case1 succession 02938475

7/28/2019 Case1 succession 02938475

1/37

1

G.R. No. 131953 June 5, 2002

MA. ESTELA MAGLASANG, NICOLAS CABATINGAN andMERLY S. CABATINGAN,petitioners,vs.THE HEIRS OF CORAZON CABATINGAN, namely, LUZ M.BOQUIA, PERLA M. ABELLA, ESTRELLA M. CAETE,LOURDES M. YUSON, and JULIA L. MAYOL, HEIRS OFGENOVIVA C. NATIVIDAD namely, OSCAR C. NATIVIDAD,OLGA NATIVIDAD, ODETTE NATIVIDAD, OPHELIA

NATIVIDAD, RICHARD NATIVIDAD, RAYMUND NATIVIDAD,RICHIE NATIVIDAD, SONIA NATIVIDAD and ENCARNACIONCABATINGAN VDA. DE TRINIDAD, ALFREDO CABATINGANand JESUSA C. NAVADA, respondents.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,J .:

Posed for resolution before the Court in this petition for review oncertiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the sole issueof whether the donations made by the late Conchita Cabatinganare donations inter vivos or mortis causa .

The facts of the case are as follows:

On February 17, 1992, Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother, petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, a "Deed of Conditionalof Donation ( sic ) Inter Vivos for House and Lot" covering one-half () portion of the former's house and lot located at Cot-cot, Liloan,Cebu. 1 Four (4) other deeds of donation were subsequentlyexecuted by Conchita Cabatingan on January 14, 1995, bestowingupon: (a) petitioner Estela C. Maglasang, two (2) parcels of land -one located in Cogon, Cebu (307 sq. m.) and the other, a portionof a parcel of land in Masbate (50,232 sq. m.); (b) petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, a portion of a parcel of land located inMasbate (80,000 sq. m.); and (c) petitioner Merly S. Cabatingan, aportion of the Masbate property (80,000 sq. m.). 2 These deeds of donation contain similar provisions, to wit:

"That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR for the DONEE, x x x the DONOR doeshereby, by these presents, transfer, convey, by way of donation, unto the DONEE the above-described property,together with the buildings and al l improvements existingthereon, to become effective upon the death of theDONOR;PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in the eventthat the DONEE should die before the DONOR, thepresent donation shall be deemed automaticallyrescinded and of no further force and effect; x x x" 3 (Emphasis Ours)

On May 9, 1995, Conchita Cabatingan died.

Upon learning of the existence of the foregoing donations,respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue,Branch 55, an action for Annulment And/Or Declaration of Nullityof Deeds of Donations and Accounting, docketed as Civil CaseNo. MAN-2599, seeking the annulment of said four (4) deeds of donation executed on January 14, 1995. Respondents allege, inter alia , that petitioners, through their sinister machinations andstrategies and taking advantage of Conchita Cabatingan's fragilecondition, caused the execution of the deeds of donation, and, thatthe documents are void for failing to comply with the provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities of wills and testaments,considering that these are donations mortis causa .4 Respondentsprayed that a receiver be appointed in order to preserve thedisputed properties, and, that they be declared as co-owners of the properties in equal shares, together with petitioner NicolasCabatingan.

5

Petitioners in their Amended Answer, deny respondents'allegations contending that Conchita Cabatingan freely, knowinglyand voluntarily caused the preparation of the instruments. 6

On respondents' motion, the court a quo rendered a partial judgment on the pleadings on December 2, 1997 in favor of respondents, with the following dispositive portion:

"WHEREREFORE, and in consideration of all theforegoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of theplaintiffs and against the defendant and unwilling co-plaintiff with regards ( sic ) to the four Deeds of Donation

Annexes "A", "A-1", "B" and Annex "C" which is thesubject of this partial decision by:

Declaring the four Deeds of Donation as null and void ab initio for being a donation Mortis Causaand for failure to comply with formal and solemn

requisite under Art. 806 of the New Civil Code;

b) To declare the plaintiffs and defendants aswell as unwilling co-plaintiff as the heirs of thedeceased Conchita Cabatingan and thereforehereditary co-owners of the properties subject of this partial decision, as mandated under Art. 777 of the New Civil Code;

SO ORDERED." 7

The court a quo ruled that the donations are donations mortiscausa and therefore the four (4) deeds in question executed onJanuary 14, 1995 are null and void for failure to comply with the

requisites of Article 806 of the Civil Code on solemnities of willsand testaments. 8

Raising questions of law, petitioners elevated the court a quo 'sdecision to this Court, 9 alleging that:

"THE LOWER COURT PALPABLY DISREGARDED THELONG-AND-WELL-ESTABLISHED RULINGS OF THISHONORABLE SUPREME COURT ON THECHARACTERIZATION OF DONATIONS AS INTERVIVOS OR MORTIS CAUSA AND, INSTEAD,PROCEEDED TO INTERPRET THE DONATIONS INQUESTION IN A MANNER CONTRARY THERETO." 10

Petitioners insist that the donations are inter vivos donations asthese were made by the late Conchita Cabatingan "inconsideration of the love and affection of the donor" for the donee,and there is nothing in the deeds which indicate that the donationswere made in consideration of Cabatingan's death. 11 In addition,petitioners contend that the stipulation on rescission in casepetitioners die ahead of Cabatingan is a resolutory condition thatconfirms the nature of the donation as inter vivos .

Petitioners' arguments are bereft of merit.

In a donation mortis causa , "the right of disposition is nottransferred to the donee while the donor is still alive." 12 Indetermining whether a donation is one of mortis causa , thefollowing characteristics must be taken into account:

(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transfereebefore the death of the transferor; or what amounts to thesame thing, that the transferor should retain theownership (full or naked) and control of the property whilealive;

(2) That before his death, the transfer should berevocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum ; butrevocability may be provided for indirectly by means of areserved power in the donor to dispose of the propertiesconveyed;

and

(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee. 13

In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa isconfirmed by the fact that the donations do not contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners prior to Cabatingan's death. 14 The phrase "to become effective upon the


2/37

2

death of the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation but thatCabatingan did not intend to transfer the ownership of theproperties to petitioners during her lifetime. Petitioners themselvesexpressly confirmed the donations as mortis causa in the following

Acceptance and Attestation clauses, uniformly found in the subjectdeeds of donation, to wit:

"That the DONEE does hereby accept the foregoingdonation mortis causa under the terms and conditions setforth therein, and avail herself of this occasion to express

her profound gratitude for the kindness and generosity of the DONOR."

x x x

"SIGNED by the above-named DONOR and DONEE atthe foot of this Deed of Donation mortis causa, whichconsists of two (2) pages x x x." 15

That the donations were made "in consideration of the love andaffection of the donor" does not qualify the donations as inter vivos because transfers mortis causa may also be made for the samereason. 16

Well in point is National Treasurer o f the Phils . v. Vda. de Meimban .17 In said case, the questioned donation contained theprovision:

"That for and in consideration of the love and affectionwhich the DONOR has for the DONEE, the said Donor bythese presents does hereby give, transfer, and conveyunto the DONEE, her heirs and assigns a portion of ONEHUNDRED THOUSAND (100,000) SQUARE METERS,on the southeastern part Pro-indiviso of the abovedescribed property. (The portion herein donated is withinLot 2-B of the proposed amendment Plan Subdivision of Lots Nos. 1 and 2, Psu-109393), with all the buildings andimprovements thereon, to become effective upon the

death of the DONOR . ( italics supplied. )"18

Notably, the foregoing provision is similar to that contained in thedonation executed by Cabatingan. We held in Meimban case thatthe donation is a mortis causa donation, and that the above quotedprovision establishes the donor's intention to transfer theownership and possession of the donated property to the doneeonly after the former's death. Further:

"As the donation is in the nature of a mortis causadisposition, the formalities of a will should have beencomplied with under Article 728 of the Civil Code,otherwise, the donation is void and would produce noeffect. As we have held in Alejandro v. Geraldez (78

SCRA 245,253), "If the donation is made in contemplationof the donor's death, meaning that the full or nakedownership of the donated properties will pass to thedonee because of the donor's death, then it is at that timethat the donation takes effect, and it is a donation mortiscausa which should be embodied in a last will andtestament. (Citing Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, 95 Phil.481)." 19

