civpro dean riano

8/11/2019 CivPro Dean Riano

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Russel vs. Vestil, 304 SCRA 738; GR No. 119347, March 17, 1999

(Civil Procedures Jurisdiction; Civil actions in which the subject of the litigationis incapable of pecuniary estimation)

Facts: Petitioners discovered a public document, which is a declaration of heirsand deed of confirmation of a previous oral agreement, of partition, affecting theland executed by and among the respondents whereby respondents divided theproperty among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who are entitledthereto as legal heirs also.

Petitioners filed a complaint, denominated DECLARATION OF NULLITY ANDPARTITION against defendants with the RTC claiming that the document wasfalse and perjurious as the private respondents were not the only heirs and thatno oral partition of the property whatsoever had been made between the heirs.The complaint prayed that the document be declared null and void and an order

be issued to partition the land among all the heirs.Private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of lackof jurisdiction over the nature of the case as the total assessed value of thesubject land is P5,000.00 which under section 33 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg.129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of theMTC.

Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss saying that the RTC has jurisdiction over the case since the action is one which is incapable of pecuniaryestimation within the contemplation of Section 19(l) of B.P. 129, as amended.

Issue: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the nature of the civil case.

Held: Yes. The complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is one incapable ofpecuniary estimation and therefore within the jurisdiction of said court.

In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, the Supreme Court ruled that:

In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is notcapable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of firstascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarilyfor the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniaryestimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts offirst instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where thebasic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, wherethe money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal reliefsought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of thelitigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusivelyby courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).


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The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null and voidthe document in question. While the complaint also prays for the partition of theproperty, this is just incidental to the main action, which is the declaration ofnullity of the document above-described. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the

subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegationsin the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether theplaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein.

Gomez v Montalban (G.R. No. 174414)

When a party has another remedy available to him, which may be either a motionfor new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was notprevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing suchmotion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition.

Facts:Lita Montalban obtained a loan from Elmer Gomez in the amount of P40,000 witha voluntary proposal on her part to pay 15% interest per month. Montalban failedto comply with her obligation so Gomez filed a complaint in the RTC for sum ofmoney. Summons was served but despite her receipt, she still failed to file an

Answer. She was declared in default and upon motion, Gomez was allowed topresent evidence ex parte. The RTC rendered a decision ordering Montalban topay Gomez.

Thereafter, respondent filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment alleging thatthere was no proper service of summons since there was no personal service.She alleged that one Mrs. Alicia Dela Torre was not authorized to receivesummons and that her failure to file an Answer was due to fraud, accident,mistake, excusable negligence (FAME). The Petition was set for hearing butcounsel for respondent failed to appear before the court hence the dismissal ofthe Petition.

Montalban filed for a Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal of the Petitionstating that counsels failure to appeal was unintentional to which the RTCgranted. To this instance, Gomez filed a Petition for Reconsideration.Issue:

Whether or not the granting of Petition for Relief from Judgment by the RTC isproper.

Held:

NO. The RTC committed an error in doing so. A Petition for Relief under Rule 38is only available against a final and executory judgment and the grounds includefraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence.


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Discussion on Grounds:

"Mistake" refers to mistake of fact, not of law, which relates to the case. The word"mistake," which grants relief from judgment, does not apply and was never

intended to apply to a judicial error which the court might have committed in thetrial. Such errors may be corrected by means of an appeal. This does not exist inthe case at bar, because respondent has in no wise been prevented frominterposing an appeal.

"Fraud," on the other hand, must be extrinsic or collateral, that is, the kind whichprevented the aggrieved party from having a trial or presenting his case to thecourt,or was used to procure the judgment without fair submission of thecontroversy. This is not present in the case at hand as respondent was notprevented from securing a fair trial and was given the opportunity to present hercase.

Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudencecould not have guarded against. Under Section 1 Rule 38, the "negligence" mustbe excusable and generally imputable to the party because if it is imputable tothe counsel, it is binding on the client. To follow a contrary rule and allow a partyto disown his counsel's conduct would render proceedings indefinite, tentative,and subject to reopening by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel. What theaggrieved litigant should do is seek administrative sanctions against the erringcounsel and not ask for the reversal of the court's ruling.

In Tuason v CA, the court explained the nature of a Petition for Relief fromJudgment:A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy that is allowed only inexceptional cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy. When aparty has another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for newtrial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was notprevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing suchmotion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition. Indeed,relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the

judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence;otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal whichhad been lost thru inexcusable negligence.

