coercion, deterrence, and authority

TIMO A I R A K S I N E N

C O E R C I O N , D E T E R R E N C E , A N D A U T H O R I T Y

Coercion and authority are two radically different forms of social power.

This has not always been noticed. Dennis Wrong, for example, makes

coercion a sub-type of authority (Wrong, 1979, p. 24). To make sense of

my present project, we need to identify some relevant social structures and

institutions, namely, those which are deterrent or coercive in nature and

those whose authority is guaranteed by a legitimate state. I do not want to

get entangled in the methodological question of what kind of things social

structures and state-institutions are (Manicas, 1980). I just presuppose that

some coercive institutions exist and that they are designed to make us obey

the law and observe the obligations created by the social order. Such institutions present genuine threats to citizens and also realize them, if necessary.

I presuppose further that the social order is at least reasonably just. This

may be taken to imply that we are studying a minimal type of coercion, and perhaps authority too. Some examples of our objects of interest are the

army, police, customs and intelligence service.

II

Let us start by studying the two senses of the concept of coercion. We suppose that

A coerces B to do x.

More fully, this is to say that

A coercesB to do x by threatening to bring about y.

The relevant utilities in this situation are expressed by the following set of formulas, CO:

Theory and Decision 17 (1984) 105-117. 0040-5833/84/0172-0105501.30. �9 1984 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.

106 TIMO AIRAKSINEN

(CO) (1) uB(x), uB(y ) < O,

(2) uB(x) > uB(y),

(3) UA(X ) > ua(Y), and

(4) ua(x) > O.

It would then be possible to elucidate the meaning of 'coercion' along the lines adopted by, say, Robert Nozick and Michael D. Bayles. Except at one point that will not interest us very much (Nozick, 1972; Bayles, 1972).

We call the idea specified by CO the strict concept of coercion and inter- pret it as follows: (1) means that B always loses something, and therefore his basic rational motive is to avoid the situation. (2) means that to follow

A's instructions toward x is better than to let A realize the threat, y . (3) means that A prefers not to realize his threat. This is a rather complex con-

dition: What is implied is that A would rather not realize his threat, but he is

still fully committed to it. Thus B is supposed to know that resistance and only resistance makes A realize the threat. A good discussion is F. C. Schelling

(1981), The Strategy ofConJTict, Ch. I. (4) means that A will get a positive net gain when B follows his orders. For example, police officer A tells suspect B that i fB does not surrender and let himself be arrested, he is going to shoot

him. It is easy to see that the conditions (1)-(4) of CO are satisfied. Next, we shall get the idea of deterrence out of the strict concept of

coercion in the following simple way: we write

(4') ua(x) = 0

and keep CO otherwise as it is. We call this modified CO DE. My point is that

officer A deters convict B's possible escape, after arresting him, by keeping his gun available all the time. Officer A cannot gain anything positive in the situation, although B's escape would be a considerable loss to him. To repeat, A does not want anything like a positive increase of utility from B. B is now only supposed to omit his best possible action-alternative, which is naturally to escape. Thus deterrence is different from strict coercion where B is supposed to do something which will profit A.

Let us call the strict concept of coercion and deterrence together coercion. One source of possible problems concerning this complex notion should now be taken care of. I mean that strict coercion is an event that always implies

COERCION, DETERRENCE, AND AUTHORITY 107

an occurrent event as the threat. Otherwise, A could not possibly elicit such

a reaction from B that would bring about a net gain to A. B actively brings about a gain to A in a situation which he prefers to avoid altogether.

Now, unlike strict coercion deterrence need not involve any explict threats

on A's part after the interaction situation is specified by A : B is supposed to

stay passive regardless of his intentions. Deterrence is in this sense continuous.

Moreover, A's deterrent threat is often left totally implicit even if B knows

that A should not be disturbed. Every deterrent threat is also conditional on

B's expressed intention or disposition to bring about non-x, or the result A

wants to avoid. We also know that the deterrent effect of an implicit threat

may be so complete that B does not even form an intention to act against

A's preferences. In this familiar case we can hardly speak about omissions of

actions. B never even tries to act against A. (But then the applicability of

condition (1) of DE becomes questionable.) This happens, say, in law en-

forcement when the system is so efficient that people do not envisage even

a chance of a successful crime and accordingly never dream of breaking

the law. They do not omit any actions which the police are supposed to

deter them from doing. We may, however, think that should the police

become corrupt and inefficient and B is poor and alienated the unlawful

alternatives might again become objects of B's planning.

