conflict and violence in contemporary sierra leone chiefdoms

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Conflict and Violence in Contemporary Sierra Leone Chiefdoms Author(s): Roger Tangri Source: The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Jun., 1976), pp. 311-321 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/160062 . Accessed: 09/05/2014 09:24 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Modern African Studies. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 194.29.185.81 on Fri, 9 May 2014 09:24:09 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

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Conflict and Violence in Contemporary Sierra Leone ChiefdomsAuthor(s): Roger TangriSource: The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Jun., 1976), pp. 311-321Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/160062 .

Accessed: 09/05/2014 09:24

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to TheJournal of Modern African Studies.

http://www.jstor.org

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Africana

Conflict and Violence in Contemporary Sierra Leone Chiefdoms by Roger Tangri, Senior Lecturer in Political Science, Fourah Bay College, University of Sierra Leone, Freetown

Violence has been a recurring feature of political life in provincial Sierra Leone for a long time. In 1898, two years after the establishment of colonial rule, a mass rebellion, commonly known as the Hut Tax War, and directed against British political authority, took place over a large part of the Pro- tectorate. Thereafter, the violence which periodically disrupted the chiefdoms of the hinterland, during both the colonial and post-colonial periods, resulted predominantly from conflicts amongst the indigenous peoples themselves. This article is concerned with the various disturbances that flared up in the Sierra Leone chiefdoms since the late I940s.

These disturbances have been characterised by Martin Kilson as 'a form of rural "radicalism", which in some instances constituted a virtual peasant revolt against traditional rulers and authority'; they were violent forms of populist opposition to specific features of chiefdom administration 'that proved unjust or unduly burdensome to the masses'.1 This view has been modified recently by Walter Barrows, who regards rural violence not as a result of popular discontent, but as the expression of conflict between elites within the chiefdoms.2 My present study seeks to develop this latter argument. In addition, the relative frequency of such local-level violence is briefly considered, and this entails some discussion of the nature of politics at the centre.

Chiefdoms, of which there are 148 today, constitute the lowest level of the administrative apparatus. Each is organised in a pyramidal hierarchy, at the head of which is an elected but also hereditary paramount chief,3 advised by a council composed of section chiefs and headmen chosen according to customary law, and a much larger membership elected on the basis of one representative per 20 taxpayers. In practice, however, the councillors are usually selected by influential men, and it is not uncommon for the choice to be considerably influenced by the paramount chief. Because of their size, many chiefdom councils have proved too unwieldy to carry out the business of day-to-day administration, and meet only rarely in order to elect the paramount chief and other office holders. Up to the late 1950s, the powers vested in these councils were exercised by the paramount

1 Martin Kilson, Political Change in a West African State: a study of the modernization process in Sierra Leone (Cambridge, Mass., I966), pp. 60 and I89.

2 Walter L. Barrows, 'Local-Level Politics in Sierra Leone: alliances in Kenema District' Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 197I.

3 A paramount chief is elected for life by the chiefdom council; candidates must belong to a 'ruling' house. This is a kinship group based on descent (usually in the male line) from a known ancestor who was a paramount chief.

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chief and his leading allies, but then chiefdom committees were established to provide for a constant review of all local affairs. These new and important decision-making bodies are appointed by the chiefdom council, and have also tended to be packed with the favourites of the paramount chief.1

The administration of the chiefdoms has not in practice been closely supervised by the central Government since the late I940S;2 controls have been formal and weakly developed, with the consequence that leading chiefdom officers have generally been able to pursue their own private or sectional goals rather than the broader public interest. During the colonial period in particular, paramount chiefs used their position for personal enrichment, and there was widespread abuse of power through the chiefdom councils.3 Moreover, offices and financial resources have not always been distributed in such a way that all groups in a chiefdom might benefit equally; the paramount chiefs and their followers have been the major beneficiaries, and certain sections have been favoured. Rivals of leading chiefdom officers have often been unable to promote a fairer allocation of benefits,4 or to advance their own positions within the chiefdom administra- tion. For them, as I shall suggest, violence has been a means of seeking to achieve a greater share of the resources and benefits of the chiefdom - for themselves and their clienteles - by overthrowing the incumbents and installing themselves in office.

