SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 103028. October 10, 1997]

CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DELA ROSA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF

MACIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, namely: GUILLERMO R. DAMIAN & JOSE R.

DAMIAN; HEIRS OF HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ, namely: TERESITA CRUZ-

SISON. HORACIO R. CRUZ, JOSEFINA CRUZ-RODIL, AMELIA CRUZ-ENRIQUEZ and

FIDEL R. CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF ROMAN RUSTIA, namely: JOSEFINA RUSTIA-ALABANO,

VIRGINIA RUSTIA-PARAISO, ROMAN RUSTIA, JR., SERGIO RUSTIA, FRANCISCO

RUSTIA, LETICIA RUSTIA-MIRANDA; GUILLERMINA R. RUSTIA and GUILLERMA RUSTIA-

ALARAS, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

TORRES, JR., J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the Resolution of Court of Appeals Seventh

Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415 promulgated on November 27, 1991, granting the private

respondents upon petition forcertiorari and mandamus. The appellate court had ruled for the approval

of the private respondents record on appeal, thus paving the way for the continuance of their appeal

from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 55 in SP Case No. 97668.

On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado, Vda. De Danao filed a Petition for Letters of Administration of

the intestate estate of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado, who died on September 8, 1972, and

Dr. Guillermo Rustia who died on February 28, 1974. The case was docketed as SP Case No.

97668. The petition was filed by Luisa Delgado on behalf of the surviving sisters, brothers, nephews,

nieces and grand-nephews and grand-nieces of Josefa Delgado. In due course, the petition was

opposed by Marciana Rustia Vda. De Damian, Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, (sisters of the deceased Dr.

Guillermo Rustia); Josefina Albano, Virginia Rustia-Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia

Francisco Rustia, Leticia Rustia Miranda, (children of the late Roman Rustia, brother of the deceased

Dr. Guillermo Rustia); and Guillermina Rustia Rustia (de facto adopted daugther of Josefa Delgado

and Guillermo Rustia).

With the permission of the trial court, Guillerma S. Rustia-(Alaras) was allowed to intervene in the

proceedings upon her assertion of the status of an acknowledged natural child, and thus, the only

surviving child and sole heir, of Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia.

On January 14, 1976, oppositor Hortencia Rustia-Cruz died and was substituted in the estate

proceedings by her husband Fidel Cruz and their five children Teresita, Horacio, Josefina, Amelia and

Fidel, Jr. In time, oppositor Marciana Rustia Vda. De Damian also died and was substituted by her

children Guillermo and Jose.

On April 3, 1978, Luisa Delgado filed an Amended Petition for Latters of Administration, this time

alleging that the deceased Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had been living continuously as

husband and wife, but without the benefit of marriage.

In the ensuing proceedings, the parties presented their respective evidence upon the following

issues, as enumerated by the estate court:

1. Whether or not the deceased Josefa Delgado was legally married to Dr. Guillermo Rustia;

2. In the negative, whether or not the petitioner and the other claimants to the estate of the late

Josefa Delgado are entitled to her estate, if any;

3. Whether or not the intervenor was acknowledged as a natural or illegitimate child by the deceased

Dr. Guillerma Rustia in his lifetime;

4. Whether or not the oppositor Guillerma Rustia has any right or interest in the estate in controversy;

5. Whether or not the estate of Josefa Delgado was legally settled; and

6. Who is entitled to the estates administration?[1]

On March 14, 1988, herein petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. De Dela Rosa was substituted for her

sister, the petitioner Luisa Vda. de Danao, who had died on May 18, 1987.

On May 11, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 55, in the proceedings for joint

administration of estate of the late Josefa Delgado and Dr. Guillermo Rustia, rendered its

decision[2] appointing herein petitioner Carlota Vda. De Dela Rosa as administrator of the estates of

the two mentioned deceased. The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner (Carlota Delgado Vda. De Dela Rosa)

and her co-claimants to the estate of the late Josefa Delgado listed in the petition, and

enumerated elsewhere in this Decision, are hereby declared as the only legal heirs of the said

Josefa Delgado who died intestate in the City of Manila on September 8, 1972, and entitled to

partition the same among themselves in accordance with the proportions referred to in this

Decision.

Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby declared as the sole and only surviving

heir of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to the entire estate of the said

decedent, to the exclusion of the oppositors and the other parties thereto.

The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa Delgado executed by the late

Guillermo J. Rustia on June 15, 1973 is hereby SET ASIDE, and declared of no force and

effect.

As the estates of both decedents have not as yet been settled, and their settlement are

considered consolidated in this proceeding in accordance with law, a single administrator

therefore is both proper and necessary, and, as the petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de Dela

Rosa has established her right to the appointment as administratrix of the estates, the Court

hereby APPOINTS her as the ADMINISTRATRIX of the intestate estate of the deceased

JOSEFA DELGADO in relation to the estate of DR. GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.

"Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION issue to the petitioner

CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DELA ROSA upon her filing of the requisite bond in the sum

of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).

Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is hereby ordered to cease and desist

from her acts of administration of the subject estates, and is likewise ordered to turn over to

the appointed Administratrix all her collections of the rentals and income due on the assets of

the estates in question, including all documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such

estates to the petitioner and appointed Administratrix CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DELA

ROSA, immediately upon receipt of this Decision. The same oppositor is hereby required to

render an accounting of her actual administration of the estates in controversy within a period

of sixty (60) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.

In due time, the private respondents (oppositors below) filed a notice of appeal on May 20, 1990,

thereby notifying the court of their intention to appeal the decision. The Record on Appeal was filed

with the trial court on June 21, 1990, thirty-one (31) days from the time counsel for private

respondents counsel received the courts decision. On September 25, 1990, the Regional Trial Court

of Manila Branch 55, the Hon. Hermogenes R. Liwag, denied due course to, and dismissed the

appeal on the ground that the Record on Appeal was filed a day late, pursuant to Batas Pambansa

129 and the Interim Rules.

Private respondents assailed the ruling in a petition for certiorari and mandamus, filed with the

Supreme Court on October 20, 1990. However, in a Resolution dated November 5, 1990, this Court

referred the petition to the Court of Appeals, the latter then having concurrent jurisdiction with the

Court over the petition. The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 23415. On March 20, 1991, the

respondent appellate court ruled that the appeal was not perfected in time, and the trial courts

decision had thus become final and executory. The court observed that the perfection of an appeal

within the time prescribed by the rules is a jurisdictional requirement, and failure to do the same

removes from the appellate court any jurisdiction over the action.

However, on motion for reconsideration by the private respondents filed on April 11, 1991, and

after hearing the parties respective oral arguments, the appellate court reversed itself, and ruled that

in the light of special circumstances attending the proceedings leading to the issuance of the letters of

administration, and in the interest of substantial justice, the private respondents appeal should be

given due course.[3]

In its Resolution dated November 27, 1991, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court should

have proceeded with caution in considering the allowance of private respondents appeal, as every

party-litigant should be afforded ample opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause,

free from the constraints of technicalities. The court cited Supreme Court rulings furthering

exceptional instances where delay in filing a record on appeal, in order to perfect an appeal, was

ignored, when, on its face, the appeal appears to be impressed with merit.

WHEREFORE, the decision dated March 21, 1991 is hereby RECONSIDERED the petition for

certiorari and mandamus is GRANTED, the Order of respondent Court dated September 25, 1990 is

ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and another one is rendered APPROVING the Record on Appeal and

GIVING DUE COURSE to the appeal interposed by oppositors-appellants-petitioners from the

decision of respondent court rendered on May 11, 1990 in SP-97668.

SO OREDERD.

Petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de Dela Rosa is now before us, insisting on the final and

executory nature of the trial courts May 11, 1990 decision naming her as administrator of the subject

estates. She argues that the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the trial courts decision

dismissing the private respondents appeal, as the taking of an appeal and the filing of the record on

appeal within the reglementary period is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and the private

respondents failure to comply with such requirement renders their appeal nugatory.

A. It is clear and patent error for the Court of Appeals to have granted the petition for certiorari

and mandamus of respondents Guillerma R. Rustia and the heirs of Marciana Vda. de

Damian, although Hermogenes R. Liwag acted within his jurisdiction and in accordance

with the law when he dismissed the appeal of Guillerma R. Rustia et. al. since they filed

their record on appeal beyond the reglementary period of thirty (30) days.

B. The Court of appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the order of

September 25, 1990 of Judge Hermogenes R. Liwag, which dismissed the appeal of

respondents Guillerma R. Rustia et. al. contrary to law and settled jurisprudence that the

taking of an appeal including the filing of the record on appeal within the reglementary

period is mandatory and jurisdictional.

C. The Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in

approving the record on appeal of Guillerma R. Rustia et. al. although it was filed beyond

the thirty (30) day reglementary period.

D. The Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction and committed grave abuse and reversible

error in giving due course to the appeal of Guillermina R. Rustia et. al. although their

record on appeal was filed out of time.

1. Judge Hermogenes R. Liwag did not commit grave abuse of discretion nor acted without or

in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order of September 25, 1990 which, denied due

course to the appeal of respondents heirs of Marciana Vda. de Damian and accordingly

dismissed the appeal.

2. Mandamus cannot and should not be granted to set aside the order of September 25, 1990

to compel Judge Hermogenes R. Liwag to give due course to the appeal of respondent

heirs of Marciana Vda. de Damian.

The general rule still holds, that the right to appeal is not a natural right, but statutory. The

appellate jurisdiction of the courts is conferred by law, and must be exercised in the manner and in

accordance with the provisions thereof and such jurisdiction is acquired by the appellate court over

the subject matter and parties by the perfection of the appeal.[4] However, dismissal of appeals based

on purely technical grounds is frowned upon by the courts as it is their policy to encourage hearings

of appeals on the merits.[5]

As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed. However, under exceptional

circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice. [6]

Even assuming that the private respondents record on appeal was filed a day late, strong

consideration of substantial significance are manifest, as attested to by the appellate courts findings,

which urge this Court to relax the stringent application of technical rules in the exercise of our equity

jurisdiction, in spite of the apparent negligence of counsel. The appellate courts discussion is hereby

reproduced:

A look at oppositors Record on Appeal which was also forwarded with the case records,

shows that it consists of 361 pages. It was dated Quezon City, for Manila, Philippines, 20

June 1990. On its page 360, counsel for oppositors-appellants submitted that the Record on

Appeal together with the evidence be certified to this Court. Counsel also submitted that the

Record on Appeal and the Notice of Appeal be heard and approved on Friday, June 29,

1991. Page 361 of the Record on Appeal shows that a copy thereof was sent by registered

mail to counsel for private respondents. The record on Appeal, therefore, can speak for itself,

that it was already prepared, completed, finished and signed by counsel for oppositors on

June 20, 1990, or within the 30-day reglementary period from counsels receipt of the decision

sought to be appealed. Though the Record on Appeal should have been presented on or

before June 20, 1990, but was submitted on the following day, June 21, the intent of counsel

for oppositors to comply strictly with rules governing the manner and period for perfecting the

appeal as well as to avoid needless delays so necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge

of judicial business is manifest. Also counsel have filed a motion for extension for more time

to submit the Record on Appeal, which is allowable under the rules, she did not to do so but

deemed it best to file the Record on Appeal. This is also a clear manifestation of her not to

delay the proceedings.

A look at the case records also show that in between June 21- when the Record on Appeal

was filed, - up to September 25 when the Record on Appeal was disapproved and the appeal

was dismissed there were numerous pleadings submitted before respondent court as well as

certain proceedings had and taken in connection therewith which must have contributed to the

delay in the resolution of the Record on Appeal. Intervenor Guillerma Rustia filed a motion for

reconsideration of the decision and an amplificatory arguments (sic) in support of her

motion. The respondent court heard her motion for reconsideration as well as granted

counsels time within which to submit their comment/opposition/reply and Guillerma filed her

rejoinder. Private respondent Carlota Vda. de Dela Rosa then filed an urgent ex-parte motion

for implementation of the decision naming and appointing her as administratrix and a reply to

oppositors opposition to her urgent ex-parte motion. The respondent court issued an order

considering the urgent ex-parte motion submitted for resolution. Private respondent Carlota

again filed an urgent ex-parte motion for implementation of the portion of the decision

appointing her as administratrix. Intervenor Guillerma Rustia also filed a motion praying that

she be appointed as special administratrix and a motion to dismiss the appeal. Private

respondent Carlota also filed her comment on the Record on Appeal, submitting that xxx the

record on appeal submitted by oppositors xxx be admitted, however asking that it includes the

documents passed upon by the trial court. Intervenor Guillerma Rustia then filed an omnibus

motion. Private respondent filed an ex-parte motion praying for the dismissal of the appeal in

conjunction with the plea of intervenor Guillerma Rustia. Oppositors filed an opposition to the

omnibus motion. The court had two hearings concerning the omnibus motion. Intervenor

Guillerma then filed a rejoinder to the opposition filed by oppositors. On September 25, 1991,

or after all these pleadings were filed and the proceedings were held that respondent court

issued the order denying due course to the record on appeal and dismissed the appeal. It is

observed, therefore, that during that intervening period, the respondent court afforded

considerable time and opportunity and patience to the private respondents recourses which

lasted for more than three (3) months, yet it resolved to disapprove the Record on Appeal as

well as to dismiss oppositors appeal because the record on appeal was filed 1-day late,

thereby showing that respondent court was too stringent in applying the rules on oppositors,

when even in the initial comment by counsel for respondent Carlota to the Record on Appeal,

he submitted that the record on appeal be admitted despite the fact that the counsel was

furnished a copy of the record on appeal and must have found out that it was submitted on

June 21, 1990.

The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial courts pronouncements as to certain matters

of substance, relating to the determination of the heirs of the decedents and the party entitled to

administration of their estate, which were to be raised in the appeal, but were barred absolutely by the

denial of the Record on Appeal upon the too technical ground of late filing. The court particularly

referred to the importance, from the legal standpoint, of the question of the veracity of the decedents

status as husband and wife. Likewise, the status of intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia, who claims to be a

natural child of Dr. Guillermo Rustia with one Amparo Sagarbarria, and that of oppositor Guillermina

R. Rustia, who on the other hand claims to have been acknowledged by Guillermo Rustia as his

daughter, concern legitimacy of children, and the resolution of their status demands closer

consideration.Summing up, the appellate court declared:

In the light of the peculiar facts embodied in the pleadings and documents and records of the

main case, the arguments/issues raised and argued during the hearing, as well as the

numerous authorities in point, most importantly, on the substantial implication/effect of the

dismissal of the appeal just because the record on appeal was presented 1-day late, and the

merits of the oppositors cause, We find it justifiable to reconsider Our decision and reverse

and set aside the order of respondent court dated September 25, 1990.

We are restating the instances wherein we allowed the continuance of an appeal in some cases

were a narrow and stringent application of the rules would have denied it, when to do so would serve

the demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of equity jurisdiction.

In Castro vs. Court of Appeals,[7] reiterated in Velasco vs. Gayapa, Jr., [8] We stressed the

importance and real purpose of appeal and ruled:

An appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. We have advised the courts to proceed

with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal (National Waterworks and

Sewerage Authority vs. Municipality of Libmanan, 97 SCRA 138) and instructed that every

party litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of

his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities (A-One Feeds, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,

100 SCRA 590).

The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. The rules of

procedure are used only to help secure, not override substantial justice. (Gregorio vs. Court of

Appeals, 72 SCRA 120). Therefore, we ruled in Republic vs. Court of Appeals (83 SCRA 453)

that a six-day delay in the perfection of the appeal does not warrant its dismissal. And again in

Ramos vs. Bagasao, 96 SCRA 395), this Court held that the delay of four (4) days in filing a

notice of appeal and a motion for extension of time to file a record on appeal can be excused

on the basis of equity.

