1. Attys Humberto Basco et al vs Phil Amusements and Gaming Corp G.R. No. 91649

Facts: Petitioners seek for the annulment of PAGCOR Charter, PD 1869 being contrary to morals, public policy and order and for tending towards monopoly, “crony economy,” waiving the Manila City government’s right to impose taxes and license fees, and violating the equal protection clause, local autonomy and other state policies in the Constitution.

Issue: Whether PD 1869 violates the local autonomy clause.

Held: PD 1869 does not violate the local autonomy clause.

The power of local government units to regulate gambling through the grant of franchises, licenses or permits was withdrawn by PD 771 and is now vested exclusively on the national governments. The power to demand or collect license fees is no longer vested in the city of Manila.

Local government units have no power to tax government instrumentalities. Being a GOCC, PAGCOR is therefore exempt from local taxes. The national government is supreme over local governments. As such, mere creatures of the State cannot defeat national policies using the power to tax as a “tool for regulation.” The power to tax cannot be allowed to defeat an instrumentality of the very entity which has the inherent power to wield it. The power of LGUs to impose taxes and fees is always subject to limitation provided by Congress.

2. Juanito Mariano Jr et al vs Commission on Elections G.R. No. 118577

Facts: Petitioners seek for annulment of section 2 of Republic Act 7854 for being unconstitutional as they failed to delineate the land areas of Makati by metes and bounds with technical descriptions, section 51 for colliding with provisions of the Constitution as said section allows for the corporate existence of a new city, thereby, permitting the incumbent municipal elective officials to have a fresh term for their office, and section 52 for adding a legislative district.

Republic Act 7854 converts the municipality of Makati into a highly urbanized city to be known as City of Makati.

Issue: Whether RA 7854 is unconstitutional.

Held: RA 7854 is constitutional.

The said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide or multiply the already established land area of Makati.

The court cannot entertain the challenge to the constitutionality of section 51 as petitioners only relied on contingencies which may or may not happen. At best, petitioners posed a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen into an actual controversy.

The reapportionment of legislative districts may be done through a special law.

3. Municipality of Jimenez vs Hon. Vicente Baz, Jr. G.R. No. 105746

Facts: The Municipality of Jimenez and Municipality of Sinacaban argued over a certain lot, which, based on E.O. 258 enacted by then Pres Elpidio Quirino—creating the Municipality of Sinacaban— defined the latter’s territorial boundary.

Jimenez’s claim over the disputed lot is based on an agreement with the Municipality of Sinacaban and approved in resolution no. 77 by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental. But said resolution was superseded by another, declaring resolution no 77 as void.

The municipality of Jimenez filed for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against Sinacaban, the Province of Misamis Occidental and its Provincial Board, the Commission of Audit and Department of Local Government Budget and Management and the Executive Secretary.

Issue: Whether Sinacaban has legal personality to file a claim and if it has, whether it is the boundary provided for in EO 248 or in Resolution 77 of the Board of Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental which should be used as the basis for adjudicating its territorial claim.

Held: Sinacaban is a de facto corporation since it had completely organized itself and exercised corporate powers for forty years before its existence was questioned. Where a municipality created as such by executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned.

Above all, it was held that whatever doubt there might be as to the de jure character of the municipality must be deemed to have been put to rest by the Local Government Code of 1991.

4. City of Pasig vs Commission on Elections G.R. No. 125646

Facts: The Comelec withheld the holding of plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan until the court has settled with finality the boundary disputes, but not the petition creating barangay napico, ruling the same is moot and academic for the plebiscite was held and the creation of such barangay was approved by majority of

the votes cast therein. The city of pasig filed a suit against comelec for holding in abeyance the plebiscite for creating Barangay Karangalan.

Issue: Whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of the two barangays should be suspended in view of the pending boundary dispute between two local governemtns.

Held: Yes, precisely because territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in the pending civil case, until and unless such issue is resolved with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only be an exercise in futility. Not only that, we would be paving the way for potentially ultra vires acts of such barangays. 

