comparative urban analysis and assumptions about causality

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Comparative urban analysis and assumptions about causality by C.G. Pickvance The aim of this paper is to clarify the meaning of comparative urban analysis, to distinguish three approaches to it, and to argue for the importance of two of them which has not been recognized in the past. Although the examples are drawn from urban and regional studies the arguments made apply equally to comparative anslysis in other fields.' The paper is divided into five parts. First we consider the uses of comparative studies, and distinguish between comparative research and comparative analysis. We then present some conflicting views about the execution of comparative analysis which reflect different theoretical positions and different ideas about underlying causal relations in society. Section I11 uses examples to introduce the three ap- proaches to comparative analysis. Two of these involve the idea of plural causation and the importance of this concept and its implications in urban and regional studies are stressed in the fourth section. We conclude by discussing the scope of comparative analysis in the light of the earlier arguments. I Throughout this paper we shall use the term comparative to refer to crossnational comparisons. This is a conventional but entirely arbitrary usage. Comparisons between cities, classes, genders, etc. are no less important, and the same arguments that will be advanced here can be applied to them, mutatis mutandis. 1) to become aware of diversity and overcome ethnocentricism, 2) to clarify one's theoretical interest in a subject, and 3) to undertake comparative analysis. The uses of comparative studies Three reasons can be distinguished for carrying out comparative studies: This paper is a completely revised version of one first read at University College, London in 1980. It has benefited from commcnts made then and subsequently at the University of Kent, University of Bristol (School of Advanccd Urban Studies), Institute of British Geographers Conference, Leicester 1981, the ESRC/CNRS Symposium on the Comparative Analysis of Arab and Muslim Cities at Birkbeck College, London, 1984, and the Fifth Urban Change and Conflict Conference, University of Susscx, 1985 1 would also like to thank Nick Manning, Bryan Roberts and John Walton for their helpful comments.

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Comparative urban analysis and assumptions about causality by C.G. Pickvance

The aim of this paper is to clarify the meaning of comparative urban analysis, to distinguish three approaches to it, and to argue for the importance of two of them which has not been recognized in the past. Although the examples are drawn from urban and regional studies the arguments made apply equally to comparative anslysis in other fields.'

The paper is divided into five parts. First we consider the uses of comparative studies, and distinguish between comparative research and comparative analysis. We then present some conflicting views about the execution of comparative analysis which reflect different theoretical positions and different ideas about underlying causal relations in society. Section I11 uses examples to introduce the three ap- proaches to comparative analysis. Two of these involve the idea of plural causation and the importance of this concept and its implications in urban and regional studies are stressed in the fourth section. We conclude by discussing the scope of comparative analysis in the light of the earlier arguments.

I

Throughout this paper we shall use the term comparative to refer to crossnational comparisons. This is a conventional but entirely arbitrary usage. Comparisons between cities, classes, genders, etc. are no less important, and the same arguments that will be advanced here can be applied to them, mutatis mutandis.

1) to become aware of diversity and overcome ethnocentricism, 2 ) to clarify one's theoretical interest in a subject, and 3) to undertake comparative analysis.

The uses of comparative studies

Three reasons can be distinguished for carrying out comparative studies:

This paper is a completely revised version of one first read at University College, London in 1980. It has benefited from commcnts made then and subsequently a t the University of Kent, University of Bristol (School of Advanccd Urban Studies), Institute of British Geographers Conference, Leicester 1981, the ESRC/CNRS Symposium on the Comparative Analysis of Arab and Muslim Cities a t Birkbeck College, London, 1984, and the Fifth Urban Change and Conflict Conference, University of Susscx, 1985 1 would also like to thank Nick Manning, Bryan Roberts and John Walton for their helpful comments.

C.G. Pickvance 163

Firstly, comparative studies help one become aware of the diversity of social phenomena and overcome ethnocentric assumptions about what is normal. For example, in the housing field most British laypersons would assume that housing policy is concerned with the distribution of housing, e.g. the provision of consump- tion subsidies such as tax relief for owner occupiers, and housing benefits to tenants; that council housing is the ‘normal’ form of non-market housing provision, and that employers have no role in housing provision.

However, exposure to the housing situation in other countries reveals that housing policy may be more about maximizing the production of new houses, than about consumption, as in the USA and Canada for example (Heidenheimer e f al., 1983). Likewise it turns out that Britian is unusual in the large role of councils in housing provision. All other advanced capitalist societies have a non-market housing sector but this usually consists of non-government bodies - largely depen- dent on government funding - like housing associations in Britain (Wynn, 1983). Finally, the French experience reveals a much greater role of employers in housing provision. All firms above a minimum size have to pay 0.9% (originally 1%) of their payroll as a tax for housing. They also have nomination rights in cases where these funds are subsequently used to build social housing (Pickvance, 1980, Appendix). In Britain, employers only have a formalized influence in the allocation of new town rented housing.

Awareness of this diversity produces a sort of culture shock. It makes one aware of new and unsuspected connections. (The implications of this for comparative analysis are dealt with later.) It also leads to a second reason for comparative studies: to clarify one’s theoretical interest in a topic. The act of comparison forces one to consider what is essential and what is inessential among the observed differ- ences between, say, forms of housing provision in two countries. How one draws this line depends not on an inherent property of housing, but on one’s theoretical interest in it. For example, discovery that council housing in Britain is unusual in being council-controlled makes one question whether this is its essential feature or whether (more likely) one’s interest in it is as an example of non-market housing provision. I f so then it can be placed in the same category as US public housing or French social housing - and British housing association housing. This would reflect a theoretical judgement that what is most important is its (non-market) economic role and that the diversity of institutional forms can be abstracted from, i.e. ignored, for the purpose at hand. In these ways, awareness of diversity through comparative studies forces one to bring theoretical assumptions into the open.

Finally, comparative studies may be carried out in order to undertake compara- tive analysis. This may seem an obscure statement to make. Are not comparative studies or comparative research synonymous with comparative analysis? In my view, no. Indeed I would see terms like comparative research and comparative studies as misnomers. The fact that a study is based on data relating to two or more societies is no guarantee fhat it is a comparative one. Such data are a necessary but not sufficient condition of comparative analysis. It is quite possible to juxtapose

164 Comparative urban analysis and assumptions about causality

data from two societies, or as Walton says, give them ‘serial treatment’ (1981,30). For example, Duncan’s (1981) discussion of the differences between Swedish and French housing is perfectly adequate to his objective of denying Castells’s claims about the generalityof the French-based housing model (1977, 156, 158). But it involves only the ‘serial treatment’ of the two countries, i.e. it goes as far as identi- fying their similarities and differences. A comparative analysis on the other hand goes beyond this and attempts to understand the two (or more) cases in terms of one or more models. It is for this reason that it is only analysis which can be termed comparative.2 The term comparative research is therefore an illegitimate one.

