che guevara on guerrilla warfare: doctrine, practice and evaluation

Society for Comparative Studies in Society and History

Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare: Doctrine, Practice and EvaluationAuthor(s): Jose A. MorenoSource: Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Apr., 1970), pp. 114-133Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/177959 .

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Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare: Doctrine, Practice and Evaluation* JOSE A. MORENO

University of Pittsburgh

Most theories of revolution seem to agree that certain preconditions must be met if a revolutionary situation is to arise.1 The peculiar contribution of Ernesto Che Guevara to understanding revolutions is that according to him such preconditions can be created [1: 4].2 Few men in the world today would be better qualified than Guevara to sustain such theory with empirical evidence from his own participation in revolutions. After his experience in Guatemala, Cuba, the Congo and, perhaps, other parts of the world, Guevara was considered, by friends and enemies alike, as one of the world's top-ranking guerrilla fighters of the twentieth century. By the time he started a new daring experiment in Bolivia he was reckoned as one of the most articulate theorists in the field. The death of Guevara in the mountains of Bolivia on October 9, 1967, brought commotion and mixed feelings to his enemies and admirers the world over. His enemies were exultant, first because the dreaded Guevara was dead, and second because his death was 'clear evidence' that his theories were wrong. His admirers were sad because he was dead, but were also elated because the puzzle of his disappearance had been unraveled and because his death at the hands of Bolivian rangers trained by a U.S. military mission, far from being 'evidence' that his theories were wrong, was 'evidence' that they were right. In order to decide whether Guevara's theory of revolution was right or wrong a series of value judg- ments needs to be made and the final outcome will, naturally, be in line

* The present paper is only part of a larger research project concerning social revolution in Latin America in which the author is presently engaged. The author wants to acknowledge the comments, criticisms and suggestions made for the first draft of this paper by Professors Gilbert Shapiro, William Delany, Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Gerhard Drekonja and by Miss Donna Maria Barbaro.

1 By revolutionary situation is understood here a state of affairs in which a stat.s quo government is presented with a challenge from within which poses a credible threat to its ability to implement coercion and maintain stability. This situation is commonly preceded by the existence of some objective and subjective conditions and is often, but not necessarily, followed by an actual revolution or seizure of power by a group that seeks to implement basic structural changes.

2 The major works of Guevara used in this study are listed at the end of this paper. For the sake of brevity all references to these works will be put in brackets, the first digit indicating the number of such work in the list and the second the pages.

114



CHE GUEVARA ON GUERRILLA WARFARE 115

with these evaluative presuppositions. It is beyond the scope of this essay to enter such discussion. It is my intention to investigate, as dispassion- ately as I can, to what extent the empirical evidence of the Cuban and the Bolivian experiments proves or disproves the major generalizations of Guevara's theory of revolution. It is with mixed feelings that I approach the subject, first because it is quite difficult to enter such a study without

taking sides, and second because of the scarcity of documents available to the writer. It goes without saying that whatever findings are presented in this paper are subject to further clarification and correction when more material with evidence relevant to this subject is made available to the public.

I. THE THEORY OF THE 'FOCO'

The main contribution of Guevara to a theory of revolution is that the necessary conditions to a revolutionary situation can be created through the emergence in rural areas of highly trained guerrilla fighters organized into a highly cohesive group called the 'foco'.3 Most theories of revolution, Marxist and non-Marxist alike, have basically agreed that certain objective and subjective conditions are to be met before a revolutionary situation can develop.4 Guevara also is aware that certain minimum preconditions are needed to kindle the first spark.5 He admits that certain grievances must exist which society is unable to redress through the ordinary mechanisms of tension management. He agrees that all other legal avenues to solve the conflict must be exhausted before violence can be used. Finally he also suggests that while the government enjoys legitimacy (through honest constitutional elections) or an appearance of it (through rigged elections) the use of violence will not be seen as appropriate. Three preconditions, therefore, are minimally required, according to Guevara, before a revolutionary situation can be developed through the use of the guerrilla foco [1: 4]: 1. A lack of legitimacy by the incumbent elite to govern the country. 2. Existence of tensions that cannot be redressed by regular channels. 3. All legal avenues to change the situation are perceived as closed.

3 The word foco is taken from the Spanish for focus, and is described both in English and Spanish as 'the centre of activity, or area of greatest energy, of a storm, eruption, etc.' (The Oxford Universal Dictionary, 3rd ed.).

4 An excellent account of such conditions in modern theoretical approaches to the study of revolution is found in, Harry Eckstein, 'On the Etiology of Internal War', in History and Theory, Vol. 4, 133-63, and in Lawrence Stone, 'Theories of Revolution', in World Politics, Vol. 18 (January 1966), 159-76. See also Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Boston: Little Brown, 1966).

5 In 1961 Guevara described these conditions in the following manner: 'The objective conditions for struggle are provided by the people's hunger, their reaction to their hunger, the terror unleashed to crush the people's reaction, and the wave of hatred that the repression creates. [Latin] America lacked the subjective conditions, the most important of which is awareness of the possibility of victory through violent struggle. ..' (Verde Olivo, April 9, 1961).



ii6 JOSE A. MORENO

The presence of these preconditions does not guarantee the success of the guerrilla foco. They make up the socio-political frame within which the foco can become a catalyst for a full fledged revolutionary situation. Whether or not thefoco will function as a catalyst will depend on other factors. Our task here is precisely to determine which, according to Gue- vara, are the factors that make a guerrilla foco truly operative and successful.

A. What Kind of Men Make up the Foco

The guerrilla fighter, according to Guevara, must be a social reformer, a man who fully dedicates himself to destroy an unjust social order to

replace it with something new [1: 30]. The ideal type of guerrilla is seen

by the Argentine physician as a man who leads an ascetic life with im-

peccable morality with strict self control and who seeks to introduce social reforms through personal example [1: 40, 65, 67]. In order to achieve such dedication to a cause, the guerrilla must be ideologically motivated. Social

justice and freedom are suggested as basic tenets of such an ideology [1: 35].6

The life in the guerrilla band is a long and painful process of learning. Not because a man has a rifle, a back pack, sleeps on a hammock and is hunted by the police, can he be called a guerrilla. All such characteristics are shared by bandits. According to Guevara, life in the guerrilla foco gives the fighter both an opportunity to become a revolutionary (which is the highest rank of the human species), and to become a man. Those who are not able to reach either stage, are advised to give up [7: 196].