In the case at bar, while the City of Pasig vigorously claims that the areas covered by the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico are within its territory, it can not deny that portions of the same area are included in the boundary dispute case pending before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo. Surely, whether the areas in controversy shall be decided as within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Cainta or the City of Pasig has material bearing to the creation of the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico. Indeed, a requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries.

5. Flaviano Mejia et al vs Pedro U. Balolong G.R. No. L-1925

Facts: In November 1947 General Election for provincial, municipal and city officials, petitioners were elected as councilors of Dagupan City. The respondents, having been defeated in the said election were nevertheless appointed as councilors by the President of the Philippines on Dec 30, 1947.

Petitioners filed an action for quo warranto against respondents on the ground that their appointments by the president of the republic of the phils were null and void.

Held: The appointments of the respondents effected on December 30, 1947, are null and void. The validity of the appointment of the respondents as councilors of the City of Dagupan by the President of the Philippines depends upon whether the City of Dagupan was created and came into existence on June 20, 1947, the date Act No. 170 became effective, or on January 1, 1948, when the city government was organized by Executive Order No. 96.

The City of Dagupan created by Act 170 came into existence as a legal entity or a public corporation upon the approval of said Act, on June 20, 1947. Because a statute like Act No. 170 is to take effect upon its approval, it is operative from the exact instance upon its approval or becoming a law. 

Since the election of the members of the Municipal Board of the City of Dagupan created on June 20, 1947, was to take and took place at the general election held on November 11, 1947, and the President of the Philippines was empowered by section 88 of Act 170 to appoint those members only if the organization of the city government had taken place pending or before the said election.

6. Ricardo Aguado vs City of Manila G.R. No. L-3282

Ricardo Aguado was an assignor of claims held by Tomas Luna Munoz against the City of Manila, the latter being an administrator of the water supply and Carriedo funds. On April 28, 1903, Aguado filed an action to recover from the City of Manila the sum of P5,621.40. The Court of First Instance decided in plaintiff’s favor.

Issue: Whether or not the present City of Manila is liable under the contracts for the obligations created by the old City of Manila as its successor.

Held: The City of Manila is not liable.

The City of Manila is in no way the successor of the Ayuntamiento de Manila in law. The mere fact that the present authority in these islands has given to the present city powers like those exercised by the Ayuntamiento de Manila in no way makes the former the successor of the latter. It is an entirely new organization, a new agent of a new principal, and only has such authority, such powers, and such obligations and responsibilities as the new principal has seen fit to grant and impose.

7. Marcos Mendoza vs Francisco De Leon et al G.R. No. 9596

Facts: Marcos Mendoza file an action for damages against the individual members of the municipal council of the municipality of Villasis, Pangasinan, for the revocation of the lease of an exclusive ferry privilege duly awarded to Mendoz under the provisions of Act. No. 1643 of the Phil Commission. Mendoza was forcibly ejected after a little more than a year of use.

Issue: Are the individual members of municipal council personally liable?

Held: The defendants are liable jointly and severally for the damages sustained by the plaintiff from the rescission of his contract of lease of the ferry privilege in question.

Under the provisions of Municipal Code and Act No. 1634, the plaintiff had a vested right to the exclusive operation of the ferry in question for the period of his lease. Were the municipality a party to this action, it would be patent that a judgment for damages against it for the rescission of the contract would be proper.

8. The People of the Phil Islands vs Maximo Cruz G.R. No. 31265

Facts: Maximo Cruz was convicted of violating ordinance No. 4 series of 1928 of the municipality of Cabanatuan and was sentenced to a fine of P200 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: Whether ordinance no. 4 is unconstitutional.

Held: The ordinance is constitutional.

Municipal councils are empowered to enact zonification ordinances within their jurisdiction in the exercise of their police power. It is a matter definitely settled by both Philippine and American cases that municipal corporation may, in the exercise of their police power, enact ordinances or regulations on zonification. Within the powers granted to municipal councils in section 2238 of the Revised Administrative Code, the municipal council of Cabanatuan was authorized to enact the zonification ordinance with which we are now concerned.

