confucius aristotle

8/8/2019 Confucius Aristotle

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/confucius-aristotle 1/26

Virtue: Confucius and AristotleAuthor(s): Jiyuan Yu

Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Apr., 1998), pp. 323-347Published by: University of Hawai'i PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1399830

Accessed: 03/09/2009 02:27

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless

you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you

may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=uhp.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed

page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the

scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that

promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

University of Hawai'i Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophy

East and West.

http://www.jstor.org

http://www.jstor.org/stable/1399830?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=uhp

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=uhp

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

http://www.jstor.org/stable/1399830?origin=JSTOR-pdf



VIRTUE: CONFUCIUS AND ARISTOTLE

Myaim in thisessay is to compareAristotle's onceptionof virtue(arete)

with Confucius'key notion ren-which has also been interpretedas

"virtue"1-in orderto make explicit whether and to what extent theycorrespond.The issue is of current nterestgiventhe distinctionbetween

ethics and moralityin the contemporaryrevival of Aristotelianvirtue

ethics.2 Confuciushas been interpreted s a thinkerwho concentrated

on ethics or moralphilosophy.Now, with regard o the distinctionbe-

tween ethics and morality,we may askon which side Confucius ies. Is

ren, understoodas a virtue,the sortof virtue that should be treatedas

standing n contrast o morality? hope thatthe following synopticcom-

parison of these two complex notions will be helpful not only in

achievinga mutual lluminationbut also in bringingConfucius'thinking

into the framework f contemporary irtueethics.

Structural imilarityThe word "virtue" s a transliteration f the Latin virtus(fromvir,

literally"manhood"),which was in turnemployed by Latinauthorsto

translate the Greek arete, originally referring o excellence of manly

qualities. The word ren was employed in the Book of Poetry(a text

earlier than Confucius)to describe noble huntsmen. Some scholars

thereforespeculatethat the concept of ren means, in a sense, "manly"or "manhood."3If that is true, an etymological parallelbetween ren

and virtue(arete) omes to the surface.

Butthey come to be used differently.The term ren consists of two

components, meaning, respectively,"human"and "two," and pointstoward human relationships.It is this sense that figures in Confucius'

basic teaching that by learningto be good one becomes a person of

ren. In Athenianphilosophy, the word arete is associated with aristos

(excellent,best)and meansthe goodnessof a kindof thing(itis therefore

also translatedas "excellence"). ForAristotle,"something'svirtue [or

excellence] is relative to its own properfunction (ergon),"4hat is, the

characteristicactivity peculiarto somethingor its distinctive mark.5A

virtuousXis an Xthatfulfills tsergonwell. Anykindof thingcan be said

to possess its (specific)virtueby performingts functionwell. As farashumanbeings are concerned, virtue is human excellence or goodnesswith regard o humanfunction. As Aristotle ays:"thevirtueof a human

being will likewise be the state that makes a human being good and

makes himperformhis functionwell" (1106a23-24). Hence, philosoph-

ically, areteis related o humanfunction,while rento human relations.

Confucius does not furnish a unified definitionof ren. Of various

utterances ecorded n hisAnalects, wo remarkscharacterizing en have

AssistantProfessor f

Philosophyat the State

University f New York

at Buffalo

PhilosophyEast&WestVolume48, Number2

April1998323-347

? 1998

by University fHawai'i Press

323

JiyuanYu



been thoughtto be fundamental:"to love man"6 and "to return o ii"- (12:1; the translationof li rangesfrom "rites" to "propriety,""cere-

mony,""decorum"and "manners").What, then, is the relationbetween

ren as love and renas returningo li?Which one of these two determi-

nationsshouldbe consideredas central? nthe prevailing nterpretation,

ren as love is taken as the fundamentalmeaning,and the two aspectsofthe notion of ren in questionare describedas the relationbetween ren

and li. This is certainly upportedby the followingremark: Whatcan a

man do with li who is not ren?" 3: 3). Theconformityo liwithout inner

feeling can only be a formality,without any humangoodness. Never-

theless, given the fact that love is a naturalproperty,how can that

determine what moral goodness is? A man might love his parents,brothers, ndfriends,but he maystillbe a bankrobber,a drugsmuggler,oreven a brutalmurderer.Confucius s not unawareof thisgap between

love and human good. He explicitly claims that to be "fond of ren

withoutbeing

fond oflearning

s liableto lead to foolishness"17:8;

cf.

8:2). Learningmeans to learnli, to recognize it and embody it in one's

behavior.Hence ren as love is not identicalwith humangoodness, and

needs to be constrainedby li. "To return o li" turnsout to be equallybasicforbeing good, thatis, beinga personof ren.Ifneitherrenas love

nor ren as returningo li can be a complete notion of humangoodness,what is ren in such a sense?

Confucius sometimes views ren as a particularquality, along with

being clever, trustworthy,orthright,ourageous,unbending,and so on.

However,there are also many passages in which ren is describedas a

comprehensivevirtue,

includingall the above and othermoralqualities

and determining heirgoodness. The distinctionbetween ren as exclu-

sive and inclusive is well recognized.7How, then, is this distinction

related to the distinctionbetween ren as returningo li and as love? Is

therea unified notion to cover all these aspects?While Confucius'concept of ren involves a tension between ren

as returning o li and ren as love, there is also a tension at the heart

of Aristotle'snotionof virtue.Accordingto his ergon argument,human

virtue is the good performance f humanfunction.And human function

is, literally ranslated,"the soul's activitythat expresses reason" (kata

logon)or "notwithout the reason"(me aneu logou)8 (1098a5-6). Kata

logon and me aneu logou refer o two partsof the soul thatdistinguishahumanbeingfromotherkindsof animals.Theformer s the part hat has

reason in itself,and the latter s the partthat is nonrationalbut obeysreason(cf. 1102b14-1103a1, 1198a4). Aristotle hen divides virtueinto

two kinds: hat which corresponds o the partof the soul that has reason

in itself is intellectualvirtue (dianoetikearete,or excellence of intelli-

gence), and that which corresponds o the partof the soul thatis nonra-

Philosophy ast&West tional but obeys reason is ethical virtue (ethikearete,or excellence of

324



ethical character). t follows that intellectualvirtue is the excellence of

exercisingreason,while ethical virtue can be understoodas the excel-

lence of obeying reason.9"The humangood," forexample eudaimonia

(happiness, or well-being), Aristotleconcludes, "turns out to be the

soul's activity hatexpressesvirtue" 1098a16).

Aristotle's rgonargument mmediatelyaces a

challenge.Reasonas

a naturalpropertymay distinguishhumansfrom other animals but does

not seem to be the criterion hatdistinguisheshumangood fromhuman

evil. Actingrationallyand actingwell ethicallydo not seem to be iden-

tical. Ifone performs robeys one's rational unctionwell, we would saythat one is intelligentor clever ratherhanthatone is good in the ethical

sense. For ntelligencemaybe putto the serviceof evil actions.A clever

bank robberor a thief with sophisticated killsat stealingis "good"as a

robberor as a thief, but is unlikelyto be accepted as being good ethi-

cally. There is a gap between rationalexcellence and social respect.For

Aristotle,however,there is anotherdimension of human nature:

"Man is by naturea political [social]animal."10A personcannot live in

isolation romsome communityand mustparticipatenand sharethe life

of society. Ethicalvirtue,which is the soul's activityin obeying reason

accordingto the ergon argument, s, in a more directsense, concerned

with character(ethos)(1103a17), which is informedby social and cul-

turalcustoms and habits(ethos).Itis the dispositionorquality o feel and

act inways admiredbythe society.This kind of stable, settled,and long-

lastingdispositionformsa state (hexis,which in Greek is relatedto "to

have")."1 n terms of the claim that a humanbeing is a social animal,Aristotle voids Socrates' xtremepositionof intellectualism, ndexpandsthe area of ethics fromthe studyof moralknowledgeand reasoning o

the studyof developmentof good habitsof feelingand action.