The 1946-56 decade The historical roots of conflict in Baoma chiefdom in the Bo district reach

back to I912 when, owing to the inability of the three 'ruling' houses to decide which should produce the paramount chief, the district commissioner accepted Alfred Demby - a section chief with no traditional claim to the paramountcy - 'as a convenient neutral'. A decision was then made that in future a paramount chief should only be chosen from a 'ruling' house, and on Demby's death in I925 a candidate from the Kondor kinship group was elected as successor. Within a few weeks, disturbances were instigated by members of the Demby family, one of whom was sentenced to six months imprisonment for inciting people to cease paying their customary tribute. The paramount chief died in I937, and was replaced by A. S. Demby, despite the decision of 1912.

The election of another Demby appears to have been accepted by the 'ruling' houses, for it was not till 1947 that the colonial authorities began to receive complaints against the paramount chief, alleging maladministra- tion, forced labour, and illegal fines. This agitation began in the eastern area where the major opposition 'ruling' house was centred, and in November 1948 violent disorders disrupted the chiefdom. An inquiry was held by the Government to investigate the administration of A. S. Demby, and this

1 Sir Herbert Cox, Report of Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in the Provinces, November 1955-March 1956 (Freetown, I956), ch. I6. See also C. Viswasam, Sierra Leone Local Government in the Chiefdoms (Freetown, 1973).

2 Cox Report, pp. 219-22 and 226. S Ibid. pp. 149 and I7I-2. 4 Ibid. pp. 2 -I2.

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showed that he had used his position to enrich himself and his family at the expenseof thelocalpopulation. In April 1950 he tendered his resignation, and two years later a member of the Kondor 'ruling' house acceded to the chieftaincy.1

Further violent disturbances broke out in the Kenema, Kailahun, and Pujehun districts, leading to the deposition or resignation of paramount chiefs and the removal of other officials. Bands of 'youngmen' - persons other than those holding positions of authority in their chiefdom2 - often counted in hundreds, protested against unpopular paramount chiefs, attacking and burning their property, often alleged to have been acquired illegally. The demonstrations were rarely directed towards persons, and there were few injuries and deaths. Nor was the aim to overthrow the structure of authority, but rather to secure the removal of specific office- holders deemed to have behaved illegally. Moreover, although the disorders involved large numbers of 'youngmen', they were not popular rural revolts against the elders. There was widespread protest against the general mal- administration of those in power but, as Barrows has suggested, the violence was often instigated and guided by elders belonging to opposition 'ruling' houses, who sought to have the incumbents ousted from their positions of authority in the chiefdom, and then to supplant them with their own nominees.3

Two main factors thus combined to produce these violent events. First, there was the unpopularity of the chiefly hierarchy among the 'youngmen'. In all the areas where violent disruptions occurred there was considerable discontent regarding the general misrule of the paramount chiefs and their supporters. The 'youngmen' had genuine grievances, notably the demand for communal labour, and the imposition of levies arising from the corrupt and autocratic system of chiefdom government. Secondly, there was the factor of dynastic ambition. Almost every chiefdom in Sierra Leone has at least two 'ruling' or crowning houses, and given the prerequisites and privileges of the office of paramount chief there has always been active competition among the rival groups. In Baoma, and other chiefdoms such as Lower Bambara, Luawa, and Small Bo, such feuds underlay the distur- bances as each faction sought to have their own members elected to the chieftaincy and other offices. The leaders of opposition 'ruling' houses were often frustrated in their attempts to gain access to the local decision-making bodies by conventional means. And given the ignorance of British officials concerning the abuse of power by chiefdom rulers, and the absence of means by which their rivals could exert influence on the colonial regime, the opposition leaders remained frustrated.