9. Seng Kee & Co vs Tomas Earnshaw G.R. No. 34976

Facts: Seng Kee & Co filed an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, declaring sections 120, 121, 122, 1067 and 1068 of the Revised Ordinances No. 1600 of the City of Manila constitutional, thereby affecting his toyo manufacturing business.

Issue: Whether the assailed provisions are unconstitutional.

Held: The provisions are constitutional.

The power of the City of Manila to adopt ordinances of this kind is derived from sections 1019 and 1020 (g) of the Administrative Code. And the constitutionality of these two provisions cannot be put in issue as they flow from the police power inherent in every legislature, and here delegated to the City of Manila.

10. In the matter of the petition of TIU SAN alias ANGEL GOMEZ to be admitted a citizen of the Philippines. TIU SAN, alias ANGEL GOMEZ, petitioner-appellant, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee. [G.R. No. L-7301. April 20, 1955.]

Facts:The petition for naturalization as a Filipino citizen by Tiu San alias Angel

Gomez was denied due to his being convicted for a violation of a Municipal Ordinance in the Municipality of Lucena, Quezon Province – on account of his failure to remove and transfer his lumber yard from a prohibited zone in said municipality.

Issue:

Whether or not conviction for a violation of a municipal ordinance is tantamount to a conviction for an offense or violation of “Government promulgated rules.”

Held:The regulation violated by petitioner was a zoning ordinance, which seeks to

protect the people and their property and to promote their well being. It was promulgated by the municipal government of Lucena acting as an agent of the national government. Hence, it partakes of the nature of a "government promulgated rule", although limited in its application to said locality.

11. MACASIANO v. DIOKNO, Mun. of Paranaque, and Palanyag Kilusang BayanGR 97764 (Aug. 10, 1992)

Facts:The Municipality of Paranaque passed an Ordinance, which authorized the

closure of several streets and the establishment of a flea market thereon. The municipality and Palanyag, a service cooperative, entered into an agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain and manage the flea market with the obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the Mun. of Paranaque. Consequently, Palanyag put up market stalls on subject streets.

Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command, ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls along GG Cruz and J Gabrielle St. in Baclaran. These stalls were returned to Palanyag. Thereafter, Macasiano wrote a letter to Palanyag, giving the latter 10 days to discontinue the flea market, otherwise the market stalls shall be dismantled.

The trial court (Judge Dikono) issued an Order upholding the validity of the Ordinance allowing the use of public streets for the operation of flea markets, and enjoining Macasiano from enforcing his letter-order to Palanyag.Issue:

WON an Ordinance or Resolution, issued by the municipal council of Paranaque, authorizing the lease and use of public streets as sites for a flea market is valid

Held:

No. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is divided into property for public use and partrimonial property (Art. 423, Civil Code).

In the present case, the streets in question are local roads used for public service and therefore considered public properties of the municipality. Properties of the local government which are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, local government has no authority

whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress

12. The United States vs Isidro Espiritusanto, G.R. No. 7404, December 11, 1912

Facts:Isidro Espiritusanto was charged with a violation of Municipal Ordinance No.

1, Series of 1910, enacted by the municipal council of Malabon, Rizal, in collecting wagers for the gambling game known as jueteng.

Accused assails the constitutionality of the said ordinance for being contrary to the municipal code because the council exceeded the powers conferred upon it which, in subsection (u) of section 39, only authorizes it "to provide against the evils of gambling, gambling houses, and disorderly houses of whatsoever sort.”

Issue:WON the ordinance is valid.

Held:Yes. A municipal council acts within its power, as conferred by the organic

law, in enacting an ordinance prohibiting the game called jueteng within the limits of the municipality. The Municipal Code, Act No. 82, section 39, authorizing municipalities to provide against the evils of gambling, should be understood to include the power to prohibit games of chance and to make necessary regulations to exterminate the evils arising from the playing of prohibited games.