Aristotle'sdistinctionbetween intellectualvirtueand ethical virtue s

hence notonly based on the two partsof the soul, butcorrespondso the

dual dimensionsof a person'shuman natureas a purelyrationalanimal

and as a social animal. There are various debates regardinghow to rec-

oncile these. InAristotle's thics, they lead to two seemingly incompat-ible notions of eudaimonia(happiness).Eudaimonia s the activitythat

expressesvirtue(1098a16). Accordingto the ergon argument, he best

life shouldbe that which mostfullyexercises one's rationalactivity,and

that,forAristotle, s the life of contemplation NEX, 7 ff.).On the other

hand, eudaimoniaas the most desirable sort of life needs to include

all intrinsicallyworthwhile activities and, in addition, externalgoods(1099a31-b6).12The issue that is more essential to our currentpurposeis this: is ethical virtue determinedmore fundamentallyby the estab-

lished habitsand customsof the particular ulturaland historical ontext

into which one happensto be thrown,or by humanrationality,which

belongs to any self-determiningagency? Intellectualvirtue includes JiyuanYu

325



theoreticalwisdom, and practicalwisdom (phronesis).13 While theo-

reticalwisdomdoes not involveaction,practicalwisdom is "concerned

withaction about what is good or bad fora humanbeing"(1140b4-6).The question,then, is about the relationbetween practicalwisdom

and ethical virtue. On the one hand, ethical virtue must be the excel-

lence of obeying reason,and Aristotleclaims thata full virtue"cannotbe acquiredwithoutpracticalwisdom" (1145a16). On the other hand,he says: "practicalwisdom, the eye of the soul, cannot reach its fully

developed state without virtue"(1144a30-31); and it is his recurringremark hat "virtuemakes the goal correct,and practicalwisdom makes

what promotesthe goal."14We seem to be caught in a cycle between

ethical virtueand practicalwisdom(1144b31-32).Thisessay intendsto arguethat a complete notion of virtuein Aris-

totle lies in an interplaybetween the two determinations f intellectual

virtueand ethical virtue.Similarly, completenotion of reninConfucius

lies in asynthesis

of the two determinations f ren as love and ren as

returningo li. On this basis, I tryto providean answer to each of the

questions raised above. Both ren and Aristotle'svirtue are concerned

with how a personshould live within a society. While Aristotle's irtue

hinges on practicalwisdom, ren is contingenton filial love. This is be-

cause while Aristotleemphasizes how a person as a self-determining

being can live, Confucius'li is an ideal social system, and hence his

concernis how a personcan complywith li, rather han whatwe should

complywith. Finally,Iwill show thatdifferent onceptionsof virtuealso

lead to differentpicturesof the cultivationof virtue.

Philosophy ast&West

Li,Ethos,and PracticalWisdom

Let us startwith Confucius'ren as returningo Ii. Lioriginallyrefers

to the rulesconcerningritualsor ceremonies involvedin religiousaffairs.

In the Analects t is conceived farmorebroadly,containingboth abstract

principlesand detailed formsof social regulations. tprescribesnotonlywhat the relationsbetween rulerandsubjectshould be (3:18, 3: 19) and

what one oughtto do in supportingone's parents, n holdinga funeral,and in payingfor a sacrifice(2:5), but also what kind of ceremonialcapone should wear, and even when one should prostrateoneself before

ascendingsteps in to see a king(9:3). This latterprescriptions like the

rulethatrequiresone to wear a blacktie to a fellows' dinnerat Oxford.Both are culturalnorms rather hanmoraldemands.In12: 1, Confucius

claimsthatreturningo li means that one should followthe guidanceof li

in "looking,""listening,""speaking,"and "moving.""One has no wayof takinghis stand unless he knows ii"(20:3). Liis thus the totalityof

socially acceptablebehaviorpatterns nd lifestyles, ncludingboth moral

and non-moralnorms.Itcorrespondso Aristotle's thos(socialcustom),15thatis, the traditional ocial moresand cultural ettings.

326



When Confuciusclaims that ren means to return o li, he is askingeach agentto act in conformitywith social values, and therebybecome

acceptedand respectedby the societyor traditionhe or she is in. To be a

personof ren is firstof all to be a social person, equipped with what

Aristotle alls "excellence of character"or "ethicalvirtue."

Yet Confucius' i immediately urnsout not to be ethos or custom assuch (in Chinese:feng su). He is not a commonsense moralist.Li is an f;6

object that Confuciusrequiresus to "return o" (fu)rather han simply V

to "conformwith." The word "return"n Chinesemeans to go back to

what we have deviated from.Lithus has a particular eference, he li of

the Zhou dynasty(fromca. 1122 B.C.).Confucius has a profoundcom-

mitment o the Zhou li: "TheZhou had the advantageof surveying he

two precedingdynasties.How resplendent s its culture(wen)!I follow i

Zhou"(3: 14). He even claims thatthisset of liwould notbe changedfor

morethan a hundredgenerations:"Should there be a successor to the

Zhou,even a hundred

generationshence can be known"(2:23).

InConfucius' ime,theZhoudynastycollapsedintomanysmallstates

that had been warring againsteach other. Chinese society underwent

a turbulentperiodof transitionduringwhich there was little order and

stability.When the Zhou house overthrew its predecessor,the Shang

dynasty,it claimed that the Shanghadforfeited he TianMing(Mandate iriof Heaven)or TianDao (Wayof Heaven)through ts misrule,while its _own social institutions onformedto the will of Heaven. Yetthey were

now broken.Where,then, could be found the Way of Heavento order

the stateand guide people's lives?This is the basic problemforpre-QinChinese philosophy.Confucius'answer is that the social turmoilof the

timeswas due to the lossof the traditional alues of the Zhouculture.He

thereforerequiresus to "return" o the social frameworkof that ideal

state.Renas returningo li means to be a personacceptableaccording o

the Zhou Ii.

Although he Analects does not presenta blueprintof the Zhou li,16

its core turns out to be a humane social hierarchymodeled on family

relationships."Letthe ruler be a ruler, he subjecta subject,the father

a father, he son a son" (12:11). A society is governedby a networkof

names each of which reflects a status which has a prescribedset of

duties.Anorderedsociety is that in which names are "rectified." feach

personplayeda rolesuitable o the personagehe assumedin society,the

societywould be pacifiedand harmonious.

Confucius'upholdingof the Zhou 1i has been interpretedas testi-

monyto his radicalconservatismortraditionalism; ence, those scholars

who would uphold Confuciusgenerally' nd not to clarifythat his li is

the Zhou ii.However,Confucius'conservatism s not necessarilya fault.

Hisbeliefs were generatedby his reflectionon the brutal ocial realityof

his time. This mightbe comparedwith EdmundBurke'sconservatism, JiyuanYu

327



the result of his reflectionon the violence of the FrenchRevolution.It

does sometimes seem thatConfucius ails to distinguish learlybetween

fundamentalprinciplesand the trivialregulations n the Zhou ii,and his

frequentemphasison regulatory etailconveys an impressionof rigidity.Nevertheless,what he reallyembraces is the spiritand essence of the

Zhou ii.When he claimsthat the Zhou li will not change fora hundredgenerations 2:23, 3: 14), he is not sayingthat none of the detailedreg-ulationsof theZhouli is changeable.As a matter f fact,he does endorse

some changes. For nstance, rugalitys preferredo extravagance n cer-

emonialpractice 3:4), and a ceremonialcap of linen can be exchangedfor a cap of black silkforreasonsof economy (9:3).

Confucius ullyrealizes that the Zhou li itself is a development rom

the precedingtwo dynasties, incorporating varietyof good elements

from them (15:11). The idea of social development is not alien to his

thinking.What should remainunchanged,however,is the deep meaningof the Zhou

li,the

trulyradical alterationof which can

onlylead to

FX calamity.As hisdiscipleZi-Xiasays:"Ifone does notoverstep he bounds

in majormatters,t is of no consequence ifone is not meticulous n minor

matters"19: 11).Confuciusadmires he Zhouli becausehe believes that

this must be the idealof social regulation,and this is the context within

which humanity an find its fullexpression.Li sthustheWay,or logos.17To "return"s not simplyto go back, but to hold onto the authentic.A

personof ren should embody the authenticspiritof a culture. Chinese

civilization is the longest-livedof historical raditions, nd it is generallybelieved that Confucianism s what has generatedthe cohesive force

behindthis civilization.And the strength f Confucianism s its insistence

on traditional alues.

