by nicolo machiavelli written c. 1505, published 1515 ... · the prince by nicolo machiavelli...

The Princeby Nicolo Machiavelli

Written c. 1505, published 1515

Translated by W. K. Marriott

The Original Version of this Text wasRendered into HTML by Jon Roland

of the Constitution Societyhttp://constitution.org

Converted to PDF by Danny Stone as a Community Service to the Constitution Society

The Prince 1 Nicolo Machiavelli

CHAPTER I

How Many Kinds Of Principalities ThereAre, And By What Means They Are

Acquired

LL STATES, all powers, that have held andhold rule over men have been and areeither republics or principalities.A

Principalities are either hereditary, in which thefamily has been long established; or they are new.

The new are either entirely new, as was Milan toFrancesco Sforza, or they are, as it were, membersannexed to the hereditary state of the prince whohas acquired them, as was the kingdom of Naplesto that of the King of Spain.

Such dominions thus acquired are eitheraccustomed to live under a prince, or to live infreedom; and are acquired either by the arms of theprince himself, or of others, or else by fortune orby ability.


CHAPTER II

Concerning Hereditary Principalities

WILL leave out all discussion on republics,inasmuch as in another place I have written ofthem at length, 1 and will address myself only

to principalities. In doing so I will keep to theorder indicated above, and discuss how suchprincipalities are to be ruled and preserved.

II say at once there are fewer difficulties in

holding hereditary states, and those longaccustomed to the family of their prince, than newones; for it is sufficient only not to transgress thecustoms of his ancestors, and to deal prudentlywith circumstances as they arise, for a prince ofaverage powers to maintain himself in his state,unless he be deprived of it by some extraordinaryand excessive force; and if he should be sodeprived of it, whenever anything sinister happensto the usurper, he will regain it.

We have in Italy, for example, the Duke ofFerrara, who could not have withstood the attacksof the Venetians in '84, nor those of Pope Julius in'10, unless he had been long established in hisdominions. For the hereditary prince has less causeand less necessity to offend; hence it happens thathe will be more loved; and unless extraordinaryvices cause him to be hated, it is reasonable to

1 Discourses.


expect that his subjects will be naturally welldisposed towards him; and in the antiquity andduration of his rule the memories and motives thatmake for change are lost, for one change alwaysleaves the toothing for another.


CHAPTER III

Concerning Mixed Principalities

UT the difficulties occur in a newprincipality. And firstly, if it be notentirely new, but is, as it were, a member

of a state which, taken collectively, may be calledcomposite, the changes arise chiefly from aninherent difficulty which there is in all newprincipalities; for men change their rulerswillingly, hoping to better themselves, and thishope induces them to take up arms against himwho rules: wherein they are deceived, because theyafterwards find by experience they have gone frombad to worse. This follows also on another naturaland common necessity, which always causes a newprince to burden those who have submitted to himwith his soldiery and with infinite other hardshipswhich he must put upon his new acquisition.

B

In this way you have enemies in all those whomyou have injured in seizing that principality, andyou are not able to keep those friends who put youthere because of your not being able to satisfy themin the way they expected, and you cannot takestrong measures against them, feeling bound tothem. For, although one may be very strong inarmed forces, yet in entering a province one hasalways need of the goodwill of the natives.

For these reasons Louis XII, King of France,


quickly occupied Milan, and as quickly lost it; andto turn him out the first time it only neededLodovico's own forces; because those who hadopened the gates to him, finding themselvesdeceived in their hopes of future benefit, would notendure the ill-treatment of the new prince. It isvery true that, after acquiring rebellious provincesa second time, they are not so lightly lostafterwards, because the prince, with littlereluctance, takes the opportunity of the rebellion topunish the delinquents, to clear out the suspects,and to strengthen himself in the weakest places.Thus to cause France to lose Milan the first time itwas enough for the Duke Lodovico to raiseinsurrections on the borders; but to cause him tolose it a second time it was necessary to bring thewhole world against him, and that his armiesshould be defeated and driven out of Italy; whichfollowed from the causes above mentioned.

Nevertheless Milan was taken from France boththe first and the second time. The general reasonsfor the first have been discussed; it remains toname those for the second, and to see whatresources he had, and what any one in his situationwould have had for maintaining himself moresecurely in his acquisition than did the King ofFrance.

Now I say that those dominions which, whenacquired, are added to an ancient state by him whoacquires them, are either of the same country andlanguage, or they are not. When they are, it is


easier to hold them, especially when they have notbeen accustomed to self-government; and to holdthem securely it is enough to have destroyed thefamily of the prince who was ruling them; becausethe two peoples, preserving in other things the oldconditions, and not being unlike in customs, willlive quietly together, as one has seen in Brittany,Burgundy, Gascony, and Normandy, which havebeen bound to France for so long a time: and,although there may be some difference inlanguage, nevertheless the customs are alike, andthe people will easily be able to get on amongstthemselves. He who has annexed them, if hewishes to hold them, has only to bear in mind twoconsiderations: the one, that the family of theirformer lord is extinguished; the other, that neithertheir laws nor their taxes are altered, so that in avery short time they will become entirely one bodywith the old principality.

But when states are acquired in a countrydiffering in language, customs, or laws, there aredifficulties, and good fortune and great energy areneeded to hold them, and one of the greatest andmost real helps would be that he who has acquiredthem should go and reside there. This would makehis position more secure and durable, as it hasmade that of the Turk in Greece, who,notwithstanding all the other measures taken byhim for holding that state, if he had not settledthere, would not have been able to keep it.Because, if one is on the spot, disorders are seen as


they spring up, and one can quickly remedy them;but if one is not at hand, they heard of only whenthey are one can no longer remedy them. Besidesthis, the country is not pillaged by your officials;the subjects are satisfied by prompt recourse to theprince; thus, wishing to be good, they have morecause to love him, and wishing to be otherwise, tofear him. He who would attack that state from theoutside must have the utmost caution; as long asthe prince resides there it can only be wrested fromhim with the greatest difficulty.

The other and better course is to send coloniesto one or two places, which may be as keys to thatstate, for it necessary either to do this or else tokeep there a great number of cavalry and infantry.A prince does not spend much on colonies, forwith little or no expense he can send them out andkeep them there, and he offends a minority only ofthe citizens from whom he takes lands and housesto give them to the new inhabitants; and thosewhom he offends, remaining poor and scattered,are never able to injure him; whilst the rest beinguninjured are easily kept quiet, and at the sametime are anxious not to err for fear it shouldhappen to them as it has to those who have beendespoiled. In conclusion, I say that these coloniesare not costly, they are more faithful, they injureless, and the injured, as has been said, being poorand scattered, cannot hurt. Upon this, one has toremark that men ought either to be well treated orcrushed, because they can avenge themselves of


lighter injuries, of more serious ones they cannot;therefore the injury that is to be done to a manought to be of such a kind that one does not standin fear of revenge.

But in maintaining armed men there in place ofcolonies one spends much more, having toconsume on the garrison all income from the state,so that the acquisition turns into a loss, and manymore are exasperated, because the whole state isinjured; through the shifting of the garrison up anddown all become acquainted with hardship, and allbecome hostile, and they are enemies who, whilstbeaten on their own ground, are yet able to do hurt.For every reason, therefore, such guards are asuseless as a colony is useful.

Again, the prince who holds a country differingin the above respects ought to make himself thehead and defender of his powerful neighbours, andto weaken the more powerful amongst them,taking care that no foreigner as powerful as himselfshall, by any accident, get a footing there; for itwill always happen that such a one will beintroduced by those who are discontented, eitherthrough excess of ambition or through fear, as onehas seen already. The Romans were brought intoGreece by the Aetolians; and in every othercountry where they obtained a footing they werebrought in by the inhabitants. And the usual courseof affairs is that, as soon as a powerful foreignerenters a country, all the subject states are drawn tohim, moved by the hatred which they feel against


the ruling power. So that in respect to these subjectstates he has not to take any trouble to gain themover to himself, for the whole of them quickly rallyto the state which he has acquired there. He hasonly to take care that they do not get hold of toomuch power and too much authority, and then withhis own forces, and with their goodwill, he caneasily keep down the more powerful of them, so asto remain entirely master in the country. And hewho does not properly manage this business willsoon lose what he has acquired, and whilst he doeshold it he will have endless difficulties andtroubles.

The Romans, in the countries which theyannexed, observed closely these measures; theysent colonies and maintained friendly relationswith the minor powers, without increasing theirstrength; they kept down the greater, and did notallow any strong foreign powers to gain authority.Greece appears to me sufficient for an example.The Achaeans and Aetolians were kept friendly bythem, the kingdom of Macedonia was humbled,Antiochus was driven out; yet the merits of theAchaeans and Aetolians never secured for thempermission to increase their power, nor did thepersuasions of Philip ever induce the Romans to behis friends without first humbling him, nor did theinfluence of Antiochus make them agree that heshould retain any lordship over the country.Because the Romans did in these instances what allprudent princes ought to do, who have to regard


not only present troubles, but also future ones, forwhich they must prepare with every energy,because, when foreseen, it is easy to remedy them;but if you wait until they approach, the medicine isno longer in time because the malady has becomeincurable; for it happens in this, as the physicianssay it happens in hectic fever, that in the beginningof the malady it is easy to cure but difficult todetect, but in the course of time, not having beeneither detected or treated in the beginning, itbecomes easy to detect but difficult to cure. Thus ithappens in affairs of state, for when the evils thatarise have been foreseen (which it is only given toa wise man to see), they can be quickly redressed,but when, through not having been foreseen, theyhave been permitted to grow in a way that everyone can see them. there is no longer a remedy.Therefore, the Romans, foreseeing troubles, dealtwith them at once, and, even to avoid a war, wouldnot let them come to a head, for they knew that waris not to be avoided, but is only put off to theadvantage of others; moreover they wished to fightwith Philip and Antiochus in Greece so as not tohave to do it in Italy; they could have avoided both,but this they did not wish; nor did that ever pleasethem which is for ever in the mouths of the wiseones of our time:— Let us enjoy the benefits of thetime — but rather the benefits of their own valourand prudence, for time drives everything before it,and is able to bring with it good as well as evil,and evil as well as good.


But let us turn to France and inquire whether shehas done any of the things mentioned. I will speakof Louis [XII] (and not of Charles [VIII]) as theone whose conduct is the better to be observed, hehaving held possession of Italy for the longestperiod; and you will see that he has done theopposite to those things which ought to be done toretain a state composed of divers elements.

King Louis was brought into Italy by theambition of the Venetians, who desired to obtainhalf the state of Lombardy by his intervention. Iwill not blame the course taken by the king,because, wishing to get a foothold in Italy, andhaving no friends there — seeing rather that everydoor was shut to him owing to the conduct ofCharles — he was forced to accept thosefriendships which he could get, and he would havesucceeded very quickly in his design if in othermatters he had not made some mistakes. The king,however, having acquired Lombardy, regained atonce the authority which Charles had lost: Genoayielded; the Florentines became his friends; theMarquess of Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, theBentivoglio, my lady of Forli, the Lords of Faenza,of Pesaro, of Rimini, of Camerino, of Piombino,the Lucchesi, the Pisans, the Sienese — everybodymade advances to him to become his friend. Thencould the Venetians realize the rashness of thecourse taken by them, which, in order that theymight secure two towns in Lombardy, had madethe king master of two-thirds of Italy.


Let any one now consider with what littledifficulty the king could have maintained hisposition in Italy had he observed the rules abovelaid down, and kept all his friends secure andprotected; for although they were numerous theywere both weak and timid, some afraid of theChurch, some of the Venetians, and thus theywould always have been forced to stand in withhim, and by their means he could easily have madehimself secure against those who remainedpowerful. But he was no sooner in Milan than hedid the contrary by assisting Pope Alexander tooccupy the Romagna. It never occurred to him thatby this action he was weakening himself, deprivinghimself of friends and those who had thrownthemselves into his lap, whilst he aggrandized theChurch by adding much temporal power to thespiritual, thus giving it great authority. And havingcommitted this prime error, he was obliged tofollow it up, so much so that, to put an end to theambition of Alexander, and to prevent hisbecoming the master of Tuscany, he was himselfforced to come into Italy.

And as if it were not enough to haveaggrandized the Church, and deprived himselffriends, he, wishing to have the kingdom ofNaples, divides it with the King of Spain, andwhere he was the prime arbiter of Italy he takes anassociate, so that the ambitious of that country andthe malcontents of his own should have where toshelter; and whereas he could have left in the


kingdom his own pensioner as king, he drove himout, to put one there who was able to drive him,Louis, out in turn.

The wish to acquire is in truth very natural andcommon, and men always do so when they can,and for this they will be praised not blamed; butwhen they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by anymeans, then there is folly and blame. Therefore, ifFrance could have attacked Naples with her ownforces she ought to have done so; if she could not,then she ought not to have divided it. And if thepartition which she made with the Venetians inLombardy was justified by the excuse that by it shegot a foothold in Italy, this other partition meritedblame, for it had not the excuse of that necessity.

Therefore Louis made these five errors: hedestroyed the minor powers, he increased thestrength of one of the greater powers in Italy, hebrought in a foreign power, he did not settle in thecountry, he did not send colonies. Which errors, ifhe had lived, were not enough to injure him had henot made a sixth by taking away their dominionsfrom the Venetians; because, had he notaggrandized the Church, nor brought Spain intoItaly, it would have been very reasonable andnecessary to humble them; but having first takenthese steps, he ought never to have consented totheir ruin, for they, being powerful, would alwayshave kept off others from designs on Lombardy, towhich the Venetians would never have consentedexcept to become masters themselves there; also


because the others would not wish to takeLombardy from France in order to give it to theVenetians, and to run counter to both they wouldnot have had the courage.

And if any one should say: King Louis yieldedthe Romagna to Alexander and the kingdom toSpain to avoid war, I answer for the reasons givenabove that a blunder ought never be perpetrated toavoid war, because it is not to be avoided, but isonly deferred to your disadvantage. And if anothershould allege the pledge which the king had givento the Pope that he would assist him in theenterprise, in exchange for the dissolution of hismarriage and for the hat to Rouen, to that I replywhat I shall write later on concerning the faith ofprinces, and how it ought to be kept.

Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not havingfollowed any of the conditions observed by thosewho have taken possession of countries andwished to retain them. Nor is there any miracle inthis, but much that is reasonable and quite natural.And on these matters I spoke at Nantes withRouen, when Valentino, 1 as Cesare Borgia, theson of Pope Alexander, was usually called,occupied the Romagna, and on Cardinal Rouenobserving to me that the Italians did not understandwar, I replied to him that the French did notunderstand statecraft, meaning that otherwise theywould not have allowed the Church to reach such

1 So called — in Italian — from the duchy of Valentinois,conferred on him by Louis XII.


greatness. And in fact it has been seen that thegreatness of the Church and of Spain in Italy hasbeen caused by France, and her ruin may beattributed to them. From this a general rule isdrawn which never or rarely fails: that he who isthe cause of another becoming powerful is ruined;because that predominancy has been brought abouteither by astuteness or else by force, and both aredistrusted by him who has been raised to power.


CHAPTER IV

Why The Kingdom Of Darius, ConqueredBy Alexander, Did Not Rebel Against The

Successors Of Alexander At His Death

ONSIDERING the difficulties which menhave had to hold a newly acquired state,some might wonder how, seeing that

Alexander the Great became the master of Asia ina few years, and died whilst it was yet scarcelysettled (whence it might appear reasonable that thewhole empire would have rebelled), neverthelesshis successors maintained themselves, and had tomeet no other difficulty than that which aroseamong themselves from their own ambitions.

C

I answer that the principalities of which one hasrecord are found to be governed in two differentways: either by a prince, with a body of servants,who assist him to govern the kingdom as ministersby his favour and permission; or by a prince andbarons, who hold that dignity by antiquity of bloodand not by the grace of the prince. Such baronshave states and their own subjects, who recognizethem as lords and hold them in natural affection.Those states that are governed by a prince and hisservants hold their prince in more consideration,because in all the country there is no one who isrecognized as superior to him, and if they yieldobedience to another they do it as to a minister and


official, and they do not bear him any particularaffection.

The examples of these two governments in ourtime are the Turk and the King of France. Theentire monarchy of the Turk is governed by onelord, the others are his servants; and, dividing hiskingdom into sanjaks, he sends there differentadministrators, and shifts and changes them as hechooses. But the King of France is placed in themidst of an ancient body of lords, acknowledgedby their own subjects, and beloved by them; theyhave their own prerogatives, nor can the king takethese away except at his peril. Therefore, he whoconsiders both of these states will recognize greatdifficulties in seizing the state of the Turk, but,once it is conquered, great ease in holding it. Thecauses of the difficulties in seizing the kingdom ofthe Turk are that the usurper cannot be called in bythe princes of the kingdom, nor can he hope to beassisted in his designs by the revolt of those whomthe lord has around him. This arises from thereasons given above; for his ministers, being allslaves and bondmen, can only be corrupted withgreat difficulty, and one can expect little advantagefrom them when they have been corrupted, as theycannot carry the people with them, for the reasonsassigned. Hence, he who attacks the Turk mustbear in mind that he will find him united, and hewill have to rely more on his own strength than onthe revolt of others; but, if once the Turk has beenconquered, and routed in the field in such a way


that he cannot replace his armies, there is nothingto fear but the family of the prince, and, this beingexterminated, there remains no one to fear, theothers having no credit with the people; and as theconqueror did not rely on them before his victory,so he ought not to fear them after it.

