china india detailed

Graduate Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies 6:2 (2008), 10-32

SEEKING ZERO GROWTH: POPULATION POLICY IN CHINA and INDIA

Phyllis E W STOLC

Florida Atlantic University, USA THE RATE1 of increase in the world population has accelerated remarkably over the last century. It took the world population millions of years to reach the first billion, then 123 years to get to the second, 33 years to the third, 14 to the fourth, 13 to the fifth billion’.2 In 1999, the world passed six billion after only 12 years and, in 2008, after just 9 years, the population is fewer than 300 million from the next billion.3 As population continues to grow, it will become increasingly important to understand what affects population growth, what effects population growth can have and how governments can control their populations, if necessary. This discussion will be limited to the major population control policies of China and India and compare the methods and effectiveness thereof. These nations were selected because of their political differences and their distinctive approaches to the population question. The purpose of this article is not to extol or decry policies directed at birthrate reduction, or even to analyze whether fertility has any effect on development, but to distinguish the policies that have proven successful and to discuss their effects on citizens. It will address the inherently feminine nature of the reproduction question, the effects population policies have on womenʹs lives and how considering womenʹs needs can influence the effectiveness of population policy in return. The goal of this article is to demonstrate an effective model for just and successful population control policy and consider whether such a conception is possible. Population growth in Asia The study of population growth began with Malthusʹ An Essay on the Principal of Population which proposed that population growth threatens the food supply, the economy and development.4 The subject of the relationship between food supply and population growth became popular in the 1960s when the food supply was threatened with shortages, inspiring governments to institute population control programs.5 Expanding on this international discourse, Paul Ehrlichʹs The Population Bomb and Garrett Hardinʹs ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ discussed the impending disaster that unstoppable population growth would bring to an ‘overgrazed’ world.6 Gary Becker supported Malthusʹ definition of the family as a single decision‐making unit. Yet, he disagreed that prosperity leads to population reduction, proposing instead that prosperity results in population growth.7

The development, between 1930 and 1960, of new hormonal and non‐hormonal methods of contraception—such as oral contraceptives, the intrauterine device (IUD) and improved sterilization techniques—provided effective means for reducing

10 www.arts.aukland.ac.nz/gjaps

fertility.8 Studies in the 1960s demonstrated that economic difficulties, among other factors, made women want to limit family size or space births, but found that women did not utilize contraception to assist themselves.9 As concern over the potential economic consequences of unchecked population growth increased, these studies that showed citizen interest in population reduction freed governments to institute family planning programs.10 China Government Policy Before the founding of the Peopleʹs Republic of China (PRC), Chinaʹs population had a high birthrate (38 per 1000 in 1936) and a high mortality rate (28 per 1000 in 1936), resulting in a low natural growth rate (10 per 1000 in 1936). Between 1840 and the founding, the population increased from more than 410 million to more than 540 million with an average annual increase of 1.19 million—a growth rate of a mere 2.5. The socialist ideology of the new government viewed rapid population growth as a sign of development and prosperity and restricted abortion and sterilization. The social and economic improvements the government was able to institute after the transition reduced the mortality rate. Combined with proscriptions on birth controls, these policies resulted in a rapid population growth.11

The first country to ‘openly, systematically, and actively’ restrict reproductive behavior,12 China developed these policies only after party officials began to see that prior interest in a large population was unwise. The PRC’s birth control policies have continually evolved through four major phases of population policy: 1949‐1952, when population development was unplanned; 1953‐1965, when planned control over‐population growth slowly began to be implemented; 1966‐1971, when population planning ceased during the Cultural Revolution; and 1971‐present, when population growth has been strictly controlled.13 By the early 1950s, Zhou Enlai (Premier 1949‐1976) acknowledged that the population could not continue to grow without severe consequences. His response was to institute programs to improve education and health and to protect women and children. He instituted constraints to support the quality of the population by outlawing marriage between close kin and those with congenital and genetic diseases.14 The first relevant policy was the Contraceptive and Induced Abortion Procedures of 1953, which loosened many conditions for abortions, but only for couples with four to six children. This act was expanded to all families in 1957. However, the birthrate did not begin to decline until after 1963, when it peaked at 43.6.15

The Cultural Revolution ended in 1971 and, with it, the 1970 fertility rate of 5.75.16 The nation began to re‐emphasize population control. Within the next six years, more than thirty million male and female sterilizations were performed.17 Abortion began to be utilized, and 1971 saw just more than half of women having a single abortion (rate of .6 per woman).18 The government attempted to control the population by redefining reproductive ideology. The new preference was not development through pure birthrate, rather a principle embodied in the wan, xi, shao (later, longer, fewer) campaign. This ideological shift emphasized delayed marriage, long birth spacing and limits on births. At first vague, this limit on births was elucidated by Premier Enlai—’One is not too few, two are ideal, and three are too

Stolc/Seeking Zero Growth 11

many’—stressing the importance of two births per family, a replacement or zero‐growth rate as the two parents are replaced by two children.19

However, zero‐growth will not reduce a population; in 1978, the government introduced the now well‐known one‐child policy.20 June 1979, Premier Hua revealed the goal of reducing the natural growth rate to 5 by 1985. This ambitious goal required state action rather than awaiting cultural shift toward preference for one‐child families. In August 1979, the State Councilʹs Birth Planning Commission, headed by Vice Premier Chen, announced a strict program of incentives and disincentives to enforce and expand the one‐child policy. The incentive programs rewarded couples for maintaining one‐child families and attempted to counteract worries about elder care. Couples in cities received a certificate verifying one‐child status, guaranteeing extended paid maternity leave and a fixed monthly stipend until the childʹs fourteenth birthday. The certificate ensured the couple housing space equal to that given to two‐child families or preferential treatment in the housing application process. Also, this single child was given priority school admission and employment. Finally, the couple would be entitled to increased pensions after retirement. One‐child families in rural areas were to receive additional pay credits until the childʹs fourteenth birthday. The child was entitled to an adultʹs grain ration. Regardless of family size, all couples received the same size private plot of land and housing. If a rural coupleʹs one child was killed or became disabled, they would be permitted another child without penalty. Also, in some areas the only‐child could receive free schooling through kindergarten and have costs for books, materials and food waived through primary and middle school when his parents agreed to sterilization. The government designed social insurance plans for elderly couples who had no children. The disincentive program instituted pay deductions for families with multiparity births until that childʹs fourteenth birthday, and additional higher parity births would increase the deductions. A one‐child family which had a second child would forfeit certification and was required to repay any received benefits.21 The goal of these policies was to keep the population within 1.2 billion through 2000. By the end of 1979, the birthrate had fallen to 17.9.22

