burne - some notes on the battle of kadesh

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Egypt Exploration Society

Some Notes on the Battle of Kadesh: Being a Military Commentary on Professor J. H.Breasted's Book, "The Battle of Kadesh" (University of Chicago Press, 1903)Author(s): A. H. BurneSource: The Journal of Egyptian Archaeology, Vol. 7, No. 3/4 (Oct., 1921), pp. 191-195Published by: Egypt Exploration SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3853565 .Accessed: 05/09/2011 18:02

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SOME NOTES ON THE BATTLE OF KADESHBEING A MILITARY COMMENTARY ON PROFESSOR J. H. BREASTED'S BOOK,THE BATTLE OF KADESHI(UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, 1903).BY MAJOR A. H. BURNE, R.A.

THEBattle of Kadesh is of peculiar interest to students of military history, inasmuch asit is the first battle in history of which we have the details recorded with any approach toaccuracy and precision. The work.by Professor Breasted on the subject is thus of thegreatest possible interest. If I venture, therefore, to offer a few comments on the book it isnot to disparage it, but rather to bring it to the notice of military students, encouragedthereto by Prof. T. Eric Peet, who has himself helped me with one or two suggestions.

Naturally a layman. cannot call in question Professor Breasted's facts, but one is notunder the same obligation to accept all the inferences he draws from those facts, and thereare one or two of these inferences which to a soldier would appear at least open to doubt, ifnot to criticism. Taking them in chronological order, my first point, which is of no greatmoment, concerns the position of the Hittite army when Ramesses reached the ford eightmiles south of Kadesh. I understand that the word translated "behind" in the passage"drawn up behind Kadesh " may equally well mean "around." If this were the meaning inthis passage, it would read "round about Kadesh." But whichever meaning is the rightone here, I think the Hittite army was then not north-west of Kadesh, but north-eastor east of it. It is true the Poem states that he was north-west, but what means would therecorder of the Poem have of ascertaining the exact position of the hostile army beforethey came into contact ? We are not told that they captured any prisoners at this point,and if they did it is clear that the prisoners lied to them. Now the Record constantly usesthe words "behind Kadesh " later on in the day to indicate "east of Kadesh." The reliefsall view the battlefield from Pharaoh's camp, whence "behind Kadesh " meant "to the eastof Kadesh" which, I submit, is the correct meaning to be attached to the passage underdiscussion. What would be the most likely place for the Hittite king to post his army ?The two Beduins who met him south of the ford must have directed him (in accordancewith instructions) over the ford and by the westerlyrroute, leaving Kadesh on his righthand. If they had not done so the Hittite king would have been in doubt as to which sideof the Orontes the Egyptians would approach Kadesh by, and he would have had to sendout patrols to establish contact and report the route taken. But there was no sign of anyhostile patrols until Ramesses came level with Kadesh. If the Beduins had these in-structions it must obviously have been the Hittites' intention to lie on the eastern side ofthe town hidden partly by the houses, but more by the prominent hill which rises in thecentre of the town.

If we are to believe the Poem in its statement that the Hittite army was north-west ofKadesh that morning it is inconceivable that Ramesses could have encamped on the samespot a few hours later, as Professor Breasted makes him do, without some traces of theenemy's carnp being left. To move an army of 20,000 men

across a broad river by a ford


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A. H. BURNEwould be a considerable military operation, and at 2.30 p.m. there would probably still besome laggards and camp-followers moving across. No, I think we can give the Hittite kingcredit for doing the right thing, and doing it in the right way. His plans appear to havebeen well conceived and well carried out, up to a point.

Next, let us consider Ramesses' march on this great day. We are asked to believe thatwhen he heard that the Hittites had refused fight and were posted round Aleppo, Pharaohwas so elated by the news that he pushed on in desperate haste, casting military precautionsto the winds. What was the situation ? The Egyptians had been marching continuouslyfor thirty days, covering on an average thirteen miles a day. This was no mean achievementand amounted almost to a forced march for the infantry. Aleppo is still a hundred milesdistant. The troops are getting footsore and weary, whereas the enemy is supposed to bestationary, and hence presumably fresh. What object will Pharaoh achieve by pushing onat still greater speed, while there are still a dozen marches in front of him, and with noprospect of effecting a surprise at the end of it ?