In the case, Montalban contended that judgment was entered against herthrough mistake or fraud because she was not duly served summons. However,under the discussion of the following grounds, the SC sees no merit in herpetition.

*Petition for Relief from Judgment is set aside.


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The doctrine that all cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lieswith the RTC regardless of the value of the property -- no longer holds true. Asthings now stand, a distinction must be made between those properties theassessed value of which is below P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila; and

P50,000.00, if within.Republic Act No. 7691 expressly provides:

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases Regional Trial Courts shall exerciseexclusive original jurisdiction:(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of, real property, or

any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceedsTwenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, wheresuch value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except for forcible entryinto and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which isconferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and

Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.In Atuel v. Valdez, the Court likewise expressly stated that:Jurisdiction over an accion publiciana is vested in a court of general

jurisdiction. Specifically, the regional trial court exercises exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve x x x possession of real property.However, if the assessed value of the real property involved does not exceedP50,000.00 in Metro Manila, and P20,000.00 outside of Metro Manila, themunicipal trial court exercises jurisdiction over actions to recover possession ofreal property.

In the case, Quinagoran maintains that there should be such an allegationof the assessed value of the real property to determine jurisdiction. However,nowhere in said complaint was the assessed value of the subject property evermentioned. There is therefore no showing on the face of the complaint that theRTC has exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the respondents. Absent anyallegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it cannot bedetermined whether the RTC or the MTC has original and exclusive jurisdictionover the petitioner's action. The courts cannot take judicial notice of the assessedor market value of the land.

Considering that the respondents failed to allege in their complaint theassessed value of the subject property, the RTC seriously erred in denying themotion to dismiss. Consequently, all proceedings in the RTC are null and void.The CA also erred in affirming the RTC.

HEIRS OF VALERIANO CONCHAvs. SPOUSES GREGORIO LUMOCSO G.R.No. 158121 December 12, 2007 450 SCRA 1

PUNO, J.: Facts:


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This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on thedecision and resolution of the Court of Appeals, annulling the resolutions andorder of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 9, in a civil case whereinpetitioners filed for a complaint for Reconveyance and/or Annulment of Title withDamages against respondents, seeking to annul Free Patent No. (IX- 8)985 and

the corresponding Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-22556 issued in thename of "Gregorio Lumocso" covering a certain parcel of land.

Respondents moved for the dismissal of the respective cases against them onthe same grounds of: (a) lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject mattersof the complaints; (b) failure to state

causes of action for reconveyance; (c) prescription; and (d) waiver,abandonment, laches and estoppel. On the issue of jurisdiction, respondentscontended that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaints pursuant toSection 19(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P.) 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691,as in each case, the assessed values of the subject lots are less thanP20,000.00. Petitioners opposed, contending that the instant cases involveactions the subject matters of which are incapable of pecuniary estimation which,under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691, fall within theexclusive original jurisdiction of the RTCs. They also contended that they havetwo main causes of action: for reconveyance and for recovery of the value of thetrees felled by respondents. Hence, the totality of the claims must be consideredwhich, if computed, allegedly falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of theRTC.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaints pursuant toSection 19(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P.) 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691,as in each case, the assessed values of the subject lots are less thanP20,000.00

Held:

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine cases ofthe general class to which the proceedings in question belong. It is conferred by

law and an objection based on this ground cannot be waived by the parties. Todetermine whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, it isimportant to determine the nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought.The trial court correctly held that the instant cases involve actions forreconveyance. An action for reconveyance respects the decree of registration asincontrovertible but seeks the transfer of property, which has been wrongfully orerroneously registered in other persons' names, to its rightful and legal owners,or to those who claim to have a better right. There is no special ground for an


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action for reconveyance. It is enough that the aggrieved party has a legal claimon the property superior to that of the registered owner and that the property hasnot yet passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.

Being in the nature of actions for reconveyance or actions to remove cloud onone's title, the applicable law to determine which court has jurisdiction is Section19(2) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, viz:

Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases.-- Regional Trial Courts shall exerciseexclusive original jurisdiction:

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, orany interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceedsTwenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, wheresuch value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcibleentry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction overwhich is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, andMunicipal Circuit Trial Courts; In the cases at bar, it is undisputed that thesubject lots are situated in Cogon, Dipolog City and

their assessed values are less than P20,000.00. Hence, the MTC clearly has jurisdiction. Petitioners' contention that this case is one that is incapable ofpecuniary estimation under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC pursuantto Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 is erroneous.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 164560 July 22, 2009

ANA DE GUIA SAN PEDRO and ALEJO DOPEO, Petitioners,vs.HON. FATIMA G. ASDALA, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge of theRegional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87; HON. MANUEL TARO, in

his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court ofQuezon City, Branch 42; and the HEIRS OF SPOUSES APOLONIO V.DIONISIO and VALERIANA DIONISIO (namely, ALLAN GEORGE R.DIONISIO and ELEANOR R. DIONISIO, herein represented by ALLANGEORGE R. DIONISIO), Respondents.

