Organizational&

institutional patterns in

MexicanMafi as

CARTELS, GANGS, NEAR-GROUPS AND

MOBS

XVII World Congress of Criminology — Monterrey

2014

JAMES CREECHAN, PH.D.

SS 17 – ORGANIZED CRIME

HTTP: / /WWW.SCRIBD.COM/DOC/225856710/CARTELS- GANGS-NEAR-GROUPS-AND-MOBS-THE-DIFFERENT-ORGANIZATIONAL-STRUCTURES-

OF-CRIME-ORGANIZATIONS- IN-MEXICO

Little Evidence of Analytical

Frameworks in developing a strategy to

manage and control

LittleConsensus in Academic

Conceptualization

CARTELDTO

TNCOVCDO

NARRATIVES – GREAT DIVIDES

Traditional CriminologyUSA, Canada, Europe

Mexico AcademiaJournalism

Government

RECENT BOOKS ON NARCO

Narrow literature Mexican criminal organizations Primarily journalistic (Spanish) & few academic investigations Limited & narrow comparative frameworks

Personality, Power & Motivational Narratives Especially true of capos, jefes, and violent operatives

Narrow analytical framework used for all cartels, & even gangs and mobs overlook important structural differences & criminal

diversification “within & between” cartels, gangs and mobs. Unmerited cartel status for some gangs and mobs Overlook transnational and macro-patterns of drug

traffi cking Cartel-State nexus viewed asymmetrically

cartel directed violence – (plato ó plomo narrative)

ACADEMIC NARRATIVES - NARROW

•Overempha

sis of

Criminal

motivation

in

explaining

narcotraffi c

•Too Little structural

analysis

• Abuse and

misuse of

cartel

concept and

narrative

OVERVIEW OF ARGUMENT

Individualcriminal

mob

Near-group

Gang

Organized criminal activity

Symbolic reconstruction of

crime into organized “cartels” has

contributed little to understanding of

crime and violence in Mexico. (Luis Astorga)

With notable exceptions…concept “cartel” means little more than “crime on a

big scale”…short hand for “a lot of crime” or “crime on a large and violent scale”.

• DTO, TNCO, VCDO add c lar i ty , but imperfect .

CARTEL?

An Under Formalized

Conception of Structures and

Institutions

An OversocializedConception of Crime Bosses

CARTELDTO

TNCOVCDO

THE CENTRAL CONCEPTUAL FAILING

Muddled & unclear conception of Mexican Crime Organizations

Formally Rational State in Global

Economy

REFORMULATION- RECONCEPTUALIZATION BY BORROWING FROM

THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY

Mexico’s Crime & Violence) Problem

Data Pattern

Gang & Mafia

Theory

Muddled & unclear conception of Mexican Crime Organizations

BRIEF

Considerati

on

OVEREMPHASIS ON ACTOR MOTIVATION

& INDIVIDUAL AGENCY

Psychological narratives are common and popular J. Edgar Hoover & Oprah effect

Basic“framework” of academic etiological theories– remains rooted in criminal motivation and individual agency

Media Effect—personal biographies of capo bosses helps book sales and makes headlines – Ioan Grillo, Malcolm Beith

Spanish language accounts in same trap– criminal “gangs” charismatic leaders, modern caciques, or rogue invaders Anabel Hernandez – however, Los Señores not el Señor Guillermo Valdes Castellano – the uncanny power of el

ChapoWar on drugs – take-down of capos

OVER-EMPHASIS ON PERSONALITY

Potential Frameworks- At least 4“narratives” can be applied— Mexico Application?

LESSONS FROM CRIMINOLOGY?

The Crime (Violence) Problem

Formally

Rational State

Data Pattern

Gang & Mafia

Theory Part 1

individual

mob

Neargroup

GangOrganized criminal activity

CRIME GROUPS – TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF GANGS

SECURITY RECONCEPTUALIZATION— HOMELAND SECURITY INFLUENCE

individual

mob

Near-group

Gang

Organized criminal activity

Source is Bunker

Are Mexican Crime Organizations “mafias”?

Mexican and Colombian drug organizations were labeled “proto-cartels” by Jean-François Gayraud based on 8 criteria to classify cartels Rooted in sociological and political theory— primarily Weber’s

theory of organizations. Gayraud applies his knowledge of transnational crime

organizations.

Table derived from Gayraud, Jean-François. 2007. El G 9 de las Mafias en el Mundo: Geopolítica del Crimen Organizado . Translated by E. R. García. Barcelona: Tendencias. (pp. 267–340 “¿Que es un mafia?”

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINOLOGY— TRUE MAFIAS?

POLITICOS/INFLUENTIAL BUSINESSMEN/HOLDING COMPANYFINANCI

EROS

CAPOS/JEFE

SFINANCIEROS

LAVADEROS

JEFE DE SEGURI

DAD

OPERADORES

LOS DRS.

