brij mohan's social policy analysis: a view from western europe

This article was downloaded by: [University of South Carolina ]On: 05 October 2014, At: 12:08Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Journal of Comparative Social WelfarePublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjcs20

Brij Mohan's social policy analysis: aview from Western EuropeNick Johns a & Mark Hyde aa School of Law and Criminal Justice, University of Plymouth ,Plymouth PL4 8AA, UKPublished online: 23 Jun 2010.

To cite this article: Nick Johns & Mark Hyde (2010) Brij Mohan's social policy analysis: aview from Western Europe, Journal of Comparative Social Welfare, 26:2-3, 189-199, DOI:10.1080/17486831003687469

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17486831003687469

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as tothe accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Contentshould not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever orhowsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arisingout of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjcs20

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/17486831003687469

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17486831003687469

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Journal of Comparative Social WelfareVol. 26, Nos. 2–3, June–October 2010, 189–199

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Brij Mohan’s social policy analysis: a view from Western Europe

Nick Johns* and Mark Hyde

School of Law and Criminal Justice, University of Plymouth, Plymouth PL4 8AA, UK

(Received 12 September 2009)

Although Brij Mohan has an outstanding reputation as a scholar andadvocate of global social justice, his distinctive contribution, spanningseveral fields, has been neglected by Western European social policyanalysis (WESPA). This is surprising given that many of the themes thatare expressed in his work are highly relevant to this tradition. This articleteases out this relevance in two ways. First, it summarises what shouldarguably be regarded as the three foundational assumptions of WESPA,highlighting their congruence with some of the central themes of Mohan’swork. Western European social policy scholars can expect to feel verycomfortable with his normative standpoint, as well as his analysis of thedynamics of injustice. Second, we examine in greater depth Mohan’scontribution regarding two specific issues, diversity and freedom.Our analysis suggests that Mohan’s substantial and varied corpus shouldbe accorded the recognition within WESPA that it so richly deserves.

Keywords: social policy analysis; solidarity; the market; the state; diversity;freedom

Introduction

Even a cursory glance would suggest that Professor Mohan’s scholarship, whichdraws upon a wealth of academic and practical experience, has been, and continuesto be, formidable. While it is evident that his ideas have influenced writers andcommentators across a number of fields, including economics (Ackerman, Goodwin,Dougherty, & Gallagher, 2000), sociology (Morgaine, 2007), international relations(Choi & James, 2003), and social welfare and social work (Earle, 2008), a review ofthe mainstream social policy writing in a Western European context would suggestthat the significance of his work has yet to be fully appreciated here. Consequently,the central aim of this article is to highlight the various ways in which Mohan’sexamination of the dynamics of injustice, including the role of the public authority, iscompatible with the mainstream trends of Western European social policy analysis(WESPA). This is pursued in two ways. First, we develop a conceptual frameworkthat captures the dominant elements of social policy thinking in a Western Europeancontext, illustrating their congruence with several of the themes of Mohan’s work.Second, and reflecting our own particular interests, we flesh out his relevance to

*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]

ISSN 1748–6831 print/ISSN 1748–684X online

� 2010 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/17486831003687469

http://www.informaworld.com

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f So

uth

Car

olin

a ]

at 1

2:08

05

Oct

ober

201

4

WESPA in greater depth by focusing on two particular issues, diversity and freedom.It is this ideal of liberty that Mohan venerates above all others, because his workaims to augment human wellbeing by identifying the conditions that are necessaryfor the emancipation of humanity.

Western European social policy analysis: foundational assumptions

As a field of scholarly enquiry, WESPA encompasses a wide range of concerns, inter-disciplinary foci, and normative perspectives. Yet the enduring influence ofcollectivist values in Western Europe, its robust tradition of labour movementactivism and involvement in policy-making, and the persistence of substantialwelfare states have meant that social democracy as a system of ideas has occupied apivotal position in the discipline (Mishra, 1984; Taylor-Gooby & Dale, 1981). Thismeans that social democratic aims and values have exercised a defining influenceover the discourses that comprise WESPA. This influence has been so pervasive thateven those scholars whose work is influenced by the liberal tradition of politicalphilosophy have found it necessary to take issue with the themes and insights,principles and policy prescriptions of social democracy (Hyde & Dixon, 2009; Hyde,Dixon, & Drover, 2009). This intellectual tradition is premised on three foundationalassumptions.

