examine his accusers, testimony against him had to be

made under oath, his judges would be the full tenured faculty, and a majority vote would be

required to fire him.

59. After Ammons filed these false charges against plaintiff, under the procedural

protections of his contract, the full tenured faculty appointed an Informal Review Committee to

review Ammon’s charges.

60. Plaintiff submitted to that Committee a 39 page affidavit which is attached as Ex. B.

61. On March 7, 2011 that Committee refused to join in Ammon’s vendetta and

dismissed the charges against plaintiff without prejudice as set forth in Exhibit C attached.

62. On March 14th Ammons wrote to the Committee and declared that she would not let

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the matter rest, as set forth in Exhibit D attached.

E. Fifth Defamatory Act

63. That same day Ammons issued a press release to the media which is attached as

Exhibit E. Therein, considering extrinsic facts, the innuendo and context of her statements, she

falsely claimed that plaintiff had been justifiably accused of professional misconduct by students

and those charges had merit to them and were not frivolous.

64. However, any such complaints were time barred under the written procedures of the

Law School, a fact defendant deliberately concealed.

65. Three days after the decision of the Informal Review Committee, on March 10th

Ammons caused to be published and filed new false charges, that plaintiff was a racist and a

sexist, with an entirely different University administrative body which she controlled which was

separate from the independent tenured faculty.

66. The judges in this administrative body consisted only of administrators and a faculty

member of Ammons choosing.

67. Plaintiff no longer had a right to legal counsel before this body. He lost his right to

cross examine his accusers under oath and other procedural protections he previously had by

contract as a tenured faculty member.

68. The new charges filed against plaintiff again falsely claimed that he was a racist and

a sexist.

69. Ammons directed that these false charges be filed despite the fact that governing

Law School regulations stated that they were time barred by a 180 day statute of limitations., a

fact she continued to conceal.

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70. In this second proceeding plaintiff submitted the following written evidence on

March 25, 2011:

71. His first and second affidavits. Ex F and B attached.

72. The expert witness affidavits of two distinguished law professors from the University

of Pennsylvania School of Law and the George Washington University School of Law. Exs G

(Kerr) and H (Salmanson) attached.

73. The affidavits of four students including an African American, an Egyptian, and a

female. Elbardissi (Ex. I); Scott (Ex. J); Ramsay (Ex. K) Shehata (Ex. L), attached

74. Twenty-nine (29) emails from students. Exhibit M attached.

75. On April 5, 2011 he submitted another affidavit of a female student. Exhibit O

(Hall) attached.

F. Sixth Defamatory Act

76. Nevertheless, despite personal knowledge from all these sworn affidavits as to the

true facts, except Ex. O, on Sunday March 27, 2011 Ammons caused to be published in the

News Journal, the newspaper of general circulation in the State of Delaware, a five paragraph

false, reckless and defamatory letter to the editor, which considering extrinsic facts, the context

and innuendo surrounding the letter, falsely and recklessly accused plaintiff of being the subject

of numerous truthful complaints of misconduct by his students, of having a faculty committee

rule against him in faculty proceedings, and falsely stating that plaintiff’s academic freedom was

not being violated by Ammons. Ex. N attached.

77. Despite plaintiff’s efforts to mitigate his damages, Ammons has succeeded in her

plan to destroy plaintiff’s professional and legal reputation. Any statement that a law professor

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and attorney is a racist and a sexist forever destroys his professional reputation and character.

78. Plaintiff’s separate and distinct immediate and long term injuries and conditions,

which were the direct and proximate result of defamatory statements, include, but are not limited

to, damage to his professional reputation and standing in the local and nationwide academic

community, the student body, and the general public at large, emotional distress, embarrassment,

humiliation, and mental suffering endured by plaintiff and any physical or bodily harm caused by

that suffering, as well as special injury, such as monetary losses in the future, including lost

wages, pension, and other benefits, such as over one million dollars in medical insurance

benefits for plaintiff’s permanently disabled and institutionalized daughter.

Count I - Common Law Defamation

79. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1-78 set forth above.

80. Plaintiff is a private figure.

81. Plaintiff has been libeled in written statements.

82. Plaintiff has been slandered in oral statements.

83. These statements have defamed plaintiff in his trade, business or profession.

84. The libels of plaintiff are clear from the written statements themselves or are clear

only after referring to extrinsic facts not contained in the writing.

85. The defendant defamed plaintiff and the defamation has been published.

86. The defendant was negligent in failing to determine the truth of the defamatory

matter.

87. The defendant intentionally or recklessly failed to determine the truth of the

defamatory matter.

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88. The defendant knew that the defamatory matter published was false and untrue.

89. The defendant acted with utter disregard for whether the defamatory matter

published was false and untrue.

90. The defendant acted with actual malice, and ill will and knowledge that her

statements were false or were made in reckless disregard of whether or not they were false.

91. The chief motive of the defendant was actual malice and ill will.

92. The statements made by the defendant in the faculty employment context constitute

publication within the law of defamation. They were not privileged in any employment context

since they were made with actual malice and out of ill will, there was no duty to furnish the

information to the recipient, and they circulated to persons other than plaintiff and injured his

professional reputation.

93. They also were made with knowledge of their falsity and recklessly disregarded

whether they were true or false.

94. The statements were made primarily to further interests other than those protected by

any qualified privilege and the chief motive for making such statements was the ill will and

malice of the defendant.

95. The statements found in a press releases or in a letter to the editor, for example, also

were outside of the performance of defendant’s official duties or functions which could give rise

to any privilege in an employment context. There was no duty whatsoever for defendant to issue

a press release about plaintiff or to write a letter to the editor about plaintiff.

96. Defendant’s abuse of any privilege found in the employment context under the law

of defamation is further evidenced by the fact that she is operating a higher educational

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institution. The website for her employer Widener University in its “Mission & Goals”

statement claims that she is committed to academic freedom “in matters pertaining to pedagogy,”

in matters of classroom instruction which she instead has attacked.

97. As established by two expert witness affidavits of which the defendant was fully

aware, plaintiff’s classroom teaching methodology is well within the mainstream of that found in

prominent American law schools. But this did not prevent defendant from falsely asserting as

fact that plaintiff uses racist and sexist classroom pedagogy.

98. Moreover, in her bulletins and handbooks the defendant claims that she is committed

to “free expression” in the classroom. But she is not committed to the free expression of plaintiff

in his classroom.

99. Plaintiff had to take and use reasonable efforts to minimize the effect of the

defamation by defendant on the student body, among the faculty and staff at his place of

employment and in the general academic community nationwide of which he was a member in

good professional standing.

100. The symbolic speech of the defendant in throwing plaintiff off campus, in writing

and orally declaring him to be a physical threat to her own and to student life and limb, and in

causing rumors and other comment to circulate in the Law School community, which destroyed

his professional reputation, all compelled plaintiff to defend his reputation publicly before the

tenured faculty and in the media in an effort to salvage and rehabilitate his professional

reputation in mitigation of the damages he was suffering.

101. The defendant could reasonably foresee that the nature of the false charges she

lodged against plaintiff would strongly compel him to repeat them in an effort to defend himself

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and to mitigate his damages in the face of the vendetta being waged against him by the

defendant.

102. The actions of defendant were willful or wanton and merit an award of punitive

damages.

103. Plaintiff’s right to be free from defamation has been denied under the common law

of the State of Delaware.

Wherefore, plaintiff prays that the Court:

(a) Enter judgment against the defendant.

(b) Enter a judgment against the defendant for compensatory and punitive damages.

( c) Enter a judgment against the defendant for costs and pre and post judgment

interest.

(d) Require such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper under the

circumstances.

THE NEUBERGER FIRM, P.A.

/s/ Thomas S. Neuberger THOMAS S. NEUBERGER, ESQ. (#243)STEPHEN J. NEUBERGER, ESQ. (#4440)RAEANN WARNER (#4931)Two East Seventh Street, Suite 302Wilmington, Delaware 19801(302) 655-0582TSN@NeubergerLaw.comSJN@NeubergerLaw.comRW@NeubergerLaw.com

Dated: April 8, 2011 Attorneys for Plaintiff

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EXHIBIT A

EXHIBITB

WIDENER UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

IN THE MATTER OF ::

Professor Lawrence J. Connell :

FIRST AFFIDAVIT OF LAWRENCE J. CONNELL

State of Delaware :: SS

County of New Castle :

I, Lawrence J. Connell, having been duly sworn, hereby depose and state as follows:

1. This affidavit is based upon my personal knowledge. I am competent to testify.

A. Employment Background.

2. I am an Associate Professor of Law at the Widener University School of Law in

Wilmington, Delaware.