All this shows how strict coercion is always an occurrent form of power-

exercise, and deterrence is a functionally effective, often latent form of

social power. Deterrence need not be exercised in order to be efficient.

This simple observation allows us to present another, related problem of

how to distinguish between strict coercion and deterrence at the conceptual

level. The problem is that if B provides A with a utility greater than zero

(cf. conditions (4) and (4') above) in such a situation in which no explicit

threat is presented by A, A can sometimes still be said to coerce B in the strict sense, namely, if B perceives a latent threat. However, A cannot possibly

coerce B because an explicit and occurrent threat is now supposed to be a necessary condition of strict coercion. Moreover, because A receives a non-

zero positive net gain from B, A is not merely deterring B from doing something. B actively fulfils A's desires (against his own will), but as no occurrent threat was identified, he is not coerced, or is he?

When he acts B anticipates A's realization of an imaginary threat for the reason that, say, A is known for his strategy of using such threats in similar

108 TIMO A I R A K S I N E N

situations against B-like counterptayers. But this idea is not satisfactory: an

imaginary, and thus implicit and continuous threat would now allow us to

identify an element of coercion in the situation. And if we reject this idea,

we must say that A's mere deterrence brings a net gain to him, which violates

the condition 4' above.

To solve our problem of drawing a line between strict coercion and deter-

rence we shall use a conceptual device invented by Robert Nozick (see

Nozick, 1972, pp. 112ff) in order to make a difference between threats and

offers. I want to save my basic distinctions. Therefore, we must focus on

what the idea of zero utility means in CO and DE. The zero point can be

interpreted as A's plausibly predictable utility-level in the situation under

normal conditions. This rather complex looking construction saves our day.

We can now say that if B supplies A with extra profit because of some plaus-

ibly anticipated realization of a merely implicit threat then what A will get

in this interaction is his (relative) zero utility. This is what A should think

he will get without his further interruption in the social exchange. In other

words, if the effect of A's explicit threat is merely 'protective' so that A would get his net gain from B anyway, the function of the threat is said to

be deterrent. At most it prevents a change in B's (previously established)

pattern of action towards A. (But the effect of A's deterrent threat need

not be redundant: B may think of resistance.) For example, A is a mobster

collecting protection money from the local green-grocers and he gets what

he wants without saying or doing anything. He just walks in and receives

the money. I f he does not, he will present an explicit new threat which,

however, must now be understood as an instance of a former deterrent

threat. In this way deterrence means only A's more or less visible effort

to retain the already established status quo; the possibility that this status

quo may be very profitable to A at the expense of B is not conceptually

important. Simple as this construal is, I must admit that it is still somewhat unclear

whether mobster A's new threat against strongly resisting B, if A by means of it demands and gets a larger sum of money that the expected relative zero, is (i) a new act of strict coercion or (ii) merely a realized earlier deter-

rent threat, retaliation (this is the idea of a fine). I cannot dwell on this now, but it seems to me that the latter alternative is better. To call it strict coercion ignores the outline of our original story. Anyway, we may call

C O E R C I O N , D E T E R R E N C E , AND A U T H O R I T Y 109

the deterrence-interpretation (realized threat) the primary and the coercion-

interpretation (new threat) the secondary way of dealing conceptually with the new turn of events. This double nature of some fines shows clearly why

we speak of only one general type of coercion. In sum: deterrence means A's effort to protect the status quo against B's

interests. In deterrence and coercion we use such an idea of A's zero utility

that is relativized to what A and B can plausibly expect A to get. Thus we

can write, for coercion in general,

(4") uA(X) >~ Oe.

I I I

I shall argue that there are two main types of social power: coercive and non-

coercive. The latter type o f power is authority, because if A influences the

behavior o f B through his relevant authority A need not present any threat.

And B will still yield.

We need now an analysis o f authority. My first point is that authority is

a consensus based idea, rather than a consent based idea. One might think

that the opposite is true, so let me deal with this problem in an explicit manner.

