central asian republics: independence and after

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Central Asian republics:Independence and afterAnthony HymanPublished online: 15 Apr 2008.

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The Round Table (1997), 341 (67-79)

CENTRAL ASIANREPUBLICS:

INDEPENDENCE ANDAFTER

ANTHONY HYMAN

The peoples of the five Central Asian republics are in search of their identity andcultural roots after lengthy artificial isolation during the Soviet era. They facedeep-seated social and economic problems in addition to the environmentalthreat of the shrinking of the Aral Sea due to overexploitation of water resourcesfor agriculture during Soviet rule. But the Caspian basin holds one of the largestunexploited sources of oil and is attracting significant international interest.Construction of a pipeline across Afghanistan to the open sea in Pakistanrequires the resolution of the Afghan conflict. Developments in the region haveimplications for China, and the Middle East as well as the West and therepublics' former rulers. Prospects for stability are linked to the republics'economic weaknesses. Conditions are likely to worsen as transition continuesand social tensions could be heightened, while the Islamic revival is exertinggreater influence.

MANY CHANGES have come to Central Asia since independence wasachieved with the Soviet Union's disintegration in 1991. The full implica-

tions of political independence sunk in slowly. The republics of the CIS havegained formal independence, but are finding that substantive political andeconomic independence is much more difficult to achieve. Russia remainscrucial to all these CIS republics, in economic, political and military spheres.

Real independence is bound to take time to achieve. One definition of inde-pendence is that a country may choose a form of government its neighboursobject to. The sequence of events following the outbreak of a civil war inTajikistan from April 1992 illustrates this very well, with Russia andUzbekistan intervening effectively to back Tajikistan's communist party againstopposition forces. In practice, there are always degrees of dependence and inter-dependence, and here the new states in Central Asia are discovering their weak-nesses rather than new or potential strengths.

This landlocked region of Asia had seen considerable economic developmentunder Soviet rule, but this had always been uneven and lopsided, with heavy

Anthony Hyman is associate editor of Central Asian Survey (London) and has published exten-sively on Afghanistan and on Central Asia. He lives in London.

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CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS: INDEPENDENCE AND AFTER

environmental costs and rather poor infrastructure. However, the past Russiandominance is being steadily diluted by agreements with many new economicpartners drawn from the West and Asia as well as neighbours. What is increas-ingly clear is that the long artificially imposed isolation of this region hasended, and that its peoples are in search of their identity and cultural roots.There has been progress recently towards regional cooperation, though verylimited so far in tackling the worsening crisis over water, due to overexploita-tion of the Aral Sea. There remain persistent rivalries between states of theregion, as well as marked differences of policy and approach.1

The key political issues of contemporary Central Asia are closely linked to itspressing social and economic problems. The five republics of this largely desertregion have a total population of some 50 million, most of them young, needingjobs, food, housing and education. The region does arguably have a geo-graphical unity, as well as close cultural and historical bonds between theirpeoples. From a geographical perspective, a key source of regional unity is acommon dependence upon the two river systems, the Amu Darya and Sirdarya.

Soviet misuse and reckless overexploitation of water resources for cotton andrice crops wastefully diverted by poorly constructed canals has caused thesteady shrinkage of the Aral Sea. This abuse of scarce water resources is moststriking in the case of Turkmenistan, which ranks as the most extravagantconsumer of water in the world, with per capita usage of 6216 m3 annually.Even taken as one region, the Central Asian republics have had a rate of waterconsumption in recent decades considerably higher than that of the USA, noto-riously profligate with water.2 It is producing an ecological disaster affectingmillions of people. No solution of the Aral Sea disaster is conceivable unlessthe governments and agricultural concerns of the Central Asian republics agreeto reduce sharply their water use and keep to strict allocations of water.

The five republics differ greatly in resources and potential. The four CentralAsian republics of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstanaccount together for 1.3 million km2 (500 000 miles2). Kazakhstan dwarfs themin area at 2.7 million km2, being twice the size of the four combined and aslarge as India, but has only 18 million people.

