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European Army?

Some thoughts on military cooperation in

todays complicated world.

COMMUNITATE

VALEMUS

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Wake up call

6 months after Russia illegally violated the sovereignty and

territorial integrity of her neighbour Ukraine, we must agree on

long-term measures to strengthen our ability to respond quickly

to any threat, to reassure those allies who fear for their own

country’s security and to deter any Russian aggression.

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But …….

We can export stability now or we

will import instability in the future.

Frans Timmermans

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With military precision

Mathematical

plan able

clear C2

disconnected from politics

Clear responsibilities

• services

• nations

• agencies

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Biggest difference

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Complexity

Significant

Delay=Significant

Delay=WORKING DRAFT – V3

Neutral/OnPopulation

Ins. StrategicCommun/IO

& Affiliation w/Population

Gov'tWorkforce

Skill & Avail

CoalitionDev.Ops-

Infrastructure,Services,

Econ.Advisory

& Aid

ANSFAppropriateUse of Force

Relative WOMMessage

AmplificationGov’t vs Ins

CoalitionAvg COINExperience

& Skill

Gov'tProfessionalismPolicy Quality

& Fairness

CoalitionStrategic

Commun./IO

Private SectorWorkforce

Skill & Avail

Likelihood of

for Payment

Ties toNarcotics &

Other CriminalFunding

InsurgentCapacity,

Priorities &Effectiveness

Strength ofReligious

Ideology &Tribal

Structures

Gov'tIntegration ofLocal TribalStructures

Gov't TrainingMentoring,Vetting, and

Hiring

Overall Gov'tReach,

ExecutionCapacity &Investment

Breadth ofCoalition &

Support

ResourceLevels

(Mil. & Civ.Forces,

Aid Levels)

CoalitionAdjustmentof Approachto Fit Afghan

CoalitionKnowledge& Underst.

of SocialStructures

Coalition‘COIN

Support’Strategy &

Unity

Recognition/Engagement to

IntegrateTribal

Structures&Beliefs

ProvideHumanitarian

Relief

Infr, Services, Econ.Policy & Execution/Perceived Fairness

InfrastructureDev. Adequacy& Sustainment

Legit EconomicActivity,Trade &

Employment

CivilianServices(SWET,

Healthcare,Education)

Private SectorCapital Mgmt., Investment &

Spending

Expectationsfor Security,Services, &Employment

Perception ofInsurgentStrength &

Intent

WesternAffiliationBacklash Perception of

Coalition Intent& Commitment

RelativeMessage

Impact Gov’tvs Ins

Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions

Legit vs. IllegitRelative

EconomicOpportunity

PopulationBasic Needs

Service Levels& Employment

Fraction ofWorkforceAnd Agric.Legit vsIllegit

IllegitAgricProduction,

Trade &Employment

Narcotics& Criminal

ActivityLevels

InsurgentRecruiting,Retention,Manpower

& ISR

Counter- Narcotics/Crime Ops

Ins.Leadership,

Training, Skill& Experience

Ins. ProvisionOf Gov’t &Services

Ins.Offensives &

Presence(Clear & Hold)

Fear ofGov’ t/ANSF/

CoalitionRepercussions

Ins. Damages& Casualties

Gov't/ANSFStrategicCommun/

IO

PerceivedDamages &Use of Force

by Ins.

RelativeMessageQuality

Gov’ ’t vs Ins.Coalition/Homeland

Acceptance ofAfghan Methods

Gov'tSecurityPolicy

Quality &Investment

R.O.L. Policy,Execution &PerceivedFairnessANSF

FundingAdequacy

CoalitionDev. Ops-

ANSFAdvisory

& Aid

ANSFInstitutional &

ExecutionCapacity

ANSFTraining &Mentoring

ANSF Avg.ProfessionalismSkill, Discipline,

& Morale

ANSFManpower

Recruiting &Retention

ANSF UnitLeadership& TacticalCapacity

TotalSecurityForce

Capacity &Focus

ISR / OpenSource Ops

CoalitionDev. Ops-

Gov’tAdvisory

& Aid

ANSFCorruption &

TribalFavoritism

ANSFCapacity,

Priorities & Effectiveness

ANSF &CoalitionDamages/Casualties

PopulationActively

SupportingGov’t & SF

Sympathizingw/ Gov’t

the FencePopulation

Sympathizingw/ Insurgents

PopulationActively

SupportingInsurgency

Ethnic/TribalRivalry

CoalitionExecutionCapacity &Priorities

TerrainHarshness& Breadth

Duration ofOperation

US DomesticPerceived

Cost/Benefit& Support

CoalitionVisibility toPopulation

US Domestic/Int'l Strategic

Commun.& Diplomacy

US Gov'tSupport forOperation

CoalitionAppropriateBalance of

Effort &Force

Gov'tFunding

Adequacy

Central Gov'tInstitutional &

ExecutionCapacity

Gov't/Contractor

Corruption &Tribal Favoritism

TaxRevenues

OutsideSupport/

Enablementof Ins.