The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party-litigant the amplest

opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of

technicalities.[9]

In Cawit vs. Court of Appeals,[10] the Court observed that in the early case of Berkenkotter vs.

Court of Appeals, promulgated on September 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 228, we departed from the rigid

interpretation of Section 6, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that failure to state and/or show

in the Record on Appeal that the appeal was perfected on time is a sufficient cause for the dismissal

of the appeal.

In this instance, private respondents intention to raise valid issues in the appeal is apparent and

should not have been construed as an attempted to delay or prolong the administration

proceedings. Surely, the natural and legal course for them would have been to file a motion for

extension of time within which to submit their Record on Appeal, and under usual practice such

request would have been granted. However, counsel for private respondents instead continued with

the filing of the Record on Appeal with the trial court for approval, albeit belatedly, in the belief that

this measure was a more efficient recourse as the Record on Appeal, which consisted of 361 pages,

would be submitted for approval earlier than if the time for the submission of the same was

extended. Unfortunately, petitioner and the intervenor pounded on this technical lapse to further their

own interests, which from a reading of the pleadings and evidence on record, does not appear

indubitably valid.

In the inception of this action for issuance of letters of administration, petitioners predecessor

alleged that Josefa Delgado and Dr. Guillermo Rustia were legally married, only to withdraw such

submission later by a belated amended petition, advancing that the two were never actually married,

but were only living together as husband and wife. Such change of stance was accepted by the trial

court, upon the justification that no record of marriage of Josefa Delgado and Dr. Guillermo Rustia

could be found, and that it was highly irregular that the two could celebrate important occasions in

grand fashion, when no whiff was made of their own marriage. In corroboration, the testimonies of

certain close friends of Josefa Delgado disclose that the marriage between Josefa and Guillermo,

allegedly, never occurred.

It bears mentioning that the records likewise disclose testimonies pointing out the existence of

marriage between the decedents. Needless to state, it s presumed in our jurisdiction that a man and a

woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of

marriage. This is the common order of society, and can only be rebutted by sufficient contrary

evidence.

In another vein, the propriety of the appointment of Carlota Vda de Damian as sole administrator

of the estates of the decedents is put to question, especially in light of the trial courts finding that

Josefa Delgado and Dr. Guillermo Rustia were not married to each other. It has been observed that

the estates of deceased spouses may be settled in a single proceeding,[11] but in all other instances,

even if the deceased persons are related as ascendants and decendants, their separate estates must

be settled in different proceedings.[12] The reason for this is the avoidance of opportunity of

encroachment into the estate left by one decedent by the heirs of another, especially in instances,

such as this petition, were different heirs are determined for different decedents.

As for the status of Guillerma Rustia-Alaras as an acknowledged child of Dr. Guillermo Rustia,

Article 175, in conjunction with Article 173 and 172 of the Family Code provides for the means for

proving filiation:

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on

the same, evidence as legitimate children.

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the

action is based on the second paragraph of 172, in which case the action may be brought

during the lifetime of the alleged parent. (289a) (Underscoring Ours)

x xx

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing, in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation is a public document or a private handwritten

instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a,

267a)

xxx

Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime

and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of

insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the

action.

The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either

or both of the parties. (286a)

The cases relied upon in the trial courts decision, pointing to a childs action for establishing

filiation even beyond the putative parents death are modified by the enactment of the above-cited

provisions of the Family Code, which cite definite periods within which such actions must be

interposed. The acknowledgment of Guillerma Alaras as an acknowledged (illegitimate) child of Dr.

Guillermo Rustia, represents a crucial bar in the claim of the private respondents, as under Articles

988[13]and 1003[14] of the Civil Code.

A review of the trial courts decision is needed, in view of the above-demonstrated divergence of

the evidence and arguments presented.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the

Resolution dated November 27, 1991 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for the

APPROVAL of the private respondents Record on Appeal and the CONTINUANCE of the appeal

from the Manila, Branch LV Regional Trial Courts May 11, 1990 decision.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, (Chairman), Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 178221 December 1, 2010

MAY D. AÑONUEVO, ALEXANDER BLEE DESANTIS and JOHN DESANTIS NERI, Petitioners,

vs.

INTESTATE ESTATE OF RODOLFO G. JALANDONI, represented by BERNARDINO G.

JALANDONI as Special Administrator, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PEREZ, J.:

On appeal1 is the Decision2 dated 31 May 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00576. In

the said decision, the Court of Appeals nullified, on certiorari, the Orders3 of the Regional Trial Court,

Branch 40, of Negros Occidental (intestate court) allowing herein petitioners and their siblings4 to

intervene in the estate proceedings of the late Rodolfo G. Jalandoni.5 The decretal portion of the

decision of the appellate court reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED, the assailed Orders dated July 2,

2004 and January 26, 2005, of the Regional Trial Court in Spec. Proc. No. 338 are hereby SET

ASIDE and NULLIFIED, and a permanent injunction is hereby issued enjoining respondents

[petitioners], their agents and anyone acting for and in their behalves, from enforcing the assailed

Orders. No costs.6

The antecedents are:

Rodolfo G. Jalandoni (Rodolfo) died intestate on 20 December 1966.7 He died without issue.8

On 28 April 1967, Bernardino G. Jalandoni (Bernardino), the brother of Rodolfo, filed a petition for the

issuance of letters of administration9 with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, to

commence the judicial settlement of the latter’s estate. The petition was docketed as Spec. Proc. No.

338 and is currently pending before the intestate court.10

On 17 January 2003, the petitioners and their siblings filed a Manifestation11 before the intestate

court. In the Manifestation, they introduced themselves as the children of Sylvia Blee Desantis

(Sylvia)—who, in turn, was revealed to be the daughter of Isabel Blee (Isabel) with one John

Desantis.12

The petitioners and their siblings contend that their grandmother—Isabel—was, at the time of

Rodolfo’s death, the legal spouse of the latter.13 For which reason, Isabel is entitled to a share in the

estate of Rodolfo.

Seeking to enforce the right of Isabel, the petitioners and their siblings pray that they be allowed to

intervene on her behalf in the intestate proceedings of the late Rodolfo G. Jalandoni.14 As it was, by

the time the Manifestation was filed, both Sylvia and Isabel have already passed away with the former

predeceasing the latter.15

To support their cause, the petitioners and their siblings appended in their Manifestation, the following

documents:

a.) Two (2) marriage certificates between Isabel and Rodolfo;16

b.) The birth certificate of their mother, Sylvia;17 and

c.) Their respective proof of births.18

It is the assertion of the petitioners and their siblings that the foregoing pieces of evidence sufficiently

establish that Isabel was the spouse of Rodolfo, and that they are her lawful representatives.

The respondent intestate estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, now represented by Bernardino as its

Special Administrator, however, begged to differ. It opposed the intervention on the ground that the

petitioners and their siblings have failed to establish the status of Isabel as an heir of Rodolfo. The

very evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings showed that Isabel had a previous and

subsisting marriage with John Desantis at the time she was purportedly married to Rodolfo.

In its Comment to the Manifestation,19 the respondent called attention to the entries in the birth

certificate of Sylvia, who was born on 14 February 1946.20 As it turned out, the record of birth of

Sylvia states that she was a "legitimate" child of Isabel and John Desantis.21 The document also

certifies the status of both Isabel and John Desantis as "married."22 The respondent posits that the

foregoing entries, having been made in an official registry, constitute prima facie proof of a prior

marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.23

According to the respondent, Isabel’s previous marriage, in the absence of any proof that it was

dissolved, made her subsequent marriage with Rodolfo bigamous and void ab initio.24

On 2 July 2004, the intestate court issued an order allowing the petitioners and their siblings to take

part in the settlement proceedings.25 The intestate court was convinced that the evidence at hand

adequately establish Isabel’s status as the legal spouse of Rodolfo and, by that token, permitted the

petitioners and their siblings to intervene in the proceedings on her behalf.26

The intestate court also held that the birth certificate of Sylvia was insufficient to prove that there was

a previous marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.27 It ventured on the possibility that the entries

in the birth record of Sylvia regarding her legitimacy and the status of her parents, may have been

made only in order to save Isabel and her family from the social condemnation of having a child out of

wedlock.28

The respondent sought for reconsideration, but was denied by the intestate court in its order dated 26

January 2006.29 Undeterred, the respondent hoisted a petition for certiorari before the Court of

Appeals.

On 31 May 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and nullified the orders of the intestate

court.30

In coming to its conclusion, the Court of Appeals found that it was an error on the part of the intestate

court to have disregarded the probative value of Sylvia’s birth certificate.31 The appellate court, siding

with the respondent, held that Sylvia’s birth certificate serves as prima facie evidence of the facts

therein stated—which includes the civil status of her parents.32 Hence, the previous marriage of

Isabel with John Desantis should have been taken as established.

The Court of Appeals added that since the petitioners and their siblings failed to offer any other

evidence proving that the marriage of Isabel with John Desantis had been dissolved by the time she

was married to Rodolfo, it then follows that the latter marriage—the Isabel-Rodolfo union—is a nullity

for being bigamous.33 From that premise, Isabel cannot be considered as the legal spouse of Rodolfo.

The petitioners and their siblings, therefore, failed to show that Isabel has any interest in the estate of

Rodolfo.

Hence, the instant appeal.34

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Court of Appeals erred when it nullified the orders of the

intestate court allowing the petitioners and their siblings to intervene in the settlement proceedings.

The petitioners answer in the affirmative. They proffer the following arguments:

One. The Court of Appeals exceeded the limits of review under a writ of certiorari.35 In nullifying the

intestate court’s order, the appellate court did not confine itself to the issue of whether the same was

issued with grave abuse of discretion.36 Rather, it chose to re-assess the evidence and touch upon

the issue pertaining to Isabel’s right to inherit from Rodolfo.37

Had the appellate court limited itself to the issue of whether grave abuse of discretion exists, it would

have found that the intestate court did not act whimsically or capriciously in issuing its assailed

orders.38 Grave abuse of discretion on the part of the intestate court is belied by the fact that the said

orders may be supported by the two (2) marriage certificates between Isabel and Rodolfo.39

Second. Assuming ex-gratia argumenti that the Court of Appeals was correct in addressing the issue

of whether there was sufficient evidence to prove that Isabel has a right to inherit from Rodolfo, it

nevertheless erred in finding that there was none.40 A proper evaluation of the evidence at hand does

not support the conclusion that Isabel had a previous marriage with John Desantis.41

To begin with, the respondent was not able to produce any marriage certificate executed between

Isabel and John Desantis.42 The conspicuous absence of such certificate can, in turn, only lend

credibility to the position that no such marriage ever took place.

Moreover, the entries in the birth certificate of Sylvia do not carry the necessary weight to be able to

prove a marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.43 In assessing the probative value of such

entries, the Court of Appeals should have taken note of a "typical" practice among unwed Filipino

couples who, in order to "save face" and "not to embarrass their families," concoct the illusion of

marriage and make it appear that a child begot by them is legitimate.44

Since the alleged previous marriage of Isabel with John Desantis was not satisfactorily proven, the

Court of Appeals clearly erred in finding that her marriage with Rodolfo is bigamous.

We are not impressed.

First Argument

The first argument raised by the petitioners is specious at best. The question of whether the intestate

court gravely abused its discretion is intricately linked with the issue of whether there was sufficient

evidence to establish Isabel’s status as the legal spouse of Rodolfo.

A court’s power to allow or deny intervention, albeit discretionary in nature, is circumscribed by the

basic demand of sound judicial procedure that only a person with interest in an action or proceeding

may be allowed to intervene.45 Otherwise stated, a court has no authority to allow a person, who has

no interest in an action or proceeding, to intervene therein.46

Consequently, when a court commits a mistake and allows an uninterested person to intervene in a

case—the mistake is not simply an error of judgment, but one of jurisdiction. In such event, the

allowance is made in excess of the court’s jurisdiction and can only be the product of an exercise of

discretion gravely abused. That kind of error may be reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari.

Verily, the Court of Appeals was acting well within the limits of review under a writ of certiorari, when

it examined the evidence proving Isabel’s right to inherit from Rodolfo. The sufficiency or insufficiency

of such evidence determines whether the petitioners and their siblings have successfully established

Isabel’s interest in Rodolfo’s estate—which, as already mentioned, is an indispensable requisite to

justify any intervention. Ultimately, the re-assessment of the evidence presented by the petitioners

and their siblings will tell if the assailed orders of the intestate court were issued in excess of the

latter’s jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

We now proceed to the second argument of the petitioners.

Second Argument

The second argument of the petitioners is also without merit. We agree with the finding of the Court of

Appeals that the petitioners and their siblings failed to offer sufficient evidence to establish that Isabel

was the legal spouse of Rodolfo. The very evidence of the petitioners and their siblings negates their

claim that Isabel has interest in Rodolfo’s estate.

Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between Isabel

and John Desantis was adequately established. This holds true notwithstanding the fact that no

marriage certificate between Isabel and John Desantis exists on record.

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded

as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage.47 Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage

may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate.48 Hence, even a person’s

birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.49

In the present case, the birth certificate of Sylvia precisely serves as the competent evidence of

marriage between Isabel and John Desantis. As mentioned earlier, it contains the following notable

entries: (a) that Isabel and John Desantis were "married" and (b) that Sylvia is their "legitimate"

child.50 In clear and categorical language, Sylvia’s birth certificate speaks of a subsisting marriage

between Isabel and John Desantis.

Pursuant to existing laws,51 the foregoing entries are accorded prima facie weight. They are

presumed to be true. Hence, unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, they can, and will,

stand as proof of the facts attested.52 In the case at bench, the petitioners and their siblings offered

no such rebuttal.

The petitioners did no better than to explain away the entries in Sylvia’s birth certificate as untruthful

statements made only in order to "save face."53 They urge this Court to take note of a "typical"

practice among unwed Filipino couples to concoct the illusion of marriage and make it appear that a

child begot by them is legitimate. That, the Court cannot countenance.

The allegations of the petitioners, by themselves and unsupported by any other evidence, do not

diminish the probative value of the entries. This Court cannot, as the petitioners would like Us to do,

simply take judicial notice of a supposed folkway and conclude therefrom that the usage was in fact

followed. It certainly is odd that the petitioners would themselves argue that the document on which

they based their interest in intervention contains untruthful statements in its vital entries.

Ironically, it is the evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings themselves which, properly

appreciated, supports the finding that Isabel was, indeed, previously married to John Desantis.

Consequently, in the absence of any proof that such marriage had been dissolved by the time Isabel

was married to Rodolfo, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and,

therefore, void ab initio.

The inability of the petitioners and their siblings to present evidence to prove that Isabel’s prior

marriage was dissolved results in a failure to establish that she has interest in the estate of Rodolfo.

Clearly, an intervention by the petitioners and their siblings in the settlement proceedings cannot be

justified. We affirm the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the decision dated 31 May 2007 of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00576 is hereby AFFIRMED.

Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,

vs.

HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the

National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\

In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the

Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by

respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for Reconsideration

of the Dismissal Order, respectively.

