Public Relations Review 31 (2005) 463–470

Challenging accounts:Public relations and a tale of two revolutions

Margalit Toledano∗

Management Communication Department, University of Waikato, Private Bag 3105, Hamilton, New Zealand

Received 31 December 2004; received in revised form 1 June 2005; accepted 15 August 2005

Abstract

This article provides a brief account of public relations, and of those who use its practices, in the Zionist revolution that led tothe formation of the state of Israel. In relating that narrative to aspects of the American Revolution, it explores similarities anddifferences with a threefold aim: (1) to describe the distinctiveness of Israeli public relations development, informed by, but notdetermined by, U.S. accounts; (2) to clarify how different national origins continue to impact on the contemporary profession; and(3) to encourage others to put forward their accounts of their specific histories, and their specific historical actors. In Kuhn’s[Kuhn,T. S. (1962).The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press]classic account of paradigm revolutionsin science, the impetus frequently comes from activities on the margins that conflict with core assumptions. The article’s specificaccount of the formation of Israel, and its intertwining with public relations, adds to the recent growing movement to constructaccounts of other national public relations histories. In contributing to this movement, it also points to how the American experiencecan be reconfigured as part, albeit a massive part, of a profession that is developing differently in different parts of the world.© 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Zionism; Revolutions; National public relations; Democratic communication

1. Textbook histories: globalizing America’s public relations revolution

As even a cursory reading of public relations textbooks and histories reveals, the U.S. is the center. Very recently,different writers in different parts of the world,Van Ruler and Vercic (2004)from Europe,Bentele and Wehmeier(2003)andBentele and Junghanel (2004)from Germany,L’Etang (2004)from Britain, McKie and Munshi (2004)from New Zealand,Sriramesh (2004)from Asia, andSriramesh and Vercic (2003)globally, for example, all lament thefact in varying ways but they all also clearly acknowledge it. The clearest sign is the international currency of the U.S.textbook. Most of the prescribed books used to teach university public relations courses internationally, from Africa,through Europe and the Middle East, to New Zealand, are written by American educators, published by Americanpublishers, and mainly aimed at American undergraduates. It is not, therefore, surprising that they all describe thehistorical origins of the profession relating to American history.

Typically, they focus on early U.S. history.Nevins (1962)describes the publication and promulgation of the FederalistPapers, and the subsequent ratification of the constitution, as “history’s finest public relations job” (p. 10) and his viewis endorsed by the main historian of public relations, ScottCutlip’s (1997) verdict that “Surely this was the most

∗ Tel.: +64 7 839 6212.E-mail address: toledano@waikato.ac.nz.

0363-8111/$ – see front matter © 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.doi:10.1016/j.pubrev.2005.08.004

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important public relations campaign ever done” (p. 18).Lattimore, Baskin, Heiman, Toth, & Van Leuven (2004)discuss the prevalence of publicity techniques during Samuel Adams’ initiation of “what can be called a publicrelations campaign” (p. 22) prior to the American Revolutionary War: “Adams was to the communication dimensionof the Revolutionary War what George Washington was to the military dimension” and “recognized the value of usingsymbols like the Liberty Tree that were easily identifiable and aroused emotions” (p. 22).

Textbooks also often mention the first modest efforts to persuade Europeans to settle in the new land, then thecampaigns to lure their offspring to move westwards across the continent. In describing this stage, one of the manyintroductory public relations textbooks provides an account of the history with “thick description” in terms of itsauthors’ reference to key figures and institutions in U.S. history:

In their efforts to promote land sales in the American West or attract attention for politicians, early publicists didnot hesitate to embellish the truth. Press agents made exaggeration into a high art. The myth of David Crockettwas the creation of the enemies of Andrew Jackson. Matthew St. Clair Clarke, Crockett’s press agent, wasattempting to lure the frontier vote away from Jackson. (Baskin, Arnoff, & Lattimore, 1997, p. 31)