The policies instituted in the late 1970s completely reordered traditions associated with family and reproduction and irreparably changed the fertility practices of the population.23 The Marriage Law of 1980 further challenged tradition by encouraging only‐child grooms to settle with their wivesʹ families, instead of wives joining to their husbandsʹ families. This practice improves the cultural view of a daughter, as her marriage gains the family a son instead of costing them the investment in their daughter. Also in 1980, party officials emphasized family obligation in maintaining single‐child families to reduce the population for the good of the nation while never outlawing higher parity births.24 The government reinforced the necessity of birth control by legalizing all methods of contraception and restating the obligation of both husband and wife to practice responsible family planning.25 By the end of 1980, Chinaʹs population neared one billion—then 22 percent of the worldʹs population.26 The abortion rate in 1971 had been .6 per woman.27 By 1979, post‐Cultural Revolution policies had led to approximately forty‐seven million abortions.28 The abortion rate per woman in 1982 was 1.6.29 The utilization of abortion had more than doubled. By 1982, two‐thirds of the population of China had been born after the founding of the PRC.30 This population was


fundamentally different from their elders in ideology and family structure. But these policies were working to reduce the population growth. By 1991, the birthrate dropped to 20 from 28 in 1979.31 By 1992, the fertility rate had dropped from 1970ʹs rate of 5.75 to 2.0.32 By 1996, Chinaʹs birthrate had fallen below replacement‐level fertility.33

The goals of the eleventh Five Year Plan, put forth in 2006, are to increase the income of urban and rural citizens, reduce poverty, expand compulsory education and increase average education to 9 years, improve public health and social security, increase coverage of basic pension to 233 million and of rural cooperative medical care to 80%, and reduce the expense of healthcare. The plan also intends to raise urbanization to 47% and to reduce standard of living and public service inequality between urban and rural residents.34 In February 2008, Zhao Baige, Vice Minister of the National Population and Family Planning Commission, reported the commission’s intention to gradually loosen fertility restrictions to ease labor shortages.35 Because of age‐dependency pressures, the capital of Guangdong Province has begun to encourage families to have a second child.36 Nationwide, individuals who were only‐children are being permitted two children of their own. Though officials recognize the need for an increase in births to meet immediate worker shortages, they do not want to encourage a large increase in population growth. While loosening restrictions, officials have also been promising tighter enforcement among wealthier citizens who have been paying fines to circumvent fertility limits.37 2008 also brought specific allowances for earthquake victims including for parents of killed or seriously injured only‐children to have another child or to receive a lifelong 600 yuan subsidy if they are over 50. Those who adopt orphans will be exempt from one‐child restrictions and families whose unregistered additional children were killed will no longer be fined.38 Overall, the policy goals are for consistency in fertility controls and balance in social and economic development.39 Whether local policy reflects these goals and the intended improvements in social factors like education and healthcare result in increased public wellbeing remains to be seen. India Government Policy Fertility policy in India has followed a cultural dialogue informed by the caste system, religious philosophies and international influence from population control advocates and foreign bodies. In 1940, before independence, the National Planning Committee of India’s Congress Party commissioned a report that addressed concern that undesirables in society—the lower castes, the diseased and the mentally ill—were reproducing at rates that threatened the welfare of ‘normal’ citizens. The Committee, then led by later Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, discussed the potential of birth control as a method of economic development but acknowledged that population measures alone would not be successful. The report recommended measures to increase upper‐caste reproduction, such as the removal of barriers to intermarriage between upper castes and policies that would reduce the fertility of the unfit, including compulsory sterilization and birth control propaganda.40 This mix of economic goals, racial quality issues and the pursuit of reducing population growth would continue to define India’s population paradigm.


At the 1952 Third International Conference of the International Planned Parenthood Federation, local officials demonstrated interest in family planning programs and even demanded programs with more eugenic basis to prevent the unfit from reproducing. A presentation by philosopher Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, then Vice President and later President of India, argued that planned fertility was a vital method of improving human rights and health for women and children, and, more importantly, was consistent with cultural norms of self‐control and using thought and skill to promote national welfare. The World Bank gave its first grant for population studies to Ansley J. Coale and Edgar M. Hoover for their Population Growth and Economic Development in Low‐Income Countries. This study demonstrated that providing nutrition, shelter and education to a growing population would demonstrate an insurmountable opportunity cost against economic development and greatly impacted Indian sentiment regarding population policy.41 Indian interest in fertility control was not invented through contact with international organizations, but was educated by it. Understanding international involvement is important to comprehending the Indian policies.42

The lack of an authoritarian government, like Chinaʹs, led to a different approach to India’s population programs. Rarely were contraceptive services compulsory. That is not to say that programs were without incident or designed to respect individual rights. The government instead concentrated on two aspects of contraceptive services: legalization and availability of contraceptive methods and incentive programs. Despite these efforts, there are some problematic features in India’s implementation of population control policies. The programs have concentrated on IUD and sterilization use, while oral contraceptives account for less than 8 percent of total method use.43 Further, while abortion has been legal, safe abortions have been hard to obtain and many women were required to seek clandestine abortions due to traditional condemnation.44 Incentive programs were first utilized in India when men were compensated for expenses associated with sterilization. Incentives and disincentives have taken many forms: payments to acceptors, including: monthly stipend to women who do not become pregnant; commission to providers; commission to recruiters; payments or services to communities with high acceptance; cancellation of benefits for couples who exceed the parity limit; and penalties for children born above parity limits.45

Indiaʹs first post‐independence census was conducted in 1951. The census commissioner found the population of 356 million, in spite of a decade of war and famine, excessive and recommended mass sterilization to reduce the birthrate to 2. This recommendation was restated more mildly the following year in Indiaʹs first Five‐Year Plan, which began the worldʹs first nationwide family planning program and called for fertility limits and free contraceptives.46 In addition to these, the plan initiated the collection of demographic data including population number, sex ratios, age ratios and physical and mental health. The Planning Commission struggled to put fertility control language into the Five‐Year Plan. It met with opposition from the Ministry of Health headed during the 1950s and 1960s by two disciples of Gandhi, Rajkumari Amrit Kaur and Sushila Nayar, who shared their mentor’s disapproval of birth control. In addition to divisions over policy at the national level, the organization of Indian federalism prevented national agencies from enforcing state implementation. These issues allowed for significant innovation in policy and neglect


of national goals as well as increased agency for NGOs in the Indian dialogue.47 The first Five‐Year Plan recommended that the programs be implemented

under the public health system and provide family planning advice to patients. The plan included an annual budget of 6.5 million Rupees (then $480,000). This was not enough to promise implementation; worse, the government only spent around 1.5 million Rupees per year throughout the plan. Allocated funds were often not spent, as implementation depended on the state discretion. However, through the designated goals and the budgets of the NGO centers (far exceeding the government coffers), proponents saw developments that prioritized family planning as a necessary economic solution and would establish the foundation for goal‐oriented policies.48