The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent

is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage,

they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973

and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in

1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the

Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila,

(the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered

to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to

manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of

action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein

respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11,

1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the

property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.

The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.

Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to appeal.

certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an interlocutory order of

the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court

acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to

exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error committed which, in such a case, is

equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it would be useless and a waste of

time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed in this case within the

exception, and we have given it due course.

For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in

the Philippines.

Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property

because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that

they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal

funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.

For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail

over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and

declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest

Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.

For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations

between petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative

community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact

in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.

The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who

appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over

private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California,

authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground

of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community property nor community

obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of

KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:

xxx xxx xxx

You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on

my behalf and do an things necessary and proper to represent me, without further

contesting, subject to the following:

1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.

2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.

3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.

xxx xxx xxx 4

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United

States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private

respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending

in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to

local law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only

Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered

contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,

which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national

law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the

standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal

Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of

competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband

and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as

to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a

husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty. that

the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely

freed from the bond of the former marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He

would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control

over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly

exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own

representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still

married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the

Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and

fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs

with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country

if the ends of justice are to be served.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the

Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.

Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001]

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A.

RECIO, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such

decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the

governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do

not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce

decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on

evidence.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the

January 7, 1999 Decision[1] and the March 24, 1999 Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court of

Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026AF. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio

solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry

under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties.[3]

The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.

The Facts

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon,

Rizal, on March 1, 1987.[4] They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18,

1989, [5] a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family

court.

On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a Certificate of

Australian Citizenship issued by the Australian government.[6] Petitioner -- a Filipina -- and respondent

were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City.[7] In

their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino.[8]

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial

dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided

on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.[9]

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage[10] in the

court a quo, on the ground of bigamy -- respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the

time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondents marriage to

Editha Samson only in November, 1997.

In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his

prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution.[11] He contended that his first marriage to an Australian

citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989;[12] thus, he was

legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.

On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couples wedding and while the suit for the

declaration of nullity was pending -- respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family

court in Sydney, Australia because the marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down.[13]

Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground that it stated no

cause of action.[14] The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.[15] The court marked

and admitted the documentary evidence of both parties.[16] After they submitted their respective

memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.[17]

Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia

was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of

any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is,respondents alleged lack of legal capacity

to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The

Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.

Hence, this Petition.[18]

Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

1 The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the

respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to

contract a second marriage with the petitioner.

2 The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of legal

capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioners marriage to the

respondent

3 The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.

4 The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of

the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.

5 The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the respondent in

Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first securing a recognition of the

judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts.[19]

The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two

pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2)

whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our ruling on

these two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue:

Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson

Petitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha

Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,[20] petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any

other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence

of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds

that respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.

Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages

solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci

celebrationis). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the conformity

of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where the marriage was performed.

At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our

discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant

it.[21] A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad,

because of Articles 15[22] and 17[23] of the Civil Code.[24] In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a

foreigner, Article 26[25] of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in

case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to

remarry.[26] A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the

Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.[27]

A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be

made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be

recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.[28] Therefore,

before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the

divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.[29] Presentation solely

of the divorce decree is insufficient.

Divorce as a Question of Fact

Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply

with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles

read as follows:

ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a

sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following:

x x x x x x x x x

(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;

x x x x x x x x x

ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be

required to

ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be

required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article,

the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the

judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x.

ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and

distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrens presumptive legitimes

shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall

not affect their persons.

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document --

a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its

authenticity and due execution.

Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive

evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence.[30] A divorce

obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the

judgment itself.[31] The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or

tribunal of a foreign country.[32]

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven

as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy

thereof attested[33] by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the

Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or

consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is

kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. [34]

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one

issued by an Australian family court.[35] However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the

aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.

Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in

evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not

been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.[36] The trial court ruled that it was

admissible, subject to petitioners qualification.[37] Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded

weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree

admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.[38]

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary;

respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship

in 1992.[39] Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and

civil rights belonging to a citizen.[40] Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former

states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his

allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.

Burden of Proving Australian Law

Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner,

because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner

was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of

Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the

Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of

foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.

We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact

or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.[41] In civil cases, plaintiffs have the

burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and

defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce

new matters.[42] Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the

pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign

laws.[43] Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among

those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.[44] The power of

judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should

be resolved in the negative.

Second Issue: Respondents Legal Capacity to Remarry

Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally

incapacitated to marry her in 1994. Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.

Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence,

adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.

Respondents contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution

of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic

ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimoniiand (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The

first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full

force.[45] There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.

Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional or provisional

judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute

divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is

effected.[46]

Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and

practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by

statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be

prohibited from marrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good

behavior.[47]

On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:

1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the

other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy.[48]

This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been

restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national

law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the

Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondents capacity to remarry despite the paucity of

evidence on this matter.

We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or

presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39[49] of the Rules of Court, for

the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree

obtained under Australian laws.

Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity

Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code

was not submitted together with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence

is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.

We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of

the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been

sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly

authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of

the alien applicant for a marriage license.[50]

As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to marry

petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were

presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit A Complaint;[51] (b) Exhibit B Certificate

of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January

12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;[52] (c) Exhibit C Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick

A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro

Manila;[53] (d) Exhibit D Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no

information of annulment between Rederick A. Recio and Editha D. Samson was in its records;[54] and

(e) Exhibit E Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;[55] (2) for respondent: (a)

Exhibit 1 -- Amended Answer;[56] (b) Exhibit 2 Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of

Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;[57] (c) Exhibit 3 Certificate of Australian Citizenship of

Rederick A. Recio;[58] (d) Exhibit 4 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of

Australia Certificate;[59] and Exhibit 5 -- Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between

Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.[60]

Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized

Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with

petitioners contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed

respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to

show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity

to contract the second marriage.

Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the

ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to

marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree.Hence, we believe that the most judicious

course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioners

legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the

parties marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage

certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March

1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the case

to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondents legal

capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties marriage void on the ground of

bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES,

P e t i t i o n e r ,

- versus-

CRASUS L. IYOY,

R e s p o n d e n t.

G.R. No. 152577

Present:

PUNO,

Chairman,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CALLEJO, SR.,

TINGA, and

CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

Promulgated:

September 21, 2005

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Republic

of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of the

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001,[1] affirming the

Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077,

dated 30 October 1998,[2] declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada

Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint[3] for declaration of nullity

of marriage by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997. According to the said Complaint, respondent

Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City.

As a result of their union, they had five children Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos who

are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that

Fely was hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant. In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United

States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six years

old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus

received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the

said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their

children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely

came back to the Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City.

Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to bear

the sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times more: in

1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their fourth

child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her American family in

New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of her American husband in the

Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in

which she was named as Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus. At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13

years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility of

reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Felys acts

brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to

perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing,

constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68,

70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.

Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim[4] with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She asserted therein

that she was already an American citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus. While

she admitted being previously married to respondent Crasus and having five children with him, Fely

refuted the other allegations made by respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She explained that she

was no more hot-tempered than any normal person, and she may had been indignant at respondent

Crasus on certain occasions but it was because of the latters drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of

sincere effort to find employment and to contribute to the maintenance of their household. She could

not have been extravagant since the family hardly had enough money for basic needs. Indeed, Fely

left for abroad for financial reasons as respondent Crasus had no job and what she was then earning

as the sole breadwinner in the Philippines was insufficient to support their family. Although she left all

of her children with respondent Crasus, she continued to provide financial support to them, as well as,

to respondent Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was able to bring her children to the U.S.A., except for

one, Calvert, who had to stay behind for medical reasons. While she did file for divorce from

respondent Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to

sign the enclosed divorce papers. After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her

American husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her American

husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her status shall be governed by the law

of her present nationality. Fely also pointed out that respondent Crasus himself was presently living

with another woman who bore him a child. She also accused respondent Crasus of misusing the

amount of P90,000.00 which she advanced to him to finance the brain operation of their son, Calvert.

On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to respondent

Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00 she

advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and litigation

expenses.

After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial Briefs,[5] the RTC afforded both

parties the opportunity to present their evidence. Petitioner Republic participated in the trial through

the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.[6]

Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in support of his Complaint: (1) his

own testimony on 08 September 1997, in which he essentially reiterated the allegations in his

Complaint;[7] (2) the Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the Health Department of Cebu City, on the

recording of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of Deeds,

such marriage celebration taking place on 16 December 1961;[8] and (3) the invitation to the wedding

of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein Fely openly used her American husbands surname,

Micklus.[9]

Felys counsel filed a Notice,[10] and, later on, a Motion,[11] to take the deposition of witnesses, namely,

Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the consular

officers of the Philippines in New York and California, U.S.A, where the said witnesses reside.

Despite the Orders[12] and Commissions[13] issued by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of New York

and California, U.S.A., to take the depositions of the witnesses upon written interrogatories, not a

single deposition was ever submitted to the RTC. Taking into account that it had been over a year

since respondent Crasus had presented his evidence and that Fely failed to exert effort to have the

case progress, the RTC issued an Order, dated 05 October 1998,[14] considering Fely to have waived

her right to present her evidence. The case was thus deemed submitted for decision.

Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of

respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio, on the basis of the following findings

The ground bearing defendants psychological incapacity deserves a reasonable

consideration. As observed, plaintiffs testimony is decidedly credible. The Court finds

that defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological incapacity to

comply with her marital duties such as striving for family unity, observing fidelity, mutual

love, respect, help and support. From the evidence presented, plaintiff adequately

established that the defendant practically abandoned him. She obtained a divorce

decree in the United States of America and married another man and has establish [sic]

another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein he is married to

a wife who is already married to another man in another country.

Defendants intolerable traits may not have been apparent or manifest before the

marriage, the FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows the annulment of the marriage

provided that these were eventually manifested after the wedding. It appears to be the

case in this instance.

Certainly defendants posture being an irresponsible wife erringly reveals her very

low regard for that sacred and inviolable institution of marriage which is the foundation

of human society throughout the civilized world. It is quite evident that the defendant is

bereft of the mind, will and heart to comply with her marital obligations, such incapacity

was already there at the time of the marriage in question is shown by defendants own

attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff.

In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendants psychological

incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations which already existed at the

time of the marriage in question has been satisfactorily proven. The evidence in herein

case establishes the irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.

Going over plaintiffs testimony which is decidedly credible, the Court finds that

the defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of such psychological incapacity

to comply with her marital obligations. These are her excessive disposition to material

things over and above the marital stability. That such incapacity was already there at

the time of the marriage in question is shown by defendants own attitude towards her

marriage to plaintiff. And for these reasons there is a legal ground to declare the

marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null and void ab

initio.[15]

Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law and

evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its Decision,

dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible error therein. It

even offered additional ratiocination for declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely

null and void, to wit

Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has remarried, and is

now permanently residing in the United States. Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated

this as one of his reasons for seeking the declaration of nullity of their marriage

Article 26 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in

accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were

solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,

except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and

38.

WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A

FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS

THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE

CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE

SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER

PHILIPPINE LAW.

The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted provision is to

avoid the absurd and unjust situation of a Filipino citizen still being married to his or her

alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he

or she has obtained a divorce abroad. In the case at bench, the defendant has

undoubtedly acquired her American husbands citizenship and thus has become an alien

as well. This Court cannot see why the benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can not be

extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually embraces another citizenship

and thus becomes herself an alien.

It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances, plaintiff would

still be considered as married to defendant, given her total incapacity to honor her

marital covenants to the former. To condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriage

that in truth and in fact does not exist and to remain married to a spouse who is

incapacitated to discharge essential marital covenants, is verily to condemn him to a

perpetual disadvantage which this Court finds abhorrent and will not countenance.

Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief by affirming the trial courts declaration of the

nullity of the marriage of the parties.[16]

After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March 2002,[17] denied its Motion for

Reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed the instant Petition before this Court, based on the following

arguments/grounds

I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondents wife do not per

se constitute psychological incapacity.

II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in accord with

law and jurisprudence considering that the Court of Appeals committed serious errors of

law in ruling that Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable to the case

at bar.[18]

In his Comment[19] to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that Felys psychological incapacity

was clearly established after a full-blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code of

the Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely, because the

latter had already become an American citizen. He further questioned the personality of petitioner

Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, to institute the instant Petition, because

Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned

to the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the State, in proceedings for

annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.

After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws and jurisprudence, this Court

finds the instant Petition to be meritorious.

I

The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding of

psychological incapacity of Fely.

Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the Family Code of

the Philippines, reads

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,

was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of

marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its

solemnization.

Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological incapacity. In a series of cases, this

Court laid down guidelines for determining its existence.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[20] the term psychological incapacity was defined, thus

. . . [P]sychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)

incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that

concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which,

as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live

together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly

any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of

psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly

demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the

marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is

celebrated[21]

The psychological incapacity must be characterized by

(a) Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of

carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;

(b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the

marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and

(c) Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be

beyond the means of the party involved.[22]

More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code

of the Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and

Molina,[23] which, although quite lengthy, by its significance, deserves to be reproduced below

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.

Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage

and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution

and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our

Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of

the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from

dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected

by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and

emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or

clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)

clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the

incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or

symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or

one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not

have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given

valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here

so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,

nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its

incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified

psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of

the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties

exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such

time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other

spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore,

such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not

necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or

employment in a job

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to

assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities,

mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The

illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or

difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling

factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that

effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with

the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to

71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and

225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied

marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and

included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the

Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given

great respect by our courts

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor

General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless

the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly

stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the

petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the

court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed

submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the

equivalent function of the defensor vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.[24]

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[25] further clarified that there is no requirement that the

defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a

condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.

Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the evidence

presented during the trial.

Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence, this Court finds that

the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged

psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null

and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his

testimony, which can be easily put into question for being self-serving, in the absence of any other

corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on the

recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely,

such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of

Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American husbands surname. Even considering

the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasuss Complaint filed with the

RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that

prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of marriage.

It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates downright

incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere

refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.[26] Irreconcilable

differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse,

habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not

warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article.[27]

As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 is not to be confused with a

divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers

to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a

malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities

of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.[28]

The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed respondent

Crasus and the rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of

respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her American family and

her American surname, may indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply with her

marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified. If the root cause of the

incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental

defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at the time of celebration

of the marriage; nor that it is incurable. While the personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or

psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of

the Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this Courts ruling in Marcos v. Marcos,[29] respondent

Crasus must still have complied with the requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and

Molina[30] that the root cause of the incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that its

incapacitating nature be fully explained.

In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.[31] No less than the

Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution

and marriage as the foundation of the family.[32]

II

Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to the

case at bar.

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated

and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him

or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under

Philippine law.

As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple

getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was

celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of

respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a

Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed

before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the

United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer,

she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely

was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil

Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status,

condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and

even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not

have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.

III The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in

proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.

Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent Crasus argued

that only the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the RTC may intervene on behalf

of the State in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages; hence,

the Office of the Solicitor General had no personality to file the instant Petition on behalf

of the State. Article 48 provides

ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage,

the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf

of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that

the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office

from intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order

No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor General as the

principal law officer and legal defender of the Government.[33] His Office is tasked to represent the

Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any

litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. The Office of the

Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge

duties requiring the services of lawyers.[34]

The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the

State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of

marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence;

and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the

land, then his intervention in such proceedings could only serve and contribute to the realization of

such intent, rather than thwart it.

Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is authorized to bring or defend

actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this

Court or the Court of Appeals.[35] While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively

participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage

before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case is elevated to the Court

of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be eventually responsible for taking the case to the appellate

courts when circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and practical that even while the

proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can already exercise

supervision and control over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to better

guarantee the protection of the interests of the State.

In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the Solicitor General in

several cases for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages that were appealed before it,

summarized as follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta[36]

In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)], this Court laid down

the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of

which concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to

appear as counsel for the State:

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and

the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall

be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which

will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his

agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor

General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court

such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed

submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge

the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon

1095. [Id., at 213]

This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)] reiterated

its pronouncement in Republic v. Court of Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role of the

prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the

State[37]

Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity

of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,[38] which became effective on

15 March 2003, should dispel any other doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority

of the Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. The Rule

recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General to intervene and take part in the

proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages before the RTC and

on appeal to higher courts. The pertinent provisions of the said Rule are reproduced

below

Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition.

(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition

on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor,

within five days from the date of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service

within the same period.

Sec. 18. Memoranda. The court may require the parties and the public

prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective

memoranda in support of their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is

terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum

if the case is of significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers may be

submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case

will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.

Sec. 19. Decision.

(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall

be served with copies of the decision personally or by registered mail. If the respondent

summoned by publication failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the

decision shall be published once in a newspaper of general circulation.

(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to

the parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or new

trial, or appeal is filed by any of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor

General.

Sec. 20. Appeal.

(2) Notice of Appeal. An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal

from the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of

the motion for reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the

notice of appeal on the adverse parties.

Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and the Court of

Appeals, and sustains the validity and existence of the marriage between respondent Crasus and

Fely. At most, Felys abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent Crasus grounds to

file for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration

of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. While this Court commiserates with

respondent Crasus for being continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless and loveless marriage,

this is one of those situations where neither law nor society can provide the specific answer to every

individual problem.[39]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-

G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22,

in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 167109 February 6, 2007

FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN, Petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, ORLANDO B. CATALAN and MEROPE E.

BRAGANZA, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review assails the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69875 dated

August 6, 2004, which reversed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City,

Branch 44, in Civil Case No. D-10636, declaring the marriage between respondents Orlando B.

Catalan and Merope E. Braganza void on the ground of bigamy, as well as the Resolution3 dated

January 27, 2005, which denied the motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini,

Pangasinan.4Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became

naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April 1988.5

Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao,

Pangasinan.6 Contending that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting

marriage with Eusebio Bristol, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with

damages in the RTC of Dagupan City7 against Orlando and Merope.

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss8 on the ground of lack of cause of action as petitioner was

allegedly not a real party-in-interest, but it was denied.9 Trial on the merits ensued.

On October 10, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of

which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is declared in favor of plaintiff Felicitas Amor Catalan and against

defendants Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E. Braganza, as follows:

1) The subsequent marriage of Merope Braganza with Orlando B. Catalan is declared null and

void ab initio;

2) The defendants are ordered jointly and severally to pay plaintiff by way of moral damages

the amount of P300,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P200,000.00 and attorney’s

fees in the amount of P50,000.00, including costs of this suit; and

3) The donation in consideration of marriage is ordered revoked and the property donated is

ordered awarded to the heirs of Juliana Braganza.

Furnish copies of this Decision to Atty. Napoleon B. Arenas, Jr. and Atty. Nolan Evangelista.

SO ORDERED.10

Respondents appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the RTC,

thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the appeal and consequently REVERSE

and SET ASIDE the appealed decision. We likewise DISMISS Civil Case No. D-10636, RTC, Branch

44, Dagupan City. No costs.

SO ORDERED.11

After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review raising

the following issues:

I.WHETHER PETITIONER HAS THE REQUIRED STANDING IN COURT TO QUESTION THE

NULLITY OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN RESPONDENTS;

II.WHETHER THE FAILURE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DECLARE THE QUESTIONED

MARRIAGE VOID CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR.12

Petitioner contends that the bigamous marriage of the respondents, which brought embarrassment to

her and her children, confers upon her an interest to seek judicial remedy to address her grievances

and to protect her family from further embarrassment and humiliation. She claims that the Court of

Appeals committed reversible error in not declaring the marriage void despite overwhelming evidence

and the state policy discouraging illegal and immoral marriages.13

The main issue to be resolved is whether petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the

declaration of nullity of marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy. However, this issue

may not be resolved without first determining the corollary factual issues of whether the petitioner and

respondent Orlando had indeed become naturalized American citizens and whether they had actually

been judicially granted a divorce decree.

While it is a settled rule that the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-

examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case,14 there

are, however, exceptions to this rule, like when the findings of facts of the RTC and the Court of

Appeals are conflicting, or when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on

which they are based.15

Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that petitioner and respondent Orlando were

naturalized American citizens and that they obtained a divorce decree in April 1988. However, after a

careful review of the records, we note that other than the allegations in the complaint and the

testimony during the trial, the records are bereft of competent evidence to prove their naturalization

and divorce.

The Court of Appeals therefore had no basis when it held:

In light of the allegations of Felicitas’ complaint and the documentary and testimonial evidence she

presented, we deem it undisputed that Orlando and Felicitas are American citizens and had this

citizenship status when they secured their divorce decree in April 1988. We are not therefore dealing

in this case with Filipino citizens whose marital status is governed by the Family Code and our Civil

Code, but with American citizens who secured their divorce in the U.S. and who are considered by

their national law to be free to contract another marriage. x x x16

Further, the Court of Appeals mistakenly considered the failure of the petitioner to refute or contest

the allegation in respondents’ brief, that she and respondent Orlando were American citizens at the

time they secured their divorce in April 1988, as sufficient to establish the fact of naturalization and

divorce.17 We note that it was the petitioner who alleged in her complaint that they acquired American

citizenship and that respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce decree.18 It is settled rule that one

who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.19

Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces

are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2)

limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second

suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.20 A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be

recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the

foreigner.21 However, before it can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the

divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it, which must be proved

considering that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.22

Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence, we cannot rule on the issue of

whether petitioner has the personality to file the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. After all,

she may have the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a limited divorce

or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree

becomes absolute.23 In such case, the RTC would be correct to declare the marriage of the

respondents void for being bigamous, there being already in evidence two existing marriage

certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Mabini, Pangasinan dated December

21, 1959 between Eusebio Bristol and respondent Merope,24 and the other, in Calasiao, Pangasinan

dated June 16, 1988 between the respondents.25

However, if there was indeed a divorce decree obtained and which, following the national law of

Orlando, does not restrict remarriage, the Court of Appeals would be correct in ruling that petitioner

has no legal personality to file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage, thus:

Freed from their existing marital bond, each of the former spouses no longer has any interest nor

should each have the personality to inquire into the marriage that the other might subsequently

contract. x x x Viewed from another perspective, Felicitas has no existing interest in Orlando’s

subsequent marriage since the validity, as well as any defect or infirmity, of this subsequent marriage

will not affect the divorced status of Orlando and Felicitas. x x x26

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married, or

even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the

nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate "proper interest" can file the same. A

petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in

the name of the real party in interest27 and must be based on a cause of action.28 Thus, in Niñal v.

Bayadog,29 the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare the

nullity of the marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional

rights.1awphi1.net

Significantly, Section 2(a) of The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and

Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003, now specifically provides:

SECTION 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. —

(a) Who may file. — A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely

by the husband or the wife.

x x x x

In fine, petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be

ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a

remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine

whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which

granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was

obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlando’s remarriage, then the trial court should

declare respondents’ marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduce the amount of moral

damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages from P200,000.00

to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed

Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage

on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the same.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for its proper

disposition. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY

BAYOT,

Petitioner,

- versus -

THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL

G.R. No. 155635

Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,

BAYOT,

Respondents.

x-------------------------------------------x

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY

BAYOT,

Petitioner,

- versus -

VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT,

Respondent.

TINGA,

VELASCO, JR., and

BRION, JJ.

G.R. No. 163979

Promulgated:

November 7, 2008

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot

impugning certain issuances handed out by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.

In the first, a petition for certiorari[1] under Rule 65 and docketed as G.R. No.

155635, Rebecca assails and seeks to nullify the April 30, 2002 Resolution[2] of the CA, as reiterated

in another Resolution of September 2, 2002,[3] granting a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of

private respondent Vicente Madrigal Bayot staving off the trial courts grant of support pendente lite to

Rebecca.

The second, a petition for review under Rule 45,[4] docketed G.R. No. 163979, assails the

March 25, 2004 Decision[5] of the CA, (1) dismissing Civil Case No. 01-094, a suit for declaration of

absolute nullity of marriage with application for support commenced by Rebecca against Vicente

before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City; and (2) setting aside certain orders and a

resolution issued by the RTC in the said case.

Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of both cases.

The Facts

Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose,

Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage Certificate[6] identified Rebecca, then 26

years old, to be an American citizen[7] born in Agaa, Guam, USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay,

American, and Helen Corn Makapugay, American.

On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine

Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente and Rebeccas marital relationship seemed to have soured

as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic. Before the

Court of the First Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Rebecca personally appeared,

while Vicente was duly represented by counsel. On February 22, 1996, the Dominican court

issued Civil Decree No. 362/96,[8] ordering the dissolution of the couples marriage and leaving them

to remarry after completing the legal requirements, but giving them joint custody and guardianship

over Alix. Over a year later, the same court would issue Civil Decree No. 406/97,[9] settling the

couples property relations pursuant to an Agreement[10] they executed on December 14, 1996. Said

agreement specifically stated that the conjugal property which they acquired during their marriage

consist[s] only of the real property and all the improvements and personal properties therein

contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang, Muntinlupa.[11]

Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance of Civil Decree No.

362/96, Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC a petition[12] dated January 26, 1996, with

attachments, for declaration of nullity of marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca,

however, later moved[13] and secured approval[14] of the motion to withdraw the petition.

On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment[15] stating under oath

that she is an American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and

that she is carrying a child not of Vicente.

On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC,

for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage[16] on the ground of Vicentes alleged psychological

incapacity. Docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094 and entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot v.

Vicente Madrigal Bayot, the petition was eventually raffled to Branch 256 of the court. In it, Rebecca

also sought thedissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application for support pendente

lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly

support for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.

On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss[17] on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of

cause of action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Earlier, on June 5,

2001, Rebecca filed and moved for the allowance of her application for support pendente lite.

To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino

citizenship, as affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid

divorce to speak of.

Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage, and Rebecca

commenced several criminal complaints against each other. Specifically, Vicente filed adultery and

perjury complaints against Rebecca. Rebecca, on the other hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and

concubinage.

Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss

and Motion for Support Pendente Lite

On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order[18] denying Vicentes motion to dismiss Civil Case

No. 01-094 and granting Rebeccas application for support pendente lite, disposing as follows:

Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed by the respondent is

DENIED. Petitioners Application in Support of the Motion for Support Pendente Lite is

hereby GRANTED. Respondent is hereby ordered to remit the amount of TWO

HUNDRED AND TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php 220,000.00) a month to

Petitioner as support for the duration of the proceedings relative to the instant Petition.

SO ORDERED.[19]

The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce judgment invoked by Vicente as bar to

the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is a matter of defense best taken up during

actual trial. As to the grant of support pendente lite, the trial court held that a mere allegation of

adultery against Rebecca does not operate to preclude her from receiving legal support.

Following the denial[20] of his motion for reconsideration of the above August 8, 2001 RTC

order, Vicente went to the CA on a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary

restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.[21] His petition was docketed as CA-G.R.

SP No. 68187.

Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA

On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO.[22] On April 30, 2002, the appellate court

granted, via a Resolution, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the decretal portion of which

reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution of the petition at

bar, let the Writ of Preliminary Injunction be ISSUED in this case, enjoining the

respondent court from implementing the assailed Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001

and the Order dated November 20, 2001, and from conducting further proceedings in

Civil Case No. 01-094, upon the posting of an injunction bond in the amount of

P250,000.00.

SO ORDERED.[23]

Rebecca moved[24] but was denied reconsideration of the aforementioned April 30,

2002 resolution. In the meantime, on May 20, 2002, the preliminary injunctive writ[25] was issued.

Rebecca also moved for reconsideration of this issuance, but the CA, by Resolution dated September

2, 2002, denied her motion.

The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and September 2, 2002 are presently being

assailed in Rebeccas petition for certiorari, docketed under G.R. No. 155635.

Ruling of the CA

Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision dated March 25, 2004,

effectively dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094, and set aside incidental orders the RTC issued in

relation to the case. The fallo of the presently assailed CA Decision reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Omnibus Order

dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001

are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered DISMISSING Civil Case No.

01-094, for failure to state a cause of action. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[26]

To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicentes motion to dismiss on the

basis of the following premises:

(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the hypothetical-

admission rule applies in determining whether a complaint or petition states a cause of

action.[27] Applying said rule in the light of the essential elements of a cause of action,[28] Rebecca had

no cause of action against Vicente for declaration of nullity of marriage.

(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her marriage with Vicente

declared void, the union having previously been dissolved on February 22, 1996 by the foreign

divorce decree she personally secured as an American citizen. Pursuant to the second paragraph of

Article 26 of the Family Code, such divorce restored Vicentes capacity to contract another marriage.

(3) Rebeccas contention about the nullity of a divorce, she being a Filipino citizen at the time

the foreign divorce decree was rendered, was dubious. Her allegation as to her alleged Filipino

citizenship was also doubtful as it was not shown that her father, at the time of her birth, was still a

Filipino citizen. The Certification of Birth of Rebecca issued by the Government of Guam also did not

indicate the nationality of her father.

(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American citizenship, having professed to have

that nationality status and having made representations to that effect during momentous events of her

life, such as: (a) during her marriage; (b) when she applied for divorce; and (c) when she applied for

and eventually secured an American passport on January 18, 1995, or a little over a year before she

initiated the first but later withdrawn petition for nullity of her marriage (Civil Case No. 96-378) on

March 14, 1996.

(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a purportedly Filipino father

in Guam, USA which follows the jus soli principle, Rebeccas representation and assertion about

being an American citizen when she secured her foreign divorce precluded her from denying her

citizenship and impugning the validity of the divorce.

Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Decision, but this recourse

was denied in the equally assailed June 4, 2004 Resolution.[29] Hence, Rebeccas Petition for Review

on Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed under G.R. No. 163979.

The Issues

In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of errors as grounds for the

allowance of her petition, all of which converged on the proposition that the CA erred in enjoining the

implementation of the RTCs orders which would have entitled her to support pending final resolution

of Civil Case No. 01-094.

In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the assailed CA decision submitting as follows:

I THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT MENTIONING AND NOT

TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS THE FACT

OF PETITIONERS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY STATED AND

ALLEGED IN HER PETITION BEFORE THE COURT A QUO.

II THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ONLY ON ANNEXES

TO THE PETITION IN RESOLVING THE MATTERS BROUGHT BEFORE IT.

III THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT

RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THAT HIS MARRIAGE TO

PETITIONER HAD ALREADY BEEN DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE OF HIS SUBSEQUENT

AND CONCURRENT ACTS.

IV THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS

ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT, MUCH LESS A

GRAVE ABUSE.[30]

We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its outcome being determinative

of the success or failure of the petition in G.R. No. 155635.

Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a divorce obtained abroad by

an alien married to a Philippine national may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the decree of

divorce is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.[31] Second, the reckoning point is not the

citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but their citizenship at the time a

valid divorce is obtained abroad. And third, an absolute divorce secured by a Filipino married to

another Filipino is contrary to our concept of public policy and morality and shall not be recognized in

this jurisdiction.[32]

Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, i.e.,

the propriety of the granting of the motion to dismiss by the appellate court, resolves itself into the

questions of:first, whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment

was rendered in the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996; and second, whether the judgment of

divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal effects?

The Courts Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case

There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained her

divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an effective

repudiation of such citizenship. The following are compelling circumstances indicative of her

American citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaa, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed in

this American territory granting American citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she was,

and may still be, a holder of an American passport.[33]

And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted, and represented

herself as an American citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage as shown in the marriage

certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix; and (3) when she secured the divorce from the Dominican

Republic. Mention may be made of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment[34] in which she stated being an

American citizen.

It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration (Bureau) of Identification

(ID) Certificate No. RC 9778 and a Philippine Passport. On its face, ID Certificate No. RC 9778 would

tend to show that she has indeed been recognized as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-

emphasized, however, that such recognition was given only on June 8, 2000 upon the affirmation by

the Secretary of Justice of Rebeccas recognition pursuant to the Order of Recognition issued by

Bureau Associate Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza.

For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate No. RC 9778:

To Whom It May Concern:

This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT* whose

photograph and thumbprints are affixed hereto and partially covered by the seal of this

Office, and whose other particulars are as follows:

Place of Birth: Guam, USA Date of Birth: March 5, 1953

Sex: female Civil Status: married Color of Hair: brown

Color of Eyes: brown Distinguishing marks on face: none

was r e c o g n i z e d as a citizen of the Philippines as per pursuant to Article IV,

Section 1, Paragraph 3 of the 1935 Constitution per order of Recognition JBL 95-213

signed by Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez dated October 6, 1995, and duly

affirmed by Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero in his 1st Indorsement dated June

8, 2000.

Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID for travel purposes.

Given under my hand and seal this 11th day of October, 1995

(SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA

ASSO. COMMISSIONER

Official Receipt No. 5939988

issued at Manila

dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000

From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following material facts and dates may be

deduced: (1) Bureau Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez issued the Order of Recognition

on October 6, 1995; (2) the 1st Indorsement of Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming

Rebeccas recognition as a Filipino citizen was issued on June 8, 2000 or almost five years from the

date of the order of recognition; and (3) ID Certificate No. RC 9778 was purportedly issued

on October 11, 1995 after the payment of the PhP 2,000 fee on October 10, 1995 per OR No.

5939988.

What begs the question is, however, how the above certificate could have been issued by the

Bureau on October 11, 1995 when the Secretary of Justice issued the required affirmation only

on June 8, 2000. No explanation was given for this patent aberration. There seems to be no error with

the date of the issuance of the 1st Indorsement by Secretary of Justice Tuquero as this Court takes

judicial notice that he was the Secretary of Justice from February 16, 2000 to January 22,

2001. There is, thus, a strong valid reason to conclude that the certificate in question must be

spurious.

Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino citizenship require the

affirmation by the DOJ of the Order of Recognition issued by the Bureau. Under Executive Order No.

292, also known as the 1987 Administrative Code, specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6), it is

the DOJ which is tasked to provide immigration and naturalization regulatory services and implement

the laws governing citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens. Thus, the confirmation by the

DOJ of any Order of Recognition for Filipino citizenship issued by the Bureau is required.

Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002[35] on Recognition as a Filipino Citizen

clearly provides:

The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section shall automatically

furnish the Department of Justice an official copy of its Order of Recognition within 72

days from its date of approval by the way of indorsement for confirmation of the Order

by the Secretary of Justice pursuant to Executive Order No. 292. No Identification

Certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of

Justice and any Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau pursuant to an Order of

Recognition shall prominently indicate thereon the date of confirmation by the Secretary

of Justice. (Emphasis ours.)

Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine passport only on June 13,

2000, or five days after then Secretary of Justice Tuquero issued the 1st Indorsement confirming the

order of recognition. It may be too much to attribute to coincidence this unusual sequence of close

events which, to us, clearly suggests that prior to said affirmation or confirmation, Rebecca was not

yet recognized as a Filipino citizen. The same sequence would also imply that ID Certificate No. RC

9778 could not have been issued in 1995, as Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002 mandates that

no identification certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of

Justice. Logically, therefore, the affirmation or confirmation of Rebeccas recognition as a Filipino

citizen through the 1st Indorsement issued only on June 8, 2000 by Secretary of Justice Tuquero

corresponds to the eventual issuance of Rebeccas passport a few days later, or on June 13, 2000 to

be exact.

When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a

Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One

The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen. But from the

foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least was not yet

recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of divorce from

the Dominican Republic.

The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that Rebecca voluntarily withdrew her

original petition for declaration of nullity (Civil Case No. 96-378 of the Makati City RTC) obviously

because she could not show proof of her alleged Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a perusal of that

petition shows that, while bearing the date January 26, 1996, it was only filed with the RTC on March

14, 1996 or less than a month after Rebecca secured, on February 22, 1996, the foreign divorce

decree in question. Consequently, there was no mention about said divorce in the

petition. Significantly, the only documents appended as annexes to said original petition were: the

Vicente-Rebecca Marriage Contract (Annex A) and Birth Certificate of Alix (Annex B). If indeed ID

Certificate No. RC 9778 from the Bureau was truly issued on October 11, 1995, is it not but logical to

expect that this piece of document be appended to form part of the petition, the question of her

citizenship being crucial to her case?

As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Civil Case

No. 01-094, like the withdrawn first petition, also did not have the ID Certificate from the Bureau as

attachment. What were attached consisted of the following material documents: Marriage Contract

(Annex A) and Divorce Decree. It was only through her Opposition (To Respondents Motion to

Dismiss dated 31 May 2001)[36] did Rebecca attach as Annex C ID Certificate No. RC 9778.

At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had sufficient basis to dismiss the

petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage as said petition, taken together with Vicentes

motion to dismiss and Rebeccas opposition to motion, with their respective attachments, clearly made

out a case of lack of cause of action, which we will expound later.

Validity of Divorce Decree

Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97 valid.

First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be recognized,

assuming for argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented

herself in public documents as an American citizen. At the very least, she chose, before, during, and

shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital relationship. Second, she

secured personally said divorce as an American citizen, as is evident in the text of the Civil Decrees,

which pertinently declared:

IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties expressly submit to the

jurisdiction of this court, by reason of the existing incompatibility of temperaments x x x.

The parties MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT, of United States nationality, 42 years of age,

married, domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa,

Philippines, x x x, who personally appeared before this court, accompanied by DR.

JUAN ESTEBAN OLIVERO, attorney, x x x and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, of

Philippine nationality, of 43 years of age, married and domiciled and residing at 502

Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Filipino, appeared before this court

represented by DR. ALEJANDRO TORRENS, attorney, x x x, revalidated by special

power of attorney given the 19th of February of 1996, signed before the Notary Public

Enrico L. Espanol of the City of Manila, duly legalized and authorizing him to subscribe

all the acts concerning this case.[37] (Emphasis ours.)

Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United

States of America, a country which allows divorce. Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and

Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their Agreement[38] executed on December 14, 1996 after

Civil Decree No. 362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No.

406/97 issued onMarch 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid.

To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce

can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the

national law of the alien spouse.[39] Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American

citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States

of the Union,[40] the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign

court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.

It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied, but in fact

admitted by both parties. And neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the divorce court nor

challenge the validity of its proceedings on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or

law, albeit both appeared to have the opportunity to do so. The same holds true with respect to the

decree of partition of their conjugal property. As this Court explained in Roehr v. Rodriguez:

Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment [of divorce] x x

x, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample

opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of

Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:

SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of

a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive

upon the title to the thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive

evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a

subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of

jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or

fact.

It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign

judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In

this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actionsin

personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely

constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is

subject to proof to the contrary.[41]

As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the foreign divorce

while Vicente was duly represented by his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro Torrens, in said

proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican

Republic court are valid and, consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.

Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of

the June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of

Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by

Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in

determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the countrys

policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid

divorce is obtained.[42]

Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce

Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res

judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the

marital vinculumbetween Rebecca and Vicente is considered severed; they are both freed from the

bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each

other. As the divorce court formally pronounced: [T]hat the marriage between MARIA REBECCA M.

BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x x leaving them free to remarry

after completing the legal requirements.[43]

Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a

husbands obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with, observe

respect and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca.[44]

The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the

Family Code, providing as follows:

Art. 26. x x x x

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated

and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him

or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under

Philippine law. (As amended by E.O. 227)

In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the applicability of the second

paragraph of Art. 26, thus:

x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26

as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen

and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or

her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the

celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained

abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.[45]

Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor further the fact of marriage of

Vicente and Rebecca, their citizenship when they wed, and their professed citizenship during the

valid divorce proceedings.

Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree No. 406/97 and the Agreement

executed on December 14, 1996 bind both Rebecca and Vicente as regards their property relations.

The Agreement provided that the ex-couples conjugal property consisted only their family home, thus:

9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property which they acquired during

their marriage consists only of the real property and all the improvements and personal

properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, covered

by TCT No. 168301 dated Feb. 7, 1990 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati,

Metro Manila registered in the name of Vicente M. Bayot, married to Rebecca M. Bayot,

x x x.[46] (Emphasis ours.)

This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was affirmed by the divorce court which,

per its second divorce decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97 dated March 4, 1997, ordered that,

THIRD: That the agreement entered into between the parties dated 14th day of December 1996 in

Makati City, Philippines shall survive in this Judgment of divorce by reference but not merged and

that the parties are hereby ordered and directed to comply with each and every provision of said

agreement.[47]

Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement contained in the Agreement. She is thus

estopped by her representation before the divorce court from asserting that her and Vicentes conjugal

property was not limited to their family home in Ayala Alabang.[48]

No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage

Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court that Rebecca lacks, under

the premises, cause of action. Philippine Bank of Communications v. Trazo explains the concept and

elements of a cause of action, thus:

A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right

of the other. A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action hypothetically admits

the truth of the allegations in the complaint. The allegations in a complaint are sufficient

to constitute a cause of action against the defendants if, hypothetically admitting the

facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with

the prayer therein. A cause of action exists if the following elements are present,

namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it

arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or

not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant

violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the

defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of

damages.[49]

One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebeccas underlying petition before the RTC, Vicentes

motion to dismiss and Rebeccas opposition thereof, with the documentary evidence attached therein:

The petitioner lacks a cause of action for declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes

the existence of a marriage.

To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant must show that the claim

for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous,

indefinite, or uncertain.[50] With the valid foreign divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more marital

tie binding her to Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to be dissolved or nullified.

The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente and Rebecca to

support the needs of their daughter, Alix. The records do not clearly show how he had discharged his

duty, albeit Rebecca alleged that the support given had been insufficient. At any rate, we do note that

Alix, having been born on November 27, 1982, reached the majority age on November 27, 2000, or

four months before her mother initiated her petition for declaration of nullity. She would now be 26

years old. Hence, the issue of back support, which allegedly had been partly shouldered by Rebecca,

is best litigated in a separate civil action for reimbursement. In this way, the actual figure for the

support of Alix can be proved as well as the earning capacity of both Vicente and Rebecca. The trial

court can thus determine what Vicente owes, if any, considering that support includes provisions until

the child concerned shall have finished her education.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need to delve into the issue tendered

in G.R. No. 155635, that is, Rebeccas right to support pendente lite. As it were, her entitlement to that

kind of support hinges on the tenability of her petition under Civil Case No. 01-094 for declaration of

nullity of marriage. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-094 by the CA veritably removed any legal

anchorage for, and effectively mooted, the claim for support pendente lite.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635 is hereby DISMISSED on the

ground of mootness, while the petition for review in G.R. No. 163979 is hereby DENIED for lack of

merit. Accordingly, the March 25, 2004 Decision and June 4, 2004 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R.

SP No. 68187 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,

vs.

DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City,

Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

(present petition).

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through

naturalization on November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T.

Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4 Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left

for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise

Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and

disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of

Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The

divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.5

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous

of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry

Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite

the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed

Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be

enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine

court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of

marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any

responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She

offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself

but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be

considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.

In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert

was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as

he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy,

under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,8 in order for him or her to be able to

remarry under Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the

country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,

except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is

thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino

spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the

second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v.

Orbecido III;10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse

remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino

spouse."11

THE PETITION

From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13

Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed

in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of

Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of

Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien

spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the

standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse – an interpretation he claims to be contrary to

the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a

proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he

might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiancée in the Philippines since two marriage

certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor

General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments,14 both support Gerbert’s position.

Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family

Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign

divorce decree.

THE COURT’S RULING

The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as

the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse

The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the second

paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.

The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void15 and voidable16 marriages.

In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage

exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution

of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute

divorce between Filipino citizens.18

Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien,

President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom

Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its

present wording, as follows:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the

country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,

except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is

thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino

spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into

the law this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases,

the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights after a foreign court’s

divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign

divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn

v. Romillo that:

To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to [the

alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should

not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien

spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal

property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be

served.22

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation

where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no

longer married to the Filipino spouse."23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse,

by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially,

the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive

right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her

to remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition

of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a

related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws

do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code

provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in

a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the

direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage

between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited

to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien

spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract

another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien

spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are

generally governed by his national law.26

Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of

Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the

benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second

paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.

The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest

to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction

We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code

bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not

sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the

second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of

legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce

decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven

according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert,

pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign

judgments. This Section states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order of a

tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is

conclusive upon the title of the thing; and

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is

presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a

subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want

of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a

party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign

judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien

abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her

national law.27

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our

courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a

rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of

another country."28 This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts

under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the

judgment on the alien himself or herself.29 The recognition may be made in an action instituted

specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an

integral aspect of his claim or defense.

In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing

his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24,

Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official

publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies

of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate

issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the

foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the

required certificates proving its authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on

divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of

supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to

determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.

We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will

be served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the

same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a

petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party,

collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to

ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once

recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata32 between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule

39 of the Rules of Court.33

In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of

foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves

as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by

its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for

the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.

Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree

As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already

recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based on the mere

presentation of the decree.34We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to

draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.

Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status

of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry of

judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a person’s legal capacity and status,

i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not

ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married

or not."35

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person’s legal capacity

and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status

specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:

Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in which

shall be entered:

(a) births;

(b) deaths;

(c) marriages;

(d) annulments of marriages;

(e) divorces;

(f) legitimations;

(g) adoptions;

(h) acknowledgment of natural children;

(i) naturalization; and

(j) changes of name.

x x x x

Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the

following books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status

of persons:

(1) Birth and death register;

(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also

divorces and dissolved marriages.

(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.

But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the

submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration. The law

should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before

it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists

recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of

turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and

Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.

Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as

it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,36 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of

198237 – both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign

judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the

registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree

without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.1avvphi1

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the

Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry.

A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the

Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.

Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected,

without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically

providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially

cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural

requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or

correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified

petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is

located;38 that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties

to the proceedings;39 and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of

general circulation.40As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present

case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the

Rules of Court.