I f A is an authority to B in relation to a subject matter z, B will in suitable

situations surrender his own judgment concerning z because he, in a some-

what special sense, trusts A. Certainly the case of trust is the least demanding

of many alternatives here: A's authority may mean that B is commit ted or

has an obligation as to A's decisions. To simplify things, I shall deal only with trust. This means that B gives his consent concerning z to the effect

that A's relevant decisions will prevail. Therefore, A's authority entails B's

consent, via the concept of surrending one's judgment and trust. But it is

certainly a mistake to argue that consent alone implies authority. Let me elucidate these points.

One important reason why consent does not imply authority is that authority is a social notion. Thus we need to build a link between the indi-

vidual consent to suspend judgement andA's socially characterizable authority. I f B personally but alone trusts A as an authority, A certainly is not a real

authority. Such a strictly two-person trust-based relationship is something

110 TIMO AIRAKSINEN

else, for instance, worship or a father-child relationship. I do not know any

general name for this familiar social phenomenon, which often carries some neurotic overtones. The two-person case is prima facie irrational in the way

genuine authority is not. It seems to me that a social consensus forms the suitable basis for the emergence of authority and helps us to understand

its rationality.

Let us then consider the following rough three-part definition of 'authori ty ' ;

we need a consent-condition, a consensus-condition, and a utility-condition:

(AU) A is an authori ty to B if and only if there is such an issue z that (i) B believes that at least in ordinary circumstances it is reason-

able to give one's consent to A's z-ing; (ii) this is the case because

B agrees with his reference group C that they should suspend

judgement with respect to z and trust A, i fA is z-ing; and (iii) z is such an issue that is directly relevant to B's expected utilities

and decisions on their basis.

AU is a logically weak definition because, as is easy to see, if A is not z-ing

B is left free to form his own judgment about the subject matter of z. It is

only A's activity which ties B's opinion. Furthermore, notice that if A is,

say, an astronomer and B is a layman, A is not a (scientific) authority to B,

simply because A's theories are of no practical concern to B. B has no judg-

ment of his own to suspend and 'trust' is just an empty phrase.

A warning is also needed: One should not think that B's suspension of

judgment is absolute and unconditional. Part (i) of AU shows that it is not,

simply because the non-suspension of judgment is a possible decision on the basis of one's expected utilities, and many unpredictable, 'unreasonable'

factors in special circumstances may influence these calculations. Only

some extreme cases of religious charismatic preaching may appear to violate

this thesis. We skip this complicated issue (see Flathman, 1980), Notice, however, that our theory of authority and AU require only that the decision to suspend judgment is based on consensus about trust. But the negative decision of not suspending judgment is always an open alternative to B, namely, if some independent calculations of utility predict an unreasonable and exceptional loss of utility to B. B may think individually that his trust is too risky. But A may even in this situation retain his (social) authority. In general he is still trusted. We shall return to this issue below.


In sum: Individual consent does not allow us to understand the con-

stitution o f authority as well as social consensus does. Thus we say that

authority is a consensus-notion. We must also specify what kind of consensus

entails authority. The key idea is the agreement on the trust on A's judg-

ments. This trust can be based on the shared knowledge of A's personal

characteristics or o f his social position.

IV

How can we argue for the difference between coercion and authority? It

seems that it is perfectly natural to maintain that even if we call authority

a form of social power it is radically different from any coercive power

proper: the typical threat position which creates a short term apparent

(false) consensus between A and B is always present in the coercive cases.

This is not true o f the authority based cases. We can illustrate these aspects

of social power by means o f two counterfactuals, of which the first is usually

recognized and reported in the literature (see Goldman, 1972, p. 232, and

Lukes, 1974, p. 74). It is a 'power counterfactual ' :

(PCF) I f A had not exercised his alleged power, B would have acted

differently.

The second, lesser known but more interesting counterfactual can be formu-

lated thus; it is a 'coercive counterfactual':

(CCF) I f B had resisted, A could have used his power resources to over-

come this resistance.

