complaint - adversary proceeding

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURTEastern District of New York

IN THE MATTER OF: )Elena Svenson )

Debtor. )______________________________ )Michael Krichevsky ) CHAPTER 7 CASE NO. 1-12-43050-ess

Plaintiff/Creditor, )vs. ) Adversary Proceeding No.

)Elena Svenson )

Defendant/Debtor ) COMPLAINT BOARD OF MANAGERS OF OCEANA ) CONDOMINIUM NO. TWO, INTERNAL ) REVENUE SERVICE, INC )

Defendants/Creditors, ) JURY TRIAL DEMANDEDVictoria Edelstein, DDS; Boris Kotlyar, )COOPER SQUARE REALTY, INC; Lana )Kaplun personally, Farid Badalov personally)Boris Meydid personally, John Doe and Jane)Johns personally (fictitious names to be )discovered) )

Defendants. ) )

Plaintiff, Pro Se for his Complaint, respectfully alleges upon his firsthand knowledge, except where it

stated upon information and belief, or where it stated that he verily believes it to be true:

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. The plaintiff, Michael Krichevsky, at all times herein mentioned was and still is a resident of the

County of Kings and the State of New York.

2. The defendant, Elena Svenson, at all times herein mentioned was and still is a resident of the County

of Kings and the State of New York.

3. All other defendants did and are doing business and committed herein torts against plaintiff and his

property in the County of Kings and the State of New York.

4. Venue lies in this District pursuant to Section 1391(b) of Title 28 of the United States Code.

5. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to the provisions of Section 1334 of Title 28 of the

United Stated Code in that this proceeding arises in and is related to the above-captioned Chapter 7

case under Title 11 and concerns property of the Debtor, validity of liens and certain debts in that Krichevsky vs. Svenson (Bankruptcy Court) of 20

case.

6. This Court has both personal and subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case pursuant to Section

1334 of Title 28 of the United States Code, Section 157(b)(2) of Title 28 of the United States Code,

7. This Court has jurisdiction to hear matters in violation of Constitution of The United States.

8. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction to hear all state law claims pursuant to Section 1367 of

Title 28 of the United States Code.

9. This matter is primarily a core proceeding and therefore the Bankruptcy Court has jurisdiction to

enter a final order

FACTS COMMON TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION

10. On or about August 2000, Michael Krichevsky and Elena Svenson entered into a written

contract with developer to buy a condominium unit, known as and located at 120 Oceans,

Drive West, Apt. 5D, Brooklyn, NY 11235 as joint partners. The purchase price for the

subject premises was $420,000.00.

11. The contract implied and parties had agreed orally to equally share all costs and expenses

associated with the purchase.

12. Michael Krichevsky solely and completely provided the down payment in the amount of

$42,000.

13. At that time, Elena Svenson owned a cooperative unit located at 2580 Ocean Parkway,

Apt. 2M, Brooklyn, NY 11235. Elena Svenson represented that she was going to obtain a

home equity line of credit (hereinafter "HELOC") against her cooperative unit in order to

liquidate funds necessary for her to contribute her share of the purchase price of the

subject condominium unit.

14. Upon information and belief, Elena Svenson's HELOC application was denied right

before closing and closing took place without her contributing any money at closing,

which was delayed for that reason and took place on or about November 26, 2001

Krichevsky vs. Svenson (Bankruptcy Court) of 20

instead of September 26, 2001.

15. For the reason of delaying the closing, the seller charged buyers additional fees which

were paid by Krichevsky at closing.

16. On or about November 26, 2001, Michael Krichevsky and Elena Svenson became the owners in fee

of real property known as and located at 120 Oceana Drive West, Apt 5D, Brooklyn, NY by

purchasing the property from Brighton Two LLC.

17. On or about November 26, 2001, Michael Krichevsky and Elena Svenson each executed a first

mortgage on the subject property, in the amount of $378,000.00 held by JP Morgan Chase Bank.

18. Said premises were conveyed by deed dated November 26, 2001 and recorded on February 27, 2002,

Reel 5494, Page 2289.

19. The funds used to purchase the property were solely and completely contributed by the plaintiff,

Michael Krichevsky, which sums exceeded 55,000.00 including the down payment and closing

costs.

