cases on relations

8/13/2019 Cases on Relations

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[G.R. No. 112497. August 4, 1994.]

HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his c!cit" s #$%R$&AR' OF ()#&I%$, Petitioner, *. MA'OR ALFR$DO #.

LIM, +I%$MA'OR (O#$ L. A&I$N-A, %I&' &R$A#)R$R AN&HON' A%$+$DO, #ANGG)NIANG ANGL)N#OD

AND &H$ %I&' OF MANILA, Respondents.

The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local Government Code reading as

follows:chanrob1es virtual 1awlibrary

rocedure !or "pproval "nd #ffectivity $f Ta% $rdinances "nd &evenue 'easures( 'andatory ublic )earings* + The

procedure for approval of local ta% ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this

Code: rovided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof( rovided,

further, That any -uestion on the constitutionality or legality of ta% ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on

appeal within thirty ./0 days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of 2ustice who shall render a decision within

si%ty .30 days from the date of receipt of the appeal: rovided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect

of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the ta%, fee, or charge levied therein:

rovided, finally, That within thirty ./0 days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the si%ty4day period without

the Secretary of 2ustice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court ofcompetent 5urisdiction*

ursuant thereto, the Secretary of 2ustice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a ta%payer, declared

$rdinance 6o* 77, otherwise 9nown as the 'anila &evenue Code, null and void for non4compliance with the

prescribed procedure in the enactment of ta% ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and

public policy* 1

n a petition for certiorarifiled by the City of 'anila, the &egional Trial Court of 'anila revo9ed the Secretary;s

resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural re-uirements had been observed* 'ore

importantly, it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in theSecretary of 2ustice of the power of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy

mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the resident of the hilippines only

the power of supervision over local governments*

The present petition would have us reverse that decision* The Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is

constitutional and that the procedural re-uirements for the enactment of ta% ordinances as specified in the Local

Government Code has indeed not been observed*

arenthetically, this petition was originally dismissed by the Court for non4compliance with Circular 1488, the Solicitor

General having failed to submit a certified true copy of the challenged decision* / )owever, on motion for

reconsideration with the re-uired certified true copy of the decision attached, the petition was reinstated in view of the

importance of the issues raised therein*

vests in the regional trial courts

5urisdiction over all civil cases in which the sub5ect of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, even as the

accused in a criminal action has the right to -uestion in his defense the co institutionality of a law he is charged with

violating and of the proceedings ta9en against him, particularly as they contravene the =ill of &ights* 'oreover, "rticle


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?, Section @.>, of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate 5urisdiction over final 5udgments and orders

of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or e%ecutive

agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in -uestion* chanrobles*com:cralaw:red

n the e%ercise of this 5urisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the

conse-uences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of

separation of powers* "s the -uestioned act is usually the handiwor9 of the legislative or the e%ecutive departments,

or both, it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher 5udgment of this

Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a thorough deliberation by a collegiate body

and with the concurrence of the ma5ority of those who participated in its discussion* @

t is also emphasiAed that every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation before

declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the e%ecutive and the

legislative departments and determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally

approved* To doubt is to sustain* The presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing

that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the re-uipped

ma5ority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must bestruc9 down*chanrobles*com : virtual lawlibrary

n the case before us, 2udge &odolfo C* alattao declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code unconstitutional

insofar as it empowered the Secretary of 2ustice to review ta% ordinances and, inferentially, to annul them* )e cited

the familiar distinction between control and supervision, the first being Bthe power of an officer to alter or modify or

set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the 5udgment of the

former for the latter,B while the second is Bthe power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their

functions is accordance with law*B 3 )is conclusion was that the challenged section gave to the Secretary the power of

control and not of supervision only as vested by the Constitution in the resident of the hilippines* This was, in his

view, a violation not only of "rticle ?, specifically Section thereof, 7 and of Section @ on the ta%ing powers of localgovernments, 8 and the policy of local autonomy in general*


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his own manner for the doing of the act* )e has no 5udgment on this matter e%cept to see to it that the rules are

followed* n the opinion of the Court, Secretary rilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so

performed an act not of control but of mere supervision*

The case of Taule v* Santos cited in the decision has no application here because the 5urisdiction claimed by the

Secretary of Local Governments over election contests in the Datipunan ng 'ga =arangay was held to belong to the

Commission on #lections by constitutional provision* The conflict was over 5urisdiction, not supervision or control* chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local "utonomy "ct, which provided in its Section > as

follows:chanrob1es virtual 1awlibrary

" ta% ordinance shall go into effect on the fifteenth day after its passage, unless the ordinance shall provide

otherwise: rovided, however, That the Secretary of !inance shall have authority to suspend the effectivity of any

ordinance within one hundred and twenty days after receipt by him of a copy thereof, if, in his opinion, the ta% or fee

therein levied or imposed is un5ust, e%cessive, oppressive, or confiscatory, or when it is contrary to declared national

economy policy, and when the said Secretary e%ercises this authority the effectivity of such ordinance shall

suspended, either in part or as a whole, for a period of thirty days within which period the local legislative body mayeither modify the ta% ordinance to meet the ob5ections thereto, or file an appeal with a court of competent

5urisdiction( otherwise, the ta% ordinance or the part or parts thereof declared suspended, shall be considered as

revo9ed* Thereafter, the local legislative body may not reimposed the same ta% or fee until such time as the grounds

for the suspension thereof shall have ceased to e%ist*

That section allowed the Secretary of !inance to suspend the effectivity of a ta% ordinance if, in his opinion, the ta% or

fee levied was un5ust, e%cessive, oppressive or confiscatory* etermination of these flaws would involve the e%ercise

of 5udgment or discretion and not merely an e%amination of whether or not the re-uirements or limitations of the law

had been observed( hence, it would smac9 of control rather than mere supervision* That power was never -uestioned

before this Court but, at any rate, the Secretary of 2ustice is not given the same latitude under Section 187* "ll he ispermitted to do is ascertain the constitutionality or legality of the ta% measure, without the right to declare that, in his

opinion, it is un5ust, e%cessive, oppressive or confiscatory* )e has no discretion on this matter* n fact, Secretary

rilon set aside the 'anila &evenue Code only on two grounds, to wit, the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires

provisions and non4compliance with the prescribed procedure in its enactment* These grounds affected the legality,

not the wisdom or reasonableness of the ta% measure* chanrobles lawlibrary : red

The issue of non4compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the 'anila &evenue Code is another

matter*

n his resolution, Secretary rilon declared that there were no written notices of public hearings on the proposed

'anila &evenue Code that were sent to interested parties as re-uired by "rt* >73.b of the mplementing &ules of the