It is for sound economic reasons as well as political and geostrategic reasonsthat an international contest for influence is going on. Uzbekistan with its 24million people and rich natural resources has the clear potential to dominate theregion. Together with Kazakhstan, it is having most success in attracting inter-national investment and badly needed Western expertise. There are many diffi-culties and dire ecological problems, but the region as a whole has valuablenatural resources in natural gas, oil, gold, cotton and rare minerals to offer.

Turkmenistan's economy is in serious difficulties. In spite of Turkmenistan'sabundant gas reserves, it looks increasingly as if the grandiose vision of itspresident to create another Kuwait on the Caspian Sea is more of a mirage thanreality. Any financial benefits from its gas must rely on getting the gas to worldmarkets, and hard-currency exports via the Russian Federation are currentlyminimal. The economic hardships of Turkmenistan are also in part due toiheodd economic priorities of its government.3

The viability of some of these republics can clearly be questioned. Of thefive, Tajikistan is clearly weakest, with the brutal civil war from 1992 exposing

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the fragility of this artificial republic which emerged in 1929, created fromdiverse ethnic and territorial elements in the name of Persian-speaking Tajiks.Its one large industrial undertaking, a giant aluminium smelter, was closeddown in 1996 because it had no economic potential to survive in the radicallyaltered conditions in the post-Soviet era. Like Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan is alsosmall in population (estimated at some 5.5 and 4.5 million respectively), andremote in geographic location, with a weak economic base. However,Kyrgyzstan is receiving considerable international loans and aid.

For all these landlocked states of former-Soviet Central Asia, where every-thing used to run through Moscow, developing alternative communications isessential if they are to exploit the opportunities offered by independence.International air services and telephone links are going forward rapidly. Thefirst of the Central Asian republics to succeed in establishing an internationalairline was, predictably, Uzbekistan.

It had some crucial advantages over its neighbours and rivals. Tashkent wassince long the regional centre of operations for Aeroflot. Uzbekistan Airwayscame into being after the giant Aeroflot group was split up, and it was quick tobuy Airbus planes, more prestigious than Ilyushin and other Soviet planes on itsnew international routes to London and a rapidly evolving network of destina-tions to Asia and the West. High-priced fares and a cargo element from London(and later other West European cities) to Tashkent, combined with muchcheaper fares for onward routes from Tashkent to South Asian destinationsKarachi and New Delhi provide a regular flow of passengers. The volume of airtraffic carried meant that unlike some of its competitors, Uzbekistan Airwayshas been able to make healthy profits.

Uzbekistan: an emerging power centre in Central Asia

Uzbekistan's natural resources are considerable and it is a major world exporterof raw cotton and gold. But it is for other reasons than Uzbekistan's economicpotential alone that relations have improved so radically since 1994 with theUSA. President Islam Karimov's official visit to the USA in June 1996 markeda remakable turnaround in relations between the two governments.

The fact is, former US preoccupation over the Karimov government's poorrecord on civil liberties and human rights issues has been steadily replaced by afuller appreciation in Washington of the regime's apparent stability along withUzbekistan's geopolitical importance in the wider region. It can help resolvetwo danger spots in the form of civil wars going on in Afghanistan andTajikistan. The anarchy and lack of any government in these borderlands hascertainly contributed to the growth in production and smuggling of opium andheroin to the USA and other Western countries.

Another basic reason why the Americans are showing greater respect andmuch greater sympathy now for the preoccupations of Uzbekistan's strongmanis that to a large extent they mirror those of the Clinton administration in theregion. Karimov has repeatedly voiced concern over political activities of Iranin Central Asia, claiming that Iran is attempting to encourage Islamic funda-mentalism and backing terrorism in the region to threaten stability in what arecurrently all secular republics.

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Karimov has also refused to join any Russian-led Eurasian grouping—unlikeKazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan—urging that as newly independent states theformer Soviet republics should be wary of Russia. Unlike the smaller, poorerrepublics of Central Asia, Uzbekistan is building up its own army, instead ofrelying totally on defence provided by the Russian Federation's armed forces.

US companies are now catching up fast with those from Western Europe,South Korea and other countries in making large investments. In WashingtonKarimov signed four large new investment deals—with the gas corporationEnron, Texaco, Bank of America and Boeing, for a total value of over$3 billion. In addition, Newmont Mining, already active in the large Zerafshangold project, is joining forces with Mitsui Mining and Smelting of Japan in asecond joint venture in Uzbekistan's goldmining sector.

