CONTEMPORARY ETHNIC CONFLICT

A COMPARATIVE CONFLICT ANALYSIS OF THE ETHNIC CONFLICT IN THEBANGLADESH LIBERATION WARAND THE CRISIS IN DARFURUNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELDPOLTICS DEPARTMENTISRAEL M. GICHAARASTUDENT NO: 130224134MARCH 2014

WORD COUNT: 2,705 words

Introduction

Conflict analysis allows observers and researchers to gain a deeper understanding of the sources of conflict; the undercurrents that determine the characteristics of the violence; and perhaps most importantly, ways of preventing and reducing the prevalence of conflict. According to DfID Guidance Notes (2002) it is also critical to determining the policy and humanitarian programmes that are established to address the sources and dynamics of conflict. He proposed a framework for the Department of International Development that was adopted by the Swisspeace Institute as its preferred model of conducting conflict analysis. This framework focuses on three main components of global conflicts; the structures in place, the actors involved and the dynamics of the conflict. The aim of this paper is to produce a succinct investigation into the comparisons and contrasts between two conflicts that differ in their location and period, yet share a similar character in that the belligerents represented a perceived ruling class versus an underclass. For this reason, the analysis will compare the cases of and the Bangladesh Liberation War [BLA] (March-December 1971) and the Crisis in Darfur [CID] (2003-present).DfID/Swisspeace ModelStructuresThis segment of the model investigates the sources of tension that develop into forthright acts of conflict. For this, it is necessary to conduct as contextual analysis of the features that have given rise to the existing tensions. DfID notes (2002) suggests a sub-model that is akin to a business SWOT analysis whereby the facets are probed based on their exposure to politics, the economy, security and social factors. The aim of this is to provide as wide a conflict map as is possible.Political FactorsIn the BLA, this was perhaps one of the most critical issues that gave rise to the conflict. The misrepresentation of Bengali interests on the national stage had been an outstanding problem with three democratically elected Prime Ministers of Bengali descent lasting a total of 5 years between them, whilst a fourth, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, was rejected by the political powers in W.Pakistan. To further exasperate this issue, the four provinces of W.Pakistan were merged into a single geo-political unit to counter-balance the population advantages of E.Pakistan. This One Unit structure was perceived as a deliberate way of subjugating the political powers in the East and was therefore a key contributing factor to the declaration of independence that initiated the conflict. The Darfur crisis, as with the Sudanese Civil War, was predominantly focussed on the marginalisation of Black-Africans in the region by the political powers in Khartoum. Despite being economically critical to the existence of the north (which relied on it for agriculture, cattle and minerals), the black civilians argued that they were subjected to a regime of marginalisation so profound that it amounted to Arab apartheid (Lasaga, 2006). This sentiment is supported by academics and political figures in both the region and further afield (Diallo, 1993; Ayittey, 1999; Wamwere, 2003). Both cases demonstrate the importance that political representation and acknowledgement play in the identities of ethnicities. In both cases, they have been used as a tool of manipulation of those out of the political loop, who in turn have turned it into a security issue that warrants armed response/defence. Inversely, it is notable that one conflict saw the victims respond with armed rebellion (Darfur) whereas the other saw the victims opt for an equally political response, id est, declaring independence.

Economic FactorsThe common budget of Pakistan was another tool used to enforce the skewed application of policy in E.Pakistan in comparison to W.Pakistan. As is illustrated in table 1, despite having a larger population, the economic disparities were outlined by E.Pakistan receiving 40.5% of the budget designation over a 20-year period. Another factor was the perceived indifferent response by the W.Pakistan government to the 1970 Bhola Cyclone which killed between 300,000-500,000 people, marking it as the worst tropical storm of the 20th Century. Whilst the President acknowledged that there had been slips in the response (New York Times, 1970); General Niazi summed up the attitude of the time: Its a low-lying land, of low-lying people (Nabi, 2010). YearSpending on West Pakistan (in millions of Pakistani rupees)Spending on East Pakistan (in millions of Pakistani rupees)Amount spent on East as percentage of West

19505511,2905,24046.4

19556016,5505,24031.7

19606533,55014,04041.8

19657051,95021,41041.2

Total113,34045,93040.5

Source: Reports of the Advisory Panels for the Fourth Five Year Plan 197075, Vol. I,published by the planning commission of Pakistan.

