beyond minsk ii
DESCRIPTION
Prospects for a New Russian Offensive Dr. Phillip A. KarberTRANSCRIPT
Beyond Minsk II!Prospects)for)a)New)Russian)Offensive)
Dr.)Phillip)A.)Karber)
25)May)2015)
The Potomac Foundation
Major)Points)
• The!conflict!between!Russia!&!Ukraine!is!characterized!by!alterna:ng!
periods!of!intense!conflict!&!nego:ated!ceasefires -- after Russian "Winter Offensive" Ukrainian forces needed time for reconstitution & refit;!
• Current!Minsk!II!ceasefire!between!Ukraine!&!RussianDproxy!forces!is!
failing!due!to!inadequate!monitoring!&!no!enforcement!mechanism;!
• Minsk II is UNSTABLE -- requirement for Ukraine to withdraw artilleryout of range,!coupled!with!lack!of!modern!An:Dtank!Weapons,!leaves!
frontD line!infantry!vulnerable!to!armored!overrun!&!invites!preemptive aKack;!
• Current!Russian!military!buildup!of!equipment!&!new!Corps/Brigade!
structure!in!the!Donbas!and!massing!of!forces!on!border!bodes!ill;!
• Russia!has!a!number!of!“Military!Op:ons”!and!may!employ!one!soon;!whichever!op:on!Russia!employs,!Ukraine!is!likely!to!be!surprised!&!
vulnerable!due!to!lack!of!strategic!warning!&!overhead!surveillance;!
• Ironically,!the!most!successful!Western!sanc:on!has!been!in!embargoing!a!
friendly!country!from!acquiring!replacement!weaponry!to!defend!itself.!
0!
5!
10!
15!
20!
25!
30!
35!
40!
45!
50!
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31!
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43!
49!
55!
61!
67!
73!
79!
85!
91!
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103!
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265!
AUG$ SEP$ OCT$ NOV! DEC! JAN! FEB! MAR! APR! MAY!
Russian)Intervention)&)Ukraine)CeaseGires!Daily!Combat:!15!Aug.!2014!to!12!May!2015!
Russian!Invasion!
Minsk I!Ceasefire!
Renewed!Vows!
Winter!Offensive!
Minsk II!Ceasefire!
OSCE!Organized!
Russian!Buildup!
Russian!Buildup!
Russian!Buildup!
Combat!Incidents!per!Day!
Russian!Reorganization!
Ukraine*Request*for*Potomac*Assessment*Joint+invite+from+NaBonal+Security+Advisor+&+Parliamentary+Leader+
Andriy+Volodymyrovych+Parubiy+Commandant+of+Maidan+Protest+&++
Secretary+of+NaBonal+Defense+&+Security+Council+
Why$So$Many$Visits$to$the$Front?$Recent&Observa-ons&
• &Understand&how&Russian&theory&of&“New&Genera-on&Warfare”&is&being& implemented&in&prac-ce&–&including&both&their&Strengths&&&Weaknesses:&
EE&Russian&have&weird&way&of&structuring&&&manning&composite&BaGalion&Tac-cal&Groups&(BTG)&&&
ongoing&organiza-on&of&Donbas&Front&with&introduc-on&of&new&Corps&Commands.&
• &Evaluate&Ukrainian&military&needs&rela-ve&to&requests&for&assistance:&
EE&NO&CHANGE&–&desperately&need:- Tandem warhead ATGM (Javelin/TOW&II) to stop Russian reactive armored Tanks;- Only&20%&of&needed&Harris&Digital&Com;&
- No&
longErange&counterEbaGery&radar&(ANTPQE36/37);&
- No&highEal-tude&UAV&for&strategic/opera-onal&
warning;&
- Only&25%&of&needed&upEarmored&HUMVEE&for&rapid&reac-on&Covering&Force.&
• &Observe&effec-veness&of&Ceasefire:&