The politics of oil

The prospects for oil production and export from the Caspian basin, one of thelargest unexploited sources of oil in the world, are of obvious US interest. Arecent study by Rosemarie Forsythe gives lucid analysis of the politics of oil inthis region which takes in Azerbaijan as well as Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan andother Central Asian states. One of the major goals for US policy is to lendsupport for US oil companies' commercial involvement in oil diversification ofworld oil supplies. Another goal is to promote, directly or indirectly, thebuilding of multiple routes for future pipelines. There are many internationalplayers in the oil and gas issues opened up since independence: Forsythe cites14 interested states (the USA, the UK, France, Italy, Norway, Saudi Arabia,Russia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistanand Oman),4 and this list is by no means comprehensive. A pipeline to WesternEuropean markets may yet be built across Russia and/or Turkey. Meanwhileother routes south are being lobbied for.

Iran has completed a railway linking Turkmenistan (and other republics) toits own railway system, and tried hard to negotiate terms for Iran providing themain route for Caspian gas and oil pipelines as well as bulk trade for CentralAsia from the Persian Gulf. For the landlocked Central Asian states, either Iranor Afghanistan forms a natural landbridge south through to Pakistan and portson the Arabian Sea. With huge deposits of both gas and oil in the Caspianregion and Central Asia, there is increasing interest by international gas and oilcompanies to explore the viability of routing new pipelines south across terri-tory of Afghanistan to reach world markets. An alternative route south wouldgo through Iran to the Persian Gulf, but the US government is determined toblock this route, as part of its policy to isolate Iran. Since neither Iran, norcertainly any of the new states of Central Asia have access to the necessaryfinance for constructing pipelines, this looks certain to depend ultimately onWestern oil companies and financial institutions.

During the past year negotiations went forward for a pipeline scheme acrossAfghan territories involving Unocal of USA and Delta Oil of Saudi Arabia,together with Gazprom of Russia. The projected total cost of the project is$3 billion, with a possible extension of the gas pipeline to India, budgeted at$2 billion. This is not the first or only pipeline project proposed across

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Afghanistan. Back in 1993, Turkmenistan and Pakistan's state-owned OGDC(Oil and Gas Development Corporation) decided to carry out a feasibility studyfor twin gas and oil pipelines, with an input by Bridas of Argentina.5

The question of political stability in Afghanistan has an obvious relevance tothe viability of pipeline projects obtaining the largescale finance required. Thepotential cash benefits of future transit revenues of gas and oil from Turk-menistan and Central Asia could even give an incentive for peace instead ofmore fighting between rival warlords. What the Kabul government of PresidentRabbani feared was that foreign gas and oil companies would strike separatedeals with two regional powers in control of key strategic regions of northernand western Afghanistan, the Taliban and Jonbesh of General Rashid Dostom.An end to the civil war would remove a major obstacle in the way of raisinginternational finance for the project.

Western investment and other links have expanded with all five republics,slowly but steadily. Companies from the USA, Germany, France, Britain, Italyand other Western states have made growing investments which in sum have aconsiderable impact upon the economies at this difficult period of transition.Their help in diversifying the economies, modernizing and expanding certainkey sectors and reducing Central Asia's heavy dependence upon Russia is vitalif the transition to a market economy is to succeed.

Another aspect of Western relations is bilateral aid. It is easy to be cynical,argues S. Frederick Starr of the Aspen Institute, about US aid (and Western aidin general) to the fledgling independent sector in the FSU. 'Far too much of thataid—estimates range up to 90 per cent—has ended up in the pockets ofAmerican and European organizations rather than of the Russian (and CIS)groups they purport to champion' .6 Some of the USAID projects, whether indevelopment or in the area of civil society are excellent, while others may belargely irrelevant or poorly planned and poorly taught. In the final analysis,argues Starr, it is the close personal links and the goodwill forged betweenactivists in the USA and those in the various republics which will be moreenduring than mere financial support.