3. I have been employed by Widener since the fall semester of 1984, when I was

hired as an instructor to teach Legal Methods to first-year students. In 1986 I was appointed an

Assistant Professor of Law and named Director of the Postconviction Relief Clinic. From 1986

to 1988 I also served as the Acting Director of the Delaware Civil Clinic, as well as the Interim

Legal Director of Delaware Volunteer Legal Services, Inc. After being promoted to Associate

Professor of Law, I was granted in 1992 what was then known as Track 2 tenure, which was a

form of tenure that emphasized teaching rather than the Track 1 emphasis on scholarship. Track

2 tenure was developed primarily to provide employment security for clinical professors. Only

two other professors, to my knowledge, were granted Track 2 tenure before the tenure rules were

once again changed to a single form of tenure that eliminated the previous distinctions.

4. In or about 1997, I was appointed a co-Director, with Professor Francis Catania,

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of the law school’s externship program. In August 2010 Vice Dean Patrick Kelly informed me

that Dean Linda Ammons had decided to remove me from that position effective January 1,

2011. I had no conversation with Ammons about her decision. Kelly further informed me that

Professor Sydney Howe-Barksdale, an untenured, non-tenure track administrator was to be my

successor.

5. I began teaching Criminal Law in 1986. Widener is unique among law schools in

that its clinical professors have always been required to teach doctrinal classes in addition to

their clinical responsibilities. Criminal Law is a required class at Widener for first-year students,

and my class size has varied from about 60 students to more than 120, though in recent years

generally much closer to the smaller number, rather than the larger.

B. Statistics on the Size of My Classes.

6. The complainants are two (2) of 67 students who were enrolled in my spring

semester 2010 Criminal Law class. Six months after the Criminal Law classes ended, the

complainants teamed up with two (2) students (known to me only as Witnesses ‘B’ and ‘C’)

from my fall semester 2010 Criminal Procedure Section B, to complain to the administration

about my ‘racist’ and ‘sexist’ behavior. Sixty-seven ( 67) students were enrolled in my Criminal

Procedure Section B class. I also taught in the fall semester a Criminal Procedure Section A class

in which 56 students were enrolled. To my knowledge, no students in Section A complained to

the administration about my being either a ‘racist’ or a ‘sexist.’ Moreover, none of the

approximate 60 externs that I supervised at any time in 2010 expressed to the administration

similar views.

7. In short, based on the word of 4 out of 250 students enrolled in my courses in

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2010, Ammons and Kelly have declared me to be not only unfit to teach, but also a threat to the

community’s safety.

C. My Teaching Methodology.

8. Criminal law involves the study of why we punish certain individuals (criminals)

at all, as well as why we place them in rigid legal categories (crimes) that largely determine the

punishment they will receive. By definition, the study of criminal law requires discussion of

violent, degrading human behavior that may offend normal sensibilities.

9. My approach to teaching criminal law has been to use a casebook that is rich with

examples, problems and scholarly commentary about criminal law. Rather than focus on

teaching common law crimes and their elements, I use the Kaplan and Weisberg casebook that

employs the Model Penal Code as its common thread. I believe that if students can learn to use a

single, relatively coherent statutory code, they will be prepared to use whatever statutory codes

have been adopted in the states in which they will practice. Moreover, most state codes are

modeled in varying degrees upon the Model Penal Code, and employ its mens rea or mental state

provisions.

10. Thus, our criminal law classes entail considerable discussion about the nature

and relationship of an actor’s mental state to his culpability. As a practical matter, the great bulk

of cases and examples in which these relationships can be explored involve violent, assaultive

conduct that often results in death. They involve reprehensible behavior and deplorable results.

My approach, therefore, is to try and lighten the atmosphere by using absurd hypothetical

problems to illustrate application of the rules. The hypotheticals often involve me, the students,

and other law school actors familiar to the students. The law school actors have included, among

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others, Dean Ammons and her white male predecessors as well. The hypos engage the students,

and the familiar characters enable them to remember the underlying rules and application.

11. To ensure that students are not lulled into believing that the analysis of cases in

the book and my absurd hypos is simply an intellectual exercise, I also talk about cases in which

I was involved both before I came to Widener and after, in the Postconviction Relief Clinic, as

well. I also talk occasionally about cases that my third-year externs have encountered. A point I

try to emphasize is that “cases” involve real people – victims, defendants, and their families --

who have suffered and have caused suffering. Using cases from the Clinic and from the externs

has the additional benefit, I believe, of enabling students to envision themselves as soon-to-be

actors in the system.

12. For nearly a quarter century of criminal law classes, students and I have been

colleagues in crime in hypothetically planning and carrying out many a successful, as well as

botched, robbery and shooting at the Wawa on Naaman’s Road (complicity, conspiracy, attempt,

felony-murder, intentional murder, grossly reckless murder, manslaughter and criminally

negligent homicide). In some hypos I have been the victim of students who have pushed or

punched me, or tried to plunge a Bowie knife into my chest. I generally manage to repel these

make-believe assaults with my trusty .357 magnum. (self-defense, proportionality of force).

13. More often, however, I am the perpetrator of various heinous crimes. For

example, each year my plan to kill their Contracts professor by placing a bomb in the class

following mine is foiled when Dick Tracy discovers and disables the bomb before it explodes.

(attempted murder) I have also made hypothetical appearances outside the window of my

students’ Property class and discharged my imaginary M-16 into their classroom just to see looks

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on their terrified faces. Occasionally a student is hypothetically struck and killed by one of my

stray bullets, but most often the bullets never graze anyone in the room (murder, attempted

murder, reckless endangering).

D. NUMBERED ANSWERS TO THE STUDENT ALLEGATIONS FOUND IN DEANAMMONS’ STATEMENT OF REASONS TO TERMINATE MY EMPLOYMENT

14. I reply as follows to the four page Statement of Reasons to dismiss me for cause

lodged against me by Dean Ammons dated February 24, 2011.

15. In paragraph number 2 of the Background, Ammons provides that the

“[s]pecific allegations [against me] included, but were not limited to, the following:”

a. “a person who is shooting at black folks [is] less dangerous than a person who is

shooting randomly.”

Answer: The allegation is denied. I never made such a statement. The person making the

allegation is biased with their own private agenda but lacking knowledge of that person’s

identity, I am unable to provide additional specificity as to bias.

16. In perhaps the second class of January 2010, the class discussed the case of

Apprendi v. New Jersey. The defendant Apprendi entered a guilty plea to a weapons offense after

shooting into the home of a black family that had moved into a previously all-white

neighborhood. After he was arrested, Apprendi made a statement – which he later retracted –

that while he did not know the owners of the home personally, “because they are black . . . he

does not want them in the neighborhood.” The statutory sentence for the weapons offense ranged

from 5 to 10 years. A separate statute allowed a judge to “extend” the sentence to 10 to 20 years

if the defendant were found to have committed the weapons offense “with a purpose to

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intimidate on account of race.” The trial judge sentenced Apprendi to 12 years, outside the range

specified for the weapons offense, but within the range of the sentencing enhancement statute.

17. Apprendi argued that any finding of fact to justify his enhanced sentence must

be determined by a jury and not by a sentencing judge. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that

Apprendi’s sentence violated the Due Process Clause.

18. Because the Apprendi case came at the end of the first chapter on the purposes

and limits of punishment, I raised the question of whether there were any retributive or utilitarian

purposes for enhancing Apprendi’s punishment, assuming he had intended to shoot into the

house because its occupants were black. I asked the class, in effect (this occurred more than a

year ago), the following hypothetical: “What if Apprendi were a psychopath who had shot into

the home because the people who lived there had red hair and Apprendi simply hated people

with red hair? Would he be less deserving of punishment than the real Apprendi (referring to the

retributive arguments)? Would he be any less dangerous than the real Apprendi (referring to the

utilitarian arguments)?”

19. What followed was some discussion of whether the real Apprendi or the

hypothetical psychopathic Apprendi should be punished more severely and the reasons why. I

closed the discussion by acknowledging that there may be some legitimate utilitarian reasons

(e.g., deterrence of racial motivated crimes) to sentence Apprendi more harshly, other utilitarian

reasons, such as the need for incapacitation, the real and the hypothetical Apprendi are at least

equally dangerous.