D E C I S I O N


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DEL CASTILLO,J.:

This resolves the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,praying that the Resolutions 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 15,2003 and June 1, 2004, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 78978, be reversed and

set aside.

The antecedent facts are as follows.

Sometime in July 2001, private respondents, heirs of spouses Apolonio andValeriana Dionisio, filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City,Branch 42, a Complaint 2 against herein petitioners and Wood Crest Residents

Association, Inc., for Accion Reivindicatoria , Quieting of Title and Damages, withPrayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. Private respondents alleged thatsubject property located in Batasan Hills, Quezon City, with an assessed valueof P32,100.00, was titled in the name of spouses Apolonio and Valeriana

Dionisio; but petitioners, with malice and evident bad faith, claimed that theywere the owners of a parcel of land that encompasses and covers subjectproperty. Private respondents had allegedly been prevented from entering,possessing and using subject property. It was further alleged in the Complaintthat petitioners' Transfer Certificate of Title over their alleged property wasspurious. Private respondents then prayed that they be declared the sole andabsolute owners of the subject property; that petitioners be ordered to surrenderpossession of subject property to them; that petitioners and Wood Crest and/orits members be ordered to pay actual and moral damages, and attorney's fees.

Petitioners, for their part, filed a Motion to Dismiss 3 said complaint on the ground

that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, as thesubject of litigation was incapable of pecuniary estimation.

The MeTC then issued an Order 4 dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion todismiss, ruling that, under Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as amended, theMeTC had exclusive original jurisdiction over actions involving title to orpossession of real property of small value.

Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of said Order dated July 4, 2002 wasdenied.

Petitioners assailed the aforementioned Order by filing a petition for certiorariwith the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 87. However, in itsDecision 5 dated March 10, 2003, the RTC dismissed the petition, finding nograve abuse of discretion on the part of the MeTC Presiding Judge. The RTCsustained the MeTC ruling, stating that, in accordance with Section 33(3) ofRepublic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, amending B.P. Blg. 129, the MeTC had jurisdictionover the complaint for Accion Reivindicatoria, as it involves recovery ofownership and possession of real property located in Quezon City, with an


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assessed value not exceeding P50,000.00. A Motion for Reconsideration 6 of theDecision was filed by petitioners, but was denied in an Order 7 dated July 3, 2003.

Petitioners then filed with the Court of Appeals another petition for certiorari,insisting that both the MeTC and RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by not ordering the dismissal of thecomplaint for Accion Reivindicatoria, for lack of jurisdiction over the same. In theassailed CA Resolution dated September 15, 2003, the CA dismissed the petitionoutright, holding that certiorari was not available to petitioners as they shouldhave availed themselves of the remedy of appeal. Petitioners' motion forreconsideration of the resolution of dismissal was denied per Resolution 8 datedJune 1, 2004.

Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition and, in support thereof, they allege that:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN (SIC) EXCESS OFJURISDICTION IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND FORFAILURE TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE RAISED IN THE CERTIORARIREGARDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTTO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF A CASE OF ACCION REINVINDICATORIA .

THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT FATIMA GONZALES-ASDALA, ASPRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC BRANCH 87, QUEZON CITY, ACTED WITHGRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF(SIC) JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ANDIN RESOLVING THAT A CASE OF ACCION REINVINDICATORIA IS WITHIN

THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT.THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT MANUEL TARO AS PRESIDINGJUDGE MeTC, BRANCH 42, QUEZON CITY, ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OFDISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN (SIC) EXCESS OFJURISDICTION IN SO TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE COMPLAINTFOR ACCION REINVINDICATORIA IN CIVIL CASE NO. 27434 ENTITLED,"HEIRS OF SPS. APOLONIO V. DIONISIO AND VALERIANA DIONISIO, ETC.VS. ANA DE GUIA SAN PEDRO, ET. AL." 9

The present Petition for Certiorari is doomed and should not have beenentertained from the very beginning.