This viewpoint has much to recommend it in the specific context of CentralAsia. US-aided programmes to date, especially in the fields of civil liberties andhuman rights, have been far more ambitious (and usually judged by profes-sionals more competently managed) than those offered under the framework ofthe European Union Tacis programme operating in the southern republics.

Russia and Russians in Central Asia

Eurasia is the term chosen as a synonym for the FSU (Former Soviet Union),yet a basic distinction between the Western and Southern 'newly independentstates' is often maintained. The Western states (ie Ukraine, Belarus, Moldovaand the three Baltic states) are often contrasted with the Southern bloc, ie theeight republics of Transcaucaus and Central Asia. Whether these eight statesactually form in a meaningful geopolitical sense one grouping is actually verydebatable.

The rewriting of history from a nationalist standpoint is popular throughoutthe FSU, in each of the Muslim-majority southern republics as in Russia,

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Ukraine and the Baltic republics. Yet a basic difference between the socialprocesses going on in the western republics and those in Central Asia is plau-sibly explained in terms of the latter's more traditional social structure:

the halfhearted efforts to promote glasnost in most of Central Asia has notled to the kind of no-holds-barred debate that has occurred in most otherparts of the former Soviet Union ... part of the explanation for thedifferent public response probably lies in the lower receptivity of theCentral Asians to nationalist appeals based on historical memory.7

It is the pragmatic pursuit of political stability, rather than any ideological goalsas such, which are the goal of the various leaders of the Central Asian republics.The legacy of past authoritarian practices and attitudes have to be reckonedwith. The upheaval now taking place in Eurasia will continue for many years,and all of these new states are experiencing economic pressures and socialtransformation that has historically taken decades. Not all the successor stateswill be successful in the transition to democracy and a market economy, and afew may not even attempt this transformation. In this ongoing process, a greatdeal will continue to depend on Russia.

The existence of a Russian diaspora, with 25 million co-nationals or ethnickinsmen living outside the core nation's territories in former Soviet lands, is acrucial factor for future bilateral relations between Russia and all the 14successor republics. It is the peculiar conjunction of Russia's great residualmilitary power combined with the resurgence of Russian ultra-nationalismwhich makes many analysts focus on the Russian diaspora communities' pres-ence in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan together with Ukraine of the former Sovietrepublics. -^

Many analysts argue that if Russia achieves substantial success with demo-cratic reforms, then the future pattern of relations between the successor statesand their 'Big Brother' Russia is likely to prove more stable and peaceful. Inthe final analysis, though, there can be no firm guarantees against the adoptionof a policy of 'rescuing' fellow Russians from oppressive regimes in the varioussuccessor states, and effectively restoring the old Soviet empire.

The Russian diaspora numbers some 9.5 million living mainly in Kazakhstanand three other republics of Central Asia. Their social position varies a greatdeal. Whatever else it was, this was not a simple colonial relationship ofmasters and subjects. One of the key advantages enjoyed by Russians outsideRussia was neither material nor political, but psychological, 'the intangiblesense of security stemming from the feeling of belonging to the Union-widedominant nation'.8 With the crash of the Soviet Union in 1991, this sense ofsecurity vanished, and its absence is still felt acutely.

The numerical size and concentration of these communities varies a greatdeal, along with their members' skills. Taken as a whole, Russians form thesecond largest nationality in this region with a total population of some 50million, after the Uzbeks. The size of the Russian diaspora is difficult to esti-mate, partly because of population movements between the republics or out ofthem, but also because many Russian-speakers of Ukrainian, Tatar and otherSoviet nationalities have become fully or partly assimilated as Russians overgenerations.

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All the five republics have other ethnic minorities besides Russians, espe-cially from the nationalities of their respective neighbour republics, often settledin compact enclaves close to the borders: Kyrgyzstan, for example, has a largeUzbek minority in Osh region of the Fergana valley, while Uzbekistan has largeminorities of Tajiks, Kazakhs, Karakalpaks etc. They are best-viewed as multi-national states.

The capitals and cities of Central Asia have large communities of KazanTatars, descended from Turkic emigrants from the Volga region of Tatarstan.Though intermarriage and assimilation of Tatars has been common, notably inUzbekistan, Tatars still form a well-placed but alien community in CentralAsia. Central Asia's many minorities include the 'deported peoples', entirenationalities of the USSR deported under Stalin to labour camps in Kazakhstanor Uzbekistan, notably Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans, Greeks, andMeskhetian Turks.