EE&Minsk&II&is&a&disaster&–&OSCE&can’t&do&the&job,&NO&provision&for&ENFORCEMENT&of&growing&
viola-ons,&and&UKE&Army&hurt&by&50km&withdrawal&of&Ar-llery&–&an&invita-on&to&invasion.&
• &Assess¤t&&&future&combat&capability&of&the&Ukrainian&Army:&
EEThey&have&at&most&30&days&of&defense&against&highEintensity&offensive;&compromised&by&
irreplaceable&losses&(Tanks&and&Arlllery,&shortage&of&ammo,&little&Air&Force,&and&low&reliability&of&old& stocks)&as&well&as&impact&of&Minsk&II.&Excellent&frontEline&Brigade&Commanders,&troop&morale&now recovered&aker&Debal’tseve&but&now&hurting&due&to&BLEEDING CONFLICT with NO&WESERN&HELP.&
• &With&Administra-on&Ban&on&US&Military&visits&to&Front:&
EE&US&Military&is&seriously&disadvantaged&in&understanding&what&is&going&on&Ukraine&side&&&missing&
important&details&of&Russian&implementa-on&of&‘New&Genera-on&Warfare.”&&
Russian'Deployment'vs.'Ukraine'Spring$2014$Prepara1on$for$Invasion(
• (During(the(Cold(War(the(glacis(plate(protec;ng(the(Western(fron;er(of(the(Soviet(Union(was(concentrated(in(Ukraine(and(Belarus.(
• (Aqer(the(break(up(of(the(Soviet(Union(the(Russian(Army(found(itself(malOdeployed(for(modern(con;ngencies(and(with(too(few(forces(covering(to(much(territory(a(factor(that(forced(them(to(move(units(great(distances(in(an;cipa;on(of(a(Ukrainian(con;ngency;(and(bringing(forces(as(far(away(as(the(Bal;c(and(Urals.(
• (Thus(in(the(spring(of(2014,(the(Russian(Army(deployed(elements(from(nearly(20(different(brigades(and(five(divisions(–(represen;ng(76(baValions(in(the(first(echelon(and(another(65(leq(in(home(bases.(
• (Learning(a(lesson(from(the(Chechen(War,(they(thought(beVer(of(commivng(conscript(infantry,(many(of(which(were(rota;ng(new(recruits(and(discharging(veterans,(into(high(intensity(combat.((
• (Once(the(Ukrainian(Army(mobilized,(the(Russians(did(not(have(enough(assets(naw(their(way(through(a(prepared(defense,(and(In(late(May(Pu;n(announced(a(significant(pull(back(of(Russian(troops(from(the(Ukrainian(border,(albeit(used(that(opportunity(to(both(give(the(an;OKiev(proxy(forces(an(upgrade(in(equipment(as(well(as(send(main(elements(of(the(spring(emergency(deployment(back(to(their(bases(to(collect(much(bring(larger(forces(to(bear,(if(needed.(
106(Abn(DIV(
10(SF(
16(SF(
98(Abn(DIV(
103(Air(Asl(
19(MRB(
50(MRB(
6(MRB(
51(Mech(95(Air(Mob(
17(Arm(
1(Arm(
30(Mech( 72(Mech(
336(NIB(
810(NIB(
Military$Posture$end$JAN$2014$
79(Air(Mob(
(3(SF(
7(Abn(DIV(
(22(SF(
39(MRB(
2(DIV(
22(MRB(
45(SF(216(SF(
2(SF(
31(Aslt(
76(Abn(DIV(
25(MRB(
56(Aslt(
38(Air(Asl(
36(NIB(
80(Abn(25(Abn(
120(MRB(11(MRB(
13(MRB(
15(MRB(
23(MRB(
21(MRB(
20(MRB(
205(MRB(
19(MRB(
17(MRB(
18(MRB(
100(Rec(
8(MRB(
136(MRB(
28(MRB(
13(MRB(
6(Tk(
9(MRB(
27(MRB(
TN(Grp(
77(NIB(33(Rec(
34(MRB(
218(Rec(
10(MRB(
4(Tk(DIV((5(MRB(
79(MRB(
7(MRB(
7(Tk(
693(MRB(
138(MRB(61(NIB(
28(Mech(
Russian$
Belarus$
Ukraine$
No$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$Yes$
MANEUVER$BRIGADES$READY$FOR$COMBAT$
24(Mech(
128(Mech(
92(Mech(
93(Mech(
169(Mech(
Infantry$
Marine$
Mechanized$
Mountain$