But the challenge for non-Americans is not just the specifics of U.S. history but its assumed universality in terms ofdevelopment. One major event still taken as comparable with today’s principles of public opinion and persuasion, or,in Cutlip’s (1994)words “the beginning of more sophisticated public relations”, is the American Revolution, “whichbrought the struggle for power between the patrician-led patriots and the commercial-propertied Tories” (p. xv). Thenames Samuel Adams, Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, Tom Paine and other political heroes of the revolutionare mentioned in most of these textbooks as communication experts who “understood the importance of public supportand knew intuitively how to arouse and channel it” (Cutlip, Center, & Broom, 2000, p. 103) and they “used pen,platform, pulpit, staged events, symbols, news tips, and political organization in an imaginative, unrelenting way” (p.103). Samuel Adams and the Boston radicals, in particular, are positioned as achieving a propaganda triumph, thoughsome writers prefer the term public relations triumph, in helping persuade the American colonists to revolt againstGreat Britain.

Despite the continuing universal spread of this particular economic, political, and social history to other parts of theworld, many other nations, and their public relations, evolved very differently (see especiallyL’Etang, 2004, for the mostcomprehensive and theoretically informed to date). This article attempts to restore a modest balance by providing onebroad brush, but detailed, account of how public relations helped develop another country very differently over half acentury before nationhood. The comparison is particularly worth making because of one key common feature: the Israelipublic relations experience is similarly rooted in a revolution. Like their American counterparts, the founding fathersof Israel were primarily political leaders rather than public relations practitioners, and they too used communicationcampaigns in a creative way and, in doing so, designed the principles that led the way for communication professionalsin their nation for many years afterwards. However, although it also formed a major force in the nation-building effort,and in the actions of the founding fathers of the state, that Zionist revolution offers significant contrast to the U.S.Many major differences arose from the long pre-history of Israel and this part of the story of Israeli public relationsnot only begins in the 19th century but ends in 1917, 31 years before nationhood.

2. Prelude to a nation: public relations in the Zionist revolution period (1891–1917)

The state of Israel was established in 1948 but the political system, the national identity, and the cultural andeconomic infrastructure preceded the independent state by about 70 years. In order to understand how public relationsevolved in Israel, it is essential to look at the roots planted by the Zionist movement since its start at the 1880s and thenation-building effort that shaped the Israeli value system during the Organized Yishuv period in Palestine (1920–1948),under the British mandate. In a sharp departure from the American experience, the Israeli environment was shapedby the factors that led to the establishment of a Jewish state, 2000 years after the Jewish people were expelled fromancient Israel by the Roman Empire and were dispersed among 70 nations all over the world.

The concept of the return of the Jewish people to Zion has been present throughout the centuries of Jewish survival inthe Diaspora, but the term Zionism, and the associated Zionist political movement, appeared during the later years of the19th century. The emergence of Zionism is best understood against the background of two major events in the historyof European. The first major event was theemancipation and constitutional abolition of discrimination on religiousgrounds, fully achieved by 1869 that followed the French Revolution. The new era opened closed doors and aroused

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hopes for equal status in the new democratic society. One of the results of the emancipation was theassimilation ofsome Jews into non-Jewish culture: “The German JewishHaskala [Enlightenment] led many Jews away from Judaismand it has come in for bitter attacks from both the Orthodox and the latter-day Jewish national movement” (Laqueur,1972, p. 17).

The second major event was the spread of modern anti-Semitism. The revolution of 1848 was accompanied by a freshwave of attacks against Jews all over Europe. Although the Jews were puzzled by these outbreaks of anti-Semitism,they soon realized that assimilation would not work: “The optimism of the early emancipation period had petered outby 1880 as unforeseen tensions and conflicts appeared, causing occasional pessimism and heart searching” (Laqueur,1972, p. 39). The combination of the stressful physical and spiritual situation of the Jewish people in Europe and theemergence of the idea of a modern state promising equal status to all its citizens had shaken the traditional closedJewish society of the mid 18th century. The Jewish press of the 1870s was the forum for vivid discussions that ledkey figures to Zionist conclusions and the quest to change the unbearable situation of the Jewish people by means ofa national liberation movement. The Israeli historian YigalElam (1984)explains the Zionist phenomena as a culturalrevolution: “Zionism was an attempt to suggest a ‘cultural’, even secular infrastructure to Judaism” (p. 17). The keyword was “nationalism” because, in Zionist ideology, “the definition of the Jewish people will be based on the conceptof nation with no affinity to the religion” (Elam, 1984, p. 17).

