#38 JESUS VIRTUCIO vs. JOSE ALEGARBES G.R. No. 187451 August 29, 2012(Topics: Art. 1106 in re Art. 712, Art. 1139, Art. 1155, Art. 1120-1125, stare decisis)FACTS:Alegarbes was granted a 24-hectare Homestead Patent in 1952. In 1955 however, the land was subdivided into three (3) lots – Lot Nos. 138,139 and 140 as a consequence of public land subdivision. Lot 139 was allocated to Custodio, and Lot 140 was allocated to petitioner Virtucio. Both Custodio and Virtucio filed Homestead Application and were granted. Alegarbes filed protest opposing the homesteads of Custodio and Virtucio, claiming that his approved application covered the whole area, including Lot Nos. 139 and 140, but was denied and he was ordered to vacate subject land but he refused. In 1997, Virtucio then filed a complaint for "Recovery of Possession and Ownership with Preliminary Injunction" before the RTC. Alegarbes argued that the his possession of Lot Nos. 138, 139 and 140 had been open, continuous, peaceful and uninterrupted in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years and had acquired such lots by acquisitive prescription.The RTC, in 2001, ruled in favor of Virtucio and ordered Alegarbes to vacate Lot No. 140. The CA, on the other hand, ruled that Alegarbes became ipso jure owner of Lot 140 and, therefore, entitled to retain possession of it,by reason of acquisitive prescription.

ISSUES:1. W/N Alegarbes acquired ownership over the subject property by acquisitive prescription.2. W/N the period of acquisitive prescription was interrupted in 1961 (or in 1954 when Alegarbes filed the protest) when the Director of Lands rendered a decision giving due course to his homestead application and that of Custodio, or when several extrajudicial demands were also made upon Alegarbes demanding that he vacate said lot.

HELD:1. The SC ruled that "the CA was, therefore, correct in ruling that Alegarbes became ipso jure owner of Lot 140 entitling him to retain possession of it because he was in open, continuous and exclusive possession for over thirty (30) years of alienable public land." Article 1106 of the New Civil Code, in relation to its Article 712, provides that prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership through the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law. Under the same law, it states that acquisitive prescription may either be ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for a period of ten years, while extraordinary acquisitive prescription requires uninterrupted adverse possession of thirty years, without need of title or of good faith. The CA, was correct in finding that: “xxx Even if the decision to approve appellee's homestead application over Lot 140 had become final, appellant could still acquire the said lot by acquisitive prescription.” In the case of Heirs of Gamos v. Heirs of Frando, the Court ruled that the mere application for a patent, coupled with the fact of exclusive, open, continuous and notorious possession for the required period, is sufficient to vest in the applicant the grant applied for. It likewise cited the cases of Susi v. Razon and Pineda v. CA, where the Court ruled that the possession of a parcel of agricultural land of the public domain for the prescribed period of 30 years ipso jure converts the lot into private property.

In this case, Alegarbes had applied for homestead patent as early as 1949. He had been in exclusive, open, continuous and notorious possession of Lot 140 for at least 30 years. By the time the DENR issued its order of execution in 1989, Alegarbes had Lot 140 in his possession for more than 30 years. Even more so when Virtucio filed the complaint before the RTC in 1997, Alegarbes was already in possession of the subject property for forty-eight (48) years.

2. Civil interruption takes place with the service of judicial summons to the possessor. When no action is filed, then there is no occasion to issue a judicial summons against the respondents. The period of acquisitive prescription continues to run. Article 1155 of the New Civil Code refers to the interruption of prescription of actions. Interruption of acquisitive prescription, on the other hand, is found in Articles 1120-1125 of the same Code. Thus, Virtucio’s reliance on Article 1155 for purposes of tolling the period of acquisitive prescription is misplaced. The only kinds of interruption that effectively toll the period of acquisitive prescription are natural and civil interruption.

#18 CECILIO HERNANDEZ vs. JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS G.R. No. 166470 August 7, 2009

FACTS:Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (or Lulu) is the sole heir of his mother, Maria San Juan Hernandez (who passed away after she was born) and of her maternal uncle Sotero San Juan (who took custody of her when her father Felix Hernandez left after Maria died). Felix eventually remarried and the union produced 3 children who are the petitioners of this case. Sotero died, Lulu inherited valuable real properties of the San Juan family (conservatively estimated at P50 million in 1997). Upon reaching the age of majority, Lulu was given full control of her estate. Nevertheless, because Lulu did not even finish her elementary education, Felix continued to exercise actual administration of Lulus properties. Upon Felix's death, petitioners took over the task of administering Lulu's properties. During the period of their informal administration, Felix and petitioners undertook various projects involving Lulus real properties. There was a time when Lulu signed a special power of attorney (SPA) believing that she was authorizing one of the petitioner to appear in court on her behalf when she was in fact unknowingly authorizing her half-sister to sell one of her properties to the Manila Electric Company. In September 1998, Lulu sought the assistance of her maternal first cousin, respondent Jovita San Juan-Santos, after learning that petitioners had been dissipating her estate. She confided to Jovita that she was made to live in the basement of petitioners home, receiving a measly daily allowance of P400 for her food and medication; she was severely overweight, unkempt and smelled of urine; occupying a cramped room lit by a single fluorescent lamp without running water; she had not been given a proper toilet, thus she urinated and defecated in the garden; she was found to be afflicted with tuberculosis, rheumatism and diabetes from which she was suffering several complications. Thus, respondent Jovita San Juan-Santos filed a petition for guardianship in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76. She alleged that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and managing her estate because she was of weak mind. Petitioners Cecilio, Teresa and Ma. Victoria, for their part, claimed that the issue of Lulus competency had been settled in 1968 (upon her emancipation) when the court ordered her legal guardian and maternal uncle, Ciriaco San Juan, to deliver the properties for her to manage. They likewise asserted that Lulu was literate and, for that reason, aware of the consequences of executing an SPA. In 2001, the RTC concluded that, due to her weak physical and mental condition, there was a need to appoint a legal guardian over the person and property of Lulu. Thus, it declared Lulu an incompetent and appointed respondent Jovita San Juan-Santos as guardian over the person and property of Lulu. Petitioners appealed the to the CA which i turn, affirmed the decision of the RTC (in the petition for guardianship) in toto. With regard to the respondents appointment as the legal guardian, the CA found that, since Lulu did not trust petitioners, none of them was qualified to be her legal guardian. Because guardianship was a trust relationship, the RTC was bound to appoint someone Lulu clearly trusted.