20. I did, however, question whether Apprendi’s actions were, for retributive

purposes, any worse than the hypothetical shooter’s. I noted that one of the objections to such

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“hate crime” sentencing enhancements is that they come dangerously close to violating one of

the fundamental principles of the criminal law: that we do not punish for bad thoughts alone. On

the other hand, if motive for committing a crime is a fair consideration for punishment, there

remains the risk in cases like Apprendi’s that the public may see such “hate crime”

enhancements as creating a preferred class of victims based on race. I added that, from the

viewpoint of their respective victims, as well as the degree of trauma or harm they may have

suffered, there was no reason to believe that Apprendi and the hypothetical shooter should be

treated any differently from one another.

21. From that discussion, the complainants opine in their initial letter that I am

“unsympathetic to the victims of racially motivated crimes,” a conclusion that appears to have

tainted their view of me from first week of the semester.

22. Paragraph 2 again alleges -

b. “You mean to tell me, if you see two black men walking, you are not going to cross

the street;”

Answer: This allegation is denied. This is an inaccurate, misleading statement, taken

completely out of the context of a conversation I had with several students, presumably

including at least one of the complainants, after a class.

23. During the class we had discussed the notorious case of Bernhard Goetz, who

was ultimately acquitted of attempted murder charges in the subway shooting of “four youths,”

as the New York Court of Appeals put it, two of whom had demanded money from Goetz. In

their initial letter to Ammons, the complainants objected to my telling the class that the “four

youths” were black male teenagers and that Goetz was white. In one of only four specific

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allegations raised in their initial letter, the complainants wrote: “The case book did not mention

anything about the races of the defendants and or (sic) victims. In class Professor Connell

said that the 4 men were black and that the defendant was white.” (emphasis in original)

24. The complainants are correct that the casebook did not mention the race of the

parties, but that I did. Nevertheless, a casebook note immediately following the Goetz opinion

informed students that a jury eventually acquitted Goetz on all charges, including attempted

murder, except for an illegal gun possession charge. Given the fact that Goetz shot at least one of

the teens in the back when he appeared to present no threat to Goetz, one might ask how a jury

conceivably could have acquitted Goetz. The answer required not only an exploration of his

Goetz’s mental state at the time of the shootings, but the jurors’ as well.

25. That inevitably involved a discussion of the role of race in the outcome. Many

folks at the time viewed Goetz as a hero who, in being prosecuted for attempted murder, was

being victimized a second time by a tone-deaf prosecutor’s office. Others, however, viewed

Goetz as an unrepentant racist vigilante. In accepting Goetz’s claim of self-defense, perhaps the

jury viewed Goetz as having responded reasonably to the threat he faced. Or perhaps they

believed that Goetz responded in an excessive manner, but feared that convicting him would

discourage law-abiding citizens from defending themselves. Or maybe Goetz and the jurors

were all simply unrepentant racists.

26. In any case, an examination of why a jury exculpated Goetz on all charges

cannot avoid a discussing of the perspective of Goetz, a white man who encountered a group of

black males demanding money from him.

27. An inescapable truth of violent crime in American cities is that it is

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disproportionately committed by young black men. The unfortunate reality of urban crime

explains why some people, of all races, fear young black men. While that fear may lead to

unfortunate and erroneous stereotyping, it nonetheless exists. It is a fair question to ask whether

Goetz experienced that fear and acted on it, or whether he never felt in imminent danger

whatsoever. The fact that a jury acquitted Goetz requires examination of the jurors’ mindsets as

well.

28. To illustrate the pervasiveness of that fear, I mentioned (and I do not recall if I

mentioned it both during the classroom discussion of Goetz, or only in the discussion after class)

recalling a statement that was attributed to Rev. Jesse Jackson about the problem of urban black

crime. I recalled Jackson reportedly saying that if he were approached by a group of young black

men on a city street, he would cross the street in order to avoid contact with them. The point

being that even Jesse Jackson felt some degree of apprehension around groups of young black

men he did not know.

29. I recall staying after class that day to talk with several students. Because the

Goetz case was the last in the self-defense lesson, we had what I thought was a wide-ranging

discussion about self-defense principles generally and about the Goetz case specifically that

lasted more than half an hour.

30. In discussing how the Goetz jury could conceivably have acquitted him, I recall

telling the students how the crime rate in New York City at the time was nearly double that of

any other American city. I noted that many New Yorkers felt besieged by out of control crime

rate, and that young black men were a highly visible part of that problem. I expressed the view

that the race of the “youths” most certainly affected Goetz’s view of his situation. Whether or

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not one agreed that his response was reasonable and proportionate was a different question.

31. One of the students – presumably one of the complainants – persisted in saying

how she did not understand how the race of the teens on the subway could have made any

difference. She said that, in a situation like Goetz’s, the race of the teens would not concern her,

but rather their dress or behavior would. I agreed that dress and behavior would be important

indicators, but the perception of race cannot simply be ignored.

32. Recalling that the student, or one of the others in the group, had mentioned she

was from Camden, I mentioned Rev. Jesse Jackson’s observation and asked, “So if you were

approached by a group of black male teens on a street in Camden, you would not cross the

street? You wouldn’t feel like Jesse Jackson? You wouldn’t feel uncomfortable in any way?”

The student responded, “No, I wouldn’t.”

33. Paragraph 2 again alleges -

c. “Reference to African Americans as ‘black folks;’”

Answer: Admitted. I often refer to groups of people as “folks,” a perfectly legitimate

word in the Merriam-Webster dictionary. I address guests in my home as “folks.” I address the

students in my classes as “folks.” For example, if this matter goes forward I will attach to this

affidavit emails to this effect..

34. Paragraph 2 again alleges -

c. “Victim hypothetical using a female student coupled with the words ‘Die Bitch;’”

Answer: This allegation is denied. I have never addressed the word to, nor used the word

in connection with, any student. The person making the allegation is biased with their own

private agenda, but lacking knowledge of the person’s identity, I am unable to provide additional

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specificity as to bias.

35. While I have never addressed the word “bitch” to any student, the word has

been used pedagogically in class. This is another example of how my accusers have pulled my

words out of context, reinterpreted them, and ascribed them back to me, complete with new and

nefarious motivations. Like most first-year criminal law courses, we study the topic of voluntary

manslaughter and the controversial “adultery” provocation. We discuss the rule’s origins in male

homicidal violence against women, and the gender bias the rule continues to promote. We

discuss how provocation as a mitigating principle was perceived by some courts to be a partial

excuse, while other courts viewed it as a partial justification.

36. When applied to the “adultery” provocation specifically, these distinctions are

troubling. If one perceives adultery as a partial excuse for an otherwise intentional killing, the

outcome depends on the killer’s state of mind and whether he actually lost the capacity for self-

control. In contrast, if one perceives adultery as a partial justification, the outcome turns on one’s

belief about the role of the victim in connection with her death. Adultery as a partial justification

implies that the victim was at least partially responsible for her own death. In plain English, the

partial justification theory for manslaughter can be characterized as “the bitch deserved it.”

37. In class I have criticized, not endorsed, the concept of adultery as a partial

justification because it trivializes and demeans the value of the life of women.

38. It is also possible, but I have no recollection of it, that I used the word “bitch” in

the context of discussing self-defense and women who have been victims of abuse by their

partners. I told the spring 2010 Criminal Law class about a case in which I was co-counsel that

involved a woman named Susan who shot and killed her unarmed partner because she feared he

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was about to kill her. Susan’s partner had sexually abused her daughter, in addition to his abuse

of Susan, and Susan fled the state in an attempt to start a new life. The partner tracked down

Susan, beat her and brought her back to Delaware at gunpoint, threatening to kill her “like a

goddam dog” if she ever tried to leave again.

39. Susan was charged with first-degree murder, but pleaded guilty to voluntary

manslaughter based on the erroneous legal advice of counsel. At first, Susan claimed self-

defense, that she reasonably feared for her life. She abandoned her self-defense claim and

pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter when her attorney convinced her

that self-defense was an affirmative defense that she would be unable to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence. Susan received the maximum sentence on the manslaughter

charge.

40. We filed a motion to set aside her guilty plea based on the ineffective assistance

of counsel. Contrary to what her counsel had told her, self-defense was not an affirmative

defense. To avoid conviction on the murder charge, Susan needed only to present evidence of

self-defense sufficient to create in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt. In a hearing on the

motion, the mother of the victim testified to the history of violence in her son’s relationship with

Susan. When asked if she considered the beatings her son gave Susan to be excessive, she

replied, “Not any more than she deserved.”