But it may be asked, in that case how do you account for the undoubted fact thatPharaoh's host was strung out over many miles of country? I think it can be explained inthe following way. The strength of his army is taken to be about 20,000 men, in fourdivisions of 5000 each. Half this force consisted of chariotry. Now each chariot containedonly two men, and allowing it a road space in column of route of ten yards, 5000 chariotswould occupy a space of 50,000 yards (over 28 miles) if all were together and closed up.On an open plain they could of course advance in line, but at defiles they might have to goin single file, and there were two defiles in this day's march, namely (1) the river Orontes,(2) the forest of Baui. As a matter of fact 5000 is probably an over-estimate of the numnberof chariots; but assuming that the chariots could cross the river and traverse the forest twoabreast they would still extend over a matter of seven or eight miles. If the infantry marchedten abreast they would require about two miles. Then there are also flocks and herds to beconsidered. It is clear from the reliefs that each division took with it sheep, oxen and goats.On the whole, if we say that the entire army would require ten miles of road spacewhen all the divisions were closed up, we shall probably not be far wrong. Travelling at21 miles per hour it would take the column four hours to pass a given point. But we knowthat the divisions were not closed up. A gap of about 1I miles existed between Amnun ndRec, and this can be easily accounted for by the ford. At the previous night's camp therewas no water. It is almost certain that there would be a halt to water and feed on reachingthe ford.The rear divisions as they came up would probably have to wait until the divisions infront had finished their meal and moved on. Not knowing that another defile, in the shapeof the forest, was in front of them the commander of division Re( might wait until hiswhole force was closed up before moving on. Thus the gap of 1I miles between him andAmiiunwould arise. And it is natural to suppose that the same would occur in the case ofPtah and Setekh. The total length of the column from the head of Amuinto the head ofSetekh would thus approximate to ten miles, without Pharaoh unduly forcing the pace infront. Now the distance from the ford to the evening's camp is about eight miles, so weshould expect to find that as Rarnesses was entering camp the head of division Setekhwould be still two miles short of the ford,and division Ptah would be in the act of crossingthe ford. This in fact is apparently the actual situation, and is substantially borne out bythe Poem.

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SOME NOTES ON THE BATTLE OF KADESHIf Pharaoh had any inkling of the proximity of the enemy this would be a faultyformation to adopt, but assuming that his information was reliable there does not seemmuch to criticise. His army is doing a long and trying march and has yet another100 miles to do before it expects to give battle. Ramesses endeavours to lighten the

journey by keeping his columns strung out. Everyone knows how it adds to the comfortand marching powers of troops to give them "elbow room" on the march. On reaching afavourable camping ground which happens to be close to a walled city (Kadesh) Pharaohomits no precautions but erects a zariba round his camp and sends out patrols towards thecity. Up to date he can congratulate himself that he has done pretty well. He has madea satisfactory march and is looking forward to his tea. But what a surprise is in storefor him!

From now onwards I think it would be a mistake to follow too closely the variousaccounts of the battle which ensued. Historical accuracy is more than we can expect. Thebattle was evidently a confused melee, a sort of Inkerman, and it is not to be expected thatthe subsequent historian would have sufficient data to put facts in their correct chrono-logical order. A battle destroys all sense of time, indeed important events in the Battle ofWaterloo are still in dispute and times for a given stage in the fight vary by as much as1i hours! So that I think all we can say for certain is that the Hittite charioteers struckReC n the right flank, dispersed it and overran the Egyptian camp, and began to plunderit. Now comes a very important event-" the arrival of the recruits " (lit. "youths "). Thecourt historian naturally makes out that Ramesses by his personal valour turned the scaleand drove the enemy into the river. I take leave to doubt this. I attribute the turn in thetide to the arrival of the "recruits." If they played the decisive part in the battle thatI believe they did, it is as well- to try and discover who they were and how they came toarrive "at the right place at the right time."First of all, then, who were these "recruits ? I see no reason whatever to suppose thatthey are the division Amun returning to the fight. They are marching in perfect orderand serried ranks in the reliefs, and are obviously fresh troops.