20. Before closing Elena Svenson promised to sell her cooperative and contribute money later.

21. On or about October of 2002, the cooperative unit was sold for approximately $180,000.

22. However, Elena Svenson failed to contribute any funds toward the purchase of the condominium.

23. Michael Krichevsky owns in fee no less than an undivided one half interest in said premises.

24. Despite the parties' prior agreement to share costs and expenses, all monthly carrying expenses

including mortgage payments, utility charges, taxes and maintenance fees were solely and

completely contributed by plaintiff, Michael Krichevsky.

25. Said monthly carrying expenses were approximately $3,600.00.

26. In addition, on or about December 2001, the parties commenced major renovations in the subject

condominium unit which included a rehabilitation of the bathroom, ceilings throughout, plumbing

throughout, and tiling throughout.

27. All costs and expenses associated with the renovations, totaling over $75,000 were paid solely and

completely by plaintiff Michael Krichevsky.


28. On or about July 2005, Michael Krichevsky and Elena Svenson tried to refinance their mortgage in

order to get a lower monthly payment.

29. Because Elena Svenson after graduation in 2003 did not find any job and did not pay her credit card

bills on time, her FICA score was low.

30. That fact made plaintiff’s score lower as well, which prevented him from refinancing.

31. As the party’s relationship began to deteriorate and at the advice of mortgage broker, Elena Svenson

entered into an agreement with plaintiff whereby she agreed to transfer her one-half interest in the

subject property to Plaintiff in order for him to be the sole borrower and owner, which would qualify

plaintiff for a higher FICA score.

32. Thereafter, on or about August 11, 2005, Michael Krichevsky and Elena Svenson refinanced their

mortgage and entered into a loan consolidation, extension and modification agreement whereby

Washington Mutual Bank, N.A. became the holder of a consolidated note in the amount of $565,000.

33. All monthly carrying expenses under the refinance agreement, including mortgage payments, utility

charges, taxes and maintenance fees, were solely and completely contributed by plaintiff, Michael

Krichevsky.

34. Said monthly carrying expenses were approximately $4,500,00.

35. Immediately after closing, closing agent told Krichevsky that transfer of Svenson’s share will cost

plaintiff approximately $50,000.00.

36. Immediately after closing, plaintiff learned from Svenson of an approximately $100,000 federal tax

lien on the property based on Elena Svenson's failure to pay her personal income taxes for the 2002

fiscal year.

37. Due to the §35 and §36 and at the advice of a certified public accountant, the transfer was held in

abeyance pending a resolution of Elena Svenson's tax obligations in an effort to avoid an appearance

of impropriety.

38. Svenson told plaintiff that there is some mistake with her 1099 form and she needs time to resolve it.

39. Plaintiff paid $1500 to the accountant hired by Svenson to settle this issue with IRS.


40. Upon information and belief, despite the passage of all these years, defendant Svenson never

contacted the Internal Revenue Service.

41. On or about December 2005, both Krichevsky and Svenson moved out of the subject premises and

entered into a one-year lease agreement with Victoria Edelstein at a monthly rent of $2,500. The

lease contained an option to renew for an additional three years at 3% annual increases.

42. At the termination of Edelstein’s one year term, Edelstein requested to remain as a month-to-month

tenant while she explored options to purchase her own residence.

43. Plaintiff and Defendant Svenson agreed and put up this apartment for sale. During this period,

Krichevsky showed the apartment to several potential purchasers.

44. On or about June 2008, Edelstein informed plaintiff that she was denied a request for a mortgage.

45. At that time, plaintiff had an interested purchaser for the subject premises, but Edelstein refused to

allow potential purchasers access to view the apartment..

46. As such, Michael Krichevsky informed Edelstein that he would not renew her lease.

47. Nonetheless, Edelstein refused to vacate.

48. Upon information and belief, between June of 2008 and November of 2009, there were at least three

(3) potential purchasers interested in the subject premises, all of whom were denied access by

Edelstein to view the apartment.

49. Upon information and belief, all three potential purchasers purchased different units in the same

condominium complex.

50. On or about August 2008, Krichevsky and Svenson commenced a summary holdover proceeding

against Edelstein in order to recover possession of the subject premises (Kings L&T Court Index

95633/08).

51. Parties’ intent was to sell the condominium unit upon recovery of possession.

52. During the pendency of the holdover proceeding, Edelstein alleged in open court that prior to

holdover preceding started, she and Boris Kotlyar, as tenants, had entered into a one year lease


agreement with Svenson, as landlord, commencing in October 2008 at a monthly rent of

approximately $2,825.00 per month.

