concepts and theories: scientific knowledge and...

46
CHAPTER I Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and Contemporary Sociological Theories

Upload: others

Post on 02-Nov-2019

21 views

Category:

Documents


1 download

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

CHAPTER I

Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and Contemporary Sociological Theories

Page 2: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

People have seen Science as an integral part of society, which is mainly

concerned with investigation and discovery of new facts about empirical world. The

sociology of science as a part of sociology of knowledge has always been concerned

with defining the nature of scientific ideas and their relations with other kinds of ideas

(i.e. ideological, philosophical, aesthetical and religious) and various institutional and

personality factors. 1 Merton's arguments in Science, Technology and Society in

Seventeenth Century England2 closely followed Weber's essay The Protestant Ethic

and the Spirit of Capitalism.3 Prior to 1940, science was always viewed as an entity

simply as a source of information having various consequences for the rest of the

society. Before going into detail of how science is being treated by sociologists it will

be pertinent to define science.

Definition of Science:

Different people have defined science in different ways. The first and foremost

question is how can one distinguish science from that which is not science. Following

Karl Popper's suggestion in, the logic of scientific discovery, this question concerning

the difference between science and non-science is usually called the problem of

demarcation.4 One difficulty with the demarcation is the fact that there are several types

of entities which may be called scientific: men and women, groups and institutions,

concepts, statements, thoughts and inferences, arguments and experiments, methods

and instruments, articles and works, theories and world views.

The term "science" may thus refer to the scientific institution (scientific

workers, organisation of research), the research process, the scientific method, or

scientific knowledge. These four aspects of science are usually defined relative to each

other in a circular way. Science as an institution is that part of the society which

Mannheim, Karl, "The Sociology of Knowledge" in Curtis, James and Petras, John (eds.). The Sociology of Knowledge: A Reader, Duckworth, London, 1982, pp.l 09-130.

2 Merton, Robert, K., Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth Century England, H. Footing, New York, 1970.

Weber, Max, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (translated by Talcott Parsons), Allen & Unwin, London, 1930.

4 Popper Formulates this problem as that of finding a criterion which would enable us to distinguish between the empirical science on the one hand, and mathematics and logic as well as 'metaphysical' system on the other (Popper, Karl, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1959, p.35).

1

Page 3: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

produces scientific knowledge by maintaining scientific research, which means

systematic and institutionalised pursuit of new knowledge by using scientific methods.

Scientific methods, in tum, are those tools for producing scientific knowledge, which is

acceptable to the scientific community. To be more clear, scientific knowledge consists

of the results of research which uses scientific methods. 5 An effective way of

comprehending the nature of scientific knowledge is to contrast it with ordinary

knowledge (common-sense knowledge). Ordinary knowledge or common-sense

knowledge is some times equated with pre-scientific knowledge, which is of inferior

"quality. However, Malinowski6 argues that if by science we understand a body of rules

and conception based on experience and logical inference embedded in material

achievement, and that it is a fixed form of tradition carried on by some sort of social

organisation, then there is no doubt that even the lowest savage communities have the

beginning of science, however rudimentary it may be.

According to Norman Campbell, "science is the study of those judgments

concerning which universal agreement can be obtained". 7 Here the emphasis is on the

nature of the matter of study. This nature and subject matter of science are dependent

on the applicability of scientific methods. However, the problem with these kinds of

definitions is the fact that the methods of science are historically developing. Our

understanding of the nature of scientific method is also continuously changing. For

these reasons, the characterisation of science by methods, which are now found to be

acceptable, is questionable. Paul Feyerabend has argued in his book 'Against Method,s

that there are no general methodological rules for science, which we should not

sometimes violate in the name of scientific progress. This statement implies that

scientific methods are not sacrosanct.

Science is a living institution which develops and changes through time. There

are certain general features as identified by Niiniluoto9 that are all associated with the

5 Niiniluoto, Ilkka, Is Science Progressive?, D.Reidel Pub., Boston, 1984, p.3 6 Malinowski, B., Magic, Science and Religion and Other Essays, Doubleday & Company, London,

1955, p.l7. 7 Campbell, Norman, What is Science?, Dover, London, 1952, p.27. 8 Feyerabend, P.K., Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, New Left Books,

London, 1975, p.ll. 9 Niiniluoto, Ilka, Is Science Progressive? op.cit., p.4.

2

Page 4: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

self-corrective nature of scientific inquiry. These features include objectivity, critical

attitude, autonomy, and progress. The scientific inquiry has to be objective at least in

two senses. First, the object of investigation has to be real in Peirce's10 sense i.e. its

character should be independent of what anybody may think it to be. Secondly, the

object should be allowed to influence the formation of the result of inquiry, and this

influence should be inter-subjectively recognisable. Science is self-corrective in the

sense that no authority can claim for him a permanent position. As there are claims and

counter claims regarding the nature and scope of science it remains inconclusive to

define science in categorical terms. Therefore, it could be understood only by analysing

its characteristic features.

Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge:

Scientific knowledge is based on connection made at both the theoretical and

observational levels. Connections of ideas in scientific systems are, therefore, both

empirical and rational. These two levels are integrated by the third type of connection

i.e. abstraction. According to Judith Willer 11, all thinking that combines rational,

empirical and abstractive thoughts is scientific. Neither catalogues of empirical facts

nor rational systems such as mathematics are scientific thinking by themselves. In the

absence of a developed science, technology is representative of empirical thinking. In

the scientific system of knowledge, empirical events are measured at the observational

level and are connected through abstraction of concepts at the theoretical level.

According to Jogtenberg 12, science is a professionalised system of theoretical

production and "finite province of meaning". That is to say, science is at the same time

a social system which has definable structures and processes, and a world of meaning

for individual scientists. The world of science, as Schutz and Luckmann 13 define it, is a

"finite province of meaning" characterized by harmony, compatibility of experience

and a particular 'cognitive style'. According to Schutz and Luckmann, cognitive styles

10 C.S. Peirce's Collected Papers, edited by Harthshone, C. and Weiss, P., Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1931-55, vol.5, p.575.

11 Willer, Judith, The Social Determination of Knowledge, Print ice Hall, New Delhi, 1971, pp.30-32. 12 Jogtenberg, Tom., Social Construction of Science: A Comparative Study of Global Direction,

Research Evolution and Legitimization, D. Reidel Pub., Dordrecht, 1983, pp.15-16. 13 Schutz, Alfred, and Luclcmann, Thomas, The Structures of the Life World, (Translated by Zaner,

Richard M. and Engelhardt, H. Tristram) Heinemann, London, 1974, pp.23-24.

3

Page 5: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

can be distinguished along with several dimensions, "tension of consciousness (e.g.

wide awakeness)" characteristic "epoche"· (e.g. 'scientific attitude'), form of

spontaneity (e.g. gearing into the external world), form of sociology (e.g.

intersubjectivity), form of self-experience (e.g. "bound" into the role of a chemist and

"free" to experiment with particular, chemicals) and temporal perspective (e.g.

"standard" time). 14 According to these authors, what distinguishes a scientific cognitive

style from an every day (life world) cognitive style is characteristic "epoche" of

"scientific attitude", 15 as contrasted with the 'natural attitude' of every day life.

Richard Boyd's 16 (1981) has argued that reality is prior to thought. Hence,

science deals with that reality which is independent of our perception. It means that

content of science is not amenable to sociological study. Karl Popper 17 has divided the

reality into three domains: Non-organic or organic physical objects and processes

(nature or world 1 ); thoughts, mental states or consciousness of higher animals and of

human beings (world 2); concrete and abstract products or public creations of human

minds (world 3). World 3 interact causally with world 1 via world 2, but it is only more

or less independent ofthe.other two worlds, since it is man-made. Given the division of

reality into three worlds, a corresponding classification of systematic discipline

0

In Schutz's terms "epoche" means "brackating away". In scientific inquiry those items of information which are not relevant for research are brakated away (i.e., kept aside from cognition); earlier Husser) used the term "epoche" to imply suspension of belief in a phenomenon. It means nearly the same thing as above; selective cognition of events, facts and phenomena.

14 Ibid., pp.35-36. 15 'Scientific attitude' is not over clearly defined by authors, but implicitly it is a type of theoretical

attitude, where scientific things are no longer taken for granted as scientific problems are encountered and dealt within a scientific way. The way that things may be dealt with scientifically is obviously subject to huge variation dependent on discipline, individual style etc. At a high level of generality one might speak of scientific rationality, but how successfully one can distinguish scientific rationality from other rationalities in an empirically useful sense is not fully clear. For example, Garfinkel (1975) has provided an inventory of 'rationalities' which distinguish the "attitude of scientific theorizing" from the attitude of daily life. They are (i) the compatibility of ends - means relationship with principles of formal logic (ii) semantic clarity and distinctiveness (iii) clarity and distinctiveness for its own sake, and (iv) compatibility of the definition of a situation with scientific knowledge. These do not occur in the attitude of daily life. But, Garfinkel is careful to point out: "to avoid misunderstanding I want to stress that the concern here is with the attitude of scientific theorizing. The attitude that informs the activities of actual scientific inequity is another matter entirely". In fact, scientists alternate between the attitude of daily life, and the attitude of scientific theorizing. (Garfinkel, Harold, "Scientific and Common Sense Activities", in Giddens, Anthony), (ed.) Positivism and Sociology, Heinemann, London, 1975, p.62-63.

16 Boyd, R. 'Scientific Realism and Natur~listic Epistemology' in Asquith, P.O. and Giere, R.N. (eds.) P.S.A. 1980, Philosophy of Science Association, East Lansing, Condon 1981, Vol.2 pp.613-663.

17 Popper, K.R., Objective Knowledge, Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 1972, pp.78-80.

4

Page 6: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

studying reality is obtained. World 1 is investigated by the natural sciences, World 2 by

psychology and the world 3 by mathematics, cultural sciences and social sciences.

Husser1 18 believes that ultimate reality is the "transcendental subject" which

constitutes the world. The critical realists also agree with Husser! that our experience is

always influenced by the accepted conceptual and theoretical framework. This means

that in studying the world, the scientists have to conceptualize it by some suitable

chosen framework. The realists also agree with "Proxists" (like later Husser! and

Heideggar) that our experience is influenced by our needs and interests i.e. by our

practical orientation towards the world. George Luckas has consistently stressed the

need to consider practice rather than thought alone, whenever knowledge and

consciousness were under sociological investigation. For him, "men generate

knowledge in the course of practice to further their particular interests" 19•

In consonance with the understanding of Lukas, Habermas20 feels that scientific

knowledge is the product of communities of interacting men and women who operate

upon and perceive reality not idly and contemplatively, but in terms of particular

instrumental, manipulative and predictive interests; in tum those interests are

constituted into the process of knowledge generation and evaluation. Knowledge is

produced through a rigorous process of interaction and convergence of ideas in the

scientific community. The reality emerges from the casual interaction in scientific

community which critically evaluates and deliberates its logic and relevance. When a

definite consensus is achieved in the opinion of scientific community, it becomes

knowledge. Peirce21 has explained this logic through the following model.

18 Husser], E., The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, North Western Univ. Press, Evanston, 1970.

19 George, Luckas, Quoted in Interest and the Growth of Knowledge by Barnes, Barry (ed.) Routledge & Paul, London, 1977, p.l2.

20 d Habennas, Jurgen, Knowle ge and Human Interest. Translated by Shapiro, Jeremy J., Polity Press, Oxford, 1987, p.21.

21 C. S. Peirce's Collected Papers, op.cit, p.ll2.

5

Page 7: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

Causal interaction

Convergence

Flnai Opinion of the Scientific

1--_________ C_o_rr_es_,p'-o_n_d_e_n_c_e __ ~/Community Peirce's Model of Knowledge Formation

The scientific knowledge is distinguished from other forms by its inter-personal

character. This means that scientific knowledge is open to all; it is not personal but

inter-personal. Ziman called scientific knowledge condensable knowledge or public

knowledge.22 By this, he means that the results of science are open to inspection to

anyone who is interested in testing its validity. Its facts and theories must survive a

period of critical study and testing by other competent and disinterested individuals,

and they must have been found so persuasive that they are almost universally accepted.