41. The circumstances in Susan’s case were sordid. It is possible that I used the

word “bitch” in either this discussion about Susan’s case or in the discussion of a series of

battered women self-defense cases in the textbook. If I had used that term – and I simply have no

recollection whether I did - it would have been in reference to the hateful and wrongful attitude

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the male abusers had toward their female victims, and most certainly would not have been used

with the intention of demeaning women in general or any student in particular.

42. Paragraph 2 again alleges -

e. “Hypotheticals in which Professor Connell ‘decided to shoot Dean Ammons and then

blew her fucking head off;’”

Answer: I admit using Dean Ammons’ name in hypotheticals for classes about the topic

of attempted crimes. The remainder of the allegation is denied.

43. In their initial letter, the complainants wrote, “4. During the second half of the

semester after almost every single class, Professor Connell would name Dean Ammons as the

victim in a hypo where he is the perpetrator who shots (sic) her.” They make no mention of my

saying anything about “[blowing] her fucking head off.”

44. Their first mention of my saying anything about “[blowing Ammons’] fucking

head off” was in their November 19 meeting with Ammons and Kelly, a date that would have

been at least seven months after the event allegedly occurred. In his report of his interview with

the complainants, Kelly wrote, “5. The students indicated that at least ten times [Connell] used

hypos in which the Dean was shot and he was the shooter. In one example, he posed the hypo

that the Dean was dealing drugs out of her office. In relating another hypo he said “I decided

to shoot Dean Ammons and then ‘blew her Fucking head off.’” (emphasis in Kelly’s report)

45. I never once used Ammons’ name in any hypothetical where she ever was shot.

The only hypos in which I used Ammons’ name occurred in two classes on the topic of

attempted crimes. By definition an attempted crime is an incomplete crime. Thus, their claim that

Ammons was “shot” and that I “was the perpetrator who shots (sic) her” is simply false.

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Moreover, their claim that I made such statements “[d]uring the second half of the semester after

almost every single class” is sheer fabrication.

46. It has been nearly a year since I taught those attempts classes, but the following

is my best recollection of the Ammons’ hypos: At the start of our discussion of attempts, I posed

three hypos that introduced the three main topics we would cover in that class and in the

subsequent class (I believe there were only two). In each hypo I was the perpetrator and

Ammons was the intended victim.

47. Scenario 1: Assume that Dean Ammons threatens to fire me (the irony of which

does not escape me!). I am angry and decide to teach her a lesson. I go out and buy a revolver

and ammunition. I load the revolver and place it in my car the morning I am coming to class at

school. I drive to school. I get out of my car with the revolver, but instead of coming to class, I

walk up to Dean Ammons’ office. I open the door to her office, walk in and see her seated at her

desk. I raise the weapon, aim it in the direction of Dean Ammons and fire. I miss, hitting a spot

on the wall four inches above her head. Does it matter why I missed? Does it matter, for

example, if my intention was not to kill Dean Ammons, but merely to scare her? This is the mens

rea issue. What state of mind must I possess in order to be guilty of attempted murder?

48. Scenario 2: Same facts as 1, except that as I get out of the car and pick up the

revolver, Dick Tracy rushes in, wrestles me to the ground, and arrests me for the attempted

murder of Dean Ammons. This the actus reus problem. How far along toward commission of the

completed crime must I progress before I can be punished for attempted murder? Buying the

weapon and ammo? Driving to school? Walking into the Dean’s Office with the revolver?

Aiming the gun? Firing the gun?

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49. Scenario 3: Same facts as 1, with only one difference. I walk into the Dean’s

Office. I see her at her desk. I aim the gun. I fire the gun. Instead of hitting a spot on the wall

four inches from the Dean’s head, however, I strike what I believe to be Dean Ammons, but it

turns out that I’ve shot only a pumpkin that has been ingeniously painted to look like her. This is

the impossibility problem. Can I be guilty of attempted murder for shooting at a pumpkin and not

at a human being? Does it matter that I believed I had shot the Dean and not a pumpkin?

50. In the following discussion about the mens rea required for attempted crimes,

we discussed the general requirement that the actor must intend to commit the underlying crime.

We then talked about how the prosecution might prove that I intended to kill Dean Ammons.

May we simply infer my intent to kill from the fact that I was shooting in her direction? That

might make more sense if the bullet had struck her, but what about my contention that I did not

intend to kill, but simply intended to frighten her? I reminded the students of the burden-shifting

due process issues associated with proof of intent that were raised in Francis v. Franklin, a case

we studied earlier in the semester.

51. Although I have no present specific recollection of having done so, it is perhaps

possible that I may have said, “What if as I aimed the gun at Dean Ammons and said, ‘I’m going

to blow your fucking head off!’ and then fired and missed?” It then would be perfectly clear

from my statement what my intent was, but the act alone of shooting and missing is considerably

more ambiguous. I allow for this possibility only because I do remember our discussing the

inverse relationship between the degree of thought evidence and conduct evidence that a

prosecutor might have. For example, if the defendant had confessed to the police and to various

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other witnesses his intent to complete the crime, then less conduct evidence might be necessary

to establish the attempt. In the absence of any such thought evidence, however, more conduct

evidence may be required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt a defendant’s criminal intent (the

“substantial step” test adopted by the MPC and many states reflects that principle).

52. I simply do not presently recall the specific language I may have used in that

discussion. I do believe, however, that the complainants have mixed up – intentionally or

otherwise - what I said in the Dean Ammons hypo with what was said in the discussion of

another case in the textbook, United States v. Watson, which I will address here shortly.

52. Coming back to the Ammons hypos, the main reason I remember anything

about them is because they were not part of my original plan for the class and I spontaneously

made them up when my original plan went awry. My original plan was one that I had employed

in several semesters before this one. My ingeniously painted pumpkin is generally a vocal

student everyone knows who sits toward the back of the class (to make my mistaken perception

more believable, of course!) and with whom I have a good rapport. The student who is the

pumpkin, as well as the others in the class, seem amused by it and often remember the pumpkin

hypo long after the attempts classes are over.

53. My plan went awry that day when I noticed at the beginning of class that the

student I had intended to use in my hypo was absent, I did not feel comfortable selecting another

student for that role, so I quickly imagined a different scenario that would raise the mens rea,

actus reus and impossibility issues and that could carry through our discussion into the next

class. The Ammons hypos were what spontaneously came to mind.

54. Going back to the claim that I threatened to blow the Dean’s fucking head off,

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the more likely scenario is that the complainants have erroneously connected the Ammons hypos

to a scenario from a case in the book, United States v. Watson, that we covered earlier in the

semester. In Watson the words “Don’t move or I’ll blow your f___ing head off” were used in the

case and I actually did say them.

55. In Watson the defendant was convicted of the first-degree murder of a police

officer, which required proof not only that Watson intended to kill the officer, but that he also

killed with premeditation and deliberation. The police had stopped Watson because they

believed he was driving a stolen car. Watson fled on foot and the police pursued him with guns

drawn. Watson ran into an apartment building, where he entered the door of an open apartment.

In a matter of minutes, one of the officers entered the apartment, with gun drawn, told Watson he

was under arrest, to which Watson asked, “What for?” Watson then struggled with the officer as

he attempted to handcuff Watson.

56. At this point, the following dialog, in effect, occurred (this plays out essentially

the same way each semester):

Me: What happened next?Student #1: Watson then grabbed the officer, they struggled and Watson shot him. Me: Does everyone agree that’s what happened next?Student #2: No. The officer ordered Watson to cooperate or he’d shoot him. Me: Is that what he said?Students: (No response as various students page through the opinion)Me: (I role play the officer. Crouching in a shooting stance, imaginary gun in hand aimed inthe direction of the class, I shake from the adrenalin rush of having chased Watson with gundrawn into the apartment, and, as Watson refuses to cooperate, scream: “Do you want me toblow your f_______ head off?” [Which is the precise quote from the case.]

57. My purpose for acting this out to the hilt is to convey the communicative effect

not only of words, but also of conduct. This, I suppose, qualifies as one of my “intimidating

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tactics to discourage other points of view particularly from women,” as Kelly puts it in summary

of his interview with the complainants. I asked the students to visualize this scene between

Watson and the officer playing out, as if they were there and caught it on a camera.