The second Five‐Year Plan, introduced in 1956, founded the Central Family Planning Board. The new director of family planning, Lieutenant Colonel B. L. Raina from the Army Medical Corps and his contraceptive advisor Sheldon Segal from the Population Council were budgeted 10 million Rupees and worked for a greater fund utilization. This second plan sought 2500 additional family planning clinics to supply free contraceptives to low‐income clients. By 1959, the program formed 473 rural clinics and 202 urban clinics and launched a nationwide promotional campaign. However, these gains amounted to a single clinician each hired at existing rural health clinics, already serving 82 percent of the population and 66,000 people each. Due to these conditions, clinicians were often under‐qualified and overwhelmed. Limitations caused officials to see the permanence of sterilization as the only efficient goal.49 R. Gopalaswami, the chief secretary of Madras instituted the first incentive program in 1956: medical practitioners were paid 25 Rupees (then $5 USD) per vasectomy on low‐income men.50 In 1959, the program was expanded to pay acceptors 30 Rupees (then $6.30) and motivators 10‐15 Rupees for each acceptor. The per capita annual GNP at the time being less than $70 USD, these incentives represented significant payments.51 The national program adopted incentives, hiring staff and allocating funds to enable 3,000 hospitals and maternity homes to provide free sterilization and compensation for expenses for low‐income acceptors. Government employees who accepted sterilization were granted a week of vacation time.52

Nineteen‐sixty saw the prioritization of family planning. The third Five‐Year Plan resulted in huge budget increases and larger clinic increase targets and included the first nation‐wide incentive of 4000 Rupees (then $800) to local leaders to encourage low‐fertility norms. This policy had a monumental incarnation in a five‐week campaign in Maharashtra where sterilization camps sought to maximize acceptance through social pressure and succeeded in more than 10,000 vasectomies. Male sterilization was preferred for this campaign because of the relative ease of the procedure, which could be performed in less than half an hour utilizing local anesthetic. However, the fast rate and low costs at which these procedures were done challenged the constraints of even this relatively simple procedure, resulting in poor cleanliness and cursory medical screening. Mass sterilization efforts continued and, in 1962, 158,000 Indians (more than 70 percent of them males) were sterilized in mobile clinics the Ministry of Health commissioned to address reproduction among those institutionalized for chronic medical and mental illness.53

The third Five‐Year Plan also contained a concrete target of a 40 percent


reduction in birthrate by 1972. The plan called for the training of 49,000 nurse‐midwives and numerous other necessary staff by 1967, but hiring and training so many proved unfeasible. In many states, physicians received only two days of training before performing vasectomies. By the end of the third plan in 1966, 42,000 people had received training in family planning including 7000 physicians, still far short of what was needed and many areas still wanted for professional staff. This issue was complicated by continued failure to properly institute training programs. Further, the national staff was nearly unchanged despite budget increases in 1966 to three hundred times larger than the 1957 budget, which prevented them from properly overseeing the programs.54

The introduction of the IUD brought new focus to policy in India. Instead of relying on vasectomy, programs now had a long‐term, inexpensive solution for women’s fertility with low risk of user error. However, the same problems that plagued sterilization affected IUDs: poor training of clinicians; poor medical screenings of patients; limited information provided to patients about risks and poor follow‐up, even with serious complications. Despite concerns, Alan Guttmacher, then head of the Population Council’s medical committee, was able to convince Nayar to support the IUD and she included it in family planning programs, canceling Ministry of Health studies on effects. She reduced insertion and treatment training to minimum standards and implemented mobile insertion teams. The Ministry also implemented both specific targets—to prevent 40 million births over the next ten years—and financial rewards for staff who met quotas. The Planning Commission anticipated that 19.7 million women would be using IUDs by 1970‐1971. No doubt influenced by international experts who insisted on separating family planning programs from the health apparatus in order to prevent the ‘misuse’ of funds on health services and allow concentration on birth control targets, the commission intended to push IUD acceptance ahead of advances in general rural health services. In 1965, the Population Council provided India with one million IUDs and 20,000 inserters. IUD insertions totaled 60,000 by December 1965 in Punjab alone.55

Indira Gandhi’s inauguration in 1966 met a growing food crisis. However, her interest in family planning ensured that the programs did not fall in the face of more pressing economic issues. She renamed the Ministry of Health to the Ministry of Health and Family Planning, denoting her dedication. Just as the administration was working to increase acceptance of IUDs with acceptor incentives, higher than expected complication rates from lax standards began to slow acceptance. Instead of addressing concerns, such as funding contraindicated infection treatment, the Ministry required clinics to pay for related care with the 3 Rupees per acceptor they received. Monthly insertion rates fell from 120,000 to 60,000 by March of 1966. In October, there were fewer than 50,000 insertions, and the Ministry of Health agreed to pay incentives to acceptors. The Ministry provided 11 Rupees per IUD, 30 per vasectomy and 40 per tubal ligation to the states with the discretion to pay whatever proved necessary to acceptors, motivators or staff to best ensure acceptance. Punjab had been paying IUD acceptors and achieved 277 percent of its target for 1965‐1966. Madras had been paying for sterilization acceptors and motivators and had the best acceptance rates nationwide. Compounding the looming famine, 1966 brought little monsoon rain and over 100 million people were at risk of starvation. The per capita


income the next year reached just 112 Rupees, increasing the impact of incentives among low‐income families and acceptance grew sharply. Bihar, in the third year of drought, saw acceptance jump from 2,355 sterilizations and 12,677 IUD insertions in 1965 to 97,409 total acceptors in 1966 and 185,605 in 1967. The famines resulted in 1.8 million acceptors nationwide between 1966 and 1967.56

Despite short‐term increases in certain states, it became indisputable that the general population was hesitant to accept the chosen birth control methods. Officials responded by increasing incentives including land and fertilizer. The complications due to poorly trained physicians grew worse. In some states, development programs fell to fund population control. In Maharashtra, some field worker and educator positions were eliminated to free funds for incentive payments. 1967 brought punitive measures against physicians for not meeting quotas, states calling for higher incentive payments and denial of maternity leave and other benefits to government employees who surpassed fertility limits. By the end of 1967, rates were down over most of the country. The national government considered but declined compulsory sterilization programs.57

Incentive programs persisted through 1971‐1972 when program expenditures exceeded funding but sterilizations increased by 70 percent. The following year, 1972‐1973, 3.1 million sterilizations occurred and the budget was again surpassed. The budget for the following year was cut, and the concentration shifted from sterilization to health care.58 However, in 1975, incentives for sterilization were raised.59 The following year, the government drafted the National Population Policy Act with the intent of reducing the birthrate from 41 to 20‐25. 1976 also brought declaration of emergency because of the high birthrate, leading some states to institute compulsory sterilization programs.60 In some rural regions in the north, sterilization camps were again used to meet targets. Disincentives were again instituted to ensure compliance, particularly among government workers. Sterilizations increased from 1.4 million in 1974‐1975 to 2.7 million in 1975‐1976 and to 8.3 million in 1976‐1977. The camps worsened the reaction of the citizens to the programs and acceptance and effectiveness suffered.61 The government succeeding Indira Gandhi in 1977 canceled compulsory sterilization programs, declaring that all family planning programs would be voluntary. Sterilization numbers promptly decreased to fewer than one million. When Indira Gandhi returned in 1980, she distanced herself from compulsory programs.62