Armored$
Air$Assault$
Airborne$
Spetsnaz$
BRIGADE$TYPES$
52(Mech(
13(MRB(
15(MRB(
23(MRB(
21(MRB(
205(MRB(
19(MRB(
17(MRB(
100(Rec(
8(MRB(
136(MRB(
28(MRB(
13(MRB(
10(SF(
16(SF(
6(Tk(
98(Abn(DIV(
9(MRB(
27(MRB(
TN(Grp(
336(NIB(
810(NIB(77(NIB(33(Rec(
7(Abn(DIV(
(22(SF(
218(Rec(
10(MRB(
39(MRB(
4(Tk(DIV(
2(DIV(
22(MRB(
45(SF(
(5(MRB(
216(SF(
79(MRB(
7(MRB(
2(SF(
31(Aslt(
76(Abn(DIV(
25(MRB(
7(Tk(
693(MRB(
(3(SF(
56(Aslt(
106(Abn(
106(Abn(
34(MRB(
20(MRB(
18(MRB(
138(MRB(61(NIB(
19(MRB(
50(MRB(
120(MRB(11(MRB(
6(MRB(
38(Air(Asl(
103(Air(Asl(
51(Mech(
24(Mech(
92(Mech(
93(Mech(
17(Arm(
1(Arm(
30(Mech(
72(Mech(
79(Air(Mob(
80(Abn(25(Abn(
169(Mech(
95(Air(Mob(
28(Mech(
Russian$
Belarus$
Ukraine$
No$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$Yes$
Maneuver$Brigades$Ready$for$Combat$
106(Abn(
128(Mech(
Military$Posture$end$FEB$2014$
Infantry$
Marine$
Mechanized$
Mountain$
Armored$
Air$Assault$
Airborne$
Spetsnaz$
BRIGADE$TYPES$
52(Mech(
21(MRB(
205(MRB(
19(MRB(
17(MRB(
100(Rec(
8(MRB(
136(MRB(
28(MRB(
18(MRB(
13(MRB(
10(SF(
TN(Grp(
336(NIB(
77(NIB(33(Rec(
7(Abn(DIV(
(22(SF(
218(Rec(
39(MRB(
4(Tk(DIV(
2(DIV(
22(MRB(
(5(MRB(
216(SF(
79(MRB(
7(MRB(
31(Aslt(
76(Abn(DIV(
25(MRB(
7(Tk(
693(MRB(
(3(SF(
56(Aslt(
106(Abn(
20(MRB(
2(SF(
27(MRB(
16(SF(
23(MRB(
15(MRB(
98(Abn(DIV(
45(SF(
10(MRB(
13(MRB(
138(MRB(61(NIB(
6(Tk(106(Abn(
(Mili;a(
51(Mech(
24(Mech(
128(Mech(
92(Mech(
1(Arm(
79(Air(Mob(
25(Abn(
169(Mech(
72(Mech(
93(Mech(
95(Air(Mob(
17(Arm(
80(Abn(
30(Mech(
19(MRB(
50(MRB(
120(MRB(11(MRB(
6(MRB(
38(Air(Asl(
103(Air(Asl(
810(NIB(
Russian$
Belarus$
Ukraine$
No$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$Yes$
Maneuver$Brigades$Ready$for$Combat$
Par1al$RUS$Units$+$link$to$Parent$
34(MRB(
106(Abn(
Military$Posture$end$MAR$2014$
Infantry$
Marine$
Mechanized$
Mountain$
Armored$
Air$Assault$
Airborne$
Spetsnaz$
BRIGADE$TYPES$
BATTALION$GROUPINGS$
Mechanized$
Armored$
Spetsnaz$
28(Mech(
9(MRB(
52(Mech(
21(MRB(
205(MRB(
19(MRB(
17(MRB(
100(Rec(
8(MRB(
136(MRB(
28(MRB(
18(MRB(
13(MRB(
10(SF(
TN(Grp(
336(NIB(
77(NIB(33(Rec(
7(Abn(DIV(
(22(SF(
218(Rec(
39(MRB(
4(Tk(DIV(
2(DIV(
22(MRB(
(5(MRB(
216(SF(
79(MRB(
7(MRB(
31(Aslt(
76(Abn(DIV(
25(MRB(
7(Tk(
693(MRB(
(3(SF(
56(Aslt(
106(Abn(
20(MRB(
2(SF(
27(MRB(
16(SF(
23(MRB(
15(MRB(
98(Abn(DIV(
45(SF(
10(MRB(
13(MRB(
138(MRB(61(NIB(
6(Tk(106(Abn(
(Mili;a(
51(Mech(
128(Mech(
92(Mech(
1(Arm(
79(Air(Mob(
25(Abn(
72(Mech(
93(Mech(
95(Air(Mob(
80(Abn(
30(Mech(
19(MRB(
50(MRB(
120(MRB(11(MRB(
6(MRB(
38(Air(Asl(
103(Air(Asl(
810(NIB(
Russian$
Belarus$
Ukraine$
No$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$Yes$
Maneuver$Brigades$Ready$for$Combat$
34(MRB(
106(Abn(
Military$Posture$end$APR$2014$
Infantry$
Marine$
Mechanized$
Mountain$
Armored$
Air$Assault$
Airborne$
Spetsnaz$
BRIGADE$TYPES$
BATTALION$GROUPINGS$
Mechanized$
Armored$
Spetsnaz$
17(Arm(
Separa1st$Area$
169(Mech(
24(Mech(
169(Mech(
28(Mech(
9(MRB(
52(Mech(
Russian'Mobilization'&'Deployment'vs.'Ukraine'