53. Due to the events in paragraph 52, Plaintiff started litigation in Kings County Supreme Court action

bearing Index No 33343/2008 to protect plaintiff’s interests and force the sale of said condominium

to above mentioned buyer.

54. Said lease was fraudulently entered into without plaintiff's knowledge or consent.

55. Plaintiff in the possession of the evidence that said lease was backdated by Svenson, Edelstein and

Kotlyar.

56. Upon information and belief, said lease was signed on November 7, 2008, and not on September 29,

2008 as the lease states.

57. This conduct is criminal, constitutes perjury and fraud upon the court because it was created,

produced to plaintiff and entered into the court record by their attorney.

58. Accordingly, this lease is void, and plaintiff is asking this Hon. court to enter declaratory judgment

that it is indeed void.

59. Svenson informed plaintiff and he verily believes that since August 2008 until November 2009,

Svenson has collected and retained all rent monies received from Edelstin, which is approximately

$35,000.

60. Plaintiff was informed by board of managers of condominium and he verily believes that Svenson

never contributed any money towards maintenance fees of the condominium.

61. Upon information and belief Svenson never paid any tax from the above amount of money.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION AS AGAINST DEFENDANT SVENSON

Breach of contract and oral agreement

62. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation in paragraphs above with the same force

and effect as if fully set forth at length herein.

63. Svenson's failure to contribute to purchase of this property and pay any carrying costs and expenses


associated with the subject condominium unit constitute a breach of the parties' contract and oral

agreement to equally share all costs and expenses.

64. Moreover, Svenson's offer of a lease agreement to Edelstin during the pendency of a summary

holdover proceeding commenced by both Krichevsky and Svenson constitutes an intentional breach

of the parties' agreement to recover possession of the subject premises and sabotaged Plaintiff’s

ability to sell the unit.

65. Svenson's actions have substantially damaged plaintiff in an amount to be determined at trial, but no

less than $600,000.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTIOIN AS AGAINST DEFENDANT SVENSON

Unjust Enrichment

66. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each of the allegations contained in paragraphs above with the same

force and effect as if fully set forth herein.

67. Defendant Svenson has received the benefit of the payments made by Plaintiff to purchase subject

premises and acquired half of the interest in it.

68. Svenson was contractually and equitably obligated to plaintiff, but had not paid her share to purchase

said premises thought promised to do so.

69. Defendant Svenson has received the benefit of the payments made, and continued to be made by

plaintiff to cover all costs and expenses associated with the subject condominium unit.

70. Svenson has not paid her share of the expenses, though demands have repeatedly been made.

71. In equity and in good conscience, Svenson should be ordered to pay her share of the carrying costs

and expenses, and should be ordered to transfer all rent monies collected from the subject premises

to plaintiff

72. Svenson has been unjustly enriched at the expense of plaintiff in an amount to be determined at trial,

but no less than $600,000.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION AS AGAINST DEFENDANT SVENSON

WasteKrichevsky vs. Svenson (Bankruptcy Court) of 20



74. Svenson has committed waste upon the subject premises, by, among other things, neglecting and

failing to pay her personal income taxes for the 2002 fiscal year, thus causing a federal lien to be

placed on the property, and, by neglecting and failing to collect market rent for the subject premises.

75. Svenson has committed waste upon the subject premises by neglecting and failing to contact IRS

and her accountant to work out payment plan after Plaintiff hired an accountant for Defendant.

76. Svenson's actions have caused plaintiff damages in an amount to be determined at trial, but no less

than $150,000.

77. Defendant's actions were willful, wanton and negligent, and as such, plaintiff is entitled to punitive

damages in the sum of $750,000.

AS AND FOR A FOUTH CAUSE OF ACTION AS AGAINST DEFENDANT SVENSON

Conversion



79. Svenson, without authority, has refused to provide plaintiff with his share of profits derived from the

rental of the subject premises.

80. As such, Svenson has excluded plaintiff and has wrongfully converted plaintiff’s property to her

own.

81. By reason of the foregoing, plaintiff has sustained money damages in the sum to be determined at

trial, but no less than $25,000.

82. Defendant's actions were willful, wanton and malicious, and as such, plaintiff is entitled to punitive

damages in the sum of $50,000.