B. Composition and Organization of the Foco

The foco is basically made up at first, of some 25 to 35 men under the

politico-military leadership of a man in charge of the whole operation. The foco has supporters and sympathizers in the city, but will not receive orders from any organized group or party stationed in the urban centers. It operates as the vanguard of a popular army. Thefoco will establish close relations with the peasants of the area in which it operates, but at no time will it sacrifice the mobility and safety of the guerrilla band for the sake of a village or territory.

The foco is not an end in itself, but only a means to create the revolu-

6 No other specification is made by Guevara either in his manual or in his diaries as to what kind of ideology the guerrilla fighters should have. In the Bolivian Diary mention is made a few times of lectures on political matters given by him to the troops, without any further mention of political indoctrination. In an article published in Verde Olivo, October 8, 1960, Guevara pointed out that the Cuban Revolution followed the course of the Marxist theory, without its leaders 'professing or knowing such laws from a theoretical point of view'. In the same article he pointed out how the ideology of the Cuban fighters had been forged during the course of the struggle.




tionary situation. However, because the foco is necessary to speed up the revolutionary process, its survival seems to be at times an end in itself [2: 1]. This is the case particularly in the first stages when the foco is still establishing itself in an area hardly known to the guerrillas and when the

support of the peasants has not been obtained. Other functions of thefoco, such as attacking the enemy, protecting the peasants or implementing agrarian reform will never be undertaken if by these the very existence of the foco is jeopardized.

The social composition of the foco should closely reflect that of the population of the area in which it operates. This means that a high per- centage of the membership should be peasants. The guerrilla band has to use the environment as a powerful ally against an enemy far superior in manpower and equipment. Climbing hills and running through jungles often becomes too hard a task for the city dwellers. Under these circumstances the peasant often qualifies as a better soldier [1: 34]. The peasant class, however, because of its backwardness and isolation cannot provide the leadership of the foco. Students, workers and intellectuals are called for this task, but the peasants will provide the bulk of the liberating army [3].

C. Functions of the Foco

The emergence of a revolutionary foco represents an open challenge both to the legitimacy of the government and to its exclusive right to use force to maintain stability, which in turn tends to generate legitimacy. The challenge to its legitimacy could be easily dismissed if it were not for the open confrontation presented by the small band to the so far un- challenged mechanisms of repression, particularly the armed forces. As the repressive ability of the government decreases, the credibility of the threat to its legitimacy presented by thefoco increases. Consequently the primary function of the foco is to minimize, neutralize and exterminate the ability of the government to curb opposition and maintain stability. The armed forces thus become the primary target of the guerrilla band.

Against an enemy far superior in number and equipment, Guevara recommends the use of constant mobility, constant vigilance and constant wariness [2: 13]. Moral and psychological rather than physical extermina- tion of the enemy is sought in planning ambushes and in selecting tactics and strategies. Only at the end of the war, when the armed forces are entirely demoralized and the foco has grown to the full size of a rebel army, is it possible to enter into regular, large-scale battle [3; 2: 15].

As the credibility of the potential and actual threat of the guerrilla band to the status quo forces increases, the foco begins to operate as an integrative center of attraction. On the one hand police repression against government opposition will grow in the cities to cut off supply and com-



II8 JOSE A. MORENO

munication lines to the rebels, to retaliate against sabotage and/or purely 'to get even' for the government losses in guerrilla ambushes. As tension, fear and lawlessness mount in the urban centers, avenues of redress and accommodation are perceived as entirely closed. Two choices are open for those in the opposition: either to go into exile or to the mountains.7

On the other hand, the peasants of the area where thefoco is in operation, who often in the past were robbed and terrorized by the regular army, begin now to realize that a common cause exists that places them and the guerrillas on the same side.8 At this point the peasants start co- operating with the guerrillas, furnishing them with much needed knowledge of the environment (roads, paths, shortcuts, location of villages, rivers, etc.) and with information about deployment of army troops, ambushes, etc. Essential foodstuffs are also provided by the peasants. Most important of all, the peasants begin to join the guerrilla group, giving thefoco a true local character [5: 72, 81]. Again the regular army retaliates against the peasants for helping the guerrillas by burning their huts and destroying their crops. The behavior of the army, so much in contrast with that of the rebels, further enrages the hatred of the peasants who now begin to seek protection and justice with the rebels.

Thus, by drawing support from the urban and rural population, the foco begins to play an increasing function in the mobilization of the masses against the existing government. The men in the mountains are no longer seen as one of the many groups that make up the opposition. They begin to be seen as a coherent, highly effective group that poses a challenge to the government. They begin to be seen as the vanguard of an armed struggle of the urban and peasant masses against the repressive methods of a government which is illegitimate and unpopular. Guerrilla warfare becomes, according to Guevara, a people's war, a mass struggle, the vanguard of which is the foco [2: 2].

D. The Foco as Vanguard and Center of the Revolution

If the revolutionaryfoco is to succeed in creating the subjective conditions for a revolutionary situation, it is clear that it must coordinate its actions with those of others also opposing the established order. If a small band is to succeed not in a coup d'etat, but in arousing the populace into a mass popular struggle, it is evident that many other groups and organizations

7 It might take months before new recruits from the city start arriving in any significant numbers. Although some city dwellers joined Castro in the first few months after the landing of the Gramma, it was not until March 16, 1957, that the first contingent of some 50 men organized by Frank Pals arrived in the mountains. By this time the attack on the presidential palace had taken place and Pelayo Cuervo, Jose A. Echevarria and others had been brutally assassinated by Batista's forces [5: 62].