Feb.%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Mar.%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Apr.%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%May%
Manpower%for%Ukraine%Con4ngency%200,000%
150,000%
100,000%
50,000%
1st#Echelon#
2nd#Echelon#
Western#Strategic#Direc6on#Ready#Forces#
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%1st%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%2nd%%%%Tank %15 %32%%Mech %24 %68%%Airborne %26 %10%%Spetnaz %9 %13%
BaIalion%Deployment%in%Echelon%
NOTE#–#weakness#in#Infantry#with#2#Divisions#
#Brigades#
leaving#half#their#BaTalions#at#home#bases.#
Implications'of'Russian'June'Troop'Withdrawal'
Need%to%Understand%their%Original%Deployment:%
QQ%LeS%65%BaIalions%in%bases:%Q Not%ready;%Q Conscripts%&%troop%rota4on;%Q Difficult%to%train%on%border%Q Logis4cs%expensive%on%border.%
QQ%Forward%Units%(76%Bn)%problems:%Q Sanita4on;%Q Boredom;%Q Discipline%(drinking).%
QQ%Rebasing#actually#increases#Capability#
%%
Shakhty$Rail(Transfer(Assembly(Area(
Novocherkassk$Training(Area(
Kamensk'Shakh6nsky$Rail(Transfer(Assembly(Area(
Rostov$on$Don$Rail(Transfer(Assembly(Area(
Kuzminka$Training(Area(
Russian'Supply'to'Proxy'Forces'MayOJune(2014(
Neklinovskiy$Training(Area(
Donetsk(
Debal’tseve$
Kramatorsk$
Separa2st'Controlled'Area'
Slovansk$
Luhansk(
Horlivka$
May2June$Crea1on$of$Supply$$$$&$Training$Depots$
Routes$of$Supply(
Russian$Tank$column$crossing$border$into$Ukraine$14$June$
Russian$Tank$in$Donetsk'12$June$ Destroyed$TO64(in$Snezhnoye$13$June$
Russian)CombinedDarms)BaMalion)moving)thru)Luhansk)(7)July)2014))
DD40)152mm)Gun)
BMPD3)Infantry)Figh&ng)Vehicle)
TD64)Tanks)
BMD21)122mm)“Grad”)MRLS)
Putin'Mobilization'Order$UKAZ([EXECUTIVE(ORDER](
OF(THE(PRESIDENT(OF(THE(RUSSIAN(FEDERATION(
Appealing$for$[male]$ci1zens$of$the$Russian$Federa1on$$in$the$[military]$reserves,$for$military$training$in$2014$
(In(conjunc;on(with(federa;on(laws(from(31(May(1996(No.(61OFZ(
“On(Defense”(and(from(28(March(1998(No.(53OFZ(“On(Military(
Responsibility(and(Military(Service,”(it(is(decreed:(
(1.(An(appeal(in(2014(that([male](ci;zens(of(the(Russian(
Federa;on(in(the(reserves(report(for(military(du;es(for(up(to(two(months(
in(the(Armed(Forces(of(the(Russian(Federa;on,(in(the(troops(of(the(
Ministry(of(Internal(Affairs(of(the(Russian(Federa;on,(in(the(offices(of(state(
protec;on,(and(in(the(FSB.(
$2.$Confiden1al.$[literally'“for'official'use”]$$3.$Confiden1al.$[literally'“for'official'use”]$(4.(The(terms(of(military(spending([i.e.$line'item$military$spending$
power](will(be(decided(by(the(execu;ve(authori;es(of(the(Russian(Federa;on,(with(the(excep;on(of(check(fees([the$base$payments$made$to$ci6zens$in$the$reserves],(which(will(be(determined(by(the(Ministry(of(
Defense(of(the(Russian(Federa;on.(
(5.(The(Government(of(the(Russian(Federa;on(and(the(execu;ve(
organs(of(the(Russian(Federa;on(will(provide(for(the(execu;on(of(ac;vi;es(
related(to(the(calling(of(Russian(ci;zens(in(the(reserves(to(undergo(military(
training(and(carry(out(these(du;es.(