The contrary happens in kingdoms governed likethat of France, because one can easily enter thereby gaining over some baron of the kingdom, forone always finds malcontents and such as desire achange. Such men, for the reasons given, can openthe way into the state and render the victory easy;but if you wish to hold it afterwards, you meet withinfinite difficulties, both from those who haveassisted you and from those you have crushed. Noris it enough for you to have exterminated thefamily of the prince, because the lords that remainmake themselves the heads of fresh movementsagainst you, and as you are unable either to satisfyor exterminate them, that state is lost whenevertime brings the opportunity.

Now if you will consider what was the nature ofthe government of Darius, you will find it similarto the kingdom of the Turk, and therefore it wasonly necessary for Alexander, first to overthrowhim in the field, and then to take the country fromhim. After which victory, Darius being killed, thestate remained secure to Alexander, for the abovereasons. And if his successors had been united theywould have enjoyed it securely and at their ease,for there were no tumults raised in the kingdom


except those they provoked themselves.But it is impossible to hold with such

tranquillity states constituted like that of France.Hence arose those frequent rebellions against theRomans in Spain, France, and Greece, owing to themany principalities there were in these states, ofwhich, as long as the memory of them endured, theRomans always held an insecure possession; butwith the power and long continuance of the empirethe memory of them passed away, and the Romansthen became secure possessors. And when fightingafterwards amongst themselves, each one was ableto attach to himself his own parts of the country,according to the authority he had assumed there;and the family of the former lord beingexterminated, none other than the Romans wereacknowledged.

When these things are remembered no one willmarvel at the ease with which Alexander held theEmpire of Asia, or at the difficulties which othershave had to keep an acquisition, such as Pyrrhusand many more; this is not occasioned by the littleor abundance of ability in the conqueror, but by thewant of uniformity in the subject state.


CHAPTER V

Concerning The Way To Govern Cities OrPrincipalities Which Lived Under TheirOwn Laws Before They Were Annexed

HENEVER those states which have beenacquired as stated have beenaccustomed to live under their own

laws and in freedom, there are three courses forthose who wish to hold them: the first is to ruinthem, the next is to reside there in person, the thirdis to permit them to live under their own laws,drawing a tribute, and establishing within it anoligarchy which will keep it friendly to you.Because such a government, being created by theprince, knows that it cannot stand without hisfriendship and interest, and does its utmost tosupport him; and therefore he who would keep acity accustomed to freedom will hold it more easilyby the means of its own citizens than in any otherway.

W

There are, for example, the Spartans and theRomans. The Spartans held Athens and Thebes,establishing there an oligarchy, nevertheless theylost them. The Romans, in order to hold Capua,Carthage, and Numantia, dismantled them, and didnot lose them. They wished to hold Greece as theSpartans held it, making it free and permitting itslaws, and did not succeed. So to hold it they were


compelled to dismantle many cities in the country,for in truth there is no safe way to retain themotherwise than by ruining them. And he whobecomes master of a city accustomed to freedomand does not destroy it, may expect to be destroyedby it, for in rebellion it has always the watch-wordof liberty and its ancient privileges as a rallyingpoint, which neither time nor benefits will evercause it to forget. And what ever you may do orprovide against, they never forget that name ortheir privileges unless they are disunited ordispersed but at every chance they immediatelyrally to them, as Pisa after the hundred years shehad been held in bondage by the Florentines.

But when cities or countries are accustomed tolive under a prince, and his family is exterminated,they, being on the one hand accustomed to obeyand on the other hand not having the old prince,cannot agree in making one from amongstthemselves, and they do not know how to governthemselves. For this reason they are very slow totake up arms, and a prince can gain them tohimself and secure them much more easily. But inrepublics there is more vitality, greater hatred, andmore desire for vengeance, which will neverpermit them to allow the memory of their formerliberty to rest; so that the safest way is to destroythem or to reside there.


CHAPTER VI

Concerning New Principalities Which AreAcquired By One's Own Arms And Ability

ET no one be surprised if, in speaking ofentirely new principalities as I shall do, Iadduce the highest examples both of prince

and of state; because men, walking almost alwaysin paths beaten by others, and following byimitation their deeds, are yet unable to keepentirely to the ways of others or attain to the powerof those they imitate. A wise man ought always tofollow the paths beaten by great men, and toimitate those who have been supreme, so that if hisability does not equal theirs, at least it will savourof it. Let him act like the clever archers who,designing to hit the mark which yet appears too fardistant, and knowing the limits to which thestrength of their bow attains, take aim much higherthan the mark, not to reach by their strength orarrow to so great a height, but to be able with theaid of so high an aim to hit the mark they wish toreach.

L

I say, therefore, that in entirely newprincipalities, where there is a new prince, more orless difficulty is found in keeping them,accordingly as there is more or less ability in himwho has acquired the state. Now, as the fact ofbecoming a prince from a private station


presupposes either ability or fortune, it is clear thatone or other of these two things will mitigate insome degree many difficulties. Nevertheless, hewho has relied least on fortune is established thestrongest. Further, it facilitates matters when theprince, having no other state, is compelled toreside there in person.

But to come to those who, by their own abilityand not through fortune, have risen to be princes, Isay that Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, andsuch like are the most excellent examples. Andalthough one may not discuss Moses, he havingbeen a mere executor of the will of God, yet heought to be admired, if only for that favour whichmade him worthy to speak with God. But inconsidering Cyrus and others who have acquired orfounded kingdoms, all will be found admirable;and if their particular deeds and conduct shall beconsidered, they will not be found inferior to thoseof Moses, although he had so great a preceptor.And in examining their actions and lives onecannot see that they owed anything to fortunebeyond opportunity, which brought them thematerial to mould into the form which seemed bestto them. Without that opportunity their powers ofmind would have been extinguished, and withoutthose powers the opportunity would have come invain.

It was necessary, therefore, to Moses that heshould find the people of Israel in Egypt enslavedand oppressed by the Egyptians, in order that they


should be disposed to follow him so as to bedelivered out of bondage. It was necessary thatRomulus should not remain in Alba, and that heshould be abandoned at his birth, in order that heshould become King of Rome and founder of thefatherland. It was necessary that Cyrus should findthe Persians discontented with the government ofthe Medes, and the Medes soft and effeminatethrough their long peace. Theseus could not haveshown his ability had he not found the Atheniansdispersed. These opportunities, therefore, madethose men fortunate, and their high ability enabledthem to recognize the opportunity whereby theircountry was ennobled and made famous.

Those who by valorous ways become princes,like these men, acquire a principality withdifficulty, but they keep it with ease. Thedifficulties they have in acquiring it arise in partfrom the new rules and methods which they areforced to introduce to establish their governmentand its security. And it ought to be rememberedthat there is nothing more difficult to take in hand,more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in itssuccess, than to take the lead in the introduction ofa new order of things. Because the innovator hasfor enemies all those who have done well under theold conditions, and lukewarm defenders in thosewho may do well under the new. This coolnessarises partly from fear of the opponents, who havethe laws on their side, and partly from theincredulity of men, who do not readily believe in


new things until they have had a long experienceof them. Thus it happens that whenever those whoare hostile have the opportunity to attack they do itlike partisans, whilst the others defendlukewarmly, in such wise that the prince isendangered along with them.

It is necessary, therefore, if we desire to discussthis matter thoroughly, to inquire whether theseinnovators can rely on themselves or have todepend on others: that is to say, whether, toconsummate their enterprise, have they to useprayers or can they use force? In the first instancethey always succeed badly, and never compassanything; but when they can rely on themselvesand use force, then they are rarely endangered.Hence it is that all armed prophets have conquered,and the unarmed ones have been destroyed.Besides the reasons mentioned, the nature of thepeople is variable, and whilst it is easy to persuadethem, it is difficult to fix them in that persuasion.And thus it is necessary to take such measures that,when they believe no longer, it may be possible tomake them believe by force.

If Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus hadbeen unarmed they could not have enforced theirconstitutions for long — as happened in our timeto Fra Girolamo Savonarola, who was ruined withhis new order of things immediately the multitudebelieved in him no longer, and he had no means ofkeeping steadfast those who believed or of makingthe unbelievers to believe. Therefore such as these


have great difficulties in consummating theirenterprise, for all their dangers are in the ascent,yet with ability they will overcome them; but whenthese are overcome, and those who envied themtheir success are exterminated, they will begin tobe respected, and they will continue afterwardspowerful, secure, honoured, and happy.

To these great examples I wish to add a lesserone; still it bears some resemblance to them, and Iwish it to suffice me for all of a like kind: it isHiero the Syracusan. This man rose from a privatestation to be Prince of Syracuse, nor did he, either,owe anything to fortune but opportunity; for theSyracusans, being oppressed, chose him for theircaptain, afterwards he was rewarded by beingmade their prince. He was of so great ability, evenas a private citizen, that one who writes of himsays he wanted nothing but a kingdom to be a king.This man abolished the old soldiery, organized thenew, gave up old alliances, made new ones; and ashe had his own soldiers and allies, on suchfoundations he was able to build any edifice: thus,whilst he had endured much trouble in acquiring,he had but little in keeping.


CHAPTER VII

Concerning New Principalities Which AreAcquired Either By The Arms Of Others

Or By Good Fortune

HOSE who solely by good fortune becomeprinces from being private citizens havelittle trouble in rising, but much in keeping

atop; they have not any difficulties on the way up,because they fly, but they have many when theyreach the summit. Such are those to whom somestate is given either for money or by the favour ofhim who bestows it; as happened to many inGreece, in the cities of Ionia and of the Hellespont,where princes were made by Darius, in order thatthey might hold the cities both for his security andhis glory; as also were those emperors who, by thecorruption of the soldiers, from being citizenscame to empire. Such stand simply upon thegoodwill and the fortune of him who has elevatedthem — two most inconstant and unstable things.Neither have they the knowledge requisite for theposition; because, unless they are men of greatworth and ability, it is not reasonable to expect thatthey should know how to command, having alwayslived in a private condition; besides, they cannothold it because they have not forces which they cankeep friendly and faithful.

T

States that rise unexpectedly, then, like all other


things in nature which are born and grow rapidly,cannot have their foundations and relations withother states fixed in such a way that the first stormwill not overthrow them; unless, as is said, thosewho unexpectedly become princes are men of somuch ability that they know they have to beprepared at once to hold that which fortune hasthrown into their laps, and that those foundations,which others have laid before they became princes,they must lay afterwards.

Concerning these two methods of rising to be aprince by ability or fortune, I wish to adduce twoexamples within our own recollection, and theseare Francesco Sforza and Cesare Borgia.Francesco, by proper means and with great ability,from being a private person rose to be Duke ofMilan, and that which he had acquired with athousand anxieties he kept with little trouble. Onthe other hand, Cesare Borgia, called by the peopleDuke Valentino, acquired his state during theascendancy of his father, and on its decline he lostit, notwithstanding that he had taken every measureand done all that ought to be done by a wise andable man to fix firmly his roots in the states whichthe arms and fortunes of others had bestowed onhim.

Because, as is stated above, he who has not firstlaid his foundations may be able with great abilityto lay them afterwards, but they will be laid withtrouble to the architect and danger to the building.If, therefore, all the steps taken by the duke be


considered, it will be seen that he laid solidfoundations for his future power, and I do notconsider it superfluous to discuss them, because Ido not know what better precepts to give a newprince than the example of his actions; and if hisdispositions were of no avail, that was not hisfault, but the extraordinary and extreme malignityof fortune.

Alexander VI, in wishing to aggrandize theduke, his son, had many immediate andprospective difficulties. Firstly, he did not see hisway to make him master of any state that was not astate of the Church; and if he was willing to robthe Church he knew that the Duke of Milan and theVenetians would not consent, because Faenza andRimini were already under the protection of theVenetians. Besides this, he saw the arms of Italy,especially those by which he might have beenassisted, in hands that would fear theaggrandizement of the Pope, namely, the Orsiniand the Colonna and their following. It behovedhim, therefore, to upset this state of affairs andembroil the powers, so as to make himself securelymaster of part of their states. This was easy for himto do, because he found the Venetians, moved byother reasons, inclined to bring back the Frenchinto Italy; he would not only not oppose this, buthe would render it more easy by dissolving theformer marriage of King Louis. Therefore the kingcame into Italy with the assistance of the Venetiansand the consent of Alexander. He was no sooner in


Milan than the Pope had soldiers from him for theattempt on the Romagna, which yielded to him onthe reputation of the king. The duke, therefore,having acquired the Romagna and beaten theColonna, while wishing to hold that and toadvance further, was hindered by two things: theone, his forces did not appear loyal to him, theother, the goodwill of France: that is to say, hefeared that the forces of the Orsini, which wasusing, would not stand to him, that not only mightthey hinder him from winning more, but mightthemselves seize what he had won, and that theKing might also do the same. Of the Orsini he hada warning when, after taking Faenza and attackingBologna, he saw them go very unwillingly to thatattack. And as to the king, he learned his mindwhen he himself, after taking the duchy of Urbino,attacked Tuscany, and the king made him desistfrom that undertaking; hence the duke decided todepend no more upon the arms and the luck ofothers.

For the first thing he weakened the Orsini andColonna parties in Rome, by gaining to himself alltheir adherents who were gentlemen, making themhis gentlemen, giving them good pay, and,according to their rank, honouring them with officeand command in such a way that in a few monthsall attachment to the factions was destroyed andturned entirely to the duke. After this he awaited anopportunity to crush the Orsini, having scatteredthe adherents of the Colonna. This came to him


soon and he used it well; for the Orsini, perceivingat length that the aggrandizement of the duke andthe Church was ruin to them, called a meeting atMagione, in the territory of Perugia. From thissprung the rebellion at Urbino and the tumults inthe Romagna, with endless dangers to the duke, allof which he overcame with the help of the French.Having restored his authority, not to leave it at riskby trusting either to the French or other outsideforces, he had recourse to his wiles, and he knewso well how to conceal his mind that, by themediation of Signor Paolo [Orsini] — whom theduke did not fail to secure with all kinds ofattention, giving him money, apparel, and horses— the Orsini were reconciled, so that theirsimplicity brought them into his power atSinigaglia. Having exterminated the leaders, andturned their partisans into his friends, the duke hadlaid sufficiently good foundations to his power,having all the Romagna and the duchy of Urbino;and the people now beginning to appreciate theirprosperity, he gained them all over to himself. Andas this point is worthy of notice, and to be imitatedby others, I am not willing to leave it out.

When the duke occupied the Romagna he foundit under the rule of weak masters, who ratherplundered their subjects than ruled them, and gavethem more cause for disunion than for union, sothat the country was full of robbery, quarrels, andevery kind of violence; and so, wishing to bringback peace and obedience to authority, he


considered it necessary to give it a good governor.Thereupon he promoted Messer Ramiro d'Orco [deLorqua], a swift and cruel man, to whom he gavethe fullest power. This man in a short time restoredpeace and unity with the greatest success.Afterwards the duke considered that it was notadvisable to confer such excessive authority, for hehad no doubt but that he would become odious, sohe set up a court of judgment in the country, undera most excellent president, wherein all cities hadtheir advocates. And because he knew that the pastseverity had caused some hatred against himself,so, to clear himself in the minds of the people, andgain them entirely to himself, he desired to showthat, if any cruelty had been practised, it had notoriginated with him, but in the natural sternness ofthe minister. Under this pretence he took Ramiro,and one morning caused him to be executed andleft on the piazza at Cesena with the block and abloody knife at his side. The barbarity of thisspectacle caused the people to be at once satisfiedand dismayed.

But let us return whence we started. I say thatthe duke, finding himself now sufficientlypowerful and partly secured from immediatedangers by having armed himself in his own way,and having in a great measure crushed those forcesin his vicinity that could injure him if he wished toproceed with his conquest, had next to considerFrance, for he knew that the king, who too late wasaware of his mistake, would not support him. And


from this time he began to seek new alliances andto temporize with France in the expedition whichshe was making towards the kingdom of Naplesagainst the Spaniards who were besieging Gaeta. Itwas his intention to secure himself against them,and this he would have quickly accomplished hadAlexander lived.