Policing &Security Ops

(Hold)

TargetedStrikes

CoordinationAmong Ins.

FactionsInsurgentTerrain

Advantage

PerceivedDamages/Use

of Force byGov’ t & Coalition

PerceivedSecurity

AverageConnectednessof Population

PotentialAttractiveness

of Gov’t vs.Insurgent Path

Visible GainsIn Security,Services &

Employment

Satisfactionw/ Gains in

Security, Services& Employment

PerceptionOf Gov’tStrength& Intent

Ability toReconcileReligiousIdeology,

TribalStructuresw/ Gov’t

Path

Ins. TargetedAttacks onProgress/Supportfor Gov’t

Criminal/TraffickingCapability &

Coercion

Legit AgricProduction

Ability toMove

People& GoodsRapidly

Legit OtherProduction& ServicesNon-Agric

Transparencyof Gov’t

Processes &Investments

MediaSensationalism

Bias

Cultural Erosion/Displacement

Durationof

Operation

Sweep Ops(Clear)

RelativePopularSupport/ /ToleranceGov’t vs

Insurgents

Funding &Material

Support to Insurgents

Territory NotUnder Gov’t

Control (Afghan & Pakistan)

Havens / Ability to Operate

Crime/Violence /Ins. Support

POPULARSUPPORT

INSURGENTS

INFRASTRUCTURE,SERVICES &ECONOMY

NARCOTICS

POPULATIONCONDITIONS& BELIEFS

COALITIONDOMESTICSUPPORT

ANSFTACTICAL

TRIBALGOVERNANCE

OVERALLGOVERNMENTCAPACITY

ANSFINSTITUTIONAL

COALITIONCAPACITY &PRIORITIES

OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENTFACTIONS

CENTRAL GOV’T

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Fear as a weapon

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Information and disinformation

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Understanding ?

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Culture as the excuse

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Corruption & Contracting

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Corruption !

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Understand complex environment

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Hybrid warfare ≠ Cold War

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It is the economy stupid !

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Information and disinformation

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Understanding ?

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Messaging !

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New paradigm: interdepedency

Chaotic

Hard (impossible) to plan

Unclear C2 (caveats)

Immediate political impact

Permanent need to explain

Always dependent on others

• joint

• multinational

• interagency

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Multinational

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“Wenn der nationale Einsatz die Ausnahme und das Wirken im multinationalen Verbund die Regel ist, müssen unsere Curricula das in der Ausbildung berücksichtigen und die internationalen Verfahren im Führungsprozess zu Grunde legen.

Das gilt im Übrigen auch für alle Übungen…“

General Volker Wieker, Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr

Oktober 2012, Bundeswehrtagung Strausberg

Train as you fight

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Smart(er) defence

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Smart ?

Soldiers will always make it work, but

it could be so much easier.

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Less stupid defence

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increaseddevelopment costs

moreexpensive spare parts

over spending

nations opt out

Teufelskreis

lower budgets

reduced numbers

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Smart buyer ?

Alone numbers are to low.

(limited bargaining position)

„Lead nation“ Construct

• real experience

• sufficient numbers

Consider national (industry)

interests fairly

Industry standards !

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Cyber ?

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Smart Defence

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Smart Defence

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Deutschland und Niederlande

„Nec temere, nec timide“ (zu deutsch:

„Weder unbesonnen noch furchtsam“).

Deeper Integration

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Urgent action

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I would like to underline that

security comes at a price. And our

need for security justifies paying

that price. At some point, we may

be forced to act militarily in order

to remain secure on the European

continent.

Underlines the new security challenges

posed by the so-called 4th generation’s

warfare, a hybrid war, which is manifested

as a combination of a use of irregular and

conventional military methods as well as

elements from cyber, economic and

information warfare, and political pressure;

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European army ?

US and NATO EU and NATO

Real cooperation

Real capabilities

Real alternative

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Credible deterrence ?

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Credible deterrence ?

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Dependency on US far to big

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Deterrence through training?

Plus de sœur moins de sang.

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Messaging !

The Alliance’s 28 leaders agreed at their

Wales Summit on Friday (5 September 2014)

to reverse the trend of declining defence

budgets and raise them over the coming

decade…

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So what ?

Paradigm shift

• accept dependencies

• accept complexity

Deterrence through training

Messaging is key

Soldiers should stick to their own trade

• dominate the security domain

but

• understand the context

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Only together we are strong.

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Questions ?