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Cognitive operations in Buddhistmeditation: interface with WesternpsychologyTse-fu KuanPublished online: 28 May 2012.

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COGNITIVE OPERATIONS IN

BUDDHIST MEDITATION: INTERFACE

WITH WESTERN PSYCHOLOGY

Tse-fu Kuan

This paper interprets Buddhist meditation from perspectives of Western psychology and

explores the common grounds shared by the two disciplines. Cognitive operations in

Buddhist meditation are mainly characterized by mindfulness and concentration

in relation to attention. Mindfulness in particular plays a pivotal role in regulating

attention. My study based on Buddhist literature corroborates significant

correspondence between mindfulness and metacognition as propounded by some

psychologists. In vipassana meditation, mindfulness regulates attention in such a way

that attention is directed to monitor the ever-changing experiences from moment to

moment so that the practitioner attains the ‘metacognitive insight’ into the nature of

things. In samatha meditation, mindfulness picks an object as the focus of ‘selective

attention’ and monitors whether attention is concentrated on the chosen object so as to

attain the state of ‘concentration’. Nimitta that appears in a deep state of concentration

resembles ‘imagery’ in psychology. Mindfulness consists in the wholesome functioning of

sanna. A finding by psychologists supports my view that sanna can act as perception

on the one hand and, on the other hand, it can produce nimitta ‘imagery’ in deep

meditation where perception is suspended.

1. Introduction

As Dudley-Grant, Bankart and Dockett (2003, 1) put it, ‘Buddhism shares

with psychology an almost infinite faith in the inherent possibilities within human

beings to transcend historical and immediate experience in order to fully actualize

human potential.’ This optimistic standpoint and approach is embodied in

Buddhist meditation, which ‘aims at producing a state of perfect mental health,

equilibrium and tranquillity’ (Rahula 2000, 67) through various forms of

methodical training.

Different types of Buddhist meditation involve various cognitive aspects

which can be compared to some mental functions discussed in Western

psychology. In my elucidation of the cognitive operations in Buddhist meditation,

Contemporary Buddhism, Vol. 13, No. 1, May 2012ISSN 1463-9947 print/1476-7953 online/12/010035-60

q 2012 Taylor & Francis http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14639947.2012.669281

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I will draw a number of parallels between Buddhism and Western psychology as

an attempt to interpret some phenomena characteristic of Buddhist meditation in

a way that people can understand or appraise Buddhist meditation more clearly

and easily. The Appendix to this paper provides a correspondence table showing

Buddhist concepts and their counterparts in psychology under discussion. This is

not intended to mean that those Buddhist concepts are exactly the same as their

counterparts in psychology—as given in the table—but to demonstrate that the

two disciplines share a lot in common with respect to their analyses of human

experiences and mental processes, even when the two disciplines deal with

cognition in different circumstances or at different spiritual levels. There is growing

interest in Buddhist meditation in the field of psychology; especially, the practice of

mindfulness is increasingly being integrated into contemporary clinical psychology

(Salmon et al. 2004, 434). When Buddhist meditation is applied to clinical practice

by psychologists, to what extent has its essence been preserved? In what way does

Buddhist meditation as appropriated by psychology resemble or differ from

authentic Buddhist meditation? Why does that happen? Such issues will also be

explored in this paper.

It is not easy to define the term ‘meditation’ in general or in the context of

Buddhism. I will try to clarify what the term ‘meditation’ may refer to in the

Theravada Buddhist Canon written in Pali. This Canon comprises three divisions,

two of which will be utilized as the main sources: (1) the Nikayas, collections of

suttas (Skt sutra) and other forms of early teachings; (2) the Abhidhamma,

scholastic works that systematize the early teachings. The Visuddhimagga, an

important Theravada exegetical work by Buddhaghosa in the fifth century AD, will

also be consulted. This paper refers to Buddhist technical terms in Pali, but their

Sanskrit equivalents are sometimes given for reference.

2. Samatha meditation and vipassana meditation

The Buddhist practice or ‘path’ is usually summarized as the three trainings

(sikkha), namely morality (sıla), concentration (samadhi) and wisdom (panna).1 The

last two trainings can be reckoned as the two main divisions of Buddhist

meditation. Concentration (samadhi) and wisdom (panna) correspond respect-

ively to samatha ‘serenity/calm’ and vipassana ‘insight’, which represent

two different but complementary aspects of Buddhist meditation (Gethin 1998,

174 –5). Cousins (1984, 59) indicates that the identification of samatha and

vipassana with samadhi (concentration) and panna (wisdom) is standard in the

Abhidhamma texts, and he demonstrates that this can be traced back to earlier

texts in the Nikayas (Cousins 1984, 56–8; see also Gunaratana 1985, 3). The

relation between the three trainings and the two types of meditation can be

summed up in the following diagram:

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Morality ðs�ılaÞ

Concentration ðsam�adhiÞ— Samathameditation

Wisdom ðpann�aÞ———— Vipassan�ameditation

8>><>>:

Let us first look at the basics about the two types of Buddhist meditation.

Samatha (serenity) meditation is geared to cultivate deep states of concentration

(samadhi), where the mind becomes still and calm, resting undisturbed on

just one object of contemplation. Vipassana (insight) meditation is aimed at

developing wisdom (panna), whereby the practitioner gains direct understanding

of the nature of things in terms of the following three aspects: that all things are

impermanent, that they are unsatisfactory, and that they are not Self (Gethin 1998,

174–6, 187; Gunaratana 1985, 3, 9; Nyanaponika Thera 1962, 4).

Among the five faculties (indriya) conducive to liberation as stated in the

Nikayas, mindfulness (sati) and concentration (samadhi) serve as the key nexus of

cognitive operations in Buddhist meditation. It seems to be a widely held opinion

in contemporary Theravada Buddhism that samatha meditation or concentration

(samadhi) is not essential for the realization of Nirvana, but the sine qua non of

liberation is vipassana meditation, which they consider to be identical with the

practice of mindfulness (Na_namoli and Bodhi 2001, 38, 40; Nyanaponika Thera

1962, 44; Rahula 1980, 271; Sılananda 2002, 9). This opinion has a considerable

influence on Western psychologists (Goleman 1975, 219ff.; Kabat-Zinn 1982, 34;

Ospina et al. 2007, 32; Salmon et al. 2004, 435). It is, however, problematic to

identify mindfulness with vipassana (insight) meditation and separate mindfulness

from concentration, or samatha. According to canonical sources, mindfulness is

not exclusively related to vipassana, but it is also essential to samatha meditation

(Kuan 2008, 58–70). Moreover, as indicated in the early scriptures, vipassana and

samatha, when yoked together and monitored by mindfulness, are conducive to

Nirvana. For example, a sutta in the Sa_myutta Nikaya gives a simile as follows in

brief:

A swift pair of messengers would ask the gatekeeper: ‘Where is the lord of this

city?’ and deliver a message of truth to the lord of the city. Here, as the Buddha

explains, ‘gatekeeper’ stands for mindfulness; ‘the swift pair of messengers’

stands for serenity (samatha) and insight (vipassana); ‘the city’ stands for the

individual; ‘the lord of the city’ is a designation for consciousness; ‘a message of

truth’ is a designation for Nirvana. (SN IV 194–195)

Therefore, the dual practice of samatha and vipassana, regulated by mindfulness,

can transform one’s consciousness and bring about Nirvana.