TRAVEL

LUGARTENIENTES

FUNCTIONARIES

DISTRIBUIDORES

NARCOMENUDISTAS

PRODUCTORES

SICARIOS

HALCÓN

BANDAS/

CHAVOS/

PORROS

HALCÓN

POLICIA/

SEDENA/

PGR/ESTATALES/MUNI

S

FUNCTIONARIOS DE

ALTO MANDO

TRANSNACIONAL

LINK

Prepared by J. Creechan: Contents copyright of Reforma Newspapers

INSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY AND DIVISION OF LABOUR IN CARTELS?

Saviano – the important link

Emphasis

Growing popularity of business model of cartels Eg. TED talk by Rodrigo Canales may be the best “framework”

of this modelFills in gaps in other explanatory frameworks

continues to promote the theme of powerful all-wise and all-controlling capo

Italian Mafia framework– organized crime model Terrorism-crime nexus described by Bunker is not much

differentLimitations – locked into neo-liberal explanations of

crime as bad for business and for the economy. Rogue corporations

Over rationalization and over-identification of the criminal gang structure

Does not identify the true CEO

ALTERNATE FRAMEWORKS- BUSINESS MODEL

AccurateDescriptionOf Cartel(s)?•Structure•Organization•Activity•Diversity•Linkage

REALITY OF NARCO CARTEL ACTIVITY:

THE DATA?

The Crime (Violence) Problem

Formally

Rational State

Data Pattern

Gang & Mafia

Theory

Part 2

Criminal organizations (DTO’s) are actually diff erent components working together in varying degrees of formal and informal cooperation

No singular model of mutual organization: DTO’s employ diff erent patterns for mutual cooperation

DTO’s and gangs do not do everything and all things . Some elements are specialized, and others diversifi ed

The scope (reach) of the plaza determines the “nature of the group” and whether it deserves the name cartel

The groups and their criminal activities are constantly in fl ux

Near Group

Gang

Mafia

STUDY OF ORGANIZED CRIME

CAUTION: IS MEANINGFUL OBSERVATION REALLY POSSIBLE?

Individual

Ethnography,Investigative JournalismCase Study

SurveysOfficial Records

Mob

Investigative Journalism,Case Study

CommissionsOfficial Files?

Gang

Investigative Journalism,Case StudyParticipant

ObservationPolice Records

CartelMAFIA

Investigative Journalism,Case StudyParticipant

ObservationCommissions and

Hearings

CONFIDENCE GAP

What is the nature of Mexican organized crime?

• How are Mexican Crime Groups similar or diff erent?• Are all Mexican organizations “truly cartels”?

TWO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS TO

CONSIDER

•Horizontaldiffuse

•comprehensive drug shipment and

production• control of Pacific,

Caribbean and transnational routes

•HierarchicalDelineated

• Whatever it takes to meet payroll

• Control of Hwy 40

•Cultish-fanatical• synthetic drugs,

extortion• control of Lazaro

Cardenas

AT LEAST THREE DISTINCT CRIMINAL GROUP TYPES IN MEXICO

Structure & Leadership

Location, Plaza, Turf

Specialization- Skill

Criminal Reach

ARGUMENT: DIMENSIONS OF DIFFERENCE

Of many Mexican crime organizations —three are “ideal types”Sinaloa/North Pacific

Gulf-ZetasCaballeros Templarios – Familia Michoacan

CARTEL INFLUENCE

CorruptionImpunityInequality TransparencyJustice ReformSocial-Cohesion

RESPONSE OF FORMALLY RATIONAL

STATES?

The Crime (Violence) Problem

Formally

Rational State

Data Pattern

Gang & Mafia

Theory

Part 3

Although there are fundamental disagreements in detail, social theories argue that social control and social cohesion are most eff ectively attained when several institutions cooperatively work to produce both informal and informal control

E.G. Durkheim, Max Weber, John Rawls etc.

MEXICO EMPHASIS ON MECHANICAL AND PUNITIVE SANCTIONS?

Trapped in narrow “sanction mode” John Bailey explores Mexico’s

"security trap”—where the dynamics of crime, violence, and corruption conspire to override eff orts to put the country on a path toward democratic governance.”

What kind of democracy will emerge in Mexico when the current levels of violence are brought under control?

Will democratic reformers gain strength in the new equilibrium between government and criminal organizations?

Or will corruption tilt the balance toward criminal interests? In the context of these questions,

THE SECURITY TRAP

World Just ice Report ranks a country’s strength according to rule of law, qual ity of governance, and cr iminal just ice system based on surveys of perception and experiences administered to over 100,000 households in three c it ies per country.

Nine factors:

constraints on government power

absence of corruption order and security fundamental rights open government regulatory enforcement civil justice criminal justice informal justice.

DATAP MEXICO’S INSTITUTIONAL INCAPACITY TO PROTECT AND

PROVIDE TOTAL JUSTICE

Federal_State

Sinaloa Hegemony

State•Sinaloa•Templarios•Zetas•CJNG

Municipal•Sinaloa•Los Zetas•Templarios

INSTITUTIONAL & SECURITY NEXUSES*

Transnational Criminal Linkages

US Drug Policy

Global Markets

For Marijuana,CocaineHeroin

Synthetics

* Plural of nexus . Latin suggests it should be Nexae

Globalized Context ofGovernance, Crime

Control and Security