Elam (1984)explains the Zionist movement as a response not to anti-Semitism, but rather to emancipation andthe threat of assimilation. For him the historical role that the Zionist movement took upon itself was “to turn theemancipation into auto-emancipation, to turn the Haskala into Hebrew Haskala. . .. This was the Zionist message:The Jew is a human being, enlightened, liberated, equal—a whole human being demanding political and culturalsovereignty” (Elam, 1984, p. 23). The revolutionary feature of the Zionist movement, as “a populist uprising againstthe Jewish ‘establishment’ as well as against the conditions imposed upon Jews of all ranks by their host nations”(Elon, 1983, p. 38), is widely recognized as an element that shaped the Israeli culture years later.

3. Foundations (1): political Zionism and Theodor Herzl

The desire for a Jewish state became part of Zionist thought only after the appearance of Dr. Theodor Herzl, andthe political pamphlet he published in 1896 in Vienna,Der Judenstate/The Jewish State. In this pamphlet Herzl, thena well known journalist and play-writer, asserted that the problem of anti-Semitism can be resolved only by a Jewishstate. He envisaged the state in full detail as the only solution to “the Jewish question”. Herzl, who was 36 yearsold at the time he publishedThe Jewish State, was born in Budapest and raised in Vienna in an assimilated Jewishfamily. He received a Doctorate in Law in Vienna and became editor of a prestigious Austrian newspaper. In 1891, hewas appointed correspondent for this paper in Paris. It was only there that he became active in the search for radicalsolutions to the Jewish question.

Herzl first tried to organize wealthy Jews to launch a national fund that would finance the migration of Jews tothe Promised Land. When this failed, he decided to appeal to the general public and published his plan for a Jewishstate. Committed to a political solution, he criticized the “infiltration” of Jews into Palestine as futile unless basedon guaranteed autonomy. In this respect his plan differed radically from earlier Zionist proposals. According to hisdiaries Herzl wrote that infiltration should be stopped and all efforts concentrated upon a charter, the internationallysanctioned acquisition of Palestine: “To achieve this we require diplomatic negotiations. . . and propaganda on thelargest scale” (cited inLaqueur, 1972, p. 95).

From that point on Herzl organized one of the world’s most impressive international public relations campaigns.The campaign helped establish a successful political movement and set up the principles and values that guided theZionist movement’s effort to reach and influence public opinion all over the world. The Zionist campaign was led by asmall radical, ideological group that faced enormous challenges and opposition from Jews, Arabs and the internationalcommunity. In today’s professional terminology its eight major goals would be identified as: (1) to build a message thatmight be acceptable by the majority of the Jewish people, including conservative religious people, and the assimilatorsthat represented huge opposition to Zionism from within; (2) to persuade Jews around the world to support not only theZionist ideology, but also its political plan; (3) to persuade world public opinion and key international decision makersto support Zionist goals; (4) to raise resources for the settlement projects in Palestine; (5) to mobilize the Jewish peopleto immigrate to Palestine and to participate in the nation/state building effort; (6) to present to the world a new imageof the Jewish people; (7) to create a new Israeli culture in the newly revived Hebrew language; and (8) to communicate

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and reach agreement with the Arab population that lived in Palestine and was hostile to the Zionist dream (the one goalthat the Zionist movement failed to recognize and implement).

With his legal and journalistic skills Herzl became a phenomenal diplomat and lobbyist:

The foremost task was of course to create a mass basis, to build up a strong movement. . .. He knew that hewould not succeed in getting a strong following among his own people unless he had some success to show inthe diplomatic field. No one was likely to listen to his message unless there was real hope of obtaining a charterfrom the sultan. And so he hurried from one European capital to another, trying to establish connections withthe mighty of this world, seeking audiences with the sultan and the German emperor, with the Pope and KingVictor Emmanuel, with Joseph Chamberlain and Lord Cromer, with Plehve and Witte—the key figures in tsaristRussia. In between, almost single handed, he organized the first Zionist world congresses, established the centralZionist newspaper (Die Welt), and ran the day to day affairs of the growing movement. He also wrote for hisnewspaper,Die Neue Freie Press—for this, and not the leadership of the Zionist movement, was his pass-key inthe chancelleries of Europe. (Laqueur, 1972, p. 97)