Local Government Code nor were copies of the proposed ordinance published in three successive issues of a

newspaper of general circulation pursuant to "rt* >73.a* 6o minutes were submitted to show that the obligatory

public hearings had been held* 6either were copies of the measure as approved posted in prominent places in the city

in accordance with Sec* @11.a of the Local Government Code* !inally, the 'anila &evenue Code was not translated

into ilipino or Tagalog and disseminated among the people for their information and guidance, conformably to Sec*

@.b of the Code* chanrobles*com*ph :virtual law library

2udge alattao found otherwise* )e declared that all the procedural re-uirements had been observed in the enactment


4/34

of the 'anila &evenue Code and that the City of 'anila had not been able to prove such compliance before the

Secretary only because he had given it only five days within which to gather and present to him all the evidence

.consisting of >@ e%hibits later submitted to the trial court*

To get to the bottom of his -uestion, the Court acceded to the motion of the respondents and called for the elevation

to it of the said e%hibits* , and E4/* chanrobles*com*ph :virtual lawlibrary

The only e%ceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission does not affect its validity,

considering that its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due

process* t has also not been shown that the te%t of the ordinance has been translated and disseminated, but this

re-uirement applies to the approval of local development plans and public investment programs of the local

government unit and not to ta% ordinances*


5/34

[G.R. No. 9/202. August 0, 1991.]

RODOLFO &. GAN-ON, Petitioner, *. &H$ HONORAL$ %O)R& OF A$AL#, n L)I# &. #AN&O#, in his

c!cit" s th3 #3c3t" o5 th3 D3!t63nt o5 Loc Go*3n63nt, Respondents.

#'LLA)#

1* C$6STTT$6"L L"


6/34

action against local officials* n the case at bar, the Secretary of Local Government, the resident;s alter ego, in

consonance with the specific legal provisions of =atas =lg* //7, the e%isting Local Government Code, can suspend

petitioner 'ayor of loilo City .G*&* 6os* />@> and @>@ and petitioner member of the Sangguniang anglunsod

.G*&* 6o* /73*

@* *( *( *( *( BS#&FS$6B 6$T 6C$'"T=L#


7/34

position as "ssistant City )ealth $fficer of loilo City( that her office was padloc9ed without any e%planation or

5ustification( that her salary was withheld without cause since "pril 1, 188( that when she filed her vacation leave,

she was given the run4around treatment in the approval of her leave in connivance with r* &odolfo Fillegas and that

she was the ob5ect of a well4engineered trumped4up charge in an administrative complaint filed by r* &odolfo

Fillegas ."nne% =*

$n the other hand, 'ansuelo 'alabor is the duty elected Fice 'ayor of loilo City and complainants &olando abao,

an alido, German GonAales, Larry $ng and #duardo ea &edondo are members of the Sangguniang anglunsod of

the City of loilo* Their complaint arose out from the case where Councilor Larry $ng, whose 9ey to his office was

unceremoniously and without previous notice, ta9en by petitioner* 8 and 10>*


8/34

The investigation was continued regarding the 'alabor case and the complainants testified including their witnesses*

$n $ctober 10, 188, petitioner;s counsel, "tty* $nginal moved for a postponement of the $ctober >, 188 hearing

to 6ovember 7 to 11, 188 which was granted* )owever, the motion for change of venue was denied due to lac9 of

funds* "t the hearing on 6ovember 7, 188, the parties and counsel were present* etitioner reiterated his motion to

change venue and moved for postponement anew* The counsel discussed a proposal to ta9e the deposition of

witnesses in loilo City so the hearing was indefinitely postponed* )owever, the parties failed to come to terms and

after the parties were notified of the hearing, the investigation was set to ecember 1/ to 1@, 188*

The petitioner sought for another postponement on the ground that his witnesses were sic9 or cannot attend the

investigation due to lac9 of transportation* The motion was denied and the petitioner was given up to ecember 1,

188 to present his evidence* cralawnad

$n ecember 1, 188, petitioner;s counsel insisted on his motion for postponement and the hearing officers gave

petitioner up to ecember 1@, 188 to present his evidence* $n ecember 1@, 188, the petitioner failed to present

evidence and the cases were considered submitted for resolution*

n the meantime, a prima facie evidence was found to e%ist in the arbitrary detention case filed by ancho #rbite so

the respondent ordered the petitioner;s second preventive suspension dated $ctober 11, 188 for another si%ty .30

days* The petitioner was able to obtain a restraining order and a writ of preliminary in5unction in the &egional Trial

Court, =ranch // of loilo City* The second preventive suspension was not enforced* @

"midst the two successive suspensions, 'ayor GanAon instituted an action for prohibition against the respondent

Secretary of Local Government .now, nterior in the &egional Trial Court, loilo City, where he succeeded in obtaining

a writ of preliminary in5unction* resently, he instituted C"4G*&* S 6o* 1317, an action for prohibition, in the

respondent Court of "ppeals*

'eanwhile, on 'ay /, 10, the respondent Secretary issued another order, preventively suspending 'ayor GanAon

for another si%ty days, the third time in twenty months, and designating meantime Fice4'ayor 'ansueto 'alabor as

acting mayor* ndaunted, 'ayor GanAon commenced C"4G*&* S 6o* >07/3 of the Court of "ppeals, a petition for

prohibition, 3 .'alabor, it is to be noted, is one of the complainants, and hence, he is interested in seeing 'ayor

GanAon ousted*

$n September 7, 18, the Court of "ppeals rendered 5udgment, dismissing C"4G*&* S 6o* 1317* $n 2uly @, 10,

it li9ewise promulgated a decision, dismissing C"4G*&* S 6o* >07/3* n a &esolution dated 2anuary >, 10, it

issued a &esolution certifying the petition of 'ary "nn "rtieda, who had been similary charged by the respondent

Secretary, to this Court*

$n 2une >3, 10, we issued a Temporary &estraining $rder, barring the respondent Secretary from implementing

the suspension orders, and restraining the enforcement of the Court of "ppeals; two decisions*

n our &esolution of 6ovember >, 10, we consolidated all three cases* n our &esolutions of 2anuary 1@, 11, we

gave due course thereto*

'ayor GanAon claims as a preliminary .G*&* 6o* />@>, that the epartment of Local Government in hearing the ten

cases against him, had denied him due process of law and that the respondent Secretary had been Bbiased, pre5udicia


9/34

and hostileB towards him 7 arising from his .'ayor GanAon;s alleged refusal to 5oin the Laban ng emo9rati9ong

ilipino party 8 and the running political rivalry they maintained in the last congressional and local elections( and his

alleged refusal to operate a lottery in loilo City* 10 )e also alleges that he re-uested the Secretary to life his

suspension since it had come ninety days prior to an election .the barangay elections of 6ovember 1, 188, 11

notwithstanding which, the latter proceeded with the hearing + and meted out two more suspension orders + of the

aforementioned cases* 1> )e li9ewise contends that he sought to bring the cases to loilo City .they were held in