ISSUE: W/N Lulu is an incompetent who requires the appointment if a judicial guardian over her person and property.

HELD: Yes. Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court, persons who, though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without outside aid, are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship. The RTC and the CA both found that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and her properties without outside aid due to her ailments and weak mind. Thus, since determining whether or not Lulu is in fact an incompetent would require a reexamination of the evidence presented in the courts a quo, it undoubtedly involves questions of fact. Respondent, as the judicial guardian of Lulu, was duty-bound to care for and protect her ward. For her to perform her obligation, respondent must have custody of Lulu. Thus, she was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus after she was unduly deprived of the custody of her ward.Petitioners claim that the opinions of Lulu's attending physician regarding her mental state were inadmissible in evidence as they were not experts in psychiatry. Respondent therefore failed to prove that Lulu's illnesses rendered her an incompetent. She should have been presumed to be of sound mind and/or in full possession of her mental capacity. For this reason, Lulu should be allowed to live with them since under Articles 194 to 196 of the Family Code, legitimate brothers and sisters, whether half-blood or full-blood are required to support each other fully. The SC found such claims without merit.

#19 IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005 FACTS:In 2000, Petitoner Honorato B. Catindig, filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. Having qualified to be her adopting parent, Catindig prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mothers surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname. The trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption. However, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name. The trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name.

ISSUE: W/N an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name.

HELD:The SC ruled that “since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.” Thus, Stephanie should be allowed to use her mother's surname GARCIA as her middle name.

Law Is Silent As To The Use Of Middle Name. As correctly submitted by both parties (Petitioner and OSG), there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father,is silent as to what middle name a child may use.The middle name or the mothers surname is only considered in Article 375(1), quoted above, in case there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle name or the mothers surname shall be added. Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter. Also, Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter, thus: "(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters; x x xHowever, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the childs mother as his middle name. The members approved the suggestion that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father. Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of the mother, how will his name be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is up to him but that his point is that it should be mandatory that the child uses the surname of the father and permissive in the case of the surname of the mother.In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that the adopted shall bear the surname of the adopters. Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle name. What it only expressly allows, as a matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption.The SC ruled that the underlying intent of adoption is in favor of the adopted child. Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child. Records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls them Mama and Papa. Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mothers surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.

Liberal Construction of Adoption Statutes In Favor Of Adoption. Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that: In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

#20 YASUO IWASAWA vs. FELISA CUSTODIO GANGAN, et. al G.R. No. 204169 September 11, 2013

FACTS:Petitioner Yasuo, a Japanese national, met private respondent Felisa sometime in 2002 in one of his visits to the Philippines. Felisa introduced herself as "single" and "has never married before." Since then, the two became close to each other. Later that year, Yasuo came back to the Philippines and married private respondent on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City. After the wedding, the couple resided in Japan. In July 2009, petitioner discovered through his wife’s confession that she had been married before and that previous husband just passed away. Upon verifying the truth of the confession, petitioner to file a petition for the declaration of his marriage to private respondent as null and void on the ground that their marriage is a bigamous one, based on Article 35(4) in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines. RTC ruled that there was insufficient evidence to prove private respondent’s prior existing valid marriage to another man. It held that while petitioner offered the certificate of marriage of private respondent to Arambulo, the petitioner failed to present the records custodian of the NSO who issued them to testify on their authenticity and due execution since proof of authenticity and due execution was necessary. Also, the RTC ruled that petitioner’s testimony is unreliable because he has no personal knowledge of private respondent’s prior marriage nor of Arambulo’s death which makes him a complete stranger to the marriage certificate between private respondent and Arambulo and the latter’s death certificate.

ISSUE: W/N the petitioner may validly annul his marriage to respondent despite the RTC’s contention regarding the acquired documents or proof.

HELD:The SC ruled that the marriage of petitioner Yasuo Iwasawa and private respondent Felisa Custodio Gangan is declared NULL and VOID. This Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, which is void from the beginning as provided in Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines. And this is what transpired in the instant case. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the documentary exhibits taken together concretely establish the nullity of the marriage of petitioner to private respondent on the ground that their marriage is bigamous. The exhibits directly prove the following facts: (1) that private respondent married Arambulo on June 20, 1994 in the City of Manila; (2) that private respondent contracted a second marriage this time with petitioner on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City; (3) that there was no judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage of private respondent with Arambulo at the time she married petitioner; (3) that Arambulo died on July 14, 2009 and that it was only on said date that private respondent’s marriage with Arambulo was deemed to have been dissolved; and (4) that the second marriage of private respondent to petitioner is bigamous, hence null and void, since the first marriage was still valid and subsisting when the second marriage was contracted.

Moreover, the RTC erred when it disregarded said documents on the sole ground that the petitioner did not present the records custodian of the NSO who issued them to testify on their authenticity and due execution since proof of authenticity and due execution was not anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said documents admissible, they deserve to be given evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. And in the instant case, the facts stated therein remain unrebutted since neither the private respondent nor the public prosecutor presented evidence to the contrary.As provided in the Civil Code: ART. 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.

#108 JOANIE SURPOSA UY vs. JOSE NGO CHUA G.R. No. 183965 September 18, 2009

FACTS:In 2003, Petitioner Joanie Surposa Uy filed a Petition for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation against respondent Chua. Petitioner Joanie alleged that respondent Chua, was his father, who was then married, had an illicit relationship with Irene Surposa (Irene), petitioner's mother. Chua and Irene had two children, namely, petitioner Joanie and her brother, Allan. Respondent denied that he had an illicit relationship with Irene, and that petitioner was his daughter. It turned out that prior to instituting the case, petitioner and respondent eventually entered into a Compromise Agreement where Joanie "declares, admits and acknowledges that there is no blood relationship or filiation between petitioner and her brother Allan on one hand and [herein respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA on the other." Furthermore, said Agreement states, "As a gesture of goodwill and by way of settling petitioner and her brothers (Allan) civil, monetary and similar claims but without admitting any liability, [respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA hereby binds himself to pay the petitioner the sum of TWO MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00) and another TWO MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00) to her brother, ALLAN SURPOSA. Petitioner and her brother hereby acknowledge to have received in full the said compromise amount."