In other words, in a situation of widespread discontent, violence was the only means of expression. The disturbances resulted from an alliance between opposition elders, who wished to advance their own position, and

1 This information is based on the unpublished report of the Commissioner who inquired into the Baoma disturbances, N. A. Weir, dated 31 October I949, Provincial Secretary, Southern Province Archives, Bo. See also File CSO 304/I.

2 Cox Report, p. 173. 3 Barrows, op cit. ch. 7.

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disaffected 'youngmen', who feared continued exploitation by ruling elders. Given the grievances of the commoners, it was not surprising that they were prepared to support any 'big men' who promised them relief from exploita- tion. The rivals of the paramount chiefs were able to enlist support from various groups and to instigate them to violent action against the ruling elite, thus furthering their own special interests of obtaining power and position within the administrative system of the chiefdom.

The many disturbances which flared up in the western areas of the Northern Province, and in the nearby Moyamba district during 1955 and 1956, have also been characterised as populist uprisings against chiefdom authorities. Certainly, these disorders swept through a much wider area than those of I946-5I in eastern Mendeland. But in spite of the greater geographical extent of the violence, the sources and objectives of the disorders in Temne country were the outcome of specific chiefdom conflicts. It is also true that although the level of violence was much greater than in the outbursts of 1946-5I, no chief was killed or even injured. And as for the bulk of property burned or otherwise destroyed, this belonged invariably to the paramount chiefs and their supporters; the destruction of buildings and property was selective, with a marked absence of looting.

These insurrections did not represent a popular movement against the existing establishment, nor the wholesale change of the structure of chiefdom authority. Just as in the case of the disorders of the immediate post-war period, those of 1955-6 resulted primarily from chiefdom conflicts and were concerned with the change of specific rulers and policies. Unfortunately the Cox Commission which investigated the disturbances did not concern itself with chiefdom conflicts, although in its report there is the following brief passage suggesting the complex nature of the underlying cleavages:

Chieftainship intrigues played a large part in fostering disorder... and the particular venom of the rioters in Samu was the result of a dynastic dispute...Intrigue has played a large part in the difficulties in Kaiyamba. The strain upon loyalties which arises in the amalgama- tion of chiefdoms was noticeable in Marampa-Masimera Chiefdom, Maforki and Buya Romende...In other places-Bumpe and Kagboro in particular-there was a Temne element in the population which complicated what otherwise would merely have been a relatively simple domestic Sherbro problem. Membership of the Poro Society or lack of

membership sometimes has affected the issue.1

Coupled with this assortment of cleavages was the existence of widespread discontent as a result of the abuse of power by paramount chiefs and their leading officers, notably as regards local tax administration, and certain other malpractices, such as forced labour, illegal exactions, and extortion. The chiefs often exhibited a particularly rapacious attitude towards the local populace and, as the Cox Commission made unmistakeably clear, the colonial Government was unaware of the extent of their abuse of power because of inadequate supervision.2 But, as I shall suggest, the disturbances were not an expression of rural radicalism; rather they ensued from the manipulation of popular discontent by opponents of the paramount chiefs.

1 Cox Report, pp. I46-7. 2 Ibid. pp. 91 and 218.

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The disturbances began in November I955 in Maforki chiefdom when a crowd of 200 protested at the district commissioner's office against tax increases, assessment abuses, and extortion via other levies. Apart from such deeply-felt grievances there were other underlying causes of unrest: 'Strains have resulted from the amalgamation of two former chiefdoms into the present Maforki chiefdom and... there exist people who willingly lend themselves to undermining the Chief.'l In 1949 the original Maforki chiefdom had been enlarged by amalgamation with the smaller Bake Loko chiefdom, which then provided the new paramount chief, Alikali Modu II. From I954 unrest began to grow as a result of extortion by the chiefdom tax assessment officers.