By 1981, the population had reached 683,810,051. The growth rate between 1971 and 1981 at 24.75 percent dropped little from 24.80 percent between 1961 and 1971.63 The sterilization camps reopened in February 1982 with rewards equaling $22 USD to female acceptors and $15 USD to males.64 It became apparent that the cultural preference for sons was causing a serious reproductive problem. When faced with incentives for reducing higher parity births, families were electing to terminate female fetuses or kill their female infants so they could try again for a son. The sex ratio for births had dropped to 934 females per 1000 males and further decreased in by 1992 to 927 females per 1000 males. The population reached 846,302,688 and the growth rate improved with development including new irrigation and urban expansion.65 As of 1997, 45 percent of married couples used contraception with 72 percent of acceptors choosing sterilization. The historical problems with large sterilization


numbers continued, and overtaxed medical staff still failed to offer less permanent methods like oral contraception.66 In 2006, the Finance Commission recommended a disincentive plan designed to tax couples with more than two children, but Prime Minister Singh disapproved of the policy as it did nothing to ensure reproductive health or improve the socioeconomic status or health of women or their children.67 The greatest challenge faced by current policy is birthrate pressure among the poor. Fifty‐six percent of the poor in India live in the five states of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Orissa and Rajasthan, home to 45 percent of the whole population. Within twenty years these five states alone will be home to more than 50 percent of the population and 75 percent of the poor.68

The Eleventh Five‐Year Plan, adopted in 2007, states numerous relevant goals. It describes women as “agents of economic and social growth”69 and states the goals of economic empowerment, provision of basic necessities, protection from violence, political participation and infrastructure to promote effective policy and involvement. It also lists goals for reducing death, disease and overwork among children. The enumerated targets for 2012 are as follows: raise sex ratio for ages 0‐6 to 935, 33 percent of government aid directly or indirectly to female citizens, reduce infant mortality to 28, reduce malnutrition for ages 0‐3 and female anemia by half, reduce primary and secondary school dropout rates by 10 percent, reduce fertility rate to 2.1. The plan also includes housing for rural homeless, water access for urban women and clean water for all citizens by 2009, guaranteed employment for job seekers, increasing access to health insurance programs, decentralization of health program planning and an incentive program for certain areas whereby families would be rewarded for benchmark actions for female children like birth registration, immunization, school enrolment and delayed marriage until age 18. The focus in India appears to have shifted to health and well‐being, but specific fertility targets remain, along with language regarding fertility programs. The Eleventh Plan still cites “unmet need” while discussing the low incidence of methods requiring male responsibility and the disproportionate dependence on female sterilization. The Plan emphasizes the protection of citizen “decision making and choices”70 while stating the intention to continue utilizing mass media campaigns for “behavioral change.71 Also, despite complaints regarding the dependence on sterilization, the Plan praises a pilot program in Tamil Nadu which trains doctors in these procedures and proposes expanding such local initiatives. Cultural Difficulties Prior to British colonization, Hindu tradition extolled high fertility encouraging men once they married to procreate extensively. However, this value must be viewed in the context of high child mortality rates and low life expectancy. Between 1911 and 1921, up to 75 percent of children died by age five.72 In the same period, life expectancy only reached age twenty.73 Though still one of the highest in the world, the infant mortality rate in India was much improved by 1997 at 80.74 India ranked fifty‐fifth in the world in 2006 with a rate of 54.63, nine times that of the United States. In 2008, India ranks seventy‐fifth for infant mortality at 32.31, still more than five times the rate in the United States. The current life expectancy in India is just more than sixty‐nine years.75 This decline in mortality rates, combined with a steady birthrate, led to the massive population growth in India. Yet, because of the historical


reality of high infant mortality rates, planning services aimed at smaller families have not been very well accepted. There are no religious proscriptions against birth control, only a scriptural condemnation of abortion. Nonetheless, the culture has been defined greatly by the fear for survival brought on by the terrifying mortality of the early twentieth century.76 Further, much of India is still agrarian and values children as workers and contributors to family welfare. In agrarian societies, children are producers, rather than consumers, and larger families are supportive rather than costly as they are seen in the neomalthusian paradigm.77 This complicates the notion of population control and requires a change in how government addresses these communities.

There is also a great disparity in Indian society in the way that men and women are viewed. Men are valuable as breadwinners and sons are necessary to care for their parents in old age. They are also necessary for religious tradition including certain ceremonies at a fatherʹs funeral service.78 Sons are even described in some texts as ensuring immortality and power to a paternal line and saving their fathers from hell.79 A woman only receives favorable treatment as a pregnant young wife. Her only religious activities are rituals carried out for the welfare of her husband and children, as babies are her god‐given purpose. Even a young woman knows that if she is widowed, only her children—and particularly her sons—will care for her.80 The disparity of the value of women and their role in the family complicates the application of contraceptive programs. Both members of the couple must be included in the discussion of reproductive health, and the method chosen must be one that both are comfortable with. Also important, women must be assured their economic status will not be compromised by the decision to limit births.

India’s population control efforts have enjoyed limited success, but some states and districts have demonstrated very important innovations. Clearly, the question of reproduction is one requiring both cultural sensitivity and cultural reformation. There are individual states in India that have demonstrated great success with their population control policies. Would these policies work when generalized across the whole and disparate population of India? Of note is the distinction of the poor agrarian families and the continued relevance of cultural preference for large families in that environment. While the urbanizing populations may be more readily persuaded of the reduced need for multiple children, children in poor agrarian families are vital contributors to the economic viability of the family.81 To be successful, population control policies applied to these areas must address the concerns of families who fear the loss of income from a missing child. The agrarian economic reality is based on dedicated labor in which more hands means increased security. It is not sufficient to give a small reward in return for contraceptive use, as it may be in a working urban family. The policies used to address population growth in rural areas must ensure long‐term economic security to families who fear losing it by cooperating with contraceptive programs.

Because of the decisions of the Indian government to comply with democratic principles and generally preserve the voluntary nature of their population control policies,82 the responsiveness of the government to citizen opinion must be flexible and quick. Enforcing policies that reduce the attractiveness of contraceptive cooperation will only result in failed policy. Because of the vast differences among the Indian population, the policies may need to be designed to meet distinct needs in


each community. To some extent, this has occurred by default as a result of the federal structure and the discretion allotted states in India.83 However, while policies may be tailored to provide accommodations that may be more helpful in one community than another, any program benefits must be available equitably across the nation, in order to provide equal opportunities for assistance. Further, policies must be formulated to be beneficial, and even persuasive, but great care must be taken to avoid coercive regulation. The aim of birth control assistances should be to enable families to more easily plan their reproduction, not to strong‐arm people into changing their personal desires to meet targets. The famine and hardship experienced in 1966‐1967 is an unfortunate example.84 Policies that take advantage of desperate people and force them to make permanent choices for immediate and temporary survival rather than assisting them toward enduring security are neither appropriate nor successful in the long‐term. The Indian people have repeatedly demonstrated their determination to resist unjust contraceptive policies in the sharp decline of acceptance rates following the discontinuation of the most coercive policies, such as mass‐sterilization camps.85 Failure to ensure just application of law will produce nothing but further resistance. Current Analysis For a population program to be just, it must recognize and support human and civil rights equitably as established within a given nation. For the program to be successful, it must promote and achieve a sustainable level of population growth that neither stresses social programs nor deprives the economy of workers. The literature presented in this article establishes that the method most likely to achieve these goals is to institute policies designed primarily to encourage social and economic welfare including the development of improved rights recognition and agency. Following, the reader will find sections dedicated to particular segments of public policy that will promote these goals and will contribute to population growth interests while maintaining a just society. These policy options should be viewed in the light of the successes and failures presented in the historiographies above. The Importance of Education Education is the cornerstone of development and advancement. Because population growth is intertwined with development, it is also intertwined with education. Any education system will be stretched by a rapidly growing population and can be the first place to combat such growth. Educational achievement is a major determinant in reproductive behavior worldwide and encouraging secondary and postsecondary education can be a powerful tool for improving the effectiveness of family planning programs. Moreover, the education system may be utilized for instructing the population as a whole on how their reproductive behavior creates national population growth and how that affects quality of life for families, communities, the nation and the world. Through education, citizens are empowered to make responsible reproductive choices.86