'anila in order to reduce the costs of proceeding, but the Secretary re5ected his re-uest* 1/ )e states that he as9ed

for postponement on Nvalid and 5ustifiableB 1 grounds, among them, that he was suffering from a heart ailment which

re-uired confinement( that his BvitalB 1@ witness was also hospitaliAed 13 but that the latter unduly denied his

re-uest*

'ayor GanAon;s primary argument .G*&* 6os* />@> and @>@ is that the Secretary of Local Government is devoid,

in any event, of any authority to suspend and remove local officials, an argument reiterated by the petitioner 'ary

"nn &ivera "rtieda .G*&* 6o* /73*

"s to 'ayor GanAon;s charges of denial of due process, the records do not show very clearly in what manner the

'ayor might have been deprived of his rights by the respondent Secretary* )is claims that he and Secretary LuisSantos were .are political rivals and that his BpersecutionB was politically motivated are pure speculation and

although the latter does not appear to have denied these contentions .as he, 'ayor GanAon, claims, we can not ta9e

his word for it the way we would have under less political circumstances, considering furthermore that Bpolitical feudB

has often been a good e%cuse in contesting complaints*

The 'ayor has failed furthermore to substantiate his say4so;s that Secretary Santos had attempted to seduce him to

5oin the administration party and to operate a lottery in loilo City* "gain, although the Secretary failed to rebut his

allegations, we can not accept them at face value, much more, as 5udicial admissions as he would have us accept

them, 18 for the same reasons above4stated and furthermore, because his say4so;s were never corroborated by

independent testimonies* "s a responsible public official, Secretary Santos, in pursuing an official function, ispresumed to be performing his duties regularly and in the absence of contrary evidence, no ill motive can be ascribed

to him*

"s to 'ayor GanAon;s contention that he had re-uested the respondent Secretary to defer the hearing on account of

the ninety4day ban prescribed by Section 3> of =atas =lg* //7, the Court finds the -uestion to be moot and academic

since we have in fact restrained the Secretary from further hearing the complaints against the petitioners* 1

"s to his re-uest, finally, for postponements, the Court is afraid that he has not given any compelling reason why we

should overturn the Court of "ppeals, which found no convincing reason to overrule Secretary Santos in denying his

re-uests* =esides, postponements are a matter of discretion on the part of the hearing officer, and based on 'ayor

GanAon;s above story, we are not convinced that the Secretary has been guilty of a grave abuse of discretion*

The Court can not say, under these circumstances, that Secretary Santos; actuations deprived 'ayor GanAon of due

process of law*


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Constitutions did, to e%ercise the power of suspension andKor removal over local officials* "ccording to both

petitioners, the Constitution is meant, first, to strengthen self4rule by local government units and second, by deleting

the phrase Bas may be provided by law,B >1 to strip the resident of the power of control over local governments* t is

a view, so they contend, that finds support in the debates of the Constitutional Commission*

The provision in -uestion reads as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1awlibrary

S#CT$6 * The resident of the hilippines shall e%ercise general supervision over local governments* rovinces with

respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays

shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions* >>

t modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1/@ Constitution, which we -uote: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

S#CT$6 10* The resident shall have control of all the e%ecutive departments, bureaus, or offices, e%ercise general

supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and ta9e care that the laws be faithfully e%ecuted*

>/

The petitioners submit that the deletion .of Bas may be provided by lawB is significant, as their argument goes, since:

.1 the power of the resident is Bprovided by lawB and .> hence, no law may provide for it any longer* chanrobles law library

t is to be noted that in meting out the suspensions under -uestion, the Secretary of Local Government acted in

consonance with the specific legal provisions of =atas =lg* //7, the Local Government Code, we -uote: chanrob1es virtual 1awlibrary

S#CT$6 3>* 6otice of )earing* + reventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are 5oined, when there is reasonable ground

to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, when the evidence of culpability is

strong, when the gravity of the offense so warrants, or when the continuance in office of the respondent could

influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence* n all cases,

preventive suspension shall not e%tend beyond si%ty days after the start of said suspension*

./ "t the e%piration of si%ty days, the suspended official shall be deemed reinstated in office without pre5udice to the

continuation of the proceedings against him until its termination* )owever, if the delay in the proceedings of the case

is due to his fault, neglect or re-uest, the time of the delay shall not be counted in computing the time of

suspension*>@cralaw:red

The issue, as the Court understands it, consists of three -uestions: .1 id the 187 Constitution, in deleting the


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phrase Bas may be provided by lawB intend to divest the resident of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline,

and or remove local officialsO .> )as the Constitution repealed Sections 3> and 3/ of the Local Government CodeO

./ 3 "utonomy, in the constitutional sense, is sub5ect to the

guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under the Constitution + and as

the Bsupervision clauseB itself suggest + is to wean local government units from over dependence on the central

government*

t is noteworthy that under the Charter, Blocal autonomyB is not instantly self4e%ecuting, but sub5ect to, among other

things, the passage of a local government code, >7 a local ta% law, >8 income distribution legislation, > and a

national representation law, /0 and measures /1 designed to realiAe autonomy at the local level* t is also noteworthy

that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local government under the general supervision of the

#%ecutive* t is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code provisions

for removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress may e%ercise removal powers, and as the e%isting Local

Government Code has done, delegate its e%ercise to the resident* Thus: chanrob1es virtual 1awlibrary

S#CT$6 /* The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive andaccountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentraliAation with effective mechanisms of

recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities

and resources, and provide for the -ualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and

functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organiAation and operation of the local

units* />

"s hereinabove indicated, the deletion of Bas may be provided by lawB was meant to stress, sub silencio, the ob5ective

of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by severing congressional control of its affairs, as observed by the Court

of "ppeals, li9e the power of local legislation* // The Constitution did nothing more, however, and insofar as e%isting

legislation authoriAes the resident .through the Secretary of Local Government to proceed against local officials

administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition*

The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the resident mere supervisory powers, which

supposedly e%cludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary

authority* t is a mista9en impression because legally, BsupervisionB is not incompatible with disciplinary authority as

this Court has held, / thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

t is true that in the case of 'ondano v* Silvosa, @1 $ff* GaA*, 6o* 3 p* >88, this Court had occasion to discuss this

scope and e%tent of the power of supervision by the resident over local government officials in contrast to the power

of control given to him over e%ecutive officials of our government wherein it was emphasiAed that the two terms,