Ziman argued that scientific enterprise is corporate. It .is not merely, in Newton's

incomparable phrase, ''that one stands on the shoulders of giants, and hence can see a

little farther". 23 Every scientist sees through his own eyes and also through the eyes of

his predecessors and colleagues. It is never one individual that goes through all the

steps in the logical inductive chain; it is a group of individuals, dividing their labour but

continuously and zealously checking each other's contributions. Thus, scientific

research is a social activity. Like all social activities, scientific endeavour involves a

process of interaction between competing realities. This can be ascertained through the

process of verification and confirmation.

22 Ziman, J.M., Public Knowledge: An Essay Concerning the Social Dimension of Science, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, f968, p.8.

23 Ibid., p.9.

6

Page 8: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

Verification and Confirmation of Scientific Theories/Knowledge:

According to Rudolf Carnap,24 there are two kinds of verification: direct and

indirect. If the question is concerned with a statement which asserts something about a

present perception i.e. there is a red square on a blue ground. Then the statement can be

tested directly by our present perception i.e. by directly seeing it. However, a statement

'P' which is not directly verifiable can only be verified from other already verified (J

statements.

According to Rom Harre25, scientists arnve at their laws and theories by

induction from the results of experiments, and to test them by further experiments.

Observation and the results of experiments are data, which provide a sound and solid

base for the scientific thought. However, experiments have limitation because they are

conducted on just a few samples, but laws and theories in different ways go beyond the

results of experiments. Sometimes, random adventurism has worked in science and this

has been called serendipity pattern by a sociologist. 26

In the philosophical debate about the criteria used to certify scientific

knowledge most attention has been given to the principles involved in validating

theoretical claims. According to Davies,27 to be classed as "scientific" a theory must

make predictions that have a logical symmetry. To be scientific a theory must:

(1) relate to a sufficiently wide range of phenomena;

(2) make predictions of what should, and what should not happen in certain

circumstances, however difficult the actual testing of these prediction may be;

(3) make predictions sufficiently precise.

24 Camap, Rudolf, Foundations of Logic and Mathematics, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1939, p.17.

25 Harre, Rom, Great Scientific Experiments: Twenty experiments that change our view of the World., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1983, p.9.

26 Merton calls it "serendipity" pattern. It means sudden or unexpected discovery. Example, Fleming discovered pencillin by chance. The word serendipity is derived from chance discovery of the island of Serendip in (Sri Lanka) by Arab traders in the past. (See, Merton, R.K., Social Theory and Social Structure, Free Press, New York, 1968.)

27 Davies, J.T., The Scientific Approach, Academic Press, London, 1973, p.66.

7

Page 9: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

Thus, theory should not be so vague and diffuse that refutation becomes

impossible hence it should be simple and experimentally testable. According to Popper,

"a simple" theory is defined as one with few arbitrary parameters and consequently,

. h h . 1 . 28 A d. D . 29 more eas1ly tested t an a t eory mvo vmg more parameters. ccor mg to av1es ,

scientific theory must have the following five attributes:

( 1) The generality 'g' i.e. unification of existing intellectual concepts which is achieved.

(2) It's simplicity's'

(3) The precision, 'p' i.e. the predictions that can be made from it.

(4) Its 'testedness' 't' i.e. its having been tested repeatedly in various ways over a wide

range of relevant experimental conditions.

(5) Its 'refutedness' 'r' in previous tests, or its inconsistency with established data.

Refutedness here refers to the extent of refutation it has suffered during the testing

't'.

Thus, according the Davies,30 credibility and elegance of a particular theory

depends on the relative importance of each of these five attributes.31 Popper32 has

suggested that the major criteria of theoretical adequacy in science is and should be the

ability of a claim to withstand attempts at falsification. In this context Popper accepted

the role of the scientist who created the refuted theory. He stated:

"Every refutation should be regarded as a great success : not merely as a success

of the scientist who refuted the theory, but also• of the scientist who created the refuted

28 Popper, Karl R. The Logic of Scientific discovery, op cit., p.I76. 29 Davies, J.J. The Scientific Approach, op.cit., p.95. 30 Ibid., p.96. 31 Other Philosophers list the attributes differently: Agassi (I 964) prefers explanatory power, simplicity

and known truth content, which appear to correspond respectively with 'g', 's' and 'p' and a combination of 'p', 't' and 'r'. Popper is primarily concerned with testability in situations of potential refutation: he uses such concepts as empirical content and explanatory power with respect to previous data, simplicity; and verisimilitude and these all contribute to his over all criterion of 'testability'.

32 Popper, Karl R., Conjectures and Refutations: Growth of Scientific Knowledge, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1963, p.217.

8

Page 10: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

theory and who thus in the first instance suggested, if only indirectly, the refuting

experiment". 33

Numerol!s criteria-such as agreement with the evidence, simplicity, accuracy,

fruitfulness and elegance etc. cited by logical empiricists for verification of theoretical

knowledge are not adequate. One of the main difficulties with these criteria is that they

deal with quite different dimensions. Hence, it is not possible for scientists to combine

them in a manner, which is not arbitrary. Popper postulated falsifiability as a criterion

of demarcation between science and non-science in place of the earlier logical positivist

criterion of verifiability.

In the light of the discussion of the nature of scientific knowledge in the

philosophy of science, it has become clear that science is not ab~olute knowledge. Now

question arises: How does scientific knowledge grow? This question is related to

dynamics in science. In this context, debates between Popper and Kuhn and Paul

Feyerabend have been discussed.

Dynamics in Science

Karl Popper's Theory of falsifications:

According to Popper it is impossible to arrive at a true universal statement on

the basis of a finite set of true singular statement. For no amount of favourable

observation could ever conclusively verify a statement; on the other hand a single

negative observation could falsify a universal statement. Thus, Popper34 emphasis on

falsifiability implied that science is an open system, which constantly changes the

constellation of theories. Popper introduced the following schema for the growth of

Knowledge

Here P1 is a problem with which we start. The first step in problem solving is

the proposal of an imaginative conjectural solution IT (the tentative theory). The next

33 Ibid., p.243. 34 Poppes, Karl R., Conjectures and Refutations: Growth ofScientific Knowledge, op cit. pp.ll9-l26.

9

Page 11: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

step is the attempted 'error elimination'. And finally P2 represents the new 'problem­

situation' which emerges from the attempt to solve problem P. However, this process is

not cyclical for P2 is always different from P1.

Popper35 has stated that rational criticism function as an essential engine of

scientific growth. That is, the progress of knowledge takes place in two ways: bold

conjectures are advanced, and they are met by attempted refutations in which critical

and severe tests are proposed and carried out. Thus, Popperian conception of science

acquires a dynamism that has been absent in logical positivism.

Kuhn's theory of Normal and Revolutionary Science:

Kuhn36 argued that instead of considering science as 'the totality of true

propositions there is another way of looking at science, as human activity. The practice

of science, he holds, is not guided by timeless and a historical canons of scientific

method. Instead, science is heavily influenced by what he calls 'paradigms'. By

'paradigms' Kuhn means those, "universally recognised scientific achievements that for

a time,provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners. These

are not fully articulated explications of principles, rules or theories, but are generally

unanalysed,taken for granted aspects of scientific practice."37

These rules, Kuhn points out, gain their significance only from the cases and

circumstances in which they are learned and utilised. At any given time in a scientific

discipline there are particular coherent traditions of scientific research', which Kuhn

terms 'normal science' that takes their shape from paradigm. According to Kuhn,

'normal science' means 'research firmly based upon one or more past scientific

achievements, achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledged

for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice'.38 'Normal Science' is the

hallmark of science, it allows progress because the legitimate areas and methods of

investigation are clearly spelled out. The concepts of 'normal science' and 'paradigm'

are 'intertwined' and are pre-requisites for calling a field science. It is through doing

35 Ibid., pp.l31-135. 36 Kuhn, Thomas s.

1 The Structure of Scientific Revolution, University of Chicago Press, Chicago,

1962, p.x. 37 Ibid., p.9. 38 Ibid., p.l 0.

10

Page 12: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

'normal science' that scientists learn the methodological, metaphysical, theoretical and

instrumental assumptions of their discipline.

According to Kuhn,39 'normal Science' does not seek to produce novelties,

rather it is a puzzle-solving activity - the scientist proceeds according to a well­

specified set of rules. Though normal science is a cumulative enterprise, it has

unintentional non-cumulative effects. By its very nature, normal science leads its

practitioners to awareness of anomalies, which are a pre-requisite to new discoveries

that ultimately can produce change in the 'paradigm'. However, small adjustment in a

'paradigm' occurs when new discoveries are able to handle the anomalous situation.

But, discoveries are not the only source of paradigm change. From time to time, a

number of anomalies can emerge within a certain normal science tradition, which

precipitates a crisis. This has profound effects on the scientific community in question.

The extraordinary research sets the stage for the possibility of a scientific

revolution, a gestalt - switch in which a new paradigm emerges. However, scientists

never reject an old 'paradigm' without coming up with a replacement of an alternative

'paradigm'. But, a new 'paradigm' is favoured only, as Kuhn argued: "if it can solve the

anomalies encountered by the older one; if it has more quantitative precision and can

predict new phenomenon, if it has certain aesthetic qualities or is supported by some of

the more well-known members of the profession."40

For example, Copernicus thus claimed that he had solved the long-vexing

problem of the length of the calender year, and Newton said that he had reconciled

terrestrial and celestial mechanics. Lavoiseir stated that he had solved the problems of

gas-identity and of weight - relations, and Einstein argued that he had made

electrodynamics compatible with a revised science of motion.41 Individual scientists

embrace a new paradigm for all sorts of reasons and usually for several at once. Kuhn

observed that "even the nationality or the prior reputation of the innovator and his

teachers can sometimes play significant role". 42

39 Ibid., pp.35-36. 40 Ibid., p.l53. 41 Ibid., p.l55. 42 Ibid., 153. Kuhn refers the case of Lord Rayleigh to illustrate the role of reputation, cf: Lord

Rayleigh, at a time when his reputation was established, submitted to the British Association a paper

11

Page 13: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

In learning a 'paradigm' the scientists acquire theory, methods and standard

together, usually in an inextricable mixture. Thus, whole positivist notion of theory

being independent of observation gets collapsed. Kuhn emphasises that what counts as

an observation of this or that is theory dependent. There are, then no raw data, no brute

facts, but only data analysed, modelled, and manufactured according to some theory.

Hence, he questioned the minimal positivist assumption that there is some description

of the fact, which is neutral among competing explanatory theories. Thus, we see that

Kuhn conceives science as a social enterprise, with an organised consensus of scientists

determining what is and is not to be considered scientific, while logical positivists

viewed science as an attempt to establish rule as correspondence between language and

the world.

Karl Popper criticised Kuhn's concept of 'normal science'. Kuhn believed that

'normal science' is the activity of the science student who accepts the ruling dogma of

the day without challenging it and who only accepts a new revolutionary theory if

almost every body else is ready to accept it. According to Karl Popper, this kind of

belief is very dangerous. The normal scientists have been taught badly. He stated: "all

teaching at the university level should be training and encouragement in critical

thinking."43 Hov,:ever, Popper has stressed the need for some dogmatism. He wrote:

"dogmatic scientists have an important role to play. If we give in to criticism too easily,

we shall never find out where the real power of our theories lie."44

Kuhn's thesis is relativistic that is why Popper dubbed it as 'the myth of

framework' and regarded it as a logical and philosophical mistake'. Popper emphasised

that a critical discussion and a comparison of the various frameworks is always

possible. It is true that an intellectual revolution often looks like a religious conversion.