According to the above discussion, the relationship between the two

mental faculties on the one hand and the two types of meditation on the other

can be shown diagrammatically as follows:

COGNITIVE OPERATIONS IN BUDDHIST MEDITATION 37

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Mindfulness Vipassana meditation

Concentration Samatha meditation

On the whole, therefore, mindfulness plays a pivotal role in Buddhist meditation.

From the foregoing we can deduce that it is impossible to practise Buddhist

meditation without mindfulness. As Conze (1962, 51) states, ‘Mindfulness is not

only the seventh of the steps of the holy eightfold path . . . On occasions it is

almost equated with Buddhism itself.’ I shall first elucidate what ‘mindfulness’

(sati/sm_rti) means in Buddhist context and interpret it from psychological

perspectives before moving on to ‘concentration’.

3. Mindfulness

3.1. Sanna and cognition

A scrutiny of the Buddhist texts reveals that mindfulness is closely related to

sanna. What does sanna refer to? As Hamilton (1996, 54–8) demonstrates,

according to many passages in the Nikayas, sanna has a discriminatory function

and it incorporates a function of assimilation or comprehension of what has been

perceived so that identification can take place. On the other hand, Hamilton (1996,

58–9) points out that sanna can also be thought of as the faculty of conception

when its functioning is not dependent on the co-temporal input of sensory data.

Wayman (1976, 326–32) also indicates that in many cases sanna (Skt sa_mjna) has

to be translated as ‘conception’, ‘notion’ or ‘idea’ (see also de Silva 2005, 26).

Referring to the Abhidhamma literature, Nyanaponika Thera (1998, 121) shows

that ‘remembering’ is a function of sanna. Similarly, Gethin (2001, 41) recognizes

sanna as playing a major role in the psychology of memory. From the foregoing

observations, it is evident that sanna covers a large part in the field of cognition in

psychology, as explained below. Hayes (2000, 13) states: ‘“Cognition” is the

general term which we give to mental activities, such as remembering, forming

concepts, using language or attending to things.’ Goldstein (2005, 481) defines

cognition as ‘mental processes involved in perception, attention, memory,

language, problem solving, reasoning, and making decisions’.

According to the Buddhist texts, mindfulness (sati) plays a role similar to

sanna in terms of its functions, which also involve memory, recognition,

discrimination and conception. The faculty (indriya) of mindfulness is defined in

the Sa_myutta Nikaya as follows:

And monks, what is the faculty of mindfulness? Here, monks, a noble disciple is

possessed of mindfulness, endowed with supreme ‘mindfulness [and]

discrimination’ (sati-nepakka), is one who remembers, who recollects what

was done and said long ago. He dwells contemplating the body as a body . . .

feelings . . . mind . . . He dwells contemplating phenomena as phenomena,

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ardent, fully aware, possessed of mindfulness, in order to remove covetousness

and dejection concerning the world. (SN V 198)

In this definition, sati (mindfulness) involves memory, discrimination and

recognition. Included here is the standard description of the well-known ‘four

establishments of mindfulness’ (cattaro satipa_t_thana): ‘He dwells contemplating

the body as a body . . . feelings . . . mind . . . phenomena as phenomena . . .

concerning the world’, which suggests properly identifying or recognizing one’s

experiences. Sati ‘mindfulness’ also has the function of deliberately forming

concepts when it is not contemporaneous with sense perceptions. The

Dhammapada (verses 296–298) mentions buddhagata sati ‘mindfulness directed

to the Buddha’, dhammagata sati ‘mindfulness directed to the Dharma’ and

sa_nghagata sati ‘mindfulness directed to the Buddhist Order’. This set of

mindfulness can be regarded as a practice of reminding oneself of the spiritually

beneficial subjects by deliberately forming concepts of these subjects.

According to the above discussion, sati (mindfulness) functions in a way

similar to sanna as cognition. In some cases, the Buddhist texts even employ sati

and sanna in such a way as if the two terms were interchangeable. For example,

Bhikkhu Bodhi (2000, 1914: n.119) says that the mara_na-sanna at SN V 132 is

usually called ‘mindfulness of death’ (mara_na-sati) as found at AN III 304–308. All

this does not imply that mindfulness (sati) is simply sanna. I would rather argue

that the essence of mindfulness consists in the wholesome functioning of sanna

for the following reasons. The Atthasalinı, the commentary on an Abhidhamma

text, states that mindfulness (sati) has firm sanna as its immediate cause (As I 122).

Therefore, only when sanna exists can mindfulness function. Mindfulness has to

work together with sanna. Gethin writes:

According to the system of Abhidhamma embodied in the Pali Abhidhamma-

pi_taka and commentaries, sati is only ever present as a mental factor (cetasika) in

skilful states of mind (kusala-citta): if there is sati, there is skilful consciousness;

and since sati is in fact always present in skilful states of mind, if there is skilful

consciousness, there is sati. (Gethin 2001, 40)2

In contrast, sanna exists in wholesome, unwholesome and indeterminate states of

mind according to the Abhidhamma.3 But as long as mindfulness (sati) is present,

sanna must be associated with wholesome mental states, and the manner in

which sanna recognizes, memorizes, forms concepts, and so on must be

wholesome (Kuan 2008, 13–17).

3.2. Mindfulness and metacognition

By inference from the above discussion, the practice of mindfulness

consists in steering sanna in such a way that one’s cognition is rendered

wholesome in a Buddhist sense. Mindfulness as understood in this way is

comparable with ‘metacognition’ in Western psychology. Hacker (1998, 2: n.1)

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says: ‘Metacognition is defined as knowledge of cognition and monitoring and

control of cognitive activities.’ As discussed above, sanna is roughly coterminous

with the field of ‘cognition’ in psychology. Since the practice of mindfulness is to

steer sanna in a wholesome way, it involves monitoring and controlling cognitive

activities.

In his clinical research, Teasdale (1999) already associates mindfulness in

Buddhism with metacognition in psychology, using mindfulness training as a

means to enter a ‘metacognitive insight mode’ in which thoughts are experienced

simply as events in the mind. Bishop et al. (2004) explicitly characterize

mindfulness as metacognition:

Metacognition is thought to consist of two related processes—monitoring and

control. The notion of mindfulness as a metacognitive process is implicit in the

operational definition that we are proposing since its evocation would require

both control of cognitive processes . . . and monitoring the stream of

consciousness. (Bishop et al. 2004, 233)

My discussion based mainly on Buddhist literature provides textual evidence that

further corroborates a significant correspondence, even just partially, between

mindfulness and metacognition as propounded by those psychologists.

3.3. Mindfulness in Buddhism and psychology: a comparison

Mindfulness as understood in psychology appears to diverge in some way

from mindfulness in Buddhist meditation. Psychologists often emphasize that

mindfulness is ‘nonjudgmental’ and free from reacting to thoughts, feelings, etc.