We apply the above rulings to the present case. The hereinsubject deeds expressly provide that the donation shall berescinded in case petitioners predecease Conchita Cabatingan. Asstated in Reyes v. Mosqueda ,20 one of the decisivecharacteristics of a donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be considered void if the donor should survive the donee.This is exactly what Cabatingan provided for in her donations. If she really intended that the donation should take effect during her lifetime and that the ownership of the properties donated betransferred to the donee or independently of, and not by reason of her death, she would have not expressed such proviso in thesubject deeds. 1wphi1.nt

Considering that the disputed donations are donations mortiscausa , the same partake of the nature of testamentary provisions 21 and as such, said deeds must be executed in accordance with the

requisites on solemnities of wills and testaments under Articles805 and 806 of the Civil Code, to wit:

"ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, mustbe subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in hispresence, and by his express direction, and attested andsubscribed by three or more credible witnesses in thepresence of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write hisname and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shallalso sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof,except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shallbe numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages usedupon which the will is written , and the fact that thetestator signed the will and every page thereof, or causedsome other person to write his name, under his expressdirection, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses,and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and allthe pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to thewitnesses, it shall be interpreted to them. (n)

ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before anotary public by the testator and the witnesses. Thenotary public shall not be required to retain a copy of thewill, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court.(n)"

The deeds in question although acknowledged before a notarypublic of the donor and the donee, the documents were notexecuted in the manner provided for under the above-quoted

provisions of law.

Thus, the trial court did not commit any reversible error indeclaring the subject deeds of donation null and void.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 113725 June 29, 2000

JOHNNY S. RABADILLA,1 petitioner,vs.

COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA2

COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA VILLACARLOS,respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PURISIMA,J .:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals ,3 dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555,which set aside the decision of Branch 52 of the Regional TrialCourt in Bacolod City, and ordered the defendants-appellees(including herein petitioner), as heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, toreconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits andinterests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of theherein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a deviseeof 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as LotNo. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre. The said Codicil, which wasduly probated and admitted in Special Proceedings No. 4046
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt1


3/37

3

before the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,contained the following provisions:

"FIRST

I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by me toDr. Jorge Rabadilla resident of 141 P. Villanueva, Pasay City:

(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered byTransfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), whichis registered in my name according to the records of theRegister of Deeds of Negros Occidental.

(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, theaforementioned property and the rights which I shall setforth hereinbelow, shall be inherited and acknowledgedby the children and spouse of Jorge Rabadilla.

xxx

FOURTH

(a)....It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that

should I die and Jorge Rabadilla shall have already received theownership of the said Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre,covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), andalso at the time that the lease of Balbinito G. Guanzon of the saidlot shall expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until hedies, every year to give to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza,Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and Twenty Five (25)piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluelay Belleza dies.

FIFTH

(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give LotNo. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate

of Title No. RT-4002 (10492), shall have the obligation to still giveyearly, the sugar as specified in the Fourth paragraph of histestament, to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza on the month of December of each year.

SIXTH

I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, inthe event that the one to whom I have left and bequeathed, andhis heir shall later sell, lease, mortgage this said Lot, the buyer,lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to respect anddeliver yearly ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar to MariaMarlina Coscolluela y Belleza, on each month of December,SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of Export and TWENTY FIVE (25)

piculs of Domestic, until Maria Marlina shall die, lastly should thebuyer, lessee or the mortgagee of this lot, not have respected mycommand in this my addition (Codicil), Maria Marlina Coscolluela yBelleza, shall immediately seize this Lot No. 1392 from my heir and the latter's heirs, and shall turn it over to my near desendants,(sic) and the latter shall then have the obligation to give the ONEHUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar until Maria Marlina shall die. Ifurther command in this my addition (Codicil) that my heir and hisheirs of this Lot No. 1392, that they will obey and follow that shouldthey decide to sell, lease, mortgage, they cannot negotiate withothers than my near descendants and my sister. "4

Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to thedeceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title No.44498 thereto issued in his name.

Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wifeRufina and children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia andZenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.

On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y BellezaVillacarlos brought a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 5588,before Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City,against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to

enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint allegedthat the defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil, inthat:

1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine NationalBank and the Republic Planters Bank in disregard of thetestatrix's specific instruction to sell, lease, or mortgageonly to the near descendants and sister of the testatrix.

2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to

deliver one hundred (100) piculs of sugar (75 piculsexport sugar and 25 piculs domestic sugar) to plaintiff Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza from sugar cropyears 1985 up to the filing of the complaint as mandatedby the Codicil, despite repeated demands for compliance.

3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the Codicil which provided that in case of the sale, lease,or mortgage of the property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall likewise have the obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar per crop year to herein privaterespondent.

The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering

defendant-heirs to reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the survivingheirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the cancellation of TCT No. 44498in the name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and theissuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the survivingheirs of the late Aleja Belleza.

On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were declared indefault but on March 28, 1990 the Order of Default was lifted, withrespect to defendant Johnny S. Rabadilla, who filed his Answer,accordingly.

During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:

On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and acertain Alan Azurin, son-in-law of the herein petitioner who waslessee of the property and acting as attorney-in-fact of defendant-heirs, arrived at an amicable settlement and entered into aMemorandum of Agreement on the obligation to deliver onehundred piculs of sugar, to the following effect:

"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in Entry No.49074 of TCT No. 44489 will be delivered not later than January of 1989, more specifically, to wit:

75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25 piculs of 'B' sugar, or then existing inany of our names, Mary Rose Rabadilla y Azurin or Alan Azurin,during December of each sugar crop year, in Azucar Sugar Central; and, this is considered compliance of the annuity asmentioned, and in the same manner will compliance of the annuitybe in the next succeeding crop years.

That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-86, 1986-87, and1987-88, will be complied in cash equivalent of the number of piculs as mentioned therein and which is as herein agreed upon,taking into consideration the composite price of sugar during eachsugar crop year, which is in the total amount of ONE HUNDREDFIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P105,000.00).

That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or delivered on astaggered cash installment, payable on or before the end of December of every sugar crop year, to wit:

For 1985-86, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1988-89;

For 1986-87, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1989-90;
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt4


4/37

4

For 1987-88, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1990-91; and

For 1988-89, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1991-92. "5

However, there was no compliance with the aforesaidMemorandum of Agreement except for a partial delivery of 50.80

piculs of sugar corresponding to sugar crop year 1988 -1989.

On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with adecision, dismissing the complaint and disposing as follows:

"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing findings, the Courtfinds that the action is prematurely filed as no cause of actionagainst the defendants has as yet arose in favor of plaintiff. Whilethere maybe the non-performance of the command as mandatedexaction from them simply because they are the children of JorgeRabadilla, the title holder/owner of the lot in question, does notwarrant the filing of the present complaint. The remedy at bar mustfall. Incidentally, being in the category as creditor of the left estate,it is opined that plaintiff may initiate the intestate proceedings, if

only to establish the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla and in order to givefull meaning and semblance to her claim under the Codicil.

In the light of the aforegoing findings, the Complaint beingprematurely filed is DISMISSED without prejudice.

SO ORDERED. "6

On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appealsreversed the decision of the trial court; ratiocinating and orderingthus:

"Therefore, the evidence on record having established plaintiff-

appellant's right to receive 100 piculs of sugar annually out of theproduce of Lot No. 1392; defendants-appellee's obligation under Aleja Belleza's codicil, as heirs of the modal heir, Jorge Rabadilla,to deliver such amount of sugar to plaintiff-appellant; defendants-appellee's admitted non-compliance with said obligation since1985; and, the punitive consequences enjoined by both the codiciland the Civil Code, of seizure of Lot No. 1392 and its reversion tothe estate of Aleja Belleza in case of such non-compliance, thisCourt deems it proper to order the reconveyance of title over LotNo. 1392 from the estates of Jorge Rabadilla to the estate of AlejaBelleza. However, plaintiff-appellant must institute separateproceedings to re-open Aleja Belleza's estate, secure theappointment of an administrator, and distribute Lot No. 1392 to

Aleja Belleza's legal heirs in order to enforce her right, reserved toher by the codicil, to receive her legacy of 100 piculs of sugar per

year out of the produce of Lot No. 1392 until she dies.

Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE andanother one entered ordering defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together withits fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.

SO ORDERED. "7

Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the Court of Appeals,petitioner found his way to this Court via the present petition,contending that the Court of Appeals erred in ordering thereversion of Lot 1392 to the estate of the testatrix Aleja Belleza onthe basis of paragraph 6 of the Codicil, and in ruling that thetestamentary institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla is a modal institutionwithin the purview of Article 882 of the New Civil Code.

The petition is not impressed with merit.

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in resolving theappeal in accordance with Article 882 of the New Civil Code onmodal institutions and in deviating from the sole issue raised whichis the absence or prematurity of the cause of action. Petitioner maintains that Article 882 does not find application as there was

no modal institution and the testatrix intended a mere simplesubstitution - i.e . the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, was to besubstituted by the testatrix's "near descendants" should theobligation to deliver the fruits to herein private respondent be notcomplied with. And since the testatrix died single and withoutissue, there can be no valid substitution and such testamentaryprovision cannot be given any effect.

The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no validsubstitution for the reason that the substituted heirs are not

definite, as the substituted heirs are merely referred to as "near descendants" without a definite identity or reference as to who arethe "near descendants" and therefore, under Articles 84 3 8 and84 59 of the New Civil Code, the substitution should be deemed asnot written.

The contentions of petitioner are untenable. Contrary to hissupposition that the Court of Appeals deviated from the issueposed before it, which was the propriety of the dismissal of thecomplaint on the ground of prematurity of cause of action, therewas no such deviation. The Court of Appeals found that the privaterespondent had a cause of action against the petitioner. Thedisquisition made on modal institution was, precisely, to stress thatthe private respondent had a legally demandable right against thepetitioner pursuant to subject Codicil; on which issue the Court of

Appeals ruled in accordance with law.

It is a general rule under the law on succession that successionalrights are transmitted from the moment of death of the deceden t10 and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law.The legitimate children and descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsoryheirs .11 Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsoryheirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded thelatter by operation of law, without need of further proceedings, andthe successional rights were transmitted to them from the momentof death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.

Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes allthe property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguishedby his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadillahad by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forcedheirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations notextinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent;corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceasedDr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsoryheirs upon his death.

In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 toDr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject to the condition that the usufructthereof would be delivered to the herein private respondent everyyear. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirssucceeded to his rights and title over the said property, and they

also assumed his (decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of thelot involved to herein private respondent. Such obligation of theinstituted heir reciprocally corresponds to the right of privaterespondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of which is now being demanded by the latter through the institutionof the case at bar. Therefore, private respondent has a cause of action against petitioner and the trial court erred in dismissing thecomplaint below.

Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code onmodal institutions is not applicable because what the testatrixintended was a substitution - Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was to besubstituted by the testatrix's near descendants should there benoncompliance with the obligation to deliver the piculs of sugar toprivate respondent.

Again, the contention is without merit.

Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the heir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for thedesignation of another heir to whom the property shall pass incase the original heir should die before him/her, renounce theinheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simplesubstitution ,12 or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jun2000/gr_113725_2000.html#fnt5


5/37


6/37

6

SPS. AGRIPINO GESTOPA and ISABEL SILARIO GESTOPA,petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and MERCEDES DANLAG y PILAPIL,respondents.

D E C I S I O N

QUISUMBING,J .:

This petition for review ,1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,assails the decisio n 2 of the Court of Appeals dated August 31,1993, in CA-G.R. CV No. 38266, which reversed the judgmen t3 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 5.

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

Spouses Diego and Catalina Danlag were the owners of sixparcels of unregistered lands. They executed three deeds of donation mortis causa , two of which are dated March 4, 1965 andanother dated October 13, 1966, in favor of private respondentMercedes Danlag-Pilapil .4 The first deed pertained to parcels 1 & 2with Tax Declaration Nos. 11345 and 11347, respectively. Thesecond deed pertained to parcel 3, with TD No. 018613. The lastdeed pertained to parcel 4 with TD No. 016821. All deedscontained the reservation of the rights of the donors (1) to amend,cancel or revoke the donation during their lifetime, and (2) to sell,mortgage, or encumber the properties donated during the donors'lifetime, if deemed necessary.

On January 16, 1973, Diego Danlag, with the consent of his wife,Catalina Danlag, executed a deed of donation inter vivo s 5 coveringthe aforementioned parcels of land plus two other parcels with TDNos. 11351 and 11343, respectively, again in favor of privaterespondent Mercedes. This contained two conditions, that (1) theDanlag spouses shall continue to enjoy the fruits of the land duringtheir lifetime, and that (2) the donee can not sell or dispose of theland during the lifetime of the said spouses, without their prior

consent and approval. Mercedes caused the transfer of theparcels' tax declaration to her name and paid the taxes on them.

On June 28, 1979 and August 21, 1979, Diego and CatalinaDanlag sold parcels 3 and 4 to herein petitioners, Mr. and Mrs.

Agripino Gestopa. On September 29, 1979, the Danlags executeda deed of revocatio n 6 recovering the six parcels of land subject of the aforecited deed of donation inter vivos .

On March 1, 1983, Mercedes Pilapil (herein private respondent)filed with the RTC a petition against the Gestopas and theDanlags, for quieting of titl e 7 over the above parcels of land. Shealleged that she was an illegitimate daughter of Diego Danlag; thatshe lived and rendered incalculable beneficial services to Diego

and his mother, Maura Danlag, when the latter was still alive. Inrecognition of the services she rendered, Diego executed a Deedof Donation on March 20, 1973, conveying to her the six (6)parcels of land. She accepted the donation in the sameinstrument, openly and publicly exercised rights of ownership over the donated properties, and caused the transfer of the taxdeclarations to her name. Through machination, intimidation andundue influence, Diego persuaded the husband of Mercedes,Eulalio Pilapil, to buy two of the six parcels covered by the deed of donation. Said donation inter vivos was coupled with conditionsand, according to Mercedes, since its perfection, she had compliedwith all of them; that she had not been guilty of any act of ingratitude; and that respondent Diego had no legal basis inrevoking the subject donation and then in selling the two parcels of land to the Gestopas.

In their opposition, the Gestopas and the Danlags averred that thedeed of donation dated January 16, 1973 was null and voidbecause it was obtained by Mercedes through machinations andundue influence. Even assuming it was validly executed, theintention was for the donation to take effect upon the death of thedonor. Further, the donation was void for it left the donor, DiegoDanlag, without any property at all.

On December 27, 1991, the trial court rendered its decision, thus:

"WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the Court herebyrenders judgment in favor of the defendants and against theplaintiff:

1. Declaring the Donations Mortis Causa and Inter Vivosas revoked, and, therefore, has (sic) no legal effect andforce of law.

2. Declaring Diego Danlag the absolute and exclusiveowner of the six (6) parcels of land mentioned in the

Deed of revocation (Exh. P-plaintiff, Exh. 6-defendantDiego Danlag).

3. Declaring the Deeds of Sale executed by Diego Danlagin favor of spouses Agripino Gestopa and Isabel Gestopadated June 28, 1979 (Exh. S-plaintiff; Exh. 18-defendant);Deed of Sale dated December 18, 1979 (Exh. T plaintiff;Exh. 9-defendant); Deed of Sale dated September 14,1979 (Exh. 8); Deed of Sale dated June 30, 1975 (Exh.U); Deed of Sale dated March 13, 1978 (Exh. X) as validand enforceable duly executed in accordance with theformalities required by law.

4. Ordering all tax declaration issued in the name of

Mercedes Danlag Y Pilapil covering the parcel of landdonated cancelled and further restoring all the taxdeclarations previously cancelled, except parcels nos. 1and 5 described, in the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos(Exh. "1") and Deed of Sale (Exh. "2") executed bydefendant in favor of plaintiff and her husband.