ISSUE: W/N the Compromise Agreement entered into between petitioner and respondent, duly approved by RTC in Special Proceeding, conclusively establish the lack of filiation.

HELD: The Court ruled in the negative. The Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent, executed in 2000, obviously intended to settle the question of petitioners status and filiation, i.e., whether she is an illegitimate child of respondent. In exchange for petitioner and her brother Allan acknowledging that they are not the children of respondent, respondent would pay petitioner and Allan P2,000,000.00 each. Although unmentioned, it was a necessary consequence of said Compromise Agreement that petitioner also waived away her rights to future support and future legitime as an illegitimate child of respondent. Evidently, the said Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent is covered by the prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code.ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:(1) The civil status of persons;(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;(3) Any ground for legal separation;(4) Future support;(5) The jurisdiction of courts;(6) Future legitime.

It must be emphasized, though, that like any other contract, a compromise agreement must comply with the requisites in Article 1318 of the Civil Code, to wit: (a) consent of the contracting parties; (b) object certain that is the subject matter of the contract; and (c) cause of the obligation that is established. And, like any other contract, the terms and conditions of a compromise agreement must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy and public order. Any compromise agreement that is contrary to law or public policy is null and void, and vests no rights in and holds no obligation for any party. It produces no legal effect at all.

#110 VALERIO E. KALAW vs. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ G.R. No. 166357 January 14, 2015FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of his marriage with the respondent. Petitioner alleged that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.

ISSUE: W/N the respondent or both parties suffer from psychological incapacity to annul their marriage.

HELD: The SC upheld the RTC decision in declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent on November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB INITIO due to the psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.

The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s moral and mental development. This disregard violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her children, as expressly defined under Article 209 and Article 220 of the Family Code, to wit:

Article 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their unemancipated children, parental authority and responsibility shall include the caring for and rearing of such children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being.

Article 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with respect to their unemancipated children or wards the following rights and duties:(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship;(4) To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their physical and mental health at all times;(5) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities, recreation and association with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals;

"It would be great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist."

To stress, our mandate to protect the inviolability of marriage as the basic foundation of our society does not preclude striking down a marital union that is "ill-equipped to promote family life," thus:

Now is also the opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development[t]," and that [m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage.

#112 BETTY B. LACBAYAN vs. BAYANI S. SAMOY, JR. [G.R. No. 165427, March 21 : 2011] FACTS:Petitioner and respondent met each other through a common friend sometime in 1978. Despite respondent being already married, their relationship developed. During their illicit relationship, petitioner and respondent, together with three more incorporators, were able to establish a manpower services company. Five parcels of land were also acquired during the said period and were registered in petitioner and respondents names, ostensibly as husband and wife. Eventually, however, their relationship turned sour and they decided to part ways sometime in 1991. In 1998, both parties agreed to divide the said properties and terminate their business partnership by executing a Partition Agreement. Initially, respondent agreed to petitioners proposal that the properties in Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter, while the ownership over the three other properties will go to respondent .However, when petitioner wanted additional demands to be included in the partition agreement, respondent refused.

ISSUE:1. W/N an action for partition precludes a settlement on the issue of ownership2. W/N the Torrens title over the disputed properties was collaterally attacked in the action for

partition; and3. W/N respondent is estopped from repudiating co-ownership over the subject realties.

HELD: 1. The SC held in Municipality of Baitan v. Garcia (G.R. No. 69260) that the determination as to the existence of co-ownership is necessary in the resolution of an action for partition. Thus:The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. x x x The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the partition" directed by the court. In that event[,] partition shall be done for the parties by the [c]ourt with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the [c]ourt after the parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question. x x x[29] (Emphasis supplied.) While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same is premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties. Petitioner insists she is a co-owner pro indiviso of the five real estate properties based on the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering the subject properties. Respondent maintains otherwise. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties. More importantly, the complaint will not even lie if the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does not even have any rightful interest over the subject properties.

2. There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked, but that rule is not material to the case at bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself. The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership which is, more often than not, represented by that document. Petitioner apparently confuses title with the certificate of title. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably used.

3. Finally, as to whether respondent's assent to the initial partition agreement serves as an admission against interest, in that the respondent is deemed to have admitted the existence of co-ownership between him and petitioner, we rule in the negative.

#114 DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 164948 June 27, 2006FACT:On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America (USA), of Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, born on August 31, 1986; Elma Dizon Ramos, born on September 7, 1987; and Eugene Dizon Ramos, born on August 5, 1989. The minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioner’s brother, and Amelia Ramos. Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died on May 19, 1990, the children were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos; their biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there and now has two children by her second marriage and no longer communicated with her children by Manuel Ramos nor with her in-laws from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption; the minors are being financially supported by the petitioner and her children, and relatives abroad; as Maria passed away on November 23, 2000. Petitioner prayed that judgment be rendered allowing the adoption of the minor children Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, and Eugene Dizon Ramos by the petitioner, and ordering that the minor children’s name follow the family name of petitioner.

ISSUE:1. W/N the petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of their biological mother, Amelia Ramos2. W/N the affidavit of consent purportedly executed by the petitioner-adopter’s children sufficiently complies with the law3. W/N petitioner is financially capable of supporting the adoptees.

HELD:1. No. The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, provides: “Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. - After being properly counseled and informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of the following to the adoption is hereby required: (a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over; (b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality which has legal custody of the child;(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter, if living with said adopter and the latter’s souse, if any; (e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted

2. No. Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilao’s Report and of the Joint Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her children; the authenticity of which she, likewise, failed to prove. The joint written consent of petitioner’s children was notarized on January 16, 2002 in Guam, USA; for it to be treated by the Rules of Court in the same way as a document notarized in this country it needs to comply with Section 2 of Act No. 2103.