8 It is clear from Guevara's writings that fear, mistrust and even betrayal may be expected from some peasants at first. Even at a later stage, when the peasants begin to cooperate with the guerrillas, some might be motivated by a petty-bourgeois ideology [3].




are to be involved in mobilizing support both in urban and rural areas. Such support is essential particularly in the early stages of the formation

of thefoco, during which time its catalytic function is not fully in operation. Because of the relative weakness of the foco in this take-off stage, dependence on city leaders for weapons, logistic support and recruits is greater than at any other time. It would be misleading, however, to inter- pret this dependence as subordination of the foco to the city leaders.

In classical approaches to guerrilla warfare, including those of Mao Tse- tung, Giap and Ho Chi Minh, it is taken for granted that guerrilla war is fought by a group of highly dedicated men, who receive precise orders from the party, whose leadership remains aloof from the battlefront. In other words, the guerrilla band is the vanguard, but is not the center of the revolution. The approach of Guevara is vastly different and seems to be most appropriate for the Latin American context [2: 10-11].9

According to Guevara the guerrilla foco is not only the vanguard but also the political and military center of the revolution. Other political forces of the opposition may gather around this nucleus, but initiative, power of decision making, direction of the struggle, tactics and strategies, will entirely and exclusively depend on the leadership of the foco. The rationale behind this centralization of powers in the hands of the guerrillas is not only tactical but strategic. It is Guevara's assumption that the foco is basically a microcosm of the revolution that is beginning to take place. While for those outside the foco it operates as a catalyst of revolution helping to create the conditions for the mass uprising, for those inside the foco itself it operates as a school of true revolutionists. And in fact, while for others the revolution will not start until the actual seizure of power by the vanguard, for those participating in the life of the foco the revolution has indeed started from the time the foco was constituted. Likewise, as the revolution at a later stage produces the ideology, leadership, tactics and strategies that seem to fit best the revolutionary process at each particular point without accepting orders or directives from outside itself, in the same manner, the foco cannot subordinate itself to the directions of anybody or any group which is outside the center of action. All other urban and rural groups should accept the political and military leadership emanating from the unified command of the foco.10

9 Regis Debray, Revolution in the Revolution? (New York: Grove Press, 1967), pp. 95-9. 10 Regis Debray, op. cit., pp. 95-116, has spelled out in detail the strategic and tactical

reasons for advocating a unified leadership in the Latin American context. The ideological differences between the so-called orthodox Marxists of the old school and th-e new breed of self-made Marxists is emphasized. It is quite clear that such differences in the Marxist camp materialized only after the success of the Cuban Revolution encouraged the emergence of guerrillafocos in several Latin American countries, often without the blessing and sometimes with the opposition of the official Communist parties in such countries. See James Petras, 'Revolutions and Guerrilla Movements in Latin America', in James Petras and M. Zeitlin, Latin America: Reform or Revolution? (New York: Fawcett World Library Publishers, 1968), pp. 329-69.



120 JOSE A. MORENO

II. THE PRACTICE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY FOCO

An attempt will be made in the second part of this paper to put together whatever empirical evidence is available to substantiate Guevara's theory of the foco as the catalyst of a revolutionary situation. Such evidence is collected from Guevara's own writings and speeches, particularly from his diaries of the Cuban and Bolivian campaigns. In both instances Gue- vara describes his personal participation in setting up a revolutionaryfoco and furnishes us with observations about the behavior of the guerrillas, the organization of the group and its relation to the outside world.

As a methodological note I would like to point out that both diaries, particularly the one from Bolivia, could be used as a unique collection of field notes of a keen and highly disciplined observer. The Cuban memoirs were based on field notes taken by Guevara and were published by him some time after the campaign. The Bolivian Diary presents the unedited field notes themselves. Very little work has been done by trained sociologists as participant-observers in revolutionary situations. My own work as participant observer in the 1965 uprising in the Dominican Republic is one of the few studies of this kind.11 Until more research of this kind is conducted, the best sociologists can do is to study the field notes of other participants.

Such observations can provide the sociologist with data for a crude qualitative analysis of the sources of strain and conflict in the group, of the degree of solidarity, morale and ideological commitment required of the individual if he is to participate fully in group life under constant tension. By classifying somewhat more systematically such observations or by gathering information and remarks made by Guevara on events, situations and individuals, an insightful researcher could succeed in build- ing classifications or typologies that could be of great use for further study of such an unconventional topic as guerrilla warfare.

In the following pages I will attempt to show to what extent the experiences collected in Guevara's diaries substantiate the major tenets of the theory of the foco, or to what extent it only helps to understand them. Or perhaps, instead of talking about substantiating theories, I should talk in terms of the extent to which the empirical experiences indicate that Guevara's doctrine was an adequate guide for guerrilla activity as a catalyst for the revolutionary situation.12

I will be using the evidence furnished by Guevara in both diaries to illustrate each of the four points discussed in the first part of this paper. For methodological reasons I will draw from the Cuban Diary first and

11 Jose A. Moreno, Barrios in Arms: Revolution in Santo Domingo (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970).

12 It is true that Guevara talks about 'developing a theory', but he also calls it a 'manual' [1: xxxi, 6] and a 'method' [2].




then from the Bolivian experiment. It seems to me that the Cuban experiment was closer than the Bolivian to what Guevara had in mind as an ideal type of a revolutionary foco going through its natural stages of development. In fact, I believe that the model for the doctrine of the foco was formulated in Guevara's mind, at least in part, upon confrontation with the Cuban experience. I also believe that in the Bolivian experiment Guevara was seeking both the implementation of a doctrine and the veri- fication of some theoretical generalizations.

A. What Kind of Men Made up the Foco

In Cuba, after the fiasco of Alegria de Pio, where the men who landed with Fidel Castro were decimated, those who managed to escape gathered again at the ridge of the Sierra Maestra mountains. By the end of December 1956 there were approximately twenty guerrillas. Soon some peasants began to join the guerrillas and by February 1957, after the first two battles were won, some new recruits arrived from the city of Manzanillo. Although the small group of original combatants seems to have been quite cohesive and enjoyed a high degree of morale, Guevara pointed out that shortly after new recruits arrived the size of the troop had to be cut down, for there was a group of men with very low morale [5: 36-40].