Any population program concentrating on improving education in general—and sexual and reproductive health in particular—is inherently more just. By entrusting citizens with the knowledge to take responsibility of their own lives and their contributions to society, a government can improve acceptance of behaviors


which will reduce population growth without risking attitudinal regression associated with such policies as compulsory sterilization. Improvement or the institution of a standardized national education system should be part of any comprehensive population control program.

The writer proposes that quality full spectrum education should be a primary focus of any policy program intending to reduce population growth. Accessible and affordable—if not free—public academic instruction at the primary and secondary levels provides citizens basic knowledge required for productive civic and economic involvement. Comprehensive health education for both public school students and the public at large empowers individuals to take responsibility for their wellbeing and is a vital part of a preventive health care program. A program instituting both of these would reduce mortality pressures and enable informed reproductive choice while improving economic and social mobility and political empowerment. All of these effects will contribute to an effective and just population policy. The Fine Line of Coercion Incentives have historically been instituted to encourage immediate positive action on the part of individuals. These programs take two manifestations, the first being small incremental remunerations which assume that a family wants to control their fertility and assist them in doing so, rewarding them for each month or year they successfully prevent new births. Incremental incentives are empowering, encouraging families to seek and utilize the contraceptive methods they are most comfortable with. The second manifestation consists of large, one‐time payments given to those who may want a larger family to meet economic needs. These change the immediate cost‐benefit dynamic to favor smaller families and are generally used to encourage permanent methods of contraception such as sterilization, changing the decisions an individual would otherwise make about reproduction.

The idea behind disincentives is that society will benefit so greatly from a reduction in population growth that the government has a vested interest in intervening in personal decisions to prevent excessive fertility for the good of the population. Thus, minor, short‐term infringement of personal rights and privacy are viewed as excusable. Disincentives, as discussed previously, include penalties for high‐parity births, failure to accept contraceptive programs and similar noncompliance. Incentives can be compatible with human rights by creating the positive effect of population control on long‐term quality of life and by the immediate benefit of financial rewards. Likewise, disincentives can be justified if properly instituted by comparing the immediate cost against rights to the long‐term improvement in human rights, which can come with a reduced population. Yet, these methods can be abused when highly organized by governments that fail to provide sufficient oversight.87 It is tempting to view disincentives as a tax on the choice to procreate beyond the government‐preferred parity. A cursory viewing would show incentives to be the more just method of encouraging cooperation, rather than punishing noncompliance. Incentives, however, often lead to coerced acceptance of sterilization and long‐term methods of contraception due to immediate economic need which may later be outweighed by the need for a child. The coercive power of incentives is demonstrated in that incentive‐driven acceptance of


impermanent methods generally produces low rates of reacceptance and reductions in acceptance once immediate economic crises have been alleviated.88

Disincentives, unlike incentives, can reinforce developing low‐birthrate norms without forcing acceptance of permanent contraception such as sterilization. These strategies are more successful in societies with full legal access to all methods of contraception and no increased hardship on higher‐parity children. Disincentives allow the acceptors to decide when and how to reduce fertility instead of having to accept the particular method with the highest financial reward.89 While they might manifest in a higher immediate cost for those who choose to have additional children, disincentives better protect human rights because of the increased likelihood of coercion toward positive action associated with some incentive programs. Therefore, incentive programs should only be instituted with great care and oversight and only in conjunction with more protective disincentives. Any disincentive program should be marked by an economic structure that permits additional child(ren) to contribute to the family income through work, though his or her birth may cost the family exceptional social benefits. However, any social welfare program which provides basic necessities should never be restricted based on fertility. The Chinese policy of giving the same size land allowance for rural families, thus, may be acceptable, though the similar program of increased grain rations for smaller families is likely not. Likewise, historical Indian policies which reduced job opportunities or political agency for large families were unjust. Other justifiable disincentives may be elimination of free post‐secondary tuition for higher birth‐order children, while elimination of free education for all the children in a family or elimination of primary or secondary education for any of the children would not be. The first of these is unjust because it punishes children for the decisions of their parents, and, rather than having the added cost of the extra‐normative children, all of the children become an opportunity cost. This and the second are unhelpful because they reduce educational opportunities to all the children in the family and of basic education to the higher‐order children, which would compromise the necessity of education to development efforts which have a higher chance of successfully limiting births than disincentive programs.90

Incentive programs in China have been more successful than those of India. The writer proposes that the increased achievement results from comprehensive incentive plans, which provide for the lifelong economic loss that can be suffered by those of agrarian or other low‐income families that would otherwise depend on multiple children to augment their income. The incentive programs in India have comprised mostly one‐time awards for acceptance of long‐term birth control methods that do not cover the economic impact that an additional child could have had in a familyʹs life. Thus, any incentive program should include comprehensive care programs providing, at the minimum, a pension for cooperating couples. When developing incentive‐disincentive programs, governments must be dedicated to analyzing the local role of children in families and seek to shift the cost‐benefit balance that plays so great a role in the decision to reproduce. The incentives must be appropriate to repay the couple for sacrificing their right to reproduce rather than convincing them to submit to government authority. There must be a commitment to comprehensive oversight in order to ensure that these programs remain wholly voluntary and that incentives and disincentives reinforce efforts without being


coercive or succumbing to unofficial abuses. Aiding in this, reinforcement programs must be built upon unrestricted and affordable access to whatever variety of contraceptive method an individual might prefer regardless of age or marital status. Any restriction of access creates an underserved population subject to unwanted pregnancy and unintended population growth. Women Change Everything

‘A womanʹs status, and with it her ability to safeguard her own health and that of her family, depends not just on her right to decide on the number and spacing of her children; her status also depends on her right to act as an independent adult (her legal capacity), to participate as a citizen in her community, to earn a living, to own and control property and to be free from discrimination on the basis of gender, race, and class’.91 Son preference is problematic in both China and India despite the differences

in their approaches to population control. As of 1991, the gender disparity in India was 927 women per 1000 men. Estimates put missing girls between age zero and six at 1.4 million.92 Chinaʹs 2000 census showed a gender disparity of 100 females to 117 males.93 As a result of this disparity, estimates place missing brides at forty million in China.94 The natural disparity between female and male births is 100 to 103‐110.95