This growing discontent was watched closely by one Bakorobah [Bai Koroboh Tarawali]... This man is a Mandingo of French Guinea origin, but he has spent much of his life in the Port Loko area. He was a protege of the [previous] Paramount Chief...and enjoyed considerable influence in [what was then] Maforki Chiefdom under his rule. Alikali Modu, however, on taking over the throne stripped him of all power...and reduced him to a nonentity, except that Bakorobah was well known to and respected by many people in both the Bake Loko and Maforki Chiefdoms, but principally the latter.2

Bai Koroboh Tarawali was friendly with Peter Kamara and Abu Sankoh, both of whom also came from the Maforki section and had personal grievances against the paramount chief. From late I955 they began urging the villagers and headmen, especially in Maforki section, to resist payment of the increased taxes, as well as the levy that had been proposed for the construction of the paramount chief's house. The three leaders may have wanted to replace the incumbent with a candidate of their own; or they may have wished to dissolve the amalgamation for various personal or other reasons. Whatever their motives, they capitalised on the corrupt and abusive practices of the ruling elders regarding taxation as well as illegal levies and forced labour, and were thus able to rally the support of disaffected 'common- ers' against the paramount chief and his leading officers.

In Maforki chiefdom, therefore, the aggrieved faction was not centred on a different 'ruling' house,3 as none of the three rebel leaders were from royal families. Violence arose mainly from personal animosities, as well as conflict between the two component parts of an amalgamated chiefdom. Such differences provided the underlying cause of the disturbances in a number of other chiefdoms, such as Gbinle-Dixing, Paki Masabong, Malal, and Marampa-Masimera. In the latter, for example, disaffection originated in the Masimera section, aggrieved because the leading chiefdom positions and facilities were monopolised by the Marampa section from which the para- mount chief, Bai Koblo Pathbana, hailed. The Cox Commission stated that in the Masimera section 'development and services are non-existent and not even seriously planned'.4

1 Ibid. p. 26. 2 See report dated i December 1955 in 'C.I.D. Report on Anti-Taxation Demonstrations

and Disturbances', kindly shown to me by Dr Arthur Abraham, Department of History, Fourah Bay College, University of Sierra Leone.

3 See Reports of the Commissioners of Enquiry into the Conduct of Certain Chiefs (Freetown, 1957), p. 57. 4 Cox Report, p. 21I. See also p. 30.

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Amalgamation disputes were a new form of conflict in Sierra Leone. The colonial Government had from the late I940s begun combining two or more chiefdoms in order to establish administrative units that were larger and more economically viable. But this was not followed by a fair and equitable distribution of positions among the component parts. Power was often weighted on the side of a single unit of the amalgamation, with the result that there was an unequal distribution of rewards and burdens. Serious conflict arose, as in I955-6, when individuals and families from a particular section continued to dominate chiefdom positions, thereby controlling the allocation of resources, usually to their own advantage.

In April 1956 the district commissioner of Tonkolili district wrote: 'The meetings I have been to in the troubled chiefdoms in the last four months have been largely made up of young men and boys, following older leaders.'l One such disturbed area was Yoni, being made up of the Mabanta and Mamilla chiefdoms which agreed to merge in 1950. At that time neither had a reigning paramount chief, and it was agreed that Mamilla should supply the first; however, since 1945 it had been unable to elect a paramount chief because rival 'ruling' houses were divided over succession claims.2 In 1950 Bai Sherbro Mankotta III was elected from one of the Mamilla 'ruling' houses because of support from the Mabanta section of the new amalgamation.

But conflict continued to wrack Mamilla. In I955 there were complaints of heavy extortion by the paramount chief, a Muslim, who was accused of using the Poro Society as a source of revenue. As the district commissioner put it: the complaints were 'really brought by members of the other ruling houses' in Mamilla.3 The people of Mabanta appear not to have been involved in any of these disputes. But when the riots erupted in late 1955, the paramount chief was opposed not only by rival 'ruling' houses from within Mamilla, but by the Mabanta as well. Because of the imbalances of

development there arose, according to the Cox Commission, 'a demand from the people of the Yoni Mabanta part of the chiefdom for it to revert to its former status as an independent chiefdom'.4 The leaders of the disorders were from Mabanta, and they were able to unite their followers because of a perceived discrimination in the distribution of development resources, as well as abuses such as forced labour on farms. Either independently, or

together with the Mamilla opposition houses, the Mabanta 'big men' began organising violent demonstrations against the chiefdom establishment. Violence in Yoni, therefore, stemmed from competition between the two

original parts of an amalgamation, complemented by 'ruling' house rivalries in one of the sections. Thesource of conflictwas not based simply on differences between once separate chiefdoms; rivalries among 'ruling' houses within each component unit were also important.