From the start discipline was strictly enforced; three crimes were punishable by death: insubordination, desertion and defeatism [5: 36, 130]. Traitors, informers and bandits were summarily tried and executed [6: 178-84]. Still, in May 1957 Guevara remarked that desertions were not uncommon due to the physical and moral inability of the men to endure the hardships of the guerrilla life. The struggle against the lack of physical, ideological and moral preparation of the men was a daily one; the results were not always encouraging [5: 88].

The Cuban guerrillas evidently saw themselves as social reformers in the implementation of revolutionary justice against some members of the armed forces who had terrorized the peasants [5: 25]. On the other hand, students and professionals of middle-class extraction now living in contact with poverty and deprivation began to feel solidarity with the peasants. A makeshift clinic was set up by Guevara and other technical services were provided by the guerrillas. The middle-class members of the foco, through contact with the peasants, began to see the need for agrarian reform [5: 81].

In Bolivia, the hard core of the foco was made up of some seventeen Cubans that Guevara brought with him. To this group three other men from Peru were added. About another twenty-nine men from Bolivia joined thefoco at one time or other [7: 108-9, 158]. The field notes show remarkable difference between the Cuban and Bolivian groups. The Cubans, most of them veterans of the Cuban struggle, were disciplined,



122 JOSE A. MORENO

highly trained, ideologically motivated, fully aware of the international dimension of the struggle and displayed a high degree of group solidarity [7: 29, 87, 170, 189, 196].13

The recruitment of Bolivians was Guevara's chief concern from the start. After the opposition of the Bolivian Communist party to the guerrillafoco became manifest, the recruitment of new fighters slowed down. The new recruits lacked the training, discipline and morale of the Cubans and often showed antagonism to them [7: 43, 65, 67, 71, 117, 170, 196]. This was to be expected since the Cubans were veterans in guerrilla warfare, while the Bolivians had no previous experience. By the end of August, however, some of the Bolivians had already shown leadership abilities. But a month later some of the best Bolivian fighters were killed. Making the summary of the last month of the life of the foco, Guevara was able to write: 'the morale of the group is quite good and I only have doubts about Willy who might try to desert' [7: 209, 230, 232].

The Bolivian Diary shows dramatically how the first task of the emergingfoco was to train the men into a school of discipline, self control and endurance facing physical and psychological hardships. Hunger, thirst, lack of sleep, physical exhaustion are part of the everyday routine when the guerrillas are not attacking or being chased by the enemy. On at least two occasions Guevara criticized his own lack of self control. Two months before his death he wrote, 'I feel like a human scrap ... and on some occasions I have lost self control' [7: 196, 205-8].

B. Composition and Organization of the Foco

In Cuba approximately twenty men escaped the first attack of Batista's forces after the landing of the Grammna in December 1956. Crescencio Perez, a peasant of the area, helped the men to find the way to the mountains. Fidel Castro occupied his leadership position from the beginning. With the cooperation of Crescencio P6rez and other peasants, communications for logistic support were established with Celia Sanchez, Frank Pais and other leaders in urban centers [5: 20-2]. Less than two months after the landing, the foco began to operate, staging a surprise attack on a tiny outpost of the army at La Plata. This military victory was highly significant as a symbol: it showed the world that the rebels were still alive and it showed the rebels that they could beat the army.

At this time the rebels could not count on the support of the peasants in any large scale. At least half a dozen peasants, however, had joined the rebels and were playing an increasingly important role not only as guides, but also in getting supplies for the group [5: 30, 46-7]. By April 1957,

13 Perhaps the most significant indicator of group solidarity was shown in an incident in which Marcos was severely reprimanded by Guevara for his lack of discipline and warned that he could be expelled from the guerrillas. Marcos replied that he would rather be put to death by a firing squad than be expelled from the group [7: 101].




five months after the landing, Guevara reports that peasants made the mobile vanguard of their column [5: 72-3]. Communications with the cities were established, some city-leaders had come to discuss the situation with Fidel, and finally new city-recruits and ammunition started to arrive from the cities. Two U.S. journalists, Herbert Matthews and Robert Taber, visited the rebels about this time [5: 51, 63, 85]. In May, Fidel reorganized the rebel forces and after discharging those who had not adapted themselves to the new style of life, still had about 125 men [5: 90]. In July, Fidel divided his forces into two columns and Guevara was appointed to lead the second column made up of some 75 men. The two columns enjoyed tactical independence, but were under Fidel's unified command. Soon after that, two more columns were created as offshoots of Fidel's column to widen the operational sphere of the foco. By this time thefoco had emerged from the stage of self-preservation into a new stage of expansion. Guevara characterizes this period as one of balance of power between the government forces and the guerrillas. Both were able to defend their positions, but were not able to make inroads into the other's territory [6: 199].

The social composition of the Bolivian foco was mentioned earlier: 18 Cubans, 29 Bolivians, and 3 Peruvians. Little is known of the social extraction of these men: there were three physicians besides Guevara, two students, some miners, and one Indian of Aymara extraction. There is reason to believe that men such as Chino, Bigote, Coco and Inti Peredo and others were middle class in origin. From the apparent lack of adapta- tion to the physical environment, it seems clear that most of the men, if not all, were from the capital or other cities [7: 207-8, 235, etc.].

The recruitment took place in the first five months. Despite the fact that Mario Monje and the Communist party had clearly refused to cooperate under the leadership of Guevara, a network of contacts with Cuba, Peru, Brazil and Argentina was established to channel support for the foco [7: 53-5, 62, 65, 73, 87]. By the end of the second month, however, Guevara's diary begins to show increasing concern for the lack of participation of Bolivians in the newfoco. At the end of the sixth month, Guevara pointed out ominously that several casualties (and one desertion) had taken place, but not a single new recruit had been incorporated [7: 71, 108, 131].