58. I frequently ask students to visualize an encounter, and to stop and analyze each

stage in the encounter, a technique I think that is particularly useful in their criminal procedure

class. I want students to realize the truth posed by Justice Harlan that “words are often chosen as

much for their emotive effect as their cognitive force.” The officer in Watson intended to send

Watson a strong message. Watson, in turn, saw an officer on the verge of losing control and with

the immediate capability of carrying out his threat. All of this is critical to understanding what

Watson may have been thinking during the period in which he was claimed to have

“premeditated” and “deliberated” the officer’s death. Providing the students with a vivid image, I

hope, enables them to see the cases in a different light and reminds them that the dry words on a

page are not merely an intellectual exercise.

59. Paragraph 2 again alleges -

f. “all criminals are poor and all poor are black folk;”

Answer: This allegation is denied. I never made such a statement. The person making the

allegation is biased with their own private agenda, but lacking knowledge of the person’s

identity, I am unable to provide additional specificity as to bias.

60. Ammons and Kelly have lifted this statement from an anonymous student

evaluation from the fall 2010 Criminal Procedure Section B. Here is the entire quote from the

evaluation:

Seems that Prof. Connell has a fixed view on certain topics and I don’t think his viewcorrectly illustrates the course info. Once in class Connell said “All criminals are poor

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and all poor are “Black Folks.”” Basically I got from that “all “Black Folks” arecriminals which (sic) TOTALLY incorrect.

61. The student’s alleged quote of mine contains no reference to time, place or

context. The statement is patently ridiculous and false, and clearly fabricated in such an

outlandish way to express the student’s animosity toward me. The use of such a statement made

by an obviously biased student whose credibility is incapable of determination – and failing to

identify it as such in her Statement of Reasons – raises serious questions about the motives in

pursuing this Dismissal for Cause action against me. This charge appears to simply be a pretext

for other motivating reasons for my removal.

62. Paragraph 2 again alleges -

g. “racist and sexist comments are not [right] in the classroom;”

Answer: The allegation is so vague and ambiguous that I cannot reasonably prepare a

response. Without some context, date, time, subject matter, etc. it is impossible to respond to

such a non-specific inflammatory and false statement other than to state that I never have made

racist and sexist comments in any classroom and this is denied. The person making the

allegation is biased with their own private agenda but lacking knowledge of that person’s

identity, I am unable to provide additional specificity as to bias. Such a false allegation is per se

defamatory under Delaware common law in that it directly reflects upon my professional

teaching competence.

63. Paragraph 2 again alleges -

h. “Professor Connell’s ‘excessive use of profanity offensive,’”

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Answer: The allegation is denied, and so vague and ambiguous that I cannot reasonably

prepare a response.

64. From the complainant’s depictions, one would imagine I were a drunken sailor

in a bar. How am I expected to respond to this? What is excessive? Every other word? Sentence?

Class? Week? Month?

65. I do not use coarse language in class for the purpose of making students

uncomfortable. To quote Justice Harlan, “linguistic expression serves a dual communicative

function: it conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but

otherwise inexpressible emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for their

emotive as their cognitive force . . . .” Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)(California statute

prohibiting the display of offensive messages such as "Fuck the Draft," violate freedom of

expression as protected by the First Amendment). Justice Harlan recognized that “one man’s

vulgarity is another’s lyric.” On the rare occasions when I have used coarse language in class, it

generally has been done for the purpose of dramatic effect to drive home a point. Occasionally

the coarse language is necessitated by the case under discussion, such as Watson, and the point

to be drawn.

66. Paragraph 2 again alleges -

I. “He also called a female police officer ‘honey’ . . . . Referring to women as ‘honey’

implies that women are second class citizens;”

Answer: This allegation is denied. The person making the allegation is biased with their

own private agenda, but lacking knowledge of that person’s identity, I am unable to provide

additional specificity as to bias.

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I have no idea to what this even refers. I have no recollection of ever having spoken of

“female police officer[s].” What is the context? If I refer to my wife as “honey,” am I implying

that she is a “second class citizen?” To turn the table, when the waitress at the Olive Garden

refers to me as “honey,” does that imply that I am a “second class citizen?” This allegation is

denied and it does not job my memory absent some context, date, time, subject matter, etc.

67.. Last, paragraph 2 again alleges -

j. “Referring to African Americans as ‘Black folk’ implies that they are uneducated,

uncultured, and undeserving of respect by the justice system.”

Answer: Denied. I have never said or implied that African-Americans are uneducated,

uncultured and undeserving of respect by the justice system. The person making the allegation is

biased with their own private agenda, but lacking knowledge of the person’s identity, I am

unable to provide additional specificity as to bias.

E. ANSWER TO ALLEGATIONS FOUND IN KELLY’S DECEMBER 10 LETTER ANDMATERIALS

68. In piling charges on, the Dean’s Statement of Reasons require me to shadow

box against unspecified charges not presented in writing to the tenured faculty in that she states

in paragraph 2 that the allegations against me are “not limited to” items 2.a. through j. found

above. Instead, the binder of charges that Kelly delivered to me on December 10, 2010, includes

other documentation for the administration’s case against me which has not been put in writing

before the faculty. The documentation falls into four distinct categories: (1) a letter of complaint

from two students regarding my spring 2010 Criminal Law class, alleging four specific incidents

of my “disrespecting racial minorities and women”; (2) additional grounds conveyed orally on

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November 19 and 22, 2010 to Ammons and Kelly by the two complainants, as well as by two

other students from my fall 2010 Criminal Procedure Section B; (3) assorted comments from

course evaluations written by students whose identities are unknown and incapable of being

determined; and (4) a reference to a complaint filed in 1996 against me by a female student

regarding comments about the student’s classroom attire I was alleged to have made in a bar,

during a private conversation, and outside the presence of the student. I will discuss the four

categories in order.

A. The Letter of Complaint

69. The initial complaint to Ammons came in the form of a letter from two students

in my spring 2010 Criminal Law class. Although the letter is dated May 21, 2010, the

complainants say in their letter that while they had “been working on this letter since May

2010,” they did not complete and deliver it to Ammons until after October 22, 2010. A time

stamp on the letter shows that it was received by Kelly in the Dean’s Office on November 18,

2010, nearly seven months after the complainant’s final Criminal Law class. Because the

complaint was neither written nor submitted on May 21, 2010, but rather submitted on

November 18, 2010, I will call it the “November 18 letter.”

70. The November 18 letter is full of opinions, rather than facts, that have no

bearing on whether I have complied with the standards required for retention of tenure. For

example, the complainants “suspect that [Connell] was, at the very least, uncomfortable around

minority students and unsympathetic to the plight of victims of racially motivated crimes (among

other things).” They further opine that “[Connell] seems to have a reputation for disrespecting

racial minorities and women,” citing only the views of one alumna and a “minority student” who

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claimed to have been offended whenever Connell said “Black folk,” it being unclear if the

student was offended by use of the word “black” or “folk.”

71. The complainants did, however, provide a list of four “specific comments” they

claim demonstrated my “minimal respect for racial minorities and women.” They provide little,

if any, detail about when or in what context the comments were made, leaving me the impossible

task of trying to reconstruct events that allegedly occurred a year ago.

72. The following are the four specific allegations, all of which I addressed

previously in this affidavit:

“1. [D]uring class Professor Connell said that he finds a person who is shooting at

black folks to be less dangerous than a person who is just shooting randomly. This was

after we discussed a case about a man who shot into a home because he did not want black

people moving into the neighborhood.”

I addressed this allegation previously regarding the charges found in paragraph 2.a.

above.

“2. This case was about a man on trial for shooting at four young men who were

trying to rob him on the subway. The court was determining whether he had used too

much force because he continued to shoot even after they ran away and had been shot. The

case book did not mention anything about the races of the defendants and or (sic) victims.

In class Professor Connell said that the 4 men were black and that the defendant was

white.”

I addressed this allegation previously regarding the charges found in paragraph 2.b.

above.

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“3. On the same day as #2, after class four students stayed to have a further

discussion about one of the cases with the Professor, . . . .We were discussing the court’s

reasoning for the case described above. . . . professor Connell said, “At that time Blacks

were terrorizing people.” “You mean to tell me that you see two black men walking, you

are not going to cross the street?”

I addressed this allegation previously regarding the charges found in paragraph 2.b.

above.