Confuciusdoes notpresentdetailedjustificationorwhy the Zhou li

is the basis for the ideal ethical and politicalorder.He seems to believe

i m that it has a divinity hat is derivedfrom he Heaven(Tian) nd Dao. The

factthat the Zhou li had declined in his time he ascribesto the fact that

Dao had not prevailedin the empire(16:2, 5: 6). To illustrate he rela-

tion between Tianand li, we musthere introduceanothermajornotion

,S?- of Confucius:de. While ren is referredo as virtue,de in varioustrans-

lations is also defined as virtue. The identicaltranslation or these two

concepts could be justifiedon the groundthat de in Chinese is derived

from"toget"and inConfuciuscan be understood s the consequenceof

returningo li. It is hence a counterpart f ethical virtuein Aristotle. f a

culture(li)acquiresthe spiritof Dao (or HeavenlyDao), it is endowed

with "de."It is in this sense that Confuciussaysthatthe de of Zhou "can

be said to have been the highest" 8:20). Ifa personlives in accordance

with li, then he has de. SometimesConfuciusmakesthe directclaim that

heaven is the authorof de (7:23; cf. also 9:5), and sometimes he jus-Philosophy ast&West tifies de in termsof the operationof Heaven. Forinstance, in Chinese

328



culture, clever talk or loquacity is not considered as a de (15:27,17:17). Why is this?Confuciusexplains:"Whatdoes Heaven ever say?Yet there are the four seasons going round and there are the hundred

things coming into being. What does Heaven ever say?"(17:19). Con-

fucius takes the Zhou li as the full embodimentof Dao or logos.

He furtherdistinguishes he "de of the gentleman"from the "de ofthe small man," but never says what the groundis for this distinction,thusgivingriseto some confusionin understandinghisconcept. Such a

distinction eems to suggest precisely he distinctionbetweenthe Zhou li

(ethos)and ethos ingeneral.Ifde is cultivatedoutof the Zhou li, it is a de

of the gentleman,and if it is a habitualqualityout of the prevailingbut

non-authentic thos, it is the de of the small man. He says:"Thevillage

worthy s the ruinof de" (17:13). But he existence of the village worthyis no doubta kindof tradition.A good personshould neitherbe liked nor

dislikedby all in the village, but should be likedby those who aregoodand disliked

bythose who arebad

(13:24).While Confucius'ethics is confined to the sacred Zhou li, Aristotle's

ethos is simplythe prevailing ocial customs and conventions. Aristotle

believes that a humanbeing must be a social animal,and accordinglymust conform o social norms.Nevertheless, ikeConfucius,he does not

feel that to cultivate ethical virtue is simplya matterof passivelycom-

plyingwith the existingcustomsand rules,whateverthey may be. It is

possible that the existingends are in conflict, and are not even good.Withinthe same social context,there are rival listsof virtuesand differ-

ent definitionsfor the same virtues.This situation is not exceptionalwithin the

polisof Athens in the fifth

century,as Plato's

earlydialoguesattest. Forexample, Aristotledistinguishesbetween "a good man" and

"a good citizen" (1130b28, Politics1276b34). Social norms,constitu-

tions, and formsof government change, and the meaningof a "goodcitizen"changes accordingly."There s not one singlevirtueof the goodcitizen thatis perfectvirtue" Politics1276b32-33). Incontrast, here is a

single perfectvirtue for human beings as human beings, namely their

reason.Aristotle'shumanity ies both in his maintaininghimselfas a self-

determiningpersonand as a personself-determined y the social norms.

But since his ethics concerns morewhat a good personshould be than

what a good citizen should be, reason becomes the ultimatedetermi-

nant."For t is our decisions to do what is good or bad, not our beliefs,that makethe characterwe have"(1112a4).

Hence, while one cannot live in isolationfrom society, one must

maintaina reflectiveattitude owardethos in order o be a good person.This reflective unction is one's practicalwisdom (phronesis).First,prac-tical wisdom helps one to understandwhy the ways of behavior that

one has learnedare reallynoble and true. One thereforeproceedsfrom

knowing"that"(oti)to knowing"why" (dioti).A personof experience JiyuanYu

329



PhilosophyEast& West

sometimes can do better han a personof knowledge,but knowledgeis

stillsuperior o experiencebecause itgrasps he cause, while experiencedoes not.18A personof practicalwisdom (phronimos) erformsa virtu-

ous act because it is reallyvirtuous,rather han a simulacrum f virtue.

Second, practicalwisdom does not merelyprovidea personwith a

morearticulateopinion as to why the instructedbehavior s good, but isalso required o comparevarious views of what goodness is, and then

alsoto grasp he trueconceptionof what ends arereallygood and should

be pursued n conflictingsituations 1143b21-22).19Thisclarification f

existingends is itself also the processof achievinga new end. ForAris-

totle, practicalwisdom is concerned withthe conceptionof the good life

in general, and the phronimosdeliberateswell "aboutwhat promotes

livingwell in general"(1140a27-28).

Third,practicalwisdom has a dimensionof contextualityor partic-

ularity.Aristotleacknowledges hatthe subjectof ethics is indeterminate,and thatuniversal

principlesare notflexible

enoughto

copewithvarious

particular ituations(1098a26 ff., 1103b34). Practicalwisdom is con-

cernedwith actions, and actions are always aboutparticulars.Hence it

hasa dimensionof perception, hatis, practical ntuition, ordeterminingwhat should be done or can be done well in certainparticular ircum-

stances: "For nothing perceptible is easily defined, and [since] these

[circumstances f virtuousand vicious action]areparticulars,he judge-ment about themdependson perception."20A practicalperceptionrec-

ognizes the salientfeaturesof the particulars nd is aware of the limitsof

the universalprinciplesin application. Practicalwisdom thus enables

one to reachanequilibrium

betweenthe universaland theparticular

nd

to be aware of what should be done in accordancewiththe good end in

a concretesituation.

Aristotle hen develops the topics related o practicalwisdom, such

as choice, deliberation,responsibility, ncontinence (akrasia),and so

on. Incontrast,Confuciussays littleabout these issues.21This is largelybecause his li is not somethingtowardwhich we are required o main-

tain a criticalattitude.We have a choice only between following li and

fallinginto disorder.ForConfucius,"a good man" and "a good citizen"

shouldnot be different, nd indeed it is as a good citizenthat one can be

a good person. Aristotledoes agree that in the best form of society a

good personand a good citizen would be the same,but the bestformof

society is to be foundthrough he science of politics.Both Aristotleand

Confuciusare concerned with what a good personshould be and con-

nect this with social cultureandtradition.However,while Aristotlesug-

gestsan attitude hat is not one of blindcompliancewithtradition,Con-

fucius insistson the continuityand authenticityof tradition.It is out of

this belief thatConfuciusdevotes muchof his life to the transmission fthe ancientclassics,which record he li or civilizationof Zhou.

330



Nevertheless, he lack of an Aristoteliannotion of practicalwisdom

turnsout to be the weakness in Confucius'thinking.Here we need to

discuss anotherof his important otions:yi (whichis generally ranslated A

as "righteousness," meaning,"or "morality").n one instance,he says:"Indealingwith the world thegentleman s not invariablyorandagainst

anything.He is on the side of yi" (4:10). What, then, is yi, and what isits relation o li? Yiappearsin the Analectstwenty-four imes withouta

unified definitionor elucidation.Moreoften, this term is used in oppo-sition to personaladvantageor profit -also li):"Thegentlemanunder- Il]

standsyi, the small man understandswhat is profitable" 4:16; cf. also

19:1, 7:15, 14:13). Yi in this sense means the principleof rightbe-

havior,in contrast o egoism. Itis somethinglike the principleof justiceor whataction one should follow or conform o. Thissense is in fact not

far fromli.22 '1

The relationbetween li and yi can be understoodas follows. As we

mentionedearlier,

i has both its detailedformsand itsspirit.