(6.(This(execu;ve(order(will(enter(force(on(the(day(of(its(official(
publica;on.(
President(of(the(Russian(Federa;on,(V.(Pu;n(
Moscow,(Kremlin(
27(June(2014(
[Ukaz](No.(471(
Shakhty$Rail(Transfer(Assembly(Area(
Novocherkassk$Training(Area(
Mariupol’$
Volnovakha$
Ukrainian'“Plan'B”'July(OO(Aug.(2014(
Kamensk'Shakh6nsky$Rail(Transfer(Assembly(Area(
Stanytsia$Luhanska$
Luhansk(
Rostov$on$Don$Rail(Transfer(Assembly(Area(
Separa2st'Controlled'Area'
Kuzminka$Training(Area(
UKE$July2Aug.$$$“Plan$B”$Thrusts$RUS$New$Routes$$$to$Staging$Areas$
Ukrainian$Thrusts(
Neklinovskiy$Training(Area(
(28(
(30(
(79((72(
(93(
128((25(
(92( (80(
(24(
(51(
(17(
(95(
Donetsk(
Debal’tseve$
Shakhty$Rail(Transfer(Assembly(Area(
Novocherkassk$Training(Area(
Rostov$on$Don$Rail(Transfer(Assembly(Area(
Donetsk(
Debal’tseve$
Mariupol’$
Volnovakha$
Russian'Fire'Strikes'Prelude'to'Invasion'
JulyOAug.(2014(
Kamensk'Shakh6nsky$Rail(Transfer(Assembly(Area(
Stanytsia$Luhanska$
Luhansk(
Russia$
Ukraine$
Amvrosiivka((JUL(11)(
Krasnopar6zansk((JUL(10,(21O22)(
Dolzhanskyi$(JUL(9,(12,(22,(26,(
AUG(1)(
RUSSIAN$ACTIVITY$(1$July231$Aug)$$Ar1llery/MRLS$strikes$Reported$Russian$$$$$$$$$$$firing$posi1ons $$$$$JUL$$$$$$AUG$Russian$Staging$Bases$Russian$over2flight$paths$$$$$$$$$by$Drones$&$Helios$
Malaysian$Flt$17$Shot2down$(JUL(17)$$
Kolesnykivka$(JUL(24)(
Solntsevo((JUL(21O22)(
Kozhevnya$(JUL(26)(
Chervonyi$(JUL(26.(AUG(5)(
Dyakove$(JUL(23O24,(AUG(1,(4O5)(
Provallya$(JUL(16)(
Kolesnykivka$(AUG(27)(
RUS(UAV(
Vasylivka((JUL(17)(
Novazovsk$(JUL(4O5,(12,(22,(26,(28,(AUG(22O24,(27O28)(
Markyne((AUG(22)(
Tel’manove(
(AUG(20)(
SEA(ATTACK(
Berezove((JUL(22O24)(
Stepne((AUG(15)(
Kutenykove((AUG(15)(
Voikovs’kyi((JUL(17)(
Vasylivka((AUG(4)(
Petropavlivka((AUG(5)(
Manych$((JUL(19)(
Oleksiivs’ke$((AUG(18)(
Marynivka$((JUL(21,(25O26)(
Hryhorivak$((JUL(23)(
Stepanivak$(AUG(15)( Biryukove$
(JUL(16)(
Chervonopartyzans’k$(JUL(22)(
Izvaryne$$(JUL(9,(11,(16,(
AUG(1)(
Ivanivak$(AUG(10)(
Lisne$(AUG(6)(
Ivanivka$(AUG(10)(Miusynsk$
(AUG(9)(Illinka$
(JUL(23O24)(
Krasnyi$Yar$(AUG(6)(
Panchenkove$(JUL(22)(
Yuhanivka$(JUL(25,(27,(AUG(22,(27)(
Krasna$Talivka$(JUL(15)(
Valuyskoye$(JUL(15)(
Sabivka$(AUG(6)(
Zelenopillya$(JUL(11)(
Separa2st'Controlled'Area'
Neklinovskiy$Training(Area(
Kuzminka$Training(Area(
Donetsk'
Kramatorsk$
Luhansk'Ukraine#
Artemivs’k$
Kryms’ke$
Volnovakha$
Debal’tseve$
Mariupol’$
Stanytsia$Luhanska$
Russia#
Proxy#Controlled#Donbas#
Russian)Buildup,)Invasion)&)Minsk)I)
August8October$2014$
MAY8JUNE:!!!Russia!began!implemen:ng!“Military!
Op:ons”!in!the!Donbas!first!by!training!&!
arming!proxy!troops.!
JULY8AUG:!!!Russia!conducts!crossDborder!“fire!strikes”!
&!surprise!invasion!with!with!BaKalion!
Tac:cal!Groups!in!north!&!south;!
!Ukrainians!defeated!at!Illovaisk!DD!can’t!stop!
Russian!armor!due!to!!lack!of!modern!An:D
tank!Guided!Missiles!–!request!US!Javelin.!
SEP8OCT:$$
!Europe!brokered!Ceasefire!&!OSCE!
introduced!to!“monitor!it;”!
!Russian!proxies!launch!aKacks!to!take!
Mariupol!port!&!gateway!to!Crimea.!