The first concerns the social conditions that are required to maximise humanwellbeing. Liberals insist that liberty is integral to welfare, because it givesindividuals the opportunity to define and pursue their conception of the good life(Hyde & Dixon, 2009). But social democrats maintain that human agents are drivenprimarily by the need for affective integration, or psychic engagement with societalnorms and values. Social solidarity may be ‘‘equated with the concept andconsciousness of ‘who is my neighbour?’. It is a desirable sensation, for man [sic]is happiest when most integrated in a group’’ (Reisman, 1977, p. 69). Socialdemocrats insist that welfare is maximised where the normative repertoire of socialcohesion gives priority to ‘‘social equality’’, which may be thought of as a relationalnormative ideal. What matters is that all individuals are regarded as having equalstanding in their communities, regardless of differentials in access to material assets.But when they are left unchecked, income inequalities may become so intense thatthey give rise to a hierarchy of ‘‘large scale cumulative inequalities of advantage’’,making it ‘‘difficult for people to live together, even if politically they are defined asequals’’ (Miller, 1999, p. 242). If social solidarity is to be preserved, the scope ofincome differentials should be circumscribed by the public authority.

Social democracy’s second foundational assumption concerns the role andimpact of the market with regard to welfare. To a greater or lesser extent, liberals areconfident that the market gives individuals the freedom to develop and deploy thecapacities that are essential to their conception of the good life (Hyde & Dixon,2010). But for social democrats, the market is incompatible with the attainment ofappropriate forms of solidarity, because unfettered markets intensify economicinequalities, creating enormous disparities in wellbeing and life-chances. The affluentand the least-advantaged ‘‘do not have a sense of shared fate’’ (Rothstein & Uslaner,2005, p. 11). Each group ‘‘looks out for its own interests and is likely to see thedemands of the other as conflicting with their own well-being. Society is seen as a‘zero-sum game’ between conflicting groups’’ (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005, p. 11),

190 N. Johns and M. Hyde

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f So

uth

Car

olin

a ]

at 1

2:08

05

Oct

ober

201

4

making solidarity more difficult. Poorly-regulated markets are notoriously volatile,

diminishing the degree to which agents are able to exercise control over their ownfutures. Yet solidarity depends upon a sense of personal efficacy and optimism about

the future. And the market gives rise to stigma, the inevitable consequence of beingregarded by society and its welfare institutions as a second-class citizen. Negativeselection is a salient characteristic of privately administered welfare programmes,

because it is ‘‘uneconomic not to exclude those who cannot pay, and those who arelikely to make excessive demands on resources’’. But this is likely to leave the least

advantaged with the ‘‘bitter taste of rejection’’ (Reisman, 1977, p. 46). In sum, areliance on markets to allocate resources intensifies income inequalities, which

undermine social cohesion; first by diminishing the affective bonds that tie peopletogether, and second by isolating the least-advantaged from the social mainstream.

Social democracy’s third foundational assumption concerns the appropriate role

and scope of the public authority. Liberals insist that public action can only bejustified where it is necessary to ensure that all individuals are able to pursue their

conception of the good life (Hyde et al., 2009). But social democrats embrace apaternalist conception of the role of the state, subordinating individual freedom to

their conception of the good. As far as social policy is concerned, selective socialservices and income transfers give rise to stigma, reinforcing the social isolation ofthe least advantaged. Where the public authority is serious about sustaining social

cohesion, it will rely on universal social services and income transfers because theyare inclusive, treat all beneficiaries in an equivalent way, have considerable popular

legitimacy, and confer greater security (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Rothstein &Uslaner, 2005).

Is Mohan a social democrat?