A serious problem that Guevara had to face in Bolivia, but not in Cuba, stemmed from the heterogeneity of the group that existed in Bolivia. The division between Cubans and Bolivians was rather sharp, and the latter resented from the start the role played by the former in the leadership of thefoco. Guevara used every opportunity to ease tensions and solve conflict, stressing the international character of the struggle, the com- munality of interests and goals and the solidarity of a fight against common



124 JOSE A. MORENO

enemies [7: 43, 53, 61, 68, 85, 117]. There is evidence that Guevara was very fond of some of the Cubans who came with him from Havana. But he was well aware of the need to develop leadership among the Bolivians and gave them every opportunity to use their abilities [7: 71, 127, 166, 209].

Perhaps the most serious blow to Guevara's plan to develop a foco in the Bolivian mountains was the negative response of the peasants to the call to join the struggle. Month after month, in summing up the major points of the period, Guevara painfully realizes the absolute lack of peasant participation. In the last summary before his death, Guevara wrote that the peasants not only did not help, but had become informers for the army [7: 131, 152, 170, 232]. This lack of cooperation contrasts sharply with the generous participation of the Cuban peasants described by Guevara as early as April 1957 [5: 72].

The stage of development reached by the Bolivian foco at the end of the first year of struggle was quite different from that attained by its Cuban counterpart. By the end of the first year the Bolivianfoco had not succeeded in taking off from the stage of training and self preservation. However, if the internal structure of the Bolivian and Cuban focos is compared in terms of cohesion, leadership and morale, no basic difference seems to exist between the two. Despite the frequent criticism Guevara made about lack of discipline, of self control and of ability to endure hardships, he agreed that the group was steadily growing in morale, solidarity and fighting capability [7: 87, 91, 95, 99, 125, 152]. At some point at the end of June, Guevara noted that the morale of the whole group was high: 'all Cubans are excellent fighters and there are only three Bolivians who are still lazy' [7: 170].

C. Functions of the Foco

As mentioned earlier, the attack on the tiny army outpost at La Plata constituted a symbolic victory for Castro's forces in Cuba. Both the illegal government of Batista and the Cuban public had to face the facts: a group of rebels had taken over an army outpost in the mountains. It was an open challenge not only to Batista's claim of legitimacy which nobody recognized, but a threat to his monopoly on the use of force which everybody reluctantly accepted. Four months after the battle at La Plata the first major attack of the rebels took place at the barracks of El Uvero. The meaning of this battle was not purely symbolic since the army lost fourteen men, nineteen were wounded and the other fourteen were captured by the rebels. As a consequence of this attack the army withdrew its forces from a number of outposts that could not easily be protected without major reinforcements [5: 101].

As the repressive ability of Batista's army against the foco decreased, the striking power and range of action of thefoco increased. The credibility




of the threat increased with the opening of a new front, and other groups emerged to challenge the forces of the government: on March 13 a group of university students attacked the presidential palace in an attempt to kill Batista; in May an anti-government expedition landed in Oriente province; in June the Student Directorate started a new front in the Escambray mountains; in September an uprising took place at the Naval Base of Cienfuegos [6: 198]. All these attempts failed to overthrow Batista but succeeded in spreading a generalized belief of dissatisfaction and in giving credit to the foco as the only credible challenge to the forces of the government.

With increased police brutality in the cities and the assassination of civilian leaders, such as those of Pelayo Cuervo and Frank Pais, many turned their hopes toward the guerrilla foco as the best expression of popular struggle against an oppressive government [6: 202]. However, not all recruits arriving in the Sierra Maestra made good guerrilla fighters. In several passages Guevara pointed out that many of the new recruits were slow in adapting themselves to the hardships of guerrilla living, and that some had to be discharged, while still others deserted the guerrilla band. It is also clear, however, that the rebel band kept growing, since, according to Guevara, by early July their number had risen to about 200 men [6: 128, 131, 133]. By this time, he believed, a qualitative change had taken place in the Sierra Maestra and a truly liberated zone began to exist. Government forces had withdrawn from the area, and both peasants and landowners began to recognize the rebel forces as the true government of the region by paying taxes to and obtaining protection from the rebel forces [6: 178-84; 192-5].

In Bolivia, from the seizure of power by General Barrientos in a coup d'etat in November 1964 no serious threat to his stay in office had been posed by any opposition group, apart from the miners' strike of May and September 1965. Barrientos' stern reaction to crush the opposition of the miners was supported by the army and by some leaders of the peasant leagues. U.S. foreign aid in the form of economic loans and military missions to Bolivia seem to have also helped Barrientos' position, if not to legitimize his claim to govern, at least to strengthen his monopoly in the use of force.14

The arrival of Che Guevara in Bolivia in the early days of November 1966 was a well calculated attempt to produce a credible threat to the legitimacy of Barrientos' power and to his monopoly in the use of force. Four months after establishing the guerrillafoco, the first encounter with the army took place. The results were highly favorable to the rebels: seven soldiers dead, fourteen prisoners including two officers, and four wounded. Weapons and ammunition were also captured. From this

14 See the New York Times, June 4, 1965.



126 JOSE A. MORENO

moment the existence of the guerrillafoco was known all over the country through official broadcasts of the government and through clandestine communiques of the rebels under the name of The National Liberation Army of Bolivia [7: 243-7].