Such was his line of action as to present affairs.But as to the future he had to fear, in the firstplace, that a new successor to the Church mightnot be friendly to him and might seek to take fromhim that which Alexander had given him, so hedecided to act in four ways. Firstly, byexterminating the families of those lords whom hehad despoiled, so as to take away that pretext fromthe Pope. Secondly, by winning to himself all thegentlemen of Rome, so as to be able to curb thePope with their aid, as has been observed. Thirdly,by converting the college more to himself.Fourthly, by acquiring so much power before thePope should die that he could by his own measuresresist the first shock. Of these four things, at thedeath of Alexander, he had accomplished three.For he had killed as many of the dispossessed lordsas he could lay hands on, and few had escaped; hehad won over the Roman gentlemen, and he hadthe most numerous party in the college. And as toany fresh acquisition, he intended to becomemaster of Tuscany, for he already possessedPerugia and Piombino, and Pisa was under hisprotection. And as he had no longer to study


France (for the French were already driven out ofthe kingdom of Naples by the Spaniards, and inthis way both were compelled to buy his goodwill),he pounced down upon Pisa. After this, Lucca andSiena yielded at once, partly through hatred andpartly through fear of the Florentines; and theFlorentines would have had no remedy had hecontinued to prosper, as he was prospering the yearthat Alexander died, for he had acquired so muchpower and reputation that he would have stood byhimself, and no longer have depended on the luckand the forces of others, but solely on his ownpower and ability.

But Alexander died five years after he had firstdrawn the sword. He left the duke with the state ofRomagna alone consolidated, with the rest in theair, between two most powerful hostile armies, andsick unto death. Yet there were in the duke suchboldness and ability, and he knew so well howmen are to be won or lost, and so firm were thefoundations which in so short a time he had laid,that if he had not had those armies on his back, orif he had been in good health, he would haveovercome all difficulties. And it is seen that hisfoundations were good, for the Romagna awaitedhim for more than a month. In Rome, although buthalf alive, he remained secure; and whilst theBaglioni, the Vitelli, and the Orsini might come toRome, they could not effect anything against him.If he could not have made Pope him whom hewished, at least the one whom he did not wish


would not have been elected. But if he had been insound health at the death of Alexander, everythingwould have been easy to him. On the day thatJulius II was elected, he told me that he hadthought of everything that might occur at the deathof his father, and had provided a remedy for all,except that he had never anticipated that, when thedeath did happen, he himself would be on the pointto die.

When all the actions of the duke are recalled, Ido not know how to blame him, but rather itappears to me, as I have said, that I ought to offerhim for imitation to all those who, by the fortuneor the arms of others, are raised to government.Because he, having a lofty spirit and far-reachingaims, could not have regulated his conductotherwise, and only the shortness of the life ofAlexander and his own sickness frustrated hisdesigns. Therefore, he who considers it necessaryto secure himself in his new principality, to winfriends, to overcome either by force or fraud, tomake himself beloved and feared by the people, tobe followed and revered by the soldiers, toexterminate those who have power or reason tohurt him, to change the old order of things for new,to be severe and gracious, magnanimous andliberal, to destroy a disloyal soldiery and to createnew, to maintain friendship with kings and princesin such a way that they must help him with zealand offend with caution, cannot find a more livelyexample than the actions of this man.


Only can he be blamed for the election of JuliusII, in whom he made a bad choice, because, as issaid, not being able to elect a Pope to his ownmind, he could have hindered any other from beingelected Pope; and he ought never to haveconsented to the election of any cardinal whom hehad injured or who had cause to fear him if theybecame pontiffs. For men injure either from fear orhatred. Those whom he had injured, amongstothers, were San Pietro ad Vincula, Colonna, SanGiorgio, and Ascanio. 1 Any one of the others, onbecoming Pope, would have had to fear him,Rouen and the Spaniards excepted; the latter fromtheir relationship and obligations, the former fromhis influence, the kingdom of France havingrelations with him. Therefore, above everything,the duke ought to have created a Spaniard Pope,and, failing him, he ought to have consented toRouen and not San Pietro ad Vincula. He whobelieves that new benefits will cause greatpersonages to forget old injuries is deceived.Therefore, the duke erred in his choice, and it wasthe cause of his ultimate ruin.

1 Julius II had been Cardinal of San Pietro ad Vincula; SanGiorgio was Raffaells Riaxis, and Ascanio was CardinalAscanio Sforza.


CHAPTER VIII

Concerning Those Who Have Obtained APrincipality By Wickedness

LTHOUGH a prince may rise from aprivate station in two ways, neither ofwhich can be entirely attributed to fortune

or genius, yet it is manifest to me that I must not besilent on them, although one could be morecopiously treated when I discuss republics. Thesemethods are when, either by some wicked ornefarious ways, one ascends to the principality, orwhen by the favour of his fellow-citizens a privateperson becomes the prince of his country. Andspeaking of the first method, it will be illustratedby two examples — one ancient, the other modern— and without entering further into the subject, Iconsider these two examples will suffice thosewho may be compelled to follow them.

A

Agathocles, the Sicilian, became King ofSyracuse not only from a private but from a lowand abject position. This man, the son of a potter,through all the changes in his fortunes always ledan infamous life. Nevertheless, he accompanied hisinfamies with so much ability of mind and bodythat, having devoted himself to the militaryprofession, he rose through its ranks to be Praetorof Syracuse. Being established in that position, andhaving deliberately resolved to make himself


prince and to seize by violence, without obligationto others, that which had been conceded to him byassent, he came to an understanding for thispurpose with Hamilcar, the Carthaginian, who,with his army, was fighting in Sicily. One morninghe assembled the people and senate of Syracuse, asif he had to discuss with them things relating to theRepublic, and at a given signal the soldiers killedall the senators and the richest of the people; thesedead, he seized and held the princedom of that citywithout any civil commotion. And although he wastwice routed by the Carthaginians, and ultimatelybesieged, yet not only was he able to defend hiscity, but leaving part of his men for its defence,with the others he attacked Africa, and in a shorttime raised the siege of Syracuse. TheCarthaginians, reduced to extreme necessity, werecompelled to come to terms with Agathocles, and,leaving Sicily to him, had to be content with thepossession of Africa.

Therefore, he who considers the actions and thegenius of this man will see nothing, or little, whichcan be attributed to fortune, inasmuch as heattained pre-eminence, as is shown above, not bythe favour of any one, but step by step in themilitary profession, which steps were gained with athousand troubles and perils, and were afterwardsboldly held by him with many hazards anddangers. Yet it cannot be called talent to slayfellow-citizens, to deceive friends, to be withoutfaith, without mercy, without religion; such


methods may gain empire, but not glory. Still, ifthe courage of Agathocles in entering into andextricating himself from dangers be considered,together with his greatness of mind in enduringovercoming hardships, it cannot be seen why heshould be esteemed less than the most notablecaptain. Nevertheless, his barbarous cruelty andinhumanity with infinite wickednesses do notpermit him to be celebrated among the mostexcellent men. What he achieved cannot beattributed either to fortune or to genius.

In our times, during the rule of Alexander VI,Oliverotto da Fermo, having been left an orphanmany years before, was brought up by his maternaluncle, Giovanni Fogliani, and in the early days ofhis youth sent to fight under Paolo Vitelli, that,being trained under his discipline, he might attainsome high position in the military profession. AfterPaolo died, he fought under his brother Vitellozzo,and in a very short time, being endowed with witand a vigorous body and mind, he became the firstman in his profession. But it appearing to him apaltry thing to serve under others, he resolved, withthe aid of some citizens of Fermo, to whom theslavery of their country was dearer than its liberty,and with the help of the Vitelli, to seize Fermo. Sohe wrote to Giovanni Fogliani that, having beenaway from home for many years, he wished to visithim and his city, and in some measure to look intohis patrimony; and although he had not laboured toacquire anything except honour, yet, in order that


the citizens should see he had not spent his time invain, he desired to come honourably, so would beaccompanied by one hundred horsemen, his friendsand retainers; and he entreated Giovanni to arrangethat he should be received honourably by thecitizens of Fermo, all of which would be not onlyto his honour, but also to that of Giovanni himself,who had brought him up.

Giovanni, therefore, did not fail in any attentionsdue to his nephew, and he caused him to behonourably received by the Fermans, and helodged him in his own house, where, havingpassed some days, and having arranged what wasnecessary for his wicked designs, Oliverotto gave asolemn banquet to which he invited GiovanniFogliani and the chiefs of Fermo. When the viandsand all the other entertainments that are usual insuch banquets were finished, Oliverotto artfullybegan certain grave discourses, speaking of thegreatness of Pope Alexander and his son Cesare,and of their enterprises, to which discourseGiovanni and others answered; but he rose at once,saying that such matters ought to be discussed in amore private place, and he betook himself to achamber, whither Giovanni and the rest of thecitizens went in after him. No sooner were theyseated than soldiers issued from secret places andslaughtered Giovanni and the rest. After thesemurders Oliverotto, mounted on horseback, rodeup and down the town and besieged the chiefmagistrate in the palace, so that in fear the people


were forced to obey him, and to form agovernment, of which he made himself the prince.He killed all the malcontents who were able toinjure him, and strengthened himself with newcivil and military ordinances, in such a way that, inthe year during which he held the principality, notonly was he secure in the city of Fermo, but he hadbecome formidable to all his neighbours. And hisdestruction would have been as difficult as that ofAgathocles if he had not allowed himself to beoverreached by Cesare Borgia, who took him withthe Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigaglia, as was statedabove. Thus one year after he had committed thisparricide, he was strangled, together withVitellozzo, whom he had made his leader in valourand wickedness.

Some may wonder how it can happen thatAgathocles, and his like, after infinite treacheriesand cruelties, should live for long secure in hiscountry, and defend himself from externalenemies, and never be conspired against by hisown citizens; seeing that many others, by means ofcruelty, have never been able even in peacefultimes to hold the state, still less in the doubtfultimes of war. I believe that this follows fromseverities being badly or properly used. Those maybe called properly used, if of evil it is lawful tospeak well, that are applied at one blow and arenecessary to one's security, and that are notpersisted in afterwards unless they can be turned tothe advantage of the subjects. The badly employed


are those which, notwithstanding they may be fewin the commencement, multiply with time ratherthan decrease. Those who practise the first systemare able, by aid of God or man, to mitigate in somedegree their rule, as Agathocles did. It isimpossible for those who follow the other tomaintain themselves.

Hence it is to be remarked that, in seizing astate, the usurper ought to examine closely into allthose injuries which it is necessary for him toinflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as not tohave to repeat them daily; and thus by notunsettling men he will be able to reassure them,and win them to himself by benefits. He who doesotherwise, either from timidity or evil advice, isalways compelled to keep the knife in his hand;neither can he rely on his subjects, nor can theyattach themselves to him, owing to their continuedand repeated wrongs. For injuries ought to be doneall at one time, so that, being tasted less, theyoffend less; benefits ought to be given little bylittle, so that the flavour of them may last longer.

And above all things, a prince ought to liveamongst his people in such a way that nounexpected circumstances, whether of good orevil, shall make him change; because if thenecessity for this comes in troubled times, you aretoo late for harsh measures; and mild ones will nothelp you, for they will be considered as forcedfrom you, and no one will be under any obligationto you for them.


CHAPTER IX

Concerning A Civil Principality

UT coming to the other point — where aleading citizen becomes the prince of hiscountry, not by wickedness or any

intolerable violence, but by the favour of his fellowcitizens — this may be called a civil principality:nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary toattain to it, but rather a happy shrewdness. I saythen that such a principality is obtained either bythe favour of the people or by the favour of thenobles. Because in all cities these two distinctparties are found, and from this it arises that thepeople do not wish to be ruled nor oppressed bythe nobles, and the nobles wish to rule and oppressthe people; and from these two opposite desiresthere arises in cities one of three results, either aprincipality, self-government, or anarchy.

B

A principality is created either by the people orby the nobles, accordingly as one or other of themhas the opportunity; for the nobles, seeing theycannot withstand the people, begin to cry up thereputation of one of themselves, and they makehim a prince, so that under his shadow they cangive vent to their ambitions. The people, findingthey cannot resist the nobles, also cry up thereputation of one of themselves, and make him aprince so as to be defended by his authority. He


who obtains sovereignty by the assistance of thenobles maintains himself with more difficulty thanhe who comes to it by the aid of the people,because the former finds himself with manyaround him who consider themselves his equals,and because of this he can neither rule nor managethem to his liking. But he who reaches sovereigntyby popular favour finds himself alone, and hasnone around him, or few, who are not prepared toobey him.

Besides this, one cannot by fair dealing, andwithout injury to others, satisfy the nobles, but youcan satisfy the people, for their object is morerighteous than that of the nobles, the latter wishingto oppress, whilst the former only desire not to beoppressed. It is to be added also that a prince cannever secure himself against a hostile people,because of their being too many, whilst from thenobles he can secure himself, as they are few innumber. The worst that a prince may expect from ahostile people is to be abandoned by them; butfrom hostile nobles he has not only to fearabandonment, but also that they will rise againsthim; for they, being in these affairs more far-seeingand astute, always come forward in time to savethemselves, and to obtain favours from him whomthey expect to prevail. Further, the prince iscompelled to live always with the same people, buthe can do well without the same nobles, being ableto make and unmake them daily, and to give ortake away authority when it pleases him.


Therefore, to make this point clearer, I say thatthe nobles ought to be looked at mainly in twoways: that is to say, they either shape their coursein such a way as binds them entirely to yourfortune, or they do not. Those who so bindthemselves, and are not rapacious, ought to behonoured and loved; those who do not bindthemselves may be dealt with in two ways; theymay fail to do this through pusillanimity and anatural want of courage, in which case you oughtto make use of them, especially of those who are ofgood counsel; and thus, whilst in prosperity youhonour yourself, in adversity you have not to fearthem. But when for their own ambitious ends theyshun binding themselves, it is a token that they aregiving more thought to themselves than to you, anda prince ought to guard against such, and to fearthem as if they were open enemies, because inadversity they always help to ruin him.

Therefore, one who becomes a prince throughthe favour of the people ought to keep themfriendly, and this he can easily do seeing they onlyask not to be oppressed by him. But one who, inopposition to the people, becomes a prince by thefavour of the nobles, ought, above everything, toseek to win the people over to himself, and this hemay easily do if he takes them under hisprotection. Because men, when they receive goodfrom him of whom they were expecting evil, arebound more closely to their benefactor; thus thepeople quickly become more devoted to him than


if he had been raised to the principality by theirfavours; and the prince can win their affections inmany ways, but as these vary according to thecircumstances one cannot give fixed rules, so Iomit them; but, I repeat, it is necessary for a princeto have the people friendly, otherwise he has nosecurity in adversity.

Nabis, Prince of the Spartans, sustained theattack of all Greece, and of a victorious Romanarmy, and against them he defended his countryand his government; and for the overcoming of thisperil it was only necessary for him to make himselfsecure against a few, but this would not have beensufficient if the people had been hostile. And donot let any one impugn this statement with the triteproverb that 'He who builds on the people, buildson the mud,' for this is true when a private citizenmakes a foundation there, and persuades himselfthat the people will free him when he is oppressedby his enemies or by the magistrates; wherein hewould find himself very often deceived, ashappened to the Gracchi in Rome and to MesserGiorgio Scali in Florence. But granted a princewho has established himself as above, who cancommand, and is a man of courage, undismayed inadversity, who does not fail in other qualifications,and who, by his resolution and energy, keeps thewhole people encouraged — such a one will neverfind himself deceived in them, and it will be shownthat he has laid his foundations well.

These principalities are liable to danger when


they are passing from the civil to the absolute orderof government, for such princes either rulepersonally or through magistrates. In the latter casetheir government is weaker and more insecure,because it rests entirely on the goodwill of thosecitizens who are raised to the magistracy, and who,especially in troubled times, can destroy thegovernment with great ease, either by intrigue oropen defiance; and the prince has not the chanceamid tumults to exercise absolute authority,because the citizens and subjects, accustomed toreceive orders from magistrates, are not of a mindto obey him amid these confusions, and there willalways be in doubtful times a scarcity of menwhom he can trust. For such a prince cannot relyupon what he observes in quiet times, whencitizens had need of the state, because then everyone agrees with him; they all promise, and whendeath is far distant they all wish to die for him; butin troubled times, when the state has need of itscitizens, then he finds but few. And so much themore is this experiment dangerous, inasmuch as itcan only be tried once. Therefore a wise princeought to adopt such a course that his citizens willalways in every sort and kind of circumstance haveneed of the state and of him, and then he willalways find them faithful.