Even as prominent a political scientist as Shlomo Avineri, considers Herzl’s achievements in public relations as hismajor contribution to the Zionist movement. This founding father’s biggest accomplishment was not the ideology orpractical program he developed:

Herzl was the first one to achieve a breakthrough for Zionism in Jewish and world public opinion. He turnedthe quest for a national solution to the plight of the Jewish people from an issue debated at great length andwith profound erudition in provincial Hebrew periodicals read by a handful of Jewish intellectuals in the remotecorners of Russian Pale of Settlement into a subject for world public opinion. (Avineri, 1981, p. 89)

Despite this,Avineri (1981) expresses mixed feeling about Herzl’s activities in public relations, describing hischutzpa in presenting himself as a representative of “A Jewish empire” (p. 90), while having no movement, no organi-zation, no money and no influence. He nevertheless respects what Herzl was able to achieve with his public relationsskills:

All this was the virtuoso performance of a master of public relations, of a person becoming aware of the newpowers-that-be of the twentieth century—public opinion, mass communication, gimmicks whose main signifi-cance is the impact they leave behind, not necessarily their substance. All this explains the over dramatization ofevents, the insistence on talking to people at the very top (Pope, Emperor, Sultan); it explains the theatrics of somuch of Herzl appearances—the top hat, the correct coattails, the white gloves, the ceremonial opening of thefirst Zionist Congress. . . but foe and friends alike had to admit that since Herzl meteoric appearance, Zionismhad begun to move in another sphere; from parochial concern of some Jewish intellectuals it became an issue ofworld politics. (Avineri, 1981, p. 91)

From its inception the Zionist movement put media, public opinion, lobbying, and propaganda very high on itsagenda. Herzl understood the crucial role of public opinion and decision makers and used persuasive tools and politicalinfluence in order to achieve Zionist goals. InThe Jewish State Herzl (1896) even paid considerable attention to whattoday would be called branding, or organizational identity, by, for example, discussing the flag and symbols thatwould most effectively communicate the Zionist vision using an emotional association to Jewish tradition. From thecommunication point of view Herzl was to the Zionist revolution what Samuel Adams was to the American Revolution.Both of them recognized the value of using symbols that were easily identifiable, carried emotive connotations, andinspired ideals in hearts as well as minds because, as Herzl asserted proudly in 1902: “You cannot make those thingsonly with money” (cited inGilbert, 1998, p. 28). By using public relation techniques Herzl made a breakthrough thateventually enabled the establishment of the Jewish state. In doing so he also made public relations central to the Zionistproject:

Public opinion. This was Zionism’s only weapon when it set out to wrest a homeland for the Jewish people fromthe clutches of world history. The Balfour declaration of 1917, The United Nations Resolution of 1947 callingfor the establishment of a Jewish state in part of Mandated Palestine, and other landmarks on the way to Jewishstate have been achieved not through Jewish economic or political power but through the ability of the Zionistmovement to enlist again and again the spiritual resources of highly literate and vocal people, adept at polemics,

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loquacious and oriented towards public debate. These were the weapons wielded by a weak, persecuted, andsmall nation in its struggle against extremely uneven odds. Herzl was the first one to realize their potential andforge them into a public force. Zionism and the state of Israel rely to a large extent on them until this very day.(Avineri, 1981, p. 91)

4. Foundations (2): socialist Zionism and the legitimization of land and propaganda

It would be impossible to understand the intellectual roots of public relations in Israel without considering thestirrings of Nationalism and Socialism in Eastern Europe and the revolutionary climate in Russia between 1880 and1920: “From Russia came Israel’s founding fathers; the Zionist Labor movement was born in Minsk in 1902 and hascontrolled Israel’s politics without intermission from the early 1930 until today” (Elon, 1983, p. 36).Elon (1983)foundtraces of the political and moral climate of Eastern Europe prior to World War I evident everywhere “in politics, socialideology, cuisine, religious behavior, and the key concepts of national identity” (p. 37).