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate

proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry – one for recognition of

the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of

Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as

the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to

establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court

can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding41 by which the applicability of the foreign

judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party,

collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008

decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order.

We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our

ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE

CATALAN,

Petitioner,

- versus -

LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE,

Respondent.

G. R. No. 183622

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

BRION,

PEREZ,

SERENO, and

REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

February 8, 2012

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

RESOLUTION

SERENO, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] and

Resolution[2] regarding the issuance of letters of administration of the intestate estate of Orlando B.

Catalan.

The facts are as follows:

Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce in

the United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage with petitioner

herein.

On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.

Thereafter, on 28 February 2005, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of

Dagupan City a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as

administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings

(Spec. Proc.) No. 228.

On 3 March 2005, while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee,

one of the children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC docketed as

Spec. Proc. No. 232.

The two cases were subsequently consolidated.

Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 232 on the ground of litis pendentia,

considering that Spec. Proc. No. 228 covering the same estate was already pending.

On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person

qualified to file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Orlando. In

support of her contention, respondent alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against

petitioner before Branch 54 of the RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan, and docketed as Crim. Case No.

2699-A.

Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint for bigamy, alleging that petitioner contracted a

second marriage to Orlando despite having been married to one Eusebio Bristol on 12 December

1959.

On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy.[3] The trial court ruled that

since the deceased was a divorced American citizen, and since that divorce was not recognized

under Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between him and petitioner was not valid.

Furthermore, it took note of the action for declaration of nullity then pending action with the trial

court in Dagupan City filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner. It considered the

pending action to be a prejudicial question in determining the guilt of petitioner for the crime of

bigamy.

Finally, the trial court found that, in the first place, petitioner had never been married to

Eusebio Bristol.

On 26 June 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissed the Petition for the

issuance of letters of administration filed by petitioner and granted that of private respondent.

Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held that the marriage between petitioner

and Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting when she married Orlando. Without expounding, it

reasoned further that her acquittal in the previous bigamy case was fatal to her cause. Thus, the trial

court held that petitioner was not an interested party who may file a petition for the issuance of letters

of administration.[4]

After the subsequent denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to

the Court of Appeals (CA) via her Petition for Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part

of the RTC in dismissing her Petition for the issuance of letters of administration.

Petitioner reiterated before the CA that the Petition filed by respondent should have been

dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia. She also insisted that, while a petition for letters of

administration may have been filed by an uninterested person, the defect was cured by the

appearance of a real party-in-interest. Thus, she insisted that, to determine who has a better right to

administer the decedents properties, the RTC should have first required the parties to present their

evidence before it ruled on the matter.

On 18 October 2007, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision. First, it held that petitioner

undertook the wrong remedy. She should have instead filed a petition for review rather than a petition

for certiorari. Nevertheless, since the Petition for Certiorari was filed within the fifteen-day

reglementary period for filing a petition for review under Sec. 4 of Rule 43, the CA allowed the Petition

and continued to decide on the merits of the case. Thus, it ruled in this wise:

As to the issue of litis pendentia, we find it not applicable in the case. For litis

pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, there must be: (a) identity of the

parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of

rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts, and (c)

the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment which may be rendered

in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the

other. A petition for letters of administration is a special proceeding. A special

proceeding is an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a

particular fact. And, in contrast to an ordinary civil action, a special proceeding involves

no defendant or respondent. The only party in this kind of proceeding is the petitioner of

the applicant. Considering its nature, a subsequent petition for letters of administration

can hardly be barred by a similar pending petition involving the estate of the same

decedent unless both petitions are filed by the same person. In the case at bar, the

petitioner was not a party to the petition filed by the private respondent, in the same

manner that the latter was not made a party to the petition filed by the former. The first

element of litis pendentia is wanting. The contention of the petitioner must perforce fail.

Moreover, to yield to the contention of the petitioner would render nugatory the

provision of the Rules requiring a petitioner for letters of administration to be an

interested party, inasmuch as any person, for that matter, regardless of whether he has

valid interest in the estate sought to be administered, could be appointed as

administrator for as long as he files his petition ahead of any other person, in derogation

of the rights of those specifically mentioned in the order of preference in the

appointment of administrator under Rule 78, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court,

which provides:

xxx xxx xxx

The petitioner, armed with a marriage certificate, filed her petition for letters of

administration. As a spouse, the petitioner would have been preferred to administer the

estate of Orlando B. Catalan. However, a marriage certificate, like any other public

document, is only prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. The fact that the

petitioner had been charged with bigamy and was acquitted has not been disputed by

the petitioner. Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or

subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been dissolved or before the absent

spouse has been declared presumptively dead by a judgment rendered in a proper

proceedings. The deduction of the trial court that the acquittal of the petitioner in the

said case negates the validity of her subsequent marriage with Orlando B. Catalan has

not been disproved by her. There was not even an attempt from the petitioner to deny

the findings of the trial court. There is therefore no basis for us to make a contrary

finding. Thus, not being an interested party and a stranger to the estate of Orlando B.

Catalan, the dismissal of her petition for letters of administration by the trial court is in

place.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[5] (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this Decision.[6] She alleged that the reasoning of the CA

was illogical in stating, on the one hand, that she was acquitted of bigamy, while, on the other hand,

still holding that her marriage with Orlando was invalid. She insists that with her acquittal of the crime

of bigamy, the marriage enjoys the presumption of validity.

On 20 June 2008, the CA denied her motion.

Hence, this Petition.

At the outset, it seems that the RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate the finding

of the RTC in Crim. Case No. 2699-A that petitioner was never married to Eusebio Bristol. Thus, the

trial court concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it follows that the first marriage

with Bristol still existed and was valid. By failing to take note of the findings of fact on the

nonexistence of the marriage between petitioner and Bristol, both the RTC and CA held that petitioner

was not an interested party in the estate of Orlando.

Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case in Crim. Case No. 2699-A was

dismissed, we had already ruled that under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid

divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. This doctrine was established as early as 1985

in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[7] wherein we said:

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil

Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces[,]

the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and

morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the

Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the

divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of

American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. xxx

We reiterated this principle in Llorente v. Court of Appeals,[8] to wit:

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle

embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the

policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of

public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain

divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.

Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, that once

proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce

from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could

very well lose her right to inherit from him.

In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent

in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its

legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in

view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.

For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be

reversed. We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife

Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. xxx

Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven as we have enunciated in Garcia v.

Recio,[9] to wit:

Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given

presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in

evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself.Indeed the

best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written

act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document

may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official

publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the

document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)

accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the

Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and

(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an

authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not

sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be

demonstrated.

Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989

was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but

only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan

City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner's

qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge.

Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as

a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not

necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he

acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an

alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized

citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their

adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to

the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.

Burden of Proving Australian Law

Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon

petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He

contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was

cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that

country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by

Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of

sound discretion.

We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the

existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. In civil

cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint

when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the

material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. Since the divorce

was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law

validating it falls squarely upon him.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of

foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital

laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their

judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every

reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative. (Emphasis

supplied)

It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlandos

divorce under the laws of the United States and the marriage between petitioner and the deceased.

Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to the trial court for further reception of evidence to

establish the fact of divorce.

Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent marriage, she has the

preferential right to be issued the letters of administration over the estate. Otherwise, letters of

administration may be issued to respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter or next of kin of the

deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court.

This is consistent with our ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,[10] in which we said:

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly

obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have

vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo's

surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove

the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent

and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the

specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held

that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its

authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule

132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign

country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer

having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such

copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or

consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which

the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in

California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the

annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their

marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the

Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of

evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent

and Felicisimo. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain

the rightful party to be issued the letters of administration over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The

Decision dated 18 October 2007 and the Resolution dated 20 June 2008 of the Court of Appeals are

herebyREVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to Branch 70 of the Regional Trial

Court of Burgos, Pangasinan for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 179922 December 16, 2008

JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, petitioner,

vs.

FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD

SANDOVAL CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA. DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO CARLOS

II, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

REYES, R.T., J.:

ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized during the

effectivity of the Family Code, except cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity and

annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or

confession of judgment.

We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)

which reversed and set aside the summary judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in an action

for declaration of nullity of marriage, status of a child, recovery of property, reconveyance, sum of

money, and damages.

The Facts

The events that led to the institution of the instant suitare unveiled as follows:

Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their

compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots are particularly

described as follows:

Parcel No. 1

Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No. 6137 of the Court of Land

Registration.

Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is specifically reserved.

Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.

Parcel No. 2

A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159, situated in the Bo. of Alabang,

Municipality of Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x x containing an area of Thirteen Thousand

Four Hundred Forty One (13,441) square meters.

Parcel No. 3

A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903, approved as a non-subd.

project), being a portion of Lot 159-B [LRC] Psd- Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila,

Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4 by Lot 155, Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE,

point 4 to 5 by Lot 159-B-5; on the S, points 5 to 1 by Lot 159-B-3; on the W, points 1 to 2 by

Lot 159-B-1 (Road widening) all of the subd. plan, containing an area of ONE HUNDRED

THIRTY (130) SQ. METERS, more or less.

PARCEL No. 4

A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being a portion of Lot 28,

Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No. 6137), situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa,

Metro Manila. Bounded on the NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27, Muntinlupa Estate; on the East &

SE, along lines 2 to 6 by Mangangata River; and on the West., along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B of

the subd. plan x x x containing an area of ONE THUSAND AND SEVENTY-SIX (1,076)

SQUARE METERS.

PARCEL No. 5

PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de Solocan. Linda por el NW,

con la parcela 49; por el NE, con la parcela 36; por el SE, con la parcela 51; y por el SW, con

la calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla a S. gds.

01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la

Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas,

continiendo un extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.

PARCEL No. 6

PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De Solocon. Linda por el NW,

con la parcela 50; por el NE, con la parcela 37; por el SE, con la parcela 52; por el SW, con la

Calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto Marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla at S. 43

gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la

Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas,

continiendo una extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS

CUADRADOS.3

During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The agreement was

made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and turn

over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.

Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the name of Teofilo.

These three (3) lots are now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 234824 issued by the

Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT No. 139061 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City;

and TCT No. 139058 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.

Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is now covered by TCT No. 160401

issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.

On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son,

Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilo's death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the name of

respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II. The said two (2) parcels of land are covered by

TCT Nos. 219877 and 210878, respectively, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila.

In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before the RTC in Muntinlupa City, docketed

as Civil Case No. 94-1964. In the said case, the parties submitted and caused the approval of a

partial compromise agreement. Under the compromise, the parties acknowledged their respective

shares in the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel of land. This includes the

remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of said land.

On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing the remaining

land of the first parcel between them.

Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,4 2,331 square meters of the second parcel of

land were adjudicated in favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000-square meter portion was later

divided between petitioner and respondents.

The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise agreement executed on August 17,

1994, with respect to Civil Case No. 94-1964. The parties submitted the supplemental compromise

agreement, which was approved accordingly.

Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in August 1994. Under the contracts, the

parties equally divided between them the third and fourth parcels of land.

In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135, against

respondents before the court a quo with the following causes of action: (a) declaration of nullity of

marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and

damages. The complaint was raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.

In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and

respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He

likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of

respondent Teofilo Carlos II.

Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he entered into with respondent Felicidad

with respect to the subject real properties. He also prayed for the cancellation of the certificates of title

issued in the name of respondents. He argued that the properties covered by such certificates of title,

including the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.

Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral and exemplary damages, attorney's

fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit.

On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They denied the material averments of

petitioner's complaint. Respondents contended that the dearth of details regarding the requisite

marriage license did not invalidate Felicidad's marriage to Teofilo. Respondents declared that Teofilo

II was the illegitimate child of the deceased Teofilo Carlos with another woman.

On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, respondents

prayed for the dismissal of the case before the trial court. They also asked that their counterclaims for

moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, be granted.

But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for summary judgment.

Attached to the motion was the affidavit of the justice of the peace who solemnized the marriage.

Respondents also submitted the Certificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate, the

late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad were designated as parents.

On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment on the ground of

irregularity of the contract evidencing the marriage. In the same breath, petitioner lodged his own

motion for summary judgment. Petitioner presented a certification from the Local Civil Registrar of

Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.

Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary judgment the testimony of respondent

Felicidad in another case. Said testimony was made in Civil Case No. 89-2384, entitled Carlos v.

Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las Piñas. In her testimony, respondent Felicidad narrated

that co-respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo.5

Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted to the trial court its report and

manifestation, discounting the possibility of collusion between the parties.

RTC and CA Dispositions

On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant's (respondent's) Motion for Summary

Judgment is hereby denied. Plaintiff's (petitioner's) Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment is

hereby granted and summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff as follows:

1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos

solemnized at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962, evidenced by the Marriage Certificate

submitted in this case, null and void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage license;

2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the natural, illegitimate, or

legally adopted child of the late Teofilo E. Carlos;

3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff the sum of P18,924,800.00

together with the interest thereon at the legal rate from date of filing of the instant complaint

until fully paid;

4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel of land, less the portion

adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11975, covered by TCT No. 139061 of the Register of

Deeds of Makati City, and ordering said Register of Deeds to cancel said title and to issue

another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;

5. Declaring the Contract, Annex "K" of complaint, between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval

null and void, and ordering the Register of Deeds of Makati City to cancel TCT No. 139058 in

the name of Teofilo Carlos, and to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;

6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval

null and void;

7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of defendant Sandoval and

defendant minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue

another title in the exclusive name of plaintiff herein;

8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of defendant Sandoval and

defendant Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue

another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein.

Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiff's evidence on his claim for moral

damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, appearance fees, and litigation expenses on

June 7, 1996 at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.

SO ORDERED.6

Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal, respondents argued, inter alia, that the

trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment annulling the

marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and in declaring Teofilo II as not an illegitimate child of Teofilo,

Sr.

On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in

lieu thereof, a new one is entered REMANDING the case to the court of origin for further

proceedings.

SO ORDERED.7

The CA opined:

We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary judgment by the court a quo contrary to

law and public policy as ensconced in the aforesaid safeguards. The fact that it was appellants

who first sought summary judgment from the trial court, did not justify the grant thereof in favor

of appellee. Not being an action "to recover upon a claim" or "to obtain a declaratory relief," the

rule on summary judgment apply (sic) to an action to annul a marriage. The mere fact that no

genuine issue was presented and the desire to expedite the disposition of the case cannot

justify a misinterpretation of the rule. The first paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil Code

expressly prohibit the rendition of decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts

or a confession of judgment. Yet, the affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment

practically amount to these methods explicitly proscribed by the law.