Itsdetailed

formscannot cover all the possibleand complex situations n ouractual

life.When such a situationoccurs,we should act in accordance with the

spiritof li, the rightnessagreedto and believed in by the community.Yi

is thus close to the convention of what is morallybinding.23Accordingly,Confuciusis saying, in the passage at 4:10 (quotedabove), thatwhen

a particular ct lacks the guidance of the concrete form of li, we must

follow the right (yi). And the source of the rightis the spiritof li, or

authentic radition.

If we should adhere to yi in a situation where the concrete regu-lations of li are not available, we need a way to judge and elaborate

what is the right(yi),that is, what constitutes he deep spiritof li or the

enduringdao and what is peripheralo the authentic radition.We need

to reflectupon what concrete forms of li embody the authenticspiritof

the tradition and what should be emended, revised, and even partly

rejected.We mustidentifywhen the Dao or Way prevailsor when it is

hidden.Confucius'notion of yi seems to open the door for an Aristote-

lian practicalwisdom, but he fails to work it out. He has a majorvirtue

called "wisdom" (zhi), but it must also be based on conformity o li.."How can the man be considered wise who, when he has the choice,does not settle in ren?" 9:1). Yet he says nothing urther bout how zhi,

based on ren,can determinewhat yi is.24

FilialLove and Self-love

The mainproblemaddressedby Aristotle's thics is how one shouldlive. When Confuciusclaimsthat a personof ren isto live in accordancewith li, he seems already o haveprovidedan answer o thisquestion.He

then needs to deal with how it is possiblefor a personto "returno" or

"complywith" ii. For,unlikeMencius afterhim, Confucius s not a uto- JiyuanYu

331




pianconcerninghuman nature.he does not believe that humannature s

innatelyprogrammedo complywith ii.Instead,he has a deep suspicionthat it is naturally ttracted o ren:"Ihave never met a manwho finds ren

attractiveor a man who finds not-renrepulsive.A man who finds ren

attractivecannot be surpassed" 4:6). When he claims that ren is "to

returno li,"the morecompleteexpression s "toovercome oneself andto return o ii."Accordingly, n returningo li, one must firstof all dis-

cipline the "self."

Of course, one could be forced to accept the requirementsof li

throughpunishment.Yet in that case one "will stay out of troublebut

will have no sense of shame" (2:3). Confucius' i mightbe normative,but in contrast o both Kantian thics and utilitarianism,t is not some-

thing external that one ought to obey without regardto one's inner

motivation.Forhim,ethics is not a matterof how we shouldbe bounded

(obligare),but of how we can follow social ruleswillinglyand naturally.It is

againstthis

backgroundhat Confucius introduceshis other

majorinterpretationf ren: "Ren s to love humanity" 12 :22).Renas love is based on the feeling one has toward one's own par-

ents and brothers."Filialpiety and brotherly ove are the roots of ren"

(1 :2).25 InConfucius'view, these roots have the most important thical

value: "Thegentlemannourishes he roots,for once the roots are estab-

lished,the dao will growtherefrom"1 :2). Iffamilylove is the basisfor

dao to prevail, given the relation between dao and li, ren as love

becomes fundamental or ren as returning o li. Filial love as natural

sentimentis inborn and not culturallyspecific. What is required s to

cherish and nurture t.

Filiallove is crucialbecause Confuciusbelieves thatgratitudeand

affection towardone's parentsenable one willinglyto accept parental

authorityand the hierarchicalrelation between parentand child. Such

an ingrainedand intimaterelation s givenas justificationor the practiceof the three-yearmourningperiodaftera parentdies: "Achild ceases to

be nursedby his parentsonly when he is threeyearsold. Threeyears'

mourning s observedthroughout he Empire" 17:21). To repaythree

yearswith threeyearsmightappeartoo formal,butthe idea here is that

filial love might inspirean internal eeling that causes one willinglyto

carryout the responsibilityowardone's parents.Kinshipnvolves a nat-

uralhierarchyand throughit is establishednaturalauthorityrelations,while its extension/expansionto other social relationsnaturalizes he

idea of hierarchyand authorityn the widersociety. Bythe same token,the feelingtowardone's brothersmakesone agreeablyaltruistic.A family

maynot be a democratic orumorprovidea context forequality,but it is

a place one loves to be in.

The idea of ren as love is the expansionof the rootsof filiallove. This

expansionconsists in the transferringf the familyrelationsof hierarchy

332



and fraternityo the larger ociety. As a good fathermakes a good ruler,a good son makes a good subject. A person of ren startswith lovingthe parent,and then graduallyexpands the circle of love. "Theyoungshouldbehavewith filialpietyat home, and with brotherlyove abroad"

(1:6); eventually,"All withinthe FourSeas are his brothers"12:5). "A

man who possessesfilialpietyand brotherlyove is unlikely o transgressagainsthis superiors,and to incline to starta rebellion" 1 :2).

Hence, the determinationhat "ren is to love man" serves to justifythe innerbasis of returningo li. Earlier mentioned, but without dis-

cussion, that there is a well-recognized but unspecifieddistinctionin

Confuciusbetween ren as completevirtueand ren as particular irtue.If

my argument hus far is sound, this distinctioncan be set on an intelli-

gible foundation.While ren as love seems a particular irtue,ren in its

complete sense is a synthesisof ren as love and ren as returningo li.

Neitheris dispensable.On the one hand, the conformity o iimust be

based on ren as love:"Whatcan a man do with liwho is not ren?"3:3);on the otherhand,ren as love itselfmust be regulatedby li:being "fond

of ren without being fond of learning[i.e., ii] is liable to lead to fool-

ishness"(17: 8). One can be fully good onlywhen one conforms o li out

of love. AlthoughConfuciusdoes not specify, it does not seem far from

his mind that such an interplayor synthesis underlies all admirable

characteristics,hatis, particular irtues.For nstance,couragecannot be

characterizedas a virtueif it does not contain this unityof ren as love

and ren as returningo li. Itwill become unrulyif not regulatedby li

(8:2, 17:8), but if it is not motivatedby love it will also lead to unrulybehavior (8:10). Evenfilial piety as a virtue is determinedby such a

unity.On the one hand, filialpiety needs to conformto li: "Whenyour

parentsarealive, complywith li in serving hem;when they die, complywith li in burying hem and in sacrificing o them" (2:5). On the other

hand, it requiresa feeling of love in servingone's parents;otherwise

"Evenhoundsand horsesare, in some way, providedwith food. Ifa man

shows no reverence,where is the difference?"2: 7).Ren as love not only keeps the compliance with li from being a

matterof externally imposed limitations,but also provides an inner

ground oraltruism.Virtues an be eitherself-regardingrother-regardingor both. It has been a central concern for virtue ethics to providethe

rationale oraltruism,hatis, other-regardingirtue.Confucius'insight sthat ifwe want to nurture ltruism, hen filial love serves as a rootor an

innatespring.26LikeConfucius,Aristotle ully acknowledgesthe intrinsicgoodness

of love. Philia,which isgenerally ranslated s "friendship,"sthe central

topic in several treatises.27Humanbeingsarepoliticalor social animals,

"tendingby nature o live togetherwith others"(1169b17), while "The

will to live togetheris friendship(philiaY' Politics1280b38). Philiain- JiyuanYu

333




cludes every kind of social relation nvolvingmutualloving and liking,and hence "love" seems a bettertranslation.28 t exists not only within

familymembersand fellow citizens, but also in various associationsof

individualswho share a common interest n utility,pleasure,or virtue.

The formerkindis natural,while the latter s voluntary.