To clarify the meaning of comparative analysis let us return to the observation of diversity in housing provision as mentioned above. At first sight it would appear to mean that no single explanatory model3 is applicable, that different processes are at work in each country. More formally this amounts to saying that differences between countries in the value of the dependent variable (whose variation we are trying to explain) cannot be explained within a single explanatory model.

But hopefully the absurdity of this proposition is self-evident. It amounts to saying that when two countries both have 60% owner occupation the same model applies, but if one rises to 70% and the other remains at 60%, different models are necessary. In fact, of course, explanatory models can explain variation in the phenomenon of interest provided it takes certain forms. Let us consider, for example, Harloe’s argument that ‘owner occupation, at least vis-u-vis the mass production of housing, only emerges when substantial proportions of the potential consumers have long-term stable earnings’ (1981a, 30). Clearly this proposition is capable of explaining differences between countries at one point in time, and within one country over time, It leads us to expect countries to show a diversity of levels of owner occupation (Y), in conformity with the proportions of their population with long-term stable earnings (X), or Y = fi (X), where fi is a function. Before we can establish whether crossnational data conform to this model or not, its terms would have to be operationalized and the shape of the function linking earnings and owner occupation specified, e.g. is it linear, and if so with what shape, is it curvilinear (U-shaped, tapering, J-shaped, etc.)? Assuming this were done, there are three possibilities, each of which corresponds to a type of comparative analysis.

’ This point is clearly made by Zelditch who states that ‘any explanatory generalizing research involves comparison’ (1971, 27!). It is the act of analysis in which one seeks the causes of a phenomenon which involves comparison. Thus even an analysis of a single case involves com- parison since one compares the observed situation with an imagined situation in which the suspected explanatory factorls) are absent (Smelser, 1976, 160-62). Comparative analysis, as discussed here, assumes that data are gathered in two situations. I make no apology for using the term model. It has recently become popular to decry notions like models. levels, abstraction, etc. on the grounds that they involve simplication and artificial separations. Since the complex totality of social reality is not graspable directly, simplifying and necessarily artificial concepts and models are unavoidable. though argument over particular concepts is always possible. Those, like some ‘realists’, who claim to be able to d o without them. have never revealed to what they owe their privileged access to the totality.

CG. Pickvance 165

Firstly the data might turn out to be exactly as postulated by the model. The result would be a (two-variable) single model, Y = fi(X) which applied to all countries: the rationale would be that owner occupation spreads as effective consumer demands expands. This is referred to below as comparative analysis using a single model. Secondly it might turn out that the relationship between earnings and owner occupation took different forms in societies with different levels of industrialization, e.g. Y = fz ( X ) and Y =fa Q This would amount to a reformulation of the original model provided that the difference between f~ and f3 was interpretable within the same market rationale. The two relationships could be rewritten as a single model Y = f, (ZJ), where I is industrialization level. What is distinctive compared to the first case is that we have had to add a societal characteristic, I , into the initial model. This case is referred to below as comparative analysis using linked submodels, (I describe fi and f3 as submodels because they share the same rationale, i.e. owner occupation is related to stable earnings in some form).

A third possibility is that in two groups of societies the level of owner occupation depends on quite different variables. For example that in advanced capitalist societies it depends on the level of stable earnings, Y = f~ (X) , but in state socialist societies it depends negatively on the scale of state house building (Z), Y =fa (2). The latter case would represent a difference of rationale with the extent of owner occupation reflecting the scale of state socialist housing production (gradually dis- placing owner occupied prewar housing) rather than any market rationality. The social process here is fundamentally different from the first two cases. This case is referred to as comparative analysis using diverse models.

Thus it can be seen that diversity at the level of phenomena may be compatible with a single model or with linked submodels, or may require two (or more) distinct models to be formulated? All three cases will be illustrated in Section 111.

What do these three approaches to comparative analysis have in common? The defining characteristic of comparative analysis, as understood here, is that it allows the investigation of influences on the phenomenon or relation of interest’ which are given or constant for one society at one point in time by studying cases in which they vary. Its success depends on the range of variation ‘naturally’ occurring in the societal features in question - given that experimentation is excluded. Some variation in societal features can be observed by studying one country over time, e.g. presence and absence of democratic political systems, or changing position in the world economy. But the range over which these features have varied may be narrow, and the covariation between them makes it difficult to separate out their

The three approaches distinguished here are quite different from those identified by Skocpol and Soniers ( 1 980). All three belong to their category of ‘macrocausal analysis’. (lheir ‘contrasturiented’ category is a form of ‘serial treatment’ - it does not involve comparative analysis. And their ‘parallel comparative’ category has some resemblance to my ‘single model’ approach but is concerned to illustrate the theory rather than expose it to test and refinement.) Comparative analysis may be searching for societal influences on a phenomenon such as owner occupation, or a relationship such as that between income and owner occupation (I’rtcworski and Teune, 1970, 39-46).

166 Comparative urban analysis and assumptions about causality

independent effects. (For this latter reason some writers advocate the study of the influence of syndromes of social characteristics on the phenomena or relationship of interest.)

The advantage of crossnational comparisons is that they allow a wider range of variation to be observed in the societal characteristics of interest, and avoid some of the covariation found in single societies. But the risks are twofold. Firstly the phenomenon or relationship may have a quite different ‘meaning’ in another society. This raises the question of cross-societal equivalence of concepts which is not discussed here (see Smelser, 1976). Secondly, our lesser familiarity with other societies makes it more hkely that some feature unknown to us has an important causal influence on the phenomenon or relationship of interest. The literature on comparative analysis sets out two solutions to this problem. One is t o make a random choice from among societies showing great diversity of societal features in an effort to randomize the effect of unknown societal features. This allows confi- dence limits to be attached to the conclusions reached. This approach is favoured in crossnational attitude or behavioural studies. A more common approach in urban and regional studies is to restrict the societies included to those with certain similari- ties ( e g advanced capitalist, high real income, with democratic political systems). This is the approach advocated by Walton (1973) and termed ‘standarized case comparison’. The advantage is that while enabling one to study the phenomenon of interest in the presence of diverse societal conditions the likelihood of unknown conditions is reduced. These two approaches have been labelled the ‘most different systems’ and ‘most similar systems’ approaches by Przeworski and Teune (1970). They correspond to J.S. Mill’s Method of Difference and Method of Agreement.

There are two common reasons for conducting a comparative analysis: t o dis- cover whether a theoreticallyderived model holds in empirical cases and to see whether an empirically-based relationship derived from the study of one society holds in another. The former applies particularly to the recent popularity of com- parative analysis in the urban studies field as part of the reaction to general theory. The 1970s was a period of grand theory when theoretically-derived models - and even single values of variables - which at best corresponded to realities in one country, were advanced as having general applicability. For example, as mentioned earlier, Castells’s theoretical analysis of housing, formed with France in mind (1977, 145-69) was explicitly presented as having a wider validity, and Harloe (1979) and Duncan (1981) quite rightly took issue with this claim. Comparative analysis is a necessary complement to such theorizing since it gives priority to testing the model over its whole scope of application (Willer, 1967, Chapter 6).