83. WHEREFORE, the plaintiff demands judgment awarding damages in the amount of $75,000.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION AS AGAINST DEFENDANTS SVENSON, EDELSTEIN AND

KOTLYAR


Tortuous Interference with Prospective Economic Relationships



85. Defendants have intentionally and knowingly interfered with Plaintiff's prospective economic

relations by: a) refusing to provide access to potential purchasers to the apartment, and b) by

entering into a lease agreement without Plaintiffs knowledge and consent during the pendency of a

holdover proceeding to recover possession of the premises.

86. Defendants were aware of Plaintiff's intent to sell the subject premises.

87. Defendants have intentionally and knowingly interfered with Plaintiff's contractual obligations and

ability to pay expenses associated with subject premises by a) conspiring not to pay plaintiff rent; b)

fraud upon the court by filing into court record backdated lease; c) disobeying the Judge’s Bunyan

order to turn $8000.00 of rent to Plaintiff.

88. As a direct or proximate result of the forgoing: a) Plaintiff defaulted on his mortgage obligations and

all of his properties are in foreclosure; b) Plaintiff’s credit rating has been destroyed; c) Plaintiff’s

existing credit lines were cut off and new credit was denied.

89. Plaintiff has been damaged and the Defendants are jointly and severally liable for all applicable

damages under the law, including punitive and treble damages.

90. WHEREFORE, the plaintiff demands judgment awarding punitive damages to be determined at

trial.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION AS AGAINST DEFENDANTS SVENSON, EDELSTEIN AND

KOTLYAR

fraudulent conveyance

91. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each of the allegations contained in paragraphs above with the

same force and effect as if fully set forth at length herein.

92. Since Svenson never paid her share for purchase of said property, as well as any expenses, she

was indebted to plaintiff as to creditor.


93. The rent money that she received was even less than plaintiff had to pay as total monthly

expenses.

94. The alleged lease agreement entered into between Defendant Svenson and Defendants Edelstin

and Kotlyar, during the pendency of a summary proceeding, without the knowledge or consent of

the Plaintiff constitutes a fraudulent conveyance.

95. As such, the lease agreement should be deemed null and void.

96. Plaintiff has been damaged and the Defendants are jointly and severally liable for all applicable

damages under the law, including punitive damages.

97. Plaintiff should be entitled to a judgment for damages in an amount to be determined at trial, but

no less than $500,000.

98. In addition, Defendants' actions were willful, wanton and malicious, and as such, plaintiff is

entitled to punitive damages in the sum of $250,000.

99. WHEREFORE, the plaintiff demands judgment awarding damages to be determined at trial.

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION AS AGAINST DEFENDAT SVENSON

Accounting



101. From November 2001 until December 2005, the parties had agreed to pay the joint obligations

for the subject premises including but not limited to: down payment, mortgage, utilities,

maintenance, improvements, repairs and other expenses. Upon information and belief, defendant

has failed to pay any noteworthy portion of these expenses. It is unknown what amounts, if any,

have been contributed by defendant.

102. In addition, defendant has rented the premises without any notice to plaintiff and has not

accounted for the rents she has presumably received.

103. Plaintiff lacks sufficient knowledge of the exact amount of rents and profits due and owing to

him.


104. Plaintiff lacks an adequate remedy at law, as such, an accounting is required,

105. WHEREFORE, the plaintiff demands order directing defendant Svenson or defendant Edelstein

to produce all books and records.

EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION AS AGAINST DEFENDANT SVENSON

Partition



107. By the Defendant Svenson’s breach of the contract, waste and intentional pushing this property

into foreclosure, she is waving her right to this property and abandoned it.

108. She has no stake in it and use it to harm the plaintiff.

109. Plaintiff no longer able and desires to hold and use the premises in common with defendant

Svenson and is entitled to an order partitioning the premises.

110. At this point in time the sale of the subject condominium unit is impossible due to loss of equity

in it and it is "under water."

111. Actions of defendant Svenson brought about the following negativities that affect the price and

ability to sell the unit which: a) slander of title; b) numerous liens; c) clouded title; d) difficulty for

prospective buyers to obtain a mortgage; e) board of managers initiated foreclosure of the unit.

112. Because defendant Svenson is literally acting as a "monkey on the back" of plaintiff, he is

unable to save this property from the future imminent foreclosure by the banks or HOA.