It is the example of Tajikistan with its brutal, destructive civil war whichethnic Russians living in other republics are desperate to avoid. All thoseRussian-speakers (as well as Uzbeks and other endangered residents ofDushanbe and other towns) who could flee Tajikistan have already done so.Between 1989 and 1994, the size of the Russian population came down from560 000 to less than 80 000, a tiny minority. The lesson of state-breakdownfrom Tajikistan makes Central Asia's Russians more willing to accept therestricted civil liberties on offer as the price of political stability. Most of theRussians, and many of those non-Tajik residents who could get out have quitTajikistan for other republics.

It is the conclusion of a recent study by Paul Kolstoe of Russian diasporacommunities that minority protection within a nation-state should be definedpolitically, not ethnically. It is individual human rights granted which will countin the long-term, argues Kolstoe:

The optimal solution for most members of the Russian diaspora seems tobe their adoption of a political identity as citizens of the successor statesand their retention of a cultural identity as Russians ... in all politicalmatters the Russians, like any other national minority, should be treated asfully-fledged citizens with all the consequent rights and obligations.9

In Kyrgyzstan, the outcome of the democratization process and the 'nationalrenaissance' of the Kyrgyz nation has brought in its wake a growing polariza-tion of political life along ethnic lines, and a marginalization of Russians, whoform about 24 per cent of the republic's population. One of the main reasonswhy many Russians in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and other Asian republics ofthe FSU do not apparently regret the absence of democracy there is thatRussians fear the repetition of events in Kyrgyzstan in their own republics:'From an each-man-for-himself democracy in an ethnically polarized societydevoid of any minority guarantees they have nothing to gain', writes Kolstoe.They may well be correct in their negative assessment.

For the future, because of the fragile balance between Russians and Kazakhs,concentrated moreover in north and southern regions, it is the situation inKazakhstan which is most sensitive and potentially explosive. The clear inten-tion of the Nazarbaev government is to keep a virtual Kazakh monopoly of

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political power, and to extend Kazakh business interests, while at the same timenot alienating the Russians. Kazakhstan's border with Russia stretches7000 km, and is settled mainly by Russians, some of whose local organizationshave separatist goals, preferring to join with the Russian Federation.10

There are more than a few parallels here of the early stages of Malaysia'sbumiputra policy favouring Malays under the nationalist Prime MinisterMohammad Mahathir. In Malaysia a large powerful community of overseasChinese (with 35 per cent of the total population, compared with Russians at 37per cent in Kazakhstan) has been blatantly discriminated against under a systemdesigned to favour Malays. If the parallel is proven correct, it will hardly satisfythe Russian element, and friction will grow.

In Uzbekistan, with the second largest Russian community in Central Asia(now under 2 million) the government has more leeway. Karimov and Yeltsinsigned a pledge to guarantee rights of ethnic minorities in their republics duringKarimov's visit to Moscow in March 1994. However, Uzbekistan has refused togrant the right to dual nationality requested by Russia. Their talks resulted in astated intention to co-ordinate more closely economic policies in tax, currenciesand customs, as well as to move gradually towards free movement of goods,services, capital and labour between Uzbekistan and Russia. Karimov went onto declare,

Russia should be a guarantor of peace and stability in Central Asia. ...There will always be two poles in the world, and we in Uzbekistan arekeeping closer to Russia's pole."

China and XinjiangThe new Central Asian states bordering China all have worries about Chineseintentions. Three of the five have common borders with Xinjiang, and they arenaturally most concerned about China's massive military power and its nuclearcapability and testing sites close to their own borders. There is also the issue ofhistorical Chinese territorial claims on Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.The position of Kazakhstan is seen by most observers as most delicate becauseof the existence of Uighur political irredentism as an upsetting factor, andsteady Chinese immigration into Kazakhstan. However, bilateral relations havegone smoothly at a state level since 1991.