Having suggested three reasons for comparative studies, and argued that only comparative analysis deserves its name, the rest of the paper is concerned with the latter.

C.G. Pickvance 167

I1 Some implications of theoretical positions and beliefs about causation for comparative analysis

We now examine some conflicting views about the types of subject comparative analysis can be applied to, and the types of research design appropriate to it. These reflect basic differences of theoretical position and beliefs about underlying patterns of causality .

In their important textbook on comparative analysis, Przeworski and Teune (1970) show no hesitation in proposing its application to individual behaviour or attitudes. More cautious souls would set their sights ‘lower’ and apply comparative analysis only to macrophenomena, e.g. structural features of societies such as level or pattern or industrialization and urbanization, or aggregate behaviours such as level of migration or residential mobility. Essentially this difference of attitude concerns the sort of regularities one believes to exist in society. Behaviourists insist that crossnational regularities are to be found even at the level of individual be- haviour. In other words they are very optimistic about the levels of disaggregation at which laws are likely to operate. Structuralists on the other hand expect that regularities will only be found at the macrolevel, such as structural features of society, and that the latter set limits to individual behaviour but do not determine it.

Przeworski and Teune distinguish between what I shall call ‘universal‘ and ’relativist patterns of social determination.(T‘heir terms are ‘generalist‘ and ’relativist’.) In the former case it is believed that the underlying causal model is sufficiently general to warrant an Q priori abstraction from spatiotemporal parameters, whereas jn the latter it is expected to be ‘highly specific to particular social systems so that the generality of statements concerning social reality is inherently limited’ (1970, 8). They suggest that the universal pattern may apply to psychological processes and the relativist pattern to social and cultural processes.

Relating this to our previous discussion, if a universal pattern prevails, then no societal characteristics (beyond X and Y , the variables of interest) enters the model, i.e. a given effect always has the same cause. This corresponds to ‘comparative analysis using a single model’. If a relativist pattern prevails, different groups of societies require different models. (Models may differ either because the same vari- ables enter but with different weights, or because they contain different variables.) Depending on the nature of the difference, the models may be a) linked submodels (i.e. where one or more societal characteristics enter the original model) or b) diverse models. These correspond to the second and third types of comparative analysis. In these cases similar effects can have different causes in different places (or times).

The universal/relativist distinction is an extremely important one, and has not received the attention it deserves. One’s beliefs about the universality of underlying causal patterns have major implications for the choice of research topic and the design of research. The key issue in the first respect is that of the acceptable degree of abstraction, i.e. how much of the social whole can be ignored when studying a topic. Abstraction is inevitable in order to cope with complexity, but there are

168 Comparative urban analysis and assumptions about causality

major differences of opinion about how much abstraction is justified. Positivists, for example, are happy to represent countries by their levels of urbanization, in- dustrialization or state intervention in the ‘social’ sphere. The degree of simplification, of abstraction, is extreme: a whole society is reduced to its values on three variables. A different tradition, such as the marxist, with a strong sense of historical process, will reject this level of simplication and insist on the complexity of the processes by which the society reached its levels of urbanization, industrialization, etc. - how they were determined by its position in the world economy, the timing of its indus- trialization, the commercial or industrial role of its cities, etc. (see, for example, Roberts, 1978a). In other words the meaning of the three values will be seen as graspable only through a knowledge of the context or development of that society. In themselves they omit the essential.

Lurking behind this issue of the choice of research topic and how much simpli- ficationit should involve are the more fundamental ones of causation and explanation. For positivists prediction is the prime goal so a relation between, say, housing type (e.g. flat, detached house) and housing satisfaction which holds good in several countries, and withstands the usual tests for spurious correlation, will be said to provide a successful explanation of housing satisfaction. The notion that housing type causes a certain level of satisfaction is not seen as problematic. There are two objections to this example of causal explanation. The first is that it does not ex- plain how or why housing type produces a certain level of satisfaction. This is a demand that a correlation which holds good in a statistical sense must also make theoretical sense - a step often omitted by positivists. The second is a more far- reaching objection and concerns the entities to which causal powers can legitimately be attributed. Any structural understanding of society implies that causal power cannot be attributed to a concept like housing type, since this is to isolate an element of a complex whole. The notion of causality is, rather, a structural one in which the organization of the whole society, and its place in the international context is the ultimate referent. In this case any invariant relation between attri- butes such as housing type and housing satisfaction would be seen as deriving its causal power from this total context - though views diverge as to how much of this context needs to be ‘brought to bear’ in a particular explanation.

Unfortunately there does not seem to be a ‘neutral’ way of resolving these questions. What level of abstraction is judged acceptable, and what notions of causality and explanation are admitted derive from theoretical positions. All that can be pointed out are the dangers for each. For positivists the danger is that the superficial notion of explanation, justified by the quest for prediction, will mean that the conditions which underlie the apparent causal power of attributes or ‘variables’ will be ignored. When these conditions change, the initial causal relation- ship may disappear. If these conditions were built into the initial relationship, it would provide greater predictive power as well as more understanding. For structura- lists, on the other hand, the danger is that commitment to understanding the whole means that the (conditioned) relations between ‘surface’ phenomena are considered not worth attention. In extreme cases this can also lead away from social science to

C.G. Pickvance 169

an idiographic stance where the particular history of one society is emphasized at the expense of any generalities.

One’s beliefs about the universality of causal patterns also influence research design. The ‘most different systems’ designs is favoured by Przeworski and Teune because their main interest is in psychological processes where they believe the universal pattern of social determination applies. Hence they advocate comparisons between the most varied societies in the expectation that the relationships of in- terest will be shown to hold irrespective of their diverse societal features. They claim that ‘if rates of suicide are the same among the Zuni, the Swedes and the Russians, those factors that distinguish these three societies are irrelevant for the explanation of suicide’ (1970, 35).6 But if the relationship of interest turns out to vary between societies, or if the underlying causal pattern is expected on theoreti- cal grounds to differ between types of society the ‘most similar systems’ design is appropriate. Societies are split into groups according to the feature thought likely to influence the pattern of determination of the phenomena of interest: political system (federal vs unitary), culture (Moslem vs Christian), etc. Relationships would be expected which were specific to each group of society. In other words, a series of submodels would be drawn up, each applying in specified conditions.’

In this section we hope to have indicated the variety of ideas about the objects to which comparative analysis can apply (and how much abstraction is justified), the entities to which causal power can be attributed, and what research designs are needed to carry it out. These relate to more basic differences of theoretical position (positivism, structuralism) and assumptions about the universality of relativity of underlying causal patterns.