The economic factors of the Darfur are often overlooked by the desperation of the humanitarian crisis; however, it could be held that they form the significant motive of the Sudanese governments involvement in the conflict. Far from being the sand-swept land where the refugee camps are located, Darfur is actually the bread-basket of Sudan with swathes of arable land and a concentration of minerals in the southern part of the province. As such, it could be deducted that the government in Khartoum feared a repeat of the secessionist wars in the oil-rich Southern part of the country, and responded to SLM/JEM aggression with equally counter-insurgent measures, id est, employing the Janjaweed. Similarly, the nomadic pastoralist Arab communities of the Sahel region rely heavily on their livestock for their livelihood, and the threat of desertification has led to persistent clashes over land and water with the agriculturalist Black-African tribes in Darfur.Again, it stands to be deducted that economics play a critical role in the escalation of tension to the development of violence. The BLA case illustrates how economic misrepresentation can give rise to separationist sentiment, whilst the CID situation demonstrates how resource scarcity can trigger violence with the patronage of wealthy, concerned parties.Security FactorsThe military composition of the Pakistan forces circa 1965 shows that only 5% of commissioned officers were of Bengali descent, and of these, majority were employed in administrative roles (LOC, 2011). This was fuelled by a W.Pakistani notion that Bengalis werent as martially inclined as those of W.Pakistani origin (LOC, 2011). To further emphasise this feeling of lack of security in E.Pakistan, there was scant spending on defence in E.Pakistan during a period when overall Pakistani spending was escalating. For instance, during the Kashmir war between India and Pakistan, only an understrength infantry and small fleet of combat aircraft were deigned sufficient to defend E.Pakistan from any Indian retaliation during the conflict (Jahan, 1972).Furthermore, as Bengali sentiment spread throughout E.Pakistan, the military command in the West ordered all the E.Pakistan forces be disarmed, whilst it covertly increased the presence of W.Pakistani forces in the region. This further emphasised the feeling of insecurity that Bengalis and certain minority groups (particularly Hindus) felt.The government of Sudan was accused of favouritism towards Arab-pastoralist tribes in Sudan long before the CID became a humanitarian problem. These included turning blind-eyes to instances of land encroachment and violent skirmishes on lands belonging to the Fur peoples. This issue became further complicated by allegations that the government was supporting the armed raids by Arabic tribes on Fur villages. As the crisis escalated, civilians caught in the conflict reported a disturbing pattern of violence whereby Sudan military aircraft (painted white to imitate UN/AU relief aid planes) would bomb villages and hideouts in the mountains, after which the Janjaweed would arrive on horseback and camelback to burn down and loot whatever was left; whilst killing any male survivors and kidnapping any female survivors (Washington Post, 2004). Both cases exhibit instances of marginalised and often isolated groups being vulnerable to the whims of more powerful groups that wield this power for their own purposes. It also illustrates the acceleration of tension to conflict in areas where insecurity is a genuine concern of one of the groups present in the region.