There were twelve or fifteen encounters between the army and the guerrillas before the one that took place at the Quebrada del Yuro where Guevara was wounded and taken prisoner. In all these battles, with the exception of one on September 26, the results were quite favorable to the rebels. The army lost from 35 to 40 men; some 25 were wounded and around 40 were made prisoners by the rebels. The losses for the rebels were quantitatively small, although some were qualitatively significant. Before the end of August Guevara had lost only eight men in combat [7: 127, 166, 189, 228]. To these casualties suffered by the small rebel band, one has to add the loss of approximately twelve men who made up the rearguard of the guerrillas and who got stranded from the rest of the group shortly after the first encounter with the army [7: 129, 135, 131]. The rearguard was made up of nearly one-third of the guerrillas, under the command of two Cubans. Despite efforts made by Guevara to find them, contact was never re-established. The guerrilla foco was thus divided prematurely, which considerably weakened its mobility and striking capability. On August 31 the Bolivian army eliminated the rearguard. At the end of every month in summing up the major events of the period in his diary, Guevara always refers dramatically to the failure to establish contact with the rear-

guard as one of the negative factors affecting their plans. To these very sensitive losses, one should finally add the desertion of a few who at different times gave up the fight.15

Putting all these losses together, the guerrilla foco was reduced from 45 men in March to 29 in April, 25 in May, 24 in June, 22 in July, 20 in

August, and 15 in September. When Guevara was ambushed by the army on October 8, there were sixteen men with him, of whom three at least were wounded. Guevara dramatically contrasted the decrease in the number of

fighters with the number of army troops actually engaged in the hunt. Two days before his capture Guevara noted in his diary that two divisions of the army were engaged in the operation with at least 1,800 men hunting the seventeen guerrillas [7: 235, 237].

It was not, however, the loss of men that made the Bolivian foco fail. It was not even the effectiveness of the rangers trained by U.S. instructors. Men were also lost in the Cuban fight, and there is no reason to believe that the Bolivian army was any better than its Cuban counterpart. In

evaluating every month the operations conducted by the army, Guevara 15 Altogether six Bolivians deserted thefoco. None of the deserters, according to notes prior

to their desertion, was a good fighter. Consequently, their loss was more psychological and political than military. However, most of the deserters when captured, furnished the army with accurate information that helped destroy the rebel band [7: 209, 212, 216, 232, 234].



CHE GUEVARA ON GUERRILLA WARFARE I27

pointed out that the Bolivian army was ineffective and utterly incapable. Only in September did he note that the army had improved in efficiency [7: 152, 170, 191, 232]. Daniel James claims that the first rangers trained by the U.S. military mission completed their training around the middle of August. The efficiency of these troops was soon felt in the defeat of the rearguard of thefoco on August 31 and in the battles of September and October that finally crushed the guerrillas [8: 55-6]. There were two other factors that doomed the Bolivian foco to fail: first, the lack of communication and recruitment from the urban centers, and second, the lack of response from the peasants. From April to October in summing up and in evaluating the events of the month, Guevara ominously singled out these two factors as the most important functions the foco was failing to fulfill [7: 131, 152, 170, 232]. Lines of communication with the capital city of La Paz, with Argentina, Cuba and other Latin American countries were cut soon after the first encounter with the army [7: 132]. No logistic support, medicine or ammunition was received by the rebel band in more than six months. Still worse, no one came from the cities to reinforce them. Support in the cities for the emergingfoco never materialized, and Guevara expressed his feelings that if some 50 to 100 could be recruited in the cities, it would not matter if the actual number of combatants was limited to 10 or 25 [7: 170, 191]. The last messages received by Guevara were dated in May and June 1967; promises of reinforcements were made. The reinforcements never arrived [7: 258].

It was quite clear to Guevara that the cooperation of the peasants was necessary if thefoco was to succeed in Bolivia. The question of time was an important one. It would be unrealistic to think that by merely setting up the foco the guerrilla band could count on the unconditional support of the peasants. It was expected that in Bolivia the peasants might react with mistrust at first, but it was hoped that later they would slowly start siding with and giving protection to the rebel band. This second stage was never reached. Every month from April to September, Guevara painfully repeated the same note: 'we have not succeeded in developing peasant support.' In the summary of September, Guevara pointed out that, 'the peasants are not helping us in any way: on the contrary they are becoming informers for the army' [7: 131, 152, 189, 232].

D. The Foco as Vanguard and Center of the Revolution In his Cuban diaries, Guevara points out that as early as February 1957 signs of disagreement were found between the llano-leaders and the guerrillas of the 26 of July Movement [5: 50]. The isolation and lack of communication between the guerrilla fighters and their supporters in the cities led to some strategic and ideological differences which had to be eliminated if thefoco was to operate from the mountains as a true catalyst of a revo-



I28 JOSE A. MORENO

lutionary situation. In order to iron out such differences a meeting was arranged between the guerrillas and the urban leaders, and as a consequence new reinforcements were sent to the mountains [5: 61].

In the early part of 1957 several opposition groups had made serious and dramatic attempts to overthrow Batista. On July 12, Castro published the Manifiesto de la Sierra, in which he advocated the formation of a united front against Batista. In October the most important groups of the opposition met in Miami and drew up a program of action against Batista. Felipe Pazos, former president of the Cuban National Bank, represented the 26 of July Movement at the meeting and signed the so- called Miami Pact. Castro from the mountains soon condemned Pazos for signing such a document without consultation with the leaders and fighters in the Sierra and denounced the document as not acceptable to them.

Out of this dissension between the llano and sierra leaders within the 26 of July Movement, it became apparent that in no circumstance would the former impose their will upon the latter. Indeed a united front and a unified leadership were required to mobilize the masses and to break the structure of the established order. But this unified leadership had to be centered around those men who precisely constituted a credible threat to the dictator. By this time, Fidel Castro and his companions had

spent a full year in the sierras, and Batista's forces had proven entirely unable to eliminate them. Consequently they had the right to lead others into the struggle [6: 211-27].

As the foco consolidated its position, it became the center of attraction for many in the opposition both in the cities and rural areas. When the Pact of Caracas was signed by most opposition leaders on July 20, 1958, the demands of the foco were accepted by all. From this moment it was clear to all that the foco was not only the vanguard of the revolution, but was also its center. When in January 1959 the sierra leaders came down to the cities and refused to accept a military junta or any other form of com-

promise with the government, everybody accepted their leadership. Nobody could have dared, at this point, dispute their right to conduct the revolution the way they wanted.

There are some who still argue that it was not Castro and his guerrilla band who brought about the downfall of Batista.16 They point out that the middle class was alienated, the rich did not feel secure, some generals betrayed Batista, bishops wrote pastoral letters, U.S. embargoes were enforced, the army disintegrated and that the whole political structure

collapsed. In my opinion, all these are manifestations of a revolutionary 16 See among others, Boris Goldenberg, The Cuban Revolution (New York: Frederick A.