The settled rule is that appeals from judgments or final orders or resolutions ofthe CA should be by a verified petition for review on certiorari , as provided forunder Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, in Pasiona, Jr. v.Court of Appeals, 10 the Court expounded as follows:


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The aggrieved party is proscribed from assailing a decision or final order of theCA via Rule 65, because such recourse is proper only if the party has no plain,speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law. In this case, petitioner had anadequate remedy, namely, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of theRules of Court. A petition for review on certiorari, not a special civil action for

certiorari was, therefore, the correct remedy.x x x x

Settled is the rule that where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, thespecial civil action for certiorari will not be entertained remedies of appeal andcertiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorariis not and cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal, especially if one's ownnegligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse.One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or anyplain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal was available, as in this

case, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuseof discretion. Petitioner's resort to this Court by Petition for Certiorari was a fatalprocedural error, and the instant petition must, therefore, fail. 11

For the very same reason given above, the CA, therefore, acted properly when itdismissed the petition for certiorari outright, on the ground that petitioners shouldhave resorted to the remedy of appeal instead of certiorari . Verily, the presentPetition for Certiorari should not have been given due course at all.

Moreover, since the period for petitioners to file a petition for reviewon certiorari had lapsed by the time the instant petition was filed, the assailed CA

Resolutions have attained finality. 1avvphi1 Nevertheless, just to put the matter to rest, the Court reiterates the ruling in Heirsof Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. v. Spouses Lumocso, 12 to wit:

In a number of cases, we have held that actions for reconveyance of or forcancellation of title to or to quiet title over real property are actions that fall underthe classification of cases that involve "title to, or possession of, real property, orany interest therein."

x x x x

x x x Thus, under the old law, there was no substantial effect on jurisdictionwhether a case is one, the subject matter of which was incapable of pecuniaryestimation, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, or one involving title to propertyunder Section 19(2). The distinction between the two classes became crucialwith the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7691 in 1994, which expanded theexclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts to include "all civil actionswhich involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein


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where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceedTwenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, wheresuch assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigationexpenses and costs." Thus, under the present law, original jurisdiction over

cases the subject matter of which involves "title to, possession of, realproperty or any interest therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 is dividedbetween the first and second level courts, with the assessed value of thereal property involved as the benchmark. This amendment was introduced to"unclog the overloaded dockets of the RTCs which would result in the speedieradministration of justice." 13

Clearly, the RTC and the CA ruled correctly that the MeTC had jurisdiction overprivate respondents' complaint for Accion Reivindicatoria .

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED for utter lack of

merit. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78978, datedSeptember 15, 2003 and June 1, 2004, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 174497 October 12, 2009 HEIRS OF GENEROSO SEBE AURELIA CENSERO SEBE and LYDIASEBE, Petitioners,vs.HEIRS OF VERONICO SEVILLA and TECHNOLOGY AND LIVELIHOODRESOURCE CENTER, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

ABAD,J.:

This case concerns the jurisdiction of Municipal Trial Courts over actionsinvolving real properties with assessed values of less than P20,000.00.

The Facts and the Case

In this petition for review on certiorari 1 petitioners seek to reverse theOrder 2 dated August 8, 2006, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dipolog City,


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Branch 9, in Civil Case 5435, for annulment of documents, reconveyance andrecovery of possession with damages. The trial court dismissed the complaint forlack of jurisdiction over an action where the assessed value of the properties isless than P20,000.00. Petitioners asked for reconsideration 3 but the court deniedit.4

On August 10, 1999 plaintiff spouses Generoso and Aurelia Sebe and theirdaughter, Lydia Sebe, (the Sebes) filed with the RTC of Dipolog City 5 a complaintagainst defendants Veronico Sevilla and Technology and Livelihood ResourcesCenter for Annulment of Document, Reconveyance and Recovery of Possessionof two lots, which had a total assessed value of P9,910.00, plus damages. 6 OnNovember 25, 1999 they amended their complaint 7 to address a deed ofconfirmation of sale that surfaced in defendant Sevillas Answer 8 to thecomplaint. The Sebes claimed that they owned the subject lots but, throughfraud, defendant Sevilla got them to sign documents conveying the lots to him. Inhis Answer 9 Sevilla insisted that he bought the lots from the Sebes in a regular

manner.While the case was pending before the RTC, plaintiff Generoso Sebe died so hiswife and children substituted him. 10 Parenthetically, with defendant VeronicoSevillas death in 2006, his heirs substituted him as respondents in this case. 11

On August 8, 2006 the RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction over thesubject matter considering that the ultimate relief that the Sebes sought was thereconveyance of title and possession over two lots that had a total assessedvalue of less than P20,000.00. Under the law, 12 said the RTC, it has jurisdictionover such actions when the assessed value of the property

exceeds P20,000.00,13

otherwise, jurisdiction shall be with the first levelcourts. 14 The RTC concluded that the Sebes should have filed their action withthe Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Dipolog City.