ForAristotle, t is friendship hat creates"familyconnexions, broth-erhood, common sacrifices"(Politics1280b37), and it is "the greatest

good of states"(Politics1262b8) to have and to preserve riendship.At

a personallevel, friendship s necessaryfor happiness (eudaimonia). t

is not merely the "greatest"and "most necessary"of externalgoods(1169b10, 1154a4-5), but also intrinsic o a happylife. Forone needs it

in all circumstancesand in every periodof life. A man withoutfriends

cannot be happy (1155a5-6, 1169b8-10, 1169b16-17). It creates an

arenafor one to realize and express one's virtue. The natural ove or

friendshipwithin the family is also highlyvalued by Aristotle.A parentloves his children because he

regardshem as

"somethingof

himself,"and children ove theirparentsbecause they regard hem as the "source

of origin" 1161b18-19). Brothersove each other becausethey are from

the same parents.The discussionof friendshipor love earns Aristotle reditforputting

friendshipand familyattachmentas important, ntrinsic tems into the

ethical sphere.This is regardedas a significantadvantageof his ethics

over modern moral theories that focus instead on impartiality nd the

impersonalpointof view. Aristotle'sdiscussion of friendship, speciallyof family ove, correctsPlato'sradicalanti-family osition nthe Republic.

Both Confuciusand Aristotleadvocatethe ethical statusof love, but

theirdiscussionsdiffer n certainsignificantaspects.Thefamilylove that

Confuciusemphasizes is filial love, the love of children toward their

parents.Filial ove is prior o virtueand is the root of the latter.We nur-

ture this rootto the effect thatsociety is seen as an enlargedfamily.All

social sympathyor love is derived from filial love and can be reduced

to it.On the otherhand,the familylove Aristotle mphasizesis parentallove. He believes thatparental ove towardchildren s more intensethan

the otherway round. This is because parentsknow children better and

have a stronger ense of possessing,and also because theirlove toward

theirchildrenstartsright rom heirbirth,"while childrenbecome fond of

the parentwhen time has passedandthey have acquiredsome compre-hension or perception"(1161b27). Since a parentis an adult and has

alreadyestablisheda stablecharacter,parental ove cannotbe a starting

point for the formationof virtue and is not associated with the notion

that a state is an enlargedfamily. Hence, when Aristotledistinguishesbetween naturalamilylove andvoluntary ocial love, he neversaysthat

the latter is derivedfrom the former.He draws a clear-cut distinction

between household and political life, and claims that it is mistaken o

334



think that families and city-statesare differentonly in size rather han in

kind (Politics1,1). He truly acknowledgesthe importanceof familyand

social sympathyin ethics, but, unlike Confucius,he fails to appreciate

family love as an ethical value that is the basis for other social regu-lations.29 ndealingwith familyand emotionalcommitment,Confucius

goes much further han Aristotle, or he not only does justice to theseethical phenomena but also considers them an Archimedeanpoint for

his ethics.

ForAristotle,social love and friendshipare an extension of one's

love of oneself rather han an extensionof filial love: "Thedefiningfea-

turesof friendshiphat are found in friendshipo one's neighbourswould

seem to be derived romfeaturesof friendshipowardoneself" (1166a1

2). All formsof love mustbe understood n the context of self-love. Such

an analysisof the essence of friendship s associatedwithAristotle's iew

that a humanbeing is essentiallya rationalbeing. He declares that "The

good personmustbe a self-lover."30He

distinguisheswo kindsof self-

lovers:one is a base egoist who does his best to gratifyappetiteand the

nonrationalpartof the soul (1186b17, 1168b22-23); the other pursuesthe gratification f the rationalpartof the soul, for reason is, above all,"what each person is, and the decent person likes this most of all."31

The good man as a self-loveris the latterkind,who is obedient to the

voice of reason within himself and sets his life in accordance with

rationality.We once againface the relationbetween Aristotle's ual dimensions

of humannature.A humanbeingas a socialanimalrequiresove, but as a

rationalbeing explainsthe natureof love. The love of others is groundedin the love of self. Itfollows that a humanbeing is, firstof all, a rational

being rather han a social being, albeitthe latter tatus s indispensable.Aristotle s chargedwith leavinglittle room for altruism n his ethics.

He fails to explain why a rational person needs to cultivate other-

regardingvirtues.A good personwill performactions in otherpeople'sinterests,but thatis for the perfectionof one's own character. fso, when

thereis a conflictwith otheragents in pursuing he developmentof their

own characters, t is rational or a moralagentto develop hisown, rather

thancurtailingt. Furthermore,ccording o Aristotle's thics,one should

only pursue he actionsthat are relevant o one's developmentof ethical

character.Aristotle'svirtuouspersoncould certainlybe altruisticout of

habituation,but a rational elf-loveaccount seems not to be sufficient o

justify his tendency. Indiscussingthe paradigmcase of friendship, hat

is, the friendshipbased on virtue, or what Cooper called "character

friendship,"32Aristotlekeeps remarkinghat those friends "wish goodto their friend or the friend'sown sake"(1156b10-12; cf. 1156a17-18,1156b10; cf. also EE1244b15-22, Rhetoric1385a18-19). Manycom-

mentatorsaccordingly nterprethe virtueof friendshipas a supplement JiyuanYu

335




or modificationof Aristotle's gocentricethics. Butthis hardlystandsupunderclose scrutiny.Aristotle tillexplainsthis form of altruism n terms

of rational self-love: "In loving their friend they love what is goodforthemselves"(1157b33).A virtuefriend is "anotherme" or "another

self." We care for friends because a friend is a mirrorby which I can

contemplatemyselfbetter.33What we seek in this kind of love is thefriend's rationalityand persistenttraits of character,rather than the

friend'saccidentalproperties.By experiencingthat characterwe enrich

and develop ourown ethical characters. nthe finalanalysisthe love of

one's virtuous riends s stillself-oriented.34

Confucius'ren as love providesa sort of justification or altruism.

Nevertheless,his altruism s graded.Love is certainlyuniversal, or we

are required o treat all people under heaven as brothers.Yet this does

not mean that a manof ren should love everyone equally.Theexpansionof love is hierarchicaland makes distinctions. This idea is explicitlydefended

byMenciusin

criticizinghe Moist

typeof

impartialuniversal

love. Thisgradedlove has been accused of partiality.Nonetheless, it is

intrinsic to Confucius' thinking. Love must be rooted in family love

because the latter nvolves an inherent ntimacybetween affection and

ethical training. Denial of this intimacy will destroy the Confucian

groundof complying with li, in particular he inner groundof other-

regardingvirtue. Such a graded love seems to be echoed in con-

temporary ociobiology and evolutionaryethics, which suggestthat we

have a gene-determinedaltruistic endency as a humanadaptation n

evolution, but,everythingbeingequal,we arebiologicallydeterminedo

cooperatefirstof all with our close kin and otherswhose reciprocations

expected. Itis also echoed incontemporarynvironmental thics,which

extends the scope of moralcommunitybeyond humanbeingsto animals

and even to nature tself.

An equal and impartialuniversal ove is definitelymore desirable,but as the highest ethical virtue it requiresan independentsource of

justification.The central concern of modern moral systems is such a

justification.But neitherdeontologynor utilitarianisms thought o fulfill

this tasksatisfactorily.Bothareaccused of holdingan impersonalpointof

view. As a matter f fact,one's affection owardother,unknownchildren

cannotbe as intense as towardone's own. Williams' amousproblemof

whether a rescuer is permitted o rescue his wife first35will presentadilemmaforan advocateof impartialove, but not for Confucius.

Given its fundamental tatus,Confuciusprotectsfilial love stronglyfromany harm. This is illustrated n the case of a fatherwho steals a

sheep. The governorof the village believes that the son who testifies

againstsuch a father s an example of a "straight" erson.On the con-

trary,Confucius claims that "Fathers over up for theirsons, and sons

coverupfor their athers. nsuch behavior sstraightnesso be found as a

336



matterof course"(18:18). Whathe is saying is that the fathermightbe

open to punishment orhiswrongdoing,but it is not his son's positionto

take responsibilityor seeing thatjustice is done.36Family ove itself is

certainly ubjectto the regulation f ethos oryi (rightness), ut if an ethos

encouragesthe disruptionof filial love, it is, for Confucius, he greatestevil.