[5.] With respect to the contract of sale of abovestatedparcels of land, vendor Diego Danlag and spouse or their estate have the alternative remedies of demanding thebalance of the agreed price with legal interest, or rescission of the contract of sale.

SO ORDERED. "8

In rendering the above decision, the trial court found that thereservation clause in all the deeds of donation indicated that DiegoDanlag did not make any donation; that the purchase by Mercedesof the two parcels of land covered by the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos bolstered this conclusion; that Mercedes failed to rebut theallegations of ingratitude she committed against Diego Danlag;and that Mercedes committed fraud and machination in preparingall the deeds of donation without explaining to Diego Danlag their contents.

Mercedes appealed to the Court of Appeals and argued that thetrial court erred in (1) declaring the donation dated January 16,1973 as mortis causa and that the same was already revoked on

the ground of ingratitude; (2) finding that Mercedes purchasedfrom Diego Danlag the two parcels of land already covered by theabove donation and that she was only able to pay three thousandpesos, out of the total amount of twenty thousand pesos; (3) failingto declare that Mercedes was an acknowledged natural child of Diego Danlag.

On August 31, 1993, the appellate court reversed the trial court. Itruled:

"PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from isREVERSED and a new judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Declaring the deed of donation inter vivos datedJanuary 16, 1973 as not having been revoked andconsequently the same remains in full force and effect;

2. Declaring the Revocation of Donation dated June 4,1979 to be null and void and therefore of no force andeffect;

3. Declaring Mercedes Danlag Pilapil as the absolute andexclusive owner of the six (6) parcels of land specified inthe above-cited deed of donation inter vivos;
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt1


7/37

7

4. Declaring the Deed of Sale executed by Diego Danlagin favor of spouses Agripino and Isabel Gestopa datedJune 28, 1979 (Exhibits S and 18), Deed of Sale datedDecember 18, 1979 (Exhibits T and 19), Deed of Saledated September 14, 1979 (Exhibit 8), Deed of Saledated June 30, 1975 (Exhibit U), Deed of Sale datedMarch 13, 1978 (Exhibit X) as well as the Deed of Sale infavor of Eulalio Danlag dated December 27, 1978 (Exhibit2) not to have been validly executed;

5. Declaring the above-mentioned deeds of sale to be nulland void and therefore of no force and effect;

6. Ordering spouses Agripino Gestopa and Isabel SilerioGestopa to reconvey within thirty (30) days from thefinality of the instant judgment to Mercedes Danlag Pilapilthe parcels of land above-specified, regarding which titleshave been subsequently fraudulently secured, namelythose covered by O.C.T. T-17836 and O.C.T. No. 17523.

7. Failing to do so, ordering the Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (Branch V) at Cebu City to effectsuch reconveyance of the parcels of land covered byO.C.T. T-17836 and 17523.

SO ORDERED. "9

The Court of Appeals held that the reservation by the donor of lifetime usufruct indicated that he transferred to Mercedes theownership over the donated properties; that the right to sellbelonged to the donee, and the donor's right referred to that of merely giving consent; that the donor changed his intention bydonating inter vivos properties already donated mortis causa ; thatthe transfer to Mercedes' name of the tax declarations pertainingto the donated properties implied that the donation was inter vivos ;and that Mercedes did not purchase two of the six parcels of landdonated to her.

Hence, this instant petition for review filed by the Gestopaspouses, asserting that:

"THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, TWELFTH DIVISION,HAS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OFTHE COURT A QUO. "10

Before us, petitioners allege that the appellate court overlookedthe fact that the donor did not only reserve the right to enjoy thefruits of the properties, but also prohibited the donee from sellingor disposing the land without the consent and approval of theDanlag spouses. This implied that the donor still had control andownership over the donated properties. Hence, the donation was

post mortem .

Crucial in resolving whether the donation was inter vivos or mortiscausa is the determination of whether the donor intended totransfer the ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed .11

In ascertaining the intention of the donor, all of the deed'sprovisions must be read together .12 The deed of donation datedJanuary 16, 1973, in favor of Mercedes contained the following:

"That for and in consideration of the love and affection which theDonor inspires in the Donee and as an act of liberality andgenerosity, the Donor hereby gives, donates, transfer and conveysby way of donation unto the herein Donee, her heirs, assigns andsuccessors, the above-described parcels of land;

That it is the condition of this donation that the Donor shallcontinue to enjoy all the fruits of the land during his lifetime andthat of his spouse and that the donee cannot sell or otherwise,dispose of the lands without the prior consent and approval by theDonor and her spouse during their lifetime.

x x x

That for the same purpose as hereinbefore stated, the Donor further states that he has reserved for himself sufficient propertiesin full ownership or in usufruct enough for his maintenance of adecent livelihood in consonance with his standing in society.

That the Donee hereby accepts the donation and expresses her thanks and gratitude for the kindness and generosity of theDonor. "13

Note first that the granting clause shows that Diego donated the

properties out of love and affection for the donee. This is a mark of a donation inter vivos .14 Second, the reservation of lifetimeusufruct indicates that the donor intended to transfer the nakedownership over the properties. As correctly posed by the Court of

Appeals, what was the need for such reservation if the donor andhis spouse remained the owners of the properties? Third, thedonor reserved sufficient properties for his maintenance inaccordance with his standing in society, indicating that the donor intended to part with the six parcels of land .15 Lastly, the doneeaccepted the donation. In the case of Alejandro vs. Geraldez, 78 SCRA 245 (1977) , we said that an acceptance clause is a markthat the donation is inter vivos . Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter vivos . Donations mortis causa , being in the form of a will, are not required to be accepted by the donees during thedonors' lifetime.

Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding thatthe right to dispose of the properties belonged to the donee. Thedonor's right to give consent was merely intended to protect hisusufructuary interests. In Alejandro , we ruled that a limitation onthe right to sell during the donors' lifetime implied that ownershiphad passed to the donees and donation was already effectiveduring the donors' lifetime.

The attending circumstances in the execution of the subjectdonation also demonstrated the real intent of the donor to transfer the ownership over the subject properties upon its execution .16 Prior to the execution of donation inter vivos , the Danlag spousesalready executed three donations mortis causa . As correctlyobserved by the Court of Appeals, the Danlag spouses wereaware of the difference between the two donations. If they did notintend to donate inter vivos , they would not again donate the four lots already donated mortis causa . Petitioners' counter argumentthat this proposition was erroneous because six years after, thespouses changed their intention with the deed of revocation, is notonly disingenious but also fallacious. Petitioners cannot use thedeed of revocation to show the spouses' intent because its validityis one of the issues in this case.

Petitioners aver that Mercedes' tax declarations in her name cannot be a basis in determining the donor's intent. They claim that itis easy to get tax declarations from the government offices suchthat tax declarations are not considered proofs of ownership.

However, unless proven otherwise, there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties .17 We find thatpetitioners did not overcome this presumption of regularity in theissuance of the tax declarations. We also note that the Court of

Appeals did not refer to the tax declarations as proofs of ownership but only as evidence of the intent by the donor totransfer ownership.

Petitioners assert that since private respondent purchased two of the six parcels of land from the donor, she herself did not believethe donation was inter vivos . As aptly noted by the Court of

Appeals, however, it was private respondent's husband whopurchased the two parcels of land.

As a rule, a finding of fact by the appellate court, especially when itis supported by evidence on record, is binding on us .18 On thealleged purchase by her husband of two parcels, it is reasonableto infer that the purchase was without private respondent'sconsent. Purchase by her husband would make the propertiesconjugal to her own disadvantage. That the purchase is againsther self-interest, weighs strongly in her favor and gives credenceto her claim that her husband was manipulated and undulyinfluenced to make the purchase, in the first place. 1wphi1
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt9


8/37

8

Was the revocation valid? A valid donation, once accepted,becomes irrevocable, except on account of officiousness, failureby the donee to comply with the charges imposed in the donation,or ingratitude .19 The donor-spouses did not invoke any of thesereasons in the deed of revocation. The deed merely stated:

"WHEREAS, while the said donation was a donation Inter Vivos,our intention thereof is that of Mortis Causa so as we could besure that in case of our death, the above-described properties willbe inherited and/or succeeded by Mercedes Danlag de Pilapil; and

that said intention is clearly shown in paragraph 3 of said donationto the effect that the Donee cannot dispose and/or sell theproperties donated during our life-time, and that we are the oneenjoying all the fruits thereof. "20

Petitioners cited Mercedes' vehemence in prohibiting the donor togather coconut trees and her filing of instant petition for quieting of title. There is nothing on record, however, showing that privaterespondent prohibited the donors from gathering coconuts. Evenassuming that Mercedes prevented the donor from gatheringcoconuts, this could hardly be considered an act covered by Article765 of the Civil Code .21 Nor does this Article cover respondent'sfiling of the petition for quieting of title, where she merely assertedwhat she believed was her right under the law.