We are not unmindful of appellee's argument that the foregoing safeguards have traditionally

been applied to prevent collusion of spouses in the matter of dissolution of marriages and that

the death of Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992 had effectively dissolved the marriage herein

impugned. The fact, however, that appellee's own brother and appellant Felicidad Sandoval

lived together as husband and wife for thirty years and that the annulment of their marriage is

the very means by which the latter is sought to be deprived of her participation in the estate left

by the former call for a closer and more thorough inquiry into the circumstances surrounding

the case. Rather that the summary nature by which the court a quo resolved the issues in the

case, the rule is to the effect that the material facts alleged in the complaint for annulment of

marriage should always be proved. Section 1, Rule 19 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

"Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or

otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may,

on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment

of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall

always be proved." (Underscoring supplied)

Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary judgment to the

case at bench, Our perusal of the record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee

would still not be warranted. While it may be readily conceded that a valid marriage license is

among the formal requisites of marriage, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab

initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the Civil Code the failure to reflect the

serial number of the marriage license on the marriage contract evidencing the marriage

between Teofilo Carlos and appellant Felicidad Sandoval, although irregular, is not as fatal as

appellee represents it to be. Aside from the dearth of evidence to the contrary, appellant

Felicidad Sandoval's affirmation of the existence of said marriage license is corroborated by

the following statement in the affidavit executed by Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of the Peace

who officiated the impugned marriage, to wit:

"That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage license issued at Silang, Cavite

on May 14, 1962 as basis of the said marriage contract executed by Teofilo Carlos and

Felicidad Sandoval, but the number of said marriage license was inadvertently not

placed in the marriage contract for the reason that it was the Office Clerk who filled up

the blanks in the Marriage Contract who in turn, may have overlooked the same."

Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We are of the considered view that

the veracity and credibility of the foregoing statement as well as the motivations underlying the

same should be properly threshed out in a trial of the case on the merits.

If the non-presentation of the marriage contract - the primary evidence of marriage - is not

proof that a marriage did not take place, neither should appellants' non-presentation of the

subject marriage license be taken as proof that the same was not procured. The burden of

proof to show the nullity of the marriage, it must be emphasized, rests upon the plaintiff and

any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.

Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who disputes the legitimacy of a

particular party, the same may be said of the trial court's rejection of the relationship between

appellant Teofilo Carlos II and his putative father on the basis of the inconsistencies in

appellant Felicidad Sandoval's statements. Although it had effectively disavowed appellant's

prior claims regarding the legitimacy of appellant Teofilo Carlos II, the averment in the answer

that he is the illegitimate son of appellee's brother, to Our mind, did not altogether foreclose the

possibility of the said appellant's illegitimate filiation, his right to prove the same or, for that

matter, his entitlement to inheritance rights as such.

Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, We find appellee's bare

allegation that appellant Teofilo Carlos II was merely purchased from an indigent couple by

appellant Felicidad Sandoval, on the whole, insufficient to support what could well be a minor's

total forfeiture of the rights arising from his putative filiation. Inconsistent though it may be to

her previous statements, appellant Felicidad Sandoval's declaration regarding the illegitimate

filiation of Teofilo Carlos II is more credible when considered in the light of the fact that, during

the last eight years of his life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said appellant the use of his name and

the shelter of his household. The least that the trial court could have done in the premises was

to conduct a trial on the merits in order to be able to thoroughly resolve the issues pertaining to

the filiation of appellant Teofilo Carlos II.8

On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of the ponente,

Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador. The CA denied the twin motions.

Issues

In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues:

1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment under the Decision, Annex A

hereof, and in denying petitioner's Motion for reconsideration under the Resolution, Annex F

hereof, with respect to the nullity of the impugned marriage, petitioner respectfully submits that

the Court of Appeals committed a grave reversible error in applying Articles 88 and 101 of the

Civil Code, despite the fact that the circumstances of this case are different from that

contemplated and intended by law, or has otherwise decided a question of substance not

theretofore decided by the Supreme Court, or has decided it in a manner probably not in

accord with law or with the applicable decisions of this Honorable Court;

2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering

another remanding the case to the court of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most

respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a serious reversible error in applying

Section 1, Rule 19 (now Section 1, Rule 34) of the Rules of Court providing for judgment on

the pleadings, instead of Rule 35 governing Summary Judgments;

3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering

another remanding the case to the court of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most

respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion,

disregarded judicial admissions, made findings on ground of speculations, surmises, and

conjectures, or otherwise committed misapplications of the laws and misapprehension of the

facts.9 (Underscoring supplied)

Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage may be declared void ab initio through

a judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment and without the benefit of a trial. But there are

other procedural issues, including the capacity of one who is not a spouse in bringing the action for

nullity of marriage.

Our Ruling

I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither judgment on the

pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed.

Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 1910 of the Revised Rules of Court, which

provides:

SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or

otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on

motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of

marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be

proved.

He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing summary

judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings.

Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within the provisions of the Rule on

judgment on the pleadings. In disagreeing with the trial court, the CA likewise considered the

provisions on summary judgments, to wit:

Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary judgment to the

case at bench, Our perusal of the record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee

would still not be warranted. x x x11

But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct in

reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the

pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of

marriage and even in annulment of marriage.

With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void

Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," the question on the application of summary

judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of marriage has been

stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid down by the said Rule, which took effect on March

15, 200312 is found in Section 17, viz.:

SEC. 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case. No

delegation of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters involving

property relations of the spouses.

(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be

proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall be

allowed. (Underscoring supplied)

Likewise instructive is the Court's pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.13 In that case, We

excluded actions for nullity or annulment of marriage from the application of summary judgments.

Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of marriage or declaration of its

nullity or for legal separation, summary judgment is applicable to all kinds of

actions.14 (Underscoring supplied)

By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful right and duty to

intervene in the case. The participation of the State is not terminated by the declaration of the public

prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties. The State should have been given the

opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered.15

Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the prosecuting attorney

to appear and intervene for the State. It is at this stage when the public prosecutor sees to it that

there is no suppression of evidence. Concomitantly, even if there is no suppression of evidence, the

public prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence to be presented or laid down before the court is

not fabricated.

To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute

Nullity of Void Marriages reiterates the duty of the public prosecutor, viz.:

SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. - (a) x x x

(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public prosecutor to intervene for the

State during the trial on the merits to prevent suppression or fabrication of evidence.

(Underscoring supplied)

Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General will ensure that the

interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for declaration of nullity of marriages

by preventing the fabrication or suppression of evidence.16

II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or

wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-

10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.

Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable

Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party

outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses by stating:

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. -

(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed

solely by the husband or the wife. (Underscoring supplied)

Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for

declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of the Rule is enlightening, viz.:

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages

or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory

or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not

have a legal right to file the petition.Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights

prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the

marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the

estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of

the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.17 (Underscoring supplied)

The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects of a healthy, loving,

peaceful marriage. They are the only ones who can decide when and how to build the foundations of

marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers of their marital life. They are simultaneously the

directors and actors of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone can and should decide

when to take a cut, but only in accordance with the grounds allowed by law.

The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line between

marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule extends

only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3,

1988.18

The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of

the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the

surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their

successional rights.

While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage

may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs

are without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in

the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of

Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the

spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding

for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.19

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March

15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the

new Rule which became effective on March 15, 200320 is prospective in its application. Thus, the

Court held in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,21 viz.:

As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family Code of

the Philippines, and is prospective in its application.22 (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The

marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends upon

when the marriage took place.23

The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is

the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.24 But the Civil Code is silent

as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can

bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?

We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a

license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to be the party

who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of

the suit.25 Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic in procedural law

that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.26

Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by

the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved

or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction

of the court as plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, the case is

dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.27

Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals,28 where the Court held:

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were

married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition

to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate "proper

interest" can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any

other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-

interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Niñal v. Badayog, the Court held

that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage of

their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.

x x x x

In fine, petitioner's personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be

ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it.

Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary

to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the

foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid

divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlando's remarriage,

then the trial court should declare respondent's marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but

reduced the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary

damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce

decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the

instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-

Catalan lacks legal personality to file the same.29(Underscoring supplied)

III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner is a real-party-in-interest to

seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage in controversy.

In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only surviving

compulsory heirs are respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under the law on succession,

successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and the compulsory

heirs are called to succeed by operation of law.30

Upon Teofilo's death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the

inheritance are transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These heirs were respondents Felicidad and

Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse and child, respectively.

Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and

ascendants;

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their

legitimate children and descendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.31

Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But although a collateral

relative, such as a brother, does not fall within the ambit of a compulsory heir, he still has a right to

succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of the New Civil Code provide:

ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the

latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their

children to the other half.

ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving

spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in

accordance with the following articles. (Underscoring supplied)

Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children excludes collateral

relatives from succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The presence of legitimate, illegitimate, or

adopted child or children of the deceased precludes succession by collateral relatives.32 Conversely,

if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral

relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent.33

If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted

son of Teofilo, petitioner would then have a personality to seek the nullity of marriage of his deceased

brother with respondent Felicidad. This is so, considering that collateral relatives, like a brother and

sister, acquire successional right over the estate if the decedent dies without issue and without

ascendants in the direct line.

The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no other siblings but

petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted

son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half of the estate of his brother, the first half being

allotted to the widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes petitioner a real-

party-interest to seek the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with

respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be void ab initio, petitioner succeeds to the

entire estate.

It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner to bring the nullity of marriage case

is contingent upon the final declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate, adopted, or illegitimate son of

Teofilo.

If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo, then petitioner

has no legal personality to ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother and respondent

Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has no successional right to be protected, hence, does

not have proper interest. For although the marriage in controversy may be found to be void from the

beginning, still, petitioner would not inherit. This is because the presence of descendant,

illegitimate,34 or even an adopted child35 excludes the collateral relatives from inheriting from the

decedent.

Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to determine the validity or

nullity of the subject marriage is called for. But the RTC is strictly instructed to dismiss the nullity of

marriage case for lack of cause of action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate,

illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother of petitioner.

IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of respondent Teofilo II is proper and in

order. There is a need to vacate the disposition of the trial court as to the other causes of action

before it.

Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling of the CA on the remand of the case

concerning the filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This notwithstanding, We should not leave the matter

hanging in limbo.

This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error by the

parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case.36

We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, petitioner's

bare allegation that respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an indigent couple is insufficient to

support a total forfeiture of rights arising from his putative filiation. However, We are not inclined to

support its pronouncement that the declaration of respondent Felicidad as to the illegitimate filiation of

respondent Teofilo II is more credible. For the guidance of the appellate court, such declaration of

respondent Felicidad should not be afforded credence. We remind the CA of the guaranty provided

by Article 167 of the Family Code to protect the status of legitimacy of a child, to wit:

ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have

declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. (Underscoring

supplied)

It is stressed that Felicidad's declaration against the legitimate status of Teofilo II is the very act that is

proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion

by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or

conceived within a valid marriage.37

Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for causes of action concerning

reconveyance, recovery of property, and sum of money must be vacated. This has to be so, as said

disposition was made on the basis of its finding that the marriage in controversy was null and void ab

initio.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:

1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard to the action on the status

and filiation of respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the validity or nullity of marriage between

respondent Felicidad Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;

2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally adopted son of the

late Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the action for nullity of

marriage for lack of cause of action;

3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision is VACATED AND SET

ASIDE.

The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits with dispatch and to give this

case priority in its calendar.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Supreme Court

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

ISIDRO ABLAZA,

Petitioner,

-versus -

REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

G.R. No. 158298

Present:

CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson,

BRION,

BERSAMIN,

ABAD,* and

VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:

August 11, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

BERSAMIN, J.:

Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage of his

deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old Civil Code is the legal issue to be

determined in this appeal brought by the petitioner whose action for that purpose has been dismissed

by the lower courts on the ground that he, not being a party in the assailed marriage, had no right to

bring the action.

Antecedents

On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cataingan, Masbate a

petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26,

1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.[1] The case was docketed

as Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage Contract between

Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner.

The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been

celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950,

thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license.

He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue

entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby

making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of

the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due

to the marriage being void ab initio.[2]

Ruling of the RTC

On October 18, 2000, [3] the RTC dismissed the petition, stating:

Considering the petition for annulment of marriage filed, the Court hereby resolved to

DISMISS the petition for the following reasons: 1) petition is filed out of time (action had

long prescribed) and 2) petitioner is not a party to the marriage (contracted between

Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Nonato on December 26, 1949 and solemnized by

Rev. Fr. Eusebio B. Calolot).

SO ORDERED.

The petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied

the motion for reconsideration on November 14, 2000.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the lone error that:

The trial court erred in dismissing the petition for being filed out of time and that the

petitioner is not a party to the marriage.

In its decision dated January 30, 2003,[4] however, the CA affirmed the dismissal

order of the RTC, thus:

While an action to declare the nullity of a marriage considered void from the beginning

does not prescribe, the law nonetheless requires that the same action must be filed by

the proper party, which in this case should be filed by any of the parties to the marriage.

In the instant case, the petition was filed by Isidro Ablaza, a brother of the deceased-

spouse, who is not a party to the marriage contracted by Cresenciano Ablaza and

Leonila Honato. The contention of petitioner-appellant that he is considered a real party

in interest under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as he stands to

be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, is simply misplaced. Actions for

annulment of marriage will not prosper if persons other than those specified in the law

file the case.

Certainly, a surviving brother of the deceased spouse is not the proper party to file the

subject petition. More so that the surviving wife, who stands to be prejudiced, was not

even impleaded as a party to said case.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error therefrom, the Orders now on appeal are

hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner-appellant.

SO ORDERED.[5]

Hence, this appeal.

Issues

The petitioner raises the following issues:

I.WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

IN CA-G.R. CV. NO. 69684 AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF THE

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 49 AT CATAINGAN, MASBATE IN SPECIAL

PROCEEDING NO. 117 IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAWS AND

JURISPRUDENCE;

II.WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

IN CA-G.R. CV NO. 69684 (SHOULD) BE REVERSED BASED ON EXECUTIVE

ORDER NO. 209 AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE.

The issues, rephrased, boil down to whether the petitioner is a real party in interest in the

action to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother.

Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and to give rise to the

mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such relation. The law prescribes the requisites of a

valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a marriage is tested according to the law in force at the time the

marriage is contracted.[6] As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already celebrated cannot be

changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing law.[7] To illustrate, a marriage between a

stepbrother and a stepsister was void under the Civil Code, but is not anymore prohibited under

the Family Code; yet, the intervening effectivity of the Family Code does not affect the void nature of

a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code.

The Civil Code marriage remains void, considering that the validity of a marriage is governed by the

law in force at the time of the marriage ceremony.[8]

Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein of Administrative

Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and

Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on March 15, 2003.

Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a

petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife.

Suchlimitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and

those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code.[9] Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends

only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a

procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings

commenced after March 15, 2003.[10]

Based on Carlos v. Sandoval,[11] the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a

marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit:

1. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-

10-SC; and

2. Those filed vis--vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil

Code and, those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15,

2003.

Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December 26,

1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the

marriage.Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate

the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no

application to the petitioner.

The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare the

nullity of a marriage, and when. Accordingly, in Nial v. Bayadog,[12] the children were allowed to

file after the death of their father a petition for the declaration of the nullity of their fathers marriage to

their stepmother contracted on December 11, 1986 due to lack of a marriage license. There, the

Court distinguished between a void marriage and a voidable one, and explained how and when each

might be impugned, thuswise:

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in

order to establish the nullity of a marriage. A void marriage does not require a judicial

decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but

though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of

good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the

nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of

competent jurisdiction. Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so

far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage

had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can

be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either

direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or

after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the

facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by

the courts. It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except

in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of

either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.But Article 40 of

the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the

nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second

marriage and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that

effect. For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the

declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of

either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the

same cannot be considered imprescriptible.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to

declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to

determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,

dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass

upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same

so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to

any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of

declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The

clause on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article

40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for

purpose of remarriage.[13]

It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes cannot

be construed as giving a license to just any person to bring an action to declare the absolute nullity of

a marriage. According to Carlos v. Sandoval,[14] the plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be

benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that

every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest.[15] Thus, only

the party who can demonstrate a proper interest can file the action.[16] Interest within the meaning of

the rule means material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of

the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental

interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as

plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is dismissible on the

ground of lack of cause of action.[17]

Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresencianos brother and surviving heir.

Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in the

estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother

like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has the right to succeed

to the estate of a deceased brother under the conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of

the Civil Code, as follows:

Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or

widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance and the brothers and

sisters or their children to the other half.

Article 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a

surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the

deceased in accordance with the following articles.

Pursuant to these provisions, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or illegitimate children of the

deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding to the deceaseds

estate.[18]Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior

determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate or

illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresencianos surviving heir. Such prior

determination must be made by the trial court, for the inquiry thereon involves questions of fact.

As can be seen, both the RTC and the CA erroneously resolved the issue presented in this case. We

reverse their error, in order that the substantial right of the petitioner, if any, may not be prejudiced.

Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila, who, as the late

Cresencianos surviving wife,[19] stood to be benefited or prejudiced by the nullification of

her own marriage. It is relevant to observe, moreover, that not all marriages celebrated under the

old Civil Code required

a marriage license for their validity;[20] hence, her participation in this action is made all the more

necessary in order to shed light on whether the marriage had been celebrated without a marriage

license and whether the marriage might have been a marriage excepted from the requirement of a

marriage license. She was truly an indispensable party who must be joined herein:

xxx under any and all conditions, [her] presence being a sine qua non for the

exercise of judicial power. It is precisely when an indispensable party is not before the

court [that] the action should be dismissed. The absence of an indispensable party

renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not

only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.[21]

We take note, too, that the petitioner and Leonila were parties in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025

entitled Heirs of Cresenciano Ablaza, namely: Leonila G. Ablaza and Leila Ablaza Jasul v. Spouses

Isidro and Casilda Ablaza, an action to determine who between the parties were the legal owners of

the property involved therein. Apparently, C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025 was decided on November 26,

2009, and the petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied on June 23, 2010. As a defendant in

that action, the petitioner is reasonably presumed to have knowledge that the therein plaintiffs,

Leonila and Leila, were the wife and daughter, respectively, of the late Cresenciano. As such, Leila

was another indispensable party whose substantial right any judgment in this action will definitely

affect. The petitioner should likewise implead Leila.

The omission to implead Leonila and Leila was not immediately fatal to the present action,

however, considering that Section 11,[22] Rule 3, Rules of Court, states that neither misjoinder nor

non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action. The petitioner can still amend his

initiatory pleading in order to implead her, for under the same rule, such amendment to implead an

indispensable party may be made on motion of any party or on (the trial courts) own initiative at any

stage of the action and on such terms as are just.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is granted.

We reverse and set aside the decision dated January 30, 2003 rendered by the Court of

Appeals.

Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage Contract between

Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner, is reinstated, and its records are

returned to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, in Cataingan, Masbate, for further proceedings, with

instructions to first require the petitioner to amend his initiatory pleading in order to implead Leonila

Honato and her daughter Leila Ablaza Jasul as parties-defendants; then to determine whether the

late Cresenciano Ablaza had any ascendants, descendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate) at

the time of his death as well as whether the petitioner was the brother and surviving heir of the late

Cresenciano Ablaza entitled to succeed to the estate of said deceased; and thereafter to proceed

accordingly.

No costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010

CYNTHIA S. BOLOS, Petitioner,

vs.

DANILO T. BOLOS, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking a review of the

December 10, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in an original action for certiorari under

Rule 65 entitled "Danilo T. Bolos v. Hon. Lorifel Lacap Pahimna and Cynthia S. Bolos," docketed as

CA-G.R. SP. No. 97872, reversing the January 16, 2007 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig

City, Branch 69 (RTC), declaring its decision pronouncing the nullity of marriage between petitioner

and respondent final and executory.

On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her

marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as JDRC

No. 6211.

After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment in a Decision, dated August 2,

2006, with the following disposition:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between petitioner CYNTHIA S.

BOLOS and respondent DANILO T. BOLOS celebrated on February 14, 1980 as null and void ab

initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of both petitioner and respondent under

Article 36 of the Family Code with all the legal consequences provided by law.

Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan as well as the National Statistics Office (NSO) copy of

this decision.

SO ORDERED.2

A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on August 25, 2006. He timely filed the Notice of

Appeal on September 11, 2006.

In an order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure

to file the required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on

Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.

On November 23, 2006, a motion to reconsider the denial of Danilo’s appeal was likewise denied.

On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order declaring its August 2, 2006 decision final and

executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia.

Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the

orders of the RTC as they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in

excess of jurisdiction, to wit: 1) the September 19, 2006 Order which denied due course to Danilo’s

appeal; 2) the November 23, 2006 Order which denied the motion to reconsider the September 19,

2006 Order; and 3) the January 16, 2007 Order which declared the August 2, 2006 decision as final

and executory. Danilo also prayed that he be declared psychologically capacitated to render the

essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of abandoning him, the family

home and their children.

As earlier stated, the CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the

RTC. The appellate court stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite

to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage between Cynthia

and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took effect. It relied on the

ruling of this Court in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli3 to the effect that the "coverage [of A.M. No.

02-11-10-SC] extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code

which took effect on August 3, 1988."

Cynthia sought reconsideration of the ruling by filing her Manifestation with Motion for Extension of

Time to File Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Partial Reconsideration [of the Honorable

Court’s Decision dated December 10, 2008]. The CA, however, in its February 11, 2009

Resolution,4 denied the motion for extension of time considering that the 15-day reglementary period

to file a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 40, 1997 Rules on

Civil Procedure citing Habaluyas v. Japson, 142 SCRA 208. The motion for partial reconsideration

was likewise denied.

Hence, Cynthia interposes the present petition via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the following

I S S U E S

I

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED DECISION DATED

DECEMBER 10, 2008 CONSIDERING THAT:

A. THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN ENRICO V. SPS.

MEDINACELI IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE CONSIDERING THAT THE

FACTS AND THE ISSUE THEREIN ARE NOT SIMILAR TO THE INSTANT CASE.

B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURT

IS APLLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE, ITS RULING IN ENRICO V. SPS. MEDINACELI IS

PATENTLY ERRONEOUS BECAUSE THE PHRASE "UNDER THE FAMILY CODE" IN A.M.

NO. 02-11-10-SC PERTAINS TO THE WORD "PETITIONS" RATHER THAN TO THE WORD

"MARRIAGES."

C. FROM THE FOREGOING, A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC ENTITLED "RULE ON DECLARATION

OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE

MARRIAGES" IS APPLICABLE TO MARRIAGES SOLEMNIZED BEFORE THE

EFFECTIVITY OF THE FAMILY CODE. HENCE, A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS A

PRECONDITION FOR AN APPEAL BY HEREIN RESPONDENT.

D. CONSIDERING THAT HEREIN RESPONDENT REFUSED TO COMPLY WITH A

PRECONDITION FOR APPEAL, A RELAXATION OF THE RULES ON APPEAL IS NOT

PROPER IN HIS CASE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION

DATED FEBRUARY 11, 2009 CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING AND THE FACTUAL

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.

III

THE TENETS OF JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY, THE NOVELTY AND IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE

AND THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE JUSTIFY AND WARRANT A LIBERAL VIEW

OF THE RULES IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER. MOREOVER, THE INSTANT PETITION IS

MERITORIOUS AND NOT INTENDED FOR DELAY.5

From the arguments advanced by Cynthia, the principal question to be resolved is whether or not

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and

Annulment of Voidable Marriages," is applicable to the case at bench.

Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages solemnized before the

effectivity of the Family Code. According to Cynthia, the CA erroneously anchored its decision to

an obiter dictum in the aforecited Enrico case, which did not even involve a marriage solemnized

before the effectivity of the Family Code.

She added that, even assuming arguendo that the pronouncement in the said case constituted a

decision on its merits, still the same cannot be applied because of the substantial disparity in the

factual milieu of the Enrico case from this case. In the said case, both the marriages sought to be

declared null were solemnized, and the action for declaration of nullity was filed, after the effectivity of

both the Family Code in 1988 and of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC in 2003. In this case, the marriage was

solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code and A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC while the action was

filed and decided after the effectivity of both.

Danilo, in his Comment,6 counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable because his marriage

with Cynthia was solemnized on February 14, 1980, years before its effectivity. He further stresses

the meritorious nature of his appeal from the decision of the RTC declaring their marriage as null and

void due to his purported psychological incapacity and citing the mere "failure" of the parties who

were supposedly "remiss," but not "incapacitated," to render marital obligations as required under

Article 36 of the Family Code.

The Court finds the petition devoid of merit.

Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case. Her stance is unavailing. The Rule on

Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained

in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope.

Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:

Section 1. Scope – This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void

marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.

The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends

only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on

August 3, 1988.7 The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code

and those solemnized under the Civil Code.8

The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation that the phrase "under the

Family Code" in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word "petitions" rather than to the word

"marriages."

A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or

ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application.9 As

the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied

without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is

expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or "speech is the index of intention." Furthermore, there

is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or "from the words of a statute there should be no

departure."10

There is no basis for petitioner’s assertion either that the tenets of substantial justice, the novelty and

importance of the issue and the meritorious nature of this case warrant a relaxation of the Rules in

her favor. Time and again the Court has stressed that the rules of procedure must be faithfully

complied with and should not be discarded with the mere expediency of claiming substantial

merit.11 As a corollary, rules prescribing the time for doing specific acts or for taking certain

proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to prevent needless delays and to orderly and

promptly discharge judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.12

The appellate court was correct in denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a motion for

reconsideration considering that the reglementary period for filing the said motion for reconsideration

is non-extendible. As pronounced in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 13

The rule is and has been that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. The

Court has made this clear as early as 1986 in Habaluyas Enterprises vs. Japzon. Since then, the

Court has consistently and strictly adhered thereto.1avvphil

Given the above, we rule without hesitation that the appellate court’s denial of petitioner’s motion for

reconsideration is justified, precisely because petitioner’s earlier motion for extension of time did not

suspend/toll the running of the 15-day reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration.

Under the circumstances, the CA decision has already attained finality when petitioner filed its motion

for reconsideration. It follows that the same decision was already beyond the review jurisdiction of this

Court.

In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision which denied due

course to respondent’s appeal and denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a motion

for reconsideration.

Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. Its purpose is to bring up for review a final judgment

of the lower court. The courts should, thus, proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of his

right to appeal.14 In the recent case of Almelor v. RTC of Las Pinas City, Br. 254,15 the Court

reiterated: While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it is an essential

part of our judicial system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the

right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper

and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.

In the case at bench, the respondent should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of

his appeal considering that what is at stake is the sacrosanct institution of marriage.

No less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution. This

constitutional policy is echoed in our Family Code. Article 1 thereof emphasizes its permanence and

inviolability, thus:

Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered

into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the

family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by

law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations

during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

This Court is not unmindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the

basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.16

Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in

which the State is vitally interested. The State finds no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy

families. The break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation

is not the concern alone of the family members.17

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

ALAIN M. DIO , G.R. No. 178044

Petitioner,

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - NACHURA,

PERALTA,

ABAD, and

MENDOZA, JJ.

MA. CARIDAD L. DIO, Promulgated:

Respondent. January 19, 2011

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 18 October 2006 Decision2 and the 12 March

2007 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 254 (trial court) in Civil Case No. LP-

01-0149.

The Antecedent Facts

Alain M. Dio (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Dio (respondent) were childhood friends and

sweethearts. They started living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996,

petitioner and respondent decided to live together again. On 14 January 1998, they were married

before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Pias City.

On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent,

citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged that respondent

failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility

to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that

depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at

times become violent and hurt him.

Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at the time of the filing of the

petition, was already living in the United States of America. Despite receipt of the summons,

respondent did not file an answer to the petition within the reglementary period. Petitioner later

learned that respondent filed a petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage with petitioner, which

was granted by the Superior Court of California on 25 May 2001. Petitioner also learned that on 5

October 2001, respondent married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara.

On 30 April 2002, the Office of the Las Pias prosecutor found that there were no indicative facts of

collusion between the parties and the case was set for trial on the merits.

Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological report establishing

that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was deeply ingrained in

her system since her early formative years. Dr. Tayag found that respondents disorder was long-

lasting and by nature, incurable.

In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent was

psychologically incapacited to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the

celebration of the marriage.

The Decision of the Trial Court

The trial court ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner was able to establish

respondents psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled that even without Dr. Tayags psychological

report, the allegations in the complaint, substantiated in the witness stand, clearly made out a case of

psychological incapacity against respondent. The trial court found that respondent committed acts

which hurt and embarrassed petitioner and the rest of the family, and that respondent failed to

observe mutual love, respect and fidelity required of her under Article 68 of the Family Code. The trial

court also ruled that respondent abandoned petitioner when she obtained a divorce abroad and

married another man.

The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIO and defendant MA. CARIDAD L.

DIO on January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the

beginning; and

2. Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.

A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance

with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General, Office of

the City Prosecutor, Las Pias City and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pias City,

for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.4

Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the dissolution of the absolute

community of property and the ruling that the decree of annulment shall only be issued upon

compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.

In its 12 March 2007 Order, the trial court partially granted the motion and modified its 18 October

2006 Decision as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1) Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIO and defendant MA. CARIDAD L.

DIO on January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the

beginning; and

2) Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.

A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation,

partition and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

Let copies of this Order be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Office

of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City and the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pias City, for their

information and guidance.5

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute

nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties

properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has merit.

Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall

only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of

the Family Code. Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of

Null Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages6 (the Rule) does not apply to Article 147 of the

Family Code.

We agree with petitioner.

The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage, regardless

of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either

by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of

parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but

whose marriage is nonetheless void,8such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.

Article 147 of the Family Code provides:

Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with

each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages

and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them

through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be

presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by

them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the

acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the

acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family

and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property

acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until

after the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad

faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default

of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall

belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share

shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination

of the cohabitation.

For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:

1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;

2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and

3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.9

All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family

Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.

We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of

marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties under

Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not

apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule

provides:

Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein

that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after

compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on

Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.

The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in Section 19(1) of the Rule are:

Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in Article 44

shall also apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final

judgment under Articles 40 and 45.10

The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of

the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the

delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous

judicial proceedings.

All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community of the conjugal partnership

shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.

In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in

accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.

Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children,

computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash,

property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had

already provided for such matters.

The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may ask for the enforcement of

the judgment.

The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the

ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either or both of the

parents; but the value of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or

absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime.

It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages

which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family

Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared

void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for

the liquidation of the properties of the parties.

Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or bigamous marriage was

contracted. Under Article 40, [t]he absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for

purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

Thus we ruled:

x x x where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of

contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to

be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring a previous marriage void.11

Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages, meaning, marriages

which are valid until they are set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for

annulment.12 In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by

absolute community of property13 or conjugal partnership of gains14 unless the parties agree to a

complete separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the

property relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of property or conjugal

partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a

decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36

of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.

In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 3615 of the Family

Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in

common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that

the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either

by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.16 The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties

of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership.

Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, [p]artitionmay be made by agreement between the parties or by

judicial proceedings. x x x. It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same

proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with the MODIFICATION that the decree of

absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial courts decision without waiting

for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family

Code.

SO ORDERED.