Xinjiang has important natural resources and one-sixth of China's total areabut only 1.2 per cent of its population. Of these, Han Chinese have risen from 8per cent in 1946 to 38 per cent (more by some estimates) in 1990. Attempts bythe regime since the early 1980s to make amends for earlier discrimination andharsh treatment have not been very successful. Xinjiang's economic backward-ness and lack of central investment have also contributed to a sense of griev-ance among Uighurs, Kazakhs and other Muslim peoples in Xinjiang, whichused to be known as 'Eastern Turkestan', a reminder, if needed, that in culture,history and ethnic roots this desert region shares much with former SovietTurkestan.

Alternative trading opportunities have been actively sought by entrepreneursbased in Xinjiang from 1988. They anticipated great benefits from trading with

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a 'Great Islamic Circle', a term which means not only the Central Asianrepublics but also states of the Middle East. Pakistan and India were alsoconsidered potential trading partners of importance. However, it was onlycross-border trade with the republics of Central Asia which rose spectacularly,from estimated $88 million in 1988 to $1 billion in 1991 and double that figurein 1992, after which it fell off. Bilateral trade has been accompanied by con-siderable investment in manufacturing joint ventures from Xinjiang.

In past centuries the Turkic and Muslim peoples of Xinjiang, though often inrebellion and even periodically independent of the Chinese empire, alwaysfound it difficult to maintain alliances against the Chinese central power. Arecent authoritative analysis by Peter Ferdinand of Warwick Universityconcludes that China cannot insulate itself from changes in Central Asia regionas a whole, and that Xinjiang has become too integrated into the Chineseeconomy for its separation from China to be anything but very painful. ButFerdinand predicts that neither China nor Xinjiang are in complete control oftheir own destinies.12

For rather special reasons, Central Asia's policymakers have shown consider-able interest in China. Its combination of strong economic growth together withpolitical stability is exactly that which they are aiming for. However, CentralAsian governments are not following the Chinese model—irrespective of whatthey may believe or claim—when they try to hold on to their old decision-making powers in the cause of stability and gradual change.

According to a recent study by Richard Pomfret,13 the Chinese model doeshave some important lessons to offer on economic development in a labourabundant economy. China's emphasis on agriculture first is a good strategy forgrowth, with increased agricultural output having many beneficial linkageeffects in other sectors too. However, China has much less to offer in experi-ence on transition from central planning, because it has failed basically toreform state enterprises and the financial sector alike.

ECO and regional integration prospects

The Economic Co-operation Organization (ECO) could serve as a usefulgrouping for wider intra-regional cooperation, independently of the CIS. Tenstates are linked in ECO, enlarged in 1992 by the three original members Iran,Turkey and Pakistan to take in the five Central Asian republics, the Trans-caucasian republic of Azerbaijan as well as Afghanistan. Having a total popula-tion of almost three hundred million and a vast area, the ECO countries haveconsiderable economic potential which clearly could be better exploited by theircloser cooperation.

The Asian republics arguably bring certain strengths to ECO, in spite of theirappalling ecological problems. Indeed, in certain areas it is arguably the CentralAsian republics which have the advantage. Educational levels are generallyhigh and literacy is widespread, among women as men. Even though industrial-ization has proceeded very unevenly, in some sectors of heavy industry theyhave a highly skilled workforce, although this remains highly dependent onRussians, Ukrainians, Jews, Volga Germans and other Europeans.

Each of the 10 countries linked were Muslim, or have large Muslim popula-

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tions. Was this, as some claimed, the first stage towards creating an 'IslamicCommon Market' or a contemporary pan-Islamic initiative? ECO looks morelike a loose economic bloc of regional states. None of the governments of theCentral Asian republics—all stridently secular in their public stances—showedany desire for a shared religion to intrude as an important factor in these revivedrelations with neighbours.

In the same way, any political role for ECO has been flatly rejected byKazakhstan and Uzbekistan notably, for example in statements outspokenlycritical of a recent initiative by President Rafsanjani of Iran to make an ECOvenue the occasion for a resolution attacking Israel over its Palestinian policy.

In terms of political influence, Turkey and Iran are keen rivals in CentralAsia as in Transcaucasus. They do represent opposed poles or models of devel-opment. However, the rivalry is less intense than some simplistic press reportshave claimed. Turkey and Iran have shown themselves prepared to cooperate inECO, and it should be remembered that for both Turkey and Iran, the bigeconomic prizes in the CIS remain Russia and Ukraine, rather than the Muslimrepublics.