But this does not mean that we cannot evaluate critically and rationally our former

view, in the light of new ones. Thus, the conceptual scheme that Kuhn developed in

"The Structure ofScient(fic Revolution" has been slighted for its inability to handle: (I)

on some paradoxes of electrodynamics. His name was inadvertently omitted when the paper was first sent, and the paper itself was at first rejected as the work of some "paradoxes". Shortly afterwards, with the author's name in place, the paper was accepted with profuse apologies (R.J. Strutt, 41

h Baron Rayleigh, John William Strut/ Third Baron Rayleigh, New York, 1924, p.228.

43 Popper, Karl R.,"Normal Science and its Dangers", in Lakatose, Imre and Musgrave, Allan (eds.), Criticism And The Growth of Knowledge.,Cambridge Univ. Press, New York, 1978, pp.51-58.

44 Ibid., p.55.

12

Page 14: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

period of normal science m which more than one paradigm exists; (2) non­

revolutionary period in which fruitful debate and criticism rather simple puzzle solving

accompany a dominant research tradition; and (3) the gradual shift in the paradigms

which are common to such period.

Kuhn45 on his part insisted that such period occurs less frequently historically

than his critics might think and that in any case, his framework is fully adequate for

describing and analysing them. Kuhn praises 'normal research' for two reasons. First,

'normal science' is the hallmark of science, as it distinguishes the scientific from non­

scientific. Second, normal science leads to revolution and thus, ultimately to scientific

development. This is the mpst controversial point between Kuhn and critics of Popper.

John Watkins, draws the line between the two thinkers in the following ways. "The 0

condition which Kuhn regards as the normal and proper condition of science is a 0

condition which if it is actually obtained, Popper would regard as unscientific, a state of

affairs in which critical science had contracted into defensive metaphysics".46

Paul Feyerabend's theory of multiplicity:

Paul Feyerabend asserted that the meanings of both observational and

theoretical terms are completely dependent on the theory in which they are embedded.

He rejected Kuhn's emphasis on the consistency condition, which demands that new

theories either contain or be consistent with well-established theories in their domain.

He argued that the condition is inherently unreasonable. He wrote: "it eliminates a

theory not because it is in disagreement with the fact; it eliminates it because it is in

disagreement with another theory ..... The only difference between such a measure and

another theory is the age and familiarity. Had the younger theory been there first then

the consistency condition would have worked in its favour". 47

The defence of consistency condition depends crucially on the truth of

assumption of the relative autonomy of facts, which states that facts exist independent

45 Kuhn, Thomas, S.,"'Retlection on my Critics" in Lakatos, lmre & Musgrave, A. (ed.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, op.cit., pp.249-59.

46 Watkins, John, "Against Normal Science" in Lakatose, lmre, & Musgrare, A. (ed.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, op.cit., p.28.

47 feyerabend, P. "How to be a good Empericist: A Plea for Tolerance in Epistemological Matters in Brady, Bruce (ed.), Reading in the Philosophy of Science, Printice Hall, New Jersey, 1970, pp.319-42.

13

Page 15: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

of theories. Since Feyerabend adheres to the theory dependent thesis, he denies the

relative autonomy of facts. He argued, if facts are theory dependent, then the best way

to increase the number of facts (and hence the empirical content of scientific

knowledge) is to increase the number of alternative mutually inconsistent theories. The

key to scientific advance is the proliferation of theories. He wrote: "you can be a good

empiricist only if you are prepared to work with many alternative theories rather than

with a single point of view and experience. This plurality of theories must not be

regarded as a preliminary stage of knowledge which will, at some time, in the future be

replaced by the one true theory."48 Theoretical pluralism is assumed to be an essential

feature of all knowledge that claims to be objective- such a plurality allows for a much

sharper criticism of accepted ideas than does the comparison with a domain of facts

which are supposed to sit there independently of theoretical consideration.49

However, one of the most glaring weaknesses of Feyerabend's analysis is his

adamant insistence that, except for trivial cases, any change in a theory will alter the

meanings of all terms- observational and theoretical. Peter Achinstein50 argued: "if we

accept Feyerabend's position then any term used in two different theories will have

different meanings in those theories. If that is true, then two theories can never

contradict each other, even if they seem to imply contradictory consequences". For

example, as Peter Achinstein stated: "if I assert p and you assert not - p, we are not

and can not be disagreeing, because the terms in my assertion are p-laden and so mean

one thing, where as those in not-pare not p laden and so mean another. Not- p, then

is not the negation of p. In short, negation is impossible". 51

48 Feyerabend, Paul, "Consolation for the Specialists" in Lakatose, Imre and Musgrave.,A (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, op.cit., pp.202-J 0.

49 A significant observation of Feyerabend is that the western science has become monolithic. A pluralistic approach enabled a seeker of truth to recognise the validity of multiple systems in the domain of science or rationality. He argued, for example, that Chinese system of medicine could not be considered less scientific than the westem medicine. The main problem in the field of western medicine was its reliance on samples for testing medicines. These samples could be defective. Feyerabend proposed that only the scientific community could not confirm that a discovery was valid. The common people must confer the validity upon it. This line was reminiscent of pragmatism centered around Pierce, Dewey and C. Wright Mills.

50 Achinstein, Peter, Concepts of Science: A Philosophical Analysis, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1968, p.96.

51 Ibid., p.93.

14

Page 16: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

Not only is any disagreement impossible for proponents of two different

theories but, for the same reason, it will be impossible for theorists to agree even on a

description of the data to be explained by their respective theories. For in such a

description all the terms employed will depend for their meanings upon the given

theory. However, if there can be no agreement and no disagreement between two

theories they cannot be called an alternative. An in-depth understanding of sociology of

science from the perspective of non-positive tradition of science reaffirms the belief

that scientific knowledge follows a non-cumulative, non-linear and discontinuous path.

Agreement, conformity, anarchism and conflict are lamp post in scientific research. As

M.G. Narasimhan52 has found that disagreement, conflict and controversy have

provided the basic force for propelling science forward especially in the contemporary

context. Following a lack of general consensus to define the dynamics and dimension

of science multiple approaches have emerged in sociological studies of science.

Review of Literature (Emerging Trends in Social Studies of Science):

The modern roots to theoretical sociological studies of science can be traced to

a variety of intellectual currents in early and mid - twentieth century scholarship: from

the emergence of the sociology of knowledge in the works of Scheler and Mannheim/3

to the Fleck's Social studies of medicine;54 from the emergence of the history and

sociology of science in the works of George Sarton, 55 Robert K. Merton56 and Boris

Hessen, 57 to the works of Ogburn, 58 and others on inventions and technology: fron; the

52 Narasimhan, M.G., Controversy as an explanatory Category in Scientific Metatheory: An Argument and an lllustration. (Unpublished Thesis). Foreign Language Division, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, 1994.

53 For a general understanding of sociology of knowledge see, Curtis, J. E. and Petras, J.W. (eds.), The sociology of Knowledge, Pareger, New York, 1970.

54 In 1935, Ludwik Fleck published a marvellous pioneering sociological study of the evaluation of scientific knowledge, which described in detail the historical variation in what counted as scientific fact and the social process through which what was accepted as fact at any time become consensually established (See, Fleck, L. Genesis and Development of scientific fact, (translated into English by Bradley, F. and Trenn, T.J) Chicago Uni. Press, Chicago, 1979);

55 Belgian Historian George Sarton ( 1884-1956) initiated the ISIS journal, which is leading (even today) journal in the history of science, See, Sarton, George, The History of Science and New Humanism, Harvard Uni. Press, Cambridge, 193 7).

56 Merton, Robert. K. Science, Technology and society in Seventeenth century England, op.cit., 1970. 57 Hessen, Boris, "The social and economic roots of Newton's Principia" in Science at the Cross Roads,

London, 1931. 58 Ogburn, William F., Social Change with Respect to Culture and Original Nature, Viking, New York,

1950 (originally published 1922).

15

Page 17: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

grand theories of Foucault, 59 and Habermas,60 to Marry Douglas',61 anthropology of

knowledge and perception; and from the Popper and Kuhn debates on the critique of

science that emerged in 1960. In course of time various perspectives in sociology of

science have developed. In the following sections some prominent perspectives in

sociology of science like functionalist, Marxian, conflict model, interest model,

constructivist and its sub-approaches will be critically evaluated for evolving suitable

theoretical construct for the present study. In the last section some studies in Indian

context have been evaluated to chalk out the unique character and need of the present

study.

Functionalist Perspective

The Mertonian perspective m sociology laid foundation of the discipline of

sociology of science. Robert K. Merton has strongly influenced research in sociology of

science. Merton contribution to the sociology of scientific knowledge began with his

doctoral dissertation, "Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth Century

England."62 His argument in this thesis closely followed Weber's essay, "The

Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism"63 In parallel with Weber thesis on the

relationship between Calvinist doctrines and entrepreneurial activity, Merton argued

that puritan value stimulated development of science.

After this work Merton focused on the social organisation of science rather than

with its relations to the rest of society. Merton wrote two important papers: 64 Science

and the social order (1938) and science and democratic social structure (1942)". These

papers originated from Merton's study of the value of science and their relations to the

larger society in which they developed, and they went beyond this to examine the social

structural characteristics of science that must accompany these values.

59 Foucault M., The Archaeology of Knowledge (Eng. Trans. (ed.) Tavistock, London, 1969. 60 Habennas. J., Knowledge and Human Interests (Trans. By Shapiro, J.J.), Beacon Books, Boston,

1971. 61 Douglas, Marry, Essays in the Sociology of Perception, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1986. 62 Merton, Robert K. Science, Technology and society in Seventeenth century England, op.cit., 1970. 63 Weber, Max, Protestant Ethic and spirit of capitalism op.cit., 1930. 64 These papers are included in Merton, Robert K., Social theory and Social Structure, Free press, New

York, 1968, pp.590-615.

16

Page 18: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

After Merton, many scholars65 like. Norman Storer, Bernard Barber, Jonathan

and Stephan Cole, Nicholas Mullins, Diana Crane, Harriat Zuckerman and many others

have adopted Mertonian perspective for the study of social institution of science.

In recent years, a body of research has emerged in sociology of scientific

knowledge (SSK) that has undermined the relevance of functionalist perspective.

However, before dwelling on these emerging trends in sociology of scientific

knowledge first we will critically analyse the basic premises of Mertonian perspective

and then we shall go for evaluation of emerging approaches in sociology of scientific

knowledge in order to find suitable theoretical construct to situate the present study. We

shall start with Mertonian perspective because, this perspective deserves attention for

the following three reasons.

(1) The Mertonian paradigm is still the main source of ideas, perspectives and advice

on science policy in developed and developing countries. 66

(2) Many scholars believed that6? 'strong programme' treatment of Merton's sociology

of science has only expanded the topics and explanatory methods of the sociology of

knowledge without radically altering the Mertonian programme.

65 For more detaiJson the Merton ian perspective, see the works of following authors. Storer, Norman, S., The Social system of Science, Holt, New York, 1966; Barber, Bernard, Science and the social order, Free press, New York, 1952; Cole, Jonathan and Cole, Stephen, Social Stratification in Science ,University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1973; Mullins, Nicholas. "The Development of a Scientific Specialty: The Phase Group and the Origin of Molecular Biology" Minerva,JO,(l),/972,pp.51-82; Crane, Diana, Invisible colleagues: Diffusion of the knowledge in scientific communities, The University of Chicago press, Chicago, 1972; Zuckerman, Harriott, "Deviant Behaviour and Social Control in Science," in Sagarin, E. (ed) Deviance and Social change, Sage, Beverly Hills, 1971 pp.89-138.