A close inspection of Brij Mohan’s social policy analysis suggests that many of his

specific concerns resonate with the three foundational assumptions of socialdemocracy. The way in which he approaches the concept of diversity (an issue we

will discuss in more detail below) demonstrates the strength of his feeling about theideal of social solidarity, and he is highly critical of movements such as those built up

around multiculturalism, which he sees as evidence of a shift towards a ‘‘NewTribalism’’. Diversity is a pragmatic reality that has taken on perverse politicalmeaning, and Mohan’s antidote to this is to reconnect with our unifying essence that

is our human existence (Mohan, 1992, 1993, 2001a, 2001b). His analysis of socialdivisions in contemporary societies is framed in terms of the importance of solidarity,

although it extends beyond the one-dimensional focus of social democracy onincome inequalities as a source of conflict.

The second foundational assumption of social democracy – that resource

allocation in the market is incompatible with welfare – is certainly consistent withMohan’s analysis. Echoing Rawls’ seminal account of moral arbitrariness, he insists

that ‘‘capitalism does not seek equality; inequality is a consequence of the freemarket values. Any scenario that seeks ‘equal opportunity for all’ without ensuring

access to its ladder is fraught with inherent contradiction’’ (Mohan, 2003, p. 70). Oneof the areas on which the ‘‘Old Left’’ has lost ground has been the way that equality

has been co-opted and distorted by its attachment to ‘‘opportunity’’ rather than

Journal of Comparative Social Welfare 191

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f So

uth

Car

olin

a ]

at 1

2:08

05

Oct

ober

201

4

‘‘outcome’’. It is worth quoting extensively from Mohan (1993, p. 38) to illustratethis point:

The doors of opportunities can lead to illusory success, real accomplishments and, moreoften than not, nightmares of reality through its seductive agents. A 20-year-oldminority sophomore athlete is worth about twenty-five million dollars in the sportsindustry; an attractive woman becomes rich after exposing herself in front ofcommercial cameras; an illiterate immigrant from Cuba wins nine million in theLouisiana lottery; and the tales of Wall Street Moguls need no detailed analysis. All thishappens at a time when hard working, honest, ingenuous American workers aresoullessly laid off in the free market and their chief executives flourish in seven-figuresalaries.

In this imagery we see encapsulated not only the vaunting of inequality, but also theway in which opportunities remain unequal. It also highlights the arbitrariness ofresource allocation under capitalism and its tokenistic application of egalitarianframeworks. Just as social democracy dismisses the ability of capitalism to advancehuman welfare, this same sentiment is strongly, forcefully, expressed in the writingof Mohan.

Turning then to the third foundational assumption of social democracyconcerning the appropriate role of the public authority, Mohan views the state asambiguous with regard to the achievement of human freedom, but he recognisesthat it is impossible to operate outside of a statist context:

The oppressor-oppressed dyad is an outcome of human nature that calls for radicalchange in the ways people relate to each other. The role of the state can be on eitherside. If oppression is undeniably the undesirable aspect of the human reality then thestate must be the chief agency of institutional changes; or else institutional barriers willcontinue to thwart human and social development. (Mohan, 1993, p. 122)

Just as social democracy supports the state, as the great hope of achieving socialsolidarity by the promotion of human welfare as a collective goal, so too doesMohan. On the flip-side, he argues that the erosion of the state exemplified by theneo-liberal elevation of free-market principles has seriously undermined humanwelfare: ‘‘The rise and fall of the nation-state has coincided with the crisis of thewelfare state’’ (Mohan, 2003, p. 32).

Ultimately, while it is possible to see Mohan’s work running comfortablyalongside social democracy, it would be wrong to categorise him in this way. It isapparent that one of the thingsMohan eschews is the application of convenient labels:

Capitalism, fascism, socialism, and communism represent different belief systemsdirected toward the shaping of human reality. Their confluence and conflict is inherentin the conceptualization of a particular framework. Also the failure and success isrelative to one’s own predilections, perceptions, and conclusions. (Mohan, 1993, p. 123)

Mohan advocates the reclamation of humanity, reflecting a desire to see beyondnational boundaries and class barriers, to get us to think about the commonalities ofour existence and to move forward with compassion and hope. He is part positivist,part existentialist, but far more than this he is a humanist.