I11 Three approaches to comparative analysis

We now present three examples of how comparative analysis can cope with diversity at the phenomenal level: using a single model, linked submodels, and diverse models.

1 Comparative analysis using a single model; Schnore’s analysis of urban spatial structure in USA and Latin America

An excellent example of the way comparative analysis can comprehend diversity by means of a single model is Schnore’s (1965) article ‘On the spatial structure of cities in the two Americas’.

This is a quite remarkable claim since it fails to specify any relationship explaining suicide. The claim would only be valid if a) the three societies have similar positions on the variables explaining suicide and b) a relativist model of causation was ruled out. It might be objected that in practice the initial choice between ‘most different systems’and ‘most similar systems’ research designs is irrelevant since each allows the actual pattern of determination to emerge in the end. Whether this is the case is discussed at the end of the next section.

170 Comparative urban analysis and assumptions about causality

His starting point is the Burgess theory of concentric zones and he makes its claims quite clear: it is an ideal type representing the spatial structure which would occur under conditions of radial growth and in the absence of distorting factors such as topography. This is very different from the popular idea that it describes actual spatial structure in every city (in America or worldwide). Schnore then follows Quinn in listing a series of assumptions about cities which were implicit in Burgess’s theory as initial conditions and thereby limited its applicability: ethnic and class heterogeneity, a commercial-industrial economic base, private property, market allocation of land, and efficient transportation in all directions, a single- centred city in which demand for land was highest in the centre, and upper-class preference for peripheral residence. This list makes clear that Burgess had US cities in mind. In drawing it up, Schnore is suggesting pointers to his own more general theory. Schnore then examines studies of class residential patterns in Latin American cities, and discovers that uniformly they reveal a pattern in which the highest classes live centrally, though there is some evidence of a trend for them to live in the periphery.

Faced with this divergence between US and Latin American spatial patterns, a common reaction would be to conclude that the Latin American evidence ‘disproved’ the Burgess model. (This would involve a real misunderstanding of how to handle diverse phenomena, since it implies that a model is constituted not by a relation between X and Y , but by a particular value of Y . ) Where Schnore innovates is in rejecting this ‘obvious’ response, and opting for a single model which embraces both the US and the Latin American evidence. To start with he notes that the ‘Latin American’ spatial pattern has been widely reported outside Latin America in ‘preindustrial’ cities. This comparison follows the ‘most different systems design’ and influences Schnore’s choice of explanatory factor, since it rules out ‘culture’ and brings into play industrial technology. (One suspects this was something of a relief for Schnore since as a human ecologist he treats culture as epiphenomenal!) Schnore then proposes an evolutionary model in which a new variable, technology, takes the place of radial growth and explains the displacement of the ‘Latin Ameri- can’ pattern of residential stratification by the ‘US’ pattern. (This is presented as a universal process, and in empirical support he mentioned ‘traces’ of the preindustrial pattern in US cities.) More specifically technology influences class residential distri- bution through a) competition for central land from emerging commercial and industrial development which makes it less attractive for upper-class residents, and b) new transportation technologies which allow the elite good access to central locations, which they need to exercise economic and political power, without actually living there. Thus the effect of Schnore’s analysis is to select technology as the key ‘hidden’ variable in Burgess’s argument and make it the keystone in a new model of residential stratification with universal application.

At best technology is a partial explanation, since its introduction depends on class and other social interests, andits conditioningeffect on social life is subject to many mediating influences. Human ecology explicitly discounts such processes and Schnore admits that his model points to the necessary but not sufficient conditions

C.G. Pickuance 171

of spatial patterns (1965, 387). But whatever one’s views of the substance of Schnore’s model (see Yujnovsky, 1975; Gilbert, 1982) it can only be regarded as a fine (and ambitious) illustration of how comparative analysis using a single explana- tory model can comprehend divergent observations. But an evolutionary assumption is not a necessary part of single models in comparative analysis.

2 Comparative analysis using linked submodels: Mullins’s analysis of home ownership and state infrastructure provision

The second type of approach to comparative analysis involves linked submodels. Our illustration is Mullins’s (1981) pathbreaking work which started from a study of Australian urbanization, and was inspired by Gordon’s (1977) work on US urbanization. (See Pickvance, 1985a, for another application.)

Mullins’s interest is in explaining crossnational differences in owner occupation and state urban infrastructure provision. To do this he sets out three submodels applying to mercentile, industrial and corporate capitalism and argues that each has a characteristic Urbanization process. The rationale in each case is a marxist one of capital accumulation and class struggle. But whereas an evolutionary model would assert that every country had to pass through each of these stages, Mullins denies this. In particular he argues that Australia passed from mercantile to corporate capitalism and that this has important (and continuing) effects on its urbanization pattern. (For a similar approach to socialist urbanization, see Murray and Szelenyi, 1984.)

The submodels of urbanization are as follows. In industrial capitalism, factory production has three effects. It places a premium on the residential location of workers nearby, and this encourages the provision of rental housing by property capital. I t encourages state infrastructure provision to meet industrial needs, such as roads, railways, water and sewerage, and residential infrastructure develops as a spin-off from this. Finally factories encourage a strong working class whch makes greater demands on the state. Consequently, he argues, under industrial capitalism, there will be a growth of rented housing (and possibly public rented housing) and a low level of owner occupation, and a high level of state involvement in urban infrastructure. By contrast in mercantile capitalism, the same logic of worker concen- tration around factories and urban infrastructure provision is absent. Infrastructure provision is if anything rural and the mercantile working class is weak: the strongest working class development is in extractive industry which is mostly rural. As a result the economic and social pressures for rented housing and extensive state involvement are weak. Owner occupation and low infrastructure provision are characteristic. In corporate capitalism, on the other hand, suburbanization is the characteristic urban form and this entails owner occupation and extensive state infrastructure provision.

Mullins’s argument is that this framework enables one to understand the con- trasting patterns of urbanization across societies and over time according to the predominant form of capitalism. His evidence is of two kinds. Firstly crossnational

172 Comparative urban analysis and assumptions about causality

comparisons of Australia, New Zealand and Iceland (as primarily mercantile econo- mies) and European countries (as primarily industrial economies). Since the war he expects some degree of convergence with the general spread of corporate capitalism. The best evidence would be prewar, before the counteracting effect of corporate capitalism had become pronounced. In fact the data he uses is exclusively postwar. It shows a) a consistently higher level of owner occupation among the three mercantile countries in 1970 compared with the west European countries (Table 1) and b) a convergence between Britain and Australia since 1947: for Britain the rate of owner occupation rose from 9% (1919) to26%(1947)and 50% in 1971 while for Australia it rose from 50% (191 1) to 53% (1947) and 69% in 1971 (Mullins, 1981,70).