“4. During the second half of the semester after almost every single class, Professor

Connell would name Dean Ammons as the victim in a hypo where he is the perpetrator

who shots (sic) her.”

I addressed this allegation previously regarding the charges found in paragraph 2.e.

above.

B. Additional Oral Complaints of November 19 and 22

I. The Complainants’ Interview of November 19

73. On November 19, 2010, Kelly and Ammons interviewed the complainants.

Most of the allegations made in that interview have been previously addressed in my answer to

Ammons’ Statement of Reasons.

73. As for others: The complainants told Ammons and Kelly that “[w]hile

discussing a statutory rape case involving a black female as a victim, Professor Connell stated . .

. that it was obvious that her parents did not care about her. He then said she was (sic) “dirty

little whore.” This allegation is denied. I reiterate as in paragraph 15 above the bias of these

witnesses.

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74. First, no statutory rape case in the Kaplan and Weisberg book identifies the race

of a victim. You need not take my word for this. I’m sure that Professors Ritter and Henderson

would attest to this fact since both of them have used the Kaplan and Weisberg casebook for

many years. Furthermore, in contrast to the Goetz case, which attained national notoriety, there

would be no way of my determining the race of a victim in a common statutory rape case.

75. The “dirty little whore” claim appended to the lie of the black statutory rape

victim is little more than an attempt to further demean me and to impugn my reputation.

76. The complainants never mentioned this incident anywhere in writing, and raised

it only in a meeting with sympathetic administrators which they thought would remain

confidential. Moreover, this came only after the complainants met with like-minded students

from my fall semester Criminal Procedure Section B who decided to join with the complainants

in launching a collective campaign to destroy my good name and eliminate me from the faculty

with a barrage of false per se defamatory aspersions and accusations.

77. Kelly also notes from the interview, “A significant concern of theirs was that

several students particularly African-American students avoid his classes if possible because of

negative experiences with him or recommendations of others based on their experience. Several .

. . do not apply for externships that he supervises because of his attitude.”

78. First, where is the record of all these students’ “negative experiences with

[me]?” What specifically are those “negative experiences?” Second, while I do not generally

divide the composition of my classes into racial categories, there in fact were “African-American

students” in my fall 2010 Clinical Externship program. One of those is student ____ _____, who

in offering to testify on my behalf, volunteered, “I very much stand by you personally and by

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your highly effective teaching methods.” His statement can be submitted if this matter proceeds

any further.

II. The Witnesses’ Interviews of November 22

79. On November 22 Kelly and Ammons interviewed witness “C,” a student in my

fall 2010 Criminal Procedure Section B class. According to Kelly, student “C” “wondered why

[Connell] continually referred to defendants’ race, but not to that of judges or police. Race is not

relevant, she said.”

80. I remember a student, most likely “C”, saying precisely that in class on or

about October 26. I believe it was October 26 because the reading assignment for that date

included a casebook note about racial profiling.

81. An excerpt from the casebook note exemplifies the tenor of the note: “That such

racial profiling happens is not speculative. In Maryland, from 1995 through 1997, a survey

indicated that 70% of drivers stopped on Interstate 95 were African-Americans, although 17.5%

of the traffic and speeders on the road were black. David Cole, No Equal Justice 36 (1999).”

Dressler & Thomas, Criminal Procedure: Investigating Crime 402 (4th ed. West 2010).

82. Concerned that questioning the standard wisdom about race and investigative

stops was akin to swatting a hornet’s nest, I sent the following email to my students the week

before the class:

A common theme of our casebook seems to be that our criminal laws historically havebeen and currently are enforced in a racially discriminatory manner. On page 403, forexample, the authors say "That such racial profiling happens is not speculative," and thenproceeds to cite a list of articles by law professors to that effect. I wish the casebookauthors had been a bit more evenhanded by offering counterviews. To that end I amproviding you with links to a couple of articles by an author whopersuasively contests those views:

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http://www.city-journal.org/html/11_2_the_myth.html http://www.city-journal.org/html/eon_3_27_02hm.html I personally believe it would be unfortunate for folks to leave this course with theimpression that the criminal justice system is a corrupt one that is simply rigged againstblacks and Hispanics. I am concerned that the casebook tends to reinforce that view.

83. In the class that followed, I reminded the students that we had already discussed

the cases of Whren v. United States and Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, and the degree of

discretion police officers have been given to stop cars. We had already discussed how, given the

Supreme Court’s decisions, police could justify pretty much stopping anyone in a car. I reminded

the students also of the email I had sent and advised that, if they had not already done so, they

should read the references I had sent and make up their own minds about the nature and extent of

racial profiling. I added that statistics like those in the casebook were deceiving.

84. This year, I said, the New York Times took up the theme of race-based stops,

reporting that blacks made up 55 percent of all investigative stops in 2009, although they are

only 23 percent of the city’s population, while whites accounted for only 10 percent of all stops,

although they are 35 percent of the city’s population. The tenor of the NYT article was that New

York police routinely engage in illegitimate racial policing. What the New York Times failed to

mention, however, was that crime reports to the NYPD in 2009 revealed blacks committed 80

percent of all shootings in the first half of 2009, while blacks and Hispanics together committed

98 percent of all reported shootings in the city. I suggested that perhaps a better measure of

whether police stops of blacks were “disproportionate” should entail a comparison of the

percentage of blacks stopped to the percentage of blacks reported as perpetrators, rather than to

the percentage of blacks in the population.

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85. It was at that moment when a student I expect was witness “C” said, with

apparent frustration, she didn’t understand why I was making such a big deal about the race of

defendants, that I never talk about the race of the police or the judges, and that race is simply

irrelevant. I replied, in effect, that I wished race were irrelevant, but that the issue of racial bias

in policing will never go away so long as blacks claim to be “disproportionately” stopped. I was

not the one “making a big deal” about race. The issue of racial profiling is simply one that exists

for the system to deal with every day. You students, I said, will be the prosecutors and defense

attorneys who have to deal with this every day. Of course, innocent blacks bear the brunt of the

problem by being subjected to these stops, but until the reality of urban crime changes, the issue

of racial profiling will never end.

86. On November 22 Kelly and Ammons also interviewed witness “B,” another

student in my fall 2010 Criminal Procedure Section B. Kelly said witness “B” “indicated that

Professor Connell (LC) frequently would not answer her questions and used body language in a

dismissive manner.” She further said that “he uses facial expressions and gestures to trivialize

questions, and he acts as if questions are not worth his time.”

87. I suspect that witness “B” is the same student who once, when I called on her to

answer a question, responded with a rambling narrative. I do not remember the specific topic or

my question. I do remember, however, saying to her at the end of her narrative, “That’s all very

interesting, but doesn’t really answer my question. Will you please answer my question?” To

which she replied, “Why should I answer your question? You never answer mine!” There was an

audible gasp from the class, at which point I had to make a split-second judgment of how to deal

with her insubordinate tone. My choice was to smile and laugh, saying, “I tell you what: you

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answer my question first, then I will be glad to try and respond to any question you may then

have.” Then she answered my question directly, and I asked, “So, is there a question I can

answer now for you?” She demurred.

88. The bias of such a witness against me should be self evident.

89. Three or four students approached me in the classroom after that class and

apologized for the student’s behavior. Again, I just laughed and told them it was not a big deal,

not to worry about it.

90. Witness “B” also reported to Kelly that “[h]er roommate who is in the class is

Caucasian. Her roommate would not be personally offended, but can understand that others with

a different background could be.” If witness “B” is the same student as I suspect, then I believe

her roommate is witness “A.” Witness “A” offered “that Professor Connell (LC) was one of her

favorite professors. She thinks highly of him.” In speaking with “A” and “B” together outside of

class, they volunteered to me how they are on opposite ends of the political spectrum, but

manage to get along well personally. I suspect that if “A” had learned from her roommate, “B”,

that she was going to complain to Kelly and Ammons, “A” most likely insisted on speaking with

Kelly and Ammons in order to provide some balance. I further suspect that is the reason why

Kelly and Ammons spoke to their one student with a viewpoint favorable to me. If this matter

proceeds testimony from Witness A will be presented.

C. Course Evaluation Comments by Anonymous Students

91. The use of course evaluation comments by a handful students, from among the

nearly 250 students I taught just in 2010, and whose identities are unknown and incapable of

being determined, constitutes a highly unreliable, unprofessional and questionable basis for

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dismissal. By definition of the writers’ anonymity, there is no way for anyone to judge their

credibility and their biases. They should be given no weight in determination of the existence or

non-existence of cause for dismissal.