3. In reversing the ruling of the RTC, the CA ruled that petitioner was not stable enough to support the children and is only relying on the financial backing, support and commitment of her children and her siblings. Petitioner contradicts this by claiming that she is financially capable as she has worked in Guam for 14 years, has savings, a house, and currently earns $5.15 an hour with tips of not less than $1,000.00 a month. Her children and siblings have likewise committed themselves to provide financial backing should the need arise. The OSG, again in its comment, banks on the statement in the Home Study Report that "petitioner has limited income." Accordingly, it appears that she will rely on the financial backing of her children and siblings in order to support the minor adoptees. The law, however, states that it is the adopter who should be in a position to provide support in keeping with the means of the family.

#116 CARMEN LAPUZ SY, represented by her substitute MACARIO LAPUZ vs. EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alias EUFEMIO SY UY G.R. No. L-30977January 31, 1972

FACTS:On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging, in the main, that they were married civilly on 21 September 1934 and canonically on 30 September 1934; that they had lived together as husband and wife continuously until 1943 when her husband abandoned her; that they had no child; that they acquired properties during their marriage; and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok at 1319 Sisa Street, Manila, on or about March 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which, among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits. Respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio alleged affirmative and special defenses, and, along with several other claims involving money and other properties, counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok. Respondent Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition for legal separation" on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) that the petition for legal separation was filed beyond the one-year period provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code; and (2) that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. On 26 June 1969, counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. Counsel for Eufemio opposed the motion.

ISSUE: W/N the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the action. If it does, whether the abatement will also apply if the action involves property right.

HELD:YES. An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses (there being no absolute divorce in this jurisdiction) is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself — actio personalis moritur cum persona.

... When one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for divorce, because the marriage is dissolved. The heirs cannot even continue the suit, if the death of the spouse takes place during the course of the suit (Article 244, Section 3). The action is absolutely dead (Cass., July 27, 1871, D. 71. 1. 81; Cass. req., May 8, 1933, D. H. 1933, 332.") 4 .

Marriage is a personal relation or status, created under the sanction of law, and an action for divorce is a proceeding brought for the purpose of effecting a dissolution of that relation. The action is one of a personal nature. In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the death of one of the parties to such action abates the action, for the reason that death has settled the question of separation beyond all controversy and deprived the court of jurisdiction, both over the persons of the parties to the action and of the subject-matter of the action itself. For this reason the courts are almost unanimous in holding that the death of either party to a divorce proceeding, before final decree, abates the action.

The same rule is true of causes of action and suits for separation and maintenance (Johnson vs. Bates, Ark. 101 SW 412; 1 Corpus Juris 208). A review of the resulting changes in property relations between spouses shows that they are solely the effect of the decree of legal separation; hence, they can not survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree.

#117 RENATO LAZATIN alias RENATO STA. CLARA vs. HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., NORA L. DE LEON, BERNARDO DE LEON, ARLENE DE LEON and IRMA L. VELOSO G.R. No. L-43955-56 July 30, 1979

FACTS:Petitioner Lazatin filed a petition which seeks to overrule respondent judge's orders declaring that he has failed to establish by competent evidence his alleged status as an adopted child of the deceased Lazatin spouses and prays for judgment of this Court "declaring as established the fact of (his) adoption as a son of the deceased spouses entitling him to succeed in their estates as such." Respondent judge ruled that he could not allow petitioner (who had filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings to probate the will of the late Margarita de Asis Vda. de Lazatin and to settle her estate as her adopted son, after having earlier filed a motion to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her pre-deceased husband as his admitted illegitimate [not natural] son), over the opposition of private respondents, to introduce evidence that he had "enjoyed ... the status of an adopted child of the without his first producing competent and documentary that there had been judicial proceedings for his by the said spouses which resulted in the final judgment of a competent court decreeing his adoption.

ISSUE: W/N Lazatin has established the fact of his adoption as a son of the deceased spouses entitling him to succeed in their estates as such in accordance with the applicable law on succession as to his inheritance

HELD:No. Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction.

No judicial records of such adoption or copies thereof are presented or attempted to be presented. Petitioner merely proceeds from a nebulous assumption that he was judicially adopted between the years 1928 and 1932.

The absence of proof of such order of adoption by the court, as provided by the statute, cannot be substituted by parol evidence that a child has lived with a person, not his parent, and has been treated as a child to establish such adoption. Even evidence of declaration of the deceased, made in his lifetime, that he intended to adopt a child as his heir, and that he had adopted him, and of the fact that the child resided with the deceased, as a member of his family, from infancy until he attained his majority, is not sufficient to establish the fact of adoption.

As a necessary consequence, petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara cannot properly intervene in the settlement of the estate of Margarita de Asis, as an adopted child because of lack of proof thereof. For one to intervene in an estate proceeding, it is a requisite that he has an interest in the estate, either as one who would be benefited as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor. A child by adoption cannot inherit from the parent creditor by adoption unless the act of adoption has been done in strict accord with the statue. Until this is done, no rights are acquired by the child and neither the supposed adopting parent or adopted child could be bound thereby.The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship. He must prove compliance with the statutes relating to adoption in the jurisdiction where the adoption occurred.

#118 EMMA K. LEE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et. al. G.R. No. 177861 July 13, 2010FACTS: Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) entered the Philippines in the 1930s as immigrants from China. They had 11 children, namely, Rita K. Lee, Leoncio K. Lee, Lucia K. Lee-Ong, Julian K. Lee, Martin K. Lee, Rosa Lee-Vanderlek, Melody Lee-Chin, Henry K. Lee, Natividad Lee-Miguel, Victoriano K. Lee, and Thomas K. Lee (collectively, the Lee-Keh children). In 1948, Lee brought from China a young woman named Tiu Chuan (Tiu), supposedly to serve as housemaid. The respondent Lee-Keh children believe that Tiu left the Lee-Keh household, moved into another property of Lee nearby, and had a relation with him. Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh children learned that Tius children with Lee (collectively, the Lee's other children) claimed that they, too, were children of Lee and Keh. This prompted the Lee-Keh children to request the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate the matter. After conducting such an investigation, the NBI concluded in its report:

[I]t is very obvious that the mother of these 8 children is certainly not KEH SHIOK CHENG, but a much younger woman, most probably TIU CHUAN. Upon further evaluation and analysis by these Agents, LEE TEK SHENG is in a quandary in fixing the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG possibly to conform with his grand design of making his 8 children as their own legitimate children, consequently elevating the status of his second family and secure their future. The doctor lamented that this complaint would not have been necessary had not the father and his second family kept on insisting that the 8 children are the legitimate children of KEH SHIOK CHENG.