Diversity

We turn now to an issue that has been addressed extensively in Mohan’s social policyanalysis. Diversity has become an incredibly pervasive, if slippery, concept in


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f So

uth

Car

olin

a ]

at 1

2:08

05

Oct

ober

201

4

modern life. In fact, one might go so far as to say that it has become part of

mainstream political culture across the western liberal democracies (Mohan, 2003).‘‘Diversity’’ and ‘‘discourse’’ have become key, if contested, threads in WESPA, and

we will refer to the British case to illustrate this contention (Johns, 2006). But first we

need to reflect on the origins of our seeming obsession with matters of identity.With the economic crisis that assailed the West in the early 1970s, the stage was

set for neo-liberalism – that uneasy compromise between economic liberals and

authoritarian conservatives – to seize the political initiative. In the United States this

took the form of ‘‘Reaganomics’’, and in the United Kingdom it manifested as‘‘Thatcherism’’. Influenced by the writings of ideologues such as Hayek and

Friedman, the state was seen as inherently problematic, and the free market washeralded as the only viable alternative. Important areas of public policy were

privatised, and individuals were given the opportunity to buy into this in various

ways – whether as owner-occupiers of council-housing stock or as shareholders inpreviously nationalised utilities.

In the face of this onslaught directed at the post-war welfare settlement, the ‘‘left’’

appeared to take different routes. Politically, initially at least, there was a lurch to the

extreme left – with Michael Foot taking control of the Labour Party in 1980, andMilitant Tendency gaining access to local government in Liverpool. Of course, this

paved the way into the political wilderness and eventually enabled the progenitors ofNew Labour to drive the party towards the centre-right. It is clear that equality of

outcome has been abandoned and that equalising opportunities is the most that will

be contemplated (Johns & Green, 2009).In terms of political thought and the scholarly enterprise, there has been a

tendency to retreat into issues of diversity and difference, mainly through the post-

structural lens of discourse. While there have been strides made in bringing

previously unheard voices into the wider debate, articulating hitherto unrecognisedexperiences, the pre-eminence of difference has also had, we would argue, quite

serious ramifications for progressive interests and even the groups that seem to have

gained the most (Michaels, 2008). We can use the issues of ‘‘race’’ and ethnicity todemonstrate this.

For a time during the 1960s until the late 1970s there existed a degree of political

unity among the ranks of those who wished to challenge the overt racism thatblighted the everyday lives of visible minorities. Under the aegis of the term ‘‘black’’,

these groups were able to organise and promote a common agenda as victims of

racism and oppression. This was shaped in the lee of the Civil Rights Movement inthe USA (Sivanandan, 1983). During the 1980s cracks began to appear, largely as

a result of the political shifts outlined above, and writers such as Modood (1988)

questioned the appropriateness of using a term like ‘‘black’’, which served to hide thespecific experiences of the ‘‘South Asian’’ population. The other side of this equation

was the implicit accusation that the ‘‘black community’’ were co-opting othergroups, using their numbers but ignoring their interests and needs.

While rallying around one ideal such as ‘‘blackness’’ can itself be problematic, its

demise as a political emblem opened the way for ‘‘ethnicism’’, which was more in

keeping with discourse and difference, and to some extent was less focused onstructural explanations. This can be seen in the far-reaching research on ethnicity in

Britain on behalf of the Policy Studies Institute (Modood & Berthoud, 1997). These

divisions were arguably exploited by the Thatcherite administrations of the 1980s, as