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control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and e%tent* Thus in that

case the Court has made the following digression: Bn administration law supervision means overseeing or the power

or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties* f the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them

the former may ta9e such action or step as prescribed by law to ma9e them perform their duties* Control, on the

other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done

in the performance of his duties and to substitute the 5udgment of the former for that of the latter*B =ut from this

pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the resident over local government

officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so re-uires, as

postulated in Section 3.c of the &evised "dministrative Code*

BControlB has been defined as Bthe power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate

officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the 5udgment of the former for test of the latter*B

/3 BSupervisionB on the other hand means Boverseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate

officers perform their duties*B /7 "s we held, /8 however, BinvestigatingB is not inconsistent with BoverseeingB,

although it is a lesser power than Baltering*B

The impression is apparently e%acerbated by the Court;s pronouncements in at least three cases, Lacson v* &o-ue, /)ebron v* &eyes, 0 and 'ondano v* Silvosa, 1 and possibly, a fourth one, elaeA v* "uditor General* > n Lacson,

this Court said that the resident en5oyed no control powers but only supervision Bas may be provided by law,B / a

rule we reiterated in )ebron, and 'ondano* n elaeA, we stated that the resident Bmay not * * * suspend an elective

official of a regular municipality or ta9e any disciplinary action against him, e%cept on appeal from a decision of the

corresponding provincial board*B )owever, neither Lacson nor )ebron nor 'ondano categorically banned the Chief

#%ecutive from e%ercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did not e%ercise control powers, but because no

law allowed her to e%ercise disciplinary authority* Thus, according to Lacson: chanrob1es virtual 1awlibrary

The contention that the resident has inherent power to remove or suspend municipal officers is without doubt not

well ta9en* &emoval and suspension of public officers are always controlled by the particular law applicable and its

proper construction sub5ect to constitutional limitations* @

n )ebron, we stated: chanrob1es virtual 1awlibrary

"ccordingly, when the procedure for the suspension of an officer is specified by law, the same must be deemed

mandatory and adhered to strictly, in the absence of e%press or clear provision to the contrary + which does not e%ist

with respect to municipal officers*

n 'ondano, the Court held: chanrob1es virtual 1awlibrary

* * * The Congress has e%pressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the

provincial governor who is authoriAed to Breceive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal

officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of mal administration of office, and conviction by final

5udgment of any crime involving moral turpitude*B "nd if the charges are serious, Bhe shall submit written charges

touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by

registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer .not being the municipal treasurer pending action by

the board, if in his opinion the charge by one effecting the official integrity of the officer in -uestion*B Section 83 of the

&evised "dministration Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be e%ercised by the epartment )ead over

the administration of * * * municipalities* * * * f it be construed that it does and such additional power is the same


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authority as that vested in the epartment )ead by section 7.c of the &evised "dministrative Code, then such

additional power must be deemed to have been abrogated by Section 110.1, "rticle F, of the Constitution*B

n elaeA, we stated that the resident can not impose disciplinary measures on local officials e%cept on appeal from

the provincial board pursuant to the "dministrative Code*

Thus, in those case that this Court denied the resident the power .to suspend remove it was not because we did notthin9 that the resident can not e%ercise it on account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power

elsewhere* =ut in those cases in which the law gave him the power, the Court, as in GanAon v* Dayanan, found little

difficulty in sustaining him*

The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully point to the debates of the Constitutional Commission to

defeat the resident;s powers* The Court believes that the deliberations are by themselves inconclusive, because

although Commissioner 2ose 6olledo would e%clude the power of removal from the resident, @0 Commissioner =las

$ple would not*

The Court is conse-uently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed the Local Government Code, =atas=lg* /7* "s we said, BsupervisionB and BremovalB are not incompatible terms and one may stand with the other

notwithstanding the stronger e%pression of local autonomy under the new Charter*

"s the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means Ba more responsive and accountable local government

structure instituted through a system of decentraliAation*B @/ The Constitution, as we observed, does nothing more

than to brea9 up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments and as put by

political adherents, to Bliberate the local governments from the imperialism of 'anila*B "utonomy, however, is not

meant to end the relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration and local

government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime of federalism* The Charter has not ta9en such a radical step*

Local governments, under the Constitution, are sub5ect to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than

precisely, albeit parado%ically, to enhance self4government*

"s we observed in one case, @ decentraliAation means devolution of national administration + but not power + to

the local levels* Thus: chanrob1es virtual 1awlibrary

6ow, autonomy is either decentraliAation of administration or decentraliAation of power* There is decentraliAation of

administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to

broaden the base of government power and in the process to ma9e local governments Bmore responsive and

accountable,B and Bensure their fullest development as self4reliant communities and ma9e them more effective

partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress*B "t the same time, it relieves the central

government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns* The resident

e%ercises Bgeneral supervisionB over them, but only to Bensure that local affairs are administered according to law*B

)e has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their 5udgments with his own*

ecentraliAation of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local

governments units declared to be autonomous, n that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own

destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities* "ccording to a constitutional author,

decentraliAation of power amounts to Bself4immolation,B since in that event, the autonomous government becomes

accountable not to the central authorities but to its contituency* @@


14/34

The successive si%ty4day suspensions imposed on 'ayor &odolfo GanAon is albeit another matter* which is to say that it need not be e%actly si%ty days long if a shorter period is

otherwise sufficient, and which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a

shorter span*

Suspension is not a penalty and is not unli9e preventive imprisonment in which the accused is held to insure his

presence at the trial* n both cases, the accused .the respondent en5oys a presumption of innocence unless and until

found guilty*

Suspension finally is temporary, and as the Local Government Code provides, it may be imposed for no more than

si%ty days* "s we held, 3/ a longer suspension is un5ust and unreasonable, and we might add, nothing less than

tyranny*

"s we observed earlier, imposing 300 days of suspension + which is not a remote possibility + on 'ayor GanAon is to

all intents and purposes, to ma9e him spend the rest of his term in inactivity* t is also to ma9e, to all intents and

purposes, his suspension permanent*

t is also, in fact, to mete out punishment in spite of the fact that the 'ayor;s guilt has not been proven*


15/34

reinstated, wiped out his tenure considerably*

The Court is not to be mista9en for obstructing the efforts of the respondent Secretary to see that 5ustice is done in

loilo City, yet it is hardly any argument to inflict on 'ayor GanAon successive suspensions when apparently, the

respondent Secretary has had sufficient time to gather the necessary evidence to build a case against the 'ayor +

without suspending him a day longer* 0 days of suspension

and the possibility of si%ty days more is arguably around the corner .which amounts to a violation of the Local