Bishop et al. (2004, 232) summarize several scholars’ opinions as follows:

Mindfulness has been described as a kind of nonelaborative, nonjudgmental,

present-centered awareness in which each thought, feeling, or sensation that

arises in the attentional field is acknowledged and accepted as it is. In a state of

mindfulness, thoughts and feelings are observed as events in the mind, without

over-identifying with them and without reacting to them in an automatic,

habitual pattern of reactivity.

Likewise, Kabat-Zinn (1994, 4) defines mindfulness as ‘paying attention in

a particular way: on purpose, in the present moment, and nonjudgmentally’.

In their research on mindfulness meditation in clinical practice, Salmon et al.

(2004, 436) say: ‘As soon as judgments, or any other form of cognitive-

based commentary, become intertwined with the flow of mental events, we are

“out of the moment” . . . ’, and emphasize ‘being able to detach from one’s

thoughts and making them objects of simple attention . . . thoughts are

treated just like any other sensation . . . rather than as special events to which we

ascribe particular significance’. Such views can claim support from a popular

Theravada Buddhist idea of mindfulness as articulated by Nyanaponika Thera

(1962) thus:

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Mindfulness, in its specific aspect of Bare Attention . . . It is called ‘bare’,

because it attends just to the bare facts of a perception as presented either

through the five physical senses or through the mind which, for Buddhist

thought, constitutes the sixth sense. When attending to the sixfold sense

impressions, attention or mindfulness is kept to a bare registering of the facts

observed, without reacting to them by deed, speech or by mental comment

which may be one of self-reference (like, dislike, etc), judgement or reflection.

(Nyanaponika Thera 1962, 30)(My italics highlighting similarities to the views

cited above)

The opinion may be backed by canonical texts such as the Satipa_t_thana Sutta (MN I

59), which states: ‘A monk understands a mind with lust as a mind with lust. He

understands a mind without lust as a mind without lust . . . with hatred . . .

without hatred . . . (The same is said of other mental states).’ Mindfulness as

usually described by psychologists in such a nonjudgmental manner represents

only one of the diverse aspects of Buddhist mindfulness.4 Following the passage

quoted above, Nyanaponika Thera further states:

By turning full attention to our thoughts as they arise, we shall get a better

knowledge of our weak and our strong points . . . By the skill attained through

Bare Attention to call bad or harmful things at once by their true names, one will

take the first step towards their elimination. (Nyanaponika Thera 1962, 42)

According to this idea, in Buddhist mindfulness there can be an evaluative or

judgmental element to the attention being paid. The Buddhist term sati in Pali or

sm_rti in Sanskrit, which is somewhat inadequately rendered into English as

‘mindfulness’, covers a much wider range of mental faculties or activities than

‘mindfulness’ as Western psychology usually describes it. An earlier study of mine

(Kuan 2008, 41–56) classifies mindfulness into the following four categories

according to the early Buddhist texts:

1. Simple awareness

2. Protective awareness

3. Introspective awareness

4. Deliberately forming conceptions

Kuan (2008, 42) points out that psychologists often understand or employ

‘mindfulness’ in the sense of simple awareness, which consists of non-judgmental

observation or awareness of an object objectively without evaluating the object,

the subject or the interaction between the two. Except for simple awareness,

however, the other three types of mindfulness do include an evaluative or

judgemental component. Mindfulness as a Buddhist practice inevitably has a

religious or ethical dimension, which entails judgment and evaluation.

The non-judgmental type of mindfulness, or simple awareness, probably

suffices to serve the purpose of clinical practice in psychology and psychotherapy.

As Salmon et al. (2004) illustrate:

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Descriptions of chronic pain are riddled with judgmental evaluations (e.g., “It’s

terrible”; “This will never end”) that represent cognitive elaborations of the more

fundamental somatotypic pain signals. It is often the case that the underlying

physical sensations receive less attention than the accompanying cognitive

evaluations, which promote anxious or depressive tendencies. (Salmon et al.

2004, 437)

Moreover, in his discussion of ‘mindfulness-based cognitive therapy’ (MBCT), Gilpin

aptly sums up the rationale behind the psychologists’ approach to mindfulness:

MBCT is based on the idea that people who have experienced major depression

are (i) vulnerable to recurrences whenever mild dysphoric states are encountered,

because (ii) these states may precipitate ‘ruminative thinking’, . . . and associative

self-criticism and judgement. To counteract this, mindfulness practice is

employed to establish a type of ‘alternative information processing

configuration’ (also known as a ‘cognitive mode’) that is incompatible with

such rumination (Teasdale 1999). . . . Thus, MBCT participants are taught to

observe their thoughts and feelings non-judgementally, and to relate to them

from a more ‘decentred’ perspective . . . rather than as aspects of self or accurate

reflections of reality (Segal, Williams, and Teasdale 2002). (Gilpin 2008, 235–36)

In contrast to psychology, what Buddhism is concerned with goes far

beyond physical or psychological illness and, therefore, in Buddhism mindfulness

(sati/sm_rti) has more diverse aspects, including evaluative aspects with religious

and ethical significance. Some evaluative aspects of mindfulness are elaborated in

a paracanonical text, the Milindapanha, as follows:

(1) When mindfulness arises, sire, it reminds one of the states together with their

counterparts that are wholesome and unwholesome, blameable and blameless

. . . Thus, sire, mindfulness has reminding (apilapana)5 as its characteristic. . . .

When mindfulness arises, sire, it examines the courses of the beneficial and

unbeneficial states thus: ‘These states are beneficial; these states are

unbeneficial; these states are helpful; these states are unhelpful.’ Then the

one who practises yoga removes the unbeneficial states and takes hold of the

beneficial states . . . Thus, sire, mindfulness has taking hold as its characteristic.

(Milindapanha, 37–8)

Accordingly, mindfulness as introspective awareness enables the practitioner to

remind himself to investigate or monitor his own mental states, wholesome and

unwholesome, beneficial and unbeneficial. Moreover, mindfulness regulates his

cognitive processes by selecting and taking hold of his wholesome and beneficial

states, thereby leading him to cultivate ‘wisdom’ (panna) in the case of vipassana

meditation, or to develop ‘concentration’ (samadhi) in the case of samatha

meditation. This is consistent with ‘metacognition’ in psychology as described by

Hacker (1998):

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Metacognition involves “active monitoring and consequent regulation and

orchestration” of cognitive processes to achieve cognitive goals (Flavell

1976, p. 252). Monitoring, regulation, and orchestration can take the form

of checking . . . selecting . . . self-interrogation and introspection . . . (Hacker

1998, 7)

Furthermore, Hacker (1998, 3) quotes from Flavell (1971, 275), saying:

‘Metacognition is an awareness of oneself as “an actor in his environment, that is,

a heightened sense of the ego as an active, deliberate storer and retriever of

information”.’ The practice of mindfulness in Buddhism is often formulated by

way of the four establishments of mindfulness, namely, contemplation (anupassin)

of the body, feelings, mind and dhammas (Skt dharma) ‘phenomena’. This

formulation seems to have been conceived in the same vein as the foregoing idea

of metacognition. The four establishments of mindfulness consist in contempla-

tion of four objects. Contemplation of the first three objects, viz. body, feelings

and mind, is concerned with awareness of oneself as an individual with physical

and psychological conditions. Contemplation of the fourth object, dhammas,

which cover virtually whatever phenomena become the objects of conscious-

ness,6 represents the objective reflection on the practitioner’s environment or

the information processed by him. Therefore, mindfulness, in terms of the four

establishments of mindfulness, is parallel in some way to ‘metacognition’ as

explained by Flavell. A significant difference, however, exists between the two.

