Report of the

COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON LESSONS LEARNT AND RECONCILIATION

November 2011

i

MembersoftheCommission

ChittaRanjandeSilvaEsquire,P.C.Chairman

Dr.AmrithRohanPereraEsquire,P.C.

ProfessorKarunaratneHangawatteEsquire,

ChandirapalChanmugamEsquire,

HewaMataraGamageSiripalaPalihakkaraEsquire,

Mrs.ManohariRamanathan

MaxwellParakramaParanagamaEsquire,

MohamedThowfeekMohamedBafiqEsquire.

ii

iii

iv

v

vi

vii

viii

mCIK fldIka iNd mkf;a 2 jk j.ka;sh hgf;a w;s.re ckdm;s;=uka iska

m;alrk ,o W.;a mdv iy m%;sikaOdkh ms

x

15thNovember2011

AbbreviationsandAcronyms

CARE CooperativeforAssistanceandReliefEverywhereCCHA ConsultativeCommitteeonHumanitarianAssistanceCDS ChiefofDefenceStaffCFA CeasefireAgreementCGES CommissionerGeneralofEssentialServicesDMI DirectorMilitaryIntelligenceDS DivisionalSecretariatENDLF EelamNationalDemocraticLiberationFrontEPDP EelamPeoplesDemocraticPartyEPRLF EelamPeople'sRevolutionaryLiberationFrontFDL ForwardDefenceLineFTR FamilyTracingandReunificationUnitGA GovernmentAgentGN GramaNiladhariGOSL GovernmentofSriLankaHR HumanRightsHSZ HighSecurityZoneICRC InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCrossIDP InternallyDisplacedPersonIHL InternationalHumanitarianLawIMF InternationalMonetaryFundINGO InternationalNongovernmentalOrganizationJOC JointOperationsCommandKKS KankesanthuraiLTTE LiberationTigersofTamilEelamMOD MinistryofDefenceMPCS MultiPurposeCooperativeSocietiesNCO NonCommissionedOfficerNGO NongovernmentalOrganizationNFZ NoFireZonePHI PublicHealthInspector

xi

PLOTE People'sLiberationOrganisationofTamilEelamPTA PreventionofTerrorismActPTF PresidentialTaskForceforResettlement,DevelopmentandSecurityintheNorthern

ProvincePTK PuthukkudiyiruppuRDS RuralDevelopmentSocietyREPPIA RehabilitationofPersons,PropertiesandIndustriesAuthoritySCOPP SecretariatforCoordinatingthePeaceProcessSEZ SpecialEconomicZoneSIHRN SubCommitteeforImmediateHumanitarianNeedsSLA SriLankaArmySLMM SriLankaMonitoringMissionSTF SpecialTaskForceTELO TamilEelamLiberationOrganisationTMVP TamilMakkalViduthalaiPulikalUAV UnmannedAerialVehicleUNHCR UnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugeesUNOCHA UNOfficeoftheCoordinatorforHumanitarianAffairsUNRC/HC UNResidentandHumanitarianCoordinatorWFP WorldFoodProgram

xii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Inpresentingthisfinalreport,theCommissionwishestoplaceonrecorditssincerethankstoallthosewho,indifferentways,extendedtheirsupporttotheworkoftheCommission.

TheCommission thanksall thosewhosent inwritten submissions,and thosewhopresentedthemselvesbeforetheCommissionandsharedtheirviews,onmattersrelevanttothemandateof theCommission.Particularmention ismadeof thegeneralpublicwhotravelled fromafarandthosewhoareresidingabroadandvolunteeredtoappearbeforetheCommissiontosharetheirviews.TheCommissionalsowishestothankallthosewhoseexpertiseintheirrespectivefieldsassisteditinitsdeliberations.

Itwas a sourceof encouragement for theCommissioners to see theenthusiasm shownbyalargenumberofmembersof thepublicwho followed thepublic sessionsof theCommissionheldinColomboandthedistricts.

TheCommissionthanksboththeprintandelectronicmedia,forthewidecoveragetheygavetotheproceedingsoftheCommission,heldbothinColomboand,also,inveryremoteareasofthecountry.

InfulfillingitsmandatetheCommissionneededtovisitseveralpartsofthecountry,andhadtoseektheassistanceofmanyGovernmentofficialsandotherinstitutions,bothinColomboandthe other districts, with regard to logistics. The willing support extended by these officials,greatlyfacilitatedtheworkoftheCommission,andtheCommissionexpressesitsthankstoallofthem.

Inconclusion,theCommissionwishestoexpress itssincerethankstotheformerandpresentSecretaryoftheCommission,Seniorstaffmembers,Consultantsandtoallothermembersofthe Secretariat staff, and the interpreters and translatorswhoperformed their dutieswith asense of responsibility and dedication, even beyond their call of duty, to our completesatisfaction.

xiii

TABLEOFCONTENTS

PREAMBLE...................................................................................................................................................1

CHAPTER1INTRODUCTIONANDMETHODOLOGY.................................................................5

CHAPTER2CEASEFIREAGREEMENT.........................................................................................11

Introduction.........................................................................................................................................................12

BackgroundtotheCeasefireAgreement.............................................................................................................12

PoliticalandSecurityDimensions........................................................................................................................14

NegotiatingProcess.............................................................................................................................................15

ResultingImpactontheProvisionsoftheCFA.....................................................................................................16

FactorswhichhadabearingontheImplementationoftheCFA..........................................................................18

EconomicandSocialDimensions.........................................................................................................................20

ObservationsoftheCommission.........................................................................................................................22

CHAPTER3OVERVIEWOFSECURITYFORCESOPERATIONS.........................................................31

Background..........................................................................................................................................................32

EasternOperations..............................................................................................................................................33

WanniOperations................................................................................................................................................34

SecurityForcesCasualtiesandLTTECasualties....................................................................................................37

CHAPTER4HUMANITARIANLAWISSUES.......................................................................................38

PrinciplesofInternationalHumanitarianLaw......................................................................................................40

SriLankaExperience............................................................................................................................................49

EvaluationoftheSriLankaExperienceinthecontextofallegationsofviolationsofIHL...................................115

ConcludingObservationsontheIHLregimeinitsapplicationtoInternalConflicts............................................130

Casualties..........................................................................................................................................................137

Channel4Video.................................................................................................................................................147

CHAPTER5HUMANRIGHTS......................................................................................................153

xiv

Introduction.......................................................................................................................................................154

Humanrightsissuesarisingfromtheconflict....................................................................................................156

CHAPTER6LANDISSUES:RETURNANDRESETTLEMENT.............................................200

Introduction.......................................................................................................................................................202

TheSituationofPeopleWhoLostLandDuetoConflict.....................................................................................202

ReturnandResettlement...................................................................................................................................210

CurrentProgressinReturnandResettlement....................................................................................................213

ConstraintsandChallenges................................................................................................................................219

ConclusionsandRecommendations..................................................................................................................230

CHAPTER7RESTITUTION/COMPENSATORYRELIEF..................................................................243

CHAPTER8RECONCILIATION.........................................................................................................251

IssuesimpactingonPostConflictReconciliation................................................................................................253

Reconciliation....................................................................................................................................................288

CHAPTER9PRINCIPALOBSERVATIONSANDRECOMMENDATIONS...........................326

ChapterTwo:ObservationsontheCeasefireAgreement..................................................................................327

ChapterThree:NarrationofEventsonly............................................................................................................328

ChapterFour:ObservationsandRecommendationsIHLIssuesrelevanttothefinalphaseoftheconflict.........328

ChapterFive:ObservationsandRecommendationsonHumanRights...............................................................338

ChapterSix:ObservationsandRecommendationsonLandIssues:ReturnandResettlement...........................355

ChapterSeven:ObservationsandRecommendationsonRestitution/CompensatoryRelief............................363

ChapterEight:ReconciliationSectionI:ObservationsonissuesimpactingonPostConflictReconciliation.....365

ChapterEight:ReconciliationSectionII:ObservationsandRecommendationsonReconciliation....................367

xv

LISTOFANNEXES

AnnexeNo.

Description

Preamble

1 ProclamationbyHisExcellencythePresident

Chapter1IntroductionandMethodology

1.1 Noticeinvitingpublicrepresentations

1.2 Listofrepresentationsreceived

1.3 Listofpersons/membersoforganizationswhomadeoralsubmissionsinColombofollowingwrittenrepresentationsorrequests

ListofpersonsinvitedbytheCommissiontomakeoralsubmissions

1.4 ListofPlacesvisitedbytheCommission

1.5 InterimRecommendations

Chapter2CeasefireAgreement

NoAnnexes

Chapter3OverviewofSecurityForcesOperations

3.1

(iv)

Detailsofattackson/killingsofcivilians,civiliantargets,VIPs/politicians,economictargets,militarytargets.Source:MinistryofDefence

3.2 MapshowingLTTEdominatedareaintheEasternProvince.Source:MinistryofDefence

3.3 MapofthesequenceoftheEasternoperations.Source:MinistryofDefence

3.4 MapshowingLTTEdominatedareasintheWanni.Source:MinistryofDefence

3.5 MapofthesequenceoftheWannioperations.Source:MinistryofDefence

3.6 MapshowingtheNFZs.

xvi

Chapter4HumanitarianLawIssues

4.1 LetterfromAirForceCommanderdated29September2011

4.2 CopyofleafletdroppedbytheSLA.Source:SriLankaArmy

4.3 SLAletterNo.DMI/INT/200A/16b(Vol.3065)dated19January2009totheICRC.

4.4 SLAletterNo.DMI/INT/200A/16b(Vol.30125)dated11February,2009totheICRC.

4.5 DirectorMilitaryIntelligenceletterNo.DMI/INT/200A/16b(Vol.3116)dated8May2009toJointOperationsHeadquarters.ICRCVavuniyahadalsobeeninformed.

4.6 CopiesofleafletsdroppedbytheSLA.SourceSLA

4.7(iii) Twolettersdated4thFebruary2009fromUNChiefSecurityAdvisertoChiefofDefenseStaff

4.8 UAVfootageshowingLTTEgunpositions

4.9 UAVfootage

4.10 ICRCletterNo.COL/09/234/LSC/EPP/PCAdated24January2009totheCommanderoftheArmy

4.10 ICRCletterNo.COL/09/234/LSC/EPP/PCAdated24January2009totheCommanderoftheArmy

4.11 ICRCletterNo.COL/09/334/EPP/PCAdated1February2009toChiefofDefenceStaff

4.12 PresidentialTaskForceforResettlement,,Development&SecurityNorthernProvince,letterNo.PTF/NP/1/7dated6April,2011furnishingdetailedaccountofthehumanitarianreliefprovidedtocivilianpopulationinJaffnaandWannidistricts.