Cultivation

ForConfucius, de, the acquiredren, is "to get," and for Aristotle,ethical virtue is connected with "hexis"(having).Both "to get" and "to

have" requirea processof ethical trainingand culturalrefinement.For

Confucius,this is a process of expandingone's filial love to society so

that one maywillingly accept the constraintsof li; forAristotle, his is a

process of the habituationand development of practicalwisdom. But

both believe that such a process of cultivation is lifelong, and virtues

areeventually

nternalizedas second nature.According

oConfucius,

he

himselfset his hearton learningat fifteen,but not untilseventycould he

follow his heart's desire "without oversteppingthe line" (2:4). That

amountsto sayingthatat thattime the dispositionwas well entrenched

and was a hexis, or second naturein the Aristotelian ense (1103a31-

b21).Confuciusviews the process of cultivation as mainly a matter of

education. Public education is an extension of family education. The

Chinese word for "education,"jiaoyu, is composed of two words: fW

"teaching"(jiao)and "nurturing"yu),and this education is not merely : W

for the purposeof conveying knowledge, but also for

shapingcorrect

behaviorpatternsand internalizing hem as partof one's character.In

Hansen'swords,it is "characterbuilding."37 uchaneducationis carried

out througha dualdialectic. On the one hand,a personis taughtby his

parents,teachers, and the noble people surroundinghim what should

be done and how to do it. He is required o respectall those who teach

him as father-like.In Chinese culture,a teacher is traditionally alled

"teacher-father,"nd the proverbgoes, "Ateacher of one day makes a

father for all life." Governmentofficials, as the practitioners f li, are

called "parentofficers."The head of the state is called "thestatefather,"and the first adythe "statemother."On the otherhand,a father upportshis family, but more importantly hould be seen as an educator,as isreflectedin the proverb hat"it is a fault for a fatheronly to supportbut

not to educate."A teacher'sdutyis not merely o teach, butalso to serve

as a model of ethical behavior. In China,the duty of a teacher is fre-

quentlydescribed as "to be a teacher and model for others." Further-

more,the functionof a ruler s notonly to order,butalso, andeven more

importantly,o serve as a model of behaviorfor the people. The basic

principleof governing s "to guide them [people]by de, and keep them JiyuanYu

337



in line with Ii"rather han"to employ punishment" 2:3; cf. also 2:1).This is because, in a sense, rulersare also teachers,and are also requiredto love theirsubjectsas theirown children.

Hence, the hierarchicalrelationships a model-copy relationship f

behaviors,and each formcan be reduced o a teacher-pupil elationship,which is in turn reduced to a father-son

relationship.The

personswho

are superiorare supposed to establish themselves as the paradigmof

humanity, hatis, the model forjuniorsand inferiors o follow and catch

upwith. Society is an extended school as well as an extendedfamily.Confucius s reported o have remarked hatthere is a single thread

pervadinghis dao (4:15), which is interpreted y his discipleas "zhongT 'L and shu." The character"xin"(heart) s a component of both words.

Zhong, traditionally enderedas "loyalty," s bettertranslatedby D. C.

Lauas "doingone's best,"thatis, inone's relationshipswith others.Shu,

etymologicallyrelatedto "as," is explainedby Confucius o mean "Do

notimpose

on others whatyou yourself

do not desire"(15:24),

and its

translationvaries:"usingoneself as a measureto gauge others"(Lau),"altruism"(Wing-tsitChan), "consideration"(Waley), "reciprocity"(Dawson),and so on. Shu is intrinsically elated o ren in its etymologi-

cally relational ense,38and in one instanceConfuciusconsidersrenthe

positivearticulation f the principleof shu:"Apersonof renhelpsothers

to taketheir stand insofaras he himselfwishesto take his stand,andgetsothersthere insofaras he himselfwishes to get there"(6:30).

How to interprethis "singlethread" has been a matterof consid-

erablecontroversy.Giventhe relationbetween shu and ren,and giventhat the self of a ren

personin Confucius s

essentiallyembedded in his

relationswith his familymembers,I suggest reading he "singlethread"

as meaningthat one should do one's best to deal with others as one

deals with one's parentsand brothers.Interpretedhis way, Confucius'

"singlethread" ndicateshow one can extend filial love to society;that

is, it is a way of cultivatingvirtue.Thisseems to be confirmedby Con-

fucius' remark hat "To be able to judge othersby what is nearto our-

selves maybe called the methodof realizingren."39One's parentsand

brothersare certainlywhat areclosest to a person.To makean analogyof them in deciding what one should or should not do in dealingwith

othersis the art of acquiringvirtue.InChineseethicaltraining,a personis generally old "to thinkof him as yourbrother" r "tothink of her as

yoursister"when decidingwhatyou should or should not do in dealingwith others. Evenin the trainingof a self-regarding irtue such as dili-

gence, a personis taught"to work hard o earnhonorforyourparents"or that "if you bear in mindyour parent'shardship n raisingyou, youwill not be lazy." The family-centered ultureof the Chinese is essen-

tially indebted o Confucius' eaching.Philosophy ast&West Aristotleagreeswith Confucius hat humanbeingsare not by nature

338



Philosophy ast&West

one's practicalwisdom.40Inthe course of repeatedlyperforming ctionssaid to be noble and just,one comes to realizewhy they are said to be

good. One's dependence on otherpeople tellingone what to do dimin-

ishes, and one comes to see what is rightfor oneself. A person alsocomes to develop a practicalperceptionof what should be done in a

particularcircumstance.The exercise of rationaljudgment becomesinherent neducation.Confucius'pictureof cultivation, ncontrast, acksthe developmentof practicalwisdom.

Earlierwe mentioned that in Aristotle'sconcept of virtuethere is a

cycle between practicalwisdom and ethical virtue.On the one hand,

practicalwisdom is not simplya matterof rationalcalculation; t is dis-

tinguished rom such notions of capacityas deliberation bouleusis)andcleverness(deinotes).It is not morally ndifferent, ut involves an essen-tial reference o, or presupposes,ethicalvirtue(1143b11-14, 1144a30-

31). Aristotleexplicitlydeclares that"we cannotbe a personof practicalwisdom without

being good" (1144a36),and he therefore

rejectsthe

idea that an incontinentpersonhas practicalwisdom. Practicalwisdomis inseparable romethical virtue and is embedded in the tradition.On

the otherhand,practicalwisdomalso reflectsandcriticizes he tradition,as we have indicatedin the second section of this essay. Viewed fromthe standpointof the dynamic process of cultivation,this cycle is not

vicious. It is inherent nthe processand promotes he fabricof characteras well as the reformation f the tradition tself.The ethical virtue that

provides he goal forpracticalwisdom is not the full virtue,forthe goalit teaches derivesfromexperiencerather han fromclearknowledgeanda criticalattitude.A human

beingas a rationalanimal cannotbe

merelya creatureof habit.Withoutexercisingrationalactivitya humanbeingcannot be human in the fullest sense. Only when one develops one's

own practicalwisdom can one fully enjoy doing noble things. A full

moralvirtue,that is, one's second nature,cannot be acquireduntil oneexercisesone's own reason.

A state of charactercan be good because it aims at the mean stateof feelingand actions(1106b28, 1109a20-30). This notion of a mean is

not one of quantitybut one of correctness.41The mean is a state that"enablesone to act at the right ime, aboutthe right hings,toward the

rightpeople, for the rightend, and in the rightway" (1109a20-23). This

rightness s determinedby correctreason(orthos ogos),thatis, practicalwisdom (1144b28). Reasondeterminesrightnessdifferently n differentsituations.On this basisAristotlederives his complete definitionof eth-icalvirtue:"virtue s a state (hexis)concerned thatdecides, consisting na mean,the meanrelative o us,which is definedby reference o reason,i.e., to the reasonby reference o which the personof practicalwisdomwould define it"(1107a1-3).

We now see that while for Confucius a complete notion of ren is

340



a synthesisof renas love and renas conforming o li, forAristotlea full

notion of virtuecomprisesvirtueas a state of characteras well as virtue

as exercising practicalrationality,and is an organic synthesisof these

two aspects. It is the synthesisof these two that determinesthe mean

state. Virtue as mean in turn determines he natureof all other ethical

virtues.