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f So

uth

Car

olin

a ]

at 1

2:08

05

Oct

ober

201

4

funding and other inducements were offered to discrete communities in different

areas on the basis of their identities (Penketh, 2000). It is instructive that agovernment committed to the free market and private enterprise should have so

vigorously – in theory at least – promoted equality of opportunity and theimportance of certain group identities. In many ways this drew the sting out of

the ‘‘race’’ riots of the mid-to-late 1980s.The same pattern of divide-and-rule politics has been adopted by New Labour in

power. They have also taken the same route as previous Labour administrations of

introducing racist immigration policies at the same time as strengthening the anti-discriminatory legislative framework. As many authors have argued (Penketh & Ali,

1997), this is counterproductive because the suspicion that attaches to minority

groups through racist immigration policy undermines any potential that anti-discriminatory legislation might have (Mohan, 2003). Even one of the architects of

this dual strategy, Roy Hattersley, appears, from the comfort of retirement, to regrethis part in its creation (Hattersley, 2005).

New Labour has gone beyond this, implementing measures to tackle ‘‘race’’ hate.

Again following the example of the USA, the Blairite agenda has been to challengehate crimes on the basis of ‘‘race’’, in the first instance through the passage of the

Crime and Disorder Act 1998. At the development stage of this act, a number ofpeople were asked to comment and make recommendations. Peter Tatchell (2002)

agreed that tackling hate through legal means was vital, but that concentrating solelyon ‘‘race’’ was problematic because it served to offer protection to only one section

of society. Eventually he was told that the government valued his proposal but that it

would dilute their aim to target ‘‘racial’’ hatred. Subsequently, the government hasintroduced legislation or regulation on age and sexuality. The Equality Act that

brings all the various pieces of legislation together will be fully functional by 2010.Therefore it is fair to say that matters of poverty and inequality have been

displaced in favour of inclusion and inequality of opportunity. This is evidence of a

retreat into identity and the control that it provides in separating out different voicesand thereby weakening them. ‘‘Ethnicism’’ has been targeted by Sivanandan (1983)

as he believes that its authors have helped to undermine any collective response tooppression. He has also been at the forefront of conceptual efforts to chart the way

that racism has shifted in order to take account of changing global realities andeconomic priorities. As Mohan (2003, p. 53) has identified: ‘‘Racism has a chameleon

character: anti-Semitism, Asian bashing, gay bashing, and welfare bashing are someof the known faces of this post-modern monstrosity’’.

Mohan develops his critique of diversity in terms of the notion of

‘‘Balkanisation’’. He maintains that something essential has been lost, becausefocusing on difference creates a drive towards obscuring what people have in

common. From a didactic point of view Mohan has articulated this in his Human

Diversity and Oppression formula. He teases out the everyday truth of humandiversity from the way in which it has been exploited for vested political interests –

reminiscent of the way in which Rousseau drew a distinction between social andnatural inequalities (Rousseau, 2004). What Mohan does so well, and so

importantly, is to prioritise humanism over all else. In this respect he acts as anavatar for the moral conscience of society. Sartre (1948) attempted to humanise

existentialism by borrowing from Smith’s Theory of moral sentiments, arguing thatwhen we choose to act, we act with a disembodied figure representing humanity in


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f So

uth

Car

olin

a ]

at 1

2:08

05

Oct

ober

201

4

our minds. This is really what Mohan achieves in relation to diversity; he gets us tothink about the shared experience of humanity, and act in accordance with it: ‘‘Toachieve decency, the ethics of humanity should transcend the politics of race, gender,class, origin, and orientation’’ (Mohan, 2003, p. 63). Diversity is a lived reality butit is secondary to the thing we all share: our humanity.

Ultimately, concepts like diversity correspond to aspects of our lived experience,and are building-blocks for the ultimate goal of a humane society. In making thispoint, Mohan calls upon the work of Orlando Patterson: ‘‘[Liberalism] must beunderstood as an ensemble of doctrines and principles that centre on but oneconception of freedom’’ (cited in Mohan, 2003, p. 63). Mohan is clear that:

the ultimate goal of science, especially all social sciences, should be achievement ofhuman freedom which implicitly implies alleviation of human unfreedom (oppression).As we cannot achieve health without alleviating ill health, we cannot attain freedomwithout dealing with unfreedom. Health, however, is more than the absence of disease.Therefore, a mere oppression-free sphere cannot ideally represent the world of freedomunless human diversity and freedom become analogous concepts. (2003, p. 67)

This brings us conveniently to what is perhaps the most prominent theme ofMohan’s scholarship – his analysis of the societal preconditions for freedom.