Debal’tseve$
Mariupol’$
Volnovakha$
Russian'Invasion'Main'Thrusts'
24(Aug(to(5(Sept.(2014(Stanytsia$Luhanska$
Luhansk(
Donetsk(
Shakhty$Rail(Transfer(Assembly(Area(
Novocherkassk$Training(Area(
Kamensk'Shakh6nsky$Rail(Transfer(Assembly(Area(
Rostov$on$Don$Rail(Transfer(Assembly(Area(
Kuzminka$Training(Area(
Neklinovskiy$Training(Area(
RUS$Main$Thrusts$
UKE$Overrun$Bdes.$
$Russian$Invasion$
Es;mates(based(on(Open(Source(repor;ng(&(Personal(Observa;on(
(28(
(30(
(93(
128(
(92(
(80(
(55(
(17(
(95(
Separa2st'Controlled'Area'
(51(
(79(
(72(
(24(
(25(
Light&Infantry&Dilemma!On!an!Open!Front!in!the!Absence!of!LongHRange!ATGM!
the!Challenge!of!Defending!Sta3c!Strong!Points!
• $UAV$real9:me$Target$Acquisi:ion$$• $Massive$Ar:llery/MLRS$Suppression$• $Nigh$:me$Infantry$Infiltra:on$• $Armored$Overrun$• $OuMlanked$&$Surrounded $$
Luhansk((Airport(Siege(((Sep(’14)(
(photos&confirmed&(Ba8le(of(Pocket((Sep(’14)(
(reports&.&unconfirmed(Debal’tseve(
(Ba8le(of(Pocket((Feb(’15)((report&.&unconfirmed(
Donetsk((Airport(Siege((jan(‘15)(
(reports&confirmed&((Airport(Siege((Mar(‘15)(
(reports&confirmed((Breakout(Ba8le((Mar(‘15)(
(reports&confirmed(Mariupol(
(Novoazvs’k(&(Sjedove(( ( ( (((((Sep(’14)(
(reports&confimed&(Novoazvs’k((Feb‘15)(
(report&unconfirmed((Novoazvs’k((Mar(‘15)(
(reports&confirmed(Ternove(
(Gunnery(Range((Mar(‘15)((report&unconfirmed&
(
TM90(SighPngs(in(Ukraine(
September&‘14&Jan/Feb&‘15&March&‘15&Unconfirmed&Confirmed&
Fall)Russian)Buildup)&)Problematic)CeaseGire)
November$–$December$2014)
NOV8DEC:$$!OSCE!surveillance!UAV’s!downed!&!it!fails!
to!monitor!either!incoming!weaponry!or!
major!combat!at!Donetsk!airport;!
!Arrival!of!Large!“humanitarian!convoys”!
associated!with!spikes!in!aKacks;!
!Russia!introduces!over!800!items!of!heavy!
military!equipment,!including!some!unique!
to!their!forces.!
DEC:$$!USDRussian!brokered!reDcommitment!to!
ceasefire;!&!exchange!of!Prisoners!of!War;!
!Ceasefire!holds!through!holidays!but!with!
escala:ng!aKacks.!
Russian'Supply'Lines'to'Proxy'Forces'SeptODec.(2014(
Shakhty$Rail(Transfer(Assembly(Area(
Novocherkassk$Training(Area(
Kamensk'Shakh6nsky$Rail(Transfer(Assembly(Area(
Rostov$on$Don$Rail(Transfer(Assembly(Area(
Kuzminka$Training(Area(
Neklinovskiy$Training(Area(
Russian&Humanitarian&Convoys&=&total&of&13&A&Direct&Correlation&between&Arrival&&&Increased&Violence&
“Terrorists$AZacks’$Escalate$a]er$Russian$‘Humanitarian$Convoy’$Invades$Ukraine,”$Ukraine$MoD,$(9$Jan.$2015)$at$<$hZps://www.facebook.com/uacrisis/photos/a.604933032908789.1073741828.604241389644620/760413540694070/$>$
Russian&Rail&Reinforcement&of&Armor&
2H3!Trains!military!trains!reported!headed!toward!Donbas!per!day!
Donetsk!
Debal’tseve-
Mariupol’-
Volnovakha-
Russian'Proxy'Resupply'during'Cease3ire'Sept%Dec.)2014! Stanytsia-Luhanska-
Luhansk!
Separa&st)Controlled)Area)
JulyTAug.'SepTDec.'Humanitarian'''Convoys'
Routes'of'Supply!
Shakhty-Rail!Transfer!Assembly!Area!
Novocherkassk-Training!Area!
Kamensk<Shakh=nsky-Rail!Transfer!Assembly!Area!