The source of preference for male children originates with the socioeconomic history of valuing the work that men have traditionally contributed to society over the input of women in both nations. Indian society has religious tradition supporting male child preference. However, there are many religious texts that describe strong and socially valuable women. By increasing the attention paid to these texts, and improving gender education in general, the Indian government could seek to combat the rising gender disparity and even the population growth itself. ‘The real solution to Indiaʹs population problem lies in [...] systematic and steady (not sporadic) valuing and education of girls and women. If women are perceived as contributors to the finances of the home, their births will not be feared and prevented’.96

The Chinese government has already instituted several policies to combat the gender disparity.97 The party drafted a resolution to revise criminal law to allow for charging those who provide services for the already illegal practice of fetus gender identification and non‐medical, sex‐selective abortions.98 Also, the Chinese have added three new incentive programs. First, families without sons will receive a yearly allowance of 600 Yuan once the parents reach sixty years of age, which will aid greatly the average yearly income of 2000 Yuan.99 Also, only‐daughters will receive bonus marks on college entrance examinations and special treatment when looking for jobs. Finally, daughter‐only families will be eligible for preferential agricultural assistance loans.100

It is not only necessary to educate the population about the value of women in society; it is vital to educate women in general. When women are educated, they marry later in life, reducing the number of childbearing years, and thus fertility, leading to smaller families. Education of women also reduces infant mortality, a large deterrent to contraceptive participation in India.101 Educating women increases their agency and empowers them to the ability to act on their own behalf to obtain


contraceptive services to regulate their childbearing. Also, improved education leads to improved employability, which can reduce the need for children to protect a woman from poverty in old age. By providing women with economic value, governments can reduce the heavy toll that high fertility wages on women and also enable them to reap the benefits of having smaller families.102

Improved gender equity through education can be expected to lower fertility rates as extensive statistical evidence supports that female education and literacy, empowerment of women via gainful employment, independent incomes, property rights, and general social standing improvements starkly reduce fertility rates.103 By correcting female illiteracy, lack of female employment and economic independence, by providing family planning education and resources, and by combating religious and traditional oppression of women, governments can expect to transform the power of women and thus the increase the effectiveness of population programs.104

The Special Case of Kerala The importance of taking women into account in population control policies is nowhere better illustrated than in Kerala—a state on the southwest coast of India. Kerala has instituted laws relating to womenʹs rights, education, land reform, food security and health services as part of their population control program. This state also has a matrilineal system that values women and their education. The fertility rate was halved within two generations to 2.2 in 1997. 80 percent of the state population practices some form of contraception. Life expectancy in Kerala in 1994 was seventy years, surpassing the national expectancy of fifty‐seven years.105 Other areas with a similar improved status for women like Tamil Nadu and Himachal Pradesh also have greatly reduced fertility rates. Analysis of Chinese policies further attests to the transformative power of female agency. ‘While Chinaʹs sharp fertility decline is often attributed to coercive policies, [...] one could have expected a roughly similar decline because of Chinaʹs excellent achievements in raising female education and employment’.106 The improvements in the lives of women in Kerala have developed much more quickly than in China and, likewise, the fertility in Kerala has dropped much more precipitously from 3 to 1.8 in the same time that Chinaʹs rate dropped 2.8 to 2.0 between 1979 and 1991. In 2001, Kerala maintained their lead on China with a fertility rate of 1.7 well under Chinaʹs rate of 1.9.107

Most important, because the programs in Kerala have been completely voluntary and coercion‐free, the infant mortality rate is much lower than where it stood even with China in 1979. The female‐infant mortality rate in Kerala is now half that of China and there is a reduced gender disparity.108 Kerala has a much lower fertility rate than the 4.4 to 5.1 rates common in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan which have reduced female education and health care but use coercion to ensure cooperation with fertility control programs.109 Female empowerment is more effective even than general economic improvement as several rich districts in Punjab and Haryana have much higher fertility rates than some poorer communities with higher female literacy and employment.110 The specific improvements in these communities clearly show that a commitment to improving the social status of women can be fundamental in decreasing both population growth pressures and the consequences associated with traditional approaches to population control.


The Problem of Age-Dependency While Chinaʹs one‐child policy is no longer officially strictly enforced, the government estimates that the population of those under age thirty is 400 million fewer than it would have been without the one‐child policy.111 The population controls have been successful as the overall growth rate in China has been reduced to .93 percent112 and, in 2000, Shanghai, the countryʹs most populous city, had a fertility rate of only .96.113 However, this reduction in population may compromise the economic strength of China for the next thirty to fifty years. When the fertility rate is high, there are a large number of children dependent on adult workers; this is part of the age‐dependency effect. When fertility declines, the reduced dependency allows for economic development. However, reduced fertility results quickly in a large, unsupported aging population and a smaller workforce.114 This top‐heavy age‐dependency effect will soon greatly impact China as more workers age and there are fewer young people to replace them.115 The workers that will be retiring in China each year beginning in 2011 will total fifteen million, equal to the number of new workers that year.116 Every ten Chinese workers will have to support seven younger or older dependents by 2050.117 One suggestion to counter this is to raise the retirement age, but age discrimination is strong in Chinaʹs workplaces, and workers in their forties are having trouble finding jobs because of preference for younger, more educated workers.118

Chinaʹs worker population has been sharply reduced, but India still has a large potential workforce that is becoming more highly educated. While the rest of the world is already experiencing population declines and facing a future starved of skilled workers, India may have a chance to populate the world with their educated youth.119 This will create an economic environment in which it will be possible for India to continue its impressive 8.3 percent growth rate.120 By supporting development and further increasing and improving education, India could easily surpass China in development. However, within twenty‐five years, the population of India will likely stabilize, thus dropping the dependency rate and leading to the same issues of an unsupported aging population within the following twenty years.121

These and any other nations interested in sustainable populations must concentrate first on sustainable economic achievement and growth. Improved public education emphasizing transferable basic skills, access to technical training programs and any grant or taxation incentive programs should be designed to increase entry into non‐volatile industries, promote entrepreneurship and provide for career redirection in the case of a rapid boom and bust cycle in a given industry. Not only will the resulting economic improvement provide the fertility reductions cited in the literature, but they will also help cushion a crisis in the age‐dependency ratio by increasing the active workforce.

Conclusion and Recommendations for Continued Success By implementing programs that resulted in improved education for the general population and women specifically and some encouragement of womenʹs rights, along with a strict, active and well‐organized system of regulations, incentives and disincentives, China has greatly reduced their population growth to well below zero‐


growth. India has attempted to keep their family planning programs more voluntary, but, without an emphasis on gender equity and education, the government has struggled to reduce the growth rate as quickly as China and even some Indian states. Both nations would benefit greatly from an expansion of efforts to educate and empower women by availing them of improved rights and protections. China has made specific efforts to change the cultural attitudes toward childbearing, namely, in correcting the stigma against small families. They are also beginning to implement similar cultural attitude changes with regard to the desire for daughters. If they can succeed in improving social opinion of women they can reduce the pressures of son preference and also improve womenʹs rights in general. When womenʹs lives are improved, population growth will reduce even more.