On August 22, 2006 the Sebes filed a motion for reconsideration. 15 They pointedout that the RTC mistakenly classified their action as one involving title to orpossession of real property when, in fact, it was a case for the annulment of thedocuments and titles that defendant Sevilla got. Since such an action forannulment was incapable of pecuniary estimation, it squarely fell within the

jurisdiction of the RTC as provided in Section 19 of Batas Pambansa 129, asamended.

To illustrate their point, the Sebes drew parallelisms between their case and thecases of De Rivera v. Halili 16 and Copioso v. Copioso. 17

The De Rivera involved the possession of a fishpond. The Supreme Court theresaid that, since it also had to resolve the issue of the validity of the contracts oflease on which the opposing parties based their rights of possession, the casehad been transformed from a mere detainer suit to one that was incapable of


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pecuniary estimation. Under Republic Act 296 or the Judiciary Act of 1948, asamended, civil actions, which were incapable of pecuniary estimation, cameunder the original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance (now the RTC). 18 TheSebes pointed out that, like De Rivera, the subject of their case was "incapable ofpecuniary estimation" since they asked the court, not only to resolve the dispute

over possession of the lots, but also to rule on the validity of the affidavits ofquitclaim, the deeds of confirmation of sale, and the titles over theproperties. 19 Thus, the RTC should try the case.

The Copioso, on the other hand, involves the reconveyance of land the assessedvalue of which was allegedlyP3,770.00. The Supreme Court ruled that the casecomprehended more than just the title to, possession of, or any interest in thereal property. It sought the annulment of contracts, reconveyance or specificperformance, and a claim for damages. In other words, there had been a joinderof causes of action, some of which were incapable of pecuniary estimation.Consequently, the case properly fell within the jurisdiction of the RTC. Here,

petitioners argued that their case had the same causes of actions and reliefs asthose involved in Copioso. Thus, the RTC had jurisdiction over their case.

On August 31, 2006 the RTC denied the Sebess motion for reconsideration,pointing out that the Copioso ruling had already been overturned by SpousesHuguete v. Spouses Embudo. 20 Before the Huguete, cancellation of titles,declaration of deeds of sale as null and void and partition were actions incapableof pecuniary estimation. Now, however, the jurisdiction over actions of thisnature, said the RTC, depended on the valuation of the properties. In this case,the MTC had jurisdiction because the assessed value of the lots did notexceedP20,000.00.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether or not the Sebess action involving the two lotsvalued at less than P20,000.00 falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

The Courts Ruling

Whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of a particular action isdetermined by the plaintiffs allegations in the complaint and the principal relief heseeks in the light of the law that apportions the jurisdiction of courts. 21

The gist of the Sebess complaint is that they had been the owner for over 40years of two unregistered lots 22 in Dampalan, San Jose, Dipolog City, covered byTax Declaration 012-239, with a total assessed value ofP9,910.00. 23 On June 3,1991 defendant Sevilla caused the Sebes to sign documents entitled affidavits ofquitclaim. 24 Being illiterate, they relied on Sevillas explanation that what theysigned were "deeds of real estate mortgage" covering a loan that they got fromhim. 25 And, although the documents which turned out to be deeds conveying


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ownership over the two lots to Sevilla for P10,000.00 26 were notarized, the Sebesdid not appear before any notary public. 27 Using the affidavits of quitclaim,defendant Sevilla applied for 28 and obtained free patent titles covering the twolots on September 23, 1991. 29 Subsequently, he mortgaged the lots to defendantTechnology and Livelihood Resource Center for P869,555.00. 30

On December 24, 1991 the Sebes signed deeds of confirmation of sale coveringthe two lots. 31 Upon closer examination, however, their signatures had apparentlybeen forged. 32 The Sebes were perplexed with the reason for making them signsuch documents to confirm the sale of the lots when defendant Sevilla alreadygot titles to them as early as September. 33 At any rate, in 1992, defendant Sevilladeclared the lots for tax purposes under his name. 34 Then, using force andintimidation, he seized possession of the lots from their tenants 35 and harvestedthat planting seasons yield 36 of coconut and palay worth P20,000.00. 37