Whereas Flavell emphasizes ‘metacognition’ as an awareness of a heightened

sense of the ego, in Buddhism mindfulness is practised with the purpose of

eliminating the ‘illusion’ of Self (atman/atta),7 the permanent and unchanging

essence of an individual. As Salmon et al. indicate:

Western psychotherapy emphasizes the concept of the self (self-improvement;

self-esteem; self-control, etc.). In contrast, Buddhist psychology views the

concept of self as an artificial, language-based construct that impedes . . . the

sort of perceptual clarity associated with mindfulness. (Salmon et al. 2004, 435)

In this context, it is worth discussing vipassana meditation from a

psychological point of view before elaborating on samatha meditation or

concentration in section 5. Applying mindfulness to vipassana (insight) meditation

can be explained, in terms of metacognition, as follows: mindfulness directs sanna,

i.e. cognition, in a way conformable to Buddhist doctrine so that the practitioner

attains ‘metacognitive insight’ into the nature of things, whereby he is able to

fully and accurately recognize that all things are impermanent, that they are

unsatisfactory, and that they are not Self.

3.4. Mindfulness and attention

A connection between mindfulness and attention is implied in the following

description of mindfulness by Nyanaponika Thera (1962, 30) cited above:

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‘Mindfulness, in its specific aspect of Bare Attention . . .When attending to the

sixfold sense impressions, attention or mindfulness is kept to a bare registering of

the facts observed’ (my italics). In the opinion of this Theravada monk, mindfulness

has an aspect of attention, and can even be paraphrased as attention. Some

psychologists also recognize that mindfulness can direct attention in a deliberate

manner to sensations, thoughts and other mental events. For example, Salmon

et al. remark:

. . . observation of the breath . . . provides a means of practicing directed

attention. The assumption in mindfulness is that turning one’s attention inward

in a focused, deliberate manner requires committed practice. . . . practice

observing the breath can proceed to directed or mindful observation of other

objects of attention—other sensations, including sounds, visual objects, and

finally thoughts. . . . mindfulness employs a broader observational stance

encompassing patterns of thoughts and other mental events. (Salmon et al.

2004, 436)

Similarly, Teasdale (1999, 154) says: ‘The essence of mindfulness is to use

intentional control of attention to establish a type of alternative information

processing configuration (or cognitive mode) . . . ’. Such interpretations of

mindfulness as something involving the function of directing or controlling

attention are in accord with our characterization of mindfulness as metacognition.

This point is articulated in the operational definition of mindfulness proposed by

Bishop et al. (2004):

Mindfulness can be defined, in part, as the self-regulation of attention, which

involves sustained attention, attention switching, and the inhibition of

elaborative processing. In this context, mindfulness can be considered a

metacognitive skill. . . . its evocation would require both control of cognitive

processes (i.e., attention self-regulation) and monitoring the stream of

consciousness. (Bishop et al. 2004, 233)

Attention is a topic usually discussed by psychologists in the context of

cognitive processes. Below is my elucidation of attention against the background

of cognitive processes in the light of both psychology and Buddhism.

4. Cognitive processes and attention

Cognitive psychology deals extensively with how attention works in

cognitive processes. Let us first look into cognitive processes as described in

psychology together with analogous concepts as found in Buddhism.

4.1. Cognitive processes

Buddhist texts are rich in describing mental processes. Take the following

passage in the Sa_myutta Nikaya as an example:

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In dependence on the eye and forms there arises eye-vinna_na. . . . The

concurrence of these three things is called eye-contact. . . . Contacted . . . one

feels, contacted one intends, contacted one perceives. [The same applies to the

ear and sounds, the nose and odours, the tongue and tastes, the body and

tactile objects, the mind and mental phenomena.] (SN IV 67–69; translation

based on Bodhi 2000, 1172)

This formula summarizes the Buddhist analysis of mental processes, which involve

the five senses and the ‘mind’ (manas), the sixth sense as Nyanaponika Thera

(1962, 30) dubs it. The above canonical passage can be illustrated in the following

diagram:

to feel

sense + object→ viññana → contact to perceive

to intend

Since my study concerns cognition, I will focus only on part of the above processes:

sense + object→ viññana → contact to perceive (sañjanati)

This roughly corresponds to the mental processes described in psychology, as

Santrock writes:

Sensation is the process of receiving stimulus energies from the external

environment. . . . A stimulus is detected by specialized receptor cells in the

sense organs—eyes, ears, skin, nose, and tongue. . . . The brain gives meaning

to sensation through perception. Perception is the process of organizing and

interpreting sensory information to give it meaning. (Santrock 2003, 122–3)

Here we have the senses (sense organs) and their corresponding objects (stimulus)

as found in the foregoing Buddhist formula. The term vinna_na has multiple

meanings depending on the context. In the canonical passage cited above,

vinna_na refers to something that occurs when the sense organs receive sensory

data. Vetter (2000, 64) maintains that vinna_na in such a context should be

translated as ‘sensation’.8 In psychology, ‘perception’ is the process consequent

upon sensation. Herrmann et al. give an example to illustrate the two processes:

Sometimes we hear a sound, sniff a smell, or see something and are not sure

what it is. At this stage, we experience sensation but only that. If, as time goes on,

we figure out what the stimulus is, we are said to perceive the stimulus.

(Herrmann et al. 2006, 74, my italics)

This description of sensation and perception is comparable to an explanation of

vinna_na and sanna by Hamilton (1996, 54): ‘It may be that vinna

_na identifies that

something has colour and sanna identifies that it is yellow; or that vinna_na

identifies that something is sour and sanna identifies it as lemon’. In the foregoing

Buddhist formula sanjanati ‘to perceive’ is the verbal form of sanna, which, in the

light of Hamilton’s explanation, refers to the same mental function as ‘perception’

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described by psychologists. In contrast with sanna which is, in a broad sense,

analogous to ‘cognition’ as discussed above, here sanna in a narrow sense is

equivalent to ‘perception’ in psychology. Therefore, cognitive processes as

described in psychology bear similarities to mental activities stated in Buddhist

scriptures. The correspondence between the two can be summed up as follows:

Buddhism : six senses þ objects ! vi ~n~n�a_na! contact ! sa~n~n�a

Psychology : sense organs þ stimulus ! sensation ! perception

In the Buddhist formula, ‘contact’ (samphassa) is explained as the concurrence of

the sense, its corresponding object, and the vinna_na that depends on the former

two. So far I have not found a counterpart of this idea in psychology.

4.2. Attention and manasikara

As mentioned above, in psychology attention is examined in terms of its

functioning in cognitive processes. Referring to other scholarly works, Sternberg

defines attention thus:

Attention is the means by which we actively process a limited amount of

information from the enormous amount of information available through our

senses, our stored memories, and our other cognitive processes. (Sternberg

2009, 124)

In addition, he says: ‘Attention acts as a means of directing mental resources

toward the information and cognitive processes that are most salient at a given

moment’ (Sternberg 2009, 125, caption for Figure 4.1).