The NBI found, for example, that in the hospital records, the eldest of the Lees other children, Marcelo Lee (who was recorded as the 12th child of Lee and Keh), was born of a 17-year-old mother, when Keh was already 38 years old at the time. Another of the Lees other children, Mariano Lee, was born of a 23-year-old mother, when Keh was then already 40 years old, and so forth. In other words, by the hospital records of the Lees other children, Kehs declared age did not coincide with her actual age when she supposedly gave birth to such other children, numbering eight. On the basis of this report, the respondent Lee-Keh children filed two separate petitions, one of them before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City in Special Proceeding C-1674 for the deletion from the certificate of live birth of the petitioner Emma Lee, one of Lees other children, the name Keh and replace the same with the name Tiu to indicate her true mothers name.

ISSUE: W/N the Lee-Keh children have the right to file the action for correction of entries in the certificates of birth of Lees other children.

HELD:Yes. Notably, the Court previously decided in the related case of Lee v. Court of Appeals that the Lee-Keh children have the right to file the action for correction of entries in the certificates of birth of Lees other children, Emma Lee included. The Court recognized that the ultimate object of the suit was to establish the fact that Lees other children were not children of Keh. Thus:

It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one outlined under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. The petitions filed by private respondents for the correction of entries in the petitioners' records of birth were intended to establish that for physical and/or biological reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have conceived and given birth to the petitioners as shown in their birth records. Contrary to petitioners' contention that the petitions before the lower courts were actually actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to declare that petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to establish that the former are not the latter's children. There is nothing to impugn as there is no blood relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng and petitioners. (Underscoring supplied)

Taking in mind the ultimate purpose of the Lee-Keh childrens action, obviously, they would want Tiu to testify or admit that she is the mother of Lees other children, including petitioner Emma Lee. Keh had died and so could not give testimony that Lees other children were not hers. The Lee-Keh children have, therefore, a legitimate reason for seeking Tius testimony and, normally, the RTC cannot deprive them of their right to compel the attendance of such a material witness.

#188 JOSE RIVERO, JESSIE RIVERO and AMALIA RIVERO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MARY JANE DY CHIAO*-DE GUZMAN, and BENITO DY CHIAO, JR., represented by his uncle HENRY S. DY CHIAO G.R. No. 141273 May 17, 2005

FACTS:In behalf of her minor child, Benedick Arevalo, her mother filed a complaint against defendants for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate child of their deceased father. During trial, Mary Jane Dy-Chiao De Guzman, one of the sister entered a compromised agreement with Benedick which provides:“1. That the defendant Maryjane Dy Chiao-De Guzman hereby recognizes the plaintiff as the illegitimate son of her deceased father Benito Dy Chiao, Sr.;2. That in full satisfaction and settlement of plaintiff's claim from the estate of the late Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., defendant Maryjane Dy Chiao De Guzman for herself and in behalf of her brothers, who are likewise defendants in this case, hereby agree and bind herself to pay the plaintiff the amount ofP6,000,000.00 which shall be taken from the estate of the late Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., which amount shall be payable under the following terms and conditions:

a. The amount of P1,500,000.00 shall be payable upon signing of this Compromise Agreement;b. The balance of P4,500,000.00 shall be payable within the period of one year from the date of

signing of this Compromise Agreement and for which the defendant Maryjane Dy Chiao-De Guzman shall issue twelve (12) checks corresponding to the said balance in the amount ofP375,000.00 per check;3. That the parties hereby waive other claims and counterclaims against each other;4. That any violation of this Compromise Agreement shall render the same to be immediately executory.The RTC granted the compromised agreement.

ISSUE: W/N the compromised agreement regarding filiation is valid?

HELD:No. The compromise agreement executed by Benedick and Mary Jane is null and void; as such, the decision of the RTC based thereon is also without force and effect.

Article 2035(1) of the New Civil Code provides that no compromise upon the civil status of persons shall be valid. As such, paternity and filiation, or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the court to determine its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.43

A compromise is a contract whereby parties, making reciprocal concerns, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced.44 Like any other contract, it must comply with the requisite provisions in Article 1318 of the New Civil Code, to wit: (a) consent of the contracting parties; (b) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and (c) cause of the obligation which is established. Like any other contract, the terms and conditions of a compromise agreement must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy and public order.45 Any compromise agreement which is contrary to law or public policy is null and void, and vests no rights and holds no obligation to any party. It produces no legal effect at all.46 Considering all these, there can be no other conclusion than that the decision of the RTC on the basis of a compromise agreement where Benedick was recognized as the illegitimate child of Benito, Sr. is null and void.

As previously stated, the Court is convinced that the compromise agreement signed by Mary Jane and Benedick was a compromise relating to the latter's filiation. Mary Jane recognized Benedick as the illegitimate son of her deceased father, the consideration for which was the amount of P6,000,000.00 to be taken from the estate, the waiver of other claims from the estate of the deceased, and the waiver by the Dy Chiao siblings of their counterclaims against Benedick. This is readily apparent, considering that the compromise agreement was executed despite the siblings' unequivocal allegations in their answer to the complaint filed only two months earlier, that Benedick was merely an impostor:

#189 VICTOR RONDINA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. 179059 June 13, 2012

FACTS:VICTOR RONDINA being then armed with a knife and by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant herein, AAA - a sixteen (16) year old lass, against her will. Hence, Victor was charged with the crime of rape. He was convicted of the crime and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. During the pendency of the proceedings and after about nine months from the date of the alleged incident, AAA gave birth to a baby girl, CCC, on May 1, 1999.

ISSUE:W/N Victor should exercise parental authority and support over CCC.