66 See, Shapin, Steven, "Mertomian Concessions", Science, Vol. 259, 1993, pp.839-841. 67 R.J. Anderson, J. A. Hughes, and W. W. Sharrock argue that the strong programme's mode of

explanation is little different from "old. Fashioned functionalism" and that it is open to many of the same criticism. Anderson and his colleagues point out that the demonstration of causality is typically made by showing homologies between particular scientific theories and others beliefs to the extant in the social milieu in which the theories originated. In a functionalist explanation, abstract homologies (e.g between basic dimensions of Puritan belief and the ethos of science)are used to demonstrate that the milieu support or motivate the promulgation and acceptance of theory. The 'strong programme' re-writes the congruence arguments in functionalism into stronger causal idioms, but the task of demonstrating and defending connections between particular abstract formulation of ''belief and knowledge" faces many of the same intractable problems. (See, Anderson, R.S., Hughes, J.A., and Sharrock, W.W. "Some Initial Difficulties with the Sociology of Knowledge: A preliminary examination of the strong programme" Manchester Polytechnic Occasional Papers, no. I., 1987). See also, Lynch, Machael, Scientific Practice and Ordinary Action, Ethnomethodology and Social Studies of Science, Cambridge Univ. Press Cambridge 1993, pp.55-59.

17

Page 19: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

(3) The Mertonian perspective is still relevant in Sociology of Scientific Knowledge for

development of a sociology of mind, thinking, and consciousness, which are reflected

in the contemporary social studies of artificial intelligence, and in self-organisation

theories of science. 68

In his most recent defence of the Mertonian paradigm, Merton examines the

thesis at three levels of theoretical abstraction.69 At socio-historical level, he stated that

ascetic Protestantism helped to motivate and channalised the activities of men in the

direction of experimental science. At middle level hypothesis he argued that the

development of science like the development of any institution had to be supported by

group values. At third or abstract level, the hypothesis is that the interests, motivations

and behaviours in any given institutional sphere - such as religion or economy - are

interdependent with the interests, motivations, and behaviour in other institutional

spheres such as science.

The third formulation of the Merton thesis tends to undermine the simple,

"reciprocal influence" assumption that has generated decades of controversy over the

relative validity of the Puritanism -science sequences versus the science -Puritanism

sequence. That formulation gives greater priority to a structural and systematic

argument as opposed to utilitarian hypotheses and hypotheses about the values and

roles of individuals in evolving science.

Merton is unusually sensitive to possible dysfunctions in the social structure of

science. For example, Merton claims that "joy in discovery and the quest for

recognition by scientific peers are stamped out of the same psychological coin". 70 This

allows him to argue that departure from the norms of science can be 'normal' and not at

all detrimental to science. Merton also recognised that "the reward system could get out

of hand and defeat its original purposes of reinforcing and perpetuating the emphasis on

68 Collin, H.M., Artificial £rperts: Social Knowledge and Intelligent Machines, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1990; See also. Restivo, Sal ,"Zen and the art of science studies" Science Technology & Human Values. 17, 1992, pp. 402-406.

69 This defence was prompted by a rather lame criticism by G. Becker of Merton's claim concerning Gennan Pietism and Science which Becker tried unsuccessfully to extend to general Merton thesis. See, Beker, G. "Pietism and Science: A Critique of Robert K. Merton's Hypothesis", American Journal of Sociology, 89, 1984,pp.l 065-90. (See also, Merton, Robert K, "The Fallacy of the latest Word: The case of Pietism and Science", American Journal of sociology, 89, 1984, pp. 1091-1121)

70 Merton, R.K. Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigation, in Storer, Nonnan W (ed) University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1973., p. 340.

18

Page 20: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

originality"71 But he has steadfastly held to the claim that only a few scientists "try to

gain reputation by means that will loose them repute" 72• Profound changes in science

are allowed in principle by the Mertonian paradigm but not changes in the ethos of

science. In general, Merton tends to assume that the social system of science works as a

systems that deviance is idiosyncratic,· and that the social structure of science is

(although dynamic and mutable in principle) fundamentally stable. This wide spread

tendency reflects the pervasiveness of and commitment to the hegemonic ideology of

modern science.

The main dogma of the Mertonian perspective is that the autonomy of science

somehow makes "scientific knowledge independent of social influence" 73. But Merton

suggestion for autonomy of science is related mainly to internal functioning of science

instead of total immunity from the society. He has conceded that external factors

facilitate or retard the pace and direction of scientific development. Hence, it seems

Merton is not a rigorous intemalist, he asserts; "society has to have a certain shape or

form to nourish the immanent development of science"74 This idea of a sociology of

immanent development becomes the great promise for the Post-Mertonian science

studies.

Merton, like Mannheim, was careful to distinguish the social and historical

conditions that gave rise to scientific innovation from the process of innovation within

the specialised disciplines. Contrary to the belief, Merton and his followers did not

ignore the 'estoric content' of scientific activity, nor did they define the natural sciences

as asocial enterprise. 75 Merton's main concern was to investigate what institutional

conditions are necessary to produce and certify knowledge claims. Merton recognised

that science has often been pressed into the service of political economic, and religious

interests but he claimed that the conflict and ethical dilemmas that arise under such

condition testify to the normative expectation that science should be an unencumbered

pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. Merton did not overtly make an ontological or

71 Ibid., pp. 300-304. 72 Ibid., p.321. 73 Ibid., p. 209. 74 Ibid., p. 204. 7! For an example of Mertonian research that, in its fashion deals with the "content" of science. See

Barber, B. and Fox, Rene, "The Case of the floppy -eared rabbits: an instance of serendipity gained and serendipity lost", American journal of sociology, 64, 1958, 128-36.

19

Page 21: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

epistemological claim about what distinguishes science from other institutions; instead,

he presented a functional argument regarding how "standardised social sentiment about

science" gives rise to and support the historically distinctive ethos of science. Merton

was also concerned about the more immediate situation in Nazi Germany.76 By

utilising the Parsonian conceptual frame work to define a distinctive constellation of

four "institutional imperatives" for modern science, Merton avoided some of the

concrete difficulties associated with Mannheim's proposal. He formulated four norms:

universalism, communism, disinterestedness and organised scepticisms. These norms

give a coherent picture of science. To an extent, this constellation of norms is modelled

after a Parsonial reading of Weber's ideal, ideal-typical account of bureaucracy with its

emphasis on universalism, specialised competency, the impersonality and communal

property /of the office, and the institutionalisation of meritocratic standards for

adjudicating competition.77 So, like Weber, Merton is also criticised for his idealised

version of norms that over look the actual practice in life. Although Merton was careful

to identify the norms as ideal standards rather than description of actual behaviour, he

nevertheless was criticised by Barry Barnes and R.G.A Dolby as follows:

Scientists have from time to time, professed these norms. The sociologists musts distinguish professed norms from the pattern of positively sanctioned behaviour; these professed norms are in themselves incapable of providing real guidance for action. Merton can point out to examples of his norms in what scientists say, but he does not produce any evidence of behaviour modified by these norms.78

Merton in his later writing made some modification regarding the normative

structure of science. He argued that he never claimed that the norms acted as

unequivocal standards guiding all scientific conduct. Instead, he contended that priority

races and related competitions among scientists create dilemmas about the enactment of

normatively appropriate conduct. 79

76 Merton, R.K., Social theory and Social Strucrture, 1968, op.cit., p.595; Barnard Barber also mentioned that Merton was also responding, to a paper" The Social Roots of Newton's Principia by Borris Hessen presented in the second International Congress held in London, 1931. Hessen argued that even pure science had social origin (see. Barber, B., Science and Social Order, George Allen, Unwin, London, 1952.

77 Weber, Max, Economy and society, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1978, vol.2. 78 Barner, B. Dolby, R.G.A.,; "The Scientific ethos: A deviant Viewpoint". European Journal of

sociology, vo1.11, 1970, pp.3-25. 79 Merton, R.K., Sociological Ambivalence and Other Essays, The Free Press, New York, 1976.

pp.32-55.

20

Page 22: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

I

The norm of universalism which enjoins upon the scientists that truth claims

whatever their sources are, to be subjected to pre-established, impersonal criteria:

consonant with observation and with previously confirmed knowledge. 80 Thus, norm

does not guarantee objectivity; rather it fosters a pre-objective commitment to

meritocratic institutional procedures for sharing and evaluating research results. As

Norman Storer argued: "it is the norm of universalism, which makes science an

international community; what a Russian discovers about the atom will be valid in

America and his work can be appreciated by scientists every where".81 Storer also

suggested that this norm is orientational rather than directives in its intents". Stephen

Hill also added utilitarian dimension to Mertonian norm ofuniversalism.82 He writes:

~

''we would suggest that the assumption of Mertonian universalism embodies an assumption of usefulness of science knowledge: the pure normative statement of universalism by Merton, is that because natural phenomena are every where the same, hence, social, cultural and political contexts are irrelevant to objective evaluation of the truth of scientific statements. But such 'truth' has more than philosophic value as it can form explanation of everyday experience and can become embodied in objects of our every day experience. Thus, 'truth' can be recognised outside a science circle of adherents. As a norm, universalism, as other posited norms of science, assumes a social system. There is no basis for science as a social system supported by society unless scientific truth is perceived as of value to society. Thus, within the normative scientist's world-view of science, usefulness is not the goal of scientific inquiry; but usefulness is seen to follow certification of knowledge and operation of other internal norms that ensure its validity. Without this assumption science as a social system has no contemporary basis. When science is turned towards developing countries (either by scientists or analysts of science), the utilitarianism which often remains implicit within the scientific community's meaning system while in advanced countries becomes explicit. Thus, the assumption reads, valid knowledge must result from universalistic science practice, and this knowledge must be useful in LDCs. My base of universalism' is similar to Merton's, but not coincident with it" .83

Dedijer is also agreed with the notion that Mertonian norm of universalism

embodies the idea of usefulness. He argued: "Every aspect of national development

policy depends on research conducted within the country, although it must, of course,

~:::-~·•::--. ~. '\ '0 ---~- (. ,. ···~

,::;. /,..../" '\._.\<' ·"' \; .. / ',,.,,.\ i~ ( 1 · I 'C', 1,.\

\

cuI l..fb~~ '~-··I! ~ !i ~ IL;.ir!t I ·r:-: ,lji :--, /.·~··· 80 Merton, Robert K, Social Theory and Social Structure, 1968 op.cit., p. 607. ~(.;\ .'.-;/

81 Storer, Nonnan, W., The Social System ofScience, 1966, op.cit., p.78. \, -~--J(:<:/ 82 Still, Stephen, C., "Contrary Meanings of Science - Interaction between cultural and p~>"

Meanings of Research in a Developing Country Scientific Research Institution" in Blume, Stuart S. (ed.) Perspective in the Sociology of Science, John, Wiley and Sons, New York, 1997. pp.l95-230.

83 Ibid., p. 224. THESIS

305.5530954 G7471 No

1111111111111111111111111111111 TH10634

Page 23: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

be used on the achievements of, and conform with the standards of international

science". 84 Thus, he accepted the universality of science.

Communism - this norm suggests that the "substantive findings of science are a

product of social collaboration and are assigned to the community".85 Norman Storer,

who is an adherent of Mertonian perspective, argued: "the communality directs the

scientist to share his findings with other scientists freely and without favour, for

knowledge that is not in the public domain can not be part of the legitimate body of

knowledge against which creativity is measured and to which other scientists refer in

their works". 86

However, in actual practice, followers of Mertonian perspective have accepted

the fact that scientists some times accept restriction on publication of their research

findings, on the ground of national security, economic value or on the ground of

incompleteness of the research. As Bernard Barber stated that scientists do accept

temporary restriction on publication of their research findings. However, there is no

restriction on sharing of information within a research groups or between two or more

reliable research institutions. Merton himself entered the first qualification on the

community rights to all discovered knowledge, noting the individual's credit for

discovery upon publication. Property rights in science are whittled down to a bare

minimum ... of recognition and esteem ... Commensurate with the significance of the

increments". 87

The norm of communality is directly related to the norm of disinterestedness.

