Caucasus: An Early Symptom of Wider Conflict? By BrigGen (Ret) Dr. Muhammad Aslam Khan Niazi (Makni) The ‘cease-fire’ agreement, after Russian forces unleashed their military might against Georgian troops in South Ossetia for five days, has been signed. The hope sustains that peace would follow, though a fragile one. Caucasus, widely termed as a region of ‘frozen conflicts’ has witnessed a ‘defreeze’ phenomenon of Ossetian dispute in an ugly way. It was not only a short and crisp war between two sovereign states but also the one to cause massive concern among Eurasian as well Euro-Atlantic powers, with clear worry lurking on the horizon that conflict could aggravate as well. After enjoying a short span of seventeen years of independence, Georgia has been served a curt reminder that her borders contiguity factor with Russian Federation would remain under its sharp focus if Georgia did not respect Russia’s strategic interests in the region. The international elite media lavishly projected Russia as an aggressor when Russian military was seen in hot pursuit of the remnants of Georgian forces. However some horrific tales of South Ossetians arriving now depict that Georgia pulled the trigger first and pounded civil population with massive ground and aerial bombing. Russia was quickto grab an opportunity as a sovereign right to protect its peace keepers as well as South Ossetians who claim to be more Russian than Georgian, being neighbour to the Russian territory of North Ossetia. What incentives Georgia had for using strong arms tactics against its own people when peaceful means of diplomacy had not been exhausted yet? A possible answer would lead us to a point that there exists pretty long and complicated tally of political and ethnic turbulence that haunts peace in the post-Soviets space. Woes of Crimean Tartars, Gagauz question in Moldova, Chechnya, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Ajaria, Borchali Azeri and Ahiska Turks relocation in Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Dagestani masses have remained unresolved over decades. Russo-Georgian war has only proved that until the basic issues are approached with sincerity by all the stake holders, stability would be a scarce commodity. In fact Georgia is believed to have got tempted to pull trigger on South Ossetians by employing its nascent NATO trained military forces as it felt emboldened to crush South Ossetians’ resistance after successful liquidation of Ajarian Turks struggle. In other words it was naked display of military muscles and diplomacy was side tracked. To further make the assumption relevant, one needs to peep briefly into history. After ‘Kars Treaty of 1921’ between Soviets Georgia and Turkish Grand National Assembly, Ajaria, as per Article 6 of th e Tre at y was guaranteed an autonomous status and it thus be came Aj ar ia Aut onomous Soviet s Soc ial ist Republi c. Dur ing Georgian civil war of 1992-93, it emerged as an autonomous Muslim’s region under Aslan Abashidze. Georgia crushed the autonomous status of Ajaria by use of force in 2004 when Aslan Abashidze fled to Moscow. Within the internal dynamics of Georgian politics, the crush-Ajaria recipe did work that could now have a parallel with South Ossetia. However Georgia failed to appreciate the international dynamics of politics because in case of Ajaria, the parent power of 1921 vintage was Turkey that has far heavier stakes in Georgia now than to rescue Ajarian T urks but on South Ossetian front it did not work. Instead it proved to be a red rag for Russian military might against Georgia.