The young generation of Jews born in Russia in the 1880s and 1890s could not stay indifferent to the revolutionaryideas and expected that the Jewish problem would be solved within the framework of the socialist revolution. They alsodid not enjoy the bourgeois lifestyle of Western European Jews, such as Herzl and Weismann, and faced unbearablesurvival conditions. These people, the generation of David Ben Gurion, Israel’s first Prime Minister, Isaac Ben Zvi,Israel’s second President, and others “saw in the Zionism an opportunity for self fulfillment of ideals of universalmeaning. Zionism could materialize an exemplary society that would bring blessing to the world” (Elam, 1984, p. 38).

These young Jews, inspired by Socialism and Zionism, were the pioneers of the 1920s, the immigrants that took apersonal decision to settle in Palestine and establish the social infrastructure for the Jewish state. AsElon (1983)notesthey “became farmers less for practical than for ideological reasons” and “thought little of profits” as “they were tryingto live a theory” (p. 111): “The pioneers believed that nations, like trees, must be “organically” rooted in the soil andthat anti-Semitism was a result of the “unnatural” occupational structure of the Jews in Eastern Europe” (p. 111).Elon(1983)continues with a critical difference between Israel and the U.S.:

Thoseolim [immigrants] who went into agricultural work were called “chalutzim”, literally, “vanguard”, butin the current Hebrew usage charged with ecstasy such as was never associated with the closest English orAmerican equivalent “pioneer”. In America, the “pioneer” ethos stressed individuality, daring, go-gettism. Inmodern Hebrew, “chalutz” connotes above allservice to an abstract idea, to a political movement, and to thecommunity. (pp. 111–2)

Their unique pioneering spirit influenced the development of Israel’s value system and had a crucial effect on thedevelopment of the economy. This manifested in a number of ways including a glorification of working the land that wentagainst the grain of a world developing towards industrialism and urbanization, and in establishing Socialist/Bolshevikconcepts of centralized controlled markets. It also shaped Israeli public relations.

One all too visible result has been authoritarian control over media and the legitimization of propaganda techniques.A fuller account of that development will involve French sociologist JaquesEllul’s (1965) ideas about propaganda.While he acknowledges that the phenomena itself has some general prerequisites,Ellul (1965) categorizes typesof propaganda as distinguishable by the regimes that employ them. InEllul’s (1965) analyses, classical, or direct,propaganda is adequate for moments of crisis when there is a need to move the masses to action in exceptionalcircumstances. He goes on to develop a distinction between this “propaganda of agitation” and “a propaganda ofintegration” (Ellul, 1965, p. 70). Israel offers an excellent case study to illustrate his ideas in action, because the twotypes were used in different historical periods in response to the changing economic, political, and social environment.

5. Foundations (3): Zionist leaders as lobbyists and spokespeople

Actually, promotion of the Zionist idea was a part and parcel of the daily work of all Zionists—not only in theexecutive of the movement, but in every town and village throughout Europe and the U.S. There was no formalcommittee, or department of propaganda, at the first stage. The leaders themselves acted as writers, publicists, diplomats,lobbyists and orators. After the death of Herzl in 1904, a number of them became spokespeople and diplomats.

Chaim Weizmann, the dominant figure after Herzl, was President of the World Zionist Organization for over 20years between 1921 and 1946, and eventually became the first President of the state of Israel (1948–1952). When he

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became active in the Zionist movement he was convinced that Zionist aspirations would be best fulfilled by the Britishand he was the one that paved the way for the Balfour declaration and played a major role in the negotiations overthe mandate. History gives him the credit for being “the main architect of what has been called ‘the greatest act ofdiplomatic statesmanship of the First World War’ ” (Laqueur, 1972, p. 469).

Inside the Jewish camp he became controversial because of his orientation towards Britain, his moderation strategies,and his support for Jewish–Arab cooperation. During the years 1915–1917, without official title or authority, he initiatedand managed the campaign for British support, using intensive lobby work and media relations that eventually convincedthe British to pledge support for the establishment of a Jewish National home in Palestine. His persuasive strategy wasbased on convincing the British that the implementation of the declaration was both in the British interest and a moralnecessity. Weizmann wrote in his memoirs about the use of emotional appeal to the British leadership who “believed inthe Bible, and Zionism represented to them a tradition for which they had enormous respect” (cited inLaqueur, 1972,p. 183).