Notice that PCF deals only with the exercise of power while saying hardly any-

thing about the existence o f power. It gives a very weak necessary condition

for the existence o f power, that is, power can be exercised, without specifying

the direction and the contents o f A 's influence on B. PCF does not state any

conditions for A's success. But the second counterfactual, CCF, says some-

thing more about the existence of power, namely, that even i fA did not exer-

cise his power just now, he still can do it, which is to say that B's attempted

resistance can be broken by means o f A 's counteraction. In other words, A

has at his disposal the threat by means o f which a typical, rational B can in

normal circumstances, be made obey A, even i fB feels like resisting.

112 TIMO AIRAKSINEN

Let me illustrate: The police, for instance, have real power against us,

citizens, also in those cases in which we are (still) perfectly law-abiding and

where, accordingly, no power is actually exercised. But the police have the

required means to make the disobedient obey their orders, if they need to do so. What about their authority? In many countries the police have a

constitutionally legitimized status and their power is prima facie authority

based, which in turn implies that there is a democratic consensus concerning

their goals of action, even if they were seemingly against the interests of

some exceptional, individual citizens. But the police are also a genuinely

coercive force, and the same is true of armies in situations of serious domestic

conflict when the consensual and legitimate basis of the law-and-order sup-

porting institutions becomes questionable. The police and the army have a

coercive potential inherent in them. This fact is certainly fully recognized by

the leftist and anarchist circles of any society. Such groups seem to think

that all merely authority-based power is impotent and cannot survive in the

long run in the course of social struggles without its more or less well con-

cealed coercive capacity. The key idea is, quite naturally, that the power

wielders can, indeed, force their will on their subordinate B. If this basic

possibility of coercion is lacking, as it is (say) in purely charismatic individual

power, I confess that I really cannot see how we could call A's influence

power in the same sense as the police and army have social power at their

disposal. Let us see what this means. We must go back to our counterfactual propositions. The following two

applications of PCF are (necessarily) valid:

(pcfl) If A had not exercised his authority, B would have acted differ-

e ntly;

and

(pcf2) I f A had not exercised his coercive power, B would have acted

differently.

This is what I mean by saying now that PCF is 'coercively neutral': First, 'authority' is a success-notion in the sense that (in normal conditions) the

exercise of authority logically entails a relevant effect on its object-person, B (see AU and also below). If A and B do not initially disagree, A need not exercise his power over B. But if they disagree and if A has authority B

COERCION, DETERRENCE, AND AUTHORITY 113

either yields, as B suspends his judgment, or B decides not to trust A because

of the excessive costs. In both cases A, nevertheless, influences B's decisions. This entails B's dependence on A. The truth of pcfl is clear. Second, 'coer-

cion' is not a success-notion because B can always, at least in principle, evade

the point of A's coercive efforts by means of his irrational choices: B lets A

realize the threat. But B certainly cannot avoid A's simple influence. B is

tied to the coercive situation from which he would, as we supposed, escape

if he had a chance. This is true both of deterrence and strict coercion: a

threat always creates a new and undesirable situation to B. In this sense, B's

actions and decisions, including omissions, now depend on A's will. There-

fore, all the instances of both pcfl and pcf2 are true, in spite of the visible

difference between the characteristics of 'authority' and 'coercion'. They

are both power-notions. Yet, the same is not true of CCF:

(ccfl) If B had resisted, A could have used his authority (over B) to

overcome this resistance.

and

(ccf2) I f B had resisted, A could have used his coercive power to over-

come this resistance.

Only ccf2 has contingently true instances since there is a perfectly natural

reading of ccfl which makes it senseless. Let me say something about it. Coercion seems to entail A's (partial) ability to break B's resistance and

this makes it a separate type of social power. Notice that B's sufficiently

strong resistance to A's intentions and purposes entails (a) in the case of

authority that A does not possess authority over B (B does not trust A, and thus A can do nothing else but repeat his inefficient appeals), and (b) in

the case of coercive power that A has been partially unsuccessful in his

attempt (B and evaded A's point: robber A has not got the money even

if he has shot B and made himself a murderer). In other words, the existence

of authority entails the non-occurrence of serious resistance but coercion entails exactly the opposite. Concerning (a) above, my main idea is this: B may resist authority A if B thinks that his obedience would be unreasonably costly. However, if this is not the case, B's resistance means simply that A lacks authority over B. Authority has its limits and certainly allows for

114 TIMO AIRAKSINEN

resistance. Yet it is equally true that this outer limit of authority can be

supposed to be known to all the relevant parties and that A should personally

realize how far his influence extends. Guaranteeing this social knowledge,

B's stubborn resistance to A's pleas for authority and to the suspension of

B's own judgment entails the lack of A's authority, as a form of social power.