4.13 Letterdated22June2011fromWFP

4.14 MedicalsuppliessenttotheconflictareasandacknowledgedbytheRegionalMedicalSuppliesDivision,Trincomalee.Source:MinistryofHealth

4.15 ListofMissingPersonswhosurrenderedinMay2009

4.16 InvitationletterstoAmnestyInternational,HumanRightsWatchandInternationalCrisisGroup

4.17 ReplyreceivedfromAmnestyInternational,HumanRightsWatch,andInternationalCrisisGroupandtheResponsebytheCommission.

xvii

4.18 FullreportbyDr.ChathuradeSilva

4.19 FullreportbyProf.E.A.Yfantis

Chapter5HumanRights

5.1 Table1Summaryofrepresentationsmadeconcerningallegationsonmissingpersonsduringfieldvisits

Table2BreakdownofrepresentationsinTable1Ampara

Table3BreakdownofrepresentationsinTable1Batticaloa

Table4BreakdownofrepresentationsinTable1Jaffna

Table5BreakdownofrepresentationsinTable1Kilinochchi

Table6BreakdownofrepresentationsinTable1Mannar

Table7BreakdownofrepresentationsinTable1Moneragala

Table8BreakdownofrepresentationsinTable1Trincomalee

5.2 Table9Summaryofrepresentationsmadeconcerningdetainees

Table10Summaryofrepresentationsmadeonthosewhosurrendered

Table11BreakdownofrepresentationsinTable9Ampara

Table12BreakdownofrepresentationsinTable9Batticaloa

Table13BreakdownofrepresentationsinTable9Jaffna

Table14BreakdownofrepresentationsinTable9Kilinochchi

Table15BreakdownofrepresentationsinTable9Mannar

Table16BreakdownofrepresentationsinTable9Moneragala

Table17BreakdownofrepresentationsinTable9Trincomalee

5.3 DetailsofChildrensHomesandOrphanagesintheNorthernProvince

Chapter6LandIssues:ReturnandResettlement

xviii

6.1 SettlementAssistancePackage

6.2 CircularonRegulatingtheActivitiesRegardingManagementofLandsintheNorthernandEasternProvincesissuedbytheCommissionerGeneralofLands

Chapter7Restitution/CompensatoryRelief

7.1 BudgetestimateandpaymentsrelatingtoallschemesadministeredbyREPPIA(20072012)

7.2 TrendinrecentpaymentsbyREPPIA:concentrationintheNorthernandEasternProvinces

Chapter8Reconciliation

8.1 QuestionnairesentbytheCommissiontotheGovernmentAgents

8.2 ResponsesreceivedfromtheGovernmentAgents

ListofSeniorStaff

1

PREAMBLE

The Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) was appointed by His ExcellencyPresidentMahindaRajapaksaintermsofthePresidentialWarrantdated15thMay2010.1TheCommissionsmandatewas to look back at the conflict Sri Lanka suffered aswell as to lookaheadforaneraofhealingandpeacebuildinginthecountry.

SriLankanowfacesamomentofunprecedentedopportunity.Rarelydoessuchanopportunitycome along without equally important attendant challenges. This is especially true of anymeaningful effort towards postconflict peace building following a protracted conflict. SriLankas case isnoexception.Terrorismandviolencehaveended.Timeand spacehavebeencreatedforhealingandbuildingsustainablepeaceandsecuritysothatthefruitsofdemocracyandcitizenshipcanbeequitablyenjoyedbyallSriLankans.Tothisend,thesuccessofendingarmed conflict must be invested in an allinclusive political process of dialogue andaccommodationsothattheconflictbyothermeanswillnotcontinue.

TheCommissionwasgratifiedtolearnfrompeoplewhoappearedbeforeit,thatthepromiseofthepresentopportunityfaroutweighstheburdenofattendantchallenges.

Havinglistenedtotheseviewsfromallcornersofthecountryandfromallstrataofsociety,theCommission is inclined to share this optimism despite some uncertainties that still loom.However,iftheseexpectationsweretobecomearealityintheformofamultiethnicnationatpeace with itself in a democratic Sri Lanka, the Government and all political leaders mustmanifest politicalwill and sincerityof purpose to take thenecessarydecisions to ensure thegoodfaithimplementationoftheCommissionsrecommendations.

Based on what it heard from the people, the Commission is confident that the citizens areready and willing to support consensual approaches advancing national interest, nationalreconciliation,justiceandequalityforallcitizens,solongasthepoliticalleaderstaketheleadinaspiritoftolerance,accommodationandcompromise.

Therequireddecisionsinthisregardtouchuponabroadspectrumofissuesthatarethesubjectmatterofcommentandrecommendationscontained inthepresent report.Theserelatetoanumberofvitalquestionsthatareindispensabletoanygoodfaithattemptatreconciliationandpeacebuilding.

1TheProclamationisatAnnex1

2

TheCommissionhopesthat itsobservationsandrecommendationswouldprovidepointerstoareas where such decisions are needed, sooner rather than later. These areas includegovernance, devolution, human rights, international humanitarian law, socio economicdevelopment, livelihoodissues, issuesaffectingheartsandminds, leadership issuesandmanymore.

While not being an exhaustive agenda to address, let alone cure, all ills of post conflict SriLanka,therecommendationsoftheCommissioncouldneverthelessconstituteaframeworkforaction by all stakeholders, in particular the Government, political parties and communityleaders.ThisframeworkwouldgoalongwayinconstructingaplatformforconsolidatingpostconflictpeaceandsecurityaswellasamityandcooperationwithinandbetweenthediversecommunitiesinSriLanka.

TheCommissionthereforeurgesthateffectbegivento itsrecommendationsandencouragesthe promotion of public awareness of the contents and implementation of thesemeasures.Suchacourseofactionwouldhelpallcommunitiesto live inpeaceandharmonyandensurethatnoroomisleftforterrorismandviolencetoraisetheiruglyheadagain.

Informulatingitsrecommendations,theCommissiontookintoaccountinteraliathefollowing,basedonthecitizensviewsitheard:

! Historical, socialandpolitical factors thatpoint to thecausesofethnicandcitizengrievances;

! Thefactsandcircumstanceswhich ledtothefailureoftheceasefireagreement in2002,withaviewtofindinglessonsthatcanbelearnttoavoidsuchfailuresinthefuture;

! Sri Lankas experience in dealing with terrorism and the effects of the culture ofviolenceongoodgovernance,lawandorderandcivilianlife;

! The events that unfolded from February, 2002 to May, 2009, and specially theincidents that took place during the armed conflict after the Mavil Aru incident;these events and incidents were examined in the context of the InternationalHumanitarian Law and the Human Rights Law and related, inter alia, to thefollowing:

- obligationtoeducatethemembersofthearmedforces intherelevantaspectsofHumanRightsandInternationalHumanitarianLaw;

- measures taken to safeguard civilians and to avoid civilian casualties duringmilitaryoperations;

- establishmentofNoFireZonesandtheLTTEstrategyofusinghumanshields;

3

- supplyofhumanitarianreliefincludingfoodandmedicinetociviliansinconflictareas;

- medicalfacilitiesandmedicalsuppliesduringthefinalstagesoftheconflict;- conductoftheSecurityForcesduringthemovementofciviliansandcombatants

toclearedareas;- allegeddisappearances;- allegationsconcerningabductions;- treatmentofdetainees;and,- conscriptionofchildrenbytheLTTEandotherarmedgroups.

! Issues relating to land matters, specially as regards settling the returnees andresettlementoftheIDPs;

! Restitution/CompensatoryRelief:! PostConflictissuesthataffectvulnerablegroupsandthecitizensatlarge;and! Policies andmeasures thatwill promote reconciliation through healing, amity and

unity.

AsummaryoftheprincipalobservationsandrecommendationsissetoutinChapter9.

4

Chapter1IntroductionandMethodology

Section ParagraphNumbers

EstablishmentoftheCommission 1.11.4

TheMandate 1.51.7

Methodology 1.81.22

5

Chapter1IntroductionandMethodology

EstablishmentoftheCommission

1.1 The following eight members were appointed to the Commission by His ExcellencyPresidentMahindaRajapaksabyProclamationdated15thMay20102.

ChittaRanjandeSilvaEsquire,P.C.,ChairmanDr.AmrithRohanPereraEsquire,P.C.,Professor.MohamedThahirMohamedJiffryEsquire,Professor.KarunaratnaHangawatteEsquire,ChandirapalChanmugamEsquire,HewaMataraGamageSiripalaPalihakkaraEsquire,Mrs.ManohariRamanathan,MaxwellParakramaParanagamaEsquire

1.2 One of themembers appointed, ProfessorM.T.M. Jiffry, was unable to serve on theCommissionduetofailinghealthandresignedwitheffectfrom31stAugust,2010.Mr.Mohamed Thowfeeq Mohamed Bafiq Esquire, Senior Attorney at Law, replaced himwitheffectfrom7thSeptember,2010.

1.3 Mr.S.M.Samarakoon,wasappointedSecretary to theCommission.He resigned fromthis position with effect from 7th September, 2010 and was succeeded by Mr. S.B.Atugoda,witheffectfrom14thSeptember,2010.

1.4 TheCommissionhelditsfirstmeetingon11thJune,2010.ItsSecretariatwasestablishedat the LakshmanKadirgamar Instituteof Strategic Studies and InternationalRelations,No.24,HortonPlace,Colombo7.

TheMandate

1.5 IntheMandate,containedintheProclamation,theCommissionersweretoinquireandreportonthefollowingmattersthatmayhavetakenplaceduringtheperiodbetween21stFebruary2002and19thMay2009,namely;

i. The facts and circumstances which led to the failure of the Ceasefire Agreementoperationalizedon21stFebruary2002andthesequenceofeventsthatfollowedthereafteruptothe19thofMay2009;

2SeeAnnex1

6

ii. Whether any person, group or institution directly or indirectly bear responsibility in thisregard;

iii. The lessons we would learn from those events and their attendant concerns, in order toensurethattherewillbenorecurrence;

iv. The methodology whereby restitution to pay persons affected by those events or theirdependantsortheirheirs,canbeeffected;

v.Theinstitutional,administrativeandlegislativemeasureswhichneedtobetakeninordertopreventanyrecurrenceofsuchconcernsinthefuture,andtopromotefurthernationalunityandreconciliationamongcommunitiesand;tomakeanysuchotherrecommendationswithreference to any of the matters that have been inquired into under the terms of theWarrant..

1.6 UndertheWarrantestablishingtheCommission,thePresidentnotedinteraliathatanopportunemomenthasarrivedtoreflectontheconflictphaseandthesufferingsthatthecountryhasgonethroughasawholeduring thisperiod.ThePresidentalsonotedthataneedhasarisentolearnfromthisrecenthistory,lessonsthatwouldensurethattherewillbenorecurrenceofanyinternecineconflictinthefutureandthatpeopleareassuredofaneraofpeace,harmonyandprosperity.

1.7 Accordingly, the work of the Commission proceeded, acknowledging a clear need tohealthewoundsofthepastandtomakerecommendationstoreconcilethenationbyrecognizing all victims of conflict, providing redress to them and thereby promotingnationalunity,peaceandharmony.

Methodology

1.8 The Commission invited representations from the public through notices in the printand electronicmedia. A copy of the notice is at Annex 1.1. Public notices were alsodisseminatedintheaffectedareaswellinadvanceofthehearingsoftheCommissioninsuchareas. In response to thesenotices, theCommission receiveda largenumberofrepresentations from the public. (Annex 1.2). Many of them requested for anopportunitytoexpresstheirviewsbeforetheCommissiononmattersreferredtointheWarrant. (The list of personswho appeared before the Commission is at Annex 1.3).TheCommissionconsideredbothwrittenandoralpresentationswithoutdistinction.