Finally, the records do not show that the donor-spouses institutedany action to revoke the donation in accordance with Article 769 of the Civil Code .22 Consequently, the supposed revocation onSeptember 29, 1979, had no legal effect.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. Theassailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1993,is AFFIRMED .

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-15939 November 29, 1965

ANGELES UBALDE PUIG, ET AL.,plaintiffs-appellants,vs.ESTELA MAGBANUA PEAFLORIDA, ET AL.,defendants-appellants.

Ceferino de los Santos, Jr. for plaintiffs-appellants.Salonga, Ordoez & Associates for defendants-appellants .

REYES, J.B.L., J .:

Direct appeal to this Court from a decision of March 23, 1959,

issued by the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, in its Civil Case No.2892, declaring null and void certain deeds of donation executedby the late Carmen Ubalde Vda. de Parcon.

The facts were stipulated in the court below, to the effect that on April 10, 1953, Carmen Ubalde Vda. de Parcon died in the City of Iloilo, without forced heirs, leaving certain properties in the Cityand province of Iloilo. She left a will and was survived by nephewsand nieces, children of her predeceased brother, Catalino Ubalde,and sister, Luisa Ubalde, married to Ariston Magbanua.

It also appears that besides her will, the deceased had executedtwo notarial deeds of donation. One, entitled DONACION MORTISCAUSA, was executed on November 24, 1948, in favor of her

niece, Estela Magbanua, married to Mariano Peaflorida,purporting to convey to the donee the properties covered byTransfer Certificates of Title Nos. 2338 and 18951 of the Registryof Deeds of Iloilo, subject to the following stipulations:

Que por y en consideracion al afecto, amor y cario quela Donante guarda para con la Donataria y tambien por motivo de la lealtad y atencion y servicion fieles que laultima ha rendido, come sigue aun rindiendo, a favor dela primera, dicha Donante, por la presente, CEDE Y

TRANSFIERE, en concepto de donacion mortis causa , afavor de la antedicha Donataria, las parcelas de terrenoarriba descritas con las mejoras existentes en ellas, bajolas siguientes condiciones:

1. Que la Donante se reserva el derecho de hipotecar yaun vender las propiedades objecto de esta escritura dedonacion mortis causa , cuando y si necesita fondos parasatisfacer sus propias necesidades, sin que para ellotenga que intervenir la Donataria, pues su consentimiento

se sobre entiende aqui, aparte de que la donacion queaqui se hace es mortis causa , es decir que la donacionsurtira sus efectos a la muerte de la donante;

2. Que la donataria sufragana todos los gastosnecesarios para los tratamientos medicos, gastos dehospital y/o entierro de la donante a menos que dichadonante tenga propios fondos depositados en un banco obancos o que haya cosecho levantada o recogida. encual caso dichos recursos responderan portales, gastos adisposicion y direccion de la donataria;

3. Que la cesion y transferencia aqui provista surtiraefecto al fallecer la Donante; y

4. Que si la Donataria muere antes de la Donante estadonacion surtira efecto a favor de los hijos odescendientes de la primera, pero su marido, el actualGovernador de la provincia de Iloilo Hon. Mariano B.Peaflorida, asumira las deligaciones que asume en estaescritura de donacion la Donataria Doa EstelaMagbanua, especialmente la de atender a los gastos deultima enfermedad y entierra de la Donante.

5. Que esta escritura de donacion no se presentara alRegistrador de Titulos de Iloilo sino despues de la muertede la donante. Que la Donataria, por la presente, aceptala donacion aqui hecha de las tres (3) parcelas de terrenoarriba, descritas, con las mejoras existentes en ellas, enlas o bajo las condiciones y/o estipulaciones arribaexpresadas, y al mismo tiempo de su mas expresivo ysincero aprecio y gratitud para con la Donante y expresasu imperecedero agradecimiento por la benevolencia ygenerosidad demonstrada por dicha Donante en esteacto.

Que Don Mariano B. Peaflorida, marido de la Donataria,asume las obligaciones contenidas en el parrafo 4 o delas condiciones de esta escritura de donacion.

On December 28, 1949, the deceased executed another deed of donation, also entitled "ESCRITURA DE DONACION MORTISCAUSA" in favor of the same donee, Estela MagbanuaPeaflorida, conveying to her three parcels of land covered byTransfer Certificates of Title Nos. 925, 927 and 11042 of theRegister of Deeds of Iloilo stipulating as follows:

Que la DONANTE, en consideracion a los serviciosprestados a la tiene, por la presente cedo y traspaso a laDONATARIA, en concepto de una DONACION MORTISCAUSA, (1) la totalidad del Lote No. 2054 del Catastro dePototan, arriba descrito, y cubierto por el Certificado deTransferencia de Titulo No.926 expedido su favor por elRegistrador de Titulos de la provincia de Iloilo, con todaslas mejoras existentes en ella, (2) la totalidad de laporcion secana y alta que no sea dedicada a la siembra ycultivo de palay de Lote No. 2053 de Catastro de

Pototan, y cubierto por el certificado de Transferencia deTitulo No. 927, expedido a su favor por el Registrador deTitulos de Iloilo, con todas las mejoras existentes en ella;(3) y la mitad de Lote No. 58 de la Catastro de Pototan,Iloilo, y cubierto por el certificado de Transferencia deTitulo No. 11042, expedido a su favor por el Registrador de Titulos de Iloilo, con todas las mejoras existentes enellas, cuya mitad de Lote No. 58 es la que colinda con loslotes Nos. 61, 62 y 63 del Catastro del Pototan, Iloilo, ycuyas tres lotes Nos. 2053, 2055, y 58 estan mas
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/oct2000/gr_111904_2000.html#fnt19


9/37

9

detalladamente descritos en el parrafo anterioir, bajo lascondiciones siguientes:

Que si en la fecha de su muerte no haya la DONANTEtras pasado VENDIDO o cedido a otras terceraspersonas o entidades la mitad de dichos lotes No. 58 delCatastro del Pototan, Iloilo, la aqui DONATARIA secompromete y se obliga a pagar a Caridad Ubalde,casada con Tomas Pedrola, y residente en el municipiode Pototan, Iloilo, la cantidad de SEIS CIENTOS PESOS

(P600.00), y el pago de esta cantidad se verificara en lafecha en que la aqui DONATARIA tome posesion de lamitad de dicho lote No. 58;

Que antes de su muerte, la DONANTE, podra enajenar,vender, traspasar o hipotecar a cualesquier personas oentidades los bienes aqui donados a favor de laDONATARIA en concepto de una donacion mortis causa ;

Que esta escritura de donacion mortis causa no seregistrara en la oficina del Registrador de Titulos de Iloilosino despues del fallecimiento de la DONANTE; y

Que la DONATARIA acepta la presente donacion bajo

las condiciones arriba consignadas y hace constar publicamente su agradecimiento a la DONANTE por sugenerosidad y liberalidad.

Both donations were recorded in the corresponding Registry of Deeds after the death of the donor.