13. The United States vs Silvestre Pompeya, G.R. No. L-10255

Facts:A municipal ordinance was enacted by the Province of Iloilo pursuant to the

provisions of Act No. 1309, requiring each able-bodied male resident of the municipality, between the ages of 18 and 55, as well as each householder, when so required by the president, to assist in the maintenance of peace and good order in the community, by apprehending landrones, as well as by giving information of the existence of such persons in the locality.

A complaint was filed by the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Iloilo against Pompeya for the violation of the said ordinance in failing to render service on patrol duty.

Issue:WON the ordinance is constitutional.

Held:

Yes. The right or power conferred upon municipalities by Act No. 1309 falls within the police power of the state. The police power of the state may be said to embrace the whole system of internal regulation, by which the state seeks not only to preserve public order and to prevent offenses against the state, but also to establish, for the intercourse of citizen with citizen, those rules on good manners and good neighborhood, which are calculated to prevent conflict of rights, and to insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment of his own.

14. People of the Philippine Islands vs Teofilo Gabriel, G.R. No. 18838

Facts:A policeman, William S. Able, while passing through Rosario Street in the city

of Manila, heard a crier of an auction sale in a place of business numbered 109 and 111 of the street, the voice of the crier to be heard at quite a little distance from the place. Such was a violation of Section 749 of Ordinance No. 938 which prohibits the use of a bell or crier, or other means of attracting bidders by the use of noise or show, other than a sign or a flag, between the hours of 8 am and 12 pm, and 2 pm and 7 pm.

Issue:WON the ordinance is discriminatory and is therefore void and

unconstitutional.

Held:There is no discrimination in the ordinance. It applies to all kinds and classes

of people alike doing business within the prohibited area, and no person within the city limits has any legal or constitutional right to auction his goods without a license from, or the consent of, the city, and it must follow that, so long as the ordinance is uniform, the city has a legal right to specify how, when, where, and in what manner goods may be sold at auction within its limits, and to prohibit their sale in any other manner.

15. Recreation and Amusement Association of the Philippines vs City of Manila, et al, G.R. No. L-7922

Facts:Petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of said City praying

that a preliminary injunction be issued to restrain the City Mayor and the Treasurer from enforcing Ordinance No. 3628 for being unconstitutional, and further praying by way of mandamus that the latter be compelled to issue permits and licenses to the members of the said corporation.

Issue:WON the grant or withholding of municipal licenses and permits can be

controlled by mandamus.

Held:No. The City Mayor has discretionary power to issue or refuse the issuance of

a license or permit. Mandamus cannot lie with regards to discretionary functions.

16. People of the Philippines vs Jaunito Solon, G.R. No. L-14864

Facts:Juanito Solon, a rig driver in the City of Cebu, was prosecuted and convicted

for violation of a city ordinance requiring drivers of animal-drawn vehicles to pick up, gather and deposit in receptacles the manure emitted or discharged by their vehicle-drawing animals in any public highways, streets, plazas, parks or alleys of the City.

Solon assails the legality of the ordinance as violative of the equal protection clause, the same being discriminatory in the sense that it does not equally apply to all owners and possessors of animals, but its application is limited to owners and drivers of vehicle-drawing animals.

Issue:WON the ordinance is valid.

Held:Yes. The principle is well-organized that the limited application of a statute,

either in the objects to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is operate, does not necessarily violate the guaranty of "equal protection of the laws." It is sufficient, for purposes of complying with this constitutional mandate, that the classification be reasonable, not arbitrary or capricious. And, for the classification to be considered reasonable, the same must be based on substantial distinction which make real differences; must be germane for the purposes of the law; must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class, under similar conditions.

17. People of the Philippines vs Loreta Gozo, G.R. No. L-36409

Facts:Gozo sought to set aside a judgment of CFI of Zambales, convicting her of a

violation of an ordinance of Olongapo, Zambales, which requires a permit from the municipal mayor for the construction or erection of a building, as well as any modification, alteration, repair, or demolition thereof. She questions its validity, or at the very least, its applicability to her, by invoking due process. She contended that her house was constructed within the naval base leased to the American armed forces located within the United States Naval Reservation within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City and therefore should be exempted from the municipal ordinance.