1.9 TheprimarysourceofinformationfortheCommissionsworkwasthegeneralpublicofSriLanka,particularlythosefromtheconflictaffectedareasandanumberofnationalorganizations and civil society groups who expressed their concerns and views in

7

response to the Commissions public notices inviting such views. In addition, theCommissionalso took intoaccount,whereappropriateandrelevant to itsmandate,arange of issues raised in published material in the form of reports by national andinternationalorganizations,includingthereportoftheUNSecretaryGeneralsPanelofExpertsonAccountabilityinSriLanka.

1.10 Although the Commission was constituted by Presidential Warrant dated 15th May,2010,settinginplacetherequisitemodalitiesincludinginstitutionalandadministrativearrangementsrelatingtothefunctionsoftheCommissiontookupaconsiderableperiodof time. After the completion of such arrangements the Commission commencedhearingson11thAugust2010.Thehearingswereheld inpublicandopento theprintandelectronicmediaunlessthepersonmakingrepresentationsbeforetheCommissionrequestedotherwise.Theprocedureadoptedatthepublichearingswastofirstinformtherepresenterthatheorshecouldbeheardinpublicorincamera.Somerepresenterselected tomake submissions in camera. Thereafter the Commissioners proceeded tointeract through questions with the representer to clarify any matters that aroseconsequenttotherepresentationsmadeorwhichtheyfeltwererelevanttothetermsoftheWarrant.

1.11 TheCommission provided every opportunity to persons tomake representations in alanguage of their choice,while providing for simultaneous translation to English. TheCommission thus recognized the salutary effect, particularly on affected persons, ofbeingabletorelatetheirstories ina languageoftheirchoice.ForthepurposesoftheReport the Commission utilized the English scripts of the simultaneous Englishtranslation.

1.12 The Commission decided to consult and hear the views of persons who would havepersonalexperienceandknowledgeondifferentaspectsofmatters referred to in theWarrant.InvitationswerealsoextendedtolocalNGOsaswellasNGOsbasedoutsideSriLanka,thathaveproducedreportsonthesituationinthiscountrypertainingtomattersrelevant to theWarrant. However, it is amatter of regret that despite the invitationextended in good faith, seeking a constructive dialogue on what the CommissionconsideredasissuesofcommonconcernfallingunderthepurviewofitsMandate,thisinvitation has not been reciprocated by three organizations3. As the public sittingsprogressed and consequent to thewidemedia coverage, therewas a keen responsefrommembersofthepublictoexpresstheirviewsbeforetheCommission.

3HumanRightsWatch,AmnestyInternationalandInternationalCrisisGroup

8

1.13 The Commission took several steps tomake itswork transparent. The hearingswereopen to the public and the media, except when a person making representationsrequestedconfidentiality.TheCommissionfacilitatedthemediatovideoandaudiotapethepublicproceedings.InadditiontheCommissionmaintainedawebsite,sinceAugust2010,wherethescheduleofCommissionvisitsandtranscriptsofpublichearings,publicrepresentationsandotherinformationregardingtheCommissionwerepublished.

1.14 AmongthosewhomaderepresentationsbeforetheCommissionweremembersofthepublic,publicservantsincludingthosewhohadservedintheaffectedareasduringtheconflictperiod,affectedindividuals,representativesofthearmedforces,seniorofficialswho were associated with the peace process, political leaders, religious leaders,members of civil society, journalists, academics and other professionals, former LTTEcadresandformermembersofotherarmedgroups.

1.15 Inaddition to thepublicsittings inColombo, theCommissionundertook fieldvisits toareasaffectedbytheconflict.AlistofplacesvisitedbytheCommissionisatAnnex1.4.The Commission was of the view that in order to ascertain firsthand the groundrealities, itwas imperative tohavepublic sittings in situ. Thiswasalsowithaview toreachingouttothepeople intheaffectedareasandtoenablethemtohighlighttheirgrievances. These people would otherwise have faced considerable difficulties intravelling to Colombo to make their representations. Through this process theCommissionwasabletoacknowledgethesufferingofthepeopleintheaffectedareasandprovideanopportunity for themto tell their stories in familiar surroundings.ThisapproachfocusedontherestorativedimensionsoftheCommissionsMandate.

1.16 In certain instances where the general public who appeared before the Commissionarticulated grievances or complaints requesting the Commission to dowhat it can toprovide relief and where the Commission felt such expeditious action would helpredresssuchgrievancesandproviderelieftothepartyconcerned,theCommissiontookthe liberty to refer the matter to the Attorney General requesting appropriateinvestigationandaction.

1.17 In addition to scheduled publicmeetings, the Commissioners alsomade it a point tohaveunscheduled,impromptumeetingstospeakwithmembersofthepublictoobtainfirst hand information about the situation. Where possible, the Commission soughtclarificationsfrompersonswhoappearedbeforetheCommissionorprovidedmaterialtotheCommissionthroughinformalmeetingsbothinColomboandduringitsfollowupvisitstotheprovinces.

9

1.18 Onthe13thofSeptember2010theCommissionmadeitsInterimRecommendationstoHisExcellencythePresident,coveringarangeof issuesrelatingtoDetention,LawandOrder, Land, Administration and Language, which in the view of the Commissiondeserved urgent attention. The Commission also expressed the view that immediateactiononthesematterswouldprovidereliefandengenderasenseofconfidenceamongthe people affected by the conflict and also provide an impetus to the reconciliationprocess.TheCommissionsInterimRecommendationsareattachedatAnnex1.5.

1.19 The hearings held throughout the country and the public attention it generatedparticularly through the provincial media, resulted in a substantial increase in publicawarenessandinterestintheworkoftheCommission.Assuch,theCommissionhadtoextendthedeadlineformakingrepresentationsinordertoaccommodateacontinuousflowofrequestsfromthepublic.Inthelightofthesedevelopmentsandtheconsequentincrease in representationsmade to the Commission, it became clear that itwas notfeasible to conclude itsworkwithin the timeperiod specified in theoriginalWarrant.Accordingly, by Warrant dated 3rd November 2010 issued by His Excellency thePresident,thetimelimitforrenderingthefinalReportoftheCommissionwasextendeduntil15thMay2011.

1.20 The Commission continued its public hearings until the 31st of January 2011. TheCommission also continued to receive written representations until the 13th of June2011.

1.21 As the process of analyzing the large volumeofmaterial gatheredprogressed, itwasevident to the Commission that there were several specific areas and issues whichrequired further elucidation/clarification, before the Commission could make anassessment of the matters, for inclusion in the report. Accordingly the Commissioninvited severalpublicofficials,militaryofficials,expertsandmembersof thepublic toappearbeforetheCommission,someonseveraloccasions.Followupvisitstosomeoftheprovinceswerealsoarranged.Allof thismade itnecessaryfortheCommissiontoseek a further extension of time. By Warrant dated 10th May 2011 issued by HisExcellencythePresidentthetimelimitwasextendeduntil15thNovember2011.

1.22 TheCommissionwasconsciousofthefactthattheremitoftheCommissionrequireditto report on matters that may have taken place during the period between 21stFebruary2002and19thMay2009.Atthesametimeitalsorecognizedthatthecausesunderlyingthegrievancesofdifferentcommunitieshaditsgenesisintheperiodpriorto

10

the time frame referred to in the Warrant. The Commission accordingly provided adegreeofflexibilitytotherepresentersinthisregard.

1.23 ThematerialplacedbeforetheCommissioncoveredabroadrangeofcomplexissuesofamultidisciplinarynature,resultinginaneedfortheCommissiontoidentifytheissueswhichtheCommissiondeemednecessarytodealwith,intermsoftheMandateanditsstatedobjectives.AccordinglytheCommissionidentifiedtheissuesthatitbelievedtoberelevantandproceededinworkingontheseareasinrelativelyselfcontainedChapterswith cross references tootherChapters,where required. TheCommissionwasof theviewthatthisapproachwouldfacilitateabetterunderstandingoftheissues,andassistinimplementationofrecommendations.

11

Chapter2CeasefireAgreement

Section ParagraphNumbers

Introduction 2.12.2BackgroundtotheCeasefireAgreement 2.32.7 PoliticalandSecurityDimensions 2.82.10NegotiatingProcess 2.112.13ResultingImpactontheProvisionsoftheCFA 2.142.20

DemarcationofTerritoryVulnerabilityofOtherGroupsPoliticalActivitiesoftheLTTEJurisdictionoftheSLMMVacationofPublicBuildingsAbsenceofanyHumanRightsComponent

FactorswhichhadabearingontheImplementationoftheCFA 2.212.24NegativeImpactontheMuslimCommunityRoleoftheFacilitator

EconomicandSocialDimensions 2.252.31ObservationsoftheCommission 2.322.61ImpactofDivisivePartyPoliticsFacilitatorsRoleintheNegotiatingProcessandImplementationImpactoftheProcessontheImplementation

12

Chapter2CeasefireAgreement

Introduction

2.1 The Warrant requires the Commission to inquire into and report on the facts andcircumstanceswhichledtothefailureoftheCeasefireAgreement(CFA)operationalisedon21stFebruary2002andthesequenceofeventsthatfollowedthereafterupto19thofMay2009.

2.2 In carrying out this task, the Commission sought the views of key officials, inter alia,thosewhohadservedtheSecretariatforCoordinatingthePeaceProcess(SCOPP)andwere closely involvedwith theworkingof theCFA, aswell asofficials of theDefenceestablishmentandothers.TheCommissionwas thereforeable tobenefit fromawiderangeofviewsexpressedbythesepersonswithregardto,

i) ThebackgroundtotheCFA;ii) PoliticalandSecurityDimensions;iii) TheNegotiatingprocess;iv) TheresultingimpactontheprovisionsoftheCFA;v) FactorswhichhadabearingontheimplementationoftheCFA;andvi) EconomicandSocialDimensionsoftheCFA

which helped the Commission in reaching its conclusions regarding the facts andcircumstanceswhichledtothefailureoftheCFA.

BackgroundtotheCeasefireAgreement

2.3 TheCommissionheard representations to theeffect that the reasons for theuprisingwere frustrationsdue to inter alia economic stagnation, perceptionsof discriminationdue to the introduction of standardization in education/employment, nonimplementation of language policy, devolution and the failure to confer a substantialdegree of political autonomy to theNorthern and Eastern Provinces to conduct theirown affairs. It was stated that even though successive administrations in postindependentSriLankahadattemptedtofindsolutionstotheseproblemsasfarbackasearly1950,nothingdurablewasachievedduetodivisivepartypoliticsandlackofabipartisan approach to vital national issues.1 In this context referencewasmade to the

1Mr.BernardGunatillekebeforetheLLRCatColomboon11thAugust2010.

13

BandaranaikeChelvanayakamPactof1956,theDudleySenanayakeChelvanayakamPactof1957,whichdidnotbearanyfruitculminatingintheVadukkodaiResolutionin1976which referred to a separate Tamil state. Itwas argued that from this incipientphasetheTamilyouthmovementhadgraduatedtoaterroristmovement.Itwasfurtherstated that the CFA was signed under tense conditions and wide publicity or publicawarenessprogramshadnotbeencarriedout.

2.4 Itwasemphasizedthatabipartisanapproachtovitalnationalissueswasasinequanonin order to arrive at a durable solution.2 Whether it was the BandaranaikeChelvanayakam (BC) pact, the Dudley SenanayakeChelvanayakam (DC) pact, the AllParty Conference of 1984, the 13th Amendment of 1987, the Parliamentary SelectCommittee 1992 Report or the proposed draft constitution of 2000 the oppositionparties always opposed the proposals. Further, the point was also made that theleadership of theminority parties had failed tomake use of the opportunitiesmadeavailabletothem,3thuspointingtoacollectivefailureinthepoliticalleadershipintheNorth and the South. Reference was also made to the various administrativearrangementswhichwereexperimentedwithby thepolitical leadershipof the times,such as the District Political Authority System of 1973/1974, and the DistrictDevelopmentCouncilsystemin1979/1980.Itwascontendedthatgiventheabsenceofpoliticalwill, thesearrangements,politicaloradministrative,hadno lasting impactonthepoliticallandscapeofthecountry.

2.5 EversincetheunattendedandunsolvedgrievancesoftheTamilsrelatingtoeconomicopportunity,politicalspaceandidentity,particularlytotheuseoftheTamillanguageindealingwiththeStatetooktheformofanarmedstruggle,especiallyafterthetargetedattacks on the Tamil population in July 1983, the Governments in power sought toengagetheTamilmilitantgroupsintalks.

2.6 Prior to the CFA of 2002, there were several attempts at reaching agreement onceasefiresandholdingpeacetalks.Amongthemwere

! theThimputalksofthemid1980s! in1989/1990underPresidentRanasinghePremadasa;! in1994/1995underPresidentChandrikaKumaranatunga;

2Mr.GodfreyGunatillekebeforetheLLRCatColomboon12thAugust2010.3Mr.AustinFernandobeforetheLLRCatColomboon18thAugust,2010.

14

! in2000/2001alsounderPresidentChandrikaKumaranatungawhichdidnotgetofftheground.

2.7 TheCFAofFebruary2002wasthelastattempt.However,therewasasignificantchangeinthepoliticalenvironmentwhentheCFAwasconcluded.TheGovernmentofthedaywasacohabitationGovernmentwherethePresidentandthePrimeMinisterwerefromdifferent political parties. This posed difficulties and impacted negatively on thestructure and implementation of the CFA. It is in this backdrop that the CFA of 2002mustbeexamined.

PoliticalandSecurityDimensions

2.8 In dealing with the facts and circumstances which led to the failure of the CFA, therepresenters underlined the need to appreciate the overall military and politicalenvironmentunderwhichtheCFAwassigned.Referencewasmadetoaseriesofeventswhich had taken place in early 2000, such as the fall of Elephant Pass, the failure ofoperationAgnikheela,resultinginthedeathofover2000soldiersandapproximately500injured,andmostimportantlytheattackagainsttheKatunayakeAirForceBaseaswell as the Civilian International Airport in Katunayake (Bandaranaike InternationalAirport) in July2001whichresulted inextensivedamagetoproperty includingseveralcivilianaircraftontheground.Itwasstatedthattheseeventshadanegativeimpactonthe economy. Thus it was pointed out that it was a politically and militarily, weakGovernmentthatwasconstrainedtositatthenegotiatingtablewiththeLTTEasequalpartners.4

2.9 SomerepresentersstatedthataceasefirehadbeendeclaredunilaterallybytheLTTEon

the eve of Christmas 2001. They further stated that a ceasefirewas going on, at theground level, informally, without a formal document. In this context they furtherpointedoutthataformalagreementwasthoughttoberequiredasearlyaspossibletoavoidsituationswhichcouldjeopardizetheceasefire.5

2.10 The attention of the Commissionwas also drawn to the unusual configurationwhichprevailedinthethenpoliticallandscapebetweentheExecutiveandtheLegislaturewiththePresident representingonepoliticalpartyandthePrimeMinisterandtheCabinetanother which was characterized as a cohabitation Government. It was explainedthat in effect, the Government formed in 2002, under the PrimeMinistership ofMr.

4Mr.BernardGunatillekebeforetheLLRCatColomboon11thAugust2010.5Ibid.

15

RanilWickremesinghewasapoliticallytenuousone,teeteringonaveryslimmajority.AccordingtotheConstitution,thePresidenthadthepowertodissolveParliamentafterone year of the election which brought the Government into office. Hence it waspointed out that the expected life span of the then incumbent WickremesingheGovernmentwas aminimumof one year and anythingmoredepended solely on theprevailing political circumstances. This aspect was referred to as an additional factorwhichexplainstheinordinateurgencyofthethenGovernmenttoconcludeaceasefireagreement in order to formalize the prevailing situation on the ground, rather thanengaging all relevant stakeholders and going through a long drawn out negotiationprocess.6

NegotiatingProcess

2.11 Several senior officials familiar with the CFA process, stated that the factors set outabove, hadadirect impacton thenegotiatingprocess resulting in somewhatunusualproceduresbeingresortedto innegotiatingtheCFA. Itwasfurtherpointedout inthiscontextthatpriortotheNorwegianfacilitatorsarrivinginSriLankawiththetext,theyhadhaddiscussionsinLondon,withMr.AntonBalasinghamtheChiefNegotiatorfortheLTTE,andhadgotthedrafttextendorsedbyhim.ItwasalsostatedthatwhenspecificproposalshavinganimportantbearingonthedefenceandsecurityinterestsoftheStatewere being made, the Norwegian facilitators had responded that in the interest ofpreserving the prenegotiated text, and to conclude the Agreement with a sense ofurgency,anyamendmentsshouldbekepttothebareminimum.7Inthiscontextitwasalso pointed out that this position was confirmed by Anton Balasingham in his bookWarandPeace:ArmedStruggleandPeaceEffortsofLiberationTigers.

2.12 Itwasemphasizedthatthisextraordinaryprocedurehadresulted,inasituationwhere

therewasnoreferencetotheneedforthepartiestousetheceasefiretopavethewayfor talkson substantive issues to findanegotiated settlement.Specificobligations forthe prohibition of unlawful importation of arms, ammunition as well as other warrelatedmaterialhadnotbeen included.While theLTTEmemberswereallowed todopoliticalwork intheGovernmentheldareas,Stateagenciesandotherpoliticalpartieshowever, were not allowed to work in the LTTE dominated uncleared areas ofMullaittivuandKilinochchi.Furtherforcibleconscriptionofchildcombatantsandother

6Mr.Mr.BernardGunatillekebeforetheLLRCatColomboon12thAugust20107Mr.AustinFernandobeforetheLLRCatColomboon18thAugust2010

16

humanrightsviolationswerenot includedasprohibitedactivitiesduring theceasefireperiod.8

2.13 Accordingly, itwas contended thatpriorityhadbeengiven to finalizingandhavinganagreementinplaceasearlyaspossible,insteadofgoingthroughthedrafttextcarefullyand attempting to address and accommodate concerns of critical importance to thesecurity and stability of the State. This had resulted in the emergence of aone sidedagreementfavourabletotheLTTE.9

ResultingImpactontheProvisionsoftheCFA

2.14 It was submitted to the Commission that the factors outlined above, relating to thenegotiatingprocesshadhadadirectimpactontheoverallbalanceoftheagreement.Inthis regard several representers emphasized that an agreement between two partiesmustbearealisticandafaironeinordertobeworkable.AnumberofprovisionsoftheCFAwerereferredtobytheserepresenterstohighlighttheelementof imbalanceandtheunrealisticnatureoftheCFAandthesearesetoutbelow.

DemarcationofTerritory

2.15 ItwasstatedthattheCFAwasstructuredondemarcatingtheterritoryofSriLankaintoLTTE controlled and government controlled areas. This had the effect of underminingthe territorial integrity of the State. It was also contended that the attempts todemarcate nogoareas/exclusionzones in respectof themovementof theSri LankaNavy, off the coast of certain parts of the Eastern seaboard, allowed the LTTE tofacilitateillicitsmugglingofweaponsandwarmaterial.10

VulnerabilityofOtherGroups

2.16 ItwasstatedthattherewerearmedgroupssuchastheEPDP,PLOTEandEPRLFwhohadengaged inviolenceearlier,buthad joinedthedemocraticprocess.Membersofthesegroups had been allowed by successive Governments to retain arms to protectthemselves.ImmediatelyaftertheCFAwassigned,theywererequiredtogiveuptheirarms and they became vulnerable given the fact that LTTE cadreswere permitted toopenlycarryarms.11

8Ibid.9Mr.BernardGunatillekebeforetheLLRCatColomboon11thAugust201010Mr.AustinFernandobeforetheLLRCatColomboon18thAugust,201011Mr.JavidYusufbeforetheLLRCatColomboon25thOctober2010

17

PoliticalActivitiesbytheLTTE

2.17 UndertheCFA,LTTEcadreswerepermittedtoengageinpoliticalworkintheclearedareas in the North and East, whereby the LTTEwas able to extend its influence intoareastheydidnotpreviouslycontrolintheNorthandEast.TherewasnocorrespondingaccessfortheGovernmentorotherpoliticalparties,intotheunclearedareasdominatedby the LTTE. The issue of reciprocity taken up by the Government had not beenaccommodated.12

JurisdictionoftheSriLankaMonitoringMission(SLMM)

2.18 TheSLMMwasestablishedconsequenttotheCFAandintermsoftheStatusofMissionAgreement (SOMA) between the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and Norway dated18thMarch 2002. All districts in the Northern and Eastern provinceswere subject tomonitoringbytheSLMMexceptfortheMullaittivuandKilinochchiDistrictsdominatedbytheLTTE.13ItwasemphasizedthatthiswasanunevenprovisionforthereasonthatpeoplewholivedinthoseareasasequalcitizensweredeprivedofanykindofreliefduetothefailureinmonitoringtheLTTEviolationsofthesaidCFA.

VacationofPublicBuildings

2.19 ItwaspointedouttotheCommissionthatthedeadlinesgiventotheSecurityForcesforvacation of public buildings were totally unrealistic. It was stated in this regard thatwheretheSecurityForceshadoccupiedpublicbuildingsandplacesofreligiousworshiptheywererequired in termsof theCFA14 tovacate suchpremiseswithinaprescribedperiod.ThiswasviewedasanunrealisticdeadlineforthereasonthatitwasnotfeasiblefortheSecurityForcestofindalternativeplacestomove intowithinashortperiodoftime as prescribed by the agreement. It was stated that this was also reflective of afailure to take into due account the overall national security dimension during thenegotiatingprocess.15

12Mr.JavidYusufbeforetheLLRCatColomboon25thOctober201013Ibid.14Article2.2ThePartiesshall refrainfromengaging inactivitiesorpropagating ideasthatcouldoffendculturalorreligioussensitivities.Placesofworship(temples,churches,mosquesandotherholysites,etc.)currentlyheldbytheforcesofeitheroftheParties shallbevacatedbyDday+30andmadeaccessible to thepublic.Placesofworshipwhicharesituated in HighSecurityZonesshallbevacatedbyallarmedpersonnelandmaintainedingoodorderbycivilianworkers,evenwhentheyarenotmadeaccessibletothepublic.Article2.3BeginningonthedateonwhichthisAgreemententersintoforce,schoolbuildingsoccupiedbyeitherPartyshallbevacatedandreturnedtotheirintendeduse.ThisactivityshallbecompletedbyDday+160atthelatest.Article2.4AscheduleindicatingthereturnofallotherpublicbuildingstotheirintendeduseshallbedrawnupbythePartiesandpublishedatthelatestbyDday+30.15Mr.AustinFernandobeforetheLLRCatColomboon18thAugust2010.

18

AbsenceofanyHumanRightsComponent

2.20 Attentionof theCommissionwasalsodrawntowhatwas referred toasasignificantlacunaintheprovisionsoftheCFAnamelytheabsenceofaHumanRightscomponent,resultinginafailuretobindtheLTTEtotheobservanceofHumanRightsnorms.MostimportantlythecriticalissueofconscriptionofchildcombatantsbytheLTTEcouldnotbe dealt with in any manner under the agreement. An international Human Rightsexpert, Mr. Ian Martin, former Secretary General of Amnesty International who hadmade a study of the incorporation of theHumanRights dimension into the CFA,hadmadecertainrecommendations inthatregard.Howeverthis initiativewasrejectedbyMr.AntonBalasinghamwhoobjectedtoan international scrutinyofthehumanrightssituationintheNorthandtheEast.ItwascontendedthatthisstrategywasadoptedbytheLTTEtodominateareas intheNorthandtheEastandtopreventanyviolationsofhuman rights in these areas from being scrutinized, with regard to the LTTEscompliancewithacceptedhumanrightsnormsandstandards.16

FactorswhichhadabearingontheImplementationoftheCFA

NegativeimpactontheMuslimCommunity

2.21 RepresenterswhoappearedbeforetheCommissionstatedthattheimplementationoftheCFAhadnegativelyimpactedontheMuslimCommunity.Itwasstatedinthisregardthat 1/3 of theMuslims live in the Eastern Province. Though they were not directlyinvolvedwiththearmedconflictbetweentheStateandtheLTTE, itwasstressedthattheconsequencesoftheconflicthadanimpactontheMuslimCommunity.Accordingtotheserepresentations,anunfortunateaspectwasthatoncetheCFAwassigned,theLawEnforcementAgencieshadactedwithanelementofrestraintwithregardtocertainlawandorder issueswhichhadarisen, inordernottocauseanytensionswhichcouldhave the effect of undermining the CFA. It was stated that as a result, there wereincidentswhichcouldhavebeendealtwithaspurelawandorderissuesandwerenotso addressed, thereby letting them escalate into situations which caused tensionbetweentheMuslimCommunityandtheTamilCommunity.Referencewasmadeinthisregard to photographs which were supposed to have appeared in the media wheremembers of the Security Forceswere seen to bewatching,when attacks against theMuslimCommunitywerebeingcarriedoutbytheLTTE.ParticularmentionwasmadeoftheseriousincidentsinApril2002inMutturcreatingheightenedtensioninthewholeof

16Mr.BernardGunatillekebeforetheLLRCatColomboon11thAugust,2010;Dr.Mrs.HiranthiWijemannebeforetheLLRCon12thAugust,2010.

19

theEasternProvince.ItwascontendedhoweverthatonecouldnotentirelyblametheSecurityForcesbecausetheywereunderstrictordersnottodoanythingtojeopardizetheCFA.17

2.22 Another aspect brought to the attention of the Commission was the fact that theMuslim Community had felt shortchanged during the peace process, because theirdemandthataseparateindependentdelegationofMuslimsbeallowedtotakepartinthenegotiationswasnotaccommodated. Itwasasserted thattheMuslimCommunityhad been promised that a separate delegation would be allowed to take part as anindependentdelegationfromthesecondroundoftalks. Howeverthesecondroundhadneverbecomea reality, because the subsequent talkshadbeen redesignatedasthesecondsessionofthefirstroundthethirdsessionofthefirstroundandsoforthalthoughthosesessionshadnointerconnectionintermsofthesubjectmatter18.Thusitwas contended that the Muslim Community had the perception that this was adeliberateattempttoexcludethemfromthenegotiationprocess,whichresultedintheerosionofconfidenceoftheMuslimsintheCFA.

RoleoftheFacilitator

2.23 It was contended before the Commission that the role that Norway played both asfacilitator of the peace process and the Head of the SLMM, resulted in a conflict offunctions and had a negative impact in ensuring compliance with the CFA. 19It waspointed out that the element of neutrality expected of a facilitator, resulted in theSLMM headed by Norway failing to exercise sufficient control or influence over thepartieswithregardtoviolationsoftheCFA.ConsequentlytheSLMMwasreducedtoaroleofarecordkeepermerelytallyingtheCFAviolations,withoutbeingabletoensureeffectivecompliancebytheparties.

2.24 Itwasemphasizedthattheabovefactorstakencollectivelypointtoalessontobelearnt

i.e.thatifunrealisticandunworkableprovisionsareincludedinanagreementwhichisdesignedtocreateconfidenceandpavethewayforsubstantivenegotiations, itwouldhave the reverse effect of generating an erosion of confidence amongst the parties,finally working to the detriment of the negotiating process and defeating the veryobjectiveofsuchanagreement.Itwasthereforepointedoutthatthelackofinclusivity

17Mr.JavidYusufbeforetheLLRCatColomboon25thOctober201018ibid19ibid

20

andattentiontodetailresultingfromthesenseofurgencyinconcludingtheagreement,hadbeenmajorcontributoryfactorsleadingtothefailureoftheCFA.20

EconomicandSocialDimensions

2.25 The CFA negotiations took placewhen Sri Lankas economywas in a troubled phase.Over the preceding decades Sri Lanka had run a series of budget deficits.Military/Defence expenditures were rising and adding to Government expenditures.Government revenues were not sufficient and the countrys total expenditure wasexcessive.Tomeettheresultingdeficits,theGovernmenthadbeenborrowingfromthegeneralpublic,banks,aswellasfromforeignsources.21

2.26 In 2001, theeconomybatteredby successivehighbudgetdeficits, showedanegativegrowthforthefirsttime.Thecountrysforeignreserveswererunninglow.Inflationwasrising. An InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF) stabilization package was negotiated inApril2001tobolstertheeconomy,butnotwithoutpainasthebenefitswouldcomeinthe long term. TheGovernment looked for a peace dividend to give hope to awarweary populace. Itwas necessary to get the peace process underway so that donorpledgesofforeignaidandforeigninvestmentwouldprovidethenecessaryfundingforthecountry togrowto itspotential.Therewaspressuretosign theCFAaspresenteddespitesomeinfirmities.Thesewerelefttoberesolvedontherun.However,thiswasnottobe,aseventsunfolded.22

2.27 InconsideringcertainotherfactorsthathadabearingontheCFA,itwouldbepertinentto refer to its economic dimensions which were brought to the attention of theCommission.Itwaspointedoutthatanimportantrationaleofanyceasefireagreementistogenerateaneconomicdividendi.e.toprovidethepeoplemoreopportunities,andmoretrickledownbenefitsfromthemarketeconomy.

2.28 ItwasalsostatedthattheGovernmentoftheday,proceededontheassumptionthataneconomicdividendwouldprovidesupportfortheGovernmentandtothepeaceprocessfromtheSouthernelectorateinSriLanka.Thiswaspremisedonthefactthatthepeacepackage,andtheaccompanyingaidflowwouldgiverisetoaneconomicrevivalwhichwould improve the living standards in the South. Furthermore, itwas stated that thepeople in the North and the East would also be the beneficiaries of the projected

20Mr.BernardGunatillekebeforetheLLRCatColomboon11thAugust201021Dr.SamanKelegamabeforetheLLRCatColomboon29thSeptember201022Mr.BernardGunatillekebeforetheLLRCatColomboon11thAugust2010

21

economic dividend. It was explained that the expectation was that with the tricklingdownofsuchbenefits, thepeople intheseareaswouldgraduallydistancethemselvesfromtheLTTE,whichwasessentialifthepeaceprocesswastosucceed.23

2.29 HoweverithadtranspiredthattheexpectedsubstantialeconomicdividendinSouthernSriLankadidnotmaterializeduetoanumberof factors.Amongthese,waswhatwasdescribedasacostlystabilizationprogrammeunderthe IMFpackagethathadbeenintroduced at the time of the CFA. It was further explained that bringing down thebudget deficit involved the pruning of expenditures under the Samurdhi Scheme,reducingthecostofthefertilizersubsidyscheme,reversing losses inStaterunenergyenterprises,electricity,watersupplyandtelecommunicationsectorsbybringingchargesmoreinlinewithcosts,andrealisticpricingforpetroleumreflectinginternationalprices.It was further stated that, defencerelated expenditure had not come downsubstantiallyaswasenvisaged,becauseasignificantamountoffundsfromtheDefencebudgetsavingshadbeendivertedfortherehabilitationof InternallyDisplacedPersons(IDPs).24

2.30 As far as theNorth and theEastwere concerned, itwas furtherpointedout that theforeignaidthatwasallocatedtotheseareas,didnotgo intotheprojectsthatdirectlytouched the people i.e.micro projects, small andmedium industries. They had beenvery much focused towards large infrastructure projects. Accordingly it was stressedthatwhatwasexpectedintheformofaneconomicdividendintheNorthandtheEastdidnotmaterializeeither.Thus,accordingtothisview,anessentialprerequisiteforthesuccessofapeaceprocesswaslacking.25

2.31 Another factor brought to the attention of theCommissionwas the failure of certaininstitutional mechanisms established under the CFA such as the Sub Committee forImmediate Humanitarian Needs (SIHRN) for the North and the East set up with theobjectiveofprovidingcivilianrelief.IttranspiredthattheGovernmentofSriLankahadproposednearly400projectsfortheNorthandtheEastandtheLTTEhadproposed80projects.TheGovernmentwasnegotiatingwiththeWorldBankforthemanagementofa fundfortheprovidingofsuchrelief. ItwaspointedoutthattheLTTEneverallowedtheSIHRNmechanismtogetofftheground.Itwasthuscontendedthatthecollapseof

23Ibid.24Ibid.25Ibid.

22

institutionssuchasSIHRNfurtherfrustratedtherealizationoftheeconomicdividendforthepeopleoftheNorthandtheEast.26

ObservationsoftheCommission

2.32 The Commission did not have the benefit of the views of the Hon. RanilWickremasinghe, the former Prime Minister who signed the CFA on behalf of theGovernment.Thoughinvited,therewasnoresponsefromhim.FormerPresident,Mrs.ChandrikaKumaratungaalsowasinvited.Therewasanexchangeofcorrespondenceonthisinvitation,butshedidnotcomebeforetheCommissiontogiveherviews.TheTamilNational Alliance (TNA) too, was invited by the Commission to present their views.HowevernorepresentativeoftheTNAcamebeforetheCommission.

2.33 HavingconsideredthematerialpertainingtotheCFApresentedtotheCommissionaswell as related literature and data in the public domain, the Commission makes thefollowing observationson the facts and circumstanceswhich led to the failure of theCFA.

ImpactofDivisivePartyPoliticsontheCFA

2.34 TheCommissionisconstrainedtoobservethatoneofthereasonsforthefailureoftheCFA,isthepartisanapproachtovitalnationalissuesonthepartofpoliticalpartieswhichhas dominated thepolitical landscape of Sri Lanka since Independence. In a situationwhichrequiredallpoliticalpartiestocloseranksonacritical issueaffectingtheentirenationandgenerationstocome,therewasanabjectfailureofthepoliticalleadership,todevelopacultureofconsensualdecisionmakingonnationalissues.TheCommissionisoftheview,thattheexceptionalpoliticalsituationwhichprevailedatthetime,namelytheExecutivePresidentbelongingtoonepoliticalpartyandthePrimeMinisterandtheCabinet belonging to another, provided an unique opportunity for the two majorpoliticalparties intheSouthtocloseranksandtospeakwithonevoiceonthecriticalnationalissue.IntheCommissionsviewhadsuchabipartisanapproachbeenadoptednotonly inrelationtotheimplementationoftheCFA,but includingthenegotiationoftheCFAitself,thestoryoftheCFAwouldhavebeendifferent.

2.35 InthisconnectionitispertinenttonotethataproposalhadbeenmadebytheSriLankaFreedomParty(SLFP)byletterdated31stMay2002,suggestingthatajointcommittee

26Mr.BernardGunatillekebeforetheLLRCatColomboon11thAugust2010.

23

headed by the President and the Prime Minister be appointed to overlook theimplementationoftheCFA.27However,itappearsthatthisofferhadnotbeenaccepted.

2.36 Thematerial before the Commission is that the President who is the Commander inChiefoftheArmedForceswasbypassedandkeptcompletelyoutofthepictureduringthe entire period leading up to the signing of the CFA. The Commission notes in thisregard, that when the then President was handed over a copy of the CFA, she hadrequestedtimetostudyit,buthadbeeninformedthatitwastoolateasthedocumenthadalreadybeensigned.28Infactatthatstage,theCFAhadbecomeafaitaccompli.Theconsequenceof this failure to take theHeadof State into confidenceandtokeepherbriefed and to seek her views, was to circumvent an important component of theExecutive limb of Government. Had the President, been consulted, as Commander inChief of the Armed Forces, shewould have been duty bound to ensure that nationalsecurityconcernswereincorporatedintotheCFAprocess.

2.37 An unfortunate consequence of the failure to adopt a bipartisan approach is that itcontributed to the public at large not being supportive of the CFA and the peaceprocess, despite their yearning for peace. Failure to engage in the widest possibleconsultative process through parliamentary debate and interparty consultationsincluding different Tamil political groups resulted in a perception that theagreementwasthrustuponthepublicandaconsequenterosionofpublicsupport. Indeedduringthe commissions visit to Jaffna one representer, a leading academic in the NorthernProvince,didstatethattheproposalsoftheUnitedNationalParty(UNP)administrationduring the CFA period, seemed to lack sincerity in Tamil minds, because thatadministrationwhileinoppositionhadsuccessfullythwartedthepassageinParliamentoftheyear2000constitutionalamendments.29

2.38 ThelackofinclusivityintheCFAprocesshasbeensoughttobeexplainedonthegroundthat it was imperative to finalize the draft CFA within the shortest possible timeirrespectiveofthedifficulties,ratherthanallowingthedefactoceasefireonthegroundtounravel.30FurthermoreithasbeenstatedthatthepoliticalrelationshipthatexistedbetweentheExecutivePresidentandthePrimeMinisterwasalsonotconducive forawiderconsultativeprocess.

27Mr.JavidYusufbeforetheLLRCatColomboon25thOctober201028Mr.JavidYusufbeforetheLLRCatColomboon25thOctober201029ProfessorRatnajeevanHoolebeforetheLLRCatJaffnaon12thNovember201030Mr.BernardGunatillekebeforetheLLRCatColomboon11thAugust2010

24

2.39 TheCommissionfindsitselfunabletoacceptthislineofargumentasajustificationforthe failure to ensure that all limbs of Government acted in concert on such a vitalnationalissue.InnegotiatinganinstrumentsuchastheCFAwhichhadacriticalimpactonthefutureoftheNation,anoverallinclusiveapproachandadherencetoestablishedconstitutional practices where different limbs of Government functioned in concert,rather than at cross purposes, was vital. Having said this, the Commission doesrecognizethat inclusivityneedstobetemperedwithpracticality.Expediencyisalsoanimportant factor to be taken into account in this regard.However in this instance, inparticular,thefailuretoconsulttheExecutivePresidentshowsthatthependulumhadswungtooneextreme,disturbingthedelicatebalancethatneededtobepreservedinrespectofvitalnationalissues.ConsequentlythisjeopardizedtheentireCFAprocess.

FacilitatorsRoleintheNegotiationProcessandImplementationofCFA

2.40 When inviting third party facilitation, it is of critical importance that the partiesconcerned have a clear perception as to the role and functions of the facilitator. Afacilitator must function as a neutral agent, and evenhandedly persuade the partiesconcerned, through exertion of its influence, to reach a compromise settlement andshouldnotinanywaygiveanappearanceofevenasemblanceofpartiality.Theeffectivedischargeofthis functionrequiresthatthethirdparty facilitatorfunctions inamannerthatinspiresconfidenceamongthepartiesconcernedandalsodoesnotundertakeanyother functions which would be incompatible with its role as facilitator. Any suchincompatibilitywould compromise the balance that needs to be preserved in carryingoutfacilitatoryfunctions.

2.41 Theseconsiderationswouldalsorequirethatwhennegotiatinganagreementwherethefacilitatoristaskedwithpresentingatextfortheconsiderationofthetwoparties,thataneutral text be placed for the consideration and discussion by the parties. Thechallengebeforethefacilitatoristonudgeandencouragethetwopartiestomovefromtheir respective entrenched positions and come to middle ground, resulting in acompromisenegotiatedtextwhichwouldultimatelyemergethroughthisprocess.Itisatriteobservationthatacompromisesolutionleavesneitherpartyentirelysatisfiednorentirelydissatisfiedbutreasonablysatisfiedabouttheoutcome.Thisistheveryessenceofacompromise,theachievementofwhichistheprincipalchallengeforafacilitator.

2.42 In thepresent instance, theprocedure followedwas a completedeparture from suchestablishedprinciplesandpracticesassetoutabove.ItiscleartotheCommissionfromthematerialplacedbeforeitthatwhatwaspresentedtotheGovernmentintheformof

25

adraftCFA,wasacompromisetextwiththeLTTEwithamoreorlesstakeitorleaveitapproach.ItisunfortunatethattheadherencetotheseestablishedprinciplesappeartohavebeensacrificedfortheostensiblepurposeofkeepingtheLTTE inthenegotiatingprocess,atgreatcosttothegeneralacceptanceoftheCFAandthesustainabilityofthepeaceprocess.

2.43 Another factorwhichappeared tohave impacted theeffective implementationof theCFA,wasthedualrolesNorwaytookonasthefacilitatorofthepeaceprocessontheone hand and the Head of the SLMM on the other.31 This had led to a situation ofconflictof interest.Asstatedearlier,a facilitatormustplayaneutralrole inamannerwhichinspiresconfidencebetweenthepartiesaswellasthepeople.ThefunctionoftheHeadofaMonitoringMissionshouldbetoexerciseeffectivecontrol intheprocessofmonitoringverificationofcompliancewithanagreement.Whenafacilitatorisentrustedwith the task of monitoring, its neutrality and independence will necessarily becompromised.TheCommissionisoftheviewthatNorwayfailedtoeffectivelymonitorcompliancewiththeCFAonthebasisthatbysuchactionitsneutralroleasafacilitatorwill be compromised. Consequently Norway failed to effectively monitor compliancewith theCFA in situationswhich required strongaction in the lightof the continuousviolationsoftheCFAcommittedbytheparties,mainlytheLTTE.

2.44 ThiswasanuntenablesituationwhichshouldhavebeenaddressedbytheGovernmentat the very inception, but perhaps overlooked given the perceived sense of urgencywhich had prevailed at the time. The deficient verificationmechanism arising from aconflict of interest in the roles of facilitator and Head of SLMM contributed in asignificantwaytotheeventualbreakdownoftheCFA.

ImpactoftheProcessontheImplementationoftheCFA

2.45 TheCeasefireAgreementasreferredtoabove,waslargelyunworkable,unrealisticandfailedtoprovideaplatformforsustainablepeaceinthelongerterm.TheCommissionisoftheviewthatnegotiatingonissueswithdefenceandsecurityimplicationssuchasthetimeframesforvacatingpublicbuildingsandplacesofreligiousworshipbytheSecurityForces should have been attempted in a more inclusive and comprehensive mannerthrough greater consultation with the Defence authorities and after obtaining theirinputs.Howeveritappearsthatsuchanimportantprocesswentbydefault.

31Mr.JavidYusufbeforetheLLRCatColomboon25thOctober2010

26

2.46 TheunbalancednatureoftheCFA,hadresultedintheSLMMbeingunabletotakeanyaction in respectofCFAviolations. Inaddition, theunclearedareasdominatedby theLTTEwerenotaccessible for investigationby theSLMM.Thus theLTTEhad remainedinsulated in theseareaswhereviolationsoftheCFAwerecommitted,with theSLMMoptingtoturnablindeyeunderthepretextoftheexpectedneutralityofthefacilitator,whointhiscasewasalsotheHeadoftheSLMM.TheCommissionalsotakescognizanceof the fact that evenwith regard to violations committedwith impunity by the LTTEwithin areas under Government control, the law enforcement agencies of the Statewererenderedpowerless.TheSLMMwereeitherunableorunwillingtoassistthelawenforcementauthoritiesoftheStateinsuchsituations.TheCommissionisconstrainedto observe from the material placed before it that this conduct on the part of theFacilitator/SLMM was totally unacceptable. The Commission further observes thatbesides the political assassinations carried out by the LTTE such as that of ForeignMinister Lakshman Kadirgamar, the perpetrators sought safe haven in the LTTE controlledareasaftercommissionofcrime.Thiswas thepositionevenwith regard topersonscommittingcrimeswhichwerenotdirectlyrelatedtotheconflict,asillustratedin thecasewhere thepolicehad to seek theassistanceof theSLMMtoapprehendapedophilewhohadcommittedoffencesintheSouthandsoughtsanctuaryintheLTTEcontrolledareas.32ThepolicerequestsforSLMMassistancewerefutile.Thusitappearsto the Commission that the lack of proper overall verification and an enforcementmechanismeffectivethroughoutthecountrycoupledwithalackofcommitmentonthepartoftheSLMMtoimplementanyformofverificationandenforcement,resultedinanerosion of public confidence in the CFA and contributed in a decisive manner to itsfailure.

2.47 The CFA also provided the LTTE with an opportunity to be equal partners with theGovernment of Sri Lanka at the negotiating table.33 The Commission recognizes thatwhile itwasnecessary that theLTTEbeaparty to theCFA, so that theyaremade toundertakeobligationsundertheagreement,itisquestionablewhethertheaccordingofparity of status to the LTTE, on par with the legitimate Government, with all thetrappings normally accorded to a State entity, and thereby conferring a degree oflegitimacy to the LTTE before the international community, was in fact necessary toachievetheobjectiveofthepeaceprocess.TheCommissiontakesaviewthatthiswasnot justified and only provided the LTTE a convenient excuse to resile from itscommitmentstothepeaceprocess.Thisisclearlyillustratedbytheepisodeswherethe

32Dr.Mrs.HiranthiWijemannebeforetheLLRCatColomboon12thAugust201033Mr.BernardGunatillekebeforetheLLRCatColomboon11thAugust,2010

27

LTTE having arrived inOslo, Norway in June 2006 failed to appear at the negotiatingtable on the specious ground that the Government delegationwas not atMinisteriallevel,anditsdecisiontofinallysuspendtheirparticipationinthepeacenegotiationsonthe ground that they were not invited by the United States Government to thePreparatoryWashingtonDonorConferenceinApril2003.34

2.48 The Commission also takes the view that there is usually an underlying strategy andobjectivewhennegotiatinganyagreement. Inthecaseofaceasefireagreement,suchstrategymust essentially lead to thenegotiationof core substantive issues towards alasting permanent settlement. In the case of the CFA the search for a politicalsettlement and the identification and discussion of core substantive issues relating tosuchasettlement,appearstohavebeensidelined.Thefocusappearstohavebeenontransitional issues, such as how tomaintain the ceasefire on the ground andmerelyrecordviolations.TheLTTEstrategyappearstohavebeentofocusonissueswhichtheyreferredtoasexistential issues.OnthepartoftheGovernmentitappearsthat ittooadopted the strategy of one step at a time as the Government itself was politicallyweak.35

2.49 ThemostalarmingfactortoemergefromthiswasthatwiththeconclusionoftheCFA,theentirecountrywascategorizedintoareas,underthecontroloftheLTTEandthoseunderthecontroloftheGovernment.Suchcategorizationappearstohaveencouragedthe LTTE todragon thenegotiatingprocess as long aspossible, discussingperipheralissueswithoutdiscussing the corepolitical issues,with theobjectiveof strengtheningtheir military capability in the intervening period. These developments wereunacceptable and unprecedented for the reason that they amounted to territorialconcessionsupfronttoanonstateentity.ThispositionwasfurthercompoundedbythelackofanycommitmentonthepartoftheLTTEtolastingpeace.

2.50 Considering the actions of the LTTE immediately prior to the signing of the CFA, it isclear to the Commission that the LTTE was totally disinterested in a negotiatedsettlementshortofthecreationofaseparatestate,andtheyusedthepeaceprocesstobuy time to militarily recoup themselves to achieve their objective through violentmeans.During the Jaffnahearings theattentionof theCommissionwasdrawn to thefactthatkeyLTTEpersonnelhadmadespeechesthattheceasefirewasonlytoprepareforthefinalbattlewhichtheywouldsoonlaunch.Therepresenterthusconcludedthatthere was no sincerity from anyone. It is regrettable that the Government failed to

34Ibid.35Mr.AustinFernandobeforetheLLRCatColomboon18thAugust2010

28

appreciatethemodusoperandioftheLTTEandtakestepstopressurizetheLTTEintheleast,toadheretotheprovisionsoftheCFAorinthealternativeifthisobjectcouldnotbeachieved,toresilefromthisonesidedagreement.ThefailureoftheGovernmentinthisregardhelpedtheLTTEtoenhanceitsmilitarycapability.

2.51 It is also a matter of concern for the Commission that the interests of the MuslimCommunity were not given due recognition in the CFA process. While the MuslimCommunitywasformallynotapartytotheagreement,theywerecertainlyanaffectedpartythetragicincidentswhichoccurredintheEasternProvinceaswellastheethniccleansingwhichhadbeenperpetratedbytheLTTEinJaffnaandMannarasfarbackas1990speakunequivocallytothefactthatthesecurityandotherconcernsoftheMuslimCommunity shouldhavebeenhighon theagendaof thepeaceprocess.AlthoughtheGovernment was expected to represent all communities, given the equal statusaccordedtotheLTTE,itwasimperativeintheCFAcontextthattheMuslimCommunityasanaffectedpartyshouldhavebeengiveneffectiverepresentationintheentireCFAprocess.InsteadtheMuslimrepresentationwasrelegatedtothatofamereobserver.InthisregardittranspiresthattheLTTEhadtakenupthepositionthatthenegotiationsbe confinedbetween theGovernment and theLTTE,whichheld itselfout as the solerepresentative of the Tamil speaking people which according to them included theMuslims. The LTTEwas thus fundamentally opposed to the participation of aMuslimdelegation.ItistheviewoftheCommissionthatthereappearstohavebeenafailureonthepartoftheGovernmentandthefacilitatorinsurmountingthestrategicobstaclesbywayofproceduralobjectionsplacedbytheLTTE.

2.52 It appears to the Commission that the political negotiations which was the expected

followup of the CFA process nevermaterialized. Firstly from 2002 2005 the wholecountrywascategorizedintotwodistinctareas.Thisledtoanapparentlegitimizationofthe territorial claims of the LTTE. The CFA violationswere perpetratedmainly by theLTTE.Theywere largelyviolationsthatoccurredwithintheterritorydominatedbytheLTTE, such as concerted campaigns of abductions, forcible conscription of children,extortion etc. Since 2005, there was essentially a declaration of war with theassassinationofForeignMinisterLakshmanKadirigamar,thekillingofalargenumberofunarmed military personnel returning on home leave, the Kebitigollewa massacre ofcivilians, the attempted assassination of the then Army Commander etc. These wereclearindicationsofalackofcommitmentonthepartoftheLTTEforanyseriousattemptatanegotiated settlement. In fact theceasefireperiodhadbeenusedby theLTTE tostrengthen itsmilitary capability inter alia, to acquire airpower, tobuild air strips, to

29

build submarines etc and to raise funds by burdening the people through illegaltaxation. The closure of theMavil Aru anicut by the LTTE and cutting off the watersupply to thousandsof farmers in theEast,was a clear indication that the LTTEwereintentonachievinga separate state throughmilitarymeans, rather thananegotiatedsettlement.ThereforewalkingawayfromthepeaceprocessandtheconsequentfailureoftheCFAwasthenaturaloutcomeoftheintransigenceoftheLTTE.

2.53 Another matter on which the Commission wishes to make some observations is theissuewhethertheCFAandthepeaceprocessprovidedsomepositivefalloutbygivingrespitetothesecurityforcesandthecountryasawholefromtheconflictandalsothatinthelongterm,ithadledtothebreakupoftheLTTE.

2.54 Whilstnodoubtthereappearstohavebeenatleastinitiallyanoverallimprovementinthe general environment in the country, nevertheless the attendant relaxation ofsecurity measures during this period, appears to have given the LTTE a heavensentopportunity to strengthen themselves militarily, as described above. The socalledceasefire period was also marked by targeted killings of political leaders and otherpersonalities,soclearlymanifestedinthecoldbloodedassassinationofForeignMinisterLakshmanKadirgamar.

2.55 Oneviewexpressedbefore theCommissionwas thatdespite the shortcomingsof theCFA, it had the salutary effect of keeping a terrorist group such as the LTTE at thenegotiating table for a considerable period leading to the surfacing of internaldifferenceswithinthemovement,whichmayhavelaindormanthadtheycontinuedtobe in active combat. This line of reasoning was sought to be justified by citing theimplosionwithinthattookplacewiththebreakawayoftheKarunafaction.

2.56 The contrary view was that the ruthless nature of the LTTE leader Prabhakaran hadalreadysowntheseedsofdissensionwithin themovement.Thedisenchantmentwiththe leadership had been exacerbated with the cold blooded elimination of key LTTEleaders. There was also, in addition, the important factor of discrimination againstcadresfromtheEasternProvinceledbyMr.VinayagamoorthyMuralitharan,whichhadprovidedthefightingstrengthoftheLTTEasagainsttheperceivedfavourabletreatmentaccordedtoNortherncadres.Theconclusiontobedrawnfromthis,itwasarguedwasthattheLTTEbreakupwasamatteroftime,irrespectiveofwhethertherewasaCFAinplaceornot.

2.57 Itwouldbe reasonable to conclude that the internal implosionof the LTTEmayhavetaken place in any event, whilst the CFA and the accompanying peace process may

30

however,haveactedasacatalystinacceleratingtheprocesstowardsthebreakupoftheLTTE.

2.58 Clearly, theCFAbroughtaboutashort livedrespitetoacountryandpeoplewhohadsuffereddecadesof terrorismandcounterviolence.Howeverunstableandeventuallyunproductive,theCFAgaveanopportunity,albeitwithoutnecessarilyprovidingasoundpolitical or security framework, for all parties concerned to make an effort to lay afoundation for a process leading to a negotiated solution. However, as the eventsunfoldeditwasclearthatnoneofthismaterialized.

2.59 Conceptual flaws and implementational deficits of the CFA process and its failure toprovidelocomotiontoasustainablepeaceprocessindicatethatitwasnotproventobea successfulmodel forpeacemakingbetweenState andnonState actors. The clearlymanifest LTTE disinterest in any negotiated solution other than its declared goal ofEelam and the absence of consensual approaches to vital national issues amongdifferent political parties including Tamil political parties within the mainstreamdemocratic system of the country, too contributed to this unhappy and damagingexperience.

2.60 The LTTE clearly capitalized on the CFA deficiencies both conceptual andimplementational,andconsolidatedtheterritorialrewards,andrecognitionaccordedtothem; benefited from the parity of status and the lack of reciprocity; exploited theabsenceofanyprovisions to startpoliticalnegotiations, letalonedecommissioningofweapons; abused theprovisionsof theCFA toexclude legitimatemaritimeactivitybytheSriLankaNavythusfacilitatingillicitarmstraffickingincontraventionofnationalandinternationallaw,includingUNSCRes.1373of2001;benefitedfromtheabsenceofanycredibleverificationregimetodeterviolations; insidiouslyabusedthetotalabsenceofany human rights obligations, let alone an effective regime against the abhorrentpracticeofemployingchildsoldiers.

2.61 Apart from the reasons pointed out above, the Commission is of the view that thefailureoftheCFAismainlyduetothedisinclinationoftheLTTEtoterminatetheconflictandenterthepoliticalprocess.

31

Chapter3OverviewofSecurityForcesOperations

Section ParagraphNumbers

Background 3.13.6

EasternOperations 3.73.12

WanniOperations 3.133.19

TheStrategy

ClearingtheArea

SecurityForcesCasualtiesandLTTECasualties 3.20

32

Chapter3OverviewofSecurityForcesOperations1

Background

3.1 Consequent to the events that took place after the CFA in 2002, the possibility of apoliticalsettlementwasfastreceding.

3.2 SeveralpersonsmaderepresentationsbeforetheCommissionhighlightingsomeofthemajorfactorsthatledtothecompletebreakdownoftheCFAandtheescalationoftheconflict.2

3.3 The attention of the Commission was drawn to the fact that after 2005 there wasessentially a declaration of war as was manifested by the killing of key political andmilitaryleadersandthemassacreofcivilianssuchastheKebithigollewamassacre.3

3.4 RepresentationswerealsomadetoapprisetheCommissionofthefactthattheplannedmodusoperandioftheLTTEwastoblockadeTrincomaleewhichwouldhavepreventedreliefsuppliesgoingtoJaffnafromTrincomalee.Theonlyavailablesupplyrouteatthetimewasthesearoute.

3.5 On21st July2006, theLTTEhad interrupted thewatersupplybyclosing theMavilAruanicutresultingin45,000acresofpaddylandintheTrincomaleeDistrictbeingdeprivedofwater.25,486personsfrom5,800familieshadbeenaffectedbythisact.

3.6 On12thAugust2006,theLTTEhadattemptedtobreakthroughMuhamalai4andenterthe Jaffna peninsula which attack had been repulsed by the Security Forces with acounteroffensive.AftersomeinitialsetbacksduetoheavyresistancefromtheLTTE,theSecurityForceshadbeensuccessfulintheircounteroffensiveandinreestablishingtheForwardDefenceLine(FDL)inMuhamalai.

1ThematerialcontainedinthischapterisbasedoncomprehensivebriefingsreceivedbytheCommissionfromSeniorDefenceOfficials and SeniorMilitary Officials, in addition to the representations received during Public Hearings from Defence andSeniorMilitaryOfficialsaswellasfromSeniorPublicOfficialswhohadservedintheconflictaffectedareasandmembersofthePublic.Datesareapproximate.2ReferChapter2ontheCeasefireAgreement.3Fordetailsofattacksonkeypoliticalleader/attacksoncivilians/civilianinstallationsandmilitaryinstallationsreferAnnex3.14Atthattime,MuhamalaihadbeentheEntryandExitpointtotheJaffnaPeninsula.

33

EasternOperations

3.7 ThefirststepoftheEasternOperationhadbeentoregaincontrolofMavilAruandtoreopentheMavilAruanicutthishadhappenedon10thAugust2006.

3.8 Atthistime,5therehadbeenasignificantLTTEpresenceintheEasternProvince,inthearea south of Weli Oya going down to Pottuvil, and extending to the WesternboundariesofMahaOyaandAmpara6.

3.9 According to material placed before the Commission by SeniorMilitary Officials, theEastern Operations had been launched on 28th July 2006, fromMavil Aru and wereconcluded in July 2007 with the capture of BatticaloaWest. Due to the strong LTTEpresence in the jungles of the Eastern Province, the operation involved searching forLTTE hideouts in vast tracts of jungle and taking them on. As such fighting had notnecessarily taken place in highly populated civilian areas except during the Vakaraioperations.

3.10 According to the briefings received from Senior Military and Defence Officials theSecurityForceshadconductedtheiroperationsintheEasternProvinceinthefollowingmanner7:

Mavilaru 28thJuly2006to8thAugust20068,Muttur/Kaddaiparichchan 2ndAugust2006to6thAugust20069,Sampoor 27thAugust2006to4thSeptember200610,Gangai/Manirasakulam 1stOctober2006to10thOctober200611,Vakarai/Kathiraveli 30thOctober2006to21stJanuary200712,

5July/August20066FordetailsseemapAnnex3.2.Source:MinistryofDefence7DetailsarefrommaterialprovidedbySeniorDefenceandSeniorMilitaryOfficials.8ThishadbeenacounteroffensivetoanLTTEattack.9MutturhadsomecivilianvillagesandwasunderGovernmentcontrolwhentheLTTEhadlaunchedanattackontheNavalBaseandArmydetachmentinKaddaiparichchan.10SampoorareahadbeenanareadominatedbytheLTTEfromwheretheLTTEfiredattheTrincomaleeharbourandotherinstallations(e.g.Prima).11AreadominatedbytheLTTE.12TheoperationhadbeencarriedoutbySpecialForcesoftheArmysupportedbyinfantry.ThestrategyoftheSecurityForceshadbeentodrawtheLTTEintothejungleareasratherthanhavedirectconfrontationwhereciviliancasualtiescouldoccur.ThedistancethattheSecurityForceshadhadtocoverwasover40kilometersofLTTEdominatedareas.Therehadbeenaround15,000 civilians living in the Vakarai Kathiraveli area. After the operations in Sampoor and adjacent areas approximately30,000civilianshadmovedtoVakaraiKathiraveliarea.About10,000hadmanagedtocrosstogovernmentheldareasinitiallybut the LTTE had used the rest as a human shield and evacuation attempts by INGOs had not materialized due to LTTEobjections.HoweverbymidDecember2006theLTTEhadlostcontrolovertheciviliansandwithinamatterofdaysnearly25,000civilianshadcrossedovertoGovernmentheldareasandthebalancehadmovedtoGovernmentheldareaswhenthefallofVakaraihadbeenimminent.Source:MinistryofDefence.

34

Kaddawana 2ndFebruaryto7thFebruary2007,13Kumburuppiddi 21stFebruaryto25thFebruary200714,BatticaloaWest(PhaseI) 24thFebruary2007to11thApril200715,Peraru 1stMarch2007to8thMarch200716BatticaloaWest(PhaseII) 25thApril2007to10thJuly200717

3.11 According to material placed before the Commission by SeniorMilitary Officials, theEasternOperationshadconcludedonthe10thofJuly200718.19

3.12 The total area cleared in the East over a period of nearly one year had beenapproximately 6,000 sq kms with a population of approximately 212,486 people. Inclearing the East the Security Forces had to traverse approximately 55 kms North toSouth20andapproximately17kmsWesttoEast.21

WanniOperations22

TheStrategy

3.13 WhilsttheEasternOperationswerecontinuing,theWannioperationshadcommencedin late February 200723, with the launch of the 57 Division, West of Vavuniya. Theoperationshadcontinuedwithpartofthe57DivisionmovingtowardstheMadhuarea.While theywereprogressing to theMadhuarea, towards theendof September (23rdSeptember2007)TaskForce124hadbeenlaunchedNorthofMannar.[Thiswasanewlyraisedformation,whichlaterbecame58Division.]SpecialForcesinthemeantimehadcaptured the Silavaturai area inorder to secure theWestern coastline toprevent theLTTEfromlaunchingattacksfromtheirbasesontheWesterncoastline.TaskForce1hadmoved North along the coast with the objective of recapturing Pooneryn.Subsequently,on7thJanuary2008,59DivisionhadbeenlaunchedSouthofMullaittivu,toconductoperationsinthatareamovinguptoMullaittivu.Thereafter,therehadbeen

13JungleareasdominatedbyLTTE14Ibid15HadbeenvastjungleareaswhereSecurityForceshadencounteredheavyresistancefromLTTE.16LTTEdominatedareas.17HadbeenvastjungleareaswhereSecurityForceshadencounteredheavyresistancefromLTTE.18ForamapofthesequenceoftheEasternoperationsreferAnnex3.3.Source:MinistryofDefence19AccordingtoSeniorMilitaryOfficials22Division,23Division,theCommandoBrigadeandSpecialForcesBrigadeparticipatedintheEasternOperations.ADivisionconsistsofapprox5,000menandaBrigadeconsistsof2,500to3,000men.20FoulPointtoPanichchankerni21KandalkadutoKaladicheni22WannireferstothefollowingdistrictsMullaitivu,Mannar,Kilinochchi,andVavuniya.23ForamapindicatingLTTEdominatedareasintheWanniasatFebruary2007referAnnex3.4.SourceMinistryofDefence24AccordingtomaterialplacedbeforetheCommissionaTaskForceconsistsof4,5005,000men.

35

other formations Task Force 2, (launched 2nd June 2008) Task Force 3 (launched 3rdOctober2008),TaskForce4(launched19thDecember2008)thathadtakenpartintheoperationsNorthofVavuniya.From theNorthern side (i.e. Jaffna side) the53and55Divisionshadconductedoperations.

ClearingtheArea25

3.14 Initially operations had been conductedmainlyWest of A9 in the jungle, Vavuniya,Madhu area (Madhu area captured on 24th April 2008). From theWestern edge TaskForce1hadcontinuedtheiroperationscapturingAdampan(9thMay2008),thericebowlarea (1st June2008),Vidataltivu area (16th July 2008Vidatalativuwas amajor LTTEBoat Landing point to which military supplies had been delivered) going up toMulangavil.

3.15 The59Divisionwhichhadbeenlaunchedon7thJanuary2008,movedNorthofWeliOyaarea towardsMullaittivu. It had capturedMungamBase (a strong LTTE Base) on 30thMay2008;Nittikaikulamon27thJuly2008,Alampilon4thDecember2008,Mulliyawalaion26thDecember2008andMullaittivuon25thJanuary2009.

3.16 Task Forces 2, 3, and 4 had cleared the area North of Omanthai supporting the 57Divisionandthe59Division.Whiletheseoperationswereprogressing,TaskForce1hadmoved NorthWest along the coast capturing Vellankulam on 12th August 2008; andmovingfurtherNorthtoPooneryn(capturedon15thNovember2008)andcomingdowntoParanthan(capturedon1stJanuary2009).FromParanthan,partofTaskForce1hadgonefurtherNorthtoprovidesupportforthe53Divisionand55DivisiontorecaptureElephantPass (9th January2009).The restofTaskForce1 (renamed58Division)hadcomedowntoKillinochchitomeetupwiththe57DivisionwhichhadcomeupNorthbythat time capturing Tunukkai on 22nd August 2008 and Mallavi on 2nd September200826.The57Divisionwiththesupportofthe58DivisionhadcapturedKillinochchion2nd January2009.Whenthe58DivisionwhichhadproceededNorthreachedElephantPass, the 53 and 55 Divisions had moved South from Muhamalai having capturedSorampattuon8thJanuary2009.AccordingtoSeniorMilitaryOfficials,the53Divisionandthe55DivisionhadbeendeployedinMuhamalaithestrategyhadbeenforthesetwoDivisionstodefendtheJaffnaPeninsula.However,astheoperationsprogressedthe53Division and 55Division had broken out fromMuhamalai and had come down to

25ForamapdepictingthesequenceoftheWannioperationsreferAnnex3.5.26AccordingtoSeniorMilitaryOfficialswhobriefedtheCommission,TunnukaiandMallavihadbeenthelargesttownshipsafterKillinochchi.

36

ElephantPasstolinkupwiththe58DivisionandcapturedElephantPasson9thJanuary2009.

3.17 TheSecurityForceshadtakenovertheA9roadon9thJanuary2009afterthecaptureofElephantPass.OncetheA9hadbeentakenover,fromtheEasternsidetheMullaittivuareaoperationshadbeenstrengthenedwiththe53DivisionbeingmovedtoMullaittivu.AccordingtomaterialplacedbeforetheCommissionbySeniorMilitaryOfficials,bythistime(i.e.January2009)thecivilianpopulationhadbeenconfinedtotheNorthEasternpart of theWanni and the LTTE had also been congregating into those areas. At thisstage it had become necessary for the Security Forces to reevaluate the Rules ofEngagementandchangethemodusoperandi.TheGovernmenthad,interalia,decidedtodemarcateNoFireZonesfromtimetotimefortheprotectionofciviliansandcivilianobjects.27Theuseofheavyweaponsalsohadbeenrestrictedwiththeestablishmentofthe No Fire Zones. In addition several Safe Areas had also been demarcated at therequestoftheUN/ICRC.28AfterthecaptureofKillinochchiandtakingovertheA9,theSecurity Forces (57 Division and 58 Division) had moved Eastwards on the A35 roadtowardsVisuamadu,Puthukudiyirippuarea.

3.18 The 58 Division supported by the 57 Division had continued Eastwards capturingTharmapuram on 15th January 2009, Visuamadu on 28th January 2009 andThamarakulamon3rdFebruary2009.Whilstthe58Divisionand57DivisionhadmovedEastwardsontheA35,the59DivisionandTaskForce4hadbeenmovingupNorthwardsandcapturedUdayakattukulamon25thJanuary2009.29Inthemeantime,the55Divisionhad been tasked to clear South of Elephant Pass, coming North to South along theEasternCoast, capturingChundikulumon21st January2009,Chalai (LTTEboat landingpoint)on7thFebruary2009andKuppilankulamon11thFebruary2009.SeniorMilitary