1 District Commissioner, Tonkolili, to Commissioner, Northern Province, CNP 435/5, 3 April 1956, District Office, Magburaka.

2 V. R. Dorjahn, 'A Brief History of the Temne of Yoni', in Sierra Leone Studies (Freetown), 14, x960, p. 87.

3 District Commissioner, Tonkolili, to Commissioner, Northern Province, CNP 435/12/1, 28 September 1955, District Office, Magburaka.

4 Cox Report, p. 43.

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Most of the 1955-6 chiefdom disturbances, however, were extensions of 'ruling' house conflicts- for example, in Samu chiefdom in the Kambia district, where the leaders of the two opposition houses organised a bitter revolt against the paramount chief. Another cause for violent eruption, albeit much less frequently, was ethnic divisions. In the Bumpe and Ribi chiefdoms of Moyamba district, ethnic antagonisms between on the one hand the Sherbro, and on the other the Temne, Loko, and Susu, provided an important source of conflict underlying the acts of violence in these areas. But the ethnic cleavages were dissected by 'ruling' house and other divisions. In Bumpe, the leaders of the Loko, who had been bitterly aggrieved at not being permitted to nominate candidates in the all-Sherbro paramount chieftaincyelection of I954, joined forces with the 'youngmen' supporting one of the defeated candidates to attack the ruling 6lite in the chiefdom.1 In Ribi, the coalition consisted of Sherbro section chiefs and some discontented Temne elders against their chiefdom hierarchy.2

'Ruling' house competition, amalgamation differences, ethnic antagonisms, personal enmities, and other conflicting interests, all involving men of influence, constituted the underlying causes of the various chiefdom riots of I955-6. And these divisions among 'big men' were expressed within the context of a popular malaise arising from the corrupt, extortionist, and authoritarian behaviour of chiefdom rulers.3 A symbiotic relationship emerged between opponents of the local establishment, who wanted to further their own interests, and discontented 'youngmen', who demanded an end to the abuse of power by the ruling elite.

The violence did not entail an attack on chiefdom political authority itself. For the 'youngmen' it was a means of ending misrule by a particular 'ruling' family, while for the elders it was an instrument for unseating and replacing opponents in order to obtain a more equitable share of chiefdom offices and resources between personal rivals, different areas, and various ethnic groups. And finally, the 'commoners' did not rise up spontaneously against their rulers; they were instigated to oppose the hierarchy by elders who could arouse the masses because a significant basis for protest existed.

Further instances of violent confrontation occurred intermittently in a number of chiefdoms throughout the Protectorate during the I946-56 decade, and can, I believe, be analysed in much the same way as the disturbances already examined. The serious disorders in the Jawi chiefdom, Kailahun district, between 1953 and 1956, for example, revolved around 'ruling' house conflicts and personal animosities. In the following decade, however, there was a sharp decline in the incidence of grass-roots violence, for reasons which will be considered later.

1 See File I/030/5, Ministry of the Interior, Freetown. 2 File 1/039/5; ibid. S Kilson, op. cit. pp. 53-9 and I8o-3.

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ROGER TANGRI

The years after i967 With the downfall of the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (S.L.P.P.) Govern-

ment in 1967, and the establishment in 1968-after a brief period of military rule - of the All Peoples Congress (A.P.C.) Government, civil strife enveloped much of the countryside. Minor clashes between rival factions occurred in various chiefdoms in the Eastern and Southern Provinces as opposition groups, now affiliated with the A.P.C., sought to have local incumbents removed from positions of authority. Violence in the chiefdoms, however, was limited for several reasons: the A.P.C. had not previously achieved much support from any of the rival factions in these areas; there was no widespread support for the removal of paramount chiefs; and the ruling officials hastened to come to terms with the new party in power.