Manasikara, a word often used as a terminology in Buddhist texts, can be

reckoned as an equivalent of ‘attention’ in psychology. In the Buddhist Canon, the

Buddha, before delivering a discourse, often says to his audience: ‘Pay attention!’

(manasikarohi, verbal form of manasikara, imperative second-person singular; or

manasikarotha, imperative second-person plural; for example DN I 124, 157; II 2,

76) Buddhaghosa, a fifth-century Theravada Buddhist commentator, explains

manasikara in his Visuddhimagga (p. 466) and Atthasalinı (p. 133) thus:

It has the characteristic of driving associated states towards the object, the

function of joining associated states to the object, the manifestation of facing

the object. . . . It should be regarded as the conductor of associated states

because it adjusts the object. (Translation based on Maung Tin 1976, 175)

This Buddhist commentator’s explanation of manasikara coincides quite well with

psychologists’ definition of ‘attention’. What Buddhaghosa calls ‘associated states’

correspond to ‘mental resources’ referred to by Sternberg (2009, 125). ‘Driving’,

‘joining’ and ‘facing’ in Buddhaghosa’s words denote the same function as

‘directing’ in Sternberg’s remark. What Buddhaghosa refers to as ‘object’ is

equivalent to ‘information’ spoken of by Sternberg, and ‘adjusting the object’

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implies the same as ‘processing a limited amount of information from the

enormous amount of information’. In other words, while there can be an

enormous amount of objects or information, manasikara adjusts the object in the

sense of processing particular objects or a limited amount of information.

5. Concentration

In Buddhism the practice of concentration is often associated with

regulating manasikara. This mental factor, apparently equivalent to ‘attention’ in

cognitive psychology, does not only exist in meditative states, but it is universal

to all types of consciousness according to the Abhidharma. I will examine how

attention is regulated in the practice of concentration.

5.1. Selective attention and concentration

Of the various functions of attention, ‘selective attention’ is crucial to the

development of concentration (samadhi), or samatha meditation.9 Vipassana

(insight) meditation is different from the former insofar as attention is not focused

on just one ‘selected’ object, but rather it is directed to monitor the ever-changing

experiences from moment to moment in a way conformable to Buddhist doctrine,

so that the practitioner attains the insight into the nature of all things. Goldstein

(2005, 101) defines ‘selective attention’ as ‘the ability to focus on one message and

ignore all others’. In the Sa_myutta Nikaya, the faculty (indriya) of ‘concentration’ is

defined thus: ‘The noble disciple gains concentration, gains one-pointedness of

mind . . . he enters and dwells in the first jhana . . . the second jhana . . . the third

jhana . . . the fourth jhana . . . ’ (SN V 198). Here the term ‘one-pointedness’

(ekagga) means ‘(with attention) fixed on one point or object’ according to DOP

(p. 527, s.v. eka), and therefore implies something similar to ‘selective attention’.

Included in the above definition is the formula of the four jhanas, which are the

four attainments reached by the practice of concentration.

Na_namoli and Bodhi (2001, 39) indicate that the suttas, the Buddha’s

discourses, do not explicitly prescribe specific meditation subjects as the means for

attaining the jhanas; but mindfulness of breathing, to which the Buddha devotes

an entire sutta (MN 118), provides an ever accessible meditation subject that can be

pursued through all four jhanas and also used to develop insight, i.e. vipassana.

Mindfulness of breathing is still a common meditative practice in contemporary

Buddhism. By investigating mindfulness of breathing, I will demonstrate below

how concentration and mindfulness operate in attaining the jhanas.

5.2. Breathing as the focus of selective attention

In its exposition of ‘mindfulness of breathing’, the Visuddhimagga (p. 278)

enumerates eight ways of attention (manasikara), amongst which counting

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(ga_nana), connexion (anubandhana), touching (phusana) and fixing (

_thapana) will

fall under my discussion. The text reads:

A beginner should first give attention (manasikatabba, future passive participle

of manasikara) to this meditation subject by counting. . . . For as long as the

meditation subject is connected with counting it is with the help of that very

counting that the mind becomes unified. . . . But how long is he to go on

counting? Until, without counting, mindfulness remains settled on the in-

breaths and out-breaths as its object. For counting is simply a device for settling

mindfulness on the in-breaths and out-breaths as object by cutting off the

external diffusion of applied thoughts. (Vism 278–280; translation based on

Na_namoli 1975, 300–1)

In this passage the word ‘mindfulness’ is apparently used in the sense of ‘attention’

since mindfulness consists in the self-regulation of attention as discussed above

(section 3.4). With regard to the statement ‘A beginner should first give attention

to this meditation subject by counting’ in this passage, ‘this meditation subject’

refers to the in-breaths and out-breaths. To put it in Goldstein’s words, the ‘selective

attention’ is now aimed to focus on the message of breathing, and to ignore all

others, which are called ‘the external diffusion of applied thoughts’ by Buddhaghosa

in the passage quoted above. However, the numerals counted seem also to come

under the focus of selective attention when counting is employed as a device for

settling attention on breathing. This is implicit in the statement: ‘A beginner should

give attention to this meditation subject by counting’.

After counting has been given up, the next stage of manasikara (attention)

is called ‘connexion’, which is the uninterrupted following of the in-breaths and

out-breaths with mindfulness (Vism 280). At this stage, attention is even more

focused on breathing itself, leaving out numerals counted. From a psychological

point of view, even more information is being filtered out by selective attention.

According to the Visuddhimagga, connexion should be practised alongside

‘touching’, another form of manasikara. The text quotes the following passage

from the Pa_tisambhidamagga (I 171), a text in the Theravada Canon:

The Bhikkhu sits, having established mindfulness at the nose tip or on the upper

lip, without giving attention to the in-breaths and out-breaths as they approach

and recede, though they are not unknown to him as they do so. (Vism 282; trans.

Na_namoli 1975, 303–4)

Therefore, attention is even more focused now on the ‘sensation of touch’

caused by the friction between the air of breath and the nose tip or the upper

lip. The approaching and receding of the in-breaths and out-breaths is outside

the focus of attention although the practitioner is actually aware of it. This is in

accord with the following remark by Sternberg (2009, 125): ‘Consciousness

includes both the feeling of awareness and the content of awareness, some of

which may be under the focus of attention.’ In other words, human

consciousness functions in such a way that some of the feeling of awareness

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and the content of awareness are outside the focus of attention. This is exactly

the case with the approaching and receding of one’s in-breaths and out-breaths,

which falls within the content of one’s awareness but outside the focus of

attention while one is practising mindfulness of breathing at the stage of

manasikara (attention) by ‘touching’.

5.3. Nimitta and imagery in relation to sanna

When a practitioner attains the stage of ‘fixing’, he enters a deep state of

meditation called jhana (as explained above), and at the same time nimitta

appears (Vism 282). The term nimitta is usually translated as ‘sign’ in English

(Gethin 1998, 181ff.; Harvey 1995, 194; Na_namoli 1975, 129ff.), but the meaning of

‘sign’ is ambiguous. According to the Visuddhimagga, there are various forms

of nimitta, depending on different people. It appears to certain people in the

form of a light touch like cotton, and appears to some others in the form of stars,

and so on. At this stage the practitioner should be encouraged to keep focusing

his attention on nimitta (Vism 285–286).