Freedom

The overwhelming priority that is assigned to social solidarity means of course thatWESPA has little to say about the importance of individual freedom. It would be fairto say that policies and programmes of reform that emphasise choice and sovereigntyare regarded with considerable suspicion, even hostility, by WESPA. Regardless ofthe specific nature of their underlying normative justification, such policies aretypically regarded as furthering the neo-liberal ‘‘individualisation’’ of responsibilityfor welfare. Not surprisingly, then, the scholarly debate regarding the importance offreedom to welfare has largely developed in disciplinary silos outside of WESPA,particularly in political philosophy.

At the risk of simplifying a complex area of enquiry, this debate has been framedin terms of the distinction between two forms of freedom. Negative liberty may bedefined as ‘‘freedom from’’, or the absence of, external constraints on individualaction. For classical liberals, this means the absence of coercion by other humanagents (Friedman, 2002; Machan, 2006). Individuals can be regarded as maximallyfree where they are not prevented by other people from pursuing their legitimatepreferences, where ‘‘legitimate’’ is defined as ‘‘justice-respecting’’. Negative liberty,then, refers to the scope of legitimate human action, or the space in which agents areable to pursue their preferences. It requires an appropriate regime of negative rightsto minimise coercion. Positive liberty, in contrast, may be defined as ‘‘freedom to’’ orthe capacity of agents to act autonomously, which has internal and external pre-requisites. It requires a degree of rationality so that individuals can identify goalsthat are relevant to their circumstances, as well as appropriate courses of action. Butit also requires access to the opportunities and services that enhance the effectivenessof individual action (Plant, 1991). The concept of positive freedom is typicallyassociated with collectivist arguments for public action to enhance internal andexternal resource endowments by maintaining an appropriate regime of positive orsocial rights (Sen, 2009).


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f So

uth

Car

olin

a ]

at 1

2:08

05

Oct

ober

201

4

In spite of the complexity of freedom, it would be fair to say that the scholarlydebate has become polarised, with individualists embracing the concept of negativeliberty, and arguing for a diminution of state activity, and collectivists embracing theconcept of positive liberty, and arguing for an extension of collective responsibility.To his credit, Mohan has avoided situating his arguments within this simplisticdichotomy. While he might be largely indentified as sympathetic to the WESPAtradition, his work transcends it in several ways. For a start, it echoes MacCallum’s(1967) attempt to heal the conceptual rift by establishing a framework thatincorporated negative and positive freedom, adding in the notion of psychologicalfreedom. In essence, this triadic relationship maintains that an individual can onlytruly be free where they are free of and in themselves, from oppression or restraintto maximise their individual potential.

Mohan (1993) picks out these elements in different ways. On the one hand heacknowledges the importance of individual sovereignty, the competence an individ-ual requires in order for freedom to have any relevance at all. In addressing thepessimism of Hobbes about the human condition he counters with an adaptedframework from Rousseau using a neo-Marxist frame of reference – that humannature has the potential for selfishness and brutality but that this is shaped by itswider social, political and economic context. A social contract shaped by collectiveself-interest and a fairer distribution of resources would serve to blunt the edges ofhumanity’s self-destructive tendencies. This of course sits comfortably within theWESPA tradition.

But he also highlights the importance of negative freedom, the absence ofcoercion. In this sense he concentrates on the individual and collective globalconsequences of untrammelled free markets. Casualties at the micro level are thevirtual slaves of Third World sweatshops, and at the international level this isexemplified by the North–South divide: ‘‘A united North – anachronism of the post-Cold War new age – is bound to deepen the North-South tension. Furthermore,it threatens the progress and development of the Third World which has hardlyrecovered from its colonial past’’ (Mohan, 1993, p. 20). As discussed above, negativefreedom is something generally skirted around in social democratic writing, butMohan reintroduces it into the equation in a way that makes it consistent withWESPA thinking.