Table 1

Iceland 71 France 43 Australia 69 Sweden 36 New Zealand 68 West Germany 34 Belgium 56 Switzerland 28 Britain 50

Rates of owner occupation by country, 1970

Source: Mullins (1981, 70).

Secondly, Mullins contrasts the level of owner occupation and sewerage provision among Australian state capitals over time. The justification for this is that the argument developed for intercountry comparisons should also apply to intercity comparisons since the Australian states had very different histories of development. The data in Table 2 show that, prior to 1939, in the two more industrialized centres (Sydney and Melbourne), levels of owner occupation were lower and levels of sewerage provision higher than in the two less industrialized centres (Perth and Brisbane), exactly as predicted. Since 1945 there has been a large degree of con- vergence, again as Mullins's argument about corporate capitalism would predict.

l'able 2 Extent of owner occupation (0) and domestic sewerage (S) provision in major Australian cities, 19 1 1-7 1

Less industrialized cities More industrialized cities Brisbane Perth Sydney Melbourne 0 S 0 S 0 S 0 S

~-

1911 46 - 41 - 31 - 35 - 1921 60 0 55 na 40 83 45 94

83 - 96 - 49 - 1931 - 20 1947151 60 34 55 61 40 74 40 79 1961 74 33 73 63 68 74 72 70 1971 70 65 66 49 66 78 70 76

Source: Mullins (1981, Tables 1 and 2). n.b. Owner occupation data 1947: sewerage data 1951.

C. G. Pickvance 173

Like Schnore, Mullins shows how comparative analysis can handle diverse ob- servations. Mullins’s three submodels are linked because all share an underlying rationale in which capital accumulation is the shaping force - but he makes no evolutionary assumption. His work is an excellent example of comparative analysis, in particular because it tests an argument at crossnational and crosscity levels. Mullins would, however, be the first to admit that he is theorizing in an area where there is little previouswork-but see Szelenyi(l981,584-89),Berry(1983; 1984)’.

3 Comparative analysis using diverse models: urban and regional sirnilanties in capitalist and state socialist societies

So far we have examined cases of comparative analysis where the models involved had a single rationale. In the present case, however, the models involved are diverse: they have contrasting rationales.

The debate here goes back to the start of the political economy approach in urban and regional studies. It concerns the parallels between capitalist and state socialist societies and how they are to be explained. Szelenyi (1972; 1978; 1983)

’ Before leaving Mullins’s work it is worth examining the criticism levelled at it by Kemeny (1 983) and Mullins’s response (1 983). Kemeny’s major objections concern the explanatory model used, and the choice of data to be explained, Kemeny argues that Mullins’s model of stages of capitalist development is economistic and classifies but does not explain, and suggests instead that class conflict should be made central. This is not a damaging criticism. For pur- poses of exposition Mullins emphasizes stages, but it is clear that class conflict is the motor of his model bringing about evolution between stages according to the particular internal and external conditions of the country concerned (Mullins, 1983). At best Kemeny suggests the need to bring out more clearly the mediations between economic structure and urban struc- ture. At worst he implies that social classes are free-floating entities unrelated to economic structure. (It is notable that by focusing on the postwar period Kemeny bypasses the issue

Kemeny’s criticisms of Mullins’s choice of data relate exclusively to the crossnational comparisons. He makes no comment on the crosscity comparisons, let alone advance an alter- native analysis. Firstly Kemeny emphasizes the variation in recent home ownership rates in European countries - see Table 1 - and the fact that in some cases they have fallen since the war. These are not basic criticisms since a) the most relevant evidence on the Mullins thesis would be prewar, before convergence under corporate capitalism set in, and b) he is now seek- ing to explain the detailed evolution of owner occupation. but only broad trends. Secondly. Kemeny points out that the USA and Canada have owner occupation rates of over 60%. Several responses to this are possible. The weakest would be to quibble about the precise figure. More sensibly one might ask what capitalist development in these countries would lead one to expect. In fact in both countries, despite regional variation, urbanization has been C ~ O ~ Y linked to mercantile development centred around staples production (Roberts, 1978b. 611-19). This suggests that the US and Canadian data support Mullins’s argument since high owner occupation is a feature of such developnient.

I t should be noted that Mullins’s submodel of urbanization under industrial capitalism assumes that population concentration, a strong working class, and state provision are found together. Roberts’s ( 1981 ) article on comparative industrialization in Manchester, Barcelona and Lima, however, shows that in the first two cities the need for collective goods and services arising from industrialization was to some extent met by industrial firms themselves.

of stages.)

174 Comparative urban analysis and assumptions about causality

has documented the emerging pattern of housing stratification in Hungary in the late 1960s. Pahl, on the other hand, focused more on east European and Soviet regional development (1977a; 1977b; 1977c) though his evidence was more anec- dotal. In each case it was claimed that parallels exist between east and west: the distribution of housing is highly class-stratified, and the development of different regions is highly unequal. The issue was what interpretation should be placed on these observations.

On the face of it the observed parallels emerge out of ‘most different systems’ research design. The logic of this design is that similar observations made in two societies are due to their common features. Hence the only problem was to know which among the common features of, say, Hungary and Britain, were determinant. Pahl’s writings on regional development followed this line of argument. He argued that large-scale technology generated its own logic of location which would tend to prevail whatever the official ideology of the society, and that bureaucrats (or ‘urban managers’) act in pursuit of their own interest again in opposition to their political masters. In other words, there were reasons for thinking that the admitted ideological differences between Hungary and Britain concealed deeper-level similarities. For Pahl it was industrialism and the size and complexity of society which placed managers and decision makers in common situations, irrespective of ideology, and led to similar patterns of outcomes. Within this model, Pahl explains different patterns in terms of different levels of production or real income. It is thus clearly an evolutionary technological/bureaucratic convergence model.

But is this argumentation secure? It rests on two foundations: empirical obser- vation (of similarities) and theoretical assumption (that similar features have common causes, following the universal model of determination). I shall argue that the universal model is no more than an assumption, and that a contrasting inter- pretation is possible.

In Szelenyi’s analysis of housing stratification he implicitly rejects this model in favour of the relativist model which holds that similar urban inequalities could occur for different reasons in capitalist and state socialist societies. Szelenyi’s study of housing in Hungary revealed that state-provided housing was allocated dispro- portionately in favour of higher-status employees, rather than to compensate lower-income groups. The result was a clear pattern of inequality in housing distri- bution. Szelenyi insists that these inequalities ‘arise logically from the socialist system of production and distribution’ (1983,4) actually existing in Hungary. One could thus conclude that in both Britain and Hungary higher income groups gain superior housing, but through different processes. In Britain market rationality (ability to pay) is the main factor, whereas in Hungary. bureaucratic allocation is responsible. (See Hegedus and Tosics ( 1983) for a discussion of post- 1970 trends in Hungarian housing.)