However, Bernard Barber has conceded for patent right even for pure research. He

stated: for "pure" scientists, patents are accepted like secrecy in research as necessary

evil under certain special conditions, for example, when some scientific discovery

should be protected in the immediate public interests and should not be published for

possible exploitation by commercial enterprises. This is the case typically with

biological and chemical discoveries, which have medical applications that are

84 Dedijer, Steven, "Underdeveloped Science in Underdeveloped countries", Minerva, 2, 1963, pp.61-81.

85 Merton, R.K. Social theory and Social Structure, 1968 op.cit., p. 611. 86 Storer, Norman. W. The Social System of Science, 1966, op.cit., p.79. 87 Merton, R.K. Social theory and Social Structure, 1968 op.cit., p.612.

22

Page 24: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

immediat<?lY apparent to the research scientists. In such circumstance, the morals of

science hold that a scientist may permit his discovery to be patented in the public

interest, but only on the condition that he himself receives no direct financial benefit

from such a patent". 88

According to Merton, the norm of disinterestedness is enforced through a

distinctive pattern of institutional control of a wide range of motives which

characterise the behaviour of scientists. "Scientists conform to strict standards of

conduct not because they are superior individuals but because, it is in their interests to

avoid fraud, cultism, trivial and spurious claims. The enforcement mechanism in this

instance is "the public and testable character of science ..... [which] it may be supposed,

has contributed to the integrity of men of science". 89 As a social norm,

disinterestedness functions primarily to protect the production of scientific knowledge

from personal bias and other 'subjective' influence. There is no denying that scientific

facts and theories are produced by human beings, whose minds can not be completely

cleansed of individual interests. As Ziman argued, "scientists can not be imagined as

bloodless, robots, indifferent to the reception of their research claims. They have the

strongest possible interests in gaining public recognition. for their discoveries".90

Merton cautioned that "disinterestedness is not to be equated with altruism nor

interested action with egoism".91 However, the trick is to nullify these individual

interests by setting them against one another. In effect, as Merton argued, the scientific

ethos delineates an agonistic arena, where a hidden melodrama of clashing egos 1s

transformed into apparently dispassionate intellectual debate.

Besides this, Merton was careful to reiterate "that all of this is epistemologically

quite irrelevant but sociologically and psychologically crucial. He asserted: "Scientific

knowledge is not the richer or the poorer for having credit given where credit is due; it

88 Barber, Bernard, Science and the Social Order, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1952, p.93. 89

Merton, Robert K., The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigation, 1973, op.cit., p.276.

90 Ziman, John, Real Science what it is, and what it means, Cambridge Uni. Press, Cambridge, 2000, pp.158-159.

91 Merton, R.K. Social Theory and Social Structure, 1968, op.cit., p. 612.

23

Page 25: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

is the social institution of science and individual men of science that would suffer from

repeated failures to allocate credit justly". 92

In Mertonian perspective, Norman Storer has accepted the fact that: "people

will be interested for applied research because the desire to create may be less strong in

some individuals or some 'people may wish to be concretely creative to produce 'things

that work' rather than abstract ideas on papers, or it may be sheer economic pressure or

necessity for employment"93 Norman Storer further pointed out that "one can see

tendency of basic scientists to look down upon applied scientists because they don't get

competent response. Therefore, even in applied research also scientists try to find and

often get chance to 'bootleg' some pure research into their works, so that they will ftave

material of general interest to the scientific community as well as to the employer. 94

Merton himself has appreciated the role of applied research. He argued: every

new technology bears witness, not only, "to the integrity of scientist', but also to the

objectivity of his knowledge and to his freedom from social influences" .95 However, in

generating and selecting questions for research, Storer argued: "Scientist must seek

continually for a balance between too much dependence on an inbred universe of

theoretical discourse on the one hand and too much dependence upon external sources

on the other. In the former case there is the danger of ignoring problems that might lead

to important advances in theory and knowledge, whereas in the latter the maintenance

of the entire social system of science would be jeopardised".96

It seems that Sklair's argument that "biggest limitation of Mertonian sociology

of science is that it refers only to pure science or academic science"97 is not justifiable.

In fact, Mertonian perspective on sociology of science emphasised on right balance

92 Merton, Robet K., "The Sociology of Science" in Barber, 8 and Hirsth, W. (eds). The Sociology of Science: Free Press. New York, 1962, p.468.

93 Storer, Norman. W. The Social System of Science, 1966, op.cit., p.lll. 94 Ibid., p.ll2 .. 95 Merton, Robert K, Social Theory and Social Structure, 1957, op.cit., p.560. 9

" Storer, Norman W., The Social System of Science, op.cit., p.ll3. 91 Sklair, L. Organised knowledge:· A Sociological view of Science and Technology. Hart-Davvis

MacGibbon, London 1973, p.l73.

24

Page 26: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

between applied and ba-;ic science. Even Norman Storer has gone to the extent of

calling "distinction between applied and basic science as invidious".98

According to Merton, the norm of 'organised scepticism IS "both a

methodological and an institutional mandate for the temporary suspension of judgement

and detached scrutiny of belief in terms of empirical and logical criteria".99 The main

intention of this norm is to ensure appropriate response to the contribution of others and

proper attention to others' responses to one's own contribution. Norman Storer

suggested pre-emptory rejection of criticism as a violation of organised scepticism. 100

In fact, the norm of organised scepticism worked as filtering process in

production and accumulation of scientific knowledge. Criticism is an essential

ingredient of creativity. This norm makes scientist to be accountable for his claim. So,

he cannot make claim for spurious or distorted truth, as it will be detected by other

people. However, it does not mean that his claim must be absolute and permanent;

rather, as Storer argued: "scientific truth is, for the moment, what is accepted by the

majority of scientists in a given area and that its acceptance is based upon its relation to

other truths rather than upon its absolute, independent merit". 101

However, Merton's proposition that: "the scientific investigator does not

preserve the cleavage between the sacred and the profane, between that which requires

uncritical respect and that which can be objectively analysed", 102 requires modification

in the light of new discoveries in physical and biological sciences. Merton might have

conceived the idea of this dichotomy for 18th to early 20th century science, the period,

which is marked by conflict between science and religion.

In twentieth century, development of quantum mechanics in physics and

challenges posed to Darwinism created space for theologians in the fold of science. The

majority of scientists have accepted the fact that science and religion are not

98 For detail discussion on this issue see, Storer, Norman S. "Basic versus Applied Research: The Conflict between Means and Ends in Science", Indian Sociological Bulletin, vol.5, no. I, 1964, pp.34-42.

99 M erton, Robert K, The Sociology of Science, 1973, op.cit., p.277. 100

Storer, Norman W, The Social System of Science, op.cit., p.ll7. 101

Storer, Norman, W., The Social System of Science, op.cit., p.l21. 102

Merton, Robert K., Social Theory and Social Structure, 1968, op.cit., p.614.

25

Page 27: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

contradictory rather religion provides meaning to science. 103 Hence, Mertonian

perspective needs to incorporate these changes. Although Mertonian perspective has

become more flexible and explicit to incorporate the emerging changes in the realm of

science and society it has to learn a lot from other emerging trends in social studies of

science. In the following sections, Marxian perspective, conflict model, interest model

and constructivist and its subsidiary approaches will be examined.

Marxian Perspective on Science

Marxist theory treats ideas as product of material and social conditions, because

the means of production include the means of mental production, and the ruling class

controls the production of ideas. Marx himself conceived modern "science as a

bourgeois, alienated mode of inquiry". 104 He associated the social transformation from

capitalism to communism with a correlated transformation of science - the negation of

science-as it is and the emergence of 'human science', dealienated, unitary, (not

unified) holistic, and global.

From a Marxian perspective science or knowledge of nature is a social

knowledge, "a tool which man progressively perfects to enhance his own material

development" .1 05 In this approach there is no place for a reified conception of science

as abstract 'pure knowledge'. Scientific and mathematical knowledge is not things 'out

there' in an eternal, universal, platonic realm that can be 'discovered' in one revelatory

way or another. Neither are they products of 'pure' mental activity or of' geniuses' who

create them out of thin air. In any given social formation, the prevailing mode of

knowing grows out of practical activities and corresponds to the prevailing mode (s) of

production and dominant social interests.

The premise that the only value of knowledge is that it can be applied for

human benefits makes a rigid distinction between pure and applied science unnecessary

103 For Detail discussion on relationship between science and religion, see,Brook, John Hedley "Science and Religion" in Obly, R .... et al (eds) Companion to the History of Modern Science, Kegan Paul & Routledge, London, 1990, pp.763-782.

104 Marx, Karl, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Foreign Language Publication House, Moscow, 1956,pp.IIO-Jl.

105 Marx, Karl. Grundrises: Foundation of critique of Political Economy, Vintage, New York, 1973, p.l43.

26

Page 28: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

in Marxian approach. Nonetheless, Marxian approach accepted the link between

applied and pure research. As a prominent Marxian scholar Bukharin wrote:

"Under the cover of the difficulty of the exact demarcation of the applied and theoretical sciences beats the dialectics of the relationship between theory and practice, the passing of one into the other. In reality, we have a whole chain of various theoretical sciences, linked up by internal connections... These sciences are born out of practice, which first sets itself technical task: the latter require in their turn the solution of theoretical problems ... a special (relative), logic and motion being thereby created. Practice in this way grows into theory; the sought for rule of action is transformed into the search for the law of objective relationship". 106

Bukharin included scientific theories with the superstructure. He stated: "the

mode of production determines also the mode of conception". 107 He considered

"scientific cognition, though the highest forms of theoretical cognition, as the practice

of material labour continued in particular forms (natural science)" .108

Antonio Gramsci, another prominent Marxist scholar, expressing his view on

objectivity and relation between science and nature denied the existence of any

independent reality. He wrote:

When one affirms that a reality would exist even if man did not, one is either speaking metaphorically or one is falling into a form of mysticism. We know reality only in relation to man, and since man is historical becoming, knowledge and reality are also a becoming and so is objectivity, etc". 109

He further writes:

Natural science should be seen correspondingly as essentially an historical category, a human relation ------ Might it not be said in a sense, and up to a certain point, that what nature provides the opportunity for are not discoveries and inventions of pre­existing forces - of pre-existing qualities of matter - but creations which are closely linked to the interests of society and to the development and further necessities of development ofthe forces ofproduction". 110

Thus, Marxian notion of constructed reality and socially contingent nature of

science gave rise to different approaches in sociology of science like conflict model,

106 Bukharin, N., 'Theory and Practice from the stand point of dialectical materialism" in Science at the Cross Rood, Kniga, London, 1931, p.26,

107 Ibid., p. 22. 108 Ibid., p. 24. 109 Gramsci, A. Selections from the prison note books of Antonio Gramsci, (I 929-35), London 1971,

p.446. 110 Ibid., p.4 65-66.

27

Page 29: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

interest model and constructivist approach etc. In fact,Marxism is at the root of most of

what is innovative about science studies in relationship to traditional history,

philosophy, and sociology of science.

Conflict Theory:

Conflict theory builds an explanation of science on the established foundation

of stratification and organisation theory in general sociology. According to Collins,

from the perspective of conflict theory, scientific activity is analysed in terms of four

basic types of social roles: political, practical, leisure - entertainment, and teaching.

The main activity of scientists in political role is, "defending the legitimacy of their

organisation and attacking the legitimacy of con{petitors" 111• In practical roles,

scientists "work to achieve some practical result for a customer client, or boss. There

are two main types of leisure - entertainment roles. In one, scientists who belong to a

leisure class carry out scientific work for their own amusement; in the other, they are

paid for entertaining patrons or a mass market. Teachers, finally, are involved in

communicating scientific knowledge to specialised full time students. This always

involves some degree of accumulating, assessing, and reorganising the contributions of

their predecessors.

According to Joseph Ben - David, teaching institutions have played a crucial

role in the development of science. Scientific activity based on practical, political, or

leisure- entertainment roles is relatively ephemeral. Ben-David argued: "The Europear1

scientific revolution was concretised and sustained by the rise of autonomous teaching

institutions, notably in France and Germar~y during the eighteenth and nineteenth

centuries". ll2 The conditions for the development of a relatively autonomous and

generationally continuous science include a sizeable arid relatively autonomous

educational system. Thus, the size, autonomy, and additionally the degree of internal

differentiation of educational systems are key factors in the emergence of scientific

golden ages and traditions.