Praeger, Pub., 1965), and Theodore Draper, Castroism: Theory and Practice (New York: Frederick Praeger, Pub., 1966), and Theodore Draper, Castro's Revolution: Myths and Realities (New York: Frederick Praeger, Pub., 1962).




situation, which was typical not only of Batista's Cuba, but of many other Latin American countries. By setting up a guerrilla foco, Castro and his men affected the revolutionary situation in two ways: first, they helped accelerate and spread the process of social disintegration of the old structure to the whole system, and second, they made people aware of such a situation. Awareness is only a first step in the process of mobilization for action. When the masses decided to act, they followed the lead of those who had been effectively active. The leaders of thefoco were now to become the leaders of a mass struggle: the revolution was about to start.

As for Bolivia, it is quite possible that long before arriving there Guevara had asked himself how the Communist Party would react to his decision to start a guerrilla foco in Bolivia. He knew only too well that the MR-13 in Guatemala and the FALN in Venezuela had run into serious opposition to their guerrilla activities from the official Communist parties in those countries. He also knew that bringing some Cubans with him to start a war of liberation for Bolivia would certainly produce ill feelings among some Bolivians whose cooperation he needed. He was convinced, on the other hand, of the international character of his mission and that in this continent objective conditions were present that would guarantee the emergence of a revolutionary situation. 'Obviously, in the countries where this condition existed, it would be criminal not to act to seize power' [2: 4].

Although the plan of Guevara had continental ambitions, the struggle had to materialize first on Bolivian soil and with Bolivian help because, according to Guevara and his associates, the country enjoyed the best objective conditions for a revolution and the best geographic location to start a continental struggle [8: 280, 285, 287]. It was therefore essential for Guevara's plan that thefoco be made up of Bolivians fighting for their own national liberation front [7: 247]. Twenty days after the foco was started, Guevara received information that a leader from Peru was planning to send him twenty recruits. Guevara was not pleased with the news because it meant that the foco would become internationalized before contacts could be established with the official Communist Party in Bolivia whose secretary general, Monje, was out of the country. Guevara discussed the matter with the Bolivian members of the foco who seemed to react favorably to the plan. At the end of the first month, Guevara mentioned that his main interest at this point was to increase the number of Bolivians to twenty and showed concern with the reaction of the Com- munist Party to the emergence of the foco [7: 36, 37].

There is little doubt that Guevara foresaw the possibility of conflict between the foco and the Communist Party. He made it clear to the members of the party who had joined the foco that it was up to them to decide whether they would break with the official party line in adopting another course of action. He also made it clear to them that no compromise could

B



130 JOSE A. MORENO

be accepted with regard to the idea of a unified leadership in the revolution [7: 44].

Mario Monje, secretary general of the Communist Party, arrived in the mountains on December 31, 1966, to see Guevara. The discussion between Guevara and Monje soon was centered around the sensitive issue of the leadership of the foco. Monje insisted that as secretary general of the party it was his right and duty to be the leader of the revolution, at least for the time that it would be confined to Bolivian soil. He showed readiness to resign his position in the city and come to lead the guerrillas. Guevara seems to have been ready to compromise in all other issues, but not in the one of a unified leadership under his direction. At this point an

impasse was reached. Monje was allowed to discuss the matter with the members of the party who were in the foco, and none of them sided with him. The next day he left for La Paz. Guevara addressed his followers and emphasized that the foco was willing to cooperate with anybody, but explained that no compromise could be accepted that would jeopardize its leadership [7: 54].

On two more occasions Mario Monje was mentioned in Guevara's field notes. He was blamed for dissuading recruits to join thefoco and for

sending Fidel Castro inaccurate information about the situation. On the last day of January Guevara accused Monje of double-crossing the rebels. The Communist Party, according to Guevara, was now taking up arms

against the foco. He was confident, however, that the very honest and committed would eventually side with him.17 The party was mentioned three other times in Guevara's notes, which show that he was hopeful that a splinter group within the party led by Kolle and 'Paulino' would come to their support. The much needed help of recruits and medical

supplies never arrived [7: 152, 170, 189, 285]. The diary of Pombo, one of Guevara's lieutenants who arrived in

Bolivia late in July 1966 to do the groundwork before Guevara's arrival, furnishes information which helps to explain why the llano leaders, and

particularly the Communist Party, failed to support the emerging foco. The first difficulty encountered by Guevara's associates in preparing the

struggle was the apathy of the Bolivians to any action [8: 261]. Whether this

apathy was a reaction against the Cuban guerrillas who were running things in Bolivia was not indicated in the diary. The notes suggest, however, that these same people were convinced that objective conditions were

present to start the struggle in Bolivia [8: 262, 266, 280]. The second factor was divisionism between factions and leaders who not only disagreed with the Cubans but also among themselves in matters of strategies and

17 In a document found with Guevara's notes and evidently sent to him from La Paz on May 13, mention is made of a declaration published by the Communist Party and signed by Monje and Kolle in which they showed solidarity with the foco [7: 54, 256].



CHE GUEVARA ON GUERRILLA WARFARE 13I

tactics. Divisions existed within the Communist Party (Monje-Zamora- Kolle), between the party and other Marxist groups (Guevara-Sanchez) and even between the Central Committee and the secretary general of the party [8: 260-9]. The third factor to obstruct the creation of a guerrilla foco as the center was ideological. Monje and other communist leaders thought that conditions were ripe for the struggle. The uprising, however, should take the form of a coup d'etat, not of mass popular struggle. Only if this failed should they plan to start guerrilla war [8: 256-7, 263, 265, 267]. Naturally this ideological position was an open negation of Gue- vara's theory of the foco and could never be reconciled with it.