113. Defendant's actions have made partition appropriate and necessary.

114. No settlement between the parties has ever been reached and the property remains titled in the

names of the plaintiff and defendant.

115. WHEREFORE, the plaintiff demands declaratory judgment awarding the plaintiff all interests in

the subject property.

AS AND FOR A NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION AS AGAINST DEFENDANT SVENSON


Fraud



117. Plaintiff and Svenson met in 1992.

118. Svenson told plaintiff that she is unmarried and looking to start a family.

119. In 1992 during Plaintiff’s first meeting with Defendant, she committed actual fraud by

fraudulently concealing her marital status and telling the Plaintiff and his friends that she is

unmarried while been married to Mr. Sam Svenson.

120. Svenson told plaintiff that she is studying in medical school to become a psychologist.

121. Plaintiff trusted Svenson and entered into relationship with her.

122. In 1994 the parties’ child, David, was born.

123. As a result of this breach of trust, Plaintiff was induced into relationship with Defendant

supporting her for more than 15 years.

124. In 2000 Svenson told plaintiff that she will graduate in 2001.

125. Based on above statement on or about August 2000 Defendant induced Plaintiff into joint

purchase of subject premises by intentionally misrepresenting to Plaintiff that in 2001 she would

graduate from her medical school, will become a doctor and will contribute to expenses

associated with purchase of subject premises, as well as to future expenses.

126. Defendant induced Plaintiff into joint purchase of subject premises by intentionally withholding

the fact that from 1998 till 2001 she did not attend her school at all.

127. Defendant Svenson instead of contributing money to plaintiff, fraudulently concealed

embezzlement, conversion or fraudulent transfer of at least $100,000 from joint account to her

personal accounts, exhibit A.

128. She wrote several checks to her family members in Germany without plaintiff’s knowledge and

consent.

129. After the sale of cooperative apartment she told plaintiff that she deposited the check into joint


account, but she never did this.

130. In 1994 Defendant feloniously breached Plaintiff’s trust and used Plaintiff to commit

marriage/immigration fraud by inducing Plaintiff Michael Krichevsky to name his new born son

David Svenson instead of David Krichevsky.

131. Upon information and belief, defendant Svenson fraudulently concealed the truth about her

marriage with Sam Svenson in order to submit false paperwork to Immigration Authorities for

US Citizenship and Naturalization as if “David Svenson, Elena Svenson and Sam Svenson” are

“real” family, exhibit B.

132. As such her Citizenship is VOID.

133. Plaintiff believed defendant Svenson and relied on her misrepresentations to his detriment.

134. Her misrepresentations, fraudulent concealment of truth and deceit continued from 1992 until

2008 and plaintiff invokes doctrines of continuous violation and equitable tolling.

135. In New York statute of limitation for fraud is six years and this claim is timely, because her last

fraudulent act against plaintiff was committed in 2010 when she fraudulently concealed from the

plaintiff and the Family Court during Contempt proceeding against plaintiff that she started

working as home attendant while claiming that her income is zero.

136. On or about July 2008 plaintiff discovered that defendant Svenson has stolen a few hundred

dollars from his pants.

137. Before going to bed he counted cash, and when he woke up he counted again, and some cash was

missing.

138. Plaintiff believes now that defendant Svenson regularly "emptied his pants".

139. As a result of the forgoing, Plaintiff demands his money back.

140. He has been damaged and the Defendant is liable for all applicable damages under the law in the

amount to be determined at trial

AS AND FOR A TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT SVENSON

Constructive Trust




142. The law of equity requires that a constrictive trust be created on behalf of Plaintiff in order to

prevent unjust enrichment by Defendant Svenson.

143. Plaintiff and Defendant had a confidential relationship and owed each other fiduciary duty.

144. Defendant was unjustly enriched when Plaintiff transferred to the Defendant half of the subject

premises without Defendant investing any money.

145. Defendant was unjustly enriched when she transferred to him her personal accounts at least

$100,000 from the joint account with plaintiff.

146. Defendant promised to pay her share to acquire subject premises, but failed to do so.

147. As a result of the forgoing, Plaintiff has been damaged and the Defendant is liable for all

applicable damages under the law in the amount to be determined at trial

148. WHEREFORE, the plaintiff demands judgment awarding damages as follows:

AS AND FOR ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION AS AGAINST DEFENDANT SVENSON

Promissory Estoppel



150. The Defendant should be held liable under doctrine of Promissory Estoppel as she on or about

August 2000 made a clear and definite promise to contribute to down payment of subject

premises at the time of closing, which was scheduled to be a one year later.