According toElam (1984), Weizmann built his strategy on British nobility and its moral commitment to solvethe Jewish problem. Weizmann’s personality was a major factor in his success: “He was, as Robert Weltsch wrote(and as Weizmann’s critics reluctantly admitted) the only Zionist leader who could meet British ministers on an equalfooting” (Laqueur, 1972, p. 471). Moreover,Laqueur (1972)also notes that a “non-Jewish observer once wrote that hispersuasiveness was irresistible” (p. 471), that he “was always more successful with the Jewish masses. . . than with hisown colleges among the Zionist leadership” (p. 471), and cites Isaiah Berlin’s view that Weizmann’s “genius largelyconsisted in making articulate and finding avenues for the realization of these aspirations and longings” (p. 471).

Insight into fundamental aspects of later Israeli public relations values can be drawn fromLaqueur’s (1972) narrativeabout mobilizing Jewish public opinion in support of the Balfour declaration: “During the summer of 1917 there wasa palpable change in the political climate, reflected inter alia in the friendly comments ofThe Times on the idea of aJewish national home” (p. 193). As a result an anti-Zionist Committee of Anglo Jews published a signed letter thatappeared inThe Times May 24, 1917, under the heading “Palestine and Zionism—views of Anglo-Jewry”:

They reiterated their protest against the Zionist theory of homeless nationality, which, if generally accepted,would have the effect everywhere of stamping Jews as strangers in their native lands. . .. The opening of thepress campaign backfired. The fact that the Conjoint Committee had thought it right to air an internal Jewishquarrel inThe Times made a bad impression in the community. . .. Less than a month later the Board of Deputiespassed a vote of no-confidence in the Conjoint Committee. This resulted in the resignation of the president ofthe board, and in September 1917, in the dissolution of the committee. (Laqueur, 1972, p. 194)

Laqueur’s (1972)analysis illustrates the low level of tolerance for dissident ideas, the belief that Jews should standunited, and should never criticize, especially when Zionism might be considered questionable in the realm of inter-national public opinion. In contrast to the values of the American Constitution, written by pioneering communicationexperts stressing democratic sensitivities to other opinions, the Zionist movement gave preference to the value of unity.That preference prevails in Israeli communication value system to this day.

Nachum Sokolow played a major role as political leader, diplomat, editor, writer, and propagandist promotingZionism and was the “most prolific and influential writer” (Laqueur, 1972, p. 149) of the Zionist movement. In 1914Sokolow wrote the editorial for the first issue of the Hebrew language journal,Kol Hamevaser, which aimed “topromote the aspirations of east European Jewry towards national freedom and autonomy” (Laqueur, 1972, p. 173).Kouts (1998)describes Sokolow’s contribution to Israeli communication concepts in an article entitled “Zionism andthe Jewish press: Between Propaganda and ‘Objective Journalism’ ”.

According toKouts (1998), Sokolow did not make any distinction between his role as journalist and as leader ofthe movement. Following the inspiration of Herzl, he saw the media, in line with the status accorded to the writtenword in Jewish tradition (seeKouts, 1993), as a tool for the achievement of the Zionist goal. Sokolow appreciatedthe power of public opinion, wrote a syllabus for “guided journalism” (cited inKouts, 1998, p. 99), and felt mediashould be enlisted for the purpose of persuasion: “Sokolow demonstrated his essential role in the movement as aprofessional in the area of information propaganda, in Hebrew–Hasbara (explanation)” (p. 103).Kouts (1998)citesSokolow’s writings from the 1930s to show how, for him, the press was an adequate tool for achieving the purpose:“All of my observations here have taught me that we can only act here and now through the press; nowhere else doesthe press have such an influence on public opinion, and Zionism can only hope for a better future through this channel”(pp. 103–104).

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Later Sokolow was to recognize the importance of public meetings as well and published “several ‘guides’ forthe Zionistmasbir [explainer]” (p. 104). According toKouts (1998), Sokolow published an editorial proclaiming thatHatzfira would not serve any party because “our nation is poor and cannot allow itself such a luxury, that strong andrich nations can afford themselves. The truth is that we are all members in one party, that of the national revival inour homeland” (p. 104). After stating the objective of unity as the goal for a Zionist newspaper he accused the cheapnewspapers of publishing lies and exaggerations from all kinds of sources.