Social FactorsThe perception of Bengalis as an inferior ethnic group was widespread throughout the Pakistani establishment prior to the engagement in hostilities. In February 1952, several activists and students were killed during demonstrations against the forced implementation of Urdu as the official language of all of Pakistan, despite the fact that the language was only spoken natively by minority groups in both East and West Pakistan. This was all part of a strategy of forcefully assimilating the Bengalis to the culture of W.Pakistan in an attempt to address the impurity, inferiority and unreliability of co-religionists in the Bengali culture (Mookherjee, 2006). The disparity between social classes in Darfur is perhaps even more pronounced than it was in E.Pakistan. The Arabic tribes are wealthier and hold more sway with the political classes in Khartoum and the Port of Sudan, who are overwhelmingly Arabic. Black-African tribes along the West and in the South of the country were constantly the victim of night-time raids by nomadic tribes on horseback with many survivors being taken north and sold into a life of slavery. Similarly, many tribes were forced to surrender their lands to nomadic tribes from the north that required fresh pastures for their livestock in the face of increasing desertification of their grasslands. To compound this misery, the nomadic tribes had a perceived superiority complex where Black-Africans were concerned. They would often refer to them as abid and zurga, local terms for black and slave (Washington Post, 2004).Social factors are accepted as a marker of ethnicity by several academics (Hutchinson & Smith, 1996; Oberschall, 2007). Thus the perceived threat to these personal attributes can be seen as a fundamental point at which groups are ready to bear arms. This was certainly the case in formation of the Bengali Language Movement, a forbearer of Bengali Nationalist Movement. Similarly, it serves the purpose of drawing together groups of that share particular social values in solidarity. This was evident in the BLA (Bengalis/Hindus vs. Biharis/Punjabis) and again 30 years on in the CID (Fur/Zaghawa/Masalit [Black-Africans] vs. Abbala/Baggara/Misseriya [Sudanese-Arabs]).

Actors

The next step that the DfID nominates for analysis is the scrutiny of the actors involved and their various interests. He also emphasises the need to look at their varying relations and their capacities to influence the conflict; both positively and negatively.Beginning with the BLA, India entered the war in December and had a critical impact in bringing it to a conclusion. Prior to its direct involvement, India had supported the Bengali liberation movement by providing support to the Mukhti Bahini insurgents. India felt a pang of responsibility for the millions of Hindus against whom they perceived the W.Pakistan forces to be subjecting to genocidal acts such as gendercide, mass murder, war-rape and forced pregnancies. Indias intervention in December had an influential impact of the result of the war as it resulted in the defeat and surrender of 93,000 W.Pakistani troops on the 16th December, 1971. They followed this up by becoming the first nation to recognise the sovereignty of Bangladesh, giving legitimacy to the new state.Keeping with the BLA, it is important to recognise that this conflict took place at the height of the Cold War, and as such, polarizing politics dictated the responses of the international community. The US backed W.Pakistan against the India backed by the USSRs might. Both nations played a critical role in preventing early intervention by India, whilst the US also tried to use its growing influence in China to encourage them to mobilise troops along its border with India to deter their involvement, an invitation China declined. It is also worth noting that the US was aware of the scale of the atrocities at the time, yet decided against sanctioning Pakistan out of fear of Soviet influence spreading in the region. The infamous Blood Telegram outlined the atrocities, and used terms such as genocide and selective genocide (US Consulate Cable/Archer Blood, 1971).

This all points directly to the susceptibility of conflicts zones to the external political pressures. This point is emphasised in the case of CID, where despite numerous embargoes and sanctions against Sudan, the government still manages to operate with the veiled support of China and Russia. This is enabled through the export of Sudanese crude oil to China, Malaysia and India in exchange for consumer goods and soviet type-arms (despite a UN arms embargo being in effect since 1999) (US Energy Information Administration, 2013). Unlike the BLA conflict, the CID has managed to attract international attention from multilateral organisations (UN and AU) and average world citizens (courtesy of celebrity intervention). While this varies from the BLA, the AU/UN mission in Darfur was initially deployed on a very limited mandate that prevented engaging hostiles, even where civilian lives were at risk. This has since been expanded to include peacekeeping duties since 2007 (UNAMID, 2007). In July 2007, it was reported that 75,000 Arab families from Chad and Niger had moved into the regions of Darfur that had previously belonged to the displaced Black-African tribes (The Independent, 2007). It was claimed that there settlement had been facilitated by the Sudanese government. This raises questions of complicity by other actors in the region including pro-Arab and Islamist groups. It is worth noting that Sudan played host to the Al-Qaeda leadership, including Osama bin Laden, between 1991-96.