Issue:

WON the property of the appellant should be exempt the application of the municipal ordinance.

Held:No. By the Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine Government merely consents

that the United States exercise jurisdiction incertain cases. The consent was given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of thePhilippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein.

Though the property is within the Naval base of US, it is a clear doctrine that the Philippines still possess the sovereignty over that area given the record that it is still a part of its territory. Thus, the state can still enforce its administrative jurisdiction by virtue of its government instrumetalities which the people sojourning to that territory must always adhere andrespect. 18. Elisa Samson and Angel Gavilan vs Honorable Mayor of Bacolod City, G.R. No. L-28745, October 23, 1974

Facts:Appellees are movie operators of Bacolod City assailing the validity of

Ordinance No. 1074 which prohibits the admission of two or more persons with only one admission ticket, for being ultra vires and its being contrary to the due process provision of the Constitution as they were deprived of their property without due process of law, more specifically in that there was a limitation on their right “to manage their respective theaters in the manner they wish.”

Issue:WON the ordinance is valid.

Held:Yes. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the

state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.

The statute is only a regulation of places of public entertainment and amusement upon terms of equal and exact justice to everyone holding a ticket of admission, and who is not, at the time, under the influence of liquor, or boisterous in conduct, or of lewd and immoral character. Such a regulation, in itself just, is likewise promotive, of peace and good order among those who attend places of public entertainment and amusement. It is neither an arbitrary exertion of the state's inherent or governmental power, nor a violation of any right secured by the Constitution

19. Ortigas & Co., Limited Partnership vs Feati Bank and Trust Co., G.R. No. L-24670, December 14, 1979

Facts:

On March 4, 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6, Block 31 of the Highway Hills Subdivision at Mandaluyong to Augusto and Natividad Angeles. The latter transferred their rights in favour of Emma Chavez, upon completion of payment a deed was executed with stipulations, one of which is that the use of the lots are to be exclusive for residential purposes only. Feati then acquired Lot 5 directly from Emma Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills. On May 5, 1963, Feati started construction of a building on both lots to be devoted for banking purposes but could also be for residential use. Ortigas sent a written demand to stop construction but Feati continued contending that the building was being constructed according to the zoning regulations as stated in Municipal Resolution 27 declaring the area along the West part of EDSA to be a commercial and industrial zone. Civil case No. 7706 was made and decided in favour of Feati.

Issue:

WON Resolution No. 27 declaring Lot 5 and 6 to be part of an industrial and commercial zone is valid considering the contract stipulation in the Transfer Certificate of Titles.

Held:

Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations. Section 3 of RA 2264 of the Local Autonomy Act empowers a Municipal Council to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the Municipality. Section 12 or RA 2264 states that implied power of the municipality should be “liberally construed in it’s favour”, “to give more power to the local government in promoting economic conditions, social welfare, and material progress in the community”. This is found in the General Welfare Clause of the said act. Although non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power.

20. Tano vs Socrates, G.R. No. 11029, August 21, 1997

FACTS:On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted

an ordinance banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January 1, 1993 to January 1, 1998. Subsequently the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted a resolution prohibiting the catching , gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a several species of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years, in and coming from Palawan waters.

Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the court declare the said ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the said ordinances deprived them of the due process of law, their

livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?

HELD:No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held

that the challenged ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws. There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation’s marine wealth. The so-called “preferential right” of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute.

In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their “exploration, development and utilization shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.

In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters. In light of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to LGUs which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned ordinances cannot be doubted.

21. MMDA vs Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., G.R. No. 135962

FACTS:On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice requesting the former to open its private road, Neptune Street, to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter separating the subdivision from Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner, praying for the issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall.

ISSUE:WON MMDA has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic as an agent of the state endowed with police power.

HELD:A ‘local government’ is a “political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs”. It is a “body politic and corporate” – one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the National

Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory (LGC of 1991).

Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in Sec.16 of the LGC of 1991. It empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan, panlungsod and bayan to “enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the [province, city or municipality] and its inhabitants pursuant to Sec.16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the [LGU’s corporate powers] provided under the Code.”

There is no syllable in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the LGUs, there is no grant of authority in RA 7924 that allows the MMDA to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is merely a “development authority” and not a political unit of government since it is neither an LGU or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. The MMDA Chairman is not an elective official, but is merely appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member.

In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the LGUs, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by the MMDA is illegal.

22. HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA, and HON. CALIXTO CATAQUIZ, petitioners, vs. HON. FRANCISCO DIZON PAÑO and TONY CALVENTO, respondents. [G.R. No. 129093. August 30, 2001.]

FACTS:On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by

the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor’s permit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996.  The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995which was issued on September 18, 1995.As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.  In the said complaint, respondent Calvento asked the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the following reliefs: (1) a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, ordering the defendants to refrain from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to issue a business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and (3) an order annulling or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Paño,

promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.

ISSUE: WON Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 is valid

HELD:As a policy statement expressing the local government’s objection to the lotto,

such resolution is valid.  This is part of the local government’s autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the national government’s.  However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress.  Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.n our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress.  As held in Tatel vs. Virac, ordinances should not contravene an existing statute enacted by Congress. The reasons for this is obvious, as elucidated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp

23. MUNICIPALITY OF DAET, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LI SENG GIAP & CO., INC., respondent. [G.R. No. L-35861. October 18, 1979.]

Facts:The municipality of Daet instituted an expropriation proceeding against

private respondent before the CFI of Camarines Norte for the purpose of acquiring and subsequently converting a parcel of land owned by the latter as a public park.

However, prior to the institution of the expropriation proceeding, petitioner, acting through its mayor, demolished the building owned by the respondent in the aforestated lot.

Issue:WON the act of petitioner, through its mayor, constituted taking.

Held:Yes. The demolition of the building of private respondent standing on the

land by the Municipal Mayor constituted the actual taking of possession of the property sought to be expropriated by the Municipality of Daet. There is taking when the a person is unduly deprived of his property.

24. Percival Moday, et al vs CA, Judge Yuipco and Municipality of Bunawan, G.R. No. 107916

FACTS: Percival Moday is a landowner in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur. In 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan passed a resolution authorizing the mayor to initiate an expropriation case against a 1 hectare portion of Moday’s land. Purpose

of which was to erect a gymnasium and other public buildings. The mayor approved the resolution and the resolution was transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which disapproved the said resolution ruling that the expropriation is not necessary because there are other lots owned by Bunawan that can be used for such purpose. The mayor pushed through with the expropriation nonetheless.

ISSUE: Whether or not a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

HELD: Yes. Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty.   It is government’s right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose.  Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utilities.  For the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation.  The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is “beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president making the same.” This was not the case in the case at bar as the SP merely stated that there are other available lands for the purpose sought, the SP did not even bother to declare the SB resolution as invalid. Hence, the expropriation case is valid.

25. Municipality of Paranaque vs VM Realty, G.R. No. 127820

Facts: Under a city council resolution, the Municipality of Parañaque filed on

September 20, 1993, a Complaint for expropriation against Private Respondent  V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of land of 10,000 square meters. The city previously negotiated for the sale of the property but VM didn’t accept.The trial court issued an Order dated February 4, 1994, authorizing petitioner to take possession of the subject property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value based on its current tax declaration.

According to the respondent, the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code); and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. Petitioner claimed that res judicata was not applicable.

Issue:WON a resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same force

and effect of an ordinance and will not deprive an expropriation case of a valid cause of action.

Held:

No. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature.

A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws.

If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution, it would have simply adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code.  But Congress did not.  In a clear divergence from the previous Local Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that the local chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance.

26. BARANGAY MATICTIC, Municipality of Norzagaray, Province of Bulacan, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE J. M. ELBINIAS as District Judge, CFI of Bulacan, Branch V and SPOUSES JOSE SERAPIO and GREGORIA PACIDA, et al., respondents. [G.R. No. L-48769. February 27, 1987.]