But in the Northern Province these three factors were absent, and the transfer of national power was followed by violent fights over local offices, inevitably won by chiefdom factions aligned to the new ruling party. Petitions flowed to the A.P.C. Government against the administration of paramount chiefs, particularly those known to have been strong supporters of the S.L.P.P. and who had variously harassed A.P.C. activists before I967. 'This is an age for petitions', remarked a provincial secretary in late 1968: 'I receive them at an average of one a week.'l In addition, bands of A.P.C. stalwarts - supporting factions centred invariably on opposition 'ruling' houses, or specific chiefdom sections - took revenge on pro-S.L.P.P. office- holders. Only those incumbent paramount chiefs were spared who hastily made public declarations of support for 'the Government of the day', or who were shown forbearance by leading A.P.C. politicians. The greatest violence occurred, as in I955-6, in the Port Loko district.

One example, from Koya chiefdom, must suffice as an illustration of the character of this latest grass-roots violence. The bitter struggle here dates back to the election in 1958 of Suri Kamara as paramount chief Bai Kumpa Yek II. The rival Dumbuya family protested, partly on the ground that there was an acknowledged practice of rotational crowning, which meant that a Kamara should not have contested the election, and partly because of alleged governmental (S.L.P.P.) influence in favour of this candidate. Tension mounted as the Dumbuya failed to reverse the decision, and as the new paramount chief proved vindictive in his treatment of opponents.2 Grievances built up again in the early I96os regarding the chief's neglect of the Lower Koya section - the headquarters of the Dumbuya family - and delegations travelled to Freetown on several occasions to deliver petitions calling for an official inquiry into his administration. To make matters worse, the local A.P.C. parliamentarian, S.A.T. Koroma, was repeatedly harassed in his successful electoral campaigns of 1962 and I967, and was personally humiliated on more than one occasion at the behest of the

paramount chief. With the full backing of the S.L.P.P. Government, how-

1 Handing-Over Notes, 29 November I968, Provincial Secretary, Northern Province

Office, Makeni. 2 See File I/I28/1, Ministry of the Interior, Freetown.

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ever, Bai Kumpa Yek II was able to ride out the wave of complaints, although bitterness against him had been built up to disruptive proportions.1

Upon the reinauguration of civilian rule in 1968, S. A. T. Koroma immediately set to work with a will. He launched a major campaign involving terror and raw force against the paramount chief and his allies, aided by S. D. Koroma, a fellow A.P.C. parliamentarian and a disgruntled claimant for the Dumbuya family to the chieftaincy in I958. Demonstrations of disaffected 'youngmen' were easily organised, especially as the chief's reign had provoked widespread dissatisfaction, and councillors were cowed into signing or thumb-printing petitions accusing Bai Kumpa Yek II of a varied assortment of infractions. Although he was soon suspended, the violence remained unabated; for example, in March 1969, about I,ooo A.P.C. youths entered Songo, the capital, and fired and looted property belonging to the paramount chief and his relatives. S. A. T. Koroma assumed the chairmanship of the chiefdom committee for a few months, and changed its membership with the help of S. D. Koroma. Both M.P.s also began revising, virtually unilaterally, the council list, and replaced various section chiefs and headmen with their own nominees. Following a judicial inquiry, Bai Kumpa Yek II was deposed, and a decade of intense intra-chiefdom conflict ended with arrangements being made for holding a new election.2

Koya was the scene of severe turmoil fanned largely by personal anti- pathies, as well as the more common rivalry between 'ruling' families. At the same time, a similar pattern of violence had flared up in neighbouring chiefdoms, characterised by local cleavages and involving the participation of wide sections of the population against unpopular chiefs and their officials. In Samu chiefdom, for instance, the conflict between the 'ruling' houses was resumed when the A.P.C. returned to power and, after a series of violent clashes and a judicial inquiry, the paramount chief was deposed, together with many of his leading supporters.