Rostov-on-Don-Rail!Transfer!Assembly!Area!
Kuzminka-Training!Area!
Neklinovskiy-Training!Area!
Russian'&'Proxy'Force'Levels'Deployed'against'Ukraine'(as$reinforced$thru$21$January$2015)$
Within Donbas In Russia TOTAL
Proxy Russian UKE Border Crimea Battalion Tactical Group (BTG) 10 16 24 2 52
Troops 31,430 12,000 42,920 24,500 107,250
Tanks 340 340 260 30 970
IFV/APC 329 720 1256 266 2571
Artillery 372 173 422 100 1067
MLRS 472 92 113 46 723
Flame Veh 4 4 8
Cmbt Aircraft 150 80 230
Attack Helio 78 48 126
Warships 30 30
Subs 2 2
Winter$Offensive$&$Minsk$II)January$–$February$2015$
JAN:$$!Proxy!forces!recons:tuted!and!rearmed;!
!Ajer!24!hour!standDdown,!RussiaDProxy!
forces!launch!major!offensive!on!six!major!
axes;!
!Ukraine!“cyborg”!defense!of!Donetsk!
airport!fails!ajer!240!day!siege;!
!Russia!brings!in!addi:onal!BaKalion!
Tac:cal!Groups!along!with!HighDcommand!
to!oversee!&!coordinate!opera:ons.!
FEB:$$!Debal’tseve!under!siege!&!heavy!aKack;!
!French!&!German!leaders!nego:ate!
Minsk!II!ceasefire!with!Pu:n;!
!Russia!exploits!“ceasefire”!talks!while!
their!TD90!tanks!used!to!seize!Debal’tseve.!
Volnovakha$
'95'
Russia#
Artemivs’k$
'128'
'93'
'79'
'28'
'30'
'72'
Shakhty$Rail'Transfer'
Assembly'Area'
Novocherkassk$Training'Area'
Rostov$on$Don$Rail'Transfer'Assembly'Area'
Kuzminka$Training'Area'
Neklinovskiy$Training'Area'
Kamensk;Shakh9nsky$Rail'Transfer'Assembly'Area'
Winter'Offensive'Week'1'
216'Major'ASacks'
'24''80'
'25'
Kramatorsk$
Luhansk'
Proxy#Controlled#Donbas#
Donetsk'
Mariupol’$
Kryms’ke$
Stanytsia$Luhanska$
Debal’tseve$
Ukraine#
Photo#taken#from#highway#Checkpoint#video_cam#<$hLps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AzbU090TTFM$>$
Volnovakha#
Ukraine’s#lack#of#Long_range#Counter_baJery#radar#encourages#Russian#“fire#strikes”#
MLRS'“:ire'strike'on'Volnovakha'kills'Civilians'Impact#craters#of#incoming#MLRS#“fire#strike”#(13#Jan.#2015)#
''
Donetsk)Airport)%%)from)Newest)to)Complete)Destruction)
$400'million'investment'aZer'4'months'of'con4nuous'RussianTProxy'Assault'
Ukraine’s!Price!of!Unenforced!Ceasefire!
MAY'
DEC.'
Donetsk'
Kramatorsk(
Luhansk'
Proxy(Controlled(Donbas(
Volnovakha(
'95'
Russia(
Artemivs’k(
Kryms’ke(
'128'
'93'
'79'
'72'
Shakhty(Rail'Transfer'
Assembly'Area'
Novocherkassk(Training'Area'
Rostov(on(Don(Rail'Transfer'Assembly'Area'
Kuzminka(Training'Area'
Neklinovskiy(Training'Area'
KamenskCShakhDnsky(Rail'Transfer'Assembly'Area'
'25'
Donbas&SitRep&3RD'WEEK'
'254'Major'Abacks'
Debal’tseve(
'24''80'
Mariupol’(
'28'
Stanytsia(Luhanska(
'30'
Ukraine(
Lessons(of(“Cease7ire”(• Minsk-I-Protocol-(Sep.%Jan.)-Failed-–-Repeatedly!-• Cause-of-Minsk-Failure?-
– Lack-of-Successful-Monitoring-by-OSCE-• Control-of-Border-Impotent-• 350-People-too-FEW-need-3,500-• Observe-but-lack-All-Source-Intel-–-UAV-shot-down-• Russian-presence-–-disrupt-consensus,-spies-• Lag-Jme-in-processing-–-too-slow-for-Defender-to-rely-on-
– Lack-of-IncenJve-for-Russian/Proxy-Observance-– SancJons-are-NOT-a-useful-enforcement-instrument-
• Minsk-II-will-Fail-unless-ENFORCEMENT-added-• Ukraine-is-the-only-country-that-can-ENFORCE-Ceasefire-
– UAV,-ATGM,-Counter%Btry-Radar,-Covering-Force,-&-Secure-C3-– IF-West-wants-successful-Ceasefire-must-supply-those-ASSETS-
Minsk)II)“limited(&(denied(access”(Zones!