Government Code + which brings to light a pattern of suspensions intended to suspend the 'ayor the rest of hisnatural tenure* The Court is simply foreclosing what appears to us as a concerted effort of the State to perpetuate an

arbitrary act*

"s we said, we can not tolerate such a state of affairs*

* The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism(

/* The change in constitutional language .with respect to the supervision clause was meant but to deny legislative

control over local governments( it did not e%empt the latter from legislative regulations provided regulation is

consistent with the fundamental premise of autonomy(

* Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by law, and in the manner

set forth therein, impose disciplinary action against local officials(

@* BSupervisionB and BinvestigationB are not inconsistent terms( BinvestigationB does not signify BcontrolB .which the

resident does not have(

3* The petitioner, 'ayor &odolfo GanAon, may serve the suspension so far ordered, but may no longer be suspended

for the offenses he was charged originally( provided: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a that delays in the investigation of those charges Bdue to his fault, neglect or re-uest, .the time of the delay shall

not be counted in computing the time of suspension*B ISupra, sec* 3/./J


16/34

b that if during, or after the e%piration of, his preventive suspension, the petitioner commits another or other crimes

and abuses for which proper charges are fled against him by the aggrieved party or parties, his previous suspension

shall not be a bar to his being preventively suspended again, if warranted under subpar* .>, Section 3/ of the Local

Government Code*


17/34

[G.R. No. 18272. D3c36:3 11, 1991.]

&H$ #OLI%I&OR G$N$RAL, RODOLFO A. MALAIRA, #&$H$N A. MON#AN&O, DAR. %ALD$RON, n

GRAND' N. &RI$#&$, Petitioners, *. &H$ M$&ROOLI&AN MANILA A)&HORI&' n th3 M)NI%IALI&' OF

MANDAL)'ONG

#'LLA)#

1* '#"L L"* C$6STTT$6"L L"


18/34

confiscation of driver;s licenses for traffic violations committed in 'etropolitan 'anila* There is nothing in the

provisions of Secs* 1, /, @ and 8 of the decree authoriAing the 'etropolitan 'anila Commission .and now the

'etropolitan 'anila "uthority to impose such sanctions* n fact, the said provisions prohibit the imposition of such

sanctions in 'etropolitan 'anila* The Commission was allowed to Bimpose fines and otherwise disciplineB traffic

violators only Bin such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed,B that is, by the decree itself*

6owhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or at least allowed by it to be imposed by the

Commission* 6otably, Section @ thereof e%pressly provides that Bin case of traffic violations, the driver;s license shall

not be confiscated*B These restrictions are applicable to the 'etropolitan 'anila "uthority and all other local political

subdivisions comprising 'etropolitan 'anila, including the 'unicipality of 'andaluyong*

3* *( *( *( C"S# "T ="&* + The re-uirement that the municipal enactment must not violate e%isting law

e%plains itself* Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power

from the national legislature .e%cept only that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy ta%es is

conferred by the Constitution itself* They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate

legislation* "s delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the

will of their principal* n the case before us, the enactments in -uestion, which are merely local in origin, cannot

prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute* The self4serving language of Section > of thechallenged ordinance is worth nothing* Curiously, it is the measure itself, which was enacted by the 'etropolitan

'anila "uthority, that authoriAes the 'etropolitan 'anila "uthority to impose the -uestioned sanction* The measures

in -uestion do not merely add to the re-uirement of 130@ but, worse, impose sanctions the decree does not allow

and in fact actually prohibits* n so doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in effect partially repeal the law*

7* *( *( *( 130@ "L#S $6LH T$ '#T&$$LT"6 '"6L" "" "6 "6 #?C#T$6 T$ T)# G#6#&"L

"T)$&TH C$6!#& =H =LC "CT* 1/3 $6 T)# C$''SS$6#& $! L"6 T&"6S$&T"T$6* +


19/34

the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by the Commission* 6o motion for reconsideration of that

decision was submitted* The 5udgment became final and e%ecutory on "ugust 3, 10, and it was duly entered in the

=oo9 of #ntries of 2udgments on 2uly 1/, 10*

Subse-uently, the following developments transpired: chanrob1es virtual 1awlibrary

n a letter dated $ctober 17, 10, &odolfo "* 'alapira complained to the Court that when he was stopped for an

alleged traffic violation, his driver;s license was confiscated by Traffic #nforcer "ngel de los &eyes in EueAon City*

$n ecember 18, 10, the Caloocan4'anila rivers and $perators "ssociation sent a letter to the Court as9ing who

should enforce the decision in the above4mentioned case, whether they could see9 damages for confiscation of their

driver;s licenses, and where they should file their complaints*

"nother letter was received by the Court on !ebruary 1, 11, from Stephen L* 'onsanto, complaining against the

confiscation of his driver;s license by Traffic #nforcer "** 'artineA for an alleged traffic violation in 'andaluyong*

This was followed by a letter4complaint filed on 'arch 7, 11, from an &* Calderon, a lawyer, also for confiscationof his driver;s license by at* &*2* Tano4an of the 'a9ati olice !orce* chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Still another complaint was received by the Court dated "pril >, 11, this time from Grandy 6* Trieste, another

lawyer, who also protested the removal of his front license plate by #* &amos of the 'etropolitan 'anila "uthority4

Traffic $perations Center and the confiscation of his driver;s license by at* "*F* #mmanuel of the 'etropolitan olice

Command47, 11, from the istrict Commander of the , 10, the 'etropolitan 'anila "uthority issued $rdinance 6o* 11, Series of 11, authoriAing itself Bto

detach the license plateKtow and impound attendedKunattendedKabandoned motor vehicles illegally par9ed or

obstructing the flow of traffic in 'etro 'anila*B cralaw virtua1aw library

$n 2uly >, 11, the Court issued the following resolution: chanrob1es virtual 1awlibrary


20/34

The attention of the Court has been called to the enactment by the 'etropolitan 'anila "uthority of $rdinance 6o* 11,

Series of 11, providing inter alia that: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

S#CT$6 >* "uthority to etach late K Tow and mpound* + The 'etropolitan 'anila "uthority, thru the Traffic

$perations Center, is authoriAed to detach the license plateKtow and impound attended unattended abandoned motor

vehicles illegally par9ed or obstructing the flow of traffic in 'etro 'anila* chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles*com:chanrobles*com*ph

The provision appears to be in conflict with the decision of the Court in the case at bar .as reported in 187 SC&" />,

where it was held that the license plates of motor vehicles may not be detached e%cept only under the conditions

prescribed in L$ /* "dditionally, the Court has received several complaints against the confiscation by police

authorities of driver;s licenses for alleged traffic violations, which sanction is, according to the said decision, not

among those that may be imposed under 130@*

To clarify these matters for the proper guidance of law4enforcement officers and motorists, the Court &esolved to

re-uire the 'etropolitan 'anila "uthority and the Solicitor General to submit, within ten .10 days from notice hereof,

separate C$''#6TS on such sanctions in light of the said decision*

n its Comment, the 'etropolitan 'anila "uthority defended the said ordinance on the ground that it was adopted

pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by #$ />* t particularly cited Section > thereof vesting in the Council .its

governing body the responsibility among others of: chanrob1es virtual 1awlibrary

1* !ormulation of policies on the delivery of basic services re-uiring coordination or consolidation for the "uthority(

and

>* romulgation of resolutions and other issuances of metropolitan wide application, approval of a code of basic

services re-uiring coordination, and e%ercise of its rule4ma9ing powers* .Emphasis supplied