Pahl and Szelenyi’s approaches to east-west urban and regional comparisons do not, in my view, differ primarily in respect of their empirical starting point. In this 1 disagree with Harloe (1981b. 187. 188) 1’oi whom the enipirical extent of similari- ties is a key point in resolving the dchatc. i.e. that Pahl‘s view would be strengthened

C.G. Pickvance 175

if more similarities were found. Nor do I agree that it would be helpful to this debate to study ‘urban developments in societies with rather differing levels of production to see whether the latter did in fact have a powerful influence on the former factors’ (Harloe, 1981b, 187). Rather, the key point at issue concerns theoretical assumptions regarding the processes by which empirical similarities are produced. By proceeding from a universal model of determination - the idea that similar phenomena musr have common causes - Pahl precludes the possibility that they might have different causal patterns, and Szelenyi’s major step forward is to show how this can happen.

But, one might ask, why is there a problem here? Surely causal processes are observable and one should be able to resolve empirically whether level of technology, level of production, bureaucracy, etc. or mode of production and distribution is the key explanatory factor. Unfortunately the premise is invalid. the attribution of cause is always a matter of inference relying on theoretical assumption, and while empirical observation may lend support to our inferences it cannot do more (Pick- vance, 1982). Moreover in the present case the nature of the potential causes makes matters more difficult: concepts like technology and level of production refer to broad background factors which cannot be observed ‘in action’. (In contrast one can get closer to processes of housing allocation: a study of outcomes can in principle be supported by a study of housing managers ‘in action’.) There are thus empirical problems in identifying and measuring potential causes here, but the key one is of theoretical assumption. Researchers committed to a universal model of determina- tion will tend to be satisfied with an explanatory model which conforms to it and will not look further. Researchers committed to a relativist model will tend only to be satisfied when patterns of causation specific to a group of societies have been uncovered.

The debate over east-west urban and regional similaritiesis not therefore resoluble on the basis of the number of such similarities but involves different assumptions about the universality of underlying causal patterns. The assumption of the ‘most different systems’ research design that similarities arise from a universal causal pattern is very deeply rooted, and indeed is the basis of the classical experimental design. But what is valid for natural science is not necessarily so for social science. The common features shared by two societies may not be the cause of similar phenomena occurring in them. In the next section I will argue that relativist patterns of causality are widespread in social science.

IV Plural causation and its implications for comparative urban analysis

The work of Schnore, Pahl, Mullins and Szelenyi demonstrates different approaches to comparative analysis. Schnore and Pahl use single models to explain different residential patterns in the US and Latin America, and similarities between east and west in housing stratification and regional inequalities. Mullins uses linked sub- models to explain similarities and differences in owner occupation and infrastructure.

176 Comparative urban analysis and assumptions about causality

And Szelenyi uses two models with different rationales to account for east-west similarities. The argument here is not that any one of the three approaches to comparative analysis is always appropriate, but that the linked submodels and diverse models approaches need proper recognition. The reason why they have lacked this recognition is that the relativist model of causation which they share threatens deeply-held beliefs about causality which have long been central to social science methodology, and because of the association of comparative analysis with convergence theory.

We are faced with a paradox. On the one hand, Przeworski and Teune argue, rightly I believe, that the relativist model of causation is predominant in social and cultural processes, and Mullins and Szelenyi make good use of it in their different approaches to comparative analysis. Yet on the other hand the conventional approach to social science method generally and to comparative analysis in particular is firmly based on the universal model.

In this section I shall illustrate the latter point by examining the fate of the notion of ‘plural causation’, and then discuss its implications for comparative urban analysis.

The essence of the relativist model of causation is that it acknowledges that the same phenomenon can occur for different reasons or causes in different cases. What is involved here is a notion of causality which has enjoyed a furtive existence since its recognition by J.S. Mill in 1843.What he called the ‘plurality of causes’ has been referred to by others as plural causation, the term used here.’

Mill’s discussion occurs in Chapter 10 of System of logic. He points out that for simplicity his discussion of the Canons of Scientific Inquiry in Chapters 8 and 9 had assumed that single causes were connected with single effects - both in the sense that given causes had unique and thus distinct effects, and that given effects had unique and thus distinct causes. But he now states that: ‘[this] supposition does not hold in either of its parts . . . it is not true that the same phenomenon is always produced by the same causes; the effect a may sometimes arise from A, sometimes from B . . . ’ (1906,285). He goes on to point o u t that:

one of the principal consequences of this fact of Plurality of Causes, is, to render the first of the inductive methods, that of Agreement, uncertain. To illustrate that method we supposed two instances, A B C followed by a b c , and A D E followed by a d e. From these appearances it might apparently be concluded that A is an invariable antecedent of a . . . The moment, however we let in the possibility of a plurality of causes, the conclusion fails. For it involves a tacit suggestion that a must have been produced in both instances by fhc same cause. If there can possibly have been two causes, those two may, for example, be C and E: the one may have been the cause of a in the former of the instances Iin the above example], the other in the latter, A having no influence in either case (1906, 286. emphasis added).

’ This is a quite distinct idea from that ol’multiple causation whrre several causes act logether. but it is always the same causcs and in the same weights. With plural causation, different causes. o r the s3nic causes with different weights. act to produce a phenomenon in different societics o r groups 01’ societies.

C.G. Pickvunce 177

This is of course precisely what we argued in the case of housing inequalities in capitalist and state socialist societies. It shows that Mill clearly has in mind the idea of plural causation. His own examples are mechanical motion, sensations and death, each of which can be produced by different causes on different occasions. Mill not only recognizes the idea of plural causation but, like Przeworski and Teune later, he sees it is a particularly acute problem in social science (1906,298, 576).

In view of Mill’s discussion we would expect that more recent writers on social science methodology would make plural causation central to their presentations. In fact what we find is an astonishing silence: most writers make no mention of plural causation and the few that do treat it with embarrassment. Some of the latter group will be briefly referred to.

Cohen and Nagel (1934, 270) in their standard text clearly appreciate the force of the notion since they devote some space to denying what they call the ‘doctrine’ of plural causation. They use the examples of death and fires, and claim that since specialists can find differences between deaths and fires caused in different ways, they are not the ‘same’ phenomena in each case. But this amounts to making the cause part of the phenomenon to be explained, or denying that it is meaningful to talk of fire or death rouc court. This is an arbitrary view and seems to derive from their strongly held belief (doctrine?) that single effects have single causes. Their only concession is to admit that ‘for many purposes it is perhaps convenient’ to abandon their view!