Contact!Line!!
!(487km)!
Ar:llery!Withdrawal!Zone!
OSCE!Monitoring!Hubs!
OSCE!SelfDrestricted!Access!
DPR/LPR!“No!access”!to!OSCE!
DPR/LPR!25%!access!to!OSCE!
DPR/LPR!50%!access!to!OSCE!
Ukraine!“No!access”!to!OSCE!
RestricQons$on$OSCE$Monitoring$&$requirement$to$withdraw$ArQllery$gives$aggressor$opportunity$&$incenQve$for$large8scale$deep$offensive.!
Russian'Battalion'Tactical'Group'(BTG)!11!April!2015!at!Bezimenne!(47.112382!!37.936069)!!22km!east!of!Mariupol,!8km!from!separaBon!line!
ASSETS:!16!x!BTRI80,!3!x!TI64B,!4!x!TI72B,!31!x!Trucks,!1!x!1RL232!“Leopard”!ArBllery!Radar !!
APC$&$Truck$Park$
T,64B$&$T,72B$Tank$Park$
Taken$by$Dnepro,1$Reg.$Surveillance$Drone$
Russian'Battalion'Tactical'Group'(BTG)'T,64B$&$T,72B$Tank$Park$&$1RL232$Counter,BaDery$Surveillance$Radar!
T,64B$
T,72B$
Bezimenne,$April$2015$$
What)comes)next?)MAR:$$!Minsk!II!gives!both!sides!opportunity!to!
regroup!&!recons:tute!exhausted!forces;!
!Minsk!II!requires!both!sides!to!withdraw!
heavy!ar:llery!50km!behind!the!lines!DD!!
without!modern!An:Dtank!weapons,!this!
leaves!the!defender!to!sudden!aKack;!
!OSCE!neither!has!the!assets!nor!access!to!
effec:vely!monitor!inflow!of!equipment!or!
insure!withdrawal!of!heavy!weapons.!
APR:$$!Russians!conduc:ng!a!major!buildup!of!
units!on!the!Ukrainian!border;!
!Russian!&!proxy!forces!in!the!Donbas!
reorganizing!for!offensive!opera:ons!with!
addi:on!of!new!Corps/Brigades!commands.!
!Western!leaders!&!observers!warning!of!
poten:al!for!renewed!deeper!offensive.!
Ukrainian$Popula1on$%$Ethnic$Russian$
4%$
24%$
55%$
8%$Rump$Ukraine$
Given$to$West$as$“Compromise”$
Russian$Incorpora1on$&$Occupa1on$
Pro2Russian$Government$Member$of$Federa1on$
Russian'Objectives?''
Current Situation
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Situation Development – Version 1
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Novorossiya'Air'Force'with#Combatant#Assets#IdenRcal#to#Russian#Systems#
SU_25#Frogfoot##aLack$aircrag$
L_29#Maya##trainer$
With$weapons$hardpoints$&$bomb$on$wings$$
With$Proxy$markings$$
TUQ95%Bomber% TUQ160%Bomber% TUQ22M%Bomber%
SUQ24%Strike% SUQ34%Strike%
MigQ31%Interceptor%MigQ29%Fighter%SUQ27%Fighter%
SUQ25%Ground%AIack%MiQ24%AIack%Helio% MiQ28%AIack%Helio%
Air'Assets'–'Russian'modernization'&'atrophied'
Russian'Air'Force'Buildup'vs'Ukraine'Buturlinovka#Air#Base–#135km#from#Ukraine#Border#
#(50.793256°##40.612718°)###
####2013########################################################2014#No#AircraE## 30#Fighters#&#FtrWBombers#
EXAMPLE#
Situation Development – Version 3
DNIPROPETROVS'K
KHARKIV
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Decline'in'Russian'Military'Strength'
$1985 $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $2015$
Manpow
er(in(Millions(
6$
5$
4$
3$
2$
1$
OTHER(
MVD(NAVY(
AIR(FORCE(
ARMY(
STRATEGIC(
MAIN$GROUND$$FORMATIOSN$(Motor.Rifle(Division(
(Motor.Rifle(Brigade((Tank(Division((Tank(Brigade((Airborne/Air(Assault(Div.((Air.Assault(Brigade(
(Spetsnaz(Brigade((Naval(Infantry(Brigade((ArMllery(Brigade(
Tajikistan(
2(Motor(Rifle(Divisions((38(