The "uthority argued that there was no conflict between the decision and the ordinance because the latter was meantto supplement and not supplant the latter* t stressed that the decision itself said that the confiscation of license

plates was invalid in the absence of a valid law or ordinance, which was why $rdinance 6o* 11 was enacted* The

"uthority also pointed out that the ordinance could not be attac9ed collaterally but only in a direct action challenging

its validity*

!or his part, the Solicitor General e%pressed the view that the ordinance was null and void because it represented an

invalid e%ercise of a delegated legislative power* The fee in the measure was that it violated e%isting law, specifically

130@, which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the confiscation of

driver;s licenses for traffic violations in 'etropolitan 'anila* )e made no mention, however, of the alleged impropriety

of e%amining the said ordinance in the absence of a formal challenge to its validity* cralawnad

$n $ctober >, 11, the $ffice of the Solicitor General submitted a motion for the early resolution of the -uestioned

sanctions, to remove once and for all the uncertainty of their validity* " similar motion was filed by the 'etropolitan

'anila "uthority, which reiterated its contention that the incidents in -uestion should be dismissed because there was

no actual case or controversy before the Court*

The 'etropolitan 'anila "uthority is correct in invo9ing the doctrine that the validity of a law or act can be challenged

only in a direct action and not collaterally* That is indeed the settled principle* )owever, that rule is not infle%ible and

may be rela%ed by the Court under e%ceptional circumstances, such as those in the present controversy* chanrobles virtual lawlibrary


21/34

The Solicitor General notes that the practices complained of have created a great deal of confusion among motorists

about the state of the law on the -uestioned sanctions* 'ore importantly, he maintains that these sanctions are

illegal, being violative of law and the Gonong decision, and should therefore be stopped*


22/34

'andaluyong are hereby impleaded as respondents* This petition is doc9eted as G*&* 6o* 10>78>* The comments

already submitted are duly noted and shall be ta9en into account by the Court in the resolution of the substantive

issues raised*

t is stressed that this action is not intended to disparage procedural rules, which the Court has recogniAed often

enough as necessary to the orderly administration of 5ustice* f we are rela%ing them in this particular case, it is

because of the failure of the proper parties to file the appropriate proceeding against the acts complained of, and the

necessity of resolving, in the interest of the public, the important substantive issues raised*

6ow to the merits*

The 'etro 'anila "uthority sustains $rdinance 6o* 114Series of 11, under the specific authority conferred upon it

by #$ />, while $rdinance 6o* 7, Series of 188, is 5ustified on the basis of the General the presence of a sufficient standard* @

nder the first re-uirement, the statute must leave the legislature complete in all its terms and provisions such that

all the delegate will have to do when the statute reaches it is to implement it*

must not be unfair or oppressive( / must not be partial or discriminatory( must not prohibit but may regulate

trade( @ must not be unreasonable( and 3 must be general and consistent with public policy* 7

" careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion

because they do not conform to e%isting law* The pertinent law is 130@* 130@ does not allow either the removal

of license plates or the confiscation of driver;s licenses for traffic violations committed in 'etropolitan 'anila* There is


23/34

nothing in the following provisions of the decree authoriAing the 'etropolitan 'anila Commission .and now the

'etropolitan 'anila "uthority to impose such sanctions: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

S#CT$6 1* The 'etropolitan 'anila Commission shall have the power to impose fines and otherwise discipline drivers

and operators of motor vehicles for violations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and regulations in 'etropolitan 'anila

in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed* !or this purpose, the powers of the Land

Transportation Commission and the =oard of Transportation under e%isting laws over such violations and punishment

thereof are hereby transferred to the 'etropolitan 'anila Commission* 0*00 for the second offense, @0*00 for the third offense, a one4year suspension of driver;s license for

the fourth offense, and a revocation of the driver;s license for the fifth offense: rovided, That the 'etropolitan 'anilaCommission may impose higher penalties as it may deem proper for violations of its ordinances prohibiting or

regulating the use of certain public roads, streets and thoroughfares in 'etropolitan 'anila*

S#CT$6 @* n case of traffic violations, the drivers license shall not be confiscated but the erring driver shall be

immediately issued a traffic citation tic9et prescribed by the 'etropolitan 'anila Commission which shall state the

violation committed, the amount of fine imposed for the violation and an advice that he can ma9e payment to the city

or municipal treasurer where the violation was committed or to the hilippine 6ational =an9 or hilippine Feterans

=an9 or their branches within seven days from the date of issuance of the citation tic9et*

f the offender fails to pay the fine imposed within the period herein prescribed, the 'etropolitan 'anila Commission

or the law enforcement agency concerned shall endorse the case to the proper fiscal for appropriate proceedings

preparatory to the filing of the case with the competent traffic court, city or municipal court* chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

f at the time a driver renews his driver;s license and records show that he has an unpaid fine, his driver;s license shal

not be renewed until he has paid the fine and corresponding surcharges*

x x x

S#CT$6 8* nsofar as the 'etropolitan manila area is concerned, all laws, decrees, orders, ordinances, rules and

regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified accordingly* .Emphasis supplied*

n fact, the above provisions prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in 'etropolitan 'anila* The Commission was

allowed to Bimpose fines and otherwise disciplineB traffic violators only Bin such amounts and under such penalties as

are herein prescribed,B that is, by the decree itself* 6owhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by the

decree or at least allowed by it to be imposed by the Commission* 6otably, Section @ thereof e%pressly provides that

Bin case of traffic violations, the driver;s license shall not be confiscated*B These restrictions are applicable to the

'etropolitan 'anila "uthority and all other local political subdivisions comprising 'etropolitan 'anila, including the

'unicipality of 'andaluyong* chanroblesvirtualawlibrary


24/34

The re-uirement that the municipal enactment must not violate e%isting law e%plains itself* Local political subdivisions

are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature .e%cept only

that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy ta%es is conferred by the Constitution itself* 8 They

are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation* "s delegates of the Congress, the

local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal* n the case before us,

the enactments in -uestion, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force

and effect of a statute*

The self4serving language of Section > of the challenged ordinance is worth noting* Curiously, it is the measure itself,

which was enacted by the 'etropolitan 'anila "uthority, that authoriAes the 'etropolitan 'anila "uthority to impose

the -uestioned sanction*chanroblesvirtualQawlibrary

n Fillacorta v* =ernardo, the Court nullified an ordinance enacted by the 'unicipal =oard of agupan City for being

violative of the Land &egistration "ct* The decision held in part: chanrob1es virtual 1awlibrary

n declaring the said ordinance null and void, the court a -uo declared: 5gc:chanrobles*com*ph