The frequency of chiefdom violence How are we to account for the high incidence of rural violence during the

1946-56 decade, and in the years after 1967, and for the far lower number of chiefdom confrontations during the period of S.L.P.P. rule between I957 and 1967? The answer probably lies, as Barrows has suggested, in the nature of the central regime and in the climate of governmental responsiveness.3 The colonial Government was sensitive to the feelings of aggrieved chiefdom factions; when violence occurred it was willing to listen to rebel elements, and did not seek to crush them. However, the regime was oblivious to the magnitude of popular discontent at the grass-roots, and was caught unawares by outbreaks of chiefdom violence. Over the years, examples of maladmini- stration had come to light, but until the riots of 1955-6 the exposure was not on a scale to alert British officials to the failings of the councils, and to the corrupt and authoritarian behavour of chiefdom rulers. The channels of

1 District Officer, Port Loko, to Provincial Secretary, Northern Province Office, NP/504/ I2/03, 4 December I963, Makeni. Also various interviews.

2 This paragraph is based on various interviews. 1 Barrows, op. cit. ch. 7.

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communication between the Government and population were poorly developed, and violence was thus a successful means of bringing local grievances to official attention at a time when the rebels would not be actively suppressed.

In regard to the S.L.P.P. Government between I957 and i967, both the Prime Ministers, Milton and Albert Margai, were opposed to the deposition of paramount chiefs loyal to the national regime, and believed that chief- dom officials ought to be protected at almost any cost from disaffected rivals. And since local incumbents generally supported the S.L.P.P., the grievances and complaints of their opponents were likely to be ignored, and acts of severe retribution were threatened should they resort to direct action. Thus, in spite of the continued existence of various chiefdom cleavages and divisions, the central regime was so unresponsive that violence was severely discouraged.

During the first few years of the A.P.C. Government, however, factions in opposition to local incumbents were often given a free rein. Indeed, the national r6gime condoned, perhaps even encouraged, chiefdom uprisings which entailed intimidation and coercion. A.P.C. parliamentarians and pro-A.P.C. chiefdom factions were, in effect, given license from the authorities to pursue violence. But after the general elections of May I973, the A.P.C. Government reversed its attitude; official tolerance, signified by the un- willingness to suppress violence, no longer prevailed. The following month, banner headlines in the government-controlled newspaper reported the Vice-President as having stated that 'the days of vindictiveness are over',1 while in November the Secretary-General of the A.P.C. declared 'that Government would not tolerate or condone any troublemaker "who thinks that because of party affiliation he will be backed by us".'2 Thus when discontent ensued after the election in Koya chiefdom in late I973, the disaffected elements, including the claimants to the paramountcy who supported the A.P.C., took recourse to petitioning rather than to instigating violent disorders.3

There are many other questions that need to be considered, including the relative frequency of violence between chiefdoms, but these must be left to another occasion. In this short article I have shown that violence in con- temporary Sierra Leone chiefdoms has followed a particular pattern. Initiated by the fears and ambitions of influential men in opposition factions, often within the context of a widespread malaise, violence has not been a popular revolt against the ruling elite. Influential opposition elders, concerned with corporate and individual interests, have focussed on popular dis- content mainly to generate support for an attack on the ruling elders from disaffected 'youngmen'. The actual extent of the violence in terms of deaths and injuries has been low; and this is related to the main objectives of the

1 S. I. Koroma quoted in the Daily Mail (Freetown), 26 July I973, p. I. 2 C. A. Kamara-Taylor quoted in ibid. 17 November 1973, p. I. 3 See The Nation (Freetown), 6 October 1973, pp. I and 8.

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disturbances, which have been more concerned with changing specific rulers and policies, rather than with the wholesale restructuring of chiefdom authority. But any study of politics at the local level must also take into account the characteristics of the national centre of power, and certainly in Sierra Leone the frequency of violence in the chiefdoms has been related to the nature of the central regime.

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