After the all too apparent break with the communists was completed the only hope for mustering support for the foco in the cities were the miners and the students, both groups with a long revolutionary tradition in Bolivia. As the foco became known after its military victories over the army from April to August it was expected that support from such groups would increase. In June 1967 the miners went on strike against the government. Barrientos attributed the strike to Guevara's work, although apparently direct links between him and the miners did not exist [7: 169]. Guevara, however, took the opportunity to write a message to the miners exhorting them to make a common front with the foco by joining the guerrillas [7: 248]. By then, however, Barrientos had sent the army into the mines and some 87 miners had been killed [7: 165].

When a few months later, Loyola, the young teacher who was one of Guevara's contacts in La Paz, was put in jail a number of teachers and students struck to protest the action of the government. Guevara found in the strike signs of solidarity between the teachers and the foco [7: 224]. Although neither this incident, nor that of the miners materialized into any serious threat to the government, thefoco was indeed beginning to function as a catalyst to a revolutionary situation. It had taken much more time than in Cuba where after one year in operation the foco had become the center of the revolution. Guevara and his men knew that wide differences existed between the Cuban and the Bolivian cases [8: 273-4]. They had foreseen the possibility of a prolonged struggle that might take from seven to ten years to achieve final success [8: 263]. It was also Guevara's opinion that their struggle was continental in character and that it would be unrealistic to think of a revolution succeeding in Bolivia alone without at least having a revolution in a coastal country if not in all of Latin America. 'If that doesn't happen', Guevara concluded on the day he arrived, 'this revolution will be smothered' [8: 285].

CONCLUSION

An attempt was made in this paper to compare Guevara's theory of guerrilla warfare against the empirical evidence furnished in his diaries



132 JOSE A. MORENO

to the Cuban and Bolivian campaigns. It was suggested that it would be more appropriate to talk about a doctrine and its application rather than of a theory and its empirical substantiation.

The paper suggests that Guevara was basically in agreement with most theories of revolution that certain objective and subjective preconditions are to be present before a revolutionary situation can emerge. Guevara's special contribution to the theory of revolution is that such conditions can be created by the revolutionaryfoco. To use one of Guevara's favorite analogies, the foco is the midwife of revolution [2: 6]. Posing a credible threat to a government seen as illegitimate is one of the primary functions of the foco. By attacking the army and other mechanisms of repression the foco challenges the efficiency of the government to curb opposition. As the inefficiency of the government increases the opposition forces are polarized toward the foco, which at this point begins to operate like a vanguard and center of the revolution.

In comparing the practice of the foco in the Cuban and the Bolivian campaigns the paper did not find any basic differences between the two in the internal structure and functions of the foco. The same types of men, the same kind of training, the same style of leadership existed in both experiments. Group morale, integration and ideological commitment was high in both experiences. The two focos went through a similar stage of consolidation before they went into action attacking the armed forces. Both in like manner posed a serious threat to the ability of the government to curb opposition. For the first nine months their attacks on the army were highly successful. These successes of bothfocos in establishing themselves and in posing a threat to the government indicate that Guevara's doctrine for guerrilla activity was adequate in both cases.

Sharp differences between the two cases were found in external circumstances, the control of which lay beyond the immediate reach of the foco in the stage of consolidation. There was a negative response of the Bolivian peasants and an apathy or even opposition of the llano leaders toward the emerging foco. By the end of the first year of struggle the Cuban foco had become the vanguard and center of the revolution with full peasant support, and the llano leaders were well aware of the symbolic and actual strength of the sierra leaders and in most cases were ready to follow their lead. By the end of one year in Bolivia, the llano leaders were openly undermining any possibility of cooperation and the peasants had given no support to the foco.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to explain why the foco failed to obtain peasant support. I may suggest some socio-political and economic characteristics which made the Bolivian and Cuban peasants different. In Cuba the foco and the peasants shared the same racial, cultural, and linguistic background. In Bolivia they did not. Second, despite progress




made after 1952, political integration of the peasant in Bolivia was lower than in Cuba. Third, although the Cuban peasant was better off than the Bolivian, he was hungry for land, and the promise of agrarian reform made him side with the rebels [3: 29]. Fourth, many Cuban peasants participated in occupations that made them resemble more an alienated urban proletariat than a traditional peasantry as in Bolivia.18 Although Guevara knew that such differences existed, he was convinced that it would be only a matter of time before the Bolivian peasant would be won over to the rebel cause [7: 18, 189].

It was also Guevara's luck that his troops were mistakenly divided and did not succeed in getting together again, thus offering the armed forces the chance of exterminating them piecemeal. The fact that a U.S. military mission helped train the Bolivian rangers to avoid the success of thefoco is another element that should perhaps be taken into consideration in explaining the failure of the Bolivian foco. Communication lines essential for the life of the foco, especially during its formative period, were cut.

All these elements, however, are external circumstances which do not affect directly the doctrine of thefoco. The facts, however, that the peasants did not respond and the llano leaders did not cooperate pose indeed more serious questions to the doctrine of the foco, which evidently the pro- ponents of the doctrine have to answer if the theoretical value and applica- bility of such doctrine is to be maintained.

REFERENCES

1. Che Guevara o0n Guerrilla Warfare, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1966.

2. 'Guerra de Guerrillas: Un Metodo', Cuba Socialista, Septiembre de 1963 (Ano III, No. 25), 1-17.

3. 'Cuba: Exceptional Case or Vanguard in the Struggle against Colonialism', Verde Olivo, April 9, 1961.

4. 'Notes for the Ideology of the Cuban Revolution', Verde Olivo, October 8, 1960. 5. Relatos de la Guerra Revolutionaria, Buenos Aires: Editora, Nueve 64, 1965. 6. Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War, New York: Monthly Review Press,

1968. 7. El Diario del Che en Bolivia, Mexico City: Siglo XXI Editores, S.A., 1968. 8. The Complete Bolivian Diaries of Che Guevara and Other Captulred Documents,

edited by Daniel James, New York: Stern and Day Pub., 1968. 9. Che Guevara Speaks: Selected Speeches and Writings, edited by George Lavan, New

York: Grove Press, Inc., 1968.

18 M. Zeitlin, Cuban Workers and the Revolution, Princeton University Press, 1967.

