JONAS SAWKBI, leader of theAngolan rebel movement Unite,recently returned from a highly .succeuft l American tour .He met with US President Ronald

Reapers, the Secretary of State, theSecretar~+ of Defence, and heads ofmost major American newspapers .He left with apromise of between

$10 and $15 million in US militaryaid, plus further millions for otherforms of aid .The Reagan administration iseager to prove its determination to'roll back communism' by backingguerillas fighting Soviet-backedstate. It depicts Angola as abmlegroumd between the forces oflight and darkness, and Savimbi as

the one leader capable of 'restoringdemocracy' .One small problem though, is that

this support for Units lands it in aneffective military alliance with Pro-toils. The SA government has beenbacking Units for many years .But alliances between the Reagan

administration and Pretoria are notnew.Previous administrations favoured

increasing isolation of the SAregime, but within five months ofReagan's taking office in 1961 PitBotha had paid an official visit tothe US. It was clear thatReagan's constructive cngacementpolicy meant a closer relationshipwith the SA government, sup-

posedly to encourage reform .The US opposed ells for sanc-tions against SA . It was the onlymajor Western power which did notcondemn SA's raid into southernAngola in August 1981 . And allalong, the US worked hard to sec-ure loans for the SA government .But, constructive engagement is

not directed only at SA, but at theentire subcontinent : the US is liningup with Botha to impose a 'morestable order' in Southern Africa .Two months ago, the Assistant

Secretary of State for AfricanAffairs, Cuter Crocker, touredthe subcontinent in a last-ditchattempt to break the deadlock overthe issue of Cuban witbdnwal from

Angola, which could set the stagefor the implementation of UNResolution 435, which provides forfree-and-fair election : in Namibia .Now, with the massive injection of

new foreign funding into Units, the30 000 Cuban troops are unlikely towithdraw .It is against this background thatPW Botha a offering to considermoving towards Namibian inde-pendence from August I .For some time now there has been

a stalemate in Ann~ola, and linkedto this, Namibia'sSA's linkage of a ban with-

drawal from Angola has nothing todo with SA ending its illegitimatebold over Namibia .

Pretoria insists it does so long asthere are 'communist forces'operating lust across Namibia'sborder, Pretoria says it does, solong as there are "communistforces" operating lust acrossNamibuu border, Pretoria aye itcan't withdraw from Namibia .The irony is that the Cubans are in

Angola to defend the governmentfrom attacks and destabilisationfrom Units, which SA u baking.So why then has PW Bothaannoim ed that independencenova in Namibia will finally beginin August?One reason is that it looks good .

Foreign attention will be divertedfrom the crises within SA, and it

will appear as if Botha is ?king seti-ously international demands for SAto end its illegal occupation .Another reason is that SA cannot

afford to hold onto Namibia indefi-nitely. At present, running the pup-pet government in Windhoek andmaintaining SADF troops in theterritory is costing SA more than amillion rind a day, end in the pre-sent economic crises, more usefulpolitical gain an be made by

that money chewbere .But it's more probable that it's a

shrewd tactical move by Botha thenew Injection of foreign 6aaooeinto Units will strengthen the rebelmovement, and make it more dif-ficult for MPLA to withdraw the

Cuban forces safely .The MPLA has said in the past thec ubans can't be removed untilUnits stops destabigsing the ooum-try, which makes it even lea likelyflat it will i ;e _now.So Botha i score a tactical vic-tory his offer to grant Namibianindependence will be seen as agenerous and reasonable gesture .But, beaus it trill remm linkedto the question of a Close with-drawal, and be aasetheMPLAwillbe even more rr c*ant to ask theCubans to leave taw that Units hasbeen injected wiih new Americanfinance, Bot . wrilbe able losinghis shoaddm sostg y sad uy, 'Baitwe tried. . .'