151. Plaintiff reasonably relied on defendant’s promise to his detriment and was injured by having to

pay virtually all expenses when Defendant did not keep her promise.

152. As a result of the forgoing, Plaintiff has been damaged and the Defendant is liable for all

applicable damages under the law in the amount to be determined at trial.

153. WHEREFORE, the plaintiff demands judgment awarding damages as follows:

AS AND FOR TWELFTH CAUSE OF ACTION AS AGAINST DEFENDANTS SVENSON,


EDELSTEIN AND KOTLYAR

Fraud/Fraud upon the court



155. Defendants committed Fraud upon the Court by conspiring to hire one attorney who aided and

abetted fraud by simultaneously representing them in three deferent actions against Plaintiff even

thought “there was conflict of interest” between them.

156. Upon information and belief said attorney advised them to create the backdated lease.

157. He employed prohibited by law and/or ethics litigation practices causing Plaintiff great financial

damage and delayed resolution of the litigation for almost 4 years as of today.

158. As a result of the forgoing Plaintiff has been damaged and the Defendants are jointly and

severally liable for all applicable damages under the law, including punitive and treble damages.

159. WHEREFORE, the plaintiff demands judgment awarding damages at trial.

AS AND FOR A FIRST CLAIM AGAINST BOARD OF MANAGERS OF OCEANA

CONDOMINIUM NO. TWO (OCEANA); COOPER SQUARE REALTY, INC (COOPER), LANA

KAPLUN, FARID BADALOV AND BORIS MEYDID – AGENT BREACHING FIDUCIARY

DUTY TO PRINCIPAL.

160. . All allegations above are incorporated by this reference as if fully restated herein.

161. That there was/is the principal-agent relationship between plaintiff and OCEANA and

COOPER.

162. That there was/is the agent-principal relationship between COOPER and KRICHEVSKY.

163. That there is/are a written and implied contracts spelling out all the duties owed to

KRICHEVSKY, as principal.

164. That there was fiduciary relationship between KRICHEVSKY and KAPLUN together with

BADALOV and MEYDID.

165. That the only reason for the existence of these corporations is to benefit, serve and protect


interests and safety of the owners of condominium units.

166. That earnings of these entities derived from individual payments of unit owners.

167. That the authority to act OCEANA and COOPER derive from the unit owners and their consent.

168. That those duties were breached on or about October 2008 by failure and/or refusal to act when

KRICHEVSKY informed OCEANA and COOPER about controversy between KRICHEVSKY,

SVENSON and EDELSTEIN.

169. That on or about October of 2008, EDELSTEIN entered in FRAUDULENT lease with

SVENSON without COOPER’ and KRICHEVSY’ knowledge and consent, and that SVENSON

does not intend to pay the monthly common charges.

170. KRICHEVSKY specifically demanded that OCEANA starts legal action against SVENSON and

EDELSTEIN.

171. KAPLUN promised KRICHEVSKY “to take care of this.”

172. As a result of this breach of duty, KRICHEVSKY had to hire an attorney, pay him personally to

protect his interests and lose about $5000.00 in attorney fees.

173. Eviction of EDELSTEIN and KOTLYAR was delayed for almost a year resulting in lost

opportunities and damages.

174. That on or about June of 2009, KRICHEVSKY demanded that KAPLUN starts any action

against SVENSON and EDELSTEIN.

175. That on or about August 2009, KRICHEVSKY demanded second time that KAPLUN starts legal

action against SVENSON and EDELSTEIN.

176. That after OCEANA or COOPER in October-November of 2009 cancelled EDELSTEIN’

membership and/or access to health club and gym, EDELSTEIN vacated KRICHEVSKY’ condo

unit.

177. As result of fidiciaries’ failure and delay to act anyhow, EDELSTEIN was not evicted until about

October-November of 2009.

178. As result of the forgoing KRICHEVSKY did not collect any rent from his unit, which made him


unable to pay his mortgage as well.

179. As direct result of the foregoing KRICHEVSKY was damaged in the sum of about $35,000 for

that year.