111 Collins, Randall, Conflict Sociology, Academic Press, New York, 1975, p.482. 112 Ben-David, Joseph, The Scientist's Role in Society: A Comparative Study, Printice-Hall, New Jersey,

1971, pp.71-87.

28

Page 30: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

According to Collins, "information, validation, and recognition and material

resources are the bases of power in the division of labour in science. The validation of

scientist contributions and peer recognition integrate the individual scientist with his or

her community and simultaneously give the community power over individual

scientists. Material resources that sustain the community are provided, in general, by

the wider social system". 113 Collins and Restivo have added new dimension to the

conflict theory of science. They have focussed on the scandals in the history of

mathematics and have suggested that major scandals indicate shift in the social

organisation of competition and production in science. 114

Interest Model

Modern approach beginnings in the late 1960, and early 1970 included efforts to

show that scientific knowledge is fueled by social interests. The 'interest model' is

widely associated with the writings of Barry Barnes, David Bloor, and their Edinburgh

colleagues. Barnes argued that behaviour must be understood "in terms of its point, i.e.

by the use of such notions as 'goal' or 'interest' and that in general, the dynamics of

institutions must be understood by reference to interests".' :s

•.. Knorr-Cetina, who favours a 'constructionist' approach as opposed to an

"interest" model, nonetheless, notes "that knowledge of the interests that inform

scientists' theoretical preferences can supplement a constructionist analysis by showing

why it is likely that particular individuals hold particular beliefs" .116 The interest theory

is viewed as a process of imputation of interests. However, Latour had denied the

possibility of imputing interests to social groups, because "there is no independent

source of knowledge about the groups, society or even human beings". 117 But Latour

distanced himself from this dispute and argued that interests are a consequence and not

a cause of the scientists' efforts to translate what others want or what the scientist

113 Collins, Randall, Conflict Sociology op.cit., p.491. 114 Collins, Randall & Retivo, Sal. "Robber barons and politicians in mathematics: A conflict model of

science" The Canadian Journal of Sociology, 8, 1983, pp. 199-227. 115 Barnes, Barry, About Science, Blackwell, Oxford, 1985. p. 31. 116 Knorr-Cetina, Karin, The Manufacture of Knowledge: A Essay on the constructivist and Contextual

nature of science, Pergamon, Oxford, 1981, p.II7. 117 Latour, Bruno, "Give me a laboratory and I will raise the world" in Knorr-Cetina, K. and Mulkay,

M.( eds ), Science Observed, Sage, London, 1983, pp. 141-170.

29

Page 31: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

makes them want. This concept of 'capturing' interest means that "by pushing the

explicit interest' of audiences and allies, the scientist furthers his or her own

interest". 118 Social interests are expressed in the claims individuals make on cultural

resources on behalf of the groups they represent, are members of or aspire to

membership in or association with. Other prominent theory in social studies of science

is constructivist.

Social Constructivist Perspective

This idea of Social construction is fundamental to sociological analysis. Its

application in modern science studies has drawn attention to the moment to moment

activities of scientists as they go about producing and reproducing scientific culture.

Constructivist holds reality not to be given but constructed; it sees the whole as

assembled, the uniform as heterogeneous, the smooth and even surfaced as covering an

internal structure. Constructivists emphasise on the relativity of scientific truth and

advocate for a sociological analysis of technical content and thereby attempt to open

the black box of scientific knowledge construction. David Bloor challenged the

exclusion of sociologists from studying how 'true' scientific knowledge is produced.

Bloor formulated four key requirements for a 'strong programme' which would take

sociological study beyond the rationalist view of how scientific knowledge is

generated: 119

(a) Causality- The aim of the sociology of scientific knowledge is to discern which

conditions bring about beliefs or states of knowledge. Bloor noted that these

condition could be psychological, economic, political or historical as well as social.

(b) Impartiality- The sociology of scientific knowledge should not select instances for

study with respect to their perceived truth or falsity, rationality or irrationality,

success or failures. These determinations are the upshot of social process and

therefore part of phenomenon to be studied.

118 Latour, Bruno, Science in Action: How to follow Scientists and Engineer through Society, Harvard Uni. Press, Cambridge, 1987, p. 110.

119 Bloor, D. Knowledge and Socia/ Imagery, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1976, pp.4-5.

30

Page 32: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

(c) Symmetry- Similarly, once instances of scientific knowledge have been chosen for

study, the sociologist should use the same types of cause in explaining instances of

scientific knowledge, whether they are classified as false or true, etc.

(d) Reflexivity - In principle, the patterns of explanation of sociology of scientific

knowledge have to be applicable to sociology itself.

According to these tenants, even mathematical statement such as 2+ 2 =4 could

be subjected to sociological inquiry. In this context the inquiry would be related to what

kinds of historical conditions gave this expression currency and, in particular what

established (and now sustains) it as a belief? However, many authors have expressed

doubt over the application of these principles in actual practices. 120 As a consequence

many sub approaches within constructivist perspective developed.

Andrew Pickering continued the tradition of 'strong programme'. In his study

entitled: "Constructing Quarks: A sociological history of particle physics", 121 he argued

that the relation between theory and experimental data is one of 'tuning' or 'symbiosis'

rather than the independent verification of theory by means of fact:

The empirical relativist programme, a version of constructive programme has

developed in close association with 'strong programme'. It is also known as the Bath

School because H.M. Collins and his students at the University of Bath are the major

contributors. 122 Their studies tend to focus on contemporary scientific controversies,

and they attempt to give symmetrical descriptions of the incommensurable positions,

theory- laden experimental practices, and non-rational (or extra-rational) methods for

reaching closure on the disputed matters.

120 Larry Laudan argues that on some points the relationship between the principles and the research is very doubtful, (See, Laudan, Larry, "The Pseudo - Science of Science?", Philosophy of Social Sciences, vol.ll, 1981, pp.173-98). To an extent Bloor himself agrees that the principles are not intended to provide the basis for the "strength' of the program. (See, Bloor, David, 'The strength of the strong programme in the sociology of knowledge'. Philosophy of the social sciences, II, 1986, p.206).

121 Pickering, Andrew, Constructing Quarks: A Sociological History of Particle Physics, Uni. of Chicago, Press Chicago, 1984.

i27 for the Bath perspective See, Collins, H.M. Changing order: Replication and lndu;tion in Scientific

Practice, Sage Pub., London, 1985; Pinch, Trevor, Confronting Nature: The Sociology of Solar Neutrino Detection, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1986.

31

Page 33: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

Constructionist ideas were re-invented in studies of laboratories. There are five

major works on laboratory studies displaying many view-points and approaches in

science studies. Latour's and Woolgar's Laboratory life123 has evolved, in Latour's

collaboration with Michael Callon124 into a semiotically inspired 'actor network'

approach. Knorr-Cetina presents, in The Manufacture of Knowledge 125 a constructivist

approach oriented toward the sociology of knowledge that is extended into a model of

'epistemic culture'. Michael Lynch's work on Art and Artefact in Laboratory Science 126

can stand for the ethno-methodological orientation and Traweek's study of Beamtimes

and life times 127 represents the analysis of a symbolic anthropologist who enters the

world of high energy physicist.

These laboratory studies focus to observe the creation of knowledge at the

work-bench, in notebooks, in scientific shop talks and in the writings of scientific

papers. One of their main conclusions is that nothing epistemologically special is

happening in the process of scientific research. However, constructivist approaches

have been severally criticised. As Latour and Woolgar claimed that scientific reality is

constituted by " the process of inquiry, that, it is a consequence rather than a cause of

scientific description" .128 These claims are frequently objected to on the ground that

they suggest that material objects are snapped into existence through the accounts

produced by science. Many authors find this view "widely implausible". 129

According to Trevor Pinch, "laboratory studies or (social constructivism) are

well suited for the micro-study of scientists', day-to-day practices, but are limited when

it comes to the study of consensus formation" .130 Many other scholars like Chubin has

123 Latour, Bruno, & Woolgar, Steve, Laboratory life: The Social Construction of Social Facts, Sage, Beverly Hill, 1979.

124 Calion, Michel, "The sociology of an actor-network: The case of the electric vehicle" in Calion, M., Law, John & Rip, Arie (eds). Mapping the dynamics of Science and Technology. Macmillan, U.K., 1986, pp. I 9-34.

125 Knorr-Cetina, Karin, The Manufacture of Knowledge: An Essay on the Constructivist and Contextual Nature of Science, Pergamon, Oxford, 198 I.

126 Lynch, Machael, Art and Artifact in Laboratory Science: A Study of Shop Work and Shop Talk in a Research Laboratory, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1985.

127 Traweek, Sharon, Beamtimes and lifetimes: The World of High Energy Physicists, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1988.

128 Latour, B & Woolgar's I 979, op.cit., pp. I80-81. 129 Giere, Ron, Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach, Chicago Univ. Press, Chicago, 1988, p.55. 130 Pinch, Trevor, Confronting Nature: The Sociology of Neutrino detection, 1986, op.cit., p.30.

32

Page 34: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

found that these studies have focussed "only on the intra-mural life world encountered

in laboratories but have ignored the societal context in which laboratories operate as

well as political aspects of science" .131

New developments in cognitive science openly challenge the 'strong

programme' in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK). Slezak argued: "The

computer programme being developed within cognitive science which can be used to

discover laws from raw data are examples of socially uncontaminated influences that

comprise a large class of counter examples of strong programme" .132 He further

suggested that strong programme is inconsistent with much of the current cognitive

science and it has many affinities with the much-discredited doctrine of behaviourism.

He writes: "Just as behaviourism tries to establish connection between external stimuli

and human behaviour so the 'strong programme' tries to establish connections with

social contexts and the complex human behaviour that is involved in science (behaviour

involved in scientific belief)". 133

Besides these criticisms, according to Sismondo, 134 the term 'social ..

construction' has been used in different meanings by various authors. These multiple

meanings create confusions and complexities to understand the real focus of this

perspective. Gad Freudenthal 135 strongly criticises the constructivist programme in

sociology of science. Freudenthal examines the text of Knorr-Cetina and found that she

has failed to recognise the role of "shared knowledge" which are very much prevalent

at core of any scientific research. He critically examines the basic premise of

contructivism as follows.

Knorr-Cetina holds that scientific knowledge is the outcome of negotiation

between interested parties, the contingent product of a social process of construction.

She suggested that every social agent interprets the situation in which she/he finds

herself/himself. This interpretation which is idiosyncratic and contingents for the

131 Chubin, Dry!, 'The Elusive Second "S" in "STS": Who's Who?", Technoscince, 1992, pp.l2-13. 132 Slezak, Peter, "Scientific Discovery by Computer as Empirical Refutation of the Strong Programme",

Social Studies ofScience, vol. 21, 1991, pp. 107-129. 133 Ibid., p.l12. 134 Sismondo, Sergio "Some Social construction", Social Studies ofScience, vol.23, 1993, pp.514-53. 135 Freudenthal, Gad, "The Role of Shared Knowledge in Science: The failure of the constructivist

programme in the sociology of science", Social Studies ofScience vol./4, 1985, pp.285-95 .

. 33

Page 35: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

'same' situation will have different meanmgs to different agents who will,

consequently, act differently. Similarly, a scientific action will depend on how the

scientist interprets the research context in the laboratory so that strictly speaking, there o

can not be two scientists working in an identical situation. According to the

constructivist thesis, the itinerary from the initial open situation to the final scientific

product (a material object, a scientific paper), is plastered with a series of selection, or

choices, which the scientist constantly requires to make. Will s/he use substance 'A' or

'B', measuring method 'C' or '0', and so on. These selections depend on an opportunistic

logic, the logic of a tinkerer', a scientists' next step will depend on the resources

accessible to her/him. S/he may choose to use substance 'A' not because it is better

adopted to some pre-determined purpose, but because 'B' is out of stock or too

expensive. S/he may use apparatus 'C' because access to 'D' is monopolised by

colleagues who set a high price (for example consigning a paper), for its use. The idea

for an experiment might come from a metaphor or an analogy casually uttered by

someone at lunch. The final product thus grows out of a series of contingent, often

accidental, selection of which depends on the material ·and social context of the

labourer.