CHAPTER X

Concerning The Way In Which TheStrength Of All Principalities Ought To Be

Measured

T IS necessary to consider another point inexamining the character of these principalities:that is, whether a prince has such power that,

in case of need, he can support himself with hisown resources, or whether he has always need ofthe assistance of others. And to make this quiteclear I say that I consider those are able to supportthemselves by their own resources who can, eitherby abundance of men or money, raise a sufficientarmy to join battle against any one who comes toattack them; and I consider those always to haveneed of others who cannot show themselvesagainst the enemy in the field, but are forced todefend themselves by sheltering behind walls. Thefirst case has been discussed, but we will speak ofit again should it recur. In the second case one cansay nothing except to encourage such princes toprovision and fortify their towns, and not on anyaccount to defend the country. And whoever shallfortify his town well, and shall have managed theother concerns of his subjects in the way statedabove, and to be often repeated, will never beattacked without great caution, for men are alwaysadverse to enterprises where difficulties can be

I


seen, and it will be seen not to be an easy thing toattack one who has his town well fortified, and isnot hated by his people.

The cities of Germany are absolutely free, theyown but little country around them, and they yieldobedience to the emperor when it suits them, nordo they fear this or any other power they may havenear them, because they are fortified in such a waythat every one thinks the taking of them by assaultwould be tedious and difficult, seeing they haveproper ditches and walls, they have sufficientartillery, and they always keep in public depotsenough for one year's eating, drinking, and firing.And beyond this, to keep the people quiet andwithout loss to the state, they always have themeans of giving work to the community in thoselabours that are the life and strength of the city,and on the pursuit of which the people aresupported; they also hold military exercises inrepute, and moreover have many ordinances touphold them.

Therefore, a prince who has a strong city, andhad not made himself odious, will not be attacked,or if any one should attack he will only be drivenoff with disgrace; again, because that affairs of thisworld are so changeable, it is almost impossible tokeep an army a whole year in the field withoutbeing interfered with. And whoever should reply:If the people have property outside the city, and seeit burnt, they will not remain patient, and the longsiege and self-interest will make them forget their


prince; to this I answer that a powerful andcourageous prince will overcome all suchdifficulties by giving at one time hope to hissubjects that the evil will not be for long, atanother time fear of the cruelty of the enemy, thenpreserving himself adroitly from those subjectswho seem to him to be too bold.

Further, the enemy would naturally on hisarrival at once burn and ruin the country at the timewhen the spirits of the people are still hot andready for the defence; and, therefore, so much theless ought the prince to hesitate; because after atime, when spirits have cooled, the damage isalready done, the ills are incurred, and there is nolonger any remedy; and therefore they are so muchthe more ready to unite with their prince, heappearing to be under obligations to them now thattheir houses have been burnt and their possessionsruined in his defence. For it is the nature of men tobe bound by the benefits they confer as much as bythose they receive. Therefore, if everything is wellconsidered, it wilt not be difficult for a wise princeto keep the minds of his citizens steadfast fromfirst to last, when he does not fail to support anddefend them.


CHAPTER XI

Concerning Ecclesiastical Principalities

T ONLY remains now to speak of ecclesiasticalprincipalities, touching which all difficultiesare prior to getting possession, because they

are acquired either by capacity or good fortune,and they can be held without either; for they aresustained by the ordinances of religion, which areso all-powerful, and of such a character that theprincipalities may be held no matter how theirprinces behave and live. These princes alone havestates and do not defend them, they have subjectsand do not rule them; and the states, althoughunguarded, are not taken from them, and thesubjects, although not ruled, do not care, and theyhave neither the desire nor the ability to alienatethemselves. Such principalities only are secure andhappy. But being upheld by powers, to which thehuman mind cannot reach, I shall speak no more ofthem, because, being exalted and maintained byGod, it would be the act of a presumptuous andrash man to discuss them.

I

Nevertheless, if any one should ask of me howcomes it that the Church has attained suchgreatness in temporal power, seeing that fromAlexander backwards the Italian potentates (notonly those who have been called potentates, butevery baron and lord, though the smallest) have


valued the temporal power very slightly — yet nowa king of France trembles before it, and it has beenable to drive him from Italy, and to ruin theVenetians — although this may be very manifest,it does not appear to me superfluous to recall it insome measure to memory.

Before Charles, King of France, passed intoItaly, this country was under the dominion of thePope, the Venetians, the King of Naples, the Dukeof Milan, and the Florentines. These potentates hadtwo principal anxieties: the one, that no foreignershould enter Italy under arms; the other, that noneof themselves should seize more territory. Thoseabout whom there was the most anxiety were thePope and the Venetians. To restrain the Venetiansthe union of all the others was necessary, as it wasfor the defence of Ferrara; and to keep down thePope they made use of the barons of Rome, who,being divided into two factions, Orsini andColonna, had always a pretext for disorder, and,standing with arms in their hands under the eyes ofthe Pontiff, kept the pontificate weak andpowerless. And although there might arisesometimes a courageous pope, such as Sixtus [IV],yet neither fortune nor wisdom could rid him ofthese annoyances. And the short life of a pope isalso a cause of weakness; for in the ten years,which is the average life of a pope, he can withdifficulty lower one of the factions; and if, so tospeak, one pope should almost destroy theColonna, another would arise hostile to the Orsini,


who would support their opponents, and yet wouldnot have time to ruin the Orsini. This was thereason why the temporal powers of the pope werelittle esteemed in Italy.

Alexander VI arose afterwards, who of all thepontiffs that have ever been showed how a popewith both money and arms was able to prevail; andthrough the instrumentality of the Duke Valentino,and by reason of the entry of the French, hebrought about all those things which I havediscussed above in the actions of the duke. Andalthough his intention was not to aggrandize theChurch, but the duke, nevertheless, what he didcontributed to the greatness of the Church, which,after his death and the ruin of the duke, became theheir to all his labours.

Pope Julius came afterwards and found theChurch strong, possessing all the Romagna, thebarons of Rome reduced to impotence, and,through the chastisements Alexander, the factionswiped out; he also found the way open toaccumulate money in a manner such as had neverbeen practised before Alexander's time. Suchthings Julius not only followed, but improvedupon, and he intended to gain Bologna, to ruin theVenetians, and to drive the French out of Italy. Allof these enterprises prospered with him, and somuch the more to his credit, inasmuch as he dideverything to strengthen the Church and not anyprivate person. He kept also the Orsini andColonna factions within the bounds in which he


found them; and although there was among themsome mind to make disturbance, nevertheless heheld two things firm: the one, the greatness of thechurch, with which he terrified them; and theother, not allowing them to have their owncardinals, who caused the disorders among them.For whenever these factions have their cardinalsthey do not remain quiet for long, becausecardinals foster the factions in Rome and out of it,and the barons are compelled to support them, andthus from the ambitions of prelates arise disordersand tumults among the barons. For these reasonshis Holiness Pope Leo found the pontificate mostpowerful, and it is to be hoped that, if others madeit great in arms, he will make it still greater andmore venerated by his goodness and infinite othervirtues.


CHAPTER XII

How Many Kinds Of Soldiery There Are,And Concerning Mercenaries

AVING discoursed particularly on thecharacteristics of such principalities as inthe beginning I proposed to discuss, and

having considered in some degree the causes oftheir being good or bad, and having shown themethods by which many have sought to acquirethem and to hold them, it now remains for me todiscuss generally the means of offence and defencewhich belong to each of them.

HWe have seen above how necessary it is for a

prince to have his foundations well laid, otherwiseit follows of necessity he will go to ruin. The chieffoundations of all states, new as well as old orcomposite, are good laws and good arms; and asthere cannot be good laws where the state is notwell armed, it follows that where they are wellarmed they have good laws. I shall leave the lawsout of the discussion and shall speak of the arms.

I say, therefore, that the arms with which aprince defends his state are either his own, or theyare mercenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed. Mercenariesand auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and ifone holds his state based on these arms, he willstand neither firm nor safe; for they are disunited,ambitious and without discipline, unfaithful,


valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies;they have neither the fear of God nor fidelity tomen, and destruction is deferred only so long as theattack is; for in peace one is robbed by them, andin war by the enemy. The fact is, they have noother attraction or reason for keeping the field thana trifle of stipend, which is not sufficient to makethem willing to die for you. They are ready enoughto be your soldiers whilst you do not make war, butif war comes they take themselves off or run fromthe foe; which I should have little trouble to prove,for the ruin of Italy has been caused by nothingelse than by resting all her hopes for many years onmercenaries, and although they formerly madesome display and appeared valiant amongstthemselves, yet when the foreigners came theyshowed what they were. Thus it was that Charles,King of France, was allowed to seize Italy withchalk in hand; 1 and he who told us that our sinswere the cause of it told the truth, but they werenot the sins he imagined, but those which I haverelated. And as they were the sins of princes, it isthe princes who have also suffered the penalty.

I wish to demonstrate further the infelicity ofthese arms. The mercenary captains are eithercapable men or they are not; if they are, you cannottrust them, because they always aspire to their owngreatness, either by oppressing you, who are theirmaster, or others contrary to your intentions; but ifthe captain is not skilful, you are ruined in the

1 With which to chalk up the billets for his soldiers.


usual way.And if it be urged that whoever is armed will act

in the same way, whether mercenary or not, I replythat when arms have to be resorted to, either by aprince or a republic, then the prince ought to go inperson and perform the duty of captain; therepublic has to send its citizens, and when one issent who does not turn out satisfactorily, it oughtto recall him, and when one is worthy, to hold himby the laws so that he does not leave the command.And experience has shown princes and republics,single-handed, making the greatest progress, andmercenaries doing nothing except damage; and it ismore difficult to bring a republic, armed with itsown arms, under the sway of one of its citizensthan it is to bring one armed with foreign arms.Rome and Sparta stood for many ages armed andfree. The Switzers are completely armed and quitefree.

Of ancient mercenaries, for example, there arethe Carthaginians, who were oppressed by theirmercenary soldiers after the first war with theRomans, although the Carthaginians had their owncitizens for captains. After the death ofEpaminondas, Philip of Macedon was madecaptain of their soldiers by the Thebans, and aftervictory he took away their liberty.

Duke Filippo being dead, the Milanese enlistedFrancesco Sforza against the Venetians, and he,having overcome the enemy at Caravaggio, alliedhimself with them to crush the Milanese, his


masters. His father, Sforza, having been engagedby Queen Johanna of Naples, left her unprotected,so that she was forced to throw herself into thearms of the King of Aragon, in order to save herkingdom. And if the Venetians and Florentinesformerly extended their dominions by these arms,and yet their captains did not make themselvesprinces, but have defended them, I reply that theFlorentines in this case have been favoured bychance, for of the able captains, of whom theymight have stood in fear, some have notconquered, some have been opposed, and othershave turned their ambitions elsewhere. One whodid not conquer was Giovanni Acuto, 2 and sincehe did not conquer his fidelity cannot be proved;but every one will acknowledge that, had heconquered, the Florentines would have stood at hisdiscretion. Sforza had the Bracceschi alwaysagainst him, so they watched each other. Francescoturned his ambition to Lombardy; Braccio againstthe Church and the kingdom of Naples. But let uscome to that which happened a short while ago.The Florentines appointed as their captain PaoloVitelli, a most prudent man, who from a privateposition had risen to the greatest renown. If thisman had taken Pisa, nobody can deny that it wouldhave been proper for the Florentines to keep inwith him, for if he became the soldier of theirenemies they had no means of resisting, and if they

2 As Sir John Hawkwood, the English leader ofmercenaries, was called by the Italians.


held to him they must obey him. The Venetians, iftheir achievements are considered, will be seen tohave acted safely and gloriously so long as theysent to war their own men, when with armedgentlemen and plebeians they did valiantly. Thiswas before they turned to enterprises on land, butwhen they began to fight on land they forsook thisvirtue and followed the custom of Italy. And in thebeginning of their expansion on land, through nothaving much territory, and because of their greatreputation, they had not much to fear from theircaptains; but when they expanded, as underCarmignola, they had a taste of this mistake; for,having found him a most valiant man (they beatthe Duke of Milan under his leadership), and, onthe other hand, knowing how lukewarm he was inthe war, they feared they would no longer conquerunder him, and for this reason they were notwilling, nor were they able, to let him go; and so,not to lose again that which they had acquired, theywere compelled, in order to secure themselves, tomurder him. They had afterwards for their captainsBartolomeo da Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino,the Count of Pitigliano, and the like, under whomthey had to dread loss and not gain, as happenedafterwards at Vaila, where in one battle they lostthat which in eight hundred years they hadacquired with so much trouble. Because from sucharms conquests come but slowly, long delayed andinconsiderable, but the losses sudden andportentous.


And as with these examples I have reached Italy,which has been ruled for many years bymercenaries, I wish to discuss them moreseriously, in order that, having seen their rise andprogress, one may be better prepared to counteractthem. You must understand that the empire hasrecently come to be repudiated in Italy, that thePope has acquired more temporal power, and thatItaly has been divided up into more states, for thereason that many of the great cities took up armsagainst their nobles, who, formerly favoured by theemperor, were oppressing them, whilst the Churchwas favouring them so as to gain authority intemporal power: in many others their citizensbecame princes. From this it came to pass that Italyfell partly into the hands of the Church and ofrepublics, and, the Church consisting of priests andthe republic of citizens unaccustomed to arms,both commenced to enlist foreigners.

The first who gave renown to this soldiery wasAlberigo da Conio, a native of the Romagna. Fromthe school of this man sprang, among others,Braccio and Sforza, who in their time were thearbiters of Italy. After these came all the othercaptains who till now have directed the arms ofItaly; and the end of all their valour has been, thatshe has been overrun by Charles, robbed by Louis,ravaged by Ferdinand, and insulted by theSwitzers. The principle that has guided them hasbeen, first, to lower the credit of infantry so thatthey might increase their own. They did this


because, subsisting on their pay and withoutterritory, they were unable to support manysoldiers, and a few infantry did not give them anyauthority; so they were led to employ cavalry, witha moderate force of which they were maintainedand honoured; and affairs were brought to such apass that, in an army of twenty thousand soldiers,there were not to be found two thousand footsoldiers. They had, besides this, used every art tolessen fatigue and danger to themselves and theirsoldiers, not killing in the fray, but taking prisonersand liberating without ransom. They did not attacktowns at night, nor did the garrisons of the townsattack encampments at night; they did not surroundthe camp either with stockade or ditch, nor didthey campaign in the winter. All these things werepermitted by their military rules, and devised bythem to avoid, as I have said, both fatigue anddangers; thus they have brought Italy to slaveryand contempt.


CHAPTER XIII

Concerning Auxiliaries, Mixed Soldiery,And One's Own

UXILIARIES, which are the other uselessarm, are employed when a prince is calledin with his forces to aid and defend, as

was done by Pope Julius in the most recent times;for he, having, in the enterprise against Ferrara,had poor proof of his mercenaries, turned toauxiliaries, and stipulated with Ferdinand, King ofSpain, for his assistance with men and arms. Thesearms may be useful and good in themselves, butfor him who calls them in they are alwaysdisadvantageous; for losing, one is undone, andwinning, one is their captive.

A

And although ancient histories may be full ofexamples, I do not wish to leave this recent one ofPope Julius II, the peril of which cannot fall to beperceived; for he, wishing to get Ferrara, threwhimself entirely into the hands of the foreigner. Buthis good fortune brought about a third event, sothat he did not reap the fruit of his rash choice;because, having auxiliaries routed at Ravenna, andthe Switzers having risen and driven out theconquerors (against all expectation, both his andothers), it so came to pass that he did not becomeprisoner to his enemies, they having fled, nor to hisauxiliaries, he having conquered by other arms


than theirs.The Florentines, being entirely without arms,

sent ten thousand Frenchmen to take Pisa, wherebythey ran more danger than at any other time oftheir troubles.

The Emperor of Constantinople, to oppose hisneighbours, sent ten thousand Turks into Greece,who, on the war being finished, were not willing toquit; this was the beginning of the servitude ofGreece to the infidels.

Therefore, let him who has no desire to conquermake use of these arms, for they are much morehazardous than mercenaries, because with them theruin is ready made; they are all united, all yieldobedience to others; but with mercenaries, whenthey have conquered, more time and betteropportunities are needed to injure you; they are notall of one community, they are found and paid byyou, and a third party, which you have made theirhead, is not able all at once to assume enoughauthority to injure you. In conclusion, inmercenaries dastardy is most dangerous; inauxiliaries, valour. The wise prince, therefore, hasalways avoided these arms and turned to his own;and has been willing rather to lose with them thanto conquer with others, not deeming that a realvictory which is gained with the arms of others.

I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia andhis actions. This duke entered the Romagna withauxiliaries, taking there only French soldiers, andwith them he captured Imola and Forli; but


afterwards, such forces not appearing to himreliable, he turned to mercenaries, discerning lessdanger in them, and enlisted the Orsini and Vitelli;whom presently, on handling and finding themdoubtful, unfaithful, and dangerous, he destroyedand turned to his own men. And the differencebetween one and the other of these forces caneasily be seen when one considers the differencethere was in the reputation of the duke, when hehad the French, when he had the Orsini and Vitelli,and when he relied on his own soldiers, on whosefidelity he could always count and found it everincreasing; he was never esteemed more highlythan when every one saw that he was completemaster of his own forces.