Dynamics

The final stage of this frameworks analysis looks into the dynamics of conflict based on its longer tern trends as well as its shorter term triggers. The long term trends can be used to assess whether over all tensions are on an increase or decrease. This can be done by assessing the structures in place over an extended period of time. The short term triggers looks at aspects of the conflict which may lead to expansion of the conflict such as the processes of the conflict.The two case studies share certain similarities in this department. The first one is the contestation of genocidal intent by one of the parties. In the BLA, the W.Pakistan military targeted people who it claimed were behind spreading Bengali cultural ideas amongst the sympathisers of the Bengali Nationalist Movement. This included academics, physicians and journalist who spread the seed of nationalism through cultural and social activities (Mamun, 1973). In addition to trying to eliminate Bengali culture, special attention was paid to Bengali Hindus. RJ Rummel (Nabi, 2010) observed that genocide and gendercidal atrocities were perpetrated by low-ranking officers and soldiers fuelled by anti-Bengali racism, especially against the Hindu minority Hindus amongst Bengalis were as Jews to the Nazis. Beyond killing off Bengali and Hindu culture in E.Pakistan, the W.Pakistani forces were complicit in the kidnapping, assaulting and raping of women between the ages of 8-75. They were often held in camps where they repeatedly assaulted and often murdered or committed suicide by hanging themselves with their hair (Jahan, 2004). General Tikka Khan, colloquially known as the Butcher of Bengal, boasted that he intended to reduce this majority to a minority by Pehle inko Mussalman karo" [Firstly, making them Muslim](DCosta, 2010). This illustrates the complicity of the W.Pakistan military in the targeted use of rape as a tool of war with the intention of leaving social pollution behind (Siddiqui, 1998). Similarly, in the CID, observers reported the targeted gendercide of men over the age of 15 as well as the disembowelment of pregnant women to stop Black-African populations from increasing. One verified account recalled a Janjaweed rapist telling his victim, Black girl, you are too dark. You are like a dog. We want to make a light baby (Washington Post, 2004). Another report by UN observers noted that attacks in the Darfur region had been carefully coordinated to protect functioning Arabic villages even in regions that were completely annihilated (UN Inter-Agency Fact Finding, 2004). Lastly, a study in 2011 that interviewed survivors of Janjaweed and Sudanese military attacks in 22 villages noted the prevalence of racial epithets and specifically targeting basic resources in the already environmentally hostile region. The study concluded that targeted genocide was being waged in the region (British Journal of Sociology, 2011).The other key similarity between the conflicts was the prevalence of a natural phenomenon that had exasperated the conflict. The Bhola Cyclone and the spread of desertification in the Sahel region had both prompted an escalation in tensions amongst the affected parties. This could serve as a warning of the further dangers that the world faces in the face of climate change and resource scarcity. Conclusion

This paper has aimed to emphasise the importance of conflict analysis as a tool of preventing the proliferation of ethnic conflict and its use in order to understand the varying aspects of conflict. Its application can serve a number of purposes, especially in the field of furthering polity understanding of conflict resolution. The BLA conflict has illustrated the risks prevalent in societies where one ethnicity dominates another so absolutely in political and economic terms. It makes a case for two-state solutions where differences are irreparable and the call for autonomy is backed on such a large scale (E.Pakistan at the time had a population of 75 million). The BLA conflict also shows what decisive intervention can achieve with a popular mandate in the recipient country and with an effective exit strategy, as India demonstrated. Lastly, it could be argued that the conflict could be used as a case study for existing ethnic conflicts to study and emulate, including CID. In the case of CID, it can be deduced that a further separation of Sudan may be required in order to separate the warring factions. While this wouldnt necessarily benefit the Afro-Arabic pastoralist communities involved in the conflict, the threat of this may be necessary in order to make the political powers in Khartoum consider the vulnerability of their position, id est, one supported by the resources and agriculture of the areas they are currently exploiting. The last point that this analysis has illuminated has been the vulnerability of communities to violence where environmental pressures are mounting. Could this lead to the environment being a catalyst of more ethnic conflict in the future? It wouldnt be rash to deduct an affirmative answer. This raises the urgency of finding solutions to the global climate crisis.

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