HELD:The Court ordered Victor to acknowledge AAAs offspring CCC and give her support. Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three different kinds of civil liability that may be imposed on the offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgement of the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing, and c) in every case to support the offspring. With the passage of the Family Code, the classification of acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction was eliminated and they now fall under the specie of illegitimate children. Since parental authority is vested by Article 176 of the Family Code upon the mother and considering that an offender sentenced to reclusion perpetua automatically loses the power to exercise parental authority over his children, no further positive act is required of the parent as the law itself provides for the childs status. Hence, [Victor] should only be ordered to indemnify and support the victims child. The amount [and terms] of support shall be determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing in accordance with Article 201 of the Family Code. Petitioner Victor Rondina is ordered to give support to AAAs offspring, CCC, in such amount and under such terms to be determined by the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City in a proper proceeding with support arrears to be reckoned from the finality of this Decision.

#190 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III. G.R. No. 154380. October 5, 2005FACTS:On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation. Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.

ISSUE: W/N respondent may remarry under the Article 26 of the Family Code.

HELD:The court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.

Taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife

subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

#192 MARIE ANTONETTE ABIGAIL C. SALIENTES, et. al vs. LORAN S.D. ABANILLA, et. al. G.R. No. 162734. August 29, 2006

FACTS:Private respondent Loran S.D. Abanilla and petitioner Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes are the parents of the minor Lorenzo Emmanuel S. Abanilla. They lived with Marie Antonette's parents, petitioners Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes. Due to in-laws problems, private respondent suggested to his wife that they transfer to their own house, but Marie Antonette refused. So, he alone left the house of the Salientes. Thereafter, he was prevented from seeing his son.Later, Loran S.D. Abanilla in his personal capacity and as the representative of his son, filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus and Custody which the trial court granted. However, petitioners contend that the order is contrary to Article 213 of the Family Code, which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. They maintain that herein respondent Loran had the burden of showing any compelling reason but failed to present even a prima facie proof thereof, and even assuming that there were compelling reasons, the proper remedy for private respondent was simply an action for custody, but not habeas corpus. Petitioners assert that habeas corpus is unavailable against the mother who, under the law, has the right of custody of the minor. Respondent on the other hand, asserts that the writ of habeas corpus is available against any person who restrains the minors right to see his father and vice versa.

ISSUE: W/N the petition for habeas corpus is available and should be granted to the petitioner.

HELD: Yes. Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person entitled thereto. Under Article 211 of the Family Code, respondent Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette have joint parental authority over their son and consequently joint custody. Further, although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the present case, private respondents cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his petition. Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him. In a petition for habeas corpus, the child’s welfare is the supreme consideration. The Child and Youth Welfare Code unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the care and custody, among others, of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration. Again, it bears stressing that the order did not grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain why private respondent is prevented from seeing his child. This is in line with the directive in Section 9 of A.M. 03-04-04-SC that within fifteen days after the filing of the answer or the expiration of the period to file answer, the court shall issue an order requiring the respondent (herein petitioners) to present the minor before the court. This was exactly what the court did. Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody by the court. Petitioners can raise it as a counter argument for private respondents petition for custody. But it is not a basis for preventing the father to see his own child. Nothing in the said provision disallows a father from seeing or visiting his child under seven years of age.

#193 FELICIANO SANCHEZ vs. FRANCISCO ZULUETA G.R. No. L-45616 May 16, 1939

FACTS:The complaint alleges that the plaintiffs Josefa and Mario are the wife and child, respectively, of the defendant Feliciano Sanchez; that the latter, since 1932, refused and still refuses to support the plaintiffs; that the latter have no means of subsistence, while the defendant receives from the United States Army a monthly pension of P174.20; that the defendant Feliciano abandoned the plaintiffs without any justifiable cause and now refuses to allow them to live with him. The plaintiffs ask that the defendant be sentenced to pay them a monthly allowance for support. Defendant Feliciano alleges, as special defense, that the plaintiff Josefa Diego abandoned the conjugal home on October 27, 1930, without his knowledge or consent, because she committed adultery with Macario Sanchez, with whom she had, as a result of the illicit relations, a child which is the other plaintiff Mario Sanchez.

The month following the filing of the complaint, the plaintiffs asked the court to compel the defendant to give them, by way of allowance pendente lite, the sum of P50 a month. In opposition to his petition, the defendant alleged that Mario Sanchez is not his legitimate child but is the adulterous child of the plaintiff with Macario Sanchez, and he asked for an oppurtunity to adduce evidence in support of this defense. The court, without acceding to this petition of the defendant to adduce evidence, favorably acted upon the application of the plaintiffs and ordered the defendant to pay a monthly allowance pendente lite of P50 to the plaintiffs. Feliciano filed a petition for prohibition before the Court of Appeals against the judge of the Court of First Instance and the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals denied the petition, and from this resolution, the defendant comes to this court on certiorari.

ISSUE: W/N Feliciano can validly withdraw his support to his wife and child.

HELD: The SC ruled that, "adultery on the part of the wife is a valid defense against an action for support (Quintana vs. Lerma, 24 Phil., 285). Consequently, as to the child, it is also a defense that it is the fruit of such adulterous relations, for in that case, it would not be the child of the defendant and, hence, would not be entitled to support as such. But as this defense should be established, and not merely alleged, it would be unavailing if proof thereof is not permitted."

Thus, the Supreme Court is of the opinion that the Court of Appeals erred in not allowing the defendant to present his evidence for the purpose of determining whether it is sufficient prima facie to overcome the application.

It is not of course necessary to go fully into the merits of the case, it being sufficient the court ascertain the kind and amount of evidence which it may deem sufficient to enable it to justly resolve the application, one way or the other, in view of the merely provisional character of the resolution to be entered.

Although mere affidavits may satisfy the court to pass upon the application, nevertheless, the failure to accompany the opposition therewith did not justify the court in ignoring said opposition, just because of this omission, inasmuch as an opportunity to present evidence has been asked. It may be that the defendant could not get hold of affidavits in support of his opposition, but he may have on hand other evidence of greater weight.

If the defendant has a valid defense which calls for proof, and he asks for an opportunity to present evidence, it is error to deny him this opportunity.

The decision rendered by the Court Appeals is reversed, and it is ordered that the petitioner be given an opportunity to present evidence in support of his defense against the application for support pendente lite, to the extent which the court determine, without special pronouncement as to the costs. So ordered.