B!rom the above4recited re-uirements, there is no showing that would 5ustify the enactment of the -uestioned

ordinance* Section 1 of said ordinance clearly conflicts with Section of "ct 3, because the latter law does not

re-uire subdivision plans to be submitted to the City #ngineer before the same is submitted for approval to and

verification by the General Land &egistration $ffice or by the irector of Lands as provided for in Section @8 of said

"ct* Section > of the same ordinance also contravenes the provisions of Section of "ct 3, the latter being silent

on a service fee of 0*0/ per s-uare meter of every lot sub5ect of such subdivision application( Section / of the

ordinance in -uestion also conflicts with Section of "ct 3, because the latter law does not mention of a

certification to be made by the City #ngineer before the &egister of eeds allows registration of the subdivision plan(

and the last section of said ordinance imposes a penalty for its violation, which Section of "ct 3 does not impose*

n other words, $rdinance >> of the City of agupan imposes upon a subdivision owner additional conditions*

x x x

BThe Court ta9es note of the laudable purpose of the ordinance in bringing to a halt the surreptitious registration of

lands belonging to the government* =ut as already intimated above, the powers of the board in enacting such a

laudable ordinance cannot be held valid when it shall impede the e%ercise of rights granted in a general law andKor

ma9e a general law subordinated to a local ordinance*B cralaw virtua1aw library


25/34

en5oining all law4enforcement authorities in 'etropolitan 'anila from removing the license plates of motor vehicles

.e%cept when authoriAed under L$ / and confiscating driver;s licenses for traffic violations within the said area*


26/34

[G.R. No. 9;489. F3:u" 14, 1992.]

%I&I-$N (. AN&ONIO M. %ARIO, Petitioner, *. &H$ $* C$6STTT$6"L L"


27/34

3* *( *( 6F$LF#'#6T $! CFL S#&FC# C$''SS$6 6#&SC$S TS CFL"6 C)"&"CT#&* + "s regards

the assertion involving the Civil Service Commission, suffice it to say that the -uestioned provisions, which read: BSec*

/1* "ppointment of 6 $fficers and 'embers* The "ppointment of the officers and members of the 6 shall be

effected in the following manner: a* olice $fficer to Senior olice $fficer F* "ppointed by the 6 regional director

for regional personnel or by the Chief of the 6 for national head-uarters personnel and attested by the Civil Service

Commission( b* nspector to Superintendent + "ppointed by the Chief of the 6, as recommended by their

immediate superiors, and attested by the Civil Service Commission( c* Senior Superintendent to eputy irector4

General + "ppointed by the resident upon recommendation of the Chief of the 6, with proper endorsement by the

Chairman of the Civil Service Commission * * * * Sec* />* #%aminations for olicemen* The Civil Service Commission

shall administer the -ualifying entrance e%aminations for policemen on the basis of the standards set by the

6"$LC$'*B precisely underscore the civilian character of the national police force, and will undoubtedly

professionaliAe the same*

7* *( *( $#S 6$T !"LL 6#& T)# C$''"6#&464C)#! $ does not

constitute abdication of commander4in4chief powers* t simply provides for the transition period or process during

which the national police would gradually assume the civilian function of safeguarding the internal security of the

State* nder this instance, the resident, to repeat, abdicates nothing of his war powers*

8* *( 6"T$6"L $LC# C$''SS$6 .6"$LC$'( #?#&CS#S "#LL"T# 2&SCT$6 T)& G$6"L

"#LL"T# =$"&S* + ursuant to the "ct, the Commission e%ercises appellate 5urisdiction, thru the regional

appellate boards, over decisions of both the L#= and the said mayors* This is so under Section >0.c* !urthermore, it

is the Commission which shall issue the implementing guidelines and procedures to be adopted by the L#= for theconduct of its hearings, and it may assign 6"$LC$' hearing officers to act as legal consultants of the L#=s .Section

/4d, d@*

* *( C$6STTT$6"L C$6ST&CT$6( #F#&H S'T$6 6LG# 6 !"F$& $! C$6STTT$6"LTH* +


28/34

control or authority of the committee*

1>* C$6STTT$6"L L"7, 10,


29/34

Later, the ntegration "ct of 17@ @ created the ntegrated 6ational olice .6 under the $ffice of the resident,

with the C as the nucleus, and the local police forces as the civilian components* The C46 was headed by the C

Chief who, as concurrent irector4General of the 6, e%ercised command functions over the 6* 3

The 6ational olice Commission 7 .6"$LC$' e%ercised administrative control and supervision while the local

e%ecutives e%ercised operational supervision and direction over the 6 units assigned within their respective

localities* 8

The set4up whereby the 6 was placed under the command of the military component, which is the C, severely

eroded the 6;s civilian character and the multiplicity in the governance of the C46 resulted in inefficient police

service* 'oreover, the integration of the national police forces with the C also resulted in ine-uities since the

military component had superior benefits and privileges* 10

The Constitutional Commission of 183 was fully aware of the structural errors that beset the system* Thus, Com*

Teodulo C* 6atividad e%plained that: chanrob1es virtual 1awlibrary

B'&* 6"TF"* * * * The basic tenet of a modern police organiAation is to remove it from the military* 11

)ere in our draft Constitution, we have already made a constitutional postulate that the military cannot occupy any

civil service position Iin Section 3 of the "rticle on the Civil Service 1> J* Therefore, in 9eeping with this and because

of the universal acceptance that a police force is a civilian function, a public service, and should not be performed by

military force, one of the basic reforms we are presenting here is that it should be separated from the military force

which is the C* 1/

!urthermore:chanrob1es virtual 1awlibrary

* * * the civilian police cannot blossom into full profession because most of the 9ey positions are being occupied by the

military* So, it is up to this Commission to remove the police from such a situation so that it can develop into a trulyprofessional civilian police * * *B

)ence, the Bone police force, national in scope, and civilian in characterB provision that is now "rticle ?F, Section 3 of

the 187 Constitution*

"nd so we now come to the merits of the petition at hand*

n the main, petitioner herein respectfully advances the view that &" 37@ emasculated the 6ational olice

Commission by limiting its power Bto administrative controlB over the hilippine 6ational olice .6, thus, BcontrolB

remained with the epartment Secretary under whom both the 6ational olice Commission and the 6 were placed*


30/34

performance of his duties and to substitute the 5udgment of the former with that of the latter*B t is said to be at the

very Bheart of the meaning of Chief #%ecutive*B 1

#-ually well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the resident, is the Boctrine of Eualified olitical