The device that makes this possible is the notion of ‘‘alienation’’, which is the keyto Mohan’s work. Echoing the Frankfurt School, particularly the work of Marcuseand Fromm, he maintains that the paradox of the capitalist ‘‘free’’ market is that theuncertainty and anxiety endemic to this economic system drives people to activelyflee from freedom:

The individual, the minority, and the dissenter still stand alone chilled in thecrowded insecurities of the new world disorder. Repression, alienation, and praxisof prejudice define the kitsch of contemporary culture. Individual powerlessnessagainst this spectre of freedom is the greatest paradox of modern times. (Mohan,1993, p. 22)

Hence the propensity for individuals to seek reassurance in organisations like theFront Nationale in France, the British National Party in the United Kingdom, andthe growth of the Christian right in the United States.

Dealing with this alienation will require a substantial reordering of global society,and this is where Mohan makes reference to positive freedom. Setting people free will


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f So

uth

Car

olin

a ]

at 1

2:08

05

Oct

ober

201

4

mean building a system, a global world order, where people are inherently valued

and their potential is facilitated. He quotes from Adler:

when external conditions, especially the conditions under which wealth is produced anddistributed, are radically altered, so, too, will be the nature of man [sic]. A new man willemerge, one capable of living peacefully and harmoniously with his fellows and withoutregulation by government or restraint by coercively enforced laws. (Mohan, 1993, p. 28)

This cannot be done by the invisible hand, it has to be done via a new social contract

drawn up by psychologically free individuals who are able to exercise sovereignty

and choice, overseen by a beneficent institutional infrastructure.

Conclusion

While it is apparent that Brij Mohan’s work has not been mined sufficiently well by

WESPA, it is equally apparent that he has much in common with this political world

view. Commentators writing from within this tradition would certainly find the

assumptions of social democracy reflected throughout his work. He writes from a

desire to further the cause of social solidarity, he recognises the inability of the free

market to furnish this, driven as it is by individualism and inequality, and, within his

framework, there is an acceptance that the state has a significant role to play.But Mohan also moves beyond the central concerns of Western European social

policy analysis, reviving something important on the one hand, and criticising one of

its most popular themes on the other. In emphasising the importance of freedom,

including the concept of negative liberty, he revives a concept that is all too often

neglected by social democracy. Arguably too much ground has been ceded in

relation to freedom and it is encouraging to see its centrality in the work of

influential writers such as Mohan. But he is also brave enough to challenge the

orthodoxy that has grown up around the notion of diversity. From his point of view,

politicised diversity carries with it not the seeds of social harmony, but the potential

for far greater division and hostility. In these two respects we believe the work of

Mohan needs to be fully acknowledged and utilised by those in a Western European

context interested in furthering the cause of social justice.

Notes on contributors

Nick Johns is a Lecturer in Criminology and Criminal Justice Studies at the University ofPlymouth, UK. He has written on issues of equal opportunities, diversity, sentencing andtourism. His most recent publications include How the British National Health Service dealswith ethnic diversity (Edwin Mellen Press, 2006) and, with Dr Adrian Barton, Evaluating thepolitical achievements of New Labour since 1997 (Edwin Mellen Press, 2009).

Mark Hyde is a Senior Lecturer in Public Policy and Management at the Plymouth BusinessSchool, University of Plymouth, UK, and is Director of Pensions Worldwide. He haspublished widely on the privatisation of pensions, including several books: The marketizationof social security (Quorum, 2001), The privatization of mandatory retirement income protection:International perspectives (Edwin Mellen Press, 2006), and Comparing how various nationsadminister retirement income: Essays on social security, privatisation, and inter-generationalcovenants (Edwin Mellen Press, 2010).


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f So

uth

Car

olin

a ]

at 1

2:08

05

Oct

ober

201

4

References

Ackerman, F., Goodwin, N.R., Dougherty, L., & Gallagher, K. (Eds.). (2000). The political

economy of inequality. Washington, DC: Island Press.Choi, S.W., & James, P. (2003). No professional soldiers, no militarized interstate disputes?