Despite demands by the Sebes, defendant Sevilla refused to return the lots,

forcing them to hire a lawyer 38

and incur expenses of litigation.39

Further theSebes suffered loss of earnings over the years. 40 They were also entitled tomoral 41 and exemplary damages. 42 They thus asked the RTC a) to declare voidthe affidavits of quitclaim and the deeds of confirmation of sale in the case; b) todeclare the Sebes as lawful owners of the two lots; c) to restore possession tothem; and d) to order defendant Sevilla to pay them P140,000.00 in lost producefrom June 3, 1991 to the date of the filing of the complaint, P30,000.00 in moraldamages, P100,000.00 in attorneys fee, P30,000.00 in litigation expenses, andsuch amount of exemplary damages as the RTC might fix. 43

Based on the above allegations and prayers of the Sebess complaint, the law

that applies to the action is Batas Pambansa 129, as amended. If this case weredecided under the original text of Batas Pambansa 129 or even under itspredecessor, Republic Act 296, determination of the nature of the case as a realaction would have ended the controversy. Both real actions and actionsincapable of pecuniary estimation fell within the exclusive original jurisdiction ofthe RTC.

But, with the amendment of Batas Pambansa 129 by Republic Act 7601, thedistinction between these two kinds of actions has become pivotal. Theamendment expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts toinclude real actions involving property with an assessed value of lessthan P20,000.00. 44

The power of the RTC under Section 19 of Batas Pambansa 129, 45 asamended, 46 to hear actions involving title to, or possession of, real property orany interest in it now covers only real properties with assessed value in excessof P20,000.00. But the RTC retained the exclusive power to hear actions thesubject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation. Thus


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SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exerciseexclusive original jurisdiction:

(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigations is incapable ofpecuniary estimation.

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, realproperty, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the propertyinvolved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actionsin Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos(P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer oflands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon theMetropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal CircuitTrial Courts; x x x.

Section 33, on the other hand provides that, if the assessed value of the real

property outside Metro Manila involved in the suit is P20,000.00 and below, as inthis case, jurisdiction over the action lies in the first level courts. Thus

SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts andMunicipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases -- Metropolitan Trial Courts,Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

x x x x

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, orpossession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of

the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos(P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed valuedoes not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) x x x.

But was the Sebess action one involving title to, or possession of, real propertyor any interest in it or one the subject of which is incapable of pecuniaryestimation?

The Sebes claim that their action is, first, for the declaration of nullity of thedocuments of conveyance that defendant Sevilla tricked them into signing and,second, for the reconveyance of the certificate of title for the two lots that Sevilla

succeeded in getting. The subject of their action is, they conclude, incapable ofpecuniary estimation. 1avvphi1

An action "involving title to real property" means that the plaintiffs cause of actionis based on a claim that he owns such property or that he has the legal rights tohave exclusive control, possession, enjoyment, or disposition of the same. 47 Titleis the "legal link between (1) a person who owns property and (2) the propertyitself." 48


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"Title" is different from a "certificate of title" which is the document of ownershipunder the Torrens system of registration issued by the government through theRegister of Deeds. 49 While title is the claim, right or interest in real property, acertificate of title is the evidence of such claim.

Another way of looking at it is that, while "title" gives the owner the right todemand or be issued a "certificate of title," the holder of a certificate of title doesnot necessarily possess valid title to the real property. The issuance of acertificate of title does not give the owner any better title than what he actuallyhas in law. 50 Thus, a plaintiffs action for cancellation or nullification of acertificate of title may only be a necessary consequence of the defendants lackof title to real property. Further, although the certificate of title may have beenlost, burned, or destroyed and later on reconstituted, title subsists and remainsunaffected unless it is transferred or conveyed to another or subjected to a lien orencumbrance. 51

Nestled between what distinguishes a "title" from a "certificate of title" is thepresent controversy between the Sebes and defendant Sevilla. Which of themhas valid title to the two lots and would thus be legally entitled to the certificatesof title covering them?

The Sebes claim ownership because according to them, they never transferredownership of the same to anyone. Such title, they insist, has remained with themuntouched throughout the years, excepting only that in 1991 they constituted areal estate mortgage over it in defendant Sevillas favor. The Sebes alleged thatdefendant Sevilla violated their right of ownership by tricking them into signingdocuments of absolute sale, rather than just a real estate mortgage to secure the

loan that they got from him. Assuming that the Sebes can prove that they have title to or a rightful claim ofownership over the two lots, they would then be entitled, first, to secure evidenceof ownership or certificates of title covering the same and, second, to possessand enjoy them. The court, in this situation, may in the exercise of its equity

jurisdiction and without ordering the cancellation of the Torrens titles issued todefendant Sevilla, direct the latter to reconvey the two lots and theircorresponding Torrens titles to them as true owners. 52

The present action is, therefore, not about the declaration of the nullity of thedocuments or the reconveyance to the Sebes of the certificates of title coveringthe two lots. These would merely follow after the trial court shall have firstresolved the issue of which between the contending parties is the lawful owner ofsuch lots, the one also entitled to their possession. Based on the pleadings, theultimate issue is whether or not defendant Sevilla defrauded the Sebes of theirproperty by making them sign documents of conveyance rather than just a deedof real mortgage to secure their debt to him. The action is, therefore, about


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ascertaining which of these parties is the lawful owner of the subject lots, jurisdiction over which is determined by the assessed value of such lots.