I was not intending to go beyond Italian andrecent examples, but I am unwilling to leave outHiero, the Syracusan, he being one of those I havenamed above. This man, as I have said, made headof the army by the Syracusans, soon found out thata mercenary soldiery, constituted like our Italiancondottieri, was of no use; and it appearing to himthat he could neither keep them nor let them go, hehad them all cut to pieces, and afterwards madewar with his own forces and not with aliens.

I wish also to recall to memory an instance fromthe Old Testament applicable to this subject. Davidoffered himself to Saul to fight with Goliath, thePhilistine champion, and, to give him courage,Saul armed him with his own weapons; whichDavid rejected as soon as he had them on his back,


saying he could make no use of them, and that hewished to meet the enemy with his sling and hisknife. In conclusion, the arms of others either fallfrom your back, or they weigh you down, or theybind you fast.

Charles VII, the father of King Louis XI, havingby good fortune and valour liberated France fromthe English, recognized the necessity of beingarmed with forces of his own, and he established inhis kingdom ordinances concerning men-at-armsand infantry. Afterwards his son, King Louis,abolished the infantry and began to enlist theSwitzers, which mistake, followed by others, is, asis now seen, a source of peril to that kingdom;because, having raised the reputation of theSwitzers, he has entirely diminished the value ofhis own arms, for he has destroyed the infantryaltogether; and his men-at-arms he hassubordinated to others, for, being as they are soaccustomed to fight along with Switzers, it doesnot appear that they can now conquer withoutthem. Hence it arises that the French cannot standagainst the Switzers, and without the Switzers theydo not come off well against others. The armies ofthe French have thus become mixed, partlymercenary and partly national, both of which armstogether are much better than mercenaries alone orauxiliaries alone, yet much inferior to one's ownforces. And this example proves it, the kingdom ofFrance would be unconquerable if the ordinance ofCharles had been enlarged or maintained.


But the scanty wisdom of man, on entering intoan affair which looks well at first, cannot discernthe poison that is hidden in it, as I have said aboveof hectic fevers. Therefore, if he who rules aprincipality cannot recognize evils until they areupon him, he is not truly wise; and this insight isgiven to few. And if the first disaster to the RomanEmpire should be examined, it will be found tohave commenced only with the enlisting of theGoths; because from that time the vigour of theRoman Empire began to decline, and all thatvalour which had raised it passed away to others.

I conclude, therefore, that no principality issecure without having its own forces; on thecontrary, it is entirely dependent on good fortune,not having the valour which in adversity woulddefend it. And it has always been the opinion andjudgment of wise men that nothing can be souncertain or unstable as fame or power notfounded on its own strength. And one's own forcesare those which are composed either of subjects,citizens, or dependants; all others are mercenariesor auxiliaries. And the way to take ready one's ownforces will be easily found if the rules suggested byme shall be reflected upon, and if one will considerhow Philip, the father of Alexander the Great, andmany republics and princes have armed andorganized themselves, to which rules I entirelycommit myself.


CHAPTER XIV

That Which Concerns A Prince On TheSubject Of The Art Of War

PRINCE ought to have no other aim orthought, nor select anything else for hisstudy, than war and its rules and

discipline; for this is the sole art that belongs tohim who rules, and it is of such force that it notonly upholds those who are born princes, but itoften enables men to rise from a private station tothat rank. And, on the contrary, it is seen that whenprinces have thought more of ease than of armsthey have lost their states. And the first cause ofyour losing it is to neglect this art; and whatenables you to acquire a state is to be master of theart. Francesco Sforza, through being martial, froma private person became Duke of Milan; and thesons, through avoiding the hardships and troublesof arms, from dukes became private persons. Foramong other evils which being unarmed bringsyou, it causes you to be despised, and this is one ofthose ignominies against which a prince ought toguard himself, as is shown later on. Because thereis nothing proportionate between the armed and theunarmed; and it is not reasonable that he who isarmed should yield obedience willingly to himwho is unarmed, or that the unarmed man shouldbe secure among armed servants. Because, there

A


being in the one disdain and in the other suspicion,it is not possible for them to work well together.And therefore a prince who does not understandthe art of war, over and above the othermisfortunes already mentioned, cannot berespected by his soldiers, nor can he rely on them.He ought never, therefore, to have out of histhoughts this subject of war, and in peace heshould addict himself more to its exercise than inwar; this he can do in two ways, the one by action,the other by study.

As regards action, he ought above all things tokeep his men well organized and drilled, to followincessantly the chase, by which he accustoms hisbody to hardships, and learns something of thenature of localities, and gets to find out how themountains rise, how the valleys open out, how theplains lie, and to understand the nature of riversand marshes, and in all this to take the greatestcare. Which knowledge is useful in two ways.Firstly, he learns to know his country, and is betterable to undertake its defence; afterwards, by meansof the knowledge and observation of that locality,he understands with ease any other which it may benecessary for him to study hereafter; because thehills, valleys, and plains, and rivers and marshesthat are, for instance, in Tuscany, have a certainresemblance to those of other countries, so thatwith a knowledge of the aspect of one country onecan easily arrive at a knowledge of others. And theprince that lacks this skill lacks the essential which


it is desirable that a captain should possess, for itteaches him to surprise his enemy, to selectquarters, to lead armies, to array the battle, tobesiege towns to advantage.

Philopoemen, Prince of the Achaeans, amongother praises which writers have bestowed on him,is commended because in time of peace he neverhad anything in his mind but the rules of war; andwhen he was in the country with friends, he oftenstopped and reasoned with them: "If the enemyshould be upon that hill, and we should findourselves here with our army, with whom wouldbe the advantage? How should one best advance tomeet him, keeping the ranks? If we should wish toretreat, how ought we to set about it? If theyshould retreat, how ought we to pursue?" And hewould set forth to them, as he went, all the chancesthat could befall an army; he would listen to theiropinion and state his, confirming it with reasons,so that by these continual discussions there couldnever arise, in time of war, any unexpectedcircumstances that he could deal with.

But to exercise the intellect the prince shouldread histories, and study there the actions ofillustrious men, to see how they have bornethemselves in war, to examine the causes of theirvictories and defeat, so as to avoid the latter andimitate the former; and above all do as anillustrious man did, who took as an exemplar onewho had been praised and famous before him, andwhose achievements and deeds he always kept in


his mind, as it is said Alexander the Great imitatedAchilles, Caesar Alexander, Scipio Cyrus. Andwhoever reads the life of Cyrus, written byXenophon, will recognize afterwards in the life ofScipio how that imitation was his glory, and howin chastity, affability, humanity, and liberalityScipio conformed to those things which have beenwritten of Cyrus by Xenophon. A wise princeought to observe some such rules, and never inpeaceful times stand idle, but increase hisresources with industry in such a way that theymay be available to him in adversity, so that iffortune changes it may find him prepared to resisther blows.


CHAPTER XV

Concerning Things For Which Men, AndEspecially Princes, Are Praised Or Blamed

T REMAINS now to see what ought to be therules of conduct for a prince towards subjectand friends. And as I know that many have

written on this point, I expect I shall be consideredpresumptuous in mentioning it again, especially asin discussing it I shall depart from the methods ofother people. But, it being my intention to write athing which shall be useful to him who apprehendsit, it appears to me more appropriate to follow upthe real truth of a matter than the imagination of it;for many have pictured republics and principalitieswhich in fact have never been known or seen,because how one lives is so far distant from howone ought to live, that he who neglects what isdone for what ought to be done, sooner effects hisruin than his preservation; for a man who wishes toact entirely up to his professions of virtue soonmeets with what destroys him among so much thatis evil.

I

Hence it is necessary for a prince wishing tohold his own to know how to do wrong, and tomake use of it or not according to necessity.Therefore, putting on one side imaginary thingsconcerning a prince, and discussing those whichare real, I say that all men when they are spoken of,


and chiefly princes for being more highly placed,are remarkable for some of those qualities whichbring them either blame or praise; and thus it isthat one is reputed liberal, another miserly, using aTuscan term (because an avaricious person in ourlanguage is still he who desires to possess byrobbery, whilst we call one miserly who depriveshimself too much of the use of his own); one isreputed generous, one rapacious; one cruel, onecompassionate; one faithless, another faithful; oneeffeminate and cowardly, another bold and brave;one affable, another haughty; one lascivious,another chaste; one sincere, another cunning; onehard, another easy; one grave, another frivolous;one religious, another unbelieving, and the like.And I know that every one will confess that itwould be most praiseworthy in a prince to exhibitall the above qualities that are considered good;but because they can neither be entirely possessednor observed, for human conditions do not permitit, it is necessary for him to be sufficiently prudentthat he may know how to avoid the reproach ofthose vices which would lose him his state; andalso to keep himself, if it be possible, from thosewhich would not lose him it; but this not beingpossible, he may with less hesitation abandonhimself to them. And again, he need not makehimself uneasy at incurring a reproach for thosevices without which the state can only be savedwith difficulty, for if everything is consideredcarefully, it will be found that something which


looks like virtue, if followed, would be his ruin;whilst something else, which looks like vice, yetfollowed brings him security and prosperity.


CHAPTER XVI

Concerning Liberality And Meanness

OMMENCING then with the first of theabove-named characteristics, I say that itwould be well to be reputed liberal.

Nevertheless, liberality exercised in a way thatdoes not bring you the reputation for it, injuresyou; for if one exercises it honestly and as it shouldbe exercised, it may not become known, and youwill not avoid the reproach of its opposite.Therefore, any one wishing to maintain amongmen the name of liberal is obliged to avoid noattribute of magnificence; so that a prince thusinclined will consume in such acts all his property,and will be compelled in the end, if he wish tomaintain the name of liberal, to unduly weighdown his people, and tax them, and do everythinghe can to get money. This will soon make himodious to his subjects, and becoming poor he willbe little valued by any one; thus, with his liberality,having offended many and rewarded few, he isaffected by the very first trouble and imperilled bywhatever may be the first danger; recognizing thishimself, and wishing to draw back from it, he runsat once into the reproach of being miserly.

C

Therefore, a prince, not being able to exercisethis virtue of liberality in such a way that it isrecognized, except to his cost, if he is wise he


ought not to fear the reputation of being mean, forin time he will come to be more considered than ifliberal, seeing that with his economy his revenuesare enough, that he can defend himself against allattacks, and is able to engage in enterprises withoutburdening his people; thus it comes to pass that heexercises liberality towards all from whom he doesnot take, who are numberless, and meannesstowards those to whom he does not give, who arefew.

We have not seen great things done in our timeexcept by those who have been considered mean;the rest have failed. Pope Julius the Second wasassisted in reaching the papacy by a reputation forliberality, yet he did not strive afterwards to keep itup, when he made war on the King of France; andhe made many wars without imposing anyextraordinary tax on his subjects, for he suppliedhis additional expenses out of his long thriftiness.The present King of Spain would not haveundertaken or conquered in so many enterprises ifhe had been reputed liberal. A prince, therefore,provided that he has not to rob his subjects, that hecan defend himself, that he does not become poorand abject, that he is not forced to becomerapacious, ought to hold of little account areputation for being mean, for it is one of thosevices which will enable him to govern.

And if any one should say: Caesar obtainedempire by liberality, and many others have reachedthe highest positions by having been liberal, and by


being considered so, I answer: Either you are aprince in fact, or in a way to become one. In thefirst case this liberality is dangerous, in the secondit is very necessary to be considered liberal; andCaesar was one of those who wished to becomepre-eminent in Rome; but if he had survived afterbecoming so, and had not moderated his expenses,he would have destroyed his government. And ifany one should reply: Many have been princes, andhave done great things with armies, who have beenconsidered very liberal, I reply: Either a princespends that which is his own or his subjects' or elsethat of others. In the first case he ought to besparing, in the second he ought not to neglect anyopportunity for liberality. And to the price whogoes forth with his army, supporting it by pillage,sack, and extortion, handling that which belongs toothers, this liberality is necessary, otherwise hewould not be followed by soldiers. And of thatwhich is neither yours nor your subjects' you canbe a ready giver, as were Cyrus, Caesar, andAlexander; because it does not take away yourreputation if you squander that of others, but addsto it; it is only squandering your own that injuresyou.

And there is nothing wastes so rapidly asliberality, for even whilst you exercise it you losethe power to do so, and so become either poor ordespised, or else, in avoiding poverty, rapaciousand hated. And a prince should guard himself,above all things, against being despised and hated;


and liberality leads you to both. Therefore it iswiser to have a reputation for meanness whichbrings reproach without hatred, than to becompelled through seeking a reputation forliberality to incur a name for rapacity which begetsreproach with hatred.


CHAPTER XVII

Concerning Cruelty And Clemency, AndWhether It Is Better To Be Loved Than

Feared

OMING now to the other qualitiesmentioned above, I say that every princeought to desire to be considered clement

and not cruel. Nevertheless he ought to take carenot to misuse this clemency. Cesare Borgia wasconsidered cruel; notwithstanding, his crueltyreconciled the Romagna, unified it, and restored itto peace and loyalty. And if this be rightlyconsidered, he will be seen to have been muchmore merciful than the Florentine people, who, toavoid a reputation for cruelty, permitted Pistoia tobe destroyed. Therefore a prince, so long as hekeeps his subjects united and loyal, ought not tomind the reproach of cruelty; because with a fewexamples he will be more merciful than those who,through too much mercy, allow disorders to arise,from which follow murders or robberies; for theseare wont to injure the whole people, whilst thoseexecutions which originate with a prince offend theindividual only.

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And of all princes, it is impossible for the newprince to avoid the imputation of cruelty, owing tonew states being full of dangers. Hence Virgil,through the mouth of Dido, excuses the


inhumanity of her reign owing to its being new,saying:

Res dura, et regni novitas me talia coguntMoliri, et late fines custode tueri. 1

Nevertheless he ought to be slow to believe andto act, nor should he himself show fear, butproceed in a temperate manner with prudence andhumanity, so that too much confidence may notmake him incautious and too much distrust renderhim intolerable.

Upon this a question arises: whether it be betterto be loved than feared or feared than loved? Itmay be answered that one should wish to be both,but, because it is difficult to unite them in oneperson, is much safer to be feared than loved,when, of the two, either must be dispensed with.Because this is to be asserted in general of men,that they are ungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly,covetous, and as long as you succeed they areyours entirely; they will offer you their blood,property, life and children, as is said above, whenthe need is far distant; but when it approaches theyturn against you. And that prince who, relyingentirely on their promises, has neglected otherprecautions, is ruined; because friendships that are

1 ...against my will, my fate,A throne unsettled, and an infant state,Bid me defend my realms with all my pow'rs,And guard with these severities my shores.


obtained by payments, and not by greatness ornobility of mind, may indeed be earned, but theyare not secured, and in time of need cannot berelied upon; and men have less scruple inoffending one who is beloved than one who isfeared, for love is preserved by the link ofobligation which, owing to the baseness of men, isbroken at every opportunity for their advantage;but fear preserves you by a dread of punishmentwhich never fails.

Nevertheless a prince ought to inspire fear insuch a way that, if he does not win love, he avoidshatred; because he can endure very well beingfeared whilst he is not hated, which will always beas long as he abstains from the property of hiscitizens and subjects and from their women. Butwhen it is necessary for him to proceed against thelife of someone, he must do it on properjustification and for manifest cause, but above allthings he must keep his hands off the property ofothers, because men more quickly forget the deathof their father than the loss of their patrimony.Besides, pretexts for taking away the property arenever wanting; for he who has once begun to liveby robbery will always find pretexts for seizingwhat belongs to others; but reasons for taking life,on the contrary, are more difficult to find andsooner lapse. But when a prince is with his army,and has under control a multitude of soldiers, thenit is quite necessary for him to disregard thereputation of cruelty, for without it he would never


hold his army united or disposed to its duties. Among the wonderful deeds of Hannibal this

one is enumerated: that having led an enormousarmy, composed of many various races of men, tofight in foreign lands, no dissensions arose eitheramong them or against the prince, whether in hisbad or in his good fortune. This arose from nothingelse than his inhuman cruelty, which, with hisboundless valour, made him revered and terrible inthe sight of his soldiers, but without that cruelty,his other virtues were not sufficient to produce thiseffect. And shortsighted writers admire his deedsfrom one point of view and from another condemnthe principal cause of them. That it is true his othervirtues would not have been sufficient for him maybe proved by the case of Scipio, that mostexcellent man, not of his own times but within thememory of man, against whom, nevertheless, hisarmy rebelled in Spain; this arose from nothing buthis too great forbearance, which gave his soldiersmore licence than is consistent with militarydiscipline. For this he was upbraided in the Senateby Fabius Maximus, and called the corrupter of theRoman soldiery. The Locrians were laid waste by alegate of Scipio, yet they were not avenged by him,nor was the insolence of the legate punished,owing entirely to his easy nature. Insomuch thatsomeone in the Senate, wishing to excuse him, saidthere were many men who knew much better hownot to err than to correct the errors of others. Thisdisposition, if he had been continued in the


command, would have destroyed in time the fameand glory of Scipio; but, he being under the controlof the Senate, this injurious characteristic not onlyconcealed itself, but contributed to his glory.