To continue to reduce populations and to improve the quality of life for the citizens of China and India and other nations with similar population problems throughout the world, the writer recommends a continued reduction in unwanted pregnancies by means of contraception rather than induced abortion. By encouraging preemptive methods and sexual education of both adults and adolescents, these countries can reduce the dangers to womenʹs health associated with unnecessary abortions and infanticide. Many cultures contain social pressures against adolescent sexuality and thus many assume that their adolescents do not need sexual education and contraceptive availability. This creates a vulnerable group, particularly with the rise in parental AIDS deaths creating more unguided orphans. These nations can fundamentally change their population dynamics by instituting early sexual education plans and making incentive programs available to unmarried individuals. Further, by investing heavily in development and education, these governments can reduce infant mortality and the economic need for large families contributed to by low‐income occupations.122 Finally, by seeking to implement comprehensive incentive‐disincentive programs similar to those in China instead of one‐time sterilization rewards similar to those in India, governments worldwide can encourage cooperation with programs by removing the need for additional children.

This article has assumed the benefits of programs aimed at reducing population growth, not because the literature describes incontrovertible evidence for them, but because countries are determined to implement them. In these attempts, some have discovered very important principles that must be a part of any nationʹs population control program. However, most of these practical discoveries—and the academic literature—stress that the most successful population control policies are actually development and human rights policies which seem to inherently result in reduced fertility. The stark reality is many less‐developed countries have large poor populations often wholly dependent on government assistance. It is more than challenging for governments to meet these needs. It is understandable why nations would view population reduction as a quick fix for strained welfare budgets, but they are not. The aim for governments must be economic and rights development. However, there is no reason to assume that any population control is inherently unjust or an unworthy goal. In exploring the successes and failures of previous attempts, the international community can easily model a program that will be guaranteed to reduce the population growth and improve the lives of citizens. This model must include the following: (1) primary, secondary and health education for all citizens; (2) general economic improvements, including increased economic


mobility and entrepreneurial opportunity; (3) increased education and social rights improvements for women, including campaigns designed to raise awareness of women’s issues and the social view of women; (4) policies to encourage womenʹs activities within the economy; (5) sexual health and contraceptive education for adults and adolescents; (6) universal and affordable contraceptive availability regardless of marital status; (7) improved health care to reduce pressures to reproduce stemming from a high mortality rate; (8) comprehensive incentive and disincentive programs to encourage citizen participation and assist those who cooperate, independent of other development efforts; (9) wholly voluntary programs with strict oversight to prevent abuse; and (10) increased political agency to empower citizen involvement rather than demonstrate top‐down, oppressive declarations. Nations seeking to implement a population control program will, naturally, have to tailor this model to their cultural norms. By following these guidelines, nations can utilize proven methods to improve their societies and reduce their growth rates.

If these steps seem familiar or obvious, it is because they represent a commitment to economic development and increasing recognition of human and political rights. Yet, these basic principles have been ignored in the development of population policy, despite demonstrated success. There has long been recognition among population control advocates that similar measures had the potential to reduce growth, but preference has been given to more aggressive policies that provided, if nothing else, a feeling of active problem‐solving effort. That international aid and the very rights and lives of citizens have hinged on these comparatively unproductive plans is reprehensible. The international community should encourage policies that instead respect the recognized values of human rights and should, if preconditions for aid are unavoidable, make such assistance dependent on such efforts that will improve quality of life rather than simply seek to control reproductive behavior.


NOTES

1 For the purposes of this discussion, the following terms will be defined. Birthrate is the number of births per 1000 people per year. [43.6 (per 1000)] Mortality rate is the number of deaths per 1000 per year. [28( per 1000)] Infant mortality rate is the number of infant deaths per 1000 per year. [80 (per 1000)] Natural growth rate is the birthrate less mortality rate per 1000 per year. Some sources express this

in percentage terms. [5 (per 1000)] Fertility rate is the average number of children born to a woman over her lifetime. [5.75 (births)] Incentives are tangible or intangible rewards that target citizens and seek to increase the likelihood

of participation in desired population related behaviors (David). Disincentives are the tangible or intangible costs imposed on a target population intended to reduce

the likelihood of failure to cooperate with desired behaviors (David). Parity denotes the level of birth order. A second child is the product of a low‐parity birth. A sixth child would

be a high‐parity birth. Parity limit denotes the maximum number of children permitted under a policy or incentive program. Acceptors are persons making fertility related decisions (David). Recruiters or motivators seek acceptors and encourage specified decisions (David). Providers are those who supply a contraceptive product or service (David). Age‐dependency describes the relationship of the number of elder citizens and children to the size of the

working population. 2 Amartya Sen, ‘Fertility and Coercion’, The University of Chicago Law Review, 63, 3 (1996), pp.1035‐

1061. p.1035. 3 US Census Bureau, World Population Information: World Population Trends, online, nd, available at:

http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/worldpopinfo.html (25 June 2008). 4 Thomas Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population, Project Gutenberg, online, 2003, available

at: http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/4239 (25 June 2008). 5 John Bongaarts, ‘Population Policy Options in the Developing World’, Science, New Series 263, 5148

(1994), pp.771‐776; Lynn P. Freedman and Stephen L. Isaacs, ‘Human Rights and Reproductive Choice’, Studies in Family Planning (SFP), 24, 1(1993), pp.18‐30.

6 Paul R. Ehrlich, The Population Bomb, Buccaneer Books,Cutchogue, New York, (1995); Garrett Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’, Science, 162, 3859(1968), pp.1243‐1248.

7 Gary S. Becker, A Treatise on the Family. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, (1981). 8 Freedman and Isaacs. 9 Bongaarts; Susheela Singh, Deidre Wulf and Heidi Jones, ‘Health Professionalsʹ Perceptions About

Induced Abortion in South Central and Southeast Asia’, International Family Planning Perspectives (IFPP), 23, 2 (1997), pp.59‐67.

10 Bongaarts. 11 Qian Xinzhong, ‘China’s Population Policy: Theory and Methods’, SFP, 14, 12 (1983), pp.295‐301. 12 H. Yuan Tien, ‘Abortion in China: Incidence and Implications’, Modern China, 13, 4 (1987), pp.441‐

68. p.456. 13 Henry P. David, ‘Incentives, Reproductive Behavior and Integrated Community Development in

Asia’, SFP 13, 5 (1982), pp.159‐173. 14 Xinzhong. 15 Tien. 16 Jianfa Shen, ‘Chinaʹs Future Population and Development Challenges’, The Geographic Journal (GJ),

164, 1 (1998), pp.32‐40. 17 Tien. 18 Thomas Frejka, ‘Induced Abortion and Fertility’, Family Planning Perspectives, 17, 5 (1985), pp.230‐

234. 19 Tien, p.442. 20 Sen, Fertility; Shen; Xinzhong, 21 David; Freedman and Isaacs; Robert L. Worden andrea Matles Savada and Ronald E. Dolan,

editors, China: A Country Study, Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, online, 1987, available at: http://countrystudies.us/china (25 June 2008).