Facts:This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus to compel respondent judge to

allow Barangay Matictic's complaint in intervention in assailing the decision of the lower court in a case entitled “Municipality of Norzagay vs Jose Serapio, et al.” Respondent judge dismissed the original complaint on the ground that at the time the complaint was filed, the plaintiff municipality had not yet obtained the requisite authority from the Department Head or Office of the President, as required in Section 2245 of the Revised Administrative Code.

Issue:WON Barangay Matictic can intervene in the case.

Held:Regarding the annulment and setting aside orders of the public respondent,

dismissing the expropriation proceedings, the proper party to appeal the same or seek a review of such dismissal, would be the Municipality of Norzagaray. Petitioner Barrio Matictic, which is a different political entity, and although a part and parcel of the aforesaid municipality, has no legal personality to question the aforestated orders because by itself, it may not continue the expropriation case. It must be considered that the subject orders of the court a quo were not appealed by the Municipality of Norzagaray. The dismissal of the expropriation case, insofar as said municipality is concerned, became final. The expropriation case ceased to exist and there is consequently no more proceeding wherein Barangay Matictic may possibly intervene.

27. PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOV. LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE and HON. BENJAMIN V. PANGA as Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 33 at Pili,

Camarines Sur, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION), ERNESTO SAN JOAQUIN and EFREN SAN JOAQUIN, respondents. [G.R. No. 103125. May 17, 1993.]

Facts:Private respondent Dato was appointed as Private Agent by the then

governer of Camarines Sur, Apolonio Maleniza. He was subsequently promoted and appointed Assistant Provincial Warden.

Dato had no civil service eligibility for the position he was appointed to, thus, he could not be legally extended a permanent appointment. He was extended a temporary appointment, which was renewed annually.

Dato was indifinetely suspended and criminal charges filed against him for allegedly conniving and/or consenting to evasion of sentence of some detention prisoners who escaped from confinement.

Two years after the request for change of status was made, the head of the Camarines Sur Unit of the Civil Service Commission wrote the governor informing him of that the status of Dato was changed from temporary to permanent, the latter having passed the examination for Supervising Security Guard. The change of status was made retroactive to the date of release of said examination.

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan suppressed the appropriation for the position of Assistant Warden and deleted the respondent's name from the petitioners plantilla.

Dato was subsequently acquitted of the charges against him. Consequently, he requested the governor for reinstatement and backwages. His request was not heeded.

Issue: WON Dato was a permanent employee of petitioner at the time he was

suspended.

Held:No. Dato being a temporary employee is not entitled to backwages for the

entire period of his suspension.

At the time Dato was appointed Assistant Provincial Warden, he had not yet qualified in an appropriate examination for the position. Such lack of civil service eligibility made his appointment temporary and and without a fixed and definite term and is dependent entirely on the pleasure of the appointing body.

28. City of Cebu vs Spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo, G.R. No. 142971

FACTS:The City of Cebu expropriated the parcel of land owned by the Sps. Dedamo.

The parties executed and submitted to the trial court an Agreement wherein they declared that they have partially settled the case. Pursuant to the Agreement, the trial court appointed 3 Commissioners to determine the just compensation of the lots sought to be expropriated. The 3 Commissioners rendered an assessment for the lot in dispute and fixed it at P 12, 824.10 per sq. m. The assessment was approved as just compensation thereof by the trial court. As a result, the City of Cebu elevated the case to the SC and raised the issue that just compensation should be based on the prevailing market price of the property at the commencement of the expropriation proceedings and not at the time the property was actually taken.

ISSUE:WON the petitioner has the right to attack or question the report of the

Commissioners on which the decision was based.

HELD:No. By a solemn document freely and voluntarily agreed upon by the

petitioner and the respondents, agreed to be bound by the report of the commission and approved by the trial court. The AGREEMENT is a contract between the parties. It has the force of law between them and should be complied with (Art. 1159 , CC). Furthermore, Art. 1315 of the same Code provides that contracts are perfected by mere consent.