Freudenthal finds contradiction at many points m her theory. For example

Knorr-Cetina writes: "scientific products are unlikely to be reproduced in the same way

under different circumstances. It seems highly improbable that the process (of

selection) could be repeated unless most of the selection are either fixed or made m

similar fashion". 136

However, the acceptance of the fact that, 'the selections are either fixed or made

in similar fashion' by different scientists in different contexts, would mean: first, that

these contexts are standards and not unique, and, second that they are then identically

interpreted by different actors. It seems that Knorr-Cetina has accepted the fact of

scientific consensus at behaviour level. She writes: "Given that scientists working on a

problem are related through communication, competition and co-operation, and often

share similar education, instrument, and interest structures, the later situation is not

really unusual". 137

136 Knorr-Cetina, Karin, The manufacture of knowledge, op.cit., p. 16.

137 lb'd I ., p.J7.

34

Page 36: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

According to Freudenthal, the main inadequacies of constructivism stem from

one fundamental conception. That is "the disregard of the systematic, trans-local and

inter-subjective aspects of scientific knowledge. The fact that Knorr- Cetina over looks

the role of shared information in her own model of science in which the existence of

such information is an essential premise· ". 138 This theory does not satisfactorily explain

the phenomena of recurrence of simultaneous discoveries and frequent rejection of

knowledge claims.

Many studies 139 made within the framework of social constructivism have tried

to show that scientific knowledge is socially constructed through the social actions of

scientists. However, if the contention of the constructivist scholars is to show that all

science is constructed, through the social actions of scientists, surely, the same criticism

can be applied to their own sociological reports. According to Chris Doran, 140 this

problem of reflexivity has polarized those working within the framework of

constructivism. The 'strong programme' in the sociology of science still adheres to the

beliefs that causal explanations are possible within this new field. 141 However, the

'reflexive' faction strongly decries such an approach, claiming that such causal

explanations are impossible. Explanations in terms of 'interests' are mere analytical

constructions, which create a certain order out of an otherwise disorderly array of

phenomena. 142 Thus, there are paradoxes on the 'reflexive programme' versus the

'strong programme'. Doran has shown that Mulkay and Woolgar argument for the

primacy of the 'reflexive programme' is paradoxical in ways similar to the 'strong

programme's paradoxes. 143

138 Freudenthal, Gad, "The Role of Shared Knowledge in Science: The failure of the Constructivist Programme in the Sociology of Science", op.cit., p.293.

139 See, Gilbert G, and Mulkay M, Opening Pandoras Box, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1984; Brannigan, A. The Social Basis of Scientific Discoveries, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1981; Mackenzie, D. "Statistical Theory and Social Interests: A Case Study", Social studies of Science, vol.8, 1978, pp.35-83.

140 Doran, Chris, "Jumping Frames: Reflexivity and Recursion in the Sociology of Science", Social Studies of Science, vol.l5, 1985, 515-31.

141 See, Barnes, B. Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1974: See also, Bloor, D. Knowledge and Social imagery, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1976.

142 For a discussion of these issues from the standpoint of the 'reflexive programme' See, Woolgar, S. "Interest and Explanation in the Social Study of Science" Social Studies of Science, vol. II, 1981, pp.365-94. • --

143 Doran, Chris. "Jumping Frames: Reflexivity and Recursion in the Sociology of Science", 1985, op.cit., p.257.

35

Page 37: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

Social constructive perspective seems less promising m the sense that

sociologists and scientists come from different background and experience, and hence

there can not be, what Gadamer called, the 'fusion of horizon'. Constructivist failed to

recognise that scientific research is not an atomised, and isolated activity, but is

inserted in and structured by a variety of non-local elements (universal).

Hagendijk144 has directed his criticism to a version of constructivism that he 0

attributed to Latour. His criticism is based on a view of science as part of a culturally

created ways of establishing facts that he believes constructivisim has undermined. He

draws on Anthony Giddens, structuration theory 145 as an alternative to constructivism.

Accordingly, science is considered to be generated by norms and rules. Science as an

institution is theorised to be dependent for its reproduction on configurations of various

types of rules and resources. Hagendijk criticises Merton for his normative bias but

ends up defending a quasi-Mertonian view of science in which traditional dichotomies

of cognitive-social, thoughts -institution, and natural-social are resurrected.

In fac~Anthony Giddens introduced the theory of structuration as an alternative

to functionalism, Marxism, structuralism, phenomenology, portion of traditional

symbolic interactionism. He tried to eliminate the shortcomings of these perspectives.

Giddens argued: "functional analysis tends to ignore the active processes of agents in

interaction and over emphasise~ social structure as constraints. The process of

structuration is intended to emphasise that the individual-society, subject -object and

micro-macro dichotomies do not constitute a dualism, but a 'duality'. That is people in

interaction use the rules and resources that constitute social structure in their day-to-day

routines in the context of co-presence, and in so doing, they reproduce these rules and

resources of structures. Thus, individual action, interaction, and social structure are all

implicated in each other. They do not constitute separate realities, but a 'duality' within

the same reality. 'The structural properties of social system are both the medium and

the outcome of the practices that constitute those systems" .146

144 Hagendijk, Rob, "Structuration Theory, Constructivism and Scientific Change". In Cozzens, S and Gieryn, T (eds.), Theories ofScience in Society, Indiana Uni. press, Blomington, I990, pp. 43-45.

145 For detail analysis see, Giddens, Anthony, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration, Polity Press, Oxford, I 984: See also, Giddens, Anthony, Central Problems in Social Theory, Macmillan, Press, London, 1979.

146 Gidden, Anthony, Central Problem in Social Theory, 1979, p.69.

36

Page 38: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

Hence, one can not understand action and interaction among scientists without

reference to the rules and resources of social structure (normative dimension of

science). Similarly one cannot fully understand large-scale, long-term institutional

structures (science) without knowledge of how actors use the rules and resources of

these institutional structures in concrete action. The actor-network approach, associated

with Calion, 147 Latour, 148 and Law149 is a novel and innovative supplement in sociology

to symbolic interactions and, to a lesser extent, functionalist approach. This is used to

describe socio-technical ensembles as heterogeneous networks of human and non­

human actors. This approach is used to analyse how an ordering of society is brought

about by reshuffling and transforming machines, institutions, and actors. The power of

actors (such as industrialists, elite scientists, or politicians) does not consist of some

thing inherently special in those individuals or institutions but originates from the

network they control. Elite scientists networks have both an "inside", which looks like

'pure science' and an 'outside' where these other actors appear on actor networks. By

"following the actors" we see interactive adjustments among scientists and government

officials leading to the very formulation of scientific knowledge.

Constructivist theory poses its strongest challenge to the naturalistic view of

science by raising the basic question whether scientific knowledge is 'found' or 'made'.

However, This question could not be tackled in isolation because scientific knowledge

have both the characters. According to Ziman, scientific knowledge is 'found' in the

sense "that 'naturalist' gives great weight to the empirical findings of research and very

elaborate technical and social procedures are used to check, counter-check, replicate or

otherwise authenticate these before they are accepted as facts". 150 Scientific knowledge

thus contains much that has been found. However, scientific knowledge is also made.

Roth and Barrett argued: "Science in its striving for universality requires the

formulation of theories. For this, very elaborate technical and social practices are

147 Calion, Michel, "The Sociology of an actor-network: The case of the electric vehicle". In Calion, M, Law, John & Rip, Arie (eds). Mapping the Dynamics of Science and Technology, Macmillan, UK, 1986, pp. 19-34.

148 Latour, Bruno., Science in Action: How to follow scientist and Engineers through society, op.cit., 1987.

149 Law, John (ed.), Power. Action and Belief A new Sociology of knowledge? Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1986.

150 Ziman, John, Real Science what it is, and what it means, Cambridge Uni. Press, Cambridge, 2000, p.235.

37

Page 39: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

employed in testing and criticising these before they are accepted communally as

reliable law. Scientific knowledge thus contain much that has been made" .151 Thus, it

can be assumed that scientific knowledge is both found and made. Having analysed

various theoretical prospectivesin sociology of science, a brief analysis of some relevant

studies in Indian con,text have been undertaken in order to make the problem of present

study more clear and relevant.

Studies in Indian Context

In the Indian context as observed by Aurora and Kumar, 152 sociologists have so

far paid scant attention to the sociology of science, which holds true to a large extent

even today. There are very few systematic studies on Indian scientific community

linking them with the internal normative dimensions and cultural context of science.

Indian culture has been shown to be incompatible with the values of modern science. 153

Ashok Parthasarthy 154 (1969a) observed the effect that interaction between local

Indian culture and International science had on science organisation and research

behaivour. He claims that this saps local scientists' self-confidence negatively and

affects their capacity for independent thought, and injects a 'caste system' in science

(based on overseas versus local education) into the local community. In another paper

Parthasarthy ( 1969b) argued: "traditional cultural forms have subsumed international

science. The value system and culture of science have proved to be inadequately robust

while the 'archaic' social structure has proved maddeningly resilient. Indeed, Indian

society has demonstrated time and again its inexhaustible capacity to dilute and devour

the most potent of injected culture" .155

151 Roth, P & Barrett, R. "Deconstructing Quarks", Social Studies ofScience, vol. 20, 1990, pp. 579-646. 152 Aurora, G.S. and Kumar, N. "Sociology of Science" in Survey of Research in Sociology and Social

Anthropology, 1969-79, ICSSR. Satvahan Pub, New Delhi, Voi.II, 1985, pp.169-208. 153 See, Rahman, A. "Scientist in India: The impact of Economic Policies and Social Perspective",

International Social Science Journal. Vol.22, 1970, pp.54-74. 154 Parthasarthy, Ashok, "Sociology of Science in Developing Countries: The Indian Experience",

Economic and Political Weekly, IV, (31), 2 August, 1969, pp.1277-80. 155 Parthasarthy, Ashok, "Sociology of Science in Developing Countries- Indian Experience- a Sequel",

Economic and Political Weekly, IV, 31, 23 August, 1969, pp.1387-1389.

38

Page 40: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

The study conducted by Professor Haribabu, 156 reveals valuable insight into the

internal dynamics of scientific community. He focuses on 'the system of peer (•

evaluation' in Indian science within the socio-cultural context of science in the country

and its historical interaction with international (Western) science. Prof. Haribabu's

study is located in the interactional approach which was one of the earliest attempts at

theorising in the western sociology of science, which for long constituted a dominant

'paradigm', as distinct from the Marxist 'paradigm' which was the most influential

among 'extemalist' approaches.

He explored evaluation pattern among a group of scientists working in I.I.Sc.

Bangalore. He found that 'peer review' system in Indian science is very weak. He

identified four main factors affecting 'peer review' system prominently: 157 (i) "scarcity

of peers in research areas, (ii) lack of professionalism and rigour; (iii) a preference for

seniors as status judges; and (iv) scientists' association with governmental works". This

study is a very important study as it reveals serious lacuna in the functioning of

scientific community in India. These factors need to be explored in different

organisational contexts like in a national governmental laboratory and in an academic

autonomous institution located in different regions. Moreover, difference should be also

made between evaluation of a research project for grant and evaluation of a scientific

claim made in a research paper. In this context the role of normative dimensions of

science could be examined. However, in the modem time economic importance of

scientific research is increasing, as a consequence the nature of scientific research is

undergoing drastic changes. It is a very important issue in sociology of science. In fact,

professor Haribabu in his latest study has focussed on this issue. His study is very much

in line with the emerging trend in social studies of science, particularly which focuses

on 'new mode of knowledge production'. 158 On the basis of his research on the

community of researcher in modem biology and bio-technology he has shown

that the context of production of scientific knowledge, its organisation and associated

156 Haribabu, E., 'A Large Community But Few Peers: A Study of the Scientific Community in India", Sociological Bulletin, 40(1&2), March-September 1991, pp.77-88.