Here, the total assessed value of the two lots subject of the suit is P9,910.00.Clearly, this amount does not exceed the jurisdictional threshold value

of P20,000.00 fixed by law. The other damages that the Sebes claim are merelyincidental to their main action and, therefore, are excluded in the computation ofthe jurisdictional amount.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Orderdated August 8, 2006, of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 9, inCivil Case 5435, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

BANK OF COMMERCE vs. SPS. PRUDENCIO SAN PABLO, JR. and

NATIVIDAD O. SAN PABLOGR NO. 167848. April 27, 2007 Chico-Nazario, J.

FACTS:

Santos obtained a loan from Direct Funders Management and Consultancy Inc.(Direct Funders) in the amount of P1,064,000.40. As a security for the loanobligation, Natividad executed a SPA in favor of Santos, authorizing the latter tomortgage to Direct Funders a paraphernal real property registered under hername and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (26469)-7561.

In the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage executed in favor of Direct Funders,Natividad and her husband, Prudencio, signed as the co-mortgagors of Santos. Itwas however agreed that the loan obligation was for the sole benefit of Santosand the spouses San Pablo merely signed the deed in order to accommodate theformer.

The spouses of San Pablo received a letter from Direct Funders informing themthat Santos failed to pay his loan obligation. After being confronted, Santospromised to promptly settle his obligation with Direct Funders, which he actuallydid. Upon learning that the debt had been fully settled, the spouses San Pablothen demanded from Santos to turn over to them the TCT of the property but the

latter failed to do so despite of repeated demands. Such refusal prompted thespouses San Pablo to inquire as to the status of the TCT with the Register ofDeeds and to their surprise, they discovered that the property was again used bySantos as collateral for another loan obligation he secured from the Bank ofCommerce.

As shown in the annotation stamped at the back of the title, the spouses SanPablo purportedly authorized Santos to mortgage the subject property to the


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Bank of Commerce, as evidenced by the SPA allegedly signed by Natividad. Itwas further shown from the annotation at the back of the title that the spousesSan Pablo signed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property infavor of Bank of Commerce, which they never did.

The spouses San Pablo filed a Complaint seeking for the Quieting of Title andNullification of the SPA and the deed of real estate mortgage with the prayer fordamages against Santos and the Bank of Commerce before the MTC ofMandaue. The spouses San Pablo claimed that their signatures on the SPA andthe Deed of Real Estate Mortgage allegedly executed to secure a loan with theBank of Commerce were forged. They claimed that while the loan with the DirectFunders was obtained with their consent and direct participation, they neverauthorized the subsequent loan obligation with the Bank of Commerce.

During the pendency of the case, the Bank of Commerce, for non-payment of theloan, initiated the foreclosure proceedings on the strength of the contested Deedof Real Estate Mortgage. During the auction sale, the Bank of Commerceemerged as the highest bidder and thus a Certificate of Sale was issued under itsname. Accordingly, the spouses San Pablo amended their complaint to includethe prayer for annulment of the foreclosure sale.

Santos countered that the loan with the Bank of Commerce was deliberatelyresorted to with the consent, knowledge and direct participation of the spousesSan Pablo in order to pay off the obligation with Direct Funders. In fact, it wasPrudencio who caused the preparation of the SPA and together with Santos, theywent to the Bank of Commerce, Cebu City Branch to apply for the loan.

Bank of Commerce filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, alleging that

the spouses San Pablo, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Santos, togetherwith Intergems, obtained a loan and denied the allegation advanced by thespouses San Pablo that the SPA and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage werespurious. Since the loan already became due and demandable, the Bank ofCommerce sought the foreclosure of the subject property.

During the trial, Anastacio Barbarona, Jr., the Manager of the Bank ofCommerce, Cebu City Branch, testified that the spouses San Pablo personallysigned the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in his presence. The testimony of adocument examiner and a handwriting expert, however, belied this claim. Theexpert witness, after carefully

examining the loan documents with the Bank of Commerce, attested that thesignatures of the spouses San Pablo on the SPA and the Deed of Real EstateMortgage were forged.