Actually A may present a claim to authority-based power only within certain

limits defined through B's relevant utility assignments; but within those

limits B's resistance entails the lack of A's authority.

v

There is no reason to think that the exercise of social power would be always

possible just on the basis of authority and other, related democratic-consensual

forms of social control and influence. Authority does not rest on a coercive

potential, even where it is fully efficient, as it sometimes is. I have already

argued for that thesis. My point is merely that in spite of effective authority

coercion is needed too. In case of resistance the precautionary threat-based

methods will be mobilized. Such a study as Michel Foucault's (1975) Sur- veiUer et punir illustrates in a powerful manner what it means to say that

the manifest threat of physical punishment, and even torture, and enforced

discipline establish the coercive power of the modern state. The reports of

the Amnesty International organization can also be used to provide an

empirical basis to my arguments: especially for political crimes most states

nowadays use torture in a rather routine manner. Now, I have already tied my hands by limiting the present study to the

minimal coercive methods of a relatively just state. It can be said that no such

state uses torture. That might well be so, but any existing state must still be

prepared to use efficient threats against its citizens. Two types of consider-

ations are relevant here, and both are derivable from my main thesis, namely, that authority does not allow A to break B's stubborn resistance, should it

occur. First, resistance might occur either because of B's irrationality or his diver-

gent political ideology. Both are cases which illustrate nicely why A should not suppose that his political authority will extend so far that no coercive threats are ever needed. The way an irrational person adopts authorities is utterly unpredictable. And no social order, even if it were just, can fix one

COERCION, DETERRENCE, AND A U T H O R I T Y 115

ultimate ideology as the dominating one. Competing theories are possible

and their contents may well openly exclude A's claims to authority. In those cases A must be prepared to apply force, if A himself and his supporting

groups do not agree with B.

Second, authority itself has two radically different functions. The follow-

ing distinction is seldom made in any unequivocal manner: Socially accept-

able authority-claims as presented by A, both (i)justify his actions in relation

to z and C, and those claims also (ii) provide an efficient motive for B, who

accepts A's authority, to yield as to the questions concerning z. Authority

has a moral as well as a psychologically motivating function: B thinks that

A is entitled to command and therefore he obeys. Thus A may remain an

authority even if individual B refuses to follow his opinions and orders. This

is the case if (say) his opinions and orders are generally taken to be justifiable

by means of a rational moral and political theory. Nevertheless, it does not

follow that a justified authority-claim is always followed by B's compliance.

On the contrary, if B does not see how and why A's claims are grounded or

if B thinks that yielding to A is constantly too costly, he may reject or

ignore A's authority claims. Therefore, understood in this way, A will be an

actual but ineffective authority. But such an 'authority' is no more a power-

wielder. Power has disappeared.

In some rather anomalous cases A, who sees his legitimate power dis-

appearing, may normally feel that he is entitled to use coercion and present

threats against B. His idea of his own authority gives him a good personal

reason, or subjective right, for this. But now to B his power is coercive, and not authority-based. Real life examples would be easy to give.

In sum: When we speak of 'coercive authority' we mean that certain coercive methods are legitimized. In this case 'authority' is not a power-

notion. Normally, however, 'authority' implies power.

My final suggestion concerning the distribution of and relations between coercion and authority comes to this. If authority is a morally 'positive'

idea, i.e., it can be used to justify social influence, 'coercion' certainly is a

'negative' one. It simply should not be practiced as it implies threats, violence and bondage. Still its total rejection implies a utopian anarchist theory without a real-life basis. I have argued that any modern state needs it as a

precautionary measure. But if it is needed, it must be made plausible and justifiable as a method of social control. One typical measure to this effect

116 TIMO AIRAKSINEN

must be mentioned now. I mean that the army and police, for instance, are

officially called, and camouflaged to look like deterrent institutions. Their

functions are said to be defensive and protective. Thus their strictly coercive

aspects are pushed aside and willingly neglected. Let me take one example:

any army is called a 'defence force', which is intended to imply that it will

not be used to threaten one's neighbours in order to increase the welfare of

the state above its status quo-defined zero level. However, as we know, this

is a mainly verbal strategy. If the state defence force so decides it can use its

arsenal to exploit other states by means of strict coercion.