D. The 1996 Complaint

92. Even more irrelevant than the course evaluation comments (if that’s possible)

must be the 1996 complaint alleging me to have made inappropriate comments about a student’s

classroom attire when I was in a bar with a group of people not including the complainant and

engaged in a private conversation. How an incident that was alleged to have occurred 15 years

ago is relevant to an “ongoing pattern of behavior,” as Kelly put it in his letter of December 10,

2010, is beyond my present comprehension.

93. But it should be noted that Ammons’ Statement of Reasons dropped the specific

reference to the 1996 complaint. If needed in the future, my legal counsel has interviewed one

current member of the Delaware Bar who was a witness to this incident and she is prepared to

testify to disprove each and every allegation therein and to state what really happened.

F. ANSWER TO ALLEGATIONS THAT I REFUSED TO PARTICIPATE ORCOOPERATE IN INVESTIGATING THE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST ME.

94. The great weight of the Dean’s attempt to remove me is the false allegation that

I refused to cooperate in any way in investigating serious charges which had been brought

against me. What really happened needs to be recounted to the faculty to remedy the one sided

sanitized version of my emergency removal from the campus because I was a supposed threat to

the physical safety of all faculty, students and staff.

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95. In early June 2010 Kelly summoned me by email to discuss an unspecified,

“serious” matter. I was out of town at the time and when I returned replied that I could come in

at his convenience. Kelly responded that he was in Europe and that the matter could wait until

his return.

96. In early August, Kelly once more summoned me with no additional information

about the topic of our conversation. When I appeared, Kelly told me that an attorney at the

Delaware Attorney General’s Office, Consumer Protection Unit, had complained to Ammons

that I had been “uncooperative” back in late 2009 about establishing a formal externship

arrangement with his office. Kelly proceeded to question me about my dealings with the

attorney, saying that the Dean was “angry” with me because in my not acquiescing to the

attorney’s demands, he apparently approached the Drexel law school, which would. The gist of

my disagreement with the attorney was that he was seeking students to work at least three days

per week and I told him that because our Academic Code permitted a student to acquire no more

than 4 credit hours in any one semester, our students could not work that many hours per week in

an externship. We went back and forth by telephone and email, and at one point he asked if there

anyone other than me who could address what I perceived to be a limitation of our Academic

Code. I told him the Code was a matter for modification by the faculty, but that he could talk to

the Dean directly about it.

97. At the end of my meeting with Kelly, he told me that Ammons was removing

me from my position as Director of the Clinical Externship Program effective January 1, 2011.

When I asked Kelly the reason for my removal, noting that Ammons never heard my version of

these events, Kelly replied that the Dean “wanted to go in a different direction” with the

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externship and that I was needed to devote more time to teaching additional sections of criminal

law and procedure. I expressed disappointment that the Dean conveyed such a decision affecting

me through Kelly, and did not do so personally.

98. A week or so after that meeting Professor Henderson returned from the summer

and stopped by my office to say hello. I invited him in and closed the door. I proceeded to tell

him about my meeting with Kelly and the Dean’s decision. I told him I did not believe the

reasons Kelly gave me for my dismissal as co-director of the externship program, and felt that

this was a step toward their forcing me out. When our conversation ended, Professor Henderson

left my room and, I thought, returned to his office. Within seconds after he left my office, I left

my office for the bathroom. As I entered the bathroom, I saw Professor Henderson standing

outside his office speaking with Professor Culhane. A couple minutes later, I returned to my

office to find Kelly standing in the doorway.

99. He stepped out of the doorway and allowed me to enter my office. He then

followed me in, but instead of stopping a few steps inside the doorway, he followed me all the

way up to my chair. He stood close, not more than a foot from me, which made me so

uncomfortable that I did not sit down. He then said, “I hear you are telling people that we are

trying to fire you. That’s not true and you know it. I told you why you were being removed from

the externship.” I replied that I was not telling anyone that, but I was telling “people” that’s what

I felt was happening to me. I asked him how he would feel if, after more than a decade serving as

the director of a program, he was peremptorily dismissed from his position by the Dean and she

never told him directly.

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100. I was shaken when Kelly confronted me. Apart from my wife, Professor

Henderson was the only other person with whom I had shared the information about my removal

from the externship program. I did not believe that Henderson would have said anything about it

to Culhane. After Kelly left, I checked with Henderson to see if he had told anyone about our

conversation. He said he had not said anything to anyone about it. That confirmed my

assumption that Kelly had somehow been eavesdropping on our conversation – which to one

who teaches the Fourth Amendment is a particularly disturbing thought.

101. In the fall semester 2010, I found myself in the uncomfortable position of

team-teaching the Clinical Externship class with my appointed successor, Professor Sydney

Howe-Barksdale. I also taught in the fall two sections of Criminal Procedure, sections A and B.

The examination for both sections was administered during the afternoon of Friday, December

10.

102. I proctored one of the rooms for the section A exam. After collecting all the

exams at the end, I spent about twenty minutes talking with one of my students about her taking

the Delaware bar exam. At about 5:00 p.m. I returned from proctoring to the Registrar’s Office,

where I saw Kelly walking about in the hallway. When he saw me enter the Registrar’s Office,

he approached me and directed me to accompany him because he needed to speak to me. He

wouldn’t tell me what it was about.

103. When I asked for a moment to collect from the Registrar my handwritten

exams, Kelly told me curtly to “forget about the exams” and to come with him immediately. I

accompanied Kelly to the Dean’s Conference Room, whereupon he directed me to sit down. At

the table next to me was a man to whom I was not initially introduced. Kelly opened a binder,

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handed it to me, told me to read the opening letter and proceeded to question me about the

contents of the binder. As he spoke, I skimmed the letter: “ . . . Discrimination and Harassment

Code . . . . 1996 . . . ongoing pattern of behavior . . . cursing and coarse unprofessional behavior .

. . demeaning people and groups . . . racist and sexist statements . . . directed at minorities and

women . . . violent, personal scenarios that demean and threaten colleagues, administrative

officials and students . . . contrary to professional standards for tenure . . . .” I was attempting to

read and listen, while trying to figure out what in the world was happening to me.

104. Before saying anything else, I believe I first turned to the unknown man next

to me and asked him, “And you are?” The man said his name, which I do not remember, and

identified himself as the Chief of Campus Security. Kelly resumed questioning me, and I

remained shellshocked, alternately stumbling between trying to answer Kelly’s questions and

trying to read various pages in the binder to which Kelly directed my attention. After some

period of time, perhaps fifteen to twenty-five minutes later, Kelly told me to produce a written

response to the materials in the binder by Tuesday, December 14. He said that we would meet

again after that to discuss options before I would be allowed to teach again.

105. As I stood to leave, I agreed that I would file a response and said that I was

now going to the Registrar’s Office to pick up my handwritten exams. He told me not to return to

the Registrar until the next day, Saturday, because the people in the Registrar’s Office needed

time to copy the exams. I tried to clarify that I didn’t mean to pick up the Examsoft exams, but

only the handwritten ones. He said he understood, adding that the handwritten ones were the

ones that needed to be copied. I asked him what he was talking about, and why my handwritten

exams needed to be copied. Kelly responded that it was simply a “precaution” in case I were to

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destroy the exams. Shocked and disgusted, I asked Kelly if he actually believed that, after

twenty-five years at Widener, I would possibly destroy student exams. He responded, “It’s

nothing personal. It’s simply a precaution.” The next day I emailed the Registrar to find out

when my exams might be ready to pick up. Tammy notified me, and I went to school and

retrieved my exams.

106. Over the next few days I reviewed the material in the binder and saw not only

the complainants’ letter of complaint, but also the student evaluations and materials about the

1996 complaint that Kelly included. What I did not see was any evidence that Kelly or Ammons

had spoken with any of the other nearly 200 students in my 2010 Criminal Law and Procedure

classes. Kelly’s and Ammons’ investigation looked more like an orchestration.

107. It dawned on me that this was not merely a question of what had happened in

my spring 2010 Criminal Law class, but was an all-out attack – seemingly coordinated by Kelly

or Ammons or both – on me. I realized that I needed the assistance of counsel in defending

myself, so on Monday I contacted Mr. Neuberger’s office for an appointment. I was told he

would be in court through Tuesday and that we could not meet until Wednesday, the day after

Kelly’s deadline.