Kouts’ (1998)research demonstrates how the Zionist print media, and other channels of communication, served astools for enlisting, and mobilizing, public opinion amongst Jews and non-Jews. The Jewish press was expected to actwith responsibility and be constructive. Later on, within the context of the struggle against Arab propaganda and theBritish oppression, that idea of responsible journalism as uncritical, developed and was mixed with Jewish traditionof denunciation of “informers”, those that put the Jewish community at risk when publishing internal disputes of apersecuted people. The traces of this concept are still dominant in many of the current Israeli organizations, especiallyin those responsible for information services [Hasbara] abroad.

Zeev Jabotinsky, the colorful, flamboyant provocative leader of the opposition, was, like so many other Zionistleaders, a poet, writer and journalist. His communication skills were exceptional. He understood the necessity of amass movement and therefore the need to address the masses with simple attractive ideas: “Like Herzl, Jabotinskysensed that the masses of east European Jewry, downtrodden and persecuted, needed a message to sustain their faith.Hence his insistence on national symbols and heraldry” (Laqueur, 1972, p. 380).

Laqueur’s (1972)description of the relationship between Jabotinsky and the Zionist leaders, in 1934, illustratesthe environment that affected public relations development in Israel years later. As part of his nationalist theory,Jabotinsky made discipline a major element of his own Zionist youth movement,Betar, and insisted on the nation’sinternal unity—the monistic principle (had ness). Citing Jabotinsky’s article from 1934, Avineri makes the case forJabotinsky arguing that discipline is what holds the nation together:

Betar is structured around the principle of discipline. . . the opponents ofBetar maintain that this does not accordwith the dignity of free man and it entails becoming a machine. I suggest not to be ashamed and respond withpride: Yes, a machine. Because it is the highest achievement of a multitude of free human beings to be able toact together with the absolute precision of a machine. (Avineri, 1981, p. 172)

This principle of “united we stand”, supported by many sections of Zionism, continues to influence the Israelicommunication system, especially in its intolerance towards internal dissident ideas and criticism.

Many other leaders acted as promoters and propagandists of Zionism in all kinds of roles and with deep com-mitment to the Zionist ideology. This article argues that the communication values of the Zionism founders helpexplain how public opinion shapers acted in Israel for many years later. Those values can be summarized as: (1)legitimization for the heavy use of “propaganda of agitation” (Ellul, 1965, p. 70) that was appropriate for the pur-pose of a revolutionary movement; (2) the approach to journalism as tool at the service of Zionist goals; and (3)the intolerance for dissident ideas, denunciation of “informers”, and belief in the priority of unity of the Jewishpeople.

This historical background differs from the American Revolution in a basic way. The American founders usedpropaganda during their revolution just as the Zionists used it for the sake of their revolution. Yet, American communi-cation experts can be credited with developing a different point of view in their involvement with the Constitution. Theessential difference is captured inSeitel’s (2001)citation from, and assessment of, a statement from Harold Barson’sspeech at Utica College of Syracuse University in March 1987:

The creation of the most important document in our nation’s history, the constitution, also owes much to publicrelations. Federalists, who supported the constitution, fought tooth and nail with anti-federalists, who opposed it.Their battle was waged in newspaper articles, pamphlets, and other organs of persuasion in an attempt to influencepublic opinion.. . . Fittingly, the first of those amendments safeguarded, among other things, the practice of publicrelations: “Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercisethereof; or bridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the rights of the people peaceably to assemble, andto petition the government for a redress of grievances”. . .. In other words people were given the right to speakup for what they believed in and the freedom to try to influence the opinions of others. Thus was the practice ofpublic relations ratified. (Seitel, 2001, p. 27)

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Israeli public relations practitioners were not so well served by the public relations legacy of their Zionist foundingfathers. It is probable that, outside the U.S., practitioners in many nations inherited similar, less democracy-friendly,founding values. However, only the development of fuller historical records will provide supporting evidence. Thisarticle ends with the hope that this specific account will add a branch to that future tree, which may not always bea Liberty Tree, of knowledge about how public relations evolved out of, and was shaped by, different value systemsacross the planet.

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