#194 LEOUEL SANTOS, SR., vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES LEOPOLDO and OFELIA BEDIA. G.R. No. 113054 March 16, 1995

FACTS:Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr. and Julia Bedia (daughter of herein respondents) were married and their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. Petitioner and wife Julia agreed to place Leouel Jr. in the temporary custody of the latter's parents, the respondent spouses Bedia. The boy's mother, Julia Bedia-Santos, left for the United States in May 1988 to work. Petitioner alleged that he is not aware of her whereabouts and his efforts to locate her in the United States proved futile. Private respondents claim that although abroad, their daughter Julia had been sending financial support to them for her son. On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household, where three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents contend that petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him away to his hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental.The respondent spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos Jr.," and the trial court awarded the custody of the child to his grandparents. Petitioner Santos, Sr. appealed this Order to the Court of Appeals but was denied. Hence this case. Petitioner contends that since private respondents have failed to show that petitioner is an unfit and unsuitable father, substitute parental authority granted to the boy's grandparents under Art. 214 of the Family Code is inappropriate. On the other hand, private respondents aver that they can provide an air-conditioned room for the boy and that petitioner would not be in a position to take care of his son since he has to be assigned to different places. They also allege that the petitioner did not give a single centavo for the boy's support and maintenance. The Bedias argue that although the law recognizes the right of a parent to his child's custody, ultimately the primary consideration is what is best for the happiness and welfare of the latter. As maternal grandparents who have amply demonstrated their love and affection for the boy since his infancy, they claim to be in the best position to promote the child's welfare.

ISSUE: Who should properly be awarded custody of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.?

HELD:The SC award the custody over the minor Leouel Santos Jr. to his legitimate father, herein petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr.The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of parental authority. Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution whereby parents rightfully assume control and protection of their unemancipated children to the extent required by the latter' s needs. It is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of the children's physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart and senses. As regards parental authority, "there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor."The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and company. The child's welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody.We find the aforementioned considerations insufficient to defeat petitioner's parental authority and the concomitant right to have custody over the minor Leouel Santos, Jr., particularly since he has not been shown to be an unsuitable and unfit parent. Private respondents' demonstrated love and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred over the grandparents. The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof that at the present time, petitioner is in no position to support the boy. The fact that he was unable to provide financial support for his minor son from birth up to over three years when he took the boy from his in-laws without permission, should not be sufficient reason to strip him of his permanent right to the child's custody. While petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable and merits only the severest criticism, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable decision against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be regarded as serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody would help enhance the bond between parent and son. It would also give the father a chance to prove his love for his son and for the son to experience the warmth and support which a father can give.

#196 Security Bank and Trust Company vs. MAR TIERRA CORPORATION, et.al G.R. No. 143382 November 29, 2006

FACTS:On May 7, 1980, respondent Mar Tierra Corporation, through its president, Wilfrido C. Martinez, applied for a credit accommodation with petitioner Security Bank and Trust Company. Petitioner approved the application and entered into a credit line agreement with respondent corporation. It was secured by an indemnity agreement executed by individual respondents Wilfrido C. Martinez, Miguel J. Lacson and Ricardo A. Lopa who bound themselves jointly and severally with respondent corporation for the payment of the loan. Unable to collect the balance of the loan, petitioner Security Bank filed a complaint for a sum of money with a prayer for preliminary attachment against respondent corporation and individual respondents in the RTC. The RTC issued a writ of attachment on all real and personal properties of respondent corporation and individual respondent Martinez. As a consequence, the conjugal house and lot of the spouses Wilfrido and Josefina Martinez in Barrio Calaanan, Caloocan City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 49158 was levied on.The RTC rendered its decision and held respondent corporation and individual respondent Martinez jointly and severally liable to petitioner. However, the RTC found that the obligation contracted by individual respondent Martinez did not redound to the benefit of his family, hence, it ordered the lifting of the attachment on the conjugal house and lot of the spouses Martinez. Petitioner appealed to the CA but the appellate court affirmed the trial courts decision in toto. Petitioner asserts among others that the RTC and CA were wrong in ruling that the conjugal partnership of the Martinez spouses could not be held liable for the obligation incurred by individual respondent Martinez.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conjugal partnership may be held liable for an indemnity agreement entered into by the husband to accommodate a third party.

HELD:No. To hold the conjugal partnership liable for an obligation pertaining to the husband alone defeats the objective of the Civil Code to protect the solidarity and well being of the family as a unit. The underlying concern of the law is the conservation of the conjugal partnership. Hence, it limits the liability of the conjugal partnership only to debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.We ruled as early as 1969 in Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. de Garcia that, in acting as a guarantor or surety for another, the husband does not act for the benefit of the conjugal partnership as the benefit is clearly intended for a third party.In Ayala Investment and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,we ruled that, if the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., the direct recipient of the money and services to be used in or for his own business or profession, the transaction falls within the term obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. In other words, where the husband contracts an obligation on behalf of the family business, there is a legal presumption that such obligation redounds to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, the transaction cannot by itself be deemed an obligation for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. It is for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption is raised that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Proof must be presented to establish the benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership. In the absence of any showing of benefit received by it, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the husband to accommodate a third party.In this case, the principal contract, the credit line agreement between petitioner and respondent corporation, was solely for the benefit of the latter. The accessory contract (the indemnity agreement) under which individual respondent Martinez assumed the obligation of a surety for respondent corporation was similarly for the latter’s benefit. Petitioner had the burden of proving that the conjugal partnership of the spouses Martinez benefited from the transaction. It failed to discharge that burden.

#197 SYED AZHAR ABBAS vs. GLORIA GOO ABBAS G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013FACTS:Petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) filed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria). He alleged the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4 of the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his marriage to Gloria.At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. He arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-law’s residence, located at 2676 F. Muñoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. Petitioner presented an evidence from the Municipal Civil Registrar, a certification to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. It further contains that "No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993."

The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner. Upon appeal to the C.A., Gloria claimed that the RTC erred in (1) declaring the marriage as null and void due to the absence of marriage license despite the clear evidence clearly showing that there was one; (2) not ruling on the issue of estoppel by laches on part of the petitioner. The C.A. reversed the RTC decision and declared the marriGe valid and subsisting.

ISSUE: W/N the marriage of Syed and Gloria is valid.

HELD: No. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio. Thus the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of RTC annulling the marriage of petitioner with respondent.As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows:Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:x x x x(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.