In the case at bar, the petitioner was estopped from attacking the report on which the decision was based due to consenting the commissioners’ report during the hearing.

29. LFREDO PATALINGHUG, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RICARDO CRIBILLO, MARTIN ARAPOL, CORAZON ALCASID, PRIMITIVA SEDO, respondents. [G.R. No. 104786. January 27, 1994.]

Facts:On November 17, 1982, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted

Ordinance No. 363, otherwise known as the “Expanded Zoning Ordinance of Davao City,” Sec.8 of which states:“A C-2 District shall be dominantly for commercial and compatible industrial uses as provided hereunder:

xxx

3.1. Funeral Parlors/Memorial Homes with adequate off street parking space and provided that they shall be established not less than 50 meters from any residential structures, churches and other institutional buildings.”

Petitioner constructed a funeral parlor in the name and style of Metropolitan Funeral Parlor at Cabaguio Avenue, Agdao, Davao City.

Acting on the complaint of several residents of Brgy. Agdao that the construction of petitioner’s funeral parlor violated Ordinance No. 363 since it was allegedly situated within a 50-meter radius from the Iglesia ni Kristo chapel and several residential structures, the Sangguniang Panlungsod conducted an investigation and found that “the nearest residential structure, owned by Wilfred Tepoot, is only 8 inches to the south”.

Notwithstanding the findings of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, petitioner continued with the construction of his funeral parlor until it was finished on November 3, 1987.

Issue:WON petitioner’s operation of a funeral home constitutes permissible use

within a particular district or zone in Davao City.

Held:Yes. Even if Tepoot’s building was declared for taxation purposes as

residential, once a local government has reclassified an area as commercial, that determination for zoning purposes must prevail. While the commercial character of the questioned vicinity has been declared through ordinance, private respondents have failed to present convincing arguments to substantiate their claim that Cabaguio Avenue, where the funeral parlor was constructed, was still a residential zone. Unquestionably, the operation of a funeral parlor constitutes as “commercial purposes” as gleaned from Ordinance No. 363.

The declaration of the said area as a commercial zone thru a municipal ordinance is an exercise of police power to promote the good order and general welfare of the people in the locality. Corollary thereto, the state, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Thus, persons may be subjected to certain kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general welfare of the state and to this fundamental aim of government, the rights of the individual may be subordinated. The ordinance which regulates the location of funeral homes has been adopted as part of comprehensive zoning plans for the orderly development of the area covered thereunder.

30. HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON, HON. REY B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondents. [G.R. No. 131457. August 19, 1999.]

Facts:

Background facts: On October 1997, alleged farmer-beneficiaries commenced a hunger strike in front of the Department of Agrarian Reform compound in Quezon City. They protested the decision of the Office of the President (OP) dated March 29, 1996 which approved the conversion of a 144-hectare land from agricultural to agro-industrial/institutional area. Note that this decision already became final and executory.

o The land is located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by NQSRMDC (Norberto Quisumbing Sr. Management and Development Corp). It was leased as a pineapple plantation to Del Monte.

o The Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon became interested in the property, and enacted an ordinance converting the said land to industrial/institutional with a view to attract investors in order to achieve economic vitality.

o Apparently, land conversion issues need to go through the Department of Agrarian Reform. The DAR rejected the land conversion and instead opted to put the same under CARP and ordered the distribution of the property to the farmers.

o The case reached the OP. The OP rendered a decision reversing the DAR and converting the land to agro-indusrial area, which became the subject of the strike of the farmers.

o The hunger strike was dramatic and well-publicized which commanded nationwide attention that even church leaders and some presidential candidates tried to intervene for their “cause”.

These events led the OP, through then Deputy Exec. Sec. Corona, to issue the so-called “Win-Win” Resolution, substantially modifying its earlier Decision (see decision dated March 29, 1996) after it had already become final and executory.

It modified the approval of the land conversion to agro-industrial area only to the extent of forty-four (44) hectares, and ordered the remaining one hundred (100) hectares to be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.