They could hardly be a draft of real recruits just arrived from Egypt, because it was theopening of the campaign, and even if they had been sent after the army so soon they couldhardly have caught the hehemup. They would have been incorporated in the ranks of the oldersoldiers before the army ever set out from Egypt. Can they have been a friendly tribe fromAmor, arriving in the nick of time from the west ? Evidently that was the direction theydid arrive from. But their dress and appearance in the reliefs does not differentiate themfrom the Egyptians. Also they would have joined Ramesses south of Ribleh instead of com-ing in from the west. The road through Hurmel (Map III) looks too mountainous for thechariots which they are shown as possessing. If they had come from the sea by the Nahrel-Kebir (Map I) they could have had no sort of previous communication with Ramesses,and to have struck in at precisely the right time and place of the whole campaign wouldbe such a strange coincidence that the Egyptians would have had a little more to say onthe matter. Also the Record says distinctly that they were Pharaoh's troops, which theylook like on the reliefs.

What, then, was this force ? I suggest that they were part of the garrison whichPharaoh had left behind at his sea-base the previous year; that he had picked them up onhis advance and attached them to one of his divisions. The Record mentions that he put thedivisions into their order of march on the shore of Amor (his base), and what more naturalJourn. of Egypt. Arch. vii. 25

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194 A. H. BURNEthan that he should pick up every available man there ? These troops would in a sense be"young men," i.e. "fresh" troops. They would be placed in the centre of the army andattached to either the rear of Re or the van of Ptah.Let us try to reconstruct the scene. And to do so we must go back a little. PassageNo. 18 over one of the Reliefs has a sentence which ProfessorBreasted translates, "Now thedivision of ReC and the division of Ptah were (still) on the march; they had not (yet)arrived, and their officers were in the forest of Baui." From this the Professor infers thattheir officers had somehow got separated from their troops. This is unconvincing; it is,moreover,now known that the word here ren-dered "officer"means no more than "soldier."

AKADESH We may therefore translate (with a slightAmnUn grammatical deviation due to Erman), "their~J6 w)y ^men had not yet come out of the wood ofI/ /fantry Baui." In other wordsthese two divisions had

~/ ^' nnotyet debouched from the forest. This fits?/ "1.Hn

InE in with probabilities, and I think we may takeR. / ~X ~Chariotry < it that when the vizier (or his messenger) went_4ri \ ~Ch ar _ back the "recruits" would be about in the

I / position shown in the accompanying roughsketch.As they debouched from the forest they

"Recruits"l f_ would see the plain to their right front alivefg9 nJ?.- O16 with hostile chariotry: the rear of divisionForest , 'Q - ] ReCwould come running back into them withBOuif _ Qq / wild stories. Their obvious course would beto bear away to the left, being too few innumbers to attack in front. About that time

P~tah~ ,11 the vizier would pass them, on his way tobring up Ptah. He would say to them "skirtP\tah~~ round to the left, avoiding the battle in yourimmediate front and see if you can helpPharaoh, who is in dire straits. Meanwhile Ip Ard\ ~ am going back to bring up Ptah. While you

Setekh attack in flank I will attack frontally with(outspanned) Ptah." We know that this is what he didE-----!yptiansgyptians actually do, and the above seems to me theJ 7 Hittites natural and probable course of events.There remains one more interesting studybefore us-that of the Hittite king. It is indeed unfortunate that we have not his accountof the battle. He would have had some caustic remarks to make if he could have seenRamesses' version. Up to a point his work was brilliant. Then, suddenly and unaccountablyhe seems to become paralysed. He commits a portion of his chariotry to the attack. Thenhe pauses apparently irresolutely. Then he sends the remainder of his cavalry. Then hehesitates again, and dares not commit his infantry. Why ? Possibly the ford was over deepfor infantry and he could not induce them to cross. But I think the most likely reason islack of that higher gift in a leader-nerve and resolution at the critical moment. Lacking


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SOME NOTES ON THE BATTLE OF KADESHthis I think he just falls short of being a really great commander. A squadron of cavalryare enlarged upon the enemy. They disappear in a cloud of dust. The situation becomes"obscure,"the commander waits for it to clarify. Alas, fatal delay ! the enemy recovers hisequilibrium, puts a bold face on it, refuses to believe he is beaten, and-wins! Manyinstances of this could be cited from the late war.The post-war edition of Field Service Regulations formulates the eight "principles ofwar." It is an interesting task to apply them to the campaign of Kadesh, with the objectof seeing how they stand the test. That task is outside the scope of this paper. Suffice itto say that the Hittite king observed the first seven of those principles and was consequentlyin a winning position, but threw away his chances of success by violating the eighth, whilePharaoh by regarding the eighth principle pulled off the victory.

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burne - some notes on the battle of kadesh

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