From DOO Tell to

INTERCEPTOR

Leveraging GPS technological advantage to mitigate

driver human factor risk

RISSB Rail Safety Conference 20164-5 April 2016, Adelaide

Phillip O’Connell MSSc

Group General Manager Zero Harm (Acting)

Carl Mills

Manager Operations Development

From DOO Tell to INTERCEPTOR

Photographs: KiwiRail

3

Project Objectives

Driver Cognition

Other Safety Critical

Industries

Aviation and Rail Industries Internationally

• Error

• ErrorThreat

• Error

• ErrorThreat

4

Project Overview

• Literature review (cognition)

• Risk Triggered Commentary Driving (UK & AU)

• Point & Call (JPN)

• Stabilised Approach (Airbus / ICAO / NASA)

Inputs

• Driver Subject Matter Expert Group

Development + OT&E • Review

• Adjust

• Integrate

Operationalise

NTS

5

Concepts to Actions

Situational Awareness

Working Memory

Confirmation

Bias

Expectation Bias

Habituation Bias

Load

Delay

Loss

Prospective Memory

Task sequencing,

rapid switching

Traditional signalling systems• Require the LE to:

monitor the environment,

identify the caution signal, and

reduce train speed to stop prior to passing the next red signal.

• Maintenance of Situational Awareness (SA) is therefore critical.

Situational Awareness

Noise Distraction, Visual and auditory overload

Poor quality visual

information

Error recovery options diminish

Human error is predictable, unable to be fully mitigated

and can lead to serious accidents.

Systems and procedures must be

designed to minimise risk through error-tolerant design and

effective driver practices.

Adapted from Airbus 2006, ‘Flight operations briefing notes, approach techniques, flying stabilized approaches’, FLT_OPS – APPR – SEQ 01, 2nd edn

Freight trains

Metro EMU

Data confirmation

Freight trains - SPAD data review

Project INTERCEPTOR

NZ Profile

40%

Signalling

CTC / Auto Signalling

Track Warrant

Distance Traffic

40% 60%

60% 40%

The GPS Opportunity

Workforce Whiteboarding …

The GPS Solution - ICT Trailed 2014 Nationwide by July 2016

Control Centre overrun alerting active 2015

Data to loco under construction now

Interceptor in sequence

Summary

Safety management actions

= human + engineering + procedural controls

Error-tolerant procedures

= Threat detection + Error Identification + Error

Correction

SPAD risk reduction

= Technology + Stabilised Approach + RTCD + NTS

THANK YOU

Newmarket, 23 March 1977

Source: NZ Railways Department