"gency*B "s the resident cannot be e%pected to e%ercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, >0 he

will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members*

nder this doctrine, which recogniAes the establishment of a single e%ecutive, >1 Ball e%ecutive and administrative

organiAations are ad5uncts of the #%ecutive epartment, the heads of the various e%ecutive departments are

assistants and agents of the Chief #%ecutive, and, e%cept in cases where the Chief #%ecutive is re-uired by the

Constitution or law to act in person on the e%igencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious

e%ecutive and administrative functions of the Chief #%ecutive are performed by and through the e%ecutive

departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course

of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief #%ecutive presumptively the acts of the Chief

#%ecutive*B >> .Emphasis ours*

Thus, and in short, Bthe resident;s power of control is directly e%ercised by him over the members of the Cabinetwho, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective 5urisdictions in the

e%ecutive department*B

"dditionally, the circumstance that the 6"$LC$' and the 6 are placed under the reorganiAed epartment of the

nterior and Local Government is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system of coordination

and cooperation among the citiAenry, local e%ecutives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety

agencies created under the assailed "ct, > the funding of the 6 being in large part subsidiAed by the national

government*c

Such organiAational set4up does not detract from the mandate of the Constitution that the national police force shallbe administered and controlled by a national police commission as at any rate, and in fact, the "ct in -uestion

ade-uately provides for administration and control at the commission level, as shown in the following provisions, to

wit:5gc:chanrobles*com*ph

BSec* 1* owers and !unctions of the Commission* + The Commission shall e%ercise the following powers and

functions:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

.i "pprove or modify plans and programs on education and training, logistical re-uirements, communications,

records, information systems, crime laboratory, crime prevention and crime reporting(

.5 "ffirm, reverse or modify, through the 6ational "ppellate =oard, personnel disciplinary actions involving demotion

or dismissal from the service imposed upon members of the hilippine 6ational olice by the Chief of the 6(

.9 #%ercise appellate 5urisdiction through the regional appellate boards over administrative cases against policemen

and over decisions on claims for police benefits(

Sec* >3* The Command and direction of the 6 shall be vested in the Chief of the 6* * * * Such command and

direction of the Chief of the 6 may be delegated to subordinate officials with respect to the units under their

respective commands, in accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed by the Commission* * * * *


31/34

Sec* /@* * * * To enhance police operational efficiency and effectiveness, the Chief of the 6 may constitute such

other support units as may be necessary sub5ect to the approval of the Commission * * *

Sec* /7* * * * There shall be established a performance evaluation system which shall be administered in accordance

with the rules, regulations and standards, and a code of conduct promulgated by the Commission for members of the

6 *

etitioner further asserts that in manifest derogation of the power of control of the 6"$LC$' over the 6, &" 37@

vested the power to choose the 6 rovincial irector and the Chiefs of olice in the Governors and 'ayors,

respectively( the power of Boperational supervision and controlB over police units in city and municipal mayors( in the

Civil Service Commission, participation in appointments to the positions of Senior Superintendent to eputy irector4

General as well as the administration of -ualifying entrance e%aminations( disciplinary powers over 6 members in

the Beople;s Law #nforcement =oardsB and in city and municipal mayors* cralaw:red

$nce more, we find no real controversy upon the foregoing assertions*

t is true that when the Constitutional Commissioners of 183 provided that the authority of local e%ecutives over the

police units in their 5urisdiction shall be provided by law, they intended that the day4to4day functions of police wor9

li9e crime investigation, crime prevention activities, traffic control, etc*, would be under the operational control of the

local e%ecutives as it would not be advisable to give full control of the police to the local e%ecutives* >3

They reasoned that in the past, this gave rise to warlordism, bossism, and sanctuaries for vices and abuses*

t would appear then that by vesting in the local e%ecutives the power to choose the officers in -uestion, the "ct went

beyond the bounds of the Constitution;s intent*

6ot so*


32/34

i* "uthority to choose the chief of police from a list of five .@ eligibles recommended by the rovincial olice irector*

!ull control remains with the 6ational olice Commission*


33/34

police force*

etitioner would li9ewise have this Court imagine that Section 1> of the -uestioned "ct, the pertinent portion of which

reads:

BSection 1>* &elationship of the epartment with the epartment of 6ational efense* + uring a period of twenty4

four .> months from the effectivity of this "ct, the "rmed !orces of the hilippines ."! shall continue its present

role of preserving the internal and e%ternal security of the State: rovided, that said period may be e%tended by the

resident, if he finds it 5ustifiable, for another period not e%ceeding twenty4four .> months, after which, the

epartment shall automatically ta9e over from the "! the primary role of preserving internal security, leaving to the

"! its primary role of preserving e%ternal security*B cralawvirtua1aw library

constitutes an Bencroachment upon, interference with, and an abdication by the resident of, e%ecutive control and

commander4in4chief powers*B cralawvirtua1aw library

That does not constitute abdication of commander4in4chief powers* t simply provides for the

transition period or process during which the national police would gradually assume the civilian function of

safeguarding the internal security of the State* nder this instance, the resident, to repeat, abdicates nothing of his

war powers* t would bear to here state, in reiteration of the preponderant view, that the resident, as Commander4

in4Chief, is not a member of the "rmed !orces* )e remains a civilian whose duties under the Commander4in4Chief


34/34

provision Brepresent only a part of the organic duties imposed upon him* "ll his other functions are clearly civil in

nature*B /1 )is position as a civilian Commander4in4Chief is consistent with, and a testament to, the constitutional

principle that Bcivilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military*B ."rticle , Section /, 187 Constitution**

!inally, petitioner submits that the creation of a BSpecial $versight CommitteeB under Section 8 of the "ct, especially

the inclusion therein of some legislators as members .namely: the respective Chairman of the Committee on Local

Government and the Committee on 6ational efense and Security in the Senate, and the respective Chairman of the

Committee on ublic $rder and Security and the Committee on 6ational efense in the )ouse of &epresentatives is

an Bunconstitutional encroachment upon and a diminution of, the resident;s power of control over all e%ecutive

departments, bureaus and offices*B cralaw virtua1aw library

=ut there is not the least interference with the resident;s power of control under Section 8* The Special $versight

Committee is simply an ad hoc or transitory body, established and tas9ed solely with planning and overseeing the

immediate Btransfer, merger andKor absorptionB into the epartment of the nterior and Local Governments of the

Binvolved agencies*B This it will underta9e in accordance with the phases of implementation already laid down in

Section 8@ of the "ct and once this is carried out, its functions as well as the committee itself would cease altogether*

/> "s an ad hoc body, its creation and the functions it e%ercises, decidedly do not constitute an encroachment and indiminution of the power of control which properly belongs to the resident*

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