Iran has had troubled relations with Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan in particular.Their governments still suspect Iran of meddling in the region, and sometimesblame for the origins and continuation alike of the Tajikistan civil war is attrib-uted to Iran. Given Iran's economic problems during the past five years, it ishardly surprising if its geopolitical ambitions have not been accompanied bylarge investments.

The same is not true of Turkey. Turkish credits were offered for a total of$1.2 billion in 1992, immediately after independence, while many privateTurkish companies were investing and trading in the region. The Turkish modelof development was the common reference point for the various regionalgovernments, producing effusive sentiments for Turkey. In the key fields oftelephone communications, infrastructure, transport and technical training,besides general trading, Turkish business interests are extremely active. In areasrequiring large-scale investment, though, and notably in the vital gas and oilsectors, Turkish companies have found it hard or even impossible to compete.Instead, it is the large Western multinationals which are making the running.

By any straightforward comparison with its rival India, Pakistan has madeconsiderable headway in the region. India had many apparent advantagesinitially at least, since before 1991 it already had a significant presence inTashkent, with its consulate and flourishing contacts at many levels. But it is noless true that initial euphoria in Pakistan has been dissipated about the hugepotential for rapid development of business and other relations with the fiverepublics of Central Asia.

Pakistan's main regional focus of interest was Uzbekistan together withTajikistan, before the civil war ruined prospects of bilateral collaboration inTajikistan's energy sector as well as large-scale investments. Pakistan'stroubled relations with Uzbekistan had clearly improved by 1996. Pakistan'sambassador Shafqat Ali Shaikh confirmed to the writer in Tashkent in March1996 (at a Pakistan Day reception unusually well attended by Uzbekistangovernment officials) that he regarded the patient building up of trust inPakistan's government as his main achievement as ambassador.

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If instead of euphoria there is now greater realism shown by Pakistan, on theone hand, and the various republics on the other about areas of collaboration,guided by principles of mutual benefit, this is arguably no bad thing and shouldactually help foster future relations.

Asian investment patterns

Western multinationals have gone for large gold mining ventures (Lonhro andNewmont Mining) and major investments in the tobacco sector (Philips andBritish American Tobacco) in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and oil or naturalgas (Chevron in the giant Tengiz oilfield venture, Amoco, Ramco, BritishPetroleum, Agip, British Gas and other companies, notably Gazprom andLukoil of Russia in consortia arrangements in the Caspian region). NumerousGerman industrial interests have invested in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, led bySiemens and Daimler-Benz.14

Japanese companies have been very cautious in committing themselves tolarge investments in Central Asia. It is South Korea, followed by Malaysiamore recently which are standing out among investors from Asia in Uzbekistan.UzDaewooauto is the name of Daewoo's joint venture started in Andizhan inFergana region in 1992, in the first year of independence. The first vehicle to beassembled, a Damas minibus, was proudly shown off amid glaring mediapublicity in March 1996. It is due to be followed by cars (Tico and Nexiafamily cars) and small lorries (Labo). Planned capacity of the Andizhan plant isfor 200 000 vehicles a year.

With South Korean investment set to rise to a total of $1000 million asexpansion continues, this Daewoo plant represents a major foreign investmentin Uzbekistan's economy, which offers the biggest single market in CentralAsia region, with almost half the total population of the five republics, situatedmoreover in the heart of the region close to other potential markets. Daewoohas adopted the same strategy in Central Europe, where it has built a big carplant in Poland, intended to supply the other smaller markets of the region aswell.

However, another and more intriguing reason for South Korean interest inUzbekistan comes from an accident of history (Stalin's forced deportation ofKoreans from the Far East to Central Asia), and the establishment of a thrivingand entrepreneurial-minded ethnic Korean community living in Uzbekistan.More recently Malaysian and Indonesian business groups have become activein Uzbekistan. The diversity of their operations reflects the rich naturalresources of Uzbekistan and the potential they see there.