The will executed by the deceased on March 26, 1951 wassubmitted to the Court of First Instance of Iloilo in SpecialProceedings No. 991; and because the Executor and Special

Administrator, Mariano B. Peaflorida, would not attack the validityof the donations above-referred to, the nephews and nieces of thelate Carmen Ubalde, children of her predeceased brother, CatalinoUbalde, filed the present suit against their cousins Magbanua,

seeking to have the two deeds of donation set aside for lack of testamentary formalities; and after issue joined and by decision of March 23, 1959 the Court of First Instance rendered judgment,with a dispositive portion reading as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court herebyrenders judgment

(a) Declaring the aforementioned two deeds of donationmortis causa , executed in favor of the defendant EstelaMagbanua Peaflorida without the testamentaryformalities prescribed by law invalid and of no effect;

(b) Declaring that the disposition mortis causa in favor of Estela Magbanua Peaflorida of the portion of Lot No.2053 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan, Iloilo, coveredby T.C.T. No. 927 of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo,described as "la porcion secana y alta que no estadedicada al cultivo y siembra de palay" contained in thevoid deed of donation mortis causa dated December 26,1949, was validated by paragraph ten of the willsubsequently executed by Carmen Ubalde on March 26,1951;

(c) Ordering the defendant Estela Magbanua Peafloridato forthwith deliver to the administrator or executor of theestate of the deceased Carmen Ubalde Vda. de Parconthe parcels of land covered by T.C.T. Nos. 2338, 18951,

925 and 11042 of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo for proper distribution among the lawful heirs and the parcelof land covered by T.C.T. No. 927 of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo for adjudication in accordance with theaforesaid will; and

(d) Dismissing the case with respect to the defendantsMariano B. Peaflorida, Isabel Magbanua Velasco, NeriMagbanua and Efrain Magbanua.

Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Both parties, plaintiff and defendant, appealed.

Two issues are propounded in the appeal, which are:

(1) Are the two donations, previously described, inter vivos or

mortis causa ? It being admitted that in the latter event thedonations are void for not being executed with testamentaryformalities.

(2) Was the donation of a portion of Lot 2053 of the PototanCadastre, covered by T.C.T. No. 927 of the Registry of Deeds of Iloilo, validated by par. 10 of the last will and testament of thedecedent, which reads as follows:

DECIMO. Lego a Doa Angeles Ubalde, casada con DonFrancisco Puig, toda la porcion palayera del Lote No.2053 del catastro de Pototan, Iloilo, y cubierto por elcertificado de Transferencia de Titulo No. 927 expedido ami favor por el Registrador de Titulos de Iloilo, y en

relacion con este lote, hago constar que he cedido ytraspasado, en concepto de una donacion mortis causa ,a Doa Estela Magbanua, casada con Don Mariano B.Peaflorida, la porcion alta y secana que no estadedicada al cultivo y siembra de palay de este mismoLote No. 2053, segun documento que he firmado a sufavor.

With regard to the character of the donations, it is well to recallhere that the jurisprudence of this Court has established thefollowing rules:

(1) That the donation mortis causa of the Roman Law and theSpanish pre-codal legislation has been eliminated as a juridical

entity from and after the enactment of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 (Art. 620) as well as the Civil Code of the Philippines (Art.728), which admit only gratuitous transfers of title or real rights toproperty either by way of donations inter vivos or else by way of last will and testament, executed with the requisite legalformalities. In the first case, the act is immediately operative, evenif the actual execution may be deferred until the death of thedonor; in the second, nothing is conveyed to the grantee andnothing is acquired by the latter, until the death of the grantor-testator, the disposition being until then ambulatory and not final(Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, 95 Phil. 481).

(2) That an essential characteristic of dispositions mortis causa isthat the conveyance or alienation should be (expressly or bynecessary implication) revocable ad nutum , i.e., at the discretion of the grantor or so-called "donor," simply because the latter haschanged his mind (Bautista vs. Sabiniano, 92 Phil. 244; Bonsatovs. Court of Appeals, 95 Phil. 481).

(3) That, in consequence, the specification in a deed of the causeswhereby the act may be revoked by the donor indicates that thedonation is inter vivos , rather than a disposition mortis causa(Zapanta vs. Posadas, 52 Phil. 557).

(4) That the designation of the donation as mortis causa , or aprovision in the deed to the effect that the donation is "to takeeffect at the death of the donor" are not controlling criteria (Lauretavs. Mata, 44 Phil. 668; Concepcion vs. Concepcion, L-4225,

August 25, 1952; Cuevas vs. Cuevas, 68 Phil. 68); suchstatements are to be construed together with the rest of theinstrument, in order to give effect to the real intent of the transferor (Concepcion vs. Concepcion, supra ; Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals,supra ).

(5) That a conveyance for onerous consideration is governed bythe rules of contracts and not by those of donation or testament(Carlos vs. Ramil, 20 Phil. 183; Manalo vs. de Mesa, 29 Phil. 495).


10/37

10

(6) That in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemeddonation inter vivos rather than mortis causa , in order to avoiduncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed.

Tested by the foregoing principles, the donation of November 24,1948, while somewhat ambiguous, should be held inter vivos incharacter. Admittedly, it is designated as " mortis causa ," andspecifies that it will take effect upon the death of the donor; but, aspreviously stated, these expressions are not controlling, and, in theinstance, before us, are contradicted by other provisions indicating

a contrary intent. Thus,

(a) The conveyance of the properties described in the deed(Annex A, amended complaint) appears made in consideration of the undertaking of the donee, Estela Magbanua, to bear "allexpenses for medical treatment, hospital expenses and/or burial of the Donor," without limiting the time when such expenses are to beincurred. In fact, the use of the words "y/o entierro" (and/or burial)strongly suggests that the illness and hospitalization expendituresto be borne by the donee may or may not be connected with thedonor's last illness.

(b) Emphasizing the onerous character of the transaction is therequirement that if the donee should predecease the donor,

Governor Peaflorida shall assume the obligations of the donee,"especialmente" (but not exclusively) "los gastos de ultimaenfermedad y entierro de la donante" (par. 4), and this undertakingwas assumed even if the properties donated would not go toPeaflorida but to the donee's children and descendants (par. 3). Itwas evidently because of this liability, unconnected with theconveyance, that Peaflorida had to sign the document together with the donee. It is easy to see that unless the conveyance wereto be effective before the death of donor,, the obligations assumedby the donee and Governor Peaflorida (her husband) would bewithout consideration (causa). In a very similar case (Manalo vs.De Mesa, 29 Phil. 495), this court ruled:

There can be no doubt that the donation in question wasmade for a valuable consideration, since the donorsmade it conditional upon the donees' bearing theexpenses that might be occasioned by the death andburial of the donor Placida Manalo, a condition andobligation which the donee Gregorio de Mesa carried outin his own behalf and for his wife Leoncia Manalo;therefore, in order to determine whether or not saiddonation is valid and effective it should be sufficient todemonstrate that, as a contract, it embraces theconditions the law requires and is valid and effective,although not recorded in a public instrument. (Manalo vs.de Mesa, 29 Phil. 495, 500)

Such conditions (consent, subject matter, causa or considerationand observance of the formalities or solemnities required by law)

are all present in the deed of November 24, 1948.

(c) Again, while there is a clause that the donor reserved her right"to mortgage or even sell the donated property, when and if sheshould need funds to meet her own needs," this last sentence of the stipulation appears incompatible with the grantor's freedom torevoke a true conveyance mortis causa , a faculty that is essentiallyabsolute and discretionary, whether its purpose should be tosupply her needs or to make a profit, or have no other reason thana change of volition on the part of the grantor-testator. If the lateCarmen Ubalde Vda. de Parcon wished or intended to retain theright to change the destination of her property at her sole will anddiscretion, there was no reason for her to specify the causes for which she could sell or encumber the property covered by her bounty.

It is illuminating, in this respect, to compare the provisions abovediscussed with the corresponding paragraph of the second deed of donation dated December 28, 1949. The latter recites as follows:

Que antes de su muerte, la Donante podra enajenar,vender, traspasar o hipotecar a cualesquier personas oentidades los bienes aqui donados a favor de laDonataria, en concepto de una donacion mortis causa .(Annex "B", Rec. App., pp. 24-25)

Here is an unlimited power to indirectly avoid the alleged donationany time the donor should choose to do so, and which leaves nodoubt as to the mortis causa nature of the conveyance; unlike theprior donation, where the power to indirectly revoke is hedged inby the specification that the donor could dispose of the propertyonly to satisfy her needs, thereby impliedly rejecting alienations for any other purpose. Hence, following the rule of Zapanta vs.Posadas , 52 Phil. 557, the donation of November 24, 1948 mustbeheld to partake of the nature of a conveyance inter vivos .