Returning to the question of being feared orloved, I come to the conclusion that, men lovingaccording to their own will and fearing accordingto that of the prince, a wise prince should establishhimself on that which is in his own control and notin that of others; he must endeavour only to avoidhatred, as is noted.


CHAPTER XVIII

Concerning The Way In Which PrincesShould Keep Faith

VERY one admits how praiseworthy it is ina prince to keep faith, and to live withintegrity and not with craft. Nevertheless

our experience has been that those princes whohave done great things have held good faith oflittle account, and have known how to circumventthe intellect of men by craft, and in the end haveovercome those who have relied on their word.You must know there are two ways of contesting,the one by the law, the other by force; the firstmethod is proper to men, the second to beasts; butbecause the first is frequently not sufficient, it isnecessary to have recourse to the second.Therefore it is necessary for a prince to understandhow to avail himself of the beast and the man. Thishas been figuratively taught to princes by ancientwriters, who describe how Achilles and many otherprinces of old were given to the Centaur Chiron tonurse, who brought them up in his discipline;which means solely that, as they had for a teacherone who was half beast and half man, so it isnecessary for a prince to know how to make use ofboth natures, and that one without the other is notdurable. A prince, therefore, being compelledknowingly to adopt the beast, ought to choose the

E


fox and the lion; because the lion cannot defendhimself against snares and the fox cannot defendhimself against wolves. Therefore, it is necessaryto be a fox to discover the snares and a lion toterrify the wolves. Those who rely simply on thelion do not understand what they are about.Therefore a wise lord cannot, nor ought he to, keepfaith when such observance may be turned againsthim, and when the reasons that caused him topledge it exist no longer. If men were entirely goodthis precept would not hold, but because they arebad, and will not keep faith with you, you too arenot bound to observe it with them. Nor will thereever be wanting to a prince legitimate reasons toexcuse this nonobservance. Of this endless modernexamples could be given, showing how manytreaties and engagements have been made void andof no effect through the faithlessness of princes;and he who has known best how to employ the foxhas succeeded best.

But it is necessary to know well how to disguisethis characteristic, and to be a great pretender anddissembler; and men are so simple, and so subjectto present necessities, that he who seeks to deceivewill always find someone who will allow himselfto be deceived. One recent example I cannot passover in silence. Alexander VI did nothing else butdeceive men, nor ever thought of doing otherwise,and he always found victims; for there never was aman who had greater power in asserting, or whowith greater oaths would affirm a thing, yet would


observe it less; nevertheless his deceits alwayssucceeded according to his wishes, because he wellunderstood this side of mankind.

Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to haveall the good qualities I have enumerated, but it isvery necessary to appear to have them. And I shalldare to say this also, that to have them and alwaysto observe them is injurious, and that to appear tohave them is useful; to appear merciful, faithful,humane, religious, upright, and to be so, but with amind so framed that should you require not to beso, you may be able and know how to change tothe opposite.

And you have to understand this, that a prince,especially a new one, cannot observe all thosethings for which men are esteemed, being oftenforced, in order to maintain the state, to actcontrary to faith, friendship, humanity, andreligion. Therefore it is necessary for him to have amind ready to turn itself accordingly as the windsand variations of fortune force it, yet, as I have saidabove, not to diverge from the good if he can avoiddoing so, but, if compelled, then to know how toset about it.

For this reason a prince ought to take care thathe never lets anything slip from his lips that is notreplete with the above-named five qualities, that hemay appear to him who sees and hears himaltogether merciful, faithful, humane, upright, andreligious. There is nothing more necessary toappear to have than this last quality, inasmuch as


men judge generally more by the eye than by thehand, because it belongs to everybody to see you,to few to come in touch with you. Every one seeswhat you appear to be, few really know what youare, and those few dare not oppose themselves tothe opinion of the many, who have the majesty ofthe state to defend them; and in the actions of allmen, and especially of princes, which it is notprudent to challenge, one judges by the result.

For that reason, let a prince have the credit ofconquering and holding his state, the means willalways be considered honest, and he will bepraised by everybody because the vulgar arealways taken by what a thing seems to be and bywhat comes of it; and in the world there are onlythe vulgar, for the few find a place there only whenthe many have no ground to rest on.

One prince 1 of the present time, whom it is notwell to name, never preaches anything else butpeace and good faith, and to both he is mosthostile, and either, if he had kept it, would havedeprived him of reputation and kingdom many atime.

1 Maximilian I, Holy Roman Emperor.


CHAPTER XIX

That One Should Avoid Being DespisedAnd Hated

OW, concerning the characteristics ofwhich mention is made above, I havespoken of the more important ones, the

others I wish to discuss briefly under thisgenerality, that the prince must consider, as hasbeen in part said before, how to avoid those thingswhich will make him hated or contemptible; and asoften as he shall have succeeded he will havefulfilled his part, and he need not fear any dangerin other reproaches.

N

It makes him hated above all things, as I havesaid, to be rapacious, and to be a violator of theproperty and women of his subjects, from both ofwhich he must abstain. And when neither theirproperty nor honour is touched, the majority ofmen live content, and he has only to contend withthe ambition of a few, whom he can curb with easein many ways.

It makes him contemptible to be consideredfickle, frivolous, effeminate, mean-spirited,irresolute, from all of which a prince should guardhimself as from a rock; and he should endeavour toshow in his actions greatness, courage, gravity, andfortitude; and in his private dealings with hissubjects let him show that his judgments are


irrevocable, and maintain himself in suchreputation that no one can hope either to deceivehim or to get round him.

That prince is highly esteemed who conveys thisimpression of himself, and he who is highlyesteemed is not easily conspired against; for,provided it is well known that he is an excellentman and revered by his people, he can only beattacked with difficulty. For this reason a princeought to have two fears, one from within, onaccount of his subjects, the other from without, onaccount of external powers. From the latter he isdefended by being well armed and having goodallies, and if he is well armed he will have goodfriends, and affairs will always remain quiet withinwhen they are quiet without, unless they shouldhave been already disturbed by conspiracy; andeven should affairs outside be disturbed, if he hascarried out his preparations and has lived as I havesaid, as long as he does not despair, he will resistevery attack, as I said Nabis the Spartan did.

But concerning his subjects, when affairsoutside are disturbed he has only to fear that theywill conspire secretly, from which a prince caneasily secure himself by avoiding being hated anddespised, and by keeping the people satisfied withhim, which it is most necessary for him toaccomplish, as I said above at length. And one ofthe most efficacious remedies that a prince canhave against conspiracies is not to be hated anddespised by the people, for he who conspires


against a prince always expects to please them byhis removal; but when the conspirator can onlylook forward to offending them, he will not havethe courage to take such a course, for thedifficulties that confront a conspirator are infinite.And as experience shows, many have been theconspiracies, but few have been successful;because he who conspires cannot act alone, nor canhe take a companion except from those whom hebelieves to be malcontents, and as soon as youhave opened your mind to a malcontent you havegiven him the material with which to contenthimself, for by denouncing you he can look forevery advantage; so that, seeing the gain from thiscourse to be assured, and seeing the other to bedoubtful and full of dangers, he must be a very rarefriend, or a thoroughly obstinate enemy of theprince, to keep faith with you.

And, to reduce the matter into a small compass,I say that, on the side of the conspirator, there isnothing but fear, jealousy, prospect of punishmentto terrify him; but on the side of the prince there isthe majesty of the principality, the laws, theprotection of friends and the state to defend him;so that, adding to all these things the populargoodwill, it is impossible that any one should be sorash as to conspire. For whereas in general theconspirator has to fear before the execution of hisplot, in this case he has also to fear the sequel tothe crime; because on account of it he has thepeople for an enemy, and thus cannot hope for any


escape.Endless examples could be given on this subject,

but I will be content with one, brought to passwithin the memory of our fathers. Messer AnnibaleBentivoglio, who was prince in Bologna(grandfather of the present Annibale), having beenmurdered by the Canneschi, who had conspiredagainst him, not one of his family survived butMesser Giovanni, who was in childhood:immediately after his assassination the people roseand murdered all the Canneschi. This sprung fromthe popular goodwill which the house ofBentivoglio enjoyed in those days in Bologna;which was so great that, although none remainedthere after the death of Annibale who were able torule the state, the Bolognese, having informationthat there was one of the Bentivoglio family inFlorence, who up to that time had been consideredthe son of a blacksmith, sent to Florence for himand gave him the government of their city, and itwas ruled by him until Messer Giovanni came indue course to the government.

For this reason I consider that a prince ought toreckon conspiracies of little account when hispeople hold him in esteem; but when it is hostile tohim, and bears hatred towards him, he ought tofear everything and everybody. And well-orderedstates and wise princes have taken every care notto drive the nobles to desperation, and to keep thepeople satisfied and contented, for this is one ofthe most important objects a prince can have.


Among the best ordered and governed kingdomsof our times is France, and in it are found manygood institutions on which depend the liberty andsecurity of the king; of these the first is theparliament and its authority, because he whofounded the kingdom, knowing the ambition of thenobility and their boldness, considered that a bit intheir mouths would be necessary to hold them in;and, on the other side, knowing the hatred of thepeople, founded in fear, against the nobles, hewished to protect them, yet he was not anxious forthis to be the particular care of the king; therefore,to take away the reproach which he would be liableto from the nobles for favouring the people, andfrom the people for favouring the nobles, he set upan arbiter, who should be one who could beatdown the great and favour the lesser withoutreproach to the king. Neither could you have abetter or a more prudent arrangement, or a greatersource of security to the king and kingdom. Fromthis one can draw another important conclusion,that princes ought to leave affairs of reproach tothe management of others, and keep those of gracein their own hands. And further, I consider that aprince ought to cherish the nobles, but not so as tomake himself hated by the people.

It may appear, perhaps, to some who haveexamined the lives and deaths of the Romanemperors that many of them would be an examplecontrary to my opinion, seeing that some of themlived nobly and showed great qualities of soul,


nevertheless they have lost their empire or havebeen killed by subjects who have conspired againstthem. Wishing, therefore, to answer theseobjections, I will recall the characters of some ofthe emperors, and will show that the causes of theirruin were not different to those alleged by me; atthe same time I will only submit for considerationthose things that are noteworthy to him whostudies the affairs of those times.

It seems to me sufficient to take all thoseemperors who succeeded to the empire fromMarcus the philosopher down to Maximinus; theywere Marcus and his son Commodus, Pertinax,Julian, Severus and his son Antoninus Caracalla,Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, andMaximinus.

There is first to note that, whereas in otherprincipalities the ambition of the nobles and theinsolence of the people only have to be contendedwith, the Roman emperors had a third difficulty inhaving to put up with the cruelty and avarice oftheir soldiers, a matter so beset with difficultiesthat it was the ruin of many; for it was a hard thingto give satisfaction both to soldiers and people;because the people loved peace, and for this reasonthey loved the unaspiring prince, whilst thesoldiers loved the warlike prince who was bold,cruel, and rapacious, which qualities they werequite willing he should exercise upon the people,so that they could get double pay and give vent totheir greed and cruelty. Hence it arose that those


emperors were always overthrown who, either bybirth or training, had no great authority, and mostof them, especially those who came new to theprincipality, recognizing the difficulty of these twoopposing humours, were inclined to givesatisfaction to the soldiers, caring little aboutinjuring the people. Which course was necessary,because, as princes cannot help being hated bysomeone, they ought, in the first place, to avoidbeing hated by every one, and when they cannotcompass this, they ought to endeavour with theutmost diligence to avoid the hatred of the mostpowerful. Therefore, those emperors who throughinexperience had need of special favour adheredmore readily to the soldiers than to the people; acourse which turned out advantageous to them ornot, accordingly as the prince knew how tomaintain authority over them.

From these causes it arose that Marcus[Aurelius], Pertinax, and Alexander, being all menof modest life, lovers of justice, enemies to cruelty,humane, and benignant, came to a sad end exceptMarcus; he alone lived and died honoured, becausehe had succeeded to the throne by hereditary title,and owed nothing either to the soldiers or thepeople; and afterwards, being possessed of manyvirtues which made him respected, he always keptboth orders in their places whilst he lived, and wasneither hated nor despised.

But Pertinax was created emperor against thewishes of the soldiers, who, being accustomed to


live licentiously under Commodus, could notendure the honest life to which Pertinax wished toreduce them; thus, having given cause for hatred,to which hatred there was added contempt for hisold age, he was overthrown at the very beginningof his administration. And here it should be notedthat hatred is acquired as much by good works asby bad ones, therefore, as I said before, a princewishing to keep his state is very often forced to doevil; for when that body is corrupt whom you thinkyou have need of to maintain yourself — it may beeither the people or the soldiers or the nobles —you have to submit to its humours and to gratifythem, and then good works will do you harm.

But let us come to Alexander, who was a man ofsuch great goodness, that among the other praiseswhich are accorded him is this, that in the fourteenyears he held the empire no one was ever put todeath by him unjudged; nevertheless, beingconsidered effeminate and a man who allowedhimself to be governed by his mother, he becamedespised, the army conspired against him, andmurdered him.

Turning now to the opposite characters ofCommodus, Severus, Antoninus Caracalla, andMaximinus, you will find them all cruel andrapacious — men who, to satisfy their soldiers, didnot hesitate to commit every kind of iniquityagainst the people; and all, except Severus, cameto a bad end; but in Severus there was so muchvalour that, keeping the soldiers friendly, although


the people were oppressed by him, he reignedsuccessfully; for his valour made him so muchadmired in the sight of the soldiers and people thatthe latter were kept in a way astonished and awedand the former respectful and satisfied. Andbecause the actions of this man, as a new prince,were great, I wish to show briefly that he knewwell how to counterfeit the fox and the lion, whichnatures, as I said above, it is necessary for a princeto imitate.

Knowing the sloth of the Emperor Julian, hepersuaded the army in Sclavonia, of which he wascaptain, that it would be right to go to Rome andavenge the death of Pertinax, who had been killedby the praetorian soldiers; and under this pretext,without appearing to aspire to the throne, hemoved the army on Rome, and reached Italy beforeit was known that he had started. On his arrival atRome, the Senate, through fear, elected himemperor and killed Julian. After this thereremained for Severus, who wished to make himselfmaster of the whole empire, two difficulties; one inAsia, where Niger, head of the Asiatic army, hadcaused himself to be proclaimed emperor; the otherin the west where Albinus was, who also aspired tothe throne. And as he considered it dangerous todeclare himself hostile to both, he decided toattack Niger and to deceive Albinus. To the latterhe wrote that, being elected emperor by the Senate,he was willing to share that dignity with him andsent him the title of Caesar; and, moreover, that the


Senate had made Albinus his colleague; whichthings were accepted by Albinus as true. But afterSeverus had conquered and killed Niger, andsettled oriental affairs, he returned to Rome andcomplained to the Senate that Albinus, littlerecognizing the benefits that he had received fromhim, had by treachery sought to murder him, andfor this ingratitude he was compelled to punishhim. Afterwards he sought him out in France, andtook from him his government and life. He whowill, therefore, carefully examine the actions ofthis man will find him a most valiant lion and amost cunning fox; he will find him feared andrespected by every one, and not hated by the army;and it need not be wondered at that he, the newman, well, because his supreme renown alwaysprotected him from that hatred which the peoplemight have conceived against him for his violence.

But his son Antoninus was a most eminent man,and had very excellent qualities, which made himadmirable in the sight of the people and acceptableto the soldiers, for he was a warlike man, mostenduring of fatigue, a despiser of all delicate foodand other luxuries, which caused him to bebeloved by the armies. Nevertheless, his ferocityand cruelties were so great and so unheard of that,after endless single murders, he killed a largenumber of the people of Rome and all those ofAlexandria. He became hated by the whole world,and also feared by those he had around him, tosuch an extent that he was murdered in the midst


of his army by a centurion. And here it must benoted that such-like deaths, which are deliberatelyinflicted with a resolved and desperate courage,cannot be avoided by princes, because any onewho does not fear to die can inflict them; but aprince may fear them the less because they are veryrare; he has only to be careful not to do any graveinjury to those whom he employs or has aroundhim in the service of the state. Antoninus had nottaken this care, but had contumeliously killed abrother of that centurion, whom also he dailythreatened, yet retained in his bodyguard; which, asit turned out, was a rash thing to do, and provedthe emperor's ruin.