For instance, state B finds oil in their common border with A, and A

wants to get its share being afraid that otherwise B will become richer and

get the upper hand in financial matters in general. Strict coercion is 'justifi-

able' through claims to those border areas and a military threat may then be

presented in order to increase A's level of welfare. No coercive machinery

can be made fit only for deterrent purposes. Nevertheless, strict coercion is

too difficult to justify as a general strategy of interaction and, so, it is not

normally advertized at the ideological or political level.

Within the state institution, the ideology of coercion often takes the

following form as it needs a special moral justification: It is said that B

obeys A because B thinks that (say)A is democratically entitled to command,

or has a divine or hereditary political right to be the leader. It may happen

that such A makes B act against B's present preferences, but in the case of A's authority.based power B still thinks that his own preferences must be

overcome, or his second order preferences, which are in favour of A, deter-

mine his decision to suppress his immediate desires. This is a typical 'Ulysses

and the Sirens' situation applied to social life: B may believe that the police

have a legitimate right to arrest him in case he acts against the law, simply

because all citizens, among them B, have founded the police-institution to

protect themselves against their own too short-sighted impulses, desires and needs. Indeed, no coercion in the strict sense of the term will take place if B is in an Ulysses-like position and a democratically established police force

is there only to protect him from his own short term egoism or irrationality. This is coercion-within-authority, or legitimate coercion.

Yet this deterrence-view is glaringly too simple, once again. I mean that the police normally extend their coercive action and its relevant threats in a routine manner all the way to those agents who, perhaps as members of some


unified communities neither participate in the process of establishing the

democratic consensus o f values nor ever go and support the official restrictions

on their basic freedom of action; a possible example is the case o f Jehovah's

Witnesses who unconditionally refuse to join the army and therefore receive a

jail sentence (in Finland). This looks like a genuine threat situation: they can

choose between the army and prison, and the coercive agent intends this to

be a threat, which it is to most Finns. But from the point of view of the

Jehovah's Witnesses jail is really a punishment, or even revenge, because they

personally have no choice. A's and B's relevant values are now so different

that no sensible coercion can be staged. Anyway, it is an example o f attempted

coercion, and shows the dangers o f this confict resolution strategy.

The police and army find their easiest legitimization within the consensus

view of society, but that view does not define the outer limits o f their efficient

action. On the contrary, one's explicit acceptance or denial of their legiti-

macy and authority has not much to do with the actual fact of finding

oneself under the coercive power o f the police and army. In this paper we

have been mainly interested in coercive institutions as they function outside

the limits of the consensus view of society.

R E F E R E N C E S

Bayles, M. D.: 1972, 'A Concept of Coercion', in J. R. Pennock and J.W. Chapman (eds.), Coercion, Nomos )(IV, Aldine-Atherton, Chicago, pp. 16-29.

Flathman, R. E.: 1980, The Practice o f Political Authority, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

Foucault, M.: 1975, Surveiller et punir, l~ditions Gallimard, Paris. Goldman, A.I.: 1972, 'Toward a Theory of Social Power', Philosophical Studies 23,

221-268. Lukes, S.: 1974, Power: A Radical View, Macmillan Press, London. Manicas, P.: 1980, 'The Concept of Social Structure', Journal of the Theory of Social

Behavior 10, 65-82. Nozick, R.: 1972, 'Coercion', in P. Laslett, W.G. Runciman and Q. Skinner (eds.),

Philosophy. Politics and Society, IV Series, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 101-135. Schelling, F. C.: 1981, The Strategy of Conflict (second edition), Harvard University

Press, Cambridge, Ma. Wrong, D.: 1979, Power, Its Forms, Bases and Uses, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.

Department o f Philosophy, University o f HelsinkL Unioninkatu 40B, SF-O01 70 HelsinM 17, Finland

coercion, deterrence, and authority

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