The MTC rendered a Decision, dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. TheMTC declared that while it was proven that the signatures of the spouses San


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Pablo on the loan documents were forged, the Bank of Commerce wasnevertheless in good faith.

Aggrieved, the spouses San Pablo appealed the adverse decision to the RTC ofMandaue City, which, in turn, affirmed the unfavorable ruling of the MTC. AMotion for Reconsideration filed also by the spouses San Pablo which wasdenied by the RTC for lack of merit. The spouses San Pablo elevated the matterbefore the Court of Appeals assailing the adverse decisions of the MTC andRTC.

The appellate court granted the petition filed by the spouses San Pablo andreversed the decisions of the MTC and RTC. The appellate court ruled that sinceit was duly proven that the signatures of the spouses San Pablo on the loandocuments were forged, then such spurious documents could never become avalid source of title. The mortgage contract executed by Santos over the subjectproperty in favor of Bank of Commerce, without the authority of the Spouses SanPablo, was therefore unenforceable, unless ratified.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the forged SPA and Special Power of Attorney could be a validsource of a right to foreclosure a property

2. Whether or not the awards of Damages, Attorneys Fees and LitigationExpenses are proper in the case at bar HELD:

1. A mortgagee has a right to rely in good faith on the certificate of title of themortgagor of the property given as security, and in the absence of any

sign that might arouse suspicion, the mortgagee has no obligation toundertake further investigation. This doctrine pre-supposes, however, thatthe mortgagor who is not the rightful owner of the property, has alreadysucceeded in obtaining Torrents title over the property in his name andthat after obtaining the said title, he succeeds in mortgaging the propertyto another who relies on what appears on the title. This, however, is notthe situation in the case at bar since Santos was not the registered ownerfor he merely represented himself to be the attorney-in-fact of the spousesSan Pablo. In cases where the mortgagee does not directly deal with theregistered owner of the real property, the law requires that a higher degreeof prudence be exercised by the mortgagee. The respondent, however, is

not an ordinary mortgagee. It is a mortgagee-bank and unlike privateindividuals, it is expected to exercise greater care and prudence in itsdealings, including those involving registered lands. A banking institutionis expected to exercise due diligence before entering into a mortgagecontract. The Bank of Commerce clearly failed to observe the requireddegree of caution in ascertaining the genuineness and extent of theauthority of Santos mortgage the subject property. It should not havesimply relied on the face of the documents submitted. Therefore, the same


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is not a valid source of the right for the foreclosure of the property.

2. The Court finds that the award for moral damages is proper is proper. Thecarelessness of the Bank of Commerce caused injury to the spouseswhich calls for the imposition of moral damages. The award of exemplary

damages is deemed to be proper by the Court for the Bank of Commercewas remiss in this obligation to inquire into the veracity of Santos authorityto mortgage the subject property, causing damage to the Spouses. Theaward of attorneys fees and litigation expenses are likewise valid sincethe spouses were compelled to litigate and thus incur expenses in order toprotect its rights over the subject property.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 159941 August 17, 2011

HEIRS OF SPOUSES TEOFILO M. RETERTA and ELISA RETERTA, namely:EDUARDO M. RETERTA, CONSUELO M. RETERTA, and AVELINA M.RETERTA, Petitioners,vs.SPOUSES LORENZO MORES and VIRGINIA LOPEZ, Respondents.

The fact that the order granting the motion to dismiss was a final order forthereby completely disposing of the case, leaving nothing more for the trial courtto do in the action, truly called for an appeal, instead of certiorari, as the correctremedy.

A motion for reconsideration is not putting forward anew issue, or presenting newevidence, or changing the theory of the case, but is only seeking areconsideration of the judgment or final order based on the same issues,contentions, and evidence.

By denying a motion for reconsideration, or by granting it only partially, therefore,a trial court finds no reason either to reverse or to modify its judgment or finalorder, and leaves the judgment or final order to stand. The remedy from thedenial is to assail the denial in the course of an appeal of the judgment or finalorder itself.

It is inadequacy, not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the dangerof failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of


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certiorari that a litigant need not mark time by resorting to the less speedyremedy of appeal in order to have an order annulled and set aside for beingpatently void for failure of the trial court to comply with the Rules of Court

The wide breadth and range of the discretion of the court are such that authority

is not wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibitionormandamus, and that in the exercise of superintending control over inferior courts,a superior court is to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular caseas the ends of justice may require. Thus, the writ will be granted whenevernecessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.

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