It is interesting o note that, with regardto the concept of virtue,neither Confucius' synthesis nor Aristotle'ssynthesis has been fully

respected historically.In the West, Aristotle'spractical wisdom and

ethical virtuehave been separated ince the Enlightenment. hilosopherscontrast the authorityof reason to tradition,and then try to establish

universaland trans-cultural rinciplesof morality n which virtue does

not have any significantplace. The currentrevival of virtue ethics is in

a sense a "return" o Aristotle's nterplaybetween reason and virtue,

althoughwith significantalterations.42Correspondingly,n the East, he

Confuciansynthesis

of ren as love and ren asreturning

o li is also

severed in the laterdevelopmentof Confucianism.Ren as observingli

comes to be moreand morerigidand inflexible,and moves farfrom ren

as love. Li was eventually accused, in the May Fourthmovement,of

"eating man."43 The basic motivationof the May Fourth movement

was to establisha sharpcontrastbetween Chinese traditionand Western

science and democracy,and then uphold the latterwhile rejecting he

former.But the recentresurgenceof Confucianism n EastAsia empha-sizes the value of Chinese traditionand criticizes Western individualist

morality.Thissounds like a tendencyto "return"o Confucius'notionof

ren. Ifthecomparison

in thepresentessay

is sound, we would like to

suggestthat while an Aristotelian evival would do well to borrow the

Confucian insightof filial love, a Confucian revival could hardlybe

constructivewithoutdevelopingan Aristotelian unction of rationalityn

weighingand reanimatinghe tradition.

NOTES

An earlierversion of this paperwas presentedat the ChinesePhilosophy

Symposiumof November 1995 held at the Centerfor Modern Chinese

Studies,University f Oxford.Thereaftertwas circulated n the Center's

working-papereries(editedby Nicholas Bunnin). would like to thank

NickBunnin or his helpfuladvice andgenerous supportat each stageof

the developmentof thisessay. Iam also grateful o RogerCrisp,Kenneth

Dorter,Matthew Liao,James McMullen, ChristopherTaylor,and the

refereesof thisjournal orvaluable commentson the earlierversions. JiyuanYu

341



Abbreviations re used in the Textand Notes as follows:

EE Eudemian Ethics

NE Nicomachean Ethics

1 - Ren has been translated in a variety of ways, including "humanity,""benevolence," "love," "virtue," "manhood," "authoritative per-

son," and so forth. James Legge calls it "complete virtue," but he

admits that "We cannot give a uniform rendering of this term" (The

Four Books [New York:Paragon Book ReprintCorp, 1966], pp. 2-

3). Given this situation, I find it more convenient to keep it

untranslated in discussion. Arete is translated as either "virtue" or

"excellence," but "virtue" seems more popular. Hence Iadopt this

conventional translation, despite the asymmetry I might create as I

keep ren untranslated.

2 - Cf. BernardWilliams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London:

Fontana Press, 1985), p. 6. These two terms originally mean the

same thing. "Ethics" is a transliterationof the Greek word ethikos,

and "morality" is from the Latin word moralis, which is the Latin

translation of ethikos. Currently, morality is characterized as deal-

ing with an agent's actions and their consequences, and as attempt-

ing to formulate legalistic moral principles and rules that are uni-

versally applicable to all moral actions. Itemphasizes "obligation"and "moral rightness" and takes an impersonal point of view

regardingmoral

agents. Moralityin this sense denotes modern

moral systems, in particular utilitarianism and Kantiandeontology,and has been the target of the recent anti-theory or anti-moralitymovement. Williams even claims, with regard to such a morality,that "we would be better off without it" (ibid., p. 174). Ethics, on

the other hand, is believed to concern, as the word "ethics" itself

suggests, an agent's character, or the kind of person an agent is, and

treats the agent as culturally and traditionallyembedded. Its central

notion is "virtue," or the excellence of character, and it takes per-sonal commitment, attachment, and deep convictions into serious

consideration. Hence thesphere

of ethics is much broader than that

of morality. This distinction is essentially a distinction between

virtue and morality. An anti-morality movement seeks to replace

morality with a virtue ethics, a tendency described as "from

morality to virtue" (Michael Slote, From Morality to Virtue [New

York: Oxford University Press], 1992).

3 - Cf. Benjamin I. Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China

PhilosophyEast&West (Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press, 1985), p. 75.

342



4 - NicomacheanEthics,1139a17. Hereafter, ll quotations romAris-

totle without prefixare from (and cited as) NE. Unless otherwise

specified, the translationis from Aristotle,Nicomachean Ethics,trans.TerenceIrwin Indianapolis:Hackett, 1985), with occasional

alterations.

5 - ForAristotle, function s also a thing'send (cf. De Caelo286a8-9;Parts f Animals694b13-15; EudemianEthics EE] 219a8) orwhat

constitutesa thing'sessence (cf. Meteorology390a10-12; Partsof

Animals 640b33-641a6; Generation of Animals 731a25-26;

Metaphysics1045b32-34; NE1176a3-9; Politics1253a23-25).

6 - Lun Yu(Analects)12.22. Hereafter,all quotationsof Confucius OA

withoutprefixare fromthe LunYu.Unless otherwisespecified,the

translation s based on that of D. C. Lau(Hong Kong:Chinese Uni-

versityPress, 1979), with alterations."Love"as a determination f

ren is affection and emotional attachment that originate amongfamilymembersand are thenextendedto the larger ociety. Itcarries

the implicationof neither romantic ove nor sacred love. Love in

Confucius is close to "care"or "concern,"and is similarto the

Greekphilia (see below, note 28).

7 - For a list of the texts upon which this distinction is revealed, see

Wing-tsitChan, "The Evolutionof the ConfucianConcept Ren,"

PhilosophyEastand West4 (1955):297-298.

8 - Following Urmson and Irwin, I prefer to translate "kata" as

"expressing" ather han "inaccordancewith."

9 - Thispointenables ethicalvirtue o connect to reasonby definition,but this is not clearlyenough expressedin the current iterature, s

it usuallymakesa generalclaimthat the humanfunction is reason.

Thiscreatesthe impression hat(ethical)virtue has littleto do with

the ergon argument.

10 - Politics1253a1; cf. NE1097b9-11, 1169b18-19.

11 - Categories8b27-28 (cf.also 9a8-13); NE1100b11-17, 1105a32-

33, 1152a30-33.12 - There is no need in this essay to enter the long-standingdispute

about whether Aristotle's notion of eudaimonia is intellectualist

(dominant)or comprehensive (inclusive). PersonallyI am sym-

patheticto the positionthatthe tension between these two notions

is not as sharpas is generally supposed.A life of contemplation s

an ideal for humanbeings. Aristotleadvises us to seek to realize

completelythis ideal, as he himselfdid throughouthis life. Buthe JiyuanYu

343



also acknowledgesthat it is beyond humancapability.For his rea-

son, althoughhe remarks hatthe life of moralvirtue"ishappyonlyin a secondary degree"comparedwith contemplation,he affirms

that "theactivitiesexpressing hisvirtueare human" 1178a8-10).

13 - Othertranslationsof phronesis include "intelligence"(Irwin)and

"Prudence" Rackham).

14 - 1112b13. Cf. 1112b34-35, 1144a8-9, 1145a5-6, 1140b11-20,

44a34-b1, 1151a15-19; EE1227b12-19. This remark eads to a

readingthatpracticalwisdom and ethical virtue constitutea rela-

tion between the end and the means,and consequently hat reason

has nothing o do with ends. Thisreadingwas initiatedbyJ.Walter,Die LehrederpraktischenVernunftn dergriechischenPhilosophie(Jena, 1874), and has had a numberof supportersn this century.In opposition, many commentators end to argue that the Greek

phrase"meansto the end" (tapros to telos)indicatesa widerrela-

tion than its Englishcounterpart uggests. "Means" can be eitherconstitutive i.e.,whatpertainso theend)or instrumentale.g.,what

is toward the end) (cf. Metaphysics1032b27; Politics 1325b16,

1338b2-4; EN 1144a3), and what Aristotlemeans is the former

rather han the latter. This is certainlyright.However, once we

notice thecycle between reasonand ethicalvirtue, he interpretationbecomes also one-sided.