But let us come to Commodus, to whom itshould have been very easy to hold the empire, for,being the son of Marcus, he had inherited it, and hehad only to follow in the footsteps of his father toplease his people and soldiers; but, being by naturecruel and brutal, he gave himself up to amusing thesoldiers and corrupting them, so that he mightindulge his rapacity upon the people; on the otherhand, not maintaining his dignity, often descendingto the theatre to compete with gladiators, and doingother vile things, little worthy of the imperialmajesty, he fell into contempt with the soldiers,and being hated by one party and despised by theother, he was conspired against and killed.

It remains to discuss the character ofMaximinus. He was a very warlike man, and thearmies, being disgusted with the effeminacy of


Alexander, of whom I have already spoken, killedhim and elected Maximinus to the throne. This hedid not possess for long, for two things made himhated and despised; the one, his having kept sheepin Thrace, which brought him into contempt (itbeing well known to all, and considered a greatindignity by every one), and the other, his havingat the accession to his dominions deferred going toRome and taking possession of the imperial seat;he had also gained a reputation for the utmostferocity by having, through his prefects in Romeand elsewhere in the empire, practised manycruelties, so that the whole world was moved toanger at the meanness of his birth and to fear at hisbarbarity. First Africa rebelled, then the Senatewith all the people of Rome, and all Italy conspiredagainst him, to which may be added his own army:this latter, besieging Aquileia and meeting withdifficulties in taking it, were disgusted with hiscruelties, and fearing him less when they found somany against him, murdered him.

I do not wish to discuss Heliogabalus, Macrinus,or Julian, who, being thoroughly contemptible,were quickly wiped out; but I will bring thisdiscourse to a conclusion by saying that princes inour times have this difficulty of giving inordinatesatisfaction to their soldiers in a far less degree,because, notwithstanding one has to give themsome indulgence, that is soon done; none of theseprinces have armies that are veterans in thegovernance and administration of provinces, as


were the armies of the Roman Empire; andwhereas it was then more necessary to givesatisfaction to the soldiers than to the people, it isnow more necessary to all princes, except the Turkand the Soldan, to satisfy the people rather than thesoldiers, because the people are the more powerful.

From the above I have excepted the Turk, whoalways keeps round him twelve infantry and fifteenthousand cavalry on which depend the security andstrength of the kingdom, and it is necessary that,putting aside every consideration for the people, heshould keep them his friends. The kingdom of theSoldan is similar; being entirely in the hands ofsoldiers, follows again that, without regard to thepeople, he must keep them his friends. But youmust note that the state of the Soldan is unlike allother principalities, for the reason that it is like theChristian pontificate, which cannot be called eitheran hereditary or a newly formed principality;because the sons of the old prince not the heirs, buthe who is elected to that position by those whohave authority, and the sons remain onlynoblemen. And this being an ancient custom, itcannot be called a new principality, because thereare none of those difficulties in it that are met within new ones; for although the prince is new, theconstitution of the state is old, and it is framed soas to receive him as if he were its hereditary lord.

But returning to the subject of our discourse, Isay that whoever will consider it will acknowledgethat either hatred or contempt has been fatal to the


above-named emperors, and it will be recognizedalso how it happened that, a number of them actingin one way and a number in another, only one ineach way came to a happy end and the rest tounhappy ones. Because it would have been uselessand dangerous for Pertinax and Alexander, beingnew princes, to imitate Marcus, who was heir tothe principality; and likewise it would have beenutterly destructive to Caracalla, Commodus, andMaximinus to have imitated Severus, they nothaving sufficient valour to enable them to tread inhis footsteps. Therefore a prince, new to theprincipality, cannot imitate the actions of Marcus,nor, again, is it necessary to follow those ofSeverus, but he ought to take from Severus thoseparts which are necessary to found his state, andfrom Marcus those which are proper and gloriousto keep a state that may already be stable and firm.


CHAPTER XX

Are Fortresses, And Many Other Things ToWhich Princes Often Resort, Advantageous

Or Hurtful?

1. SOME princes, so as to hold securely the state,have disarmed their subjects; others have kept theirsubject towns by factions; others have fosteredenmities against themselves; others have laidthemselves out to gain over those whom theydistrusted in the beginning of their governments;some have built fortresses; some have overthrownand destroyed them. And although one cannot givea final judgment on all one of these things unlessone possesses the particulars of those states inwhich a decision has to be made, nevertheless Iwill speak as comprehensively as the matter ofitself will admit.

2. There never was a new prince who hasdisarmed his subjects; rather when he has foundthem disarmed he has always armed them,because, by arming them, those arms becomeyours, those men who were distrusted becomefaithful, and those who were faithful are kept so,and your subjects become your adherents. Andwhereas all subjects cannot be armed, yet whenthose whom you do arm are benefited, the otherscan be handled more freely, and this difference intheir treatment, which they quite understand,


makes the former your dependants, and the latter,considering it to be necessary that those who havethe most danger and service should have the mostreward, excuse you. But when you disarm them,you at once offend them by showing that youdistrust them, either for cowardice or for want ofloyalty, and either of these opinions breeds hatredagainst you. And because you cannot remainunarmed, it follows that you turn to mercenaries,which are of the character already shown; even ifthey should be good they would not be sufficient todefend you against powerful enemies anddistrusted subjects. Therefore, as I have said, a newprince in a new principality has always distributedarms. Histories are full of examples. But when aprince acquires a new state, which he adds as aprovince to his old one, then it is necessary todisarm the men of that state, except those whohave been his adherents in acquiring it; and theseagain, with time and opportunity, should berendered soft and effeminate; and matters shouldbe managed in such a way that all the armed menin the state shall be your own soldiers who in yourold state were living near you.

3. Our forefathers, and those who were reckonedwise, were accustomed to say that it was necessaryto hold Pistoia by factions and Pisa by fortresses;and with this idea they fostered quarrels in some oftheir tributary towns so as to keep possession ofthem the more easily. This may have been wellenough in those times when Italy was in a way


balanced, but I do not believe that it can beaccepted as a precept for to-day, because I do notbelieve that factions can ever be of use; rather it iscertain that when the enemy comes upon you individed cities you are quickly lost, because theweakest party will always assist the outside forcesand the other will not be able to resist. TheVenetians, moved, as I believe, by the abovereasons, fostered the Guelph and Ghibellinefactions in their tributary cities; and although theynever allowed them to come to bloodshed, yet theynursed these disputes amongst them, so that thecitizens, distracted by their differences, should notunite against them. Which, as we saw, did notafterwards turn out as expected, because, after therout at Vaila, one party at once took courage andseized the state. Such methods argue, therefore,weakness in the prince, because these factions willnever be permitted in a vigorous principality; suchmethods for enabling one the more easily tomanage subjects are only useful in times of peace,but if war comes this policy proves fallacious.

4. Without doubt princes become great whenthey overcome the difficulties and obstacles bywhich they are confronted, and therefore fortune,especially when she desires to make a new princegreat, who has a greater necessity to earn renownthan an hereditary one, causes enemies to arise andform designs against him, in order that he mayhave the opportunity of overcoming them, and bythem to mount higher, as by a ladder which his


enemies have raised. For this reason many considerthat a wise prince, when he has the opportunity,ought with craft to foster some animosity againsthimself, so that, having crushed it, his renown mayrise higher.

5. Princes, especially new ones, have foundmore fidelity and assistance in those men who inthe beginning of their rule were distrusted thanamong those who in the beginning were trusted.Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, ruled his statemore by those who had been distrusted than byothers. But on this question one cannot speakgenerally, for it varies so much with the individual;I will only say this, that those men who at thecommencement of a princedom have been hostile,if they are of a description to need assistance tosupport themselves, can always be gained overwith the greatest ease, and they will be tightly heldto serve the prince with fidelity, inasmuch as theyknow it to be very necessary for them to cancel bydeeds the bad impression which he had formed ofthem; and thus the prince always extracts moreprofit from them than from those who, serving himin too much security, may neglect his affairs. Andsince the matter demands it, I must not fail to warna prince, who by means of secret favours hasacquired a new state, that he must well considerthe reasons which induced those to favour himwho did so; and if it be not a natural affectiontowards him, but only discontent with theirgovernment, then he will only keep them friendly


with great trouble and difficulty, for it will beimpossible to satisfy them. And weighing well thereasons for this in those examples which can betaken from ancient and modern affairs, we shallfind that it is easier for the prince to make friendsof those men who were contented under the formergovernment, and are therefore his enemies, than ofthose who, being discontented with it, werefavourable to him and encouraged him to seize it.

6. It has been a custom with princes, in order tohold their states more securely, to build fortressesthat may serve as a bridle and bit to those whomight design to work against them, and as a placeof refuge from a first attack. I praise this systembecause it has been made use of formerly.Notwithstanding that, Messer Nicolo Vitelli in ourtimes has been seen to demolish two fortresses inCitta di Castello so that he might keep that state;Guidubaldo, Duke of Urbino, on returning to hisdominion, whence he had been driven by CesareBorgia, razed to the foundations all the fortressesin that province, and considered that without themit would be more difficult to lose it; theBentivoglio returning to Bologna came to a similardecision. Fortresses, therefore, are useful or notaccording to circumstances; if they do you good inone way they injure you in another. And thisquestion can be reasoned thus: the prince who hasmore to fear from the people than from foreignersought to build fortresses, but he who has more tofear from foreigners than from the people ought to


leave them alone. The castle of Milan, built byFrancesco Sforza, has made, and will make, moretrouble for the house of Sforza than any otherdisorder in the state. For this reason the bestpossible fortress is — not to be hated by thepeople, because, although you may hold thefortresses, yet they will not save you if the peoplehate you, for there will never be wanting foreignersto assist a people who have taken arms against you.It has not been seen in our times that suchfortresses have been of use to any prince, unless tothe Countess of Forli, when the Count Girolamo,her consort, was killed; for by that means she wasable to withstand the popular attack and wait forassistance from Milan, and thus recover her state;and the posture of affairs was such at that time thatthe foreigners could not assist the people. Butfortresses were of little value to her afterwardswhen Cesare Borgia attacked her, and when thepeople, her enemy, were allied with foreigners.Therefore it would have been safer for her, boththen and before, not to have been hated by thepeople than to have had the fortresses. All thesethings considered then, I shall praise him whobuilds fortresses as well as him who does not, and Ishall blame whoever, trusting in them, cares littleabout being hated by the people.


CHAPTER XXI

How A Prince Should Conduct Himself AsTo Gain Renown

OTHING makes a prince so muchesteemed as great enterprises and setting afine example. We have in our time

Ferdinand of Aragon, the present King of Spain.He can almost be called a new prince, because hehas risen, by fame and glory, from being aninsignificant king to be the foremost king inChristendom; and if you will consider his deedsyou will find them all great and some of themextraordinary. In the beginning of his reign heattacked Granada, and this enterprise was thefoundation of his dominions. He did this quietly atfirst and without any fear of hindrance, for he heldthe minds of the barons of Castile occupied inthinking of the war and not anticipating anyinnovations; thus they did not perceive that bythese means he was acquiring power and authorityover them. He was able with the money of theChurch and of the people to sustain his armies, andby that long war to lay the foundation for themilitary skill which has since distinguished him.Further, always using religion as a plea, so as toundertake greater schemes, he devoted himselfwith a pious cruelty to driving out and clearing hiskingdom of the Moors; nor could there be a more

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admirable example, nor one more rare. Under thissame cloak he assailed Africa, he came down onItaly, he has finally attacked France; and thus hisachievements and designs have always been great,and have kept the minds of his people in suspenseand admiration and occupied with the issue ofthem. And his actions have arisen in such a way,one out of the other, that men have never beengiven time to work steadily against him.

Again, it much assists a prince to set unusualexamples in internal affairs, similar to those whichare related of Messer Bernabo da Milano, who,when he had the opportunity, by any one in civillife doing some extraordinary thing, either good orbad, would take some method of rewarding orpunishing him, which would be much spokenabout. And a prince ought, above all things, alwaysto endeavour in every action to gain for himself thereputation of being a great and remarkable man.

A prince is also respected when he is either atrue friend or a downright enemy, that to say,when, without any reservation, he declares himselfin favour of one party against the other; whichcourse will always be more advantageous thanstanding neutral; because if two of your powerfulneighbours come to blows, they are of such acharacter that, if one of them conquers, you haveeither to fear him or not. In either case it willalways be more advantageous for you to declareyourself and to make war strenuously; because, inthe first case, if you do not declare yourself, you


will invariably fall a prey to the conqueror, to thepleasure and satisfaction of him who has beenconquered, and you will have no reasons to offer,nor anything to protect or to shelter you. Becausehe who conquers does not want doubtful friendswho will not aid him in the time of trial; and hewho loses will not harbour you because you didnot willingly, sword in hand, court his fate.

Antiochus went into Greece, being sent for bythe Aetolians to drive out the Romans. He sentenvoys to the Achaeans, who were friends of theRomans, exhorting them to remain neutral; and onthe other hand the Romans urged them to take uparms. This question came to be discussed in thecouncil of the Achaeans, where the legate ofAntiochus urged them to stand neutral. To this theRoman legate answered: "As for that which hasbeen said, that it is better and more advantageousfor your state not to interfere in our war, nothingcan be more erroneous; because by not interferingyou will be left, without favour or consideration,the guerdon of the conqueror." Thus it will alwayshappen that he who is not your friend will demandyour neutrality, whilst he who is your friend willentreat you to declare yourself with arms. Andirresolute princes, to avoid present dangers,generally follow the neutral path, and are generallyruined. But when a prince declares himselfgallantly in favour of one side, if the party withwhom he allies himself conquers, although thevictor may be powerful and may have him at his


mercy, yet he is indebted to him, and there isestablished a bond of amity; and men are never soshameless as to become a monument of ingratitudeby oppressing you. Victories after all are never socomplete that the victor must not show someregard, especially to justice. But if he with whomyou ally yourself loses, you may be sheltered byhim, and whilst he is able he may aid you, and youbecome companions in a fortune that may riseagain.

In the second case, when those who fight are ofsuch a character that you have no anxiety as to whomay conquer, so much the more is it greaterprudence to be allied, because you assist at thedestruction of one by the aid of another who, if hehad been wise, would have saved him; andconquering, as it is impossible that he should notwith your assistance, he remains at your discretion.And here it is to be noted that a prince ought totake care never to make an alliance with one morepowerful than himself for the purpose of attackingothers, unless necessity compels him, as is saidabove; because if he conquers you are at hisdiscretion, and princes ought to avoid as much aspossible being at the discretion of any one. TheVenetians joined with France against the Duke ofMilan, and this alliance, which caused their ruin,could have been avoided. But when it cannot beavoided, as happened to the Florentines when thePope and Spain sent armies to attack Lombardy,then in such a case, for the above reasons, the


prince ought to favour one of the parties.Never let any Government imagine that it can

choose perfectly safe courses; rather let it expect tohave to take very doubtful ones, because it is foundin ordinary affairs that one never seeks to avoidone trouble without running into another; butprudence consists in knowing how to distinguishthe character of troubles, and for choice to take thelesser evil.

A prince ought also to show himself a patron ofability, and to honour the proficient in every art. Atthe same time he should encourage his citizens topractise their callings peaceably, both in commerceand agriculture, and in every other following, sothat the one should not be deterred from improvinghis possessions for fear lest they be taken awayfrom him or another from opening up trade for fearof taxes; but the prince ought to offer rewards towhoever wishes to do these things and designs inany way to honour his city or state.

Further, he ought to entertain the people withfestivals and spectacles at convenient seasons ofthe year; and as every city is divided into guilds orinto societies, he ought to hold such bodies inesteem, and associate with them sometimes, andshow himself an example of courtesy andliberality; nevertheless, always maintaining themajesty of his rank, for this he must never consentto abate in anything.


CHAPTER XXII

Concerning The Secretaries Of Princes

HE choice of servants is of no littleimportance to a prince, and they are goodor not according to the discrimination of

the prince. And the first opinion which one formsof a prince, and of his understanding, is byobserving the men he has around him; and whenthey are capable and faithful he may always beconsidered wise, because he has known how torecognize the capable and to keep them faithful.But when they are otherwise one cannot form agood opinion of him, for the prime error which hemade was in choosing them.

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There were none who knew Messer Antonio daVenafro as the servant of Pandolfo Petrucci, Princeof Siena, who would not consider Pandolfo to be avery clever man in having Venafro for his servant.Because there are three classes of intellects: onewhich comprehends by itself; another whichappreciates what others comprehend; and a thirdwhich neither comprehends by itself nor by theshowing of others; the first is the most excellent,the second is good, the third is useless. Therefore,it follows necessarily that, if Pandolfo was not inthe first rank, he was in the second, for wheneverone has judgment to know good or bad when it issaid and done, although he himself may not have


the initiative, yet he can recognize the good and thebad in his servant, and the one he can praise andthe other correct; thus the servant cannot hope todeceive him, and is kept honest.

But to enable a prince to form an opinion of hisservant there is one test which never falls; whenyou see the servant thinking more of his owninterests than of yours, and seeking inwardly hisown profit in everything, such a man will nevermake a good servant, nor will you ever be able totrust him; because he who has the state of anotherin his hands ought never to think of himself, butalways of his prince, and never pay any attention tomatters in which the prince is not concerned.