It is noteworthy that in the Visuddhimagga (p. 285), nimitta ‘sign’ is said to be

produced by sanna, and it appears differently because of difference in sanna. In

my view, this idea can find support from the Buddhist Canon. For example, in the

Upakkilesa Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya, the Buddha asks Anuruddha whether he

and his fellow monks have attained a ‘comfortable dwelling which is a distinction

in knowledge and vision worthy of the noble ones and beyond human states’

(uttari_m manussadhamma alamariyana

_nadassanaviseso phasuviharo). This long

term ‘comfortable dwelling . . . ’ refers to any of the four jhanas.10 In reply to the

Buddha’s question, Anuruddha says: ‘We conceive (sanjanama) radiance and a

vision of forms. But soon afterwards the radiance and the vision of forms

disappear, and we do not master that nimitta.’ (MN III 157) The radiance and the

vision of forms apparently refer to nimitta ‘sign’ from the context, and are

respectively rephrased as obhasa-nimitta (‘the sign of radiance’) and rupa-nimitta

(‘the sign of forms’) in the later part of this text (MN III 161). The expression ‘we

conceive (sanjanama) radiance and a vision of forms’ suggests that nimitta ‘sign’ is

produced by sanna, which is the nominal form of sanjanama ‘we conceive’.

Following Anuruddha’s reply, the Buddha says that before he was enlightened, he

also had the same experience. He realized that when mental defilements arose in

him, his concentration (samadhi) fell away, and when concentration fell away, the

radiance and the vision of forms disappeared (MN III 157–160). To sum up the

main points of this canonical text, as long as a practitioner dwells stably in one of

the jhana meditative states, or concentration (samadhi), he firmly fixes his

attention on the nimitta ‘sign’ generated by his sanna. This is a canonical source

that underlies the foregoing idea in the Visuddhimagga.

What does sanna refer to here in the context of jhana? It cannot refer to

‘perception’ in psychology as it does in the formula of cognitive processes

discussed in section 4.1, because what psychologists call ‘sensation’ disappears in

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such a deep state of meditation and ‘perception’ is contingent upon ‘sensation’ as

discussed above. Gethin explains such meditative states thus:

. . . the dhyanas (Pali jhana), a term which means something like ‘deep thought’

or ‘meditation’. In Buddhist technical terms, the mind has temporarily escaped

from ‘the sphere of the senses (kamavacara)—its normal preoccupation with

thoughts that are in some way bound up with the objects of the five senses.

(Gethin 1998, 176)

In other words, in the jhanas, one’s mind is withdrawn from the five senses. In the

A_nguttara Nikaya the Buddha says: ‘Sound is a thorn for the first jhana;

vitakkavicara is a thorn for the second jhana; . . . ’ (AN V 134–135; cf. SN IV 217)

This statement implies that sound is not heard by one who attains the first jhana11

or the ensuing higher meditative states; vitakkavicara (discursive thinking) does

not exist in the second jhana or the ensuing higher meditative states, and so on.

The Kathavatthu (XVIII 8, p. 572f.) an Abhidhamma work, infers from this passage

that all the five senses do not work in the jhanas. In such a condition, the five sense

organs no longer receive any information, and therefore the process of ‘sensation’

stops according to psychology. Nevertheless, ‘attention’ can remain functioning

according to psychology as cited above:

Attention is the means by which we actively process a limited amount of

information from the enormous amount of information available through our

senses, our stored memories, and our other cognitive processes.

Therefore, even if the five senses stop receiving any information, a person’s stored

memories or other cognitive processes can still provide information for him to

process by attention. Nimitta ‘sign’ belongs to such information under the focus of

attention in the jhanas. As mentioned earlier, nimitta results from sanna. Let us

return to the question: ‘What does sanna refer to here in the context of jhana?’

Here sanna cannot refer to ‘perception’ in psychology as it does in the formula of

cognitive processes discussed above. This is because perception is the process of

organizing sensation and giving it meaning (see section 4.1), and so when

sensation is suspended in meditation, perception cannot function either. In my

view, nimitta resembles what psychologists call ‘imagery’ or ‘mental image’ in

many ways. Referring to several works, Sternberg (2009, 259) defines ‘imagery’ as

‘the mental representation of things that are not currently being sensed by the

sense organs’. Sternberg further notes:

Mental imagery may represent things that have never been observed by your

senses at any time. . . . Mental images even may represent things that do not

exist at all outside the mind of the person creating the image. (Sternberg 2009,

260)

Accordingly, ‘imagery’ is created by a mental faculty that operates independently

of sensation, which is based on the senses receiving information. What is this

mental faculty which creates imagery? According to the Buddhist idea that

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‘nimitta is generated by sanna’, this mental faculty is apparently a counterpart of

sanna if ‘imagery’ is regarded as somewhat equivalent to nimitta. As discussed

above, sanna in a broad sense covers a large part in the field of ‘cognition’ in

psychology. Yet sanna only serves as the faculty of conception when its

functioning is not dependent on the co-temporal input of sensory data (Hamilton

1996, 58– 9), and this is what happens in the jhanas. It is this function of sanna,

rather than sanna as ‘perception’, that produces nimitta, a Buddhist counterpart of

‘imagery’ in psychology.

Apart from the similarity between the mechanism that produces nimitta and

that produces ‘imagery’, nimitta shares one more feature in common with

imagery. Sternberg indicates:

Imagery may involve mental representations in any of the sensory modalities,

such as hearing, smell, or taste. . . . Most of us are more aware of visual imagery

than of other forms of imagery. When students kept a diary of their mental

images, the students reported many more visual images than auditory, smell,

touch, or taste images. (Sternberg 2009, 260)

Likewise, nimitta that appears in meditation as described in the Buddhist texts is

mostly visual. The aforementioned obhasa-nimitta (‘the sign of radiance’) and rupa-

nimitta (‘the sign of forms’), stated in the Upakkilesa Sutta, both belong to visual

imagery. The Visuddhimagga (p. 285) enumerates 17 kinds of nimitta as follows:

a light touch like cotton or silk cotton or draught, the form of stars, a string of

jewels, a string of pearls, a rough touch like a silk cotton seed or a pin made of

heartwood, a long braid of thread, a wreath of flowers, a puff of smoke, a spread-

out cobweb, a film of cloud, a lotus flower, a chariot wheel, the disc of the moon,

the disc of the sun.

Among these 17 forms of nimitta, 12 are visual images, and the remaining five are

tactile images. Apart from being visual, ‘a puff of smoke’ may also refer to a smell

image. In conclusion, nimitta in meditation as recorded in Buddhist literature seem

to be overwhelmingly visual in nature. This is consistent with the discovery

of psychologists that most of us are more aware of visual imagery than of other

forms of imagery.

In his discussion of imagery and perception, Reisberg (2007, 374–5)

hypothesizes that there are some mental structures, or mental processes, used by

both imaging and perceiving. Then, focusing on visual imagery and perception, he

refers to the studies by some psychologists and confirms: ‘visual perception and

visual imagery draw on similar structures in the brain’. Likewise, Herrmann et al.