15 - It also amounts to what Wittgensteincalls "form of life." Foran

interpretationf li in terms of "formof life,"see Chad Hansen,A

DaoistTheory

of ChineseThought:

APhilosophicalInterpretation(New York:OxfordUniversityPress,1994), pp. 75 ff.

16 - Analects, book X, describes in detail li in daily life, yet this

description s widely regardedas "inauthentic."

17 - Inthis sense HerbertFingarettes certainly right o call it a "holyrite" or "sacred ceremony" (Confucius:The Secular as Sacred,

HarperTorchBooks[New York:Harper nd Row, 1972], pp. 6-7).

18 - Metaphysics 981 a29.

19- This is, indeed, the task Aristotleascribesto his ethics. His dia-

lectical ethics shows that we need to examine the endoxa, thereceived views (1098b23-26), at leastthe most influentialamongthem (1095a28-30), to discover the aporiai hese views cause, and

then decide which of them should be followed or what can be

preserved 1146b5-6; EE1235b15-18). Aristotle ries to draw the

whole truth hat other views captureonly in part.

20 - 1109b22-23. Cf. also 1110b6; 1126b4; 1141b27-28; 1142a24-

Philosophy ast&West 27; 1143a28-35, b6; 1147a3, 25-26, b5.

344



21 - In this sense, Fingarette s certainly right in remarkinghat Con-

fucius lacks a propermoralpsychology.Cf. Fingarette,Confucius,

chap. 2, "AWay without a Crosswords."

22-Cf. 1:13, 2:24, 5:16, 7:3, 12:10 and 20, 13:4, 15:16, 16:11.

On the notionof "yi"at the passage4:10 underdiscussion,many

translatorsend to view it as somethingexternaland objective,andrender it as "what is moral"(D. C. Lau)or "righteousnessas the

standard" Wing-tsitChan).Inothersenses, yi is sometimesrelated

to the regulationof the characterof courage(2:24, 17:23), which

is again close to li, and is sometimesopposed to small cleverness

(15:17). Confuciussays:"Thegentlemanhas yi as his native sub-

stance (chi), and by observing li puts it into practice" (15:18). fSince nativesubstance at 4:16 is in contrast o culture(wen),yi in

this context seems to refer to natural character before cultural

refinement.

23 - Schwartz(Worldof Thought,pp. 79-80) also distinguishes i from

yi, but he claims thatyi is simplywhat is rightbeyondthe reach of

the prescription f li, and thus makesyi an independentsource of

rightbehavioralongside ii. Chad Hansen also sees the distinction

between li andyi as the distinctionbetweenetiquette social mores)and realmorality.Nonetheless,he also remarks: Giventhe nature

of Confucius' reference to yi (morality),we cannot tell if he dis-

tinguishedbetween realmoralityand a community's ocial mores,"and "the discourse in the Analects makes no distinctionbetween

moraldao andconventionalmores" Hansen,DaoistTheory, . 82).

24 - This account of yi and its relationto li is in contrast o the inter-

pretationof Hall and Ames (ThinkingThroughConfucius[Albany:StateUniversity f New YorkPress,19871),who claim that here is a

long-ignoreddistinctionbetween li and yi. While li is not "divinelyestablished"(p. 89), the notion of yi reflects a capacityto importthe agent's significanceinto the world,a "flexibilityor a personto

interactwith and integratento ever new situations"; i is particular,creative,and responsive,and it is a "central heme" in Confucius

to "underscore he creative and novel dimensions of yi" (p. 95).

Consequently,a personof ren is made by exercisinghis own judg-ment(yi) o adaptthe tradition li).Although he authorsdo not referto Aristotle, t is interesting hat their readingof Confucius is vir-

tuallyan Aristotelian ne. Licorresponds o undogmaticethos,and

yi to practicalwisdom (phronesis).Since I have arguedthat Con-

fucius insisted on the continuityof the Zhou li, and thatyi is con-

ventional on the basis of li rather hanpersonal, heirinterpretationseems to me to be open to challenge. Nevertheless, t is insightful f

the authors of this interpretationo draw our attention to the JiyuanYu

345



ignorednotion of yi, which seems exactlythe place fordevelopingConfucius'thinking.

25 - Here I follow the translationof Wing-tsitChan (A SourceBook in

Chinese Philosophy[Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1963],

p. 20).

26 - BertrandRussell seems to miss the point entirelywhen he says:"Filialpiety, and the strengthof the familygenerally,are perhapsthe weakest point in Confucianethics" (The Problem of China

[London:GeorgeAllenand Unwin, 1922], p. 40).

27 - NEVII;EE7; Rhetoric1380b33 ff.

28 - This is suggested by MarthaC. Nussbaum(Fragility f Goodness:

Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedyand Philosophy [Cambridge:

CambridgeUniversityPress,1986], p. 354). Other translations n-

clude "social relation" Urmson)and "socialsympathy" Barker).

29 - ForAristotle, he relationsbetween fatherand son, between hus-

band and wife, and between brothersare various.They can be

eithermonarchic,aristocratic, nd timocratic,or tyrannical,oligar-chic, and democratic.Accordingly,family relation cannot be in

itselfa source of social justice.

30 - Philautos1169a11; cf. also 1169b1.

31 -1169a2; cf. also 1162a15, 1168b35, 1178a2-3.

32 - J.M.Cooper,"Aristotle n Friendship,"nAmelieRorty, d., Essays

on Aristotle'sEthics Berkeley:University f CaliforniaPress,1980),p. 308.

33 - MagnaMoralia1213a10-26; EE1245a29-37; NE1170b7.

34 - Furthermore, irtue friendshipexists only between good peoplewho are similar n theirvirtues.Hence virtue s prior o and neces-

saryforfriendship.

35 - BernardWilliams, "Persons,Characterand Morality," n Moral

Luck:Philosophical Papers, 1973-1980 (Cambridge:Cambridge

UniversityPress,1981), p. 18.

36 - This was later recognized in Chinese imperial law. See I. J.

McMullen, "Filial Piety, Loyaltyand Universalismin Japanese

Thoughtof the TokugawaPeriod," n FilialPietyand FutureSociety

(Songnam:Academyof KoreanStudies,1995), p. 640.

37 - Hansen,Daoist Theory, . 78.

38 - For a useful discussion of their relationship, ee Hall and Ames,

Philosophy ast&West ThinkingThroughConfucius,pp. 286-287.

346



39 - The translation s based on that of Wing-tsitChan (SourceBook,

p. 31), whose paragraph umber s 6:28, while Lau's s 6:30.

40 - Thereis indeed a traditional nterpretationn Aristotle cholarshipthat the cultivationof ethical virtue out of habits is a purelynon-

cognitive process of habituation.But this has been convincingly

rejectedby Burnyeat,"Aristotle n Learningo be Good," RichardSorabji,"Aristotle n the Role of Intellect n Virtue" botharticles

are included in Rorty, Essayson Aristotle'sEthics),and NancySherman, The Fabricof Character:Aristotle's Theoryof Virtue

(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1989).

41 - The traditional iscussionof Aristotle's octrineof the mean focuses

on its quantitativedetermination,and the doctrine is accordinglynot highlyvalued. But this traditionalapproachhas been rejected

by Urmson,who arguesconvincinglythat the mean refers o the

mean dispositiontowardaction, rather han a dispositiontoward

the mean action. See Urmson,"Aristotle'sDoctrineof the Mean,"inthe AmericanPhilosophicalQuarterly1973):223-230, reprintedin Rorty,Essayson Aristotle'sEthics.

42 - Alasdair Maclntyre asks, "Whose justice? Which rationality?"(WhoseJustice?WhichRationality NotreDame, Indiana:Univer-

sityof Notre Dame Press,1988]), and BernardWilliamsattempts o

replaceboththeoryand prejudicewith "reflection" Ethics nd the

Limitsof Philosophy London:Fontana,1985], p. 112).

43 - The remarks fromLu Xun'sDiaryof a Madmanand OtherStories *LE

(Honolulu:Universityof HawaiiPress,1990).

JiyuanYu

confucius aristotle

Documents