180. As direct result of the forgoing KRICHEVSKY’ condo unit entered into foreclosure by mortgage

company.

181. On or about January 15, 2010 plaintiff brought in Cooper's office two checks in the amount of

$2900 each from new tenant, Vladimir.

182. Badalov refused to consider application for tenancy before plaintiff pays the alleged debt.

183. Plaintiff explained Badalov that after tenant is approved, plaintiff would be able to cash the

checks and pay for maintenance.

184. Upon information and belief they rejected this tendency in order to drive plaintiff's unit further

into the debt and foreclosure.

185. OCEANA instituted self-serving policy Incorporated into By-Laws, were they have a first right

of refusal to buy any condominium unit.

186. Accordingly, if plaintiff unit goes into foreclosure and sold at auction they will be the first to buy

it on the cheap to be able to resell for a profit.

187. This is the reason plaintiff believes OCEANA and COOPER conspired to drive plaintiff's unit

into foreclosure.

188. This is the reason plaintiff believes Oceana created controversy and filed a lien on plaintiff's unit.

189. OCEANA, in fact, filed foreclosure action against plaintiff’s unit, but proceedings is stayed due

to the bankruptcy proceedings in this court.

190. Because they never notified plaintiff of their intention to file a lien, they violated New York

State Lien law and this lien is void.

191. As the direct result of OCEANA and COOPER’ refusal to approve KRICHEVSKY’ tenant, he

was unable to collect $2900.00 per month in rent up until today.

192. That the above mentioned fiduciaries entered in activities against KRICHEVSKY’ interest.


193. That these fiduciaries owed KRICHEVSKY the duty of loyalty.

194. That their duties entered into conflict of personal interests and self-dealing.

195. That after KRICHEVSKY explained them his situation and requested assistance, they became

beligerent and hostile.

196. After KRICHEVSKY told BADALOV that his extortion leaves KRICHEVSKY no choice, but

to sue him personally for damages, he laughed and told KRICHEVSKY “to do what he has to do.”

197. Upon information and belief BADALOV was removed from managing OCEANA by COOPER

due to complaints of other people as well.

198. Defendant Boris Meydid substituted Badalov and continued harassment of plaintiff by disabling

entrance keys numerous times within the past year.

199. When plaintiff would come to Cooper’ office to complain, Meydid would torturously tell

plaintiff that some kind of computer virus attacked their computer disabling entrance keys.

200. These acts constitute nuisance and harassment. They designed to constructively evict plaintiff's

guests.

201. WHEREFORE, the plaintiff demands judgment awarding damages and declaratory judgment

that OCEANA’ lien is void.

AS AND FOR FIRST CLAIM AGAINST IRS



203. Defendant IRS never served plaintiff with a notice of intention to file a lien against his

property in violation of New York State Lien Law.

204. Defendant IRS violated US Constitution by not giving plaintiff Notice and an opportunity to be

heard in violation of due process clause.

205. Accordingly, this court lacks jurisdiction to enforce their lien.

206. They slandered the title of plaintiff’s property and plaintiff is damaged.

207. Plaintiff is lost as to why they did not file a lien against defendant Svenson's cooperative


apartment at 2620 Ocean Parkway, Apt 3K in Brooklyn, New York.

208. As such their lien is void.

209. WHEREFORE, the plaintiff demands judgment awarding damages and declaratory judgment

that IRS’ lien is void.

Under penalty of perjury

Dated: Brooklyn, New York July 31, 2012

_______________________________________________ MICHAEL KRICHEVSKY, Pro Se, All rights reserved


ELENA SVENSON2620 Ocean Parkway, Apt 3KBrooklyn, NY 11235

COOPER SQUARE REALTY, INC6 East 43rd StreetNew York, NY 10017

BOARD OF MANAGERS OCEANA CONDOMINIUM No. TWO,40 Oceana Drive WestBrooklyn, NY 11235

LANA KAPLUN120 Oceana Drive West Apt 5FBrooklyn, NY 11235

FARID BADALOVC/O COOPER SQUARE REALTY, INC6 East 43rd StreetNew York, NY 10017

BORIS MEYDIDC/O COOPER SQUARE REALTY, INC6 East 43rd StreetNew York, NY 10017


complaint - adversary proceeding

Documents

united states

cooper square

monthly carrying

personal income

subject condominium

svenson told

elena svenson

year lease