(d) Finally, it is no objection to our view that the donation of November 24, 1948 should provide that it is not to be recordeduntil after the donor's death (par. 5), since the absence of registration would affect only subsequent purchasers, withoutdenying the validity and obligatory effects of the conveyance asbetween the parties thereto.

We, therefore, conclude, and so hold, that the court below erred inadjudging the deed of November 24, 1948 to be null and void. Thesame is valid and operative as a donation inter vivos .

Turning now to the deed of donation (also labelled mortis causa )executed by and between the same parties on December 28,1949, the text thereof (quoted ante , pp. 4-5) is clear that no

proprietary right was intended to pass to the alleged "donee" prior to the "donor's" death, and that the same was a true conveyancemortis causa , which by law is invalid because it was not executedwith the testamentary formalities required by the statutes in forceat the time. Here, unlike in the previous donation the designation isdonation mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that no signscontradict or limit the unqualified and unrestricted right of thedonor to alienate the conveyed properties in favor of other personsof her choice at any time that she should wish to do so; it is soexpressed in the deed, and it indirectly recognizes the donor'spower to nullify the conveyance to the alleged "donee" whatever the "donor" wished to do so, for any reason or for no particular reason at all. As we have seen, this faculty is characteristic of conveyances post mortem or mortis causa : for the right of thetransfer or to alienate the "donated" property to someone else

necessarily imports that the conveyance to the "donee" will notbecome final and definite in favor of the latter until the death of the"donor" should exclude every possibility that the property maybealienated to some other person.

Defendant-appellant Estela Magbanua Peaflorida contends thatthis second deed of December 28, 1949 is also a donation inter vivos ; and she argues that the stipulated power of the grantor toencumber or alienate the property to persons, other than thedonee, at any time before the grantor dies, should be viewed as amere resolutory condition that does not contradict but confirms theimmediate effectivity of the donation. This ingenious argument isnot legally tenable, since it ignores the circumstance that the so-called "resolutory condition" is one purely dependent upon theexclusive will of the grantor, and is proof that the deed asexecuted, is not obligatory at all (Civ. Code of 1889, Art. 1115;Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 1182). Confirming the rule, boththe old and the new Civil Codes prescribe that the effectivity,compliance, or binding effect of contracts cannot be left to the solewill of one of the parties (Art. 1256, Civ. Code of 1889; Art. 1308,Civil Code of the Philippines).

It is also argued that the stipulation empowering the "donor" toalienate the property elsewhere would be unnecessary if thedonation were mortis causa . The flaw in this reasoning is that itloses sight of the fact that the clause in question proves that thereis no donation at all, since it shows that the alleged donor, CarmenUbalde, did not wish to be bound, and did not want to lose her titleto, nor her control over, the property during her own lifetime. There

was, therefore, no conveyance inter vivos , since none wasintended; and no donation mortis causa because, as alreadypointed out, acts intended to be effective after the death of thegrantor must be executed in the form of a last will and testament,or else they will not be legally valid.

The nullity of the donation of December 28, 1949 has anexception: the conveyance therein of "la porcion alta y secana queno esta dedicada al cultivo y siembra de palay" of Lot 2053 of thePototan (Iloilo) Cadastre was correctly held by the appealed


11/37

11

decision to have been confirmed and validated by the late CarmenUbalde in clause 10 of her last will and testament executed onMarch 26, 1951 (Stip. of Facts, Annex "A"; Rec. on Appeal, pp. 52-53), when she solemnly declared that she had conveyed saidportion to defendant-appellant Estela Magbanua by donationmortis causa . While made by way of reference, we are satisfiedthat this portion of the will's tenth clause (previously quoted onpage 7 of this decision) is valid as an independent testamentarylegacy, as it is apparent and indubitable that the decedent hadintended to bequeath the described portion of Lot 2053 to thedefendant-appellant. That it should be expressed in the past tenseis irrelevant: technicalities should not be allowed to enervate themanifest will of the testatrix, clearly expressed in a valid testament,or unavoidably inferred therefrom.

In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Court of FirstInstance of Iloilo should be and is modified by declaring, as wehereby rule, that the deed of Donation executed by the lateCarmen Ubalde in favor of Estela Magbanua Peaflorida onNovember 24, 1948 is a valid and effective conveyance by way of donation inter vivos , duly accepted by the donee.

IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS, the appealed decision is affirmed.Without costs in this instance.

Let the records be returned to the Court of origin for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion

G.R. No. L-15939 January 31, 1966

ANGELES UBALDE PUIG, ET AL.,plaintiffs-appellants,vs.ESTELLA MAGBANUA PEAFLORIDA, ET AL.,defendants-appellants.

Salonga and Ordonez for the plaintiffs-appellants.Fulgencio Vega for the defendants-appellants.

R E S O L U T I O N

(Main opinion was promulgated on November 29, 1965).

REYES, J.B.L., J .:

Defendants-appellants Estela Magbanua Peaflorida, et al., insistthat the reservation by the donor of the right to dispose of theproperty during her lifetime in the deed of December 28, 1949indicates that title had passed to the donee in her lifetime,otherwise, it is argued, the reservation would be superfluous, andthey cite American authorities in support.

This thesis would be plausible if the reservation of the power todispose were the only indication to be considered in decidingwhether the donation of December 28, 1949 was mortis causa or inter vivos . But such is not the case. The Court in its decision tookto account not only the foregoing circumstance but also the factthat the deceased expressly and consistently declared her conveyance to be one of donation mortis causa , and further forbade the registration of the deed until after her death. All thesefeatures concordantly indicated that the conveyance was notintended to produce any definitive effects, nor to finally pass anyinterest to the grantee, except from and after the death of thegrantor.

We see nothing in the deed itself to indicate that any right, title or interest in the properties described was meant to be transferred toDoa Estela Magbanua prior to the death of the grantor, CarmenUbalde Vda. de Parcon. Not ownership, certainly, for thestipulation:

Que esta escritura de donacion mortis causa no seregistrara en la oficina del Registrador de Titulos de Iloilosino despues del fallecimiento de la Donante

necessarily meant, according to section 50 of the LandRegistration Act, that the deed in question should not take effect as a conveyance nor bind the land until after the death of the"donor".

Neither did the document operate to vest possession upon DoaEstela Magbanua, in view of the express condition that (paragraph3) if at the date of her death the donor had not transferred, sold, or conveyed one-half of lot 58 of the Pototan Cadastre to other persons or entities, the donee would be bound to pay to Caridad

Ubalde, married to Tomas Pedrola, the amount of P600.00, andsuch payment was to be made on the date the donee tookpossession of Lot No. 58. As the obligation to pay the legacy toCaridad Ubalde would not definitely arise until after the death of the donor, because only by then would it become certain that the"donor" could not transfer the property to someone else, and suchpayment must precede the taking possession of the property"donated", it necessarily follows that the "donee's" taking of possession could not occur before the death of the donor.

It being thus clear that the disposition contained in the deed is onethat produces no effect until the death of the grantor, we areclearly faced by an act mortis causa of the Roman and Spanishlaw. We thus see no need of resorting to American authorities asto the import of the reservation of the donor's right to dispose of the donated property, for the Spanish authorities are very clear onthis point:

Desde el momento en que la muerte del donante es laque determina la adquisicion o el derecho a los bienes;desde el montento en que la disposicion puede ser revocada voluntariamente , se salva la linea divisoriaentre unos y otros actos: la donacion equivale a unlegado; mas aun que esto: es un legado en realidad . (5Manresa, 5th Ed., p. 107)

Ahora bien: si el mal llamado donante no solo dilata lafecha de la ejecucion para el momento de su muerte,sino que ademas se reserva la facultad de revocar a suarbitrio la disposicion , entonces el acto no es valido bajola forma de contrato; hay en realidad una disposicionmortis causa que exige las solemnidades del testamento .(V Manresa, 5th Ed., p. 109) (Emphasis supplied)

The presence of an acceptance is but a consequence of theerroneous concept of the true nature of the juridical act, and doesnot indicate that in the same is a true donation inter vivos .