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 47(6), 796–816.Earle, N. (2008). Social work in social change. The profession and education of social workers in

South Africa. Cape Town: HSRC Press.Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Cambridge: Polity Press.Friedman, M. (2002). Capitalism and freedom. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Hattersley, R. (2005, 31 January). Lessons of the salamander. The Guardian, p. 58.Hyde, M., & Dixon, J. (2009). A just retirement pension system: Beyond neoliberalism.

Poverty and Public Policy, 1(1), 1–25.Hyde, M. & Dixon, J. (Eds.). (2010). Social security: Market, state and associations in

retirement provision. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press.Hyde, M., Dixon, J., & Drover, G. (2009). Assessing the capacity of pension institutions to

promote distributive justice: A liberal conceptual framework. The Open Social Science

Journal, 2, 16–31.Johns, N.R. (2006). Diversity in the British National Health Service: Professional problems,

patient problems. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press.Johns, N.R., & Green, A. (2009). Equality, equal opportunities and diversity: Obfuscation

as social justice. Equal Opportunities International, 28(4), 289–303.MacCallum Jr, G.C. (1967). Negative and positive freedom. Philosophical Review, 76(3),

312–334.Machan, T.R. (2006). Libertarianism defended. Farnham: Ashgate.Michaels, B. (2008, July/August). Against diversity. New Left Review, 52, 33–36.

Miller, D. (1999). Principles of social justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Mishra, R. (1984). Society and social policy: Theory and practice of welfare. London: Palgrave

Macmillan.Modood, T. (1988). Black, racial equality and Asian identity. New Community, 14(3), 397–404.Modood, T. & Berthoud, R. (Eds.). (1997). Ethnic minorities in Britain. London: Policy

Studies Institute.Mohan, B. (1992). Global development: Post-material values and social praxis. New York:

Praeger.Mohan, B. (1993). Eclipse of freedom. The world of oppression. New York: Praeger.

Mohan, B. (2001a). Deconstructing the diversity discourse: Toward a unifying analogue of

social justice. Journal of Comparative Social Welfare, 17(1), 45–54.Mohan, B. (2001b). Social work revisited. Bloomington, IN: Xlibris.Mohan, B. (2003). The practice of hope: Diversity, discontent and discourse. Bloomington,

IN: Xlibris.Morgaine, K. (2007). Domestic violence and human rights: Local challenges to a universal

framework. Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, 34(1), 109–129.Penketh, L. (2000). Tackling institutional racism: Anti-racist policies and social work education

and training. Oxford: Policy Press.Penketh, L., & Ali, Y. (1997). Racism and social welfare. In M. Lavalette & A. Pratt (Eds.),

Social policy. A conceptual and theoretical introduction (pp. 101–120). London: Sage.Plant, R. (1991). Modern political thought. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell.

Reisman, D. (1977). Richard Titmuss: Welfare and society. London: Heinemann.Rothstein, B., & Uslaner, E.M. (2005). All for all: Equality and social trust. London: London

School of Economics.Rousseau, J.J. (2004). Discourse on the origin of inequality. London: Dover Publications.Sartre, J. (1948). Existentialism and humanism. London: Eyre Methuen.

Sen, A. (2009). The idea of justice. London: Allen Lane.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f So

uth

Car

olin

a ]

at 1

2:08

05

Oct

ober

201

4

Sivanandan, A. (1983). Challenging racism: Strategies for the 80s. Race and Class, 25(2),347–368.

Tatchell, P. (2002). Some people are more equal than others. In P. Iganski (Ed.), The hatedebate (pp. 54–70). London: Profile Books.

Taylor-Gooby, P., & Dale, J. (1981). Social theory and social welfare. London: Hodder-Arnold.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f So

uth

Car

olin

a ]

at 1

2:08

05

Oct

ober

201

4

brij mohan's social policy analysis: a view from western europe

Documents