22 David; Tien. 23 Karen A. Laidlaw and Edward G. Stockwell, ‘Fertility Control Programs in Asia: Another Look at

the Data’, Asian Survey (AS), 20, 8 (1980), pp.803‐811. 24 David. 25 David; Tien; Xinzhong. 26 David. 27 Frejka. 28 Tien. 29 Frejka. 30 A.J. Jowett, ‘The Growth of Chinaʹs Population, 1949‐1982 (With Special Reference to the

Demographic Disaster of 1960‐1961)’, GJ, 150, 2 (1984), pp.155‐170. 31 Sen, Fertility. 32 Shen. 33 Sen, Fertility. 34 Kai Ma, The 11th Five‐Year Plan: Targets, Paths and Policy Orientation, National Development and

Reform Commission, online, 19 March 2006, available at: http://english.gov.cn/2006‐03/23/content_234832htm (25 September 2008).

35 The New York Times (NYT), ‘China to Reconsider One‐Child Limit’, 29 February 2008. 36 China Daily (CD), ‘City eases ‘one child’ policy’, 5 July 2007. 37 NYT, 29 February 2008. 38 Radio Free Asia, ‘Quake Victims Allowed Extra Child’, 27 May 2008, available at:

http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/quake_orphans‐05272008155530.html (September 25, 2008). 39 Xinhua News Agency (XNA), ‘1st Ld‐China focus: Gender Imbalance worries China, govt takes

action’, 22 September 2006. 40 Matthew Connelly, ‘Population Control in India: Prologue to the Emergency Period’, Population

and Development Review (PDR), 32, 4 (December 2006), pp.629‐667. 41 A.J. Coale and E.M. Hoover, Population growth and economic development in low‐income countries: a

case study of Indiaʹs prospects, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1958 (cit. Connelly). 42 Connelly. 43 John C. Caldwell, James F. Phillips and Barakat‐e‐Khuda, ‘The Future of Family Planning

Programs’, SFP, 33, 1 (2002), pp.1‐10; Connelly. 44 Singh, Wulf and Jones. 45 Freedman and Isaacs. 46 Connelly; David; Kaval Gulhati, ‘Compulsory Sterilization: The Change in Indiaʹs Population

Policy’, Science, New Series 195, 4284 (1977), pp.1300‐1305. 47 Connelly. 48 ibid. 49 ibid. 50 David. 51 Connelly; David. 52 Connelly. 53 ibid. 54 ibid. 55 ibid. 56 ibid. 57 ibid. 58 Gulhati. 59 David. 60 Karen A. Laidlaw and Edward G. Stockwell, ‘Fertility Control Programs in Asia: Another Look at

the Data’, AS, 20, 8 (1980), pp.803‐811. 61 Sen, Fertility; Gulhati; David. 62 David. 63 The Population Council, India: Population Growth in the 1970s, PDR, 7, 2 (1981), pp.325‐334. 64 David. 65 James Heitzman and Robert L. Worden, editors, India: A Country Study, Washington: GPO for the

Library of Congress, online, 1995, available at: http://countrystudies.us/india (25 June 2008).


http://english.gov.cn/2006-03/23/content_234832htm

http://english.gov.cn/2006-03/23/content_234832htm

66 Vasudha Narayanan, ‘One Tree is Equal to Ten Sons’: Hindu Responses to the Problems of

Ecology, Population and Consumption’, Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 65, 2 (1997), pp.291‐332.

67 Hindustan Times (HT), ‘PM frowns on tough population checks’, 23 August 2006. 68 ibid. 69 Planning Commission (PC), Eleventh Five‐Year Plan: 2007‐2012, Government of India, online, nd,

available at: http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/welcome.html (September 25, 2008). p.184.

70 PC, p.94. 71 PC, p.96. 72 Narayanan. 73 Heitzman and Worden, India. 74 Narayanan. 75 US Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Rank Orders,

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the‐world‐factbook/rankorder/2091rank.html (June 25, 2008). 76 Narayanan. 77 Connelly; Gulhati. 78 Gulhati. 79 Narayanan. 80 Gulhati, Kaval. 81 Connelly; Gulhati; V.A. Pai Panandiker and P.K. Umashankar, ‘Fertility Control and Politics in

India’, PDR, 20 (1994), Supplement: The New Politics of Population: Conflict and Consensus in Family Planning, pp.89‐104.

82 Connelly; David. 83 Connelly. 84 ibid. 85 Sen, Fertility; Gulhati; David. 86 Riad B. Tabbarah, ‘Population Education as a Component of Development Policy’, SFP, 7, 7 (1976),

pp.197‐201. 87 David. 88 Connelly; David. 89 David. 90 Amartya Sen, ‘Population and Gender Equity’, Journal of Public Health Policy, 22, 2 (2001), pp.169‐

174. p.19. 91 Freedman and Isaacs. 92 Narayanan. 93 BBC Monitoring International Reports (BBC), ‘China implements policies to counter gender

imbalance’, 22 September 2006; CD, Population to peak at 1.5B in 2030s, 23 June 2006; XNA, 22 September 2006.

94 Alexander Monro, ‘Hidden legacy of Chinaʹs family plan’, New Scientist, 8 July 2006. 95 BBC, 22 September 2006; CD, 23 June 2006; XNA, 22 September 2006. 96 Narayanan, p.315. 97 BBC, 22 September 2006; XNA, 22 September 2006. 98 CD, 23 June 2006. 99 BBC 22 September 2006; XNA, 22 September 2006. 100 XNA, 22 September 2006. 101 Narayanan; Sen, Fertility. 102 Thomas W. Merrick, ‘Population and Poverty: New Views on an Old Controversy’, IFPP, 28, 1

(2002), pp.41‐46. 103 Sen, Fertility. 104 Sen, Population. 105 Narayanan. 106 Sen, Population, p.171‐2. 107 ibid. 108 ibid. 109 Sen, Fertility.


110 ibid. 111 National Public Radio (NPR), ‘Morning Edition: Chinese government continues population curbs’,

17 October 2006. 112 Suzanne Ogden, China, McGraw‐Hill/Dushkin, Connecticut, 2006. 113 The Nikkei Weekly (NW), ‘Population explosion gives way to worker shortages linked to one‐child

policy’, 4 September 2006. 114 Merrick. 115 South China Morning Post, New policies needed to tackle an old problem, 26 May 2006; NPR, 17

October 2006. 116 NW, 4 September 2006. 117 Monro, 8 July 2006. 118 South China Morning Post, 26 May 2006. 119 Statesman, From liability to asset, 13 June 2006. 120 James H.K. Norton, India and South Asia, McGraw‐Hill/Dushkin, Iowa, 2005. 121 Tim Dyson, Robert Cassen and Leela Visaria, Twenty‐first Century India: Population, Economy,

Human Development and the Environment, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004. 122 Bongaarts.


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