Appellant Magbanua further argues that the reserved power of thedonor to convey the donated property to other parties during her lifetime is but a resolutory condition (albeit a potestative one) thatconfirms the passing of the title to the donee. In reality, thisargument is a veritable petitio principii ; it takes for granted whathas to be proved, i.e., that some proprietary right has passedunder the terms of the deed, which, as we have shown, is not trueuntil the donor has died .

It is highly illuminating to compare the condition imposed in thedeed of donation of December 28, 1949 with that established inthe contract dealt with in Taylor vs. Uy Tieng Piao & Tau Liuan, 43Phil. 874, invoked by appellants.

In the alleged deed of donation of December 28, 1949, the lateDoa Carmen Ubalde imposed expressly that:

Que antes de su muerte, la Donante podra enajenar,vender, traspasar e hipotecar a cualesquiera personas oentidades los bienes aqui donados a favor de laDonataria en concepto de Donacion mortis causa .

In the Taylor vs. Uy Tieng Piao case, on the other hand, thecondition read:

It is understood and agreed that should the machinery tobe installed in said factory fail, for any reason, to arrive, inthe City of Manila within the period of six (6) months fromdate hereof, this contract may be cancelled by the party


12/37

12

of the second part at its option, such cancellation,however, not to occur before the expiration of such six (6)months. (pp. 874-875, cas. cit.).

In the Uy Tieng Piao case the contract could only be cancelledafter six months, so that there could be no doubt that it was inforce at least for that long, and the optional cancellation can beviewed as a resolutory condition (or more properly, a non-retroactive revocatory one); but no such restriction limited thepower of the donor, Doa Carmen Ubalde, to set at naught the

alleged conveyance in favor of Doa Estela Magbanua byconveying the property to other parties at any time, even at thevery next instant after executing the donation, if she so chose. Itrequires no argument to demonstrate that the power, as reservedin the deed, was a power to destroy the donation at any time , andthat it meant that the transfer is not binding on the grantor until her death made it impossible to channel the property elsewhere.Which, in the last analysis, as held in our main decision, signifiesthat the liberality is testamentary in nature, and must appear withthe solemnities required of last wills and testaments in order to belegally valid.

Wherefore, the motion to reconsider is denied.

G.R. No. L-33849 August 18, 1977

TEODORICO ALEJANDRO, IRENEO POLICARPIO, VIRGINIAALEJANDRO, MARIA ALEJANDRO, SALUD ALEJANDRO,EMILIA ALEJANDRO, FLORENCIO ALEJANDRO andDIONISIA ALEJANDRO,petitioners,vs.HON. AMBROSIO M. GERALDEZ, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch V, Sta. Maria, ANDREA DIAZand ANGEL DIAZ,respondents.

G.R. No. L-33968 August 18, 1977

ANDREA DIAZ, petitioner,

vs.

HON. AMBROSIO M. GERALDEZ, in his capacity as PresidingJudge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch V,TEODORICO ALEJANDRO, IRENEO POLICARPIO, VIRGINIAALEJANDRO, MARIA ALEJANDRO, EMILIA ALEJANDRO,FLORENCIO ALEJANDRO and DIONISIA ALEJANDRO,respondents.

Ponciano G. Hernandez for Teodorico Alejandro, et al.

Porfirio Villaroman for Andrea Diaz and Angel Diaz.

AQUINO.J .

This is a case about donations inter vivos and mortis causa . Thebone of contention is Lot No. 2502 of the Lolomboy Friar LandsEstate with an area of 5,678 square meters, situated in Sta. Maria,Bulacan and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7336. Thefacts are as follows: On January 20, 1949 the spouses Gabino(Gavino) Diaz and Severa Mendoza, their daughter-in-law ReginaFernando and their three children, Olimpia Diaz, Angel Diaz and

Andrea Diaz, executed a deed of donation covering eight lots of the Lolomboy Friar Lands Estate, owned by the Diaz spouses,

located at Barrio Parada, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The deed reads asfollows:

KASULATAN NG PAGKAKALOOB (A DEED OF DONATION)

ALAMIN NG LAHAT NG MAKATUTUNGHAYNITO:

Ang pagkakaloob (donation) na ito, ginawa atpinagtibay dito sa municipio ng Sta. Maria,

lalawigan ng Bulacan, Pilipinas, ngayong ika 20ng Enero, 1949, ng mag-asawang GABINODIAZ at SEVERA MENDOZA, filipinos, may mgasapat na gulang, naninirahan sa nayon ngParada, Sta. Maria, Bulacan na dito'ykinikilalang NAGKALOOB (DONORS), sakapakanan nila REGINA FERNANDO, filipina,may sapat na gulang, viuda; OLIMPIA DIAZ,filipina, may sapat na gulang, kasal kayTeodorico Alejandro, ANGEL DIAZ, filipino, maysapat na gulang, kasal kay Catalina Marcelo, at

ANDREA DIAZ, filipina, may sapat na gulang,kasal kay Perfecto Marcelo, mga naninirahan sanayon ng Parada, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, na dito'ykinikilalang PINAGKALOOBAN (DONEES).

PAGPAPATUNAY:

Na ang Nagkaloob (DONORS) ay siyangmayari, at kamayari at namomosision sakasalukuyan ng mga parcelang lupa kasamaang mga kagalingan na nasa lugar ng Parada,Sta. Maria, Bulacan, mapagkikilala sa paraangmga sumusunod (description and statements asto registration are omitted):

1. TCT No. 7336, Lot No. 2502, 5,678 squaremeters.

2. TCT No. 10998, Lot No. 2485, 640 squaremeters.

3. TCT No. 10840, Lot No. 2377,16,600 squaremeters.

4. TCT No. 10997, Lot No. 2448,12,478 squaremeters.



7. TCT No. 17961, Lot No. 2521, 715 squaremeters.


Na dahil at alang-alang sa pagmamahal at

masuyong pagtingin na taglay ngNAGKAKALOOB (DONORS) saPinagkakalooban (DONEES) gayun din sa tapatat mahalagang paglilingkod noong mga lumipasna panahon na ginawa ng huli sa una, angnabanggit na nagkakaloob sa pamamagitan ngkasulatang ito ng pagkakaloob (Donation) aybuong pusong inililipat at lubos na ibinibigay sanasabing pinagkakalooban ang lupangbinabanggit at makikilala sa unahan nito, laya saano mang sagutin at pagkakautang, katulad nito:

(a) Na ang lupang sinasaysay sa Lote No.2502 o Titulo No. 7336, (No. 1) sa unahan nitoay hinati sa dalawang parte ang unang parte(1/2) na nasa bandang Kanluran (West) ayipinagkakaloob ng mag-asawang Gabino Diaz atSevera Mendoza sa kanilang anak na si AngelDiaz, kasal kay Catalina Marcelo; at angikalawang parte (1/2) na nasa 'bandang silangan(East) ay ipinagkakaloob ng mag-asawangGabino Diaz at Severa Mendoza sa kanilanganak na si Andrea Diaz, kasal kay PerfectoMarcelo."


13/37

13

(Note Some dispositions are not reproducedverbatim but are merely summarized becausethey are not involved in this case. Paragraph (a)above is the one involved herein).

(b) Lot No. 2485, TCT No.10998, to ReginaFernando (daughter- in-law of the donors andwidow of their deceased son, Miguel Diaz) andOlimpia Diaz in equal shares.

(c) Lot No. 2377, TCT No. 10840, 1/3 to Angel Diaz, 1/3 to Andrea Diaz, and 1/3 "ayinilalaan o inihahanda ng mag-asawang GabinoDiaz at Severa Mendoza sa kanilang sarilingkapakanan o mga gastos nila.

(d) Lot No. 2448, TCT No. 10997 to OlimpiaDiaz sa condicion na pagkakalooban ni OlimpiaDiaz si Crisanta de la Cruz, asawa ni Alejandro -- - - - (sic) sakaling si Crisanta ay mamatay nghalagang isang daang piso (P100), bilanggastos sa libing."

(e) Na ang lupang-solar na sinasaysay sa

Lote No. 41

case1 succession 02938475

Documents