Prospects for political stability in the region are closely linked to therepublics' economic weaknesses. The ongoing reorganization or 'transition'will make conditions worse before they get better, and social tensions are boundto grow if costly subsidies on basic goods are withdrawn. Nevertheless, thegovernments have certain strengths, with a largely docile population little inter-ested or experienced in politics, and all exercising tight controls over publishingand media.

The ongoing Islamic revival in Central Asia is certainly to be reckoned with,especially since it has a strong appeal among young people. Muslim activism in

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the towns will surely continue to be stimulated by social problems andeconomic strains. Yet speculation about the potential for Islam becoming politi-cized and emerging as the guiding ideology in place of socialism or nationalismmust take into account observable trends. The revived ideology of pan-Turkismand pan-Islamic ideas alike have failed to find much popular backing amongMuslims of Central Asia, although Turkey, Iran and Pakistan along with otherMuslim states have raised their profile sharply in the region. Their new tradinglinks, joint-investments and varied cultural initiatives will inevitably go torebuild pre-1917 links with the Middle Eastern countries. One sign of this is thegrowing number of embassies established in Tashkent by Arab states.

Notes and references1 See Central Asia and the Caucasus after the Soviet Union. Domestic and

International Dynamics, edited by Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Florida, USA, 1994;Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia: the Calculus of Independence, Current History,USA, October 1995.

2 World Bank Development Report 1995, pp 226-227; and see further, FinalReport, International Conference on Sustainable Development of the Aral SeaBasin, Nukus, Uzbekistan, UNDP, 1996.

3 See Helen Boss, Turkmenistan: Far from Customers who Pay, RIIA/FSSBriefings, London, 1995. An incisive analysis is by John-Anderson, 'Authoritarianpolitical development in Central Asia: the case of Turkmenistan', Central AsianSurvey, Vol 14, No 4, 1995.

4 R. Forsythe, The Politics of Oil in The Caucasus and Central Asia, Adelphi Paper300, IISS/Oxford University Press, 1996.

5 See further R. Forsythe, ibid; and John Roberts, Caspian Pipelines, Royal Instituteof International Affairs, London, 1996.

6 See The Post-Soviet Handbook. A Guide to Grassroots Organizations and InternetResources in the Newly Independent States, by M. Holt Ruffin, Joan McCarter andRichard Upjohn, Center for Civil Society International, Seattle, WA, andUniversity of Washington Press, Seattle, 1996.

7 See Russia and the New States of Eurasia. The Politics of Upheaval, by KarenDawisha and Bruce Parrott, Cambridge University Press, 1995; and PoliticalCulture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, edited byVladimir Tismaneanu, M. E. Sharpe, Armonk, NY, 1995.

8 See Paul Kolstoe, Russians in the Former Soviet Republics, C. Hurst and Co,London, 1995, and Graham Smith, ed, The Nationalities Question in the Post-Soviet States, Longman, London, 1966 (2nd edition).

9 Quoted Paul Kolstoe (1995), p 312; and see further Jeff Chinn and Robert Kaiser,Russians as the New Minority. Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Soviet SuccessorStates, Westview, USA, 1996; and Neil Melvin, Russians Beyond Russia. ThePolitics of National Identity, RIIA, London, 1995.

10 See Ian Bremmer and Cory Welt, 'The trouble with democracy in Kazakhstan',Central Asian Survey, Vol 15, No 2, 1996; and also Adam Dixon, 'Kazakhstan:political reform and economic development', in Roy Allison, ed, RIIA andBrookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1996.

11 See Anthony Hyman, 'Political change in post-Soviet Central Asia', in Challengesfor the Former Soviet South, Roy Allison, ed (1966).

12 P. Ferdinand in China Deconstructs. Politics, Trade and Regionalism, edited byDavid S. G. Goodman and Gerald Segal, Routledge, London, 1994; and see

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further, Justin Jon Rudelson, 'The Uighurs in the future of Central Asia',Nationalities Papers, Vol 22, No 2, 1994.

13 Richard Pomfret, The Economics of Central Asia, Princeton, NJ, 1995.14 A survey is in Michael Kaser and Santosh Mehrotra, 'The Central Asian

economies after independence', in Roy Allison, ed (1996).

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central asian republics: independence and after

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