157 Ibid., p.82. 158 Gibbons ... et. al., have suggested that 'new mode of knowledge production' have arisen 'in the

context of application' that is, in the course of research on technological, environmental, medical or :;ocietal problems. See Gibbons, M., Limoges, C., Nowotny, H .... et.al., The Production of Knowledge, The Dynamics of Science and Research in Contemporary Societies, Sage Pub., London, 1994.

39

Page 41: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

values are changing. His study 159 shows that "in India a shift in cognitive value from

'knowing for its own sake' to 'knowing with an eye on patent' is discernible. Prof.

Haribabu has highlighted on a very significant pattern of change in the nature of

scientific research. He has indicated that two distinct cultures of science-academic

research and applied research - have begun to merge. He stated: "Economic interests

are increasingly influencing research so much so that basic research in molecular

biology is shaped by potential applications". 160 He further writes: "In strategic research

both basic researchers and applied researchers net work to find out solution to

problem" .161 This is a good study showing the anxiety and apprehensions of individual

scientist in the process of production of scientific knowledge. However there is need to

study how this new trend will affect normative structure of science and community of

scientists.

Radhika Ramasubhan in her study 162 has suggested that a Marxian sociology of

science is most relevant for the study of science in India and vehemently criticised the

functionalist sociology of science. She asserted: "It is not hard to understand why the

functionalist sociology of Science is an unreal analytical framework within which to

analyse Indian science. It is only the Marxian sociology of science with its historical

perspective and relating science to its economic basis, which provides the necessary

insights into the functioning of science as a social activity". 163

Many scholars have shown that social and economic factors shape the

production of scientific knowledge. However, the analysis of science, as Pro~. Haribabu

argued, in "Marxist tradition does not provide concepts to understand the practice of

science at the micro level, meanings underlying, motivations of scientists, local

contingencies and culture in the process of production of scientific knowledge". 164

159 Haribabu, E. "Scientific Knowledge in India: From Public Resource to Intellectual Property", Sociological Bulletin, 48( I &2) March- Sept. 1999, pp.217-233. (The study is based on Research. Project entitled: Community of Rice Researchers in India; A study of National Rice Biotechnology Network, funded by the Rockfeller Foundation, New York, 1998-99 (no. Rf. 9700/95 dt. 15.12.97).

160 Ibid .. p.221. 161 Ibid., p.227. 162 Ramasubhan, Radhika, "Towards a Relevant Sociology of Science for India", in Blume, Stuart S.

(ed) Perspectives in the Sociology of Science, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1977, pp.155- I 93.

:~1 Ibid., p.l88.

164 Haribabu, E. "Scientific knowledge in India: From Public Resources to Intellectual Property", 1999, op.cit., p. 220.

40

Page 42: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

JPS Uberai's165 work on science and culture is a very important work (although

philosophical in orientation) in the theoretical sociology of science. Uberai advocates

for semiological method for science in place of positivist method of science. He argued:

"the foundation of positivist method is based on mutually exclusive division between

the truth and the reality. It rejects all relations of a higher transcendental, immanent or

dialectical unity, of mutual participations or of reciprocal dependence between the truth

and the reality". 166

Whereas, "semiological science deals with the truth, order and sense of the

universe or of some select segment of it, viewed as a system of signs and relations; an

individual sign is being treated as both a fact and a value, objective and subjective at

one and the same time. Semiological method will seek to understand things and events

in terms of the whole and the part rather than in terms of the cause and the effect or in

terms of factors and correlation, or in terms of the ends and the means". 167 However,

Uberai accepted the fact that recognition of the value of the subject in scientific

epistemology will be questionable. He writes:

"It is true that recognition of the value of the subject in scientific epistemology

would ent;il an answer to the question as to whether or individual human beings

inhabit distinct world, and if so then what is the relation between them? We can only

give the answer, that although all human beings are in some way equal, unique and

incommensurable, yet their respective world views and life-worlds, both individual

and collective, are somehow also inter-communicable and interconvertible and

together make up the universe of human discourse that we call life and

knowledge" .168

If we accept the views of JPS Uerai then public character of science becomes

very clear. There is a consensus among scientists (researchers) over existence of some

sort of order and uniformity. An idea may come to mind of an individual scientist,

however until it is being inter-communicated with other scientists and agreed by them,

165 Uberai, J.P.S., Science and Culture, Oxford. Uni. Press, Delhi, 1988. 166 Ibid., p.l9. 167 Ibid., p.20. 168 Ibid., p.38.

41

Page 43: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

it is not scientific. Thus science IS, as Ziman argued, 169 consensus and public

knowledge.

According to Uberai, a semiological logic adoptsthe sacraments as a model to

apply to and among all fields and so have come to view the entire universe as the

meaningful and effective sign of God. The symbols always mediated between the fact

and the value in human life and thought, in just the same way that one says the word

mediates and brings in relation the thought and deeds. 170 Thus, God, man and the world

could be still united in theoretical belief and faith. Uberai says that "once God is

disappeared as a symbol of mediator between man and nature (world), the nature

became a fatherless child to be discovered, protected or exploited by man for his own

ends". 171 For this Goethe, called the positivist science as the 'empirico-mechanico­

dogmatic torture chamber of nature '. 172 Hence, Uberai emphasised that new approach

towards science should emphasise the mutual participation of such apparently different

things according to the principle of unity of variety, whether in cosmology, ontology or

. l " 173 episterna ogy .

Shiv Visvanathan's 174 study of scientists in National Physical Laboratory, New

Delhi is a basic study of scientists and their laboratory life. However, his study is

confined to the debate between basic research versus applied research and he traced the

history of how the nature of research in NPL has undergone changes from academic

science to industrial science. He seems to be emphasising the role of basic science over

applied science, but did not explain the reasons for such a feeling among scientists. He

studied political, economic factors and individual charismatic leadership but did not

correlate it with the normative structure of science. Moreover, while talking about

applied research he did not take into account the community life of scientists and their

cultural orientation that guide the basic world view of the scientists.

169 Ziman, J., Public Knowledge, op.cit., p.5. 170 Uberai, JPS, Science and Culture, op.cit., p.41. 171 Ibid., p.41. 172 Ibid., p.69. 173 Ibid., 85. 174 Vishvanathan, Shiv. Organisation for Science: The Making of an Industrial Research Laboratory,

Oxford University Press, New Delhi, I 985.

42

Page 44: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

V.V. Krishna's 175 work on scientists in laboratories is an important study in

sociology of science delving into the dynamics of cultural and social context of science

from a cross-cultural perspective. He studied two laboratories - Central Food

Technology Research Institute (CSIR. India) and Food Research Laboratory (CSIRO,

Australia). Both these laboratories have similar historical origin and organisational

structures besides being involved in similar research area i.e. Food Technology

Research. Though it was a bold attempt in linking the goal orientation of scientists to

their political and social context it has overlooked the distinction between ideal and

practical aspects. That is, normative structure of science that determines the goal

orientation of scientists and their application in actual practice. Another obvious

limitation of this study is that it has not taken into account the contextual differences

which exist between a bureaucratic government laboratory and autonomous academic

organisation.

Another study by Robert Anderson176 ofTata Institute of Fundamental Research

(TIFR), Bombay and Saha Institute of Nuclear Science (SINS), Calcutta deals only

with the role of leadership for effective research. Anderson has highlighted on how

charismatic leadership of Homi J. Bhaba of TIFR and Meghnad Saha of SINS and their

friendly connection with the political elite of the country helped to grow these

institutions. His sole emphasis has been on exploring the role of effective leadership

and their style of working on scientific research.

The Present Study:

The present study is concerned with the normative dimensions, community life

and cultural orientation of scientists in two scientific institutions. It has become clear

from the above discussion that many theoretical approaches (developed in sociology of

science - like functionalist, Marxian, conflict modd, interest model, and constructivism

etc) treated science segmentally. Functionalist perspective focused only on internal

normative structure of science, Marxian and its subsidiaries, conflict and interest model

175 Krishna, V.V. Scientists in Laboratories: A Comparative Study on the Organization of Science and Goal Orientation of Scientist in CSJRO, (Australia) and CSIR (India) Institution (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis) Deptt of Sociology, The University ofWollongong, Australia, 1987.

m Anderson, Robert S. The Life of Scientists in India: A Comparative Ethnography of Two Research Institutes. (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Microfilmed), Deptt. of Anthropology, University of Chicago, 1971.

43

Page 45: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

have concentrated on 'external factors' shaping the course of development of science.

However they failed to recognize that science as a social institution has its own internal

rules and dynamics. Similarly constructivist framework (which encompasses many sub­

approaches like strong programme, empirical relativist approach, lab studies, and

ethno-fnethodological studies etc.) failed to recognise that scientific research is not

atomised, segmented and isolated activity but is an integrated, holistic activity

structured by a variety of universal elements. Nonetheless these studies provide very

valuable insight into the functioning of science as a social institution. These approaches

explored into the content of scientific knowledge and did not grant any special/distinct

epistemological status to science. However, this attempt of de-mythologizing of science

need to be cautioned. Nonetheless, post Mertonian studies have come as a positive

challenge to one side vision of science. Although Mertonian perspective has anticipated

virtually all the criticism and empirical alternative to its programme that emerged from

several ethnographic and ethno-methodological studies, it required to incorporate new

elements in its framework as indicated by these studies.

Since no single approach is adequate to fully understand the complex nature of

science and its relation with society, some kind of hybrid theoretical construct is needed

to understand the normative dimensions of science and community life of scientists and

their cultural orientations. Moreover, the goal orientations of scientists are determined

by the organisational and socio-political and cultural context in which they are situated.

These 'external factors' influence the community of scientists in formulation and

construction of scientific problems. However, science as a social system has it own

internal rules and dynamics. Hence, 'functionalist-constructionist.! 77 hybrid theoretical

model could be subscribed to integrate communities of scientists with internal

noq:native dimensionsof science as well as with the external domain of culture. (- used

in a broad sense including social, economic and political contexts). It is assumed that

177 Some recent studies have developed 'functionalist- constructionist hybrid' model that have retained many aspects of mertonian approach to the study of science. This perspective preserves the functionalist form of argument without a positivistic commitment to verification, replication through crucial tests and the like. The arguments are concerned with the way that funding, state imperatives, and other "broadly social" agendas influence the local sites of scientific practice. See Gieryn, Thoman, "Boundary work and demarcation of science from non-science" ISIS, 79, 1988, pp.582-93; See, also Cozzens, Susan and Gieryn, Thoman (eds), Theories of Science in Society, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1990; Mukherji, Chanda, A Fragil Power: Scientists and the State, Princeton Uni. Press, Princeton, 1989.

44

Page 46: Concepts and Theories: Scientific Knowledge and ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/29319/7/07_chapter 1.pdf · Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge: Scientific knowledge

the border between these two domains is porous in order to facilitate continuous

interactions. The present study is located in the space defined by these two major

perspectives in sociology of science.

Conclusion:

In this chapter the theories and concepts related to scientific knowledge have

been explained with the help of contemporary sociological theories. An attempt has

been made to study the nature of scientific knowledge and its internal dynamics by

highlighting the debate between Kuhn, & Popper and other thinkers. As part of

literature review in sociology of science different perspectives like, functionalist

Marxian perspective, conflict model, interest model, and constructivist approaches have

been critically evaluated for selecting a suitable theoretical construct for the present

study. In Indian context-important works, like the work of Ashok Parthasharthy, E.

Haribabu, Shiv Visvanathan, V.V. Krishna, Robert Anderson, Radhika Ramasubhan

and J.P.S. Uberai have been examined in order to chalk out the unique character and

need for the present study. The next chapter deals with the methodology.

45