Some later writers also mention the notion of plural causation. Goode and Hatt (1952, 74-75) and Zelditch (197 1 , 2 10) both follow Mill and agree that it weakens his Method of Agreement. Nagel admits the idea that ‘the cause of an event is a necessary (or indispensable) condition for its occurrence, [but] the necessity may be only relative’ (1965,20) The addition of ‘contingent necessity’ to the usual stronger notions of cause (absolute necessity, sufficiency) involved Nagel in a com- plete reversal of position since his example - bank failure and its many causes - could well have been used in his 1934 text along with fire and death to deny plural causation. The anthropologist Kobben (1968) acknowledges plural causation but like the later Nagel does not see it as central. Finally Smelser in his comparative text admits that ‘it is possible, even probable that for Weber ‘different sets of causes give rise to the same effect’ (1976, 142). However, he does not agree and argues that plural causation is spurious and caused by a failure to identify all the relevant factors operating. Of all these writers the sociologist Zelditch is most aware of the ubiquity of plural causation. In particular he notes that good ideas will be abandoned too readily if Mill’s Canons of Inquiry are adhered to too strictly. For the remainder it is an embarrassment, of marginal importance.

In sum the notion of plural causation threatens to upset the applecart of social science method and has thus been relegated to the status of an oddity in the handful of methodological writings which mention it. Correspondingly, comparative analysis based on plural causation or the relativist model of causation as we called it earlier has remained in the shadow of that based on universal models: the single model approach has prevailed over the linked submodel and diverse model approaches.

178 Comparative urban analysis and assumptions about cnusality

What are the implications of the prevalence of plural causation for comparative urban analysis?

The most important is that it enables one t o develop more sophisticated and richer explanations. Rather than be bound t o the idea that social phenomena can be brought about in only one way, the diversity of causal processes becomes a legiti- mate area of inquiry. This was clearly shown in Szelenyi’s argument on east-west comparison. If Szelenyi had not implicitly been working with an idea of plural causation, he would have been confined in a straitjacket: the universal model of causation would have required him t o search for common causes for common effects, and hence lead in the direction of a technocratic-organizational theory - or possibly t o the reductio ad absurdum that Hungary was a capitalist society.

Another example is the differing patterns of causation operating o n British regional policy at different times. Regional policy originated in the 1930s as a limited response t o regional concentrations of unemployment. But in the 1960s and early 1970s under the influence of Labour and Conservative governments committed to modernization, regional policy was used t o bolster manufacturing investment in the regions however small its effects in reducing unemployment (Pickvance, 198 1). The reasons for channelling some investment incentives in this form - when others were available nationally - was as a response t o the pressures from local ‘spatial coalitions’ (Pickvance, 1985b). But in the changes announced in late 1984 regional policy has been cu t in amount and partly subjected t o a cost/job criterion, thereby reducing the grants given t o projects creating few jobs. I would argue that this dramatic change reflects a new pattern of causes in which the priority accorded t o modernization investment has declined and the need t o respond t o local spatial coalitions has risen so as t o become a major factor sustaining regional policy - as well as influencing the areas covered by it (Pickvance, 1986). In this way plural causation helps one t o be aware of the changing causation of a given phenomenon in one country over time, as well as the different causal patterns underlying similar phenomena in different countries.

A second important implication of plural causation is that it discourages the premature abandonment o f promising ideas. For example, if we find evidence that contradicts our expectations, then working within a universal model of causation, we are obliged to reject our working hypothesis. However, with a relativist model (plural causation) we might be able t o imagine ways in which it can be retained. For example in a recent study of local politics in Dartford and Chatham, Smith (1985) was unable t o discover any evidence of business influence on local council policy. He might therefore have jettisoned the idea as relevant in the American but not in the British context. Instead, by pursuing it he found historical evidence t o support the thesis that urban politics in the two towns had gone through three phases: a) business people as philanthropists, b ) business control of council policy (as councils expanded their functions and taxation powers), and c) council ailtononly of business but frequently acting in support of present and potential interests). In this way the initial insight could be retained and the changing patterns of causal influence of dif- ferent groups in local politics over time and between countries could be explored.

C. ‘3. Pickvilnce 179

These examples show that some past work has implicitly used plural causation - but without any clear methodological basis. I would suggest that the traditional caution in urban studies towards making comparisons of very different societies reflects the same tacit recognition of the problems with methods based on universal models of causation. Thus Castells argues against east-west comparisons and in favour of comparisons ‘within the same type of system’ (1975, 18). Similarly Abu- Lughod (1 976) distinguishes between ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ comparisons and considers only those limited to countries of similar culture and technological level t o be legitimate. The choice of common features in this method is a matter of theoretical judgement. (Some idea of the evolution of the field can be seen by com- paring Sjoberg’s (1959) and Walton’s (1981) overviews of comparative urban research.) By bringing plural causation out into the light hopefully the basis for choosing ‘similar’ cases can be clarified.

A third implication of plural causation concerns convergence theory. Compara- tive analysis using a single model does not imply a convergence theory. If the two occur together the connection is accidental. Thus while Schnore’s analysis did assume that technology would always advance, Harloe’s model linking owner occupation and stable earnings does not require that movement is in one direction only. Indeed with continuing economic crisis it is evident that the recent growth in mortgage defaults (fourfold between 1980 and 1984 in Britain) can reverse the so- called natural upward trend in owner occupation without necessarily challenging the relationship with stable earnings. The linked submodels and diverse models approaches to comparative analysis are least likely to be associated with convergence theory. Szelenyi’s work points out that there is a logic inherent in Hungarian state socialism that leads to housing inequality. For convergence to be a matter of pro- cess rather than outcome it would have to be shown that this logic was unstable and was giving way to market rationality (or, less likely, that the market principle was declining in capitalist societies). Mullins points out how a marxist approach need not imply convergent evolution. He does not claim that all societies pass through each of his three stages, but only that certain consequences follow from being in a given stage. Likewise I have argued that although urban movements are most numerous and radical in specific societal conditions (absence of democratic politics or long-term one party rule, rising state social intervention) there is no law that state social intervention can only rise (as we are seeing at present) or that demo- cratic politics once established are secure (as witness many Latin American countries) (Pickvance, 1985a). To sum up, one can say that while convergence theory pre- supposes a single model of comparative analysis (universal causation), none of the three approaches to comparative analysis assumes convergence theory.’ Hence comparative urban analysis can stay clear of debates over convergence theory if it chooses. (See in this connection Harloe and Martens’s (1984) attempt to rescue

l o A similar argument is made in the context of structural-functionalism by Cole (1973) who shows that explanations of how given functions are performed in different societies which appeal to functional alternatives are in fact admitting plural causation. For another applica- tion see Walton (1977, 204).

180 Comparative urban analysis and assumptions about musality

comparative housing analysis from its traditional attachment to convergence theory.)

The final point about plural causation is more speculative. It is frequently pointed out that places which are similar on some variable - owner occupation, residential segregation, political structure - simply ‘feel different’ to people living there. Ob- viously this could be due to differences perceptable at a finer level, or to other factors entirely. But it is possible that different causal processes involved help explain this different ‘feel’.