As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.

#198 YOLANDA SIGNEY vs. SSS, et.al, G.R. No. 173582 January 28, 2008

FACTS:Rodolfo Signey, Sr., a member of the SSS, died on 21 May 2001. In his members records, he had designated Yolanda Signey (petitioner) as primary beneficiary and his four children with her as secondary beneficiaries. On 6 July 2001, petitioner filed a claim for death benefits with the public respondent SSS. She revealed in her SSS claim that the deceased had a common-law wife, Gina Servano (Gina), with whom he had two minor children namey, Ginalyn Servano (Ginalyn), born on 13 April 1996, and Rodelyn Signey (Rodelyn), born on 20 April 2000. Petitioners declaration was confirmed when Gina herself filed a claim for the same death benefits on 13 July 2001 in which she also declared that both she and petitioner were common-law wives of the deceased and that Editha Espinosa (Editha) was the legal wife.In addition, in October 2001, Editha also filed an application for death benefits with the SSS stating that she was the legal wife of the deceased. The SSS, through a letter dated 4 December 2001, denied the death benefit claim of petitioner. However, it recognized Ginalyn and Rodelyn, the minor children of the deceased with Gina, as the primary beneficiaries under the SSS Law. The SSS also found that the 20 March 1992 marriage between petitioner and the deceased was null and void because of a prior subsisting marriage contracted on 29 October 1967 between the deceased and Editha, as confirmed with the Local Civil Registry of Cebu City. Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition with the SSC. SSC affirmed the decision of the SSS. Petitioner appealed the judgment of the SSC to the Court of Appeals which in turn, affirmed the decision of the SSC.

ISSUE: Who between petitioner and the illegitimate children of the deceased are the primary beneficiaries lawfully entitled to the social security benefits accruing by virtue of the latter’s death?

HELD:The SC upheld the ruling of the SSS that Ginalyn and Rodelyn, the minor children of the deceased with Gina, as the primary beneficiaries of the deceased. As to the issue of who has the better right over the SSS death benefits, Section 8(e) and (k) of R. A. No. 8282 is very clear. Hence, we need only apply the law.

Section 8(e) and (k) of R.A. No. 8282 provides: SEC. 8. Terms Defined.For the purposes of this Act, the following terms shall, unless the context indicates otherwise, have the following meanings: (e) Dependents The dependent shall be the following: (1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member; 2) The legitimate, legitimated, or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not reached twenty-one years (21) of age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally; and 3) The parent who is receiving regular support from the member. (k) Beneficiaries The dependent spouse until he or she remarries, the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children, who shall be the primary beneficiaries of the member: Provided, That the dependent illegitimate children shall be entitled to fifty percent (50%) of the share of the legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted children: Provided, further, That in the absence of the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted children of the member, his/her dependent illegitimate children shall be entitled to one hundred percent (100%) of the benefits. In their absence, the dependent parents who shall be the secondary beneficiaries of the member. In the absence of all of the foregoing, any other person designated by the member as his/her secondary beneficiary.           

SEC. 13. Death Benefits. Upon the death of a member who has paid at least thirty-six (36) monthly contributions prior to the semester of death, his primary beneficiaries shall be entitled to the monthly pension: Provided, That if he has no primary beneficiaries, his secondary beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit equivalent to thirty-six (36) times the monthly pension. If he has not paid the required thirty-six (36) monthly contributions, his primary or secondary beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit equivalent to the monthly pension times the number of monthly contributions paid to the SSS or twelve (12) times the monthly pension, whichever is higher. 

#199 ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007

FACTS:On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio, a male by birth but has undergone sex reassignment to transform himself as a "woman" on January 27, 2001, filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila and impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent. Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex

ISSUE: W/N petitioner is entitled to the change of name and sex in his birth certificate.

HELD:The SC ruled on the negative. A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment. Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides: SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.

RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.Moreover, the determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.

#200 Mario Siochi vs. Alfredo Gozon, Winifred Gozon, Gil Tabije, Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc., and Elvira Gozon. G.R. No. 169900. March 18, 2010

FACTS: Elvira filed a petition for legal separation against her husband Alfredo and while the legal separation case was still pending, Alfredo and Mario Sochi (Mario) entered into an agreement to buy and sell (agreement) involving the conjugal property. Among the stipulations in the agreement were that Alfredo would secure an affidavit from Elvira that the property is Alfredo’s exclusive property and to annotate the agreement at the back of TCT No. 5357, etc. However, despite repeated demands from Mario, Alfredo failed to comply with these stipulations. After paying the p5 million earnest money as partial payment of the purchase price, Mario took possession of the property in September 1993. On 6 September 1993, the agreement was annotated on TCT No. 5357. RTC rendered decreeing the legal separation between petitioner and respondent. The conjugal partnership of gains of the spouses is hereby declared dissolved and liquidated. Being the offending spouse, respondent is deprived of his share in the net profits and the same is awarded to their child Winifred R. Gozon whose custody is awarded to petitioner. However, Alfredo had executed a deed of donation over the property in favor of their daughter, Winifred Gozon (Winifred). In October 1994, he, by virtue of a special power of attorney executed in his favor by Winifred, sold the property to Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. (IDRI) for P18 million. IDRI paid has given full payment for the property. Subsequently, the Register of Deeds of Malabon cancelled TCT No. M-10508 and issued TCT No. M-10976 to IDRI.

ISSUE: W/N the sale and donation of the conjugal properties are valid without the written consent of Elvira.

HELD:No. As the sole administrator of the property, Alfredo still cannot sell the property without the written consent of Elvira or the authority of the court. Without such consent or authority, the sale is void. The absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders the entire sale void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale. Even if the other spouse actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the property, that other spouses written consent to the sale is still required by law for its validity. The agreement entered into by Alfredo and Mario was without the written consent of Elvira. Thus, the agreement is entirely void. As regards Mario’s contention that the agreement is a continuing offer which may be perfected by Elvira’s acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property was subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was already withdrawn.

Moreover, among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated and the offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership. It is only Alfredos share in the net profits which is forfeited in favor of Winifred. Article 102(4) of the Family Code provides that [f]or purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Article 43, no. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution. Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredo’s share in the conjugal partnership property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership property.