(2006, 75) observe: ‘Our imagery follows some of the same rules as actual perception

(Kosslyn, 1995).’ This suggests that perception and imagery may function on the

basis of the same cerebral or mental mechanism. This is important since it supports

my view that sanna can act as perception, which proceeds from sensation, and on

the other hand sanna can produce nimitta, or ‘imagery’ in psychology, in deep

meditation where sensation and perception, consequent on sensation, are

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suspended. Psychology has been concerned with the relationship between imagery

and perception in the case of Buddhist meditation. For example, Stephen Kosslyn,

professor of psychology at Harvard University, has the following remark:

Buddhists are able to hold on to mental images for 20 minutes. How can brain

science engage this? Science needs to know about that ability. Does meditation

increase the recruitment of imagery in brain areas used in perception? (Marano

2004, 26)

This highlights the importance of interdisciplinary research and raises some

thought-provoking questions that are worth further enquiry.

6. Mindfulness and concentration in light of nimitta

In the Cu_lavedalla Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya, a nun called Dhammadinna

explains the Buddha’s teaching thus: ‘The four establishments of mindfulness

(satipa_t_thana) are the nimittas of concentration (samadhi)’ (MN I 301). What does

she mean by this rather brief statement? The word nimitta has several meanings

apart from ‘sign’ or imagery discussed above, such as ‘cause’ (Nyanatiloka 1970, 107;

PED, s.v. nimitta). A pun is probably played on this word here. I will demonstrate that

the four establishments of mindfulness, interpreted as causes, can lead to

concentration, and as ‘signs’ they induce the formation of imagery in the jhanas.

6.1. Mindfulness directs sanna to produce imagery forconcentration

In the Sa_ngıti Sutta of the Dıgha Nikaya, while reciting the Buddha’s teaching

in the assembly, Sariputta says:

Here, friends, a monk guards a favourable nimitta of concentration when it has

arisen, [such as] conception (sanna) of a skeleton (a_t_thika), conception of a

worm[-infested corpse] (pu_lavaka-sanna), conception of a livid [corpse]

(vinılaka8), conception of [a corpse] full of holes (vicchiddaka8), and

conception of a bloated [corpse] (uddhumataka8). (DN III 226)

It is noteworthy that in this passage sanna, here rendered as ‘conception’, is

related to nimitta. The practice of contemplating a corpse in different stages of

decomposition is also found in the Satipa_t_thana Sutta, a text devoted to the

four establishments of mindfulness included in the Majjhima Nikaya. Even some

of the above terms, namely a_t_thika ‘skeleton’, vinılaka ‘livid’ and uddhumataka

‘bloated’, occur in this text. Each stage of contemplating a corpse in this text is

stated in a formula such as the following (MN I 58):

Again, monks, as though a monk were to see a corpse thrown aside in a charnel

ground, one, two, or three days dead, bloated, livid, and oozing matter, a monk

compares this same body with it thus: ‘This body too is of the same nature, it will

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be like that, it is not exempt from that fate.’ (Translation based on Na_namoli and

Bodhi 2001, 148)

Bhikkhu Bodhi explains this passage thus:

The phrase ‘as though’ (seyyathapi) suggests that this meditation, and those to

follow, need not be based upon an actual encounter with a corpse in the state of

decay described, but can be performed as an imaginative exercise. ‘This same body’

is, of course, the meditator’s own body. (Na_namoli and Bodhi 2001, 1192: n.150)

This ‘imaginative exercise’, as Bhikkhu Bodhi dubs it, conforms to ‘constructive

imagination’ in the words of Hamilton (1996, 61), who counts it as a ‘function of

sanna’ which ‘represents a process of good/positive (constructive) conditioning

of one’s faculty of apperception by means of deliberate conceptualising

(constructing)’. Such ‘constructive imagination’ is listed among the practices of

mindfulness in the Satipa_t_thana Sutta because it is mindfulness which directs

sanna in such a constructive manner that sanna produces the mental images,

nimitta, of a corpse in different stages of putrefaction. This may explain why

Sariputta relates ‘nimitta of concentration’ to sanna (constructive conception) of a

skeleton, etc. Here again we find the role of mindfulness as ‘metacognition’. To

conclude, the passages in the Cu_lavedalla Sutta and the Sa_ngıti Sutta imply that

mindfulness, by steering sanna (cognition), brings about and guards (in Sariputta’s

words) nimitta (imagery) of concentration.

6.2. Mindfulness as cause of concentration

Alternatively, nimitta can be interpreted as ‘cause’ in the foregoing canonical

statement: ‘The four establishments of mindfulness are the nimittas of

concentration’. In the Buddhist Canon, mindfulness of breathing (anapana-sati)

is often correlated with the four establishments of mindfulness (e.g. SN V 323–324,

MN III 83–85). The Sa_myutta Nikaya (SN V 318–319) says that if a monk wishes to

enter and dwell in the four jhanas and five other meditative attainments, he should

practise ‘concentration by mindfulness of breathing’ (anapana-sati-samadhi). This

suggests that mindfulness of breathing is a means by which a practitioner can

attain various meditative states of concentration or samatha meditation, including

the jhanas. How this works is expounded at great length in the Visuddhimagga

(pp. 266–293), and some points therein, manasikara ‘attention’ in particular, are

already dealt with above. Now let us turn to sati ‘mindfulness’ itself.

Lutz et al. state:

In such a practice [referring back to samatha (samatha) meditation], the

practitioner augments especially a mental faculty known as sm_rti, confusingly

translated as both “mindfulness” and “awareness”; in simple terms, it is the

mental function (caittasika) that focuses the mind on an object. At the same

time, the meditation involves a faculty that checks to see whether the sm_rti is

focused on the intended object or whether it has lost the object. Thus, this other

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faculty, often called samprajanya, involves a type of meta-awareness that is not

focused on an object per se, but rather is an awareness of that intentional

relation itself. (Lutz et al. 2007, 504)

Some points in this statement are debatable. According to Buddhist texts, the

mental faculty that focuses the mind on an object is samadhi ‘concentration’, rather

than sm_rti (Pali sati) ‘mindfulness’, as discussed above. Furthermore, it is not

beyond question that samprajanya (Pali sampajanna) could be distinguished from

sm_rti/sati in the way Lutz et al. do. Wallace (2006, 79) also accepts such a distinction

on the basis of later Buddhist literature, and associates samprajanya/sampajanna

(which he translates as ‘introspection’) alone with metacognition. This distinction,

however, is not found in early Buddhist texts, where the two terms are actually

almost synonymous with each other (see PED s.v. sampajanna). I would argue that,

in the words of Lutz et al., ‘mindfulness’ (both sati and sampajanna) is the faculty

that checks to see whether one’s cognition (sanna, including attention) is focused

on the intended object or whether it has lost the object. Similarly, Gunaratana

(2002, 149) says: ‘Mindfulness picks the objects of attention, and notices when the

attention has gone astray. Concentration does the actual work of holding the

attention steady on that chosen object.’