Having argued for the importance of plural causation in comparative urban analysis, in the conclusion some assessment of the potential of comparative analysis will be made.

V

Comparative analysis cannot take the place of single-country studies. For practical reasons, it is highly dependent on secondary analyses of such studies. It asks a different type of question: what is the effect of societal features that are constant in a single country study on the relationship or phenomenon of interest. Plural causa- tion is essentially an aid to discovering the complexity of these effects.

Three types of work are necessary: detailed single-country monographs which convey their full particularity in some respect; studies which identify structural features in one or more countries; and comparative analyses proper. Without mono- graphic studies the abstraction of isolated features is likely to be unwarranted as in the positivist tendency of ‘throwing into the hopper all cities at all times from all over to see which traits and isolated characteristics appear congruent and divergent’ (Abu-Lughod, 1976, 21). But writers of monographs are often reluctant to pick out key structural features which can be taken as starting points for comparative analysis. A commitment to complexity and particularity arising from such studies often discourages abstractive thought. This is why a second type of study which focuses on potential structural features is so useful. A good example is Newton’s (1974) work on local political systems in the US and Britain which identifies dimensions of comparison, such as centralization of political power at city level (few vs numerous local governmental units), and at national level (central control vs local autonomy), the extent to which communities are organized into parties and/or pressure groups etc. This immediately suggests bases for comparative analysis.

Finally, one needs comparative analyses proper. These can never substitute for the previous types of study. They deliberately operate at a higher level of abstrac- tion than single-country studies. This is because they focus on what is general (i.e. applies to more than one society) and are indifferent to the particularity of a society. To be more precise they seek to capture some aspects of the specificity of a society (its positions on variables which are included in the model, and their interaction) but not others (its positions on excluded variables, their interaction. and their links with included variables). Accusations by those familiar with a country

The scope of comparative analysis

C. G. Pickvunce 18 1

that comparative analyses are simplistic are thus always valid. But that criticism misses the point since no description can be complete. The real issue is what level of abstraction/inclusion is necessary for the purpose in hand. In comparative analysis that purpose is to uncover what is general and the extent of this cannot be known beforehand. Some writers (e.g. Headey, 1978, Chapter 9) argue that only broad societal ‘conditions’ such as technological level, income level and political system are likely to be the subject of such general propositions. But there is no obvious reason why the role of agents such as classes as well as structures should not also be included - as in the comparative analysis of strikes (Korpi and Shalev, 1980).

The main argument of this paper is that comparative analysis should employ all three of the approaches illustrated in Section 111: single models, linked submodels and diverse models. The connection between research design and assumptions about underlying causal patterns needs to be recognized, and in particular the way that natural science research designs assume the existence of universal patterns. Against this I have argued that, in social science, relativist patterns of causation are wide- spread and can only be discovered by the elaboration of linked submodels and diverse models. It was shown that the notion of cause they assume, plural causation, is a perfectly legitimate one which deserves recognition after such a long period of marginalization. But I have also argued that the nature of underlying patterns of causation can never be resolved on the basis of empirical observation. It is always partly a matter of inference and hence theoretical assumption. By paying attention to plural causation the fruitfulness of comparative urban analysis will be maximized.

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On distingue trois categories d’analyses comparatives en fonction de leur objectif, B savoir accroitre la conscience de la diversite, apporter une clarification sur le plan thtorique et enfin entreprendre une analyse comparative. On soutient que I’Ctude de deux ou plusieurs wcittes ne font appel B une Ctude comparative que dans le cas oh des modkles explicatifs sont elaborks pour rendre compte de leurs differences et de leurs similarites. Trois approches de I’analyse comparative sont alors distinguees selon le type de modtle tlabore. Elles wnt illustrees h partir des travaux de Schnore sur la structure de I’espace urbain, I’etude de Mullins sur I’urbanisation en Australie et le dtbat entre Pahl et Szelenyi au sujet des paralleles Est-Ouest. Deux de ces approches renvoient au concept de la ‘causation plurielle’, selon lequel diverses manifestation d’un phtnomhe donne peuvent &re produites de facons diffkrentes. II est dit que ce type precis de causation mtrite mieux que la place marginale qui lui est accordee par les sciences sociales et qu’il prCsente un certain nombre d’avantages pour I’analyse comparative en urbanisme. Des exemples sont fournis B I’appui.

Unterschieden werden drei verschiedene Zwecke von vergleichenden Untersuchungen: um das BewuBtsein uber die Vielgestaltigkeit zu erhohen, zur theoretischen Klarung und fur die vergleichende Analyse. Es wird der Standpunkt eingenommen, daB die Untersuchung von zwei oder mehr Gesellschaften nur dann die Venvendung von verglejchender Analyse mit such bringt, wenn Erklarungsmodelle konstruiert werden, um auf die Ahnlichkeiten und Unterxhiede zwischen ihnen einzugehen. Danach werden drei verschiedene Ansatze fur die vergleichende Analyse unterschieden, und zwar gemI3 Art des konstruierten Modells. Diese werden veranschanlicht mithilfe von Schnores Arbeit uber urbane Raumstrukteu, Mullins’ Analyse der australischen Uranusuerung und der Debatte zwischen Pahl und Szelenyi uber ost-westliche Parallelen. Bei zwei Ansatzen geht es um die Idee der ‘Mehrfach-Kausalitat’ (‘plural causation’), wonach verschiedene Beispiele eines Phanomens auf unterschiefliche Weise verursacht werden konnen. Es wird argumentiert, daB diese Art von Kausalitat ihren marginalen Status in den Sozialwissenschaften nicht ‘verdient, sondern mehrere Vorteile fur die vergleichende Analyse urbaner Verhaltnisse bietet. Diese werden veranschaulicht.

Se distinguen tres objetivos de estudios comparados: para aumentar la percepci6n de la diversidad, para la aclaracidn te6rica, y para realizar un anfilisis comparado. Se sostiene qur 10s estudios de dos o m8s sociedades s610 comprenden el anfilisis comparado si se construyen modelos explucativos para justificar las semejanzae y diferencias entre ellas. Se distinguen entonces tres enfoques del anfilisis comparado segun el tipo de modelo construido. Estos se ilustran mediante el trabajo de Schnore sobre la estructura espacial urbana, el anfilisis de Mullins respecto a la urbanizaci6n australiana y el debate entre Pahl y Szelenyi relativo a paralelos entre Oriente y Occidente. Dos de 10s enfoques comprenden la idea de ‘causalidad plural’, segun la cual se pueden causer casos diferentes de un fen6meno de diferentes modos. Se sostienne que este tipo de causalidad no merece la condicidn marginal que tiene en las ciencias sociales y que presenta varias ventajas para el anfilisis urbano comparado, las cuales se hallan ilustradas.