108. On Tuesday, December 14, the deadline date, I asked Kelly for an extension of

time to respond so that I might have the opportunity to consult with my attorney. He gave me an

extension until Thursday, December 16, to file a written reply, and said that we could meet no

later than Friday, December 17. My attorney filed on my behalf a written reply to Kelly on

December 16, denying the allegations and declining a further meeting with Kelly on December

17.

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109. Having been ambushed twice before by Kelly, I was not about to appear for

further interrogation without the assistance of my attorney. It was apparent to me that Kelly was

no neutral arbiter of some student’s claim against me. He was an active participant in the

creation of an affirmative case against me. His use of anonymous student evaluation comments,

as well as the 15-year-old, so-called “harassment” claim, made clear that this was nothing the

administration intended to settle amicably with me.

110. My encounter with him on December 10, coupled with his letter and

accompanying materials, insinuated that I was something evil and sinister. This point was only

reinforced by his confronting me with the Chief of Security, as if I were a common criminal, and

by his preventing my access to my exams. To compound my humiliation and fears, he had

already gone on the written record with his letter to characterize my teaching methods as violent

and threatening.

111. As an attorney who teaches and has practiced criminal law, I would never

recommend to a client who is under investigation by a prosecutor to speak alone with that

prosecutor. I wasn’t about to do that myself.

112. On December 20, Kelly informed me that Ammons had placed me on

administrative leave, but gave no details of what that entailed. On January 12, Kelly directed me

once more to “respond substantively in writing to the allegations” and to meet with him to

discuss them. Furthering the impression that the administration considered me a threat to the

community, he also informed me that I was barred from the campus, without prior permission

from him or Ammons. The last thing Kelly informed me was that my failure to adhere to any of

these directives would result in the initiation of dismissal for cause proceedings.

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113. Each time Kelly demanded a written response, I had provided him one by the

deadline date that denied all charges,. When Ammons directed me to meet with her so that she

could present me with the formal Statement of Reasons for my dismissal, I came to Widener

with my attorney. I had been instructed to go to the security office, which we did, where we were

met and escorted to the Dean’s Conference Room by the Chief of Security. Once there, my

attorney was barred from the room. Following my meeting with Ammons, Kelly, and George

Hassel, the Vice President for Administration of the University, the Chief of Security was

waiting to escort us back to our vehicles. Instead, Mr. Hassel instructed the Chief that he would

escort us back and told me he was doing so to spare me any further embarrassment. He escorted

us back to our vehicles, which were parked near the maintenance building, and observed us leave

the campus.

114. I always made it clear in writing to Kelly and the administration that before I

could provide a written response to the notebook of charges against me I needed to see the actual

documents provided to the administration. I had only been given expurgated versions of the

written charges. Many redactions are found in the documents given to me. This is not simply

the removal of the name of the charging party or witnesses against me. Instead, many lines of

substantive allegations against me have been removed.

115. Before I committed my self in writing to a response in defense of myself I

insisted that the expurgated redacted substantive material be provided to me under a normal

evidentiary rule of completeness so that I could determine what had actually been said about me

and perhaps find therein something to use in my defense. However, the train had already left the

station to discharge me and Kelly continually refused to provide me with what had actually been

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said in context about me.

116. And so with one hand tied behind my back in defending myself, unable to see

all the material submitted against me in context to seek helpful admissions against the interest of

my accusers, I am submitting this affidavit to the faculty. If this matter proceeds further I am in

the process of gathering three expert witness affidavits from law professors from the University

of Pennsylvania School of Law and other institutions as to the propriety of my teaching methods.

I also have over two dozen students prepared to testify in my behalf and former students to

explain that I have applied my teaching methods to white as well as black administrators in my

teaching examples.

117. I submit that all charges against me must be dismissed. Now that context has

been given for any of my classroom remarks, there is no competent sworn evidence in the record

on which any reasonable faculty members could conclude that anything racist, sexist or

dangerous has even occurred in my classroom.

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EXHIBITC

Widener University, 4601 Concord Pike, P.O. Box 7474, Wilmington, Delaware, 19803-0474

School of Law

March 7, 2011

TO: Dean Linda Ammons & Professor Lawrence Connell

FROM: Informal Committee of Inquiry

RE: Dismissal for Cause Charges against Professor Connell

In our role as the Informal Committee of Inquiry, pursuant to Article V, Section 2,charged at this point in time to undertake efforts to informally resolve the status of theDismissal For Cause Action commenced February 24, 2011 regarding ProfessorLawrence Connell, and in light of the proceedings also now underway pursuant toSection 6 of The Widener University Faculty Member Discrimination and HarassmentCode concerning Professor Connell, and in the interest of efficient resolution of theseissues, we recommend withdrawal of the Dismissal for Cause Action, but withoutprejudice, thus preserving the possibility of the action being recommenced in the futureupon re-filing.

Respectfully,

/s/ Alicia Kelly

Alicia Kelly, Associate Professor of Law

/s/ Michael J. Goldberg

Michael J. Goldberg, Professor of Law

/s/ Nathaniel Nichols

Nathaniel Nichols, Associate Professor of Law

cc: Vice Dean J. Patrick KellyProfessor Jean Eggen, Tenure Committee Chair

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March 14, 2011 Dear Committee Members: I respectfully do not accept the recommendation of the Informal Committee of Inquiry to withdraw the dismissal for cause charges, but without prejudice. Professor Connell's refusal to participate in the informal procedure under the University's Discrimination and Harassment Code is a serious breach of his obligations. First, no faculty member may refuse to participate in the Code. Second, no faculty member has the right to 'waive' the informal process; only the Complainant does. (This is because some Complainants will not wish to proceed to the formal procedure, preferring to attempt only informal resolution.) Third, there is no automatic right to counsel in any employment proceeding at a private institution. (As you know, the Code grants limited rights to counsel during various proceedings. The omission of a right to counsel simply means that no right has been granted by the Law School or University at the informal stage.) Finally, Professor Connell's refusal to participate in the informal process puts the University in an untenable position: it cannot simply proceed to the formal procedure, waiving the informal procedure, because the Complainants would have a valid claim that the University did not follow its Code procedures; and, it cannot proceed with the informal procedure because Professor Connell refuses to do so without counsel. This is unacceptable. However, in view of the recent filing of a formal complaint against Professor Connell, I am temporarily staying the dismissal for cause proceedings, pending the outcome of the Discrimination and Harassment Code hearing. Linda L. Ammons, J.D. Associate Provost and Dean

EXHIBITE

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT: Dan Hanson March 14, 2011 Director of Public Relations Phone: 610-499-4433 E-mail: dwhanson@widener.edu

Statement Regarding Widener School of Law Discrimination and Harassment/Dismissal for Cause Procedures

Chester, Pa.—The Widener University School of Law is committed to protecting the rights and interests of its students, faculty and staff. In connection with its legal obligations, the Law School is processing complaints lodged by certain students against Professor Lawrence Connell. The merits of those complaints have been, and will continue to be, examined in accordance with published procedures adopted by the Law School and agreed upon, in writing, by each and every faculty member of the Law School. To date, the administration of the Law School has declined to comment on the pending investigation for the protection of both the students and the faculty member involved. The Law School will continue to respect its obligations to Professor Connell and the students involved by not releasing any factual information relating to the pending complaints. However, the university has decided that an explanation of the procedure is necessary. All faculty members are entitled to utilize counsel to assist them should a complaint of discrimination or harassment move from the informal level to the formal process. The purpose of the initial informal process is to attempt, without any record of the proceeding, a resolution of a complaint acceptable to all parties. In the event that the matter proceeds to the next stage, all parties are given unredacted copies of all documents or statements. At the formal stage, all parties are entitled to have counsel assist them. Widener also has a procedure for dismissal for cause which has been adopted by the faculty and is set forth within Promotion Retention and Tenure Guidelines. The informal committee of inquiry is the first step of the process, ultimately resulting in a recommendation to the full tenure committee of the Law School for a formal hearing. At the formal hearing before the tenure committee, the faculty member has substantial procedural rights, including the right to representation by counsel and to confront and cross examine witnesses. Widener appreciates attempts by the press to respect its responsibility to maintain the factual basis of the allegations as confidential, in deference not only to the faculty member involved, but also, to the students who have the right to lodge formal complaints under the Discrimination and Harassment Code. Please be assured that Widener will continue to follow its stated procedures such that the rights of all involved are preserved and protected.

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