On the other to keep his servant honest theprince ought to study him, honouring him,enriching him, doing him kindnesses, sharing withhim the honours and cares; and at the same time lethim see that he cannot stand alone, so that manyhonours not make him desire more, many richesmake him wish for more, and that many cares maymake him dread changes. When, therefore,servants, and princes towards servants, are thusdisposed, they can trust each other, but when it isotherwise, the end will always be disastrous foreither one or the other.


CHAPTER XXIII

How Flatterers Should Be Avoided

DO NOT wish to leave out an important branchof this subject, for it is a danger from whichprinces are with difficulty preserved, unless

they are very careful and discriminating. It is thatof flatterers, of whom courts arc full, because menare so self-complacent in their own affairs, and in away so deceived in them, that they are preservedwith difficulty from this pest, and if they wish todefend themselves they run the danger of fallinginto contempt. Because there is no other way ofguarding oneself from flatterers except letting menunderstand that to tell you the truth does not offendyou; but when every one may tell you the truth,respect for you abates.

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Therefore a wise prince ought to hold a thirdcourse by choosing the wise men in his state, andgiving to them only the liberty of speaking thetruth to him, and then only of those things of whichhe inquires, and of none others; but he ought toquestion them upon everything, and listen to theiropinions, and afterwards form his ownconclusions. With these councillors, separately andcollectively, he ought to carry himself in such away that each of them should know that, the morefreely he shall speak, the more he shall bepreferred; outside of these, he should listen to no


one, pursue the thing resolved on, and be steadfastin his resolutions. He who does otherwise is eitheroverthrown by flatterers, or is so often changed byvarying opinions that he falls into contempt.

I wish on this subject to adduce a modernexample. Fra Luca, the man of affairs toMaximilian, the present emperor, speaking of hismajesty, said: He consulted with no one, yet nevergot his own way in anything. This arose because ofhis following a practice the opposite to the above;for the emperor is a secretive man — he does notcommunicate his designs to any one, nor does hereceive opinions on them. But as in carrying theminto effect they become revealed and known, theyare at once obstructed by those men whom he hasaround him, and he, being pliant, is diverted fromthem. Hence it follows that those things he doesone day he undoes the next, and no one everunderstands what he wishes or intends to do, andno one can rely on his resolutions.

A prince, therefore, ought always to takecounsel, but only when he wishes and not whenothers wish; he ought rather to discourage everyone from offering advice unless he asks it; but,however, he ought to be a constant inquirer, andafterwards a patient listener concerning the thingsof which he inquired; also, on learning that anyone, on any consideration, has not told him thetruth, he should let his anger be felt.

And if there are some who think that a princewho conveys an impression of his wisdom is not


so through his own ability, but through the goodadvisers that he has around him, beyond doubt theyare deceived, because this is an axiom which neverfails: that a prince who is not wise himself willnever take good advice, unless by chance he hasyielded his affairs entirely to one person whohappens to be a very prudent man. In this caseindeed he may be well governed, but it would notbe for long, because such a governor would in ashort time take away his state from him.

But if a prince who is not experienced shouldtake counsel from more than one he will never getunited counsels, nor will he know how to unitethem. Each of the counsellors will think of his owninterests, and the prince will not know how tocontrol them or to see through them. And they arenot to be found otherwise, because men willalways prove untrue to you unless they are kepthonest by constraint. Therefore it must be inferredthat good counsels, whencesoever they come, areborn of the wisdom of the prince, and not thewisdom of the prince from good counsels.


CHAPTER XXIV

The Princes Of Italy Have Lost TheirStates

HE previous suggestions, carefullyobserved, will enable a new prince toappear well established, and render him at

once more secure and fixed in the state than if hehad been long seated there. For the actions of anew prince are more narrowly observed than thoseof an hereditary one, and when they are seen to beable they gain more men and bind far tighter thanancient blood; because men are attracted more bythe present than by the past, and when they find thepresent good they enjoy it and seek no further; theywill also make the utmost defence for a prince if hefails them not in other things. Thus it will be adouble glory to him to have established a newprincipality, and adorned and strengthened it withgood laws, good arms, good allies, and with a goodexample; so will it be a double disgrace to himwho, born a prince, shall lose his state by want ofwisdom.

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And if those seigniors are considered who havelost their states in Italy in our times, such as theKing of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and others,there will be found in them, firstly, one commondefect in regard to arms from the causes whichhave been discussed at length; in the next place,


some one of them will be seen, either to have hadthe people hostile, or if he has had the peoplefriendly, he has not known how to secure thenobles. In the absence of these defects states thathave power enough to keep an army in the fieldcannot be lost.

Philip of Macedon, not the father of Alexanderthe Great, but he who was conquered by TitusQuintius, had not much territory compared to thegreatness of the Romans and of Greece whoattacked him, yet being a warlike man who knewhow to attract the people and secure the nobles, hesustained the war against his enemies for manyyears, and if in the end he lost the dominion ofsome cities, nevertheless he retained the kingdom.

Therefore, do not let our princes accuse fortunefor the loss of their principalities after so manyyears' possession, but rather their own sloth,because in quiet times they never thought therecould be a change (it is a common defect in mannot to make any provision in the calm against thetempest), and when afterwards the bad times camethey thought of flight and not of defendingthemselves, and they hoped that the people,disgusted with the insolence of the conquerors,would recall them. This course, when others fail,may be good, but it is very bad to have neglectedall other expedients for that, since you would neverwish to fall because you trusted to be able to findsomeone later on to restore you. This again eitherdoes not happen, or, if it does, it will not be for


your security, because that deliverance is of noavail which does not depend upon yourself; thoseonly are reliable, certain, and durable that dependon yourself and your valour.


CHAPTER XXV

What Fortune Can Effect In HumanAffairs, And How To Withstand Her

T is not unknown to me how many men havehad, and still have, the opinion that the affairsof the world are in such wise governed by

fortune and by God that men with their wisdomcannot direct them and that no one can even helpthem; and because of this they would have usbelieve that it is not necessary to labour much inaffairs, but to let chance govern them. This opinionhas been more credited in our times because of thegreat changes in affairs which have been seen, andmay still be seen, every day, beyond all humanconjecture. Sometimes pondering over this, I am insome degree inclined to their opinion.Nevertheless, not to extinguish our free will, I holdit to be true that Fortune is the arbiter of one-halfof our actions, but that she still leaves us to directthe other half, or perhaps a little less.

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I compare her to one of those raging rivers,which when in flood overflows the plains,sweeping away trees and buildings, bearing awaythe soil from place to place; everything flies beforeit, all yield to its violence, without being able inany way to withstand it; and yet, though its naturebe such, it does not follow therefore that men,when the weather becomes fair, shall not make


provision, both with defences and barriers, in sucha manner that, rising again, the waters may passaway by canal, and their force be neither sounrestrained nor so dangerous. So it happens withfortune, who shows her power where valour hasnot prepared to resist her, and thither she turns herforces where she knows that barriers and defenceshave not been raised to constrain her.

And if you will consider Italy, which is the seatof these changes, and which has given to themtheir impulse, you will see it to be an open countrywithout barriers and without any defence. For if ithad been defended by proper valour, as areGermany, Spain, and France, either this invasionwould not have made the great changes it has madeor it would not have come at all. And this Iconsider enough to say concerning resistance tofortune in general.

But confining myself more to the particular, Isay that a prince may be seen happy to-day andruined to-morrow without having shown anychange of disposition or character. This, I believe,arises firstly from causes that have already beendiscussed at length, namely, that the prince whorelies entirely upon fortune is lost when it changes.I believe also that he will be successful who directshis actions according to the spirit of the times, andthat he whose actions do not accord with the timeswill not be successful. Because men are seen, inaffairs that lead to the end which every man hasbefore him, namely, glory and riches, to get there


by various methods; one with caution, another withhaste; one by force, another by skill; one bypatience, another by its opposite; and each onesucceeds in reaching the goal by a differentmethod. One can also see of two cautious men theone attain his end, the other fail; and similarly, twomen by different observances are equallysuccessful, the one being cautious, the otherimpetuous; all this arises from nothing else thanwhether or not they conform in their methods tothe spirit of the times. This follows from what Ihave said, that two men working differently bringabout the same effect, and of two workingsimilarly, one attains his object and the other doesnot.

Changes in estate also issue from this, for if, toone who governs himself with caution andpatience, times and affairs converge in such a waythat his administration is successful, his fortune ismade; but if times and affairs change, he is ruinedif he does not change his course of action. But aman is not often found sufficiently circumspect toknow how to accommodate himself to the change,both because he cannot deviate from what natureinclines him to, and also because, having alwaysprospered by acting in one way, he cannot bepersuaded that it is well to leave it; and, therefore,the cautious man, when it is time to turnadventurous, does not know how to do it, hence heis ruined; but had he changed his conduct with thetimes fortune would not have changed.


Pope Julius II went to work impetuously in allhis affairs, and found the times and circumstancesconform so well to that line of action that healways met with success. Consider his firstenterprise against Bologna, Messer GiovanniBentivogli being still alive. The Venetians werenot agreeable to it, nor was the King of Spain, andhe had the enterprise still under discussion with theKing of France; nevertheless he personally enteredupon the expedition with his accustomed boldnessand energy, a move which made Spain and theVenetians stand irresolute and passive, the latterfrom fear, the former from desire to recover all thekingdom of Naples; on the other hand, he drewafter him the King of France, because that king,having observed the movement, and desiring tomake the Pope his friend so as to humble theVenetians, found it impossible to refuse himsoldiers without manifestly offending him.Therefore Julius with his impetuous actionaccomplished what no other pontiff with simplehuman wisdom could have done; for if he hadwaited in Rome until he could get away, with hisplans arranged and everything fixed, as any otherpontiff would have done, he would never havesucceeded. Because the King of France would havemade a thousand excuses, and the others wouldhave raised a thousand fears.

I will leave his other actions alone, as they wereall alike, and they all succeeded, for the shortnessof his life did not let him experience the contrary;


but if circumstances had arisen which required himto go cautiously, his ruin would have followed,because he would never have deviated from thoseways to which nature inclined him.

I conclude therefore that, fortune beingchangeful and mankind steadfast in their ways, solong as the two are in agreement men aresuccessful, but unsuccessful when they fall out.For my part I consider that it is better to beadventurous than cautious, because fortune is awoman, and if you wish to keep her under it isnecessary to beat and ill-use her; and it is seen thatshe allows herself to be mastered by theadventurous rather than by those who go to workmore coldly. She is, therefore, always, woman-like,a lover of young men, because they are lesscautious, more violent, and with more audacitycommand her.


CHAPTER XXVI

An Exhortation To Liberate Italy From TheBarbarians

AVING carefully considered the subject ofthe above discourses, and wonderingwithin myself whether the present times

were propitious to a new prince, and whether therewere the elements that would give an opportunityto a wise and virtuous one to introduce a new orderof things which would do honour to him and goodto the people of this country, it appears to me thatso many things concur to favour a new prince that Inever knew a time more fit than the present.

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And if, as I said, it was necessary that the peopleof Israel should be captive so as to make manifestthe ability of Moses; that the Persians should beoppressed by the Medes so as to discover thegreatness of the soul of Cyrus; and that theAthenians should be dispersed to illustrate thecapabilities of Theseus: then at the present time, inorder to discover the virtue of an Italian spirit, itwas necessary that Italy should be reduced to theextremity she is now in, that she should be moreenslaved than the Hebrews, more oppressed thanthe Persians, more scattered than the Athenians;without head, without order, beaten, despoiled,torn, overrun; and to have endured every kind ofdesolation.


Although lately some spark may have beenshown by one, which made us think he wasordained by God for our redemption, neverthelessit was afterwards seen, in the height of his career,that fortune rejected him; so that Italy, left aswithout life, waits for him who shall yet heal herwounds and put an end to the ravaging andplundering of Lombardy, to the swindling andtaxing of the kingdom and of Tuscany, and cleansethose sores that for long have festered. It is seenhow she entreats God to send someone who shalldeliver her from these wrongs and barbarousinsolencies. It is seen also that she is ready andwilling to follow a banner if only someone willraise it.

Nor is there to be seen at present one in whomshe can place more hope than in your illustrioushouse, with its valour and fortune, favoured byGod and by the Church of which it is now thechief, and which could be made the head of thisredemption. This will not be difficult if you willrecall to yourself the actions and lives of the men Ihave named. And although they were great andwonderful men, yet they were men, and each oneof them had no more opportunity than the presentoffers, for their enterprises were neither more justnor easier than this, nor was God more their friendthan He is yours.

With us there is great justice, because that war isjust which is necessary, and arms are hallowedwhen there is no other hope but in them. Here there


is the greatest willingness, and where thewillingness is great the difficulties cannot be greatif you will only follow those men to whom I havedirected your attention. Further than this, howextraordinarily the ways of God have beenmanifested beyond example: the sea is divided, acloud has led the way, the rock has poured forthwater, it has rained manna, everything hascontributed to your greatness; you ought to do therest. God is not willing to do everything, and thustake away our free will and that share of glorywhich belongs to us.

And it is not to be wondered at if none of theabove-named Italians have been able to accomplishall that is expected from your illustrious house; andif in so many revolutions in Italy, and in so manycampaigns, it has always appeared as if militaryvirtue were exhausted, this has happened becausethe old order of things was not good, and none ofus have known how to find a new one. Andnothing honours a man more than to establish newlaws and new ordinances when he himself wasnewly risen. Such things when they are wellfounded and dignified will make him revered andadmired, and in Italy there are not wantingopportunities to bring such into use in every form.

Here there is great valour in the limbs whilst itfails in the head. Look attentively at the duels andthe hand-to-hand combats, how superior theItalians are in strength, dexterity, and subtlety. Butwhen it comes to armies they do not bear


comparison, and this springs entirely from theinsufficiency of the leaders, since those who arecapable are not obedient, and each one seems tohimself to know, there having never been any oneso distinguished above the rest, either by valour orfortune, that others would yield to him. Hence it isthat for so long a time, and during so muchfighting in the past twenty years, whenever therehas been an army wholly Italian, it has alwaysgiven a poor account of itself; as witness Taro,Alessandria, Capua, Genoa, Vaila, Bologna,Mestre.

If, therefore, your illustrious house wishes tofollow those remarkable men who have redeemedtheir country, it is necessary before all things, as atrue foundation for every enterprise, to be providedwith your own forces, because there can be nomore faithful, truer, or better soldiers. Andalthough singly they are good, altogether they willbe much better when they find themselvescommanded by their prince, honoured by him, andmaintained at his expense. Therefore it is necessaryto be prepared with such arms, so that you can bedefended against foreigners by Italian valour.

And although Swiss and Spanish infantry maybe considered very formidable, nevertheless thereis a defect in both, by reason of which a third orderwould not only be able to oppose them, but mightbe relied upon to overthrow them. For theSpaniards cannot resist cavalry, and the Switzersare afraid of infantry whenever they encounter


them in close combat. Owing to this, as has beenand may again be seen, the Spaniards are unable toresist French cavalry, and the Switzers areoverthrown by infantry. And although a completeproof of this latter cannot be shown, neverthelessthere was some evidence of it at the battle ofRavenna, when the Spanish infantry wereconfronted by German battalions, who follow thesame tactics as the Swiss; when the Spaniards, byagility of body and with the aid of their shields, gotin under the pikes of the Germans and stood out ofdanger, able to attack, while the Germans stoodhelpless, and, if the cavalry had not dashed up, allwould have been over with them. It is possible,therefore, knowing the defects of both theseinfantries, to invent a new one, which will resistcavalry and not be afraid of infantry; this need notcreate a new order of arms, but a variation uponthe old. And these are the kind of improvementswhich confer reputation and power upon a newprince.

This opportunity, therefore, ought not to beallowed to pass for letting Italy at last see herliberator appear. Nor can one express the love withwhich he would be received in all those provinceswhich have suffered so much from these foreignscourings, with what thirst for revenge, with whatstubborn faith, with what devotion, with whattears. What door would be closed to him? Whowould refuse obedience to him? What envy wouldhinder him? What Italian would refuse him


homage? To all of us this barbarous dominionstinks. Let, therefore, your illustrious house take upthis charge with that courage and hope with whichall just enterprises are undertaken, so that under itsstandard our native country may be ennobled, andunder its auspices may be verified that saying ofPetrarch:

Virtu contro al FurorePrendera l'arme, e fia il combatter corto:Che l'antico valoreNegli italici cuor non e ancor morto. 1

THE END

1 Virtue against fury shall advance the fight,And it i' th' combat soon shall put to flight;For the old Roman, valour is not dead,Nor in th' Italians' breasts extinguished.

by nicolo machiavelli written c. 1505, published 1515 ... · the prince by nicolo machiavelli...

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