Therefore mindfulness, equivalent to metacognition, monitors and controls

cognitive processes, including how attention (manasikara) operates in the practice

of concentration or samatha meditation. Such ‘metacognition’, as Brefczynski-

Lewis et al. (2007, 11487) describe, is ‘to evaluate the quality of the meditation,

monitor and signal when attention leaves the object of meditation, and detect and

signal present and future problems with concentration such as being too distracted

or drowsy.’ Here is an example to illustrate this mechanism. When someone decides

to practise ‘concentration by mindfulness of breathing’, his mindfulness picks his

breathing as the focus of his selective attention, ignoring all other information, and

his concentration holds the attention steady on breathing to the extent of ‘one-

pointedness’, while his mindfulness monitors whether attention is focused on

breathing or not. Once he reaches a deep state of concentration called jhana, his

attention shifts to nimitta ‘sign’. If his attention fails to keep concentrating on the

intended object and wanders about, his mindfulness can detect the distraction and

draw his attention back to the object. As long as he is able to focus and sustain

attention on the intended object, he can maintain the state of concentration.

7. Conclusion

Based on a comparative study of Buddhism and Western psychology, this

paper provides a survey of cognitive operations in Buddhist meditation, which

comprises samatha (serenity) and vipassana (insight). Cognitive operations in

Buddhist meditation are mainly characterized by mindfulness and concentration in

relation to attention. Some psychologists suggest that mindfulness corresponds to

metacognition. My study shows that this correspondence can be corroborated by

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Buddhist literature since sati ‘mindfulness’ consists in steering sanna ‘cognition’ in

such a way that one’s cognition is rendered wholesome in a Buddhist sense. While

mindfulness and concentration both involve attention (manasikara), mindfulness

in particular plays a pivotal role in regulating attention. In the case of vipassana

(insight) meditation, attention is regulated by mindfulness in such a way that it is

not focused on a single object, but is directed to monitor the ever-changing

experiences from moment to moment in a way conformable to Buddhist doctrine,

so that the practitioner attains ‘metacognitive insight’ whereby he recognizes the

nature of all things as impermanent, unsatisfactory and not-Self. In the case of

samatha (serenity) meditation, in order to attain the state of ‘concentration’, one

has to concentrate one’s attention on a single object. Mindfulness picks an object

as the focus of ‘selective attention’, that is ekagga ‘one-pointedness’ in Buddhist

terminology, and monitors whether attention is focused on the chosen object to

ensure that the state of concentration is maintained. In a deep state of

concentration, nimitta ‘imagery’ is generated by a mental faculty that operates

independently of sensation, upon which perception is contingent. Psychologists

have found that perception and imagery may function on the basis of the same

cerebral or mental mechanism. This finding supports my view that sanna can act as

perception on the one hand, and on the other hand sanna can produce nimitta

‘imagery’ in deep meditation where sensation and perception are suspended.

This paper represents a preliminary study of cognitive operations in

Buddhist meditation as an attempt to explore the interface between the two

disciplines. Enquiry into cognitive and other aspects of Buddhist meditation from

psychological perspectives remains an important issue for further research.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A preliminary version of this paper entitled ‘Mindfulness and concentration:

Cognitive operations in Buddhist meditation’ was presented at the Conference on

‘Cultural histories of meditation: Practice and interpretation in a global perspective’

in Jevnaker, Norway in May 2010. I would like to thank Professor Halvor Eifring for

inviting me to present this paper at the conference that he organized, where I

benefited by the participants’ questions and comments. I am greatly indebted to

Professor Maurits G.T. Kwee, Professor Øyvind Ellingsen and the referee for reading

earlier drafts of this article and offering valuable advice and suggestions.

NOTES

1. See e.g. Vism 4. Cf. DN I 206–208, DN III 219, AN I 229ff., MN I 301.

2. This argument could agree with theDhammasa _nga_ni (§§1–364), anAbhidhamma

text, which shows that sati exists in various skilful states of mind (kusala-citta).

In the Abhidhammattha-sa _ngaha, sati is one of the 19 mental factors (cetasika)

common to beauty (sobhanasadhara_na). Bodhi (1993, 85) explains that these 19

mental factors are invariably present in all beautiful consciousness.

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3. For example Dhs §§1–364 shows that sanna exists in various wholesome states of

mind. Dhs §§365–427 shows that sanna exists in various unwholesome states of

mind. Dhs §§ 431ff. shows that sanna exists in various indeterminate states of mind.

In theAbhidhammattha-sa_ngaha, sanna is among the seven metal factors (cetasika)

common to every consciousness (sabbacittasadhara_na) (Bodhi, 1993, 77).

4. Dreyfus (2011) and Gethin (2011) also address the issue of psychologists’

description of mindfulness as nonjudgmental in Contemporary Buddhism, 12 (1),

May 2011. My paper was submitted to the journal in February 2011.

5. Horner (1964, 50f.) translates apilapana as ‘not wobbling’, and its verbal form

apilapeti ‘does not wobble’, but this could be a misunderstanding. I render it as

‘reminding’ with reference to Norman (1988, 50–1) and Gethin (2001, 38–9).

6. For details, see Kuan (2008, 128).

7. While the Buddha accepted the conventional usage of the term ‘atta’ (in Pali,

atman in Sanskrit) to refer to ‘oneself’, ‘myself’ or ‘himself’ according to context,

he did not accept anything to be an atta in the sense of a permanent Self as a

separate entity. Here I use the form ‘Self’ to refer to this kind of (supposed) self,

as distinct from the conventional or empirical ‘self’ of ‘oneself’ etc.

8. Vetter refers to Webster’s new dictionary of synonyms (Springfield 1984), p. 721a.

9. Lutz et al. (2008, 164) already point out the role of selective attention in

meditation, but they associate selective attention with their proposed category

of meditation called ‘focused attention (FA)’, as opposed to ‘open monitoring

(OM)’.

10. According to the Cu_lagosi _nga Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya, this long term refers

to any of the nine meditative attainments, including the four jhanas (MN I 207–

209). In our passage, however, this long term must refer only to the jhanas

because it is associated with the radiance and the vision of forms, whereas the

five meditative attainments higher than the jhanas surmount conceptions of

forms (rupasanna) according to the Nikayas.

11. The text literally means that sound may ‘prick’ (destroy) the delicate state of the

first jhana, let alone the even more delicate states of the second, third and fourth

jhana. In other words, no sound should be heard in the jhanas.

ABBREVIATIONS

References to Pali texts are to the Pali Text Society editions.

AN A_nguttara Nikaya

As Atthasalinı

Dhs Dhammasa_nga_ni

DN Dıgha Nikaya

DOP A Dictionary of Pali, ed. Margaret Cone, Oxford: Pali Text Society,

2001.

MN Majjhima Nikaya

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PED The Pali Text Society’s Pali-English Dictionary, edited by T.W. Rhys

Davids and William Stede, London: Pali Text Society, repr. 1986. First

published 1921–1925.

Skt Sanskrit

SN Sa_myutta Nikaya

Vism Visuddhimagga

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Tse-fu Kuan

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Appendix

Buddhist terms in Pali Counterparts in psychology

sanna in general cognitionsanna consequent upon the five senses perceptionsanna independent of sensory data concept formationsati (mindfulness) metacognitionvinna

_na sensation

manasikara attentionekagga (one-pointedness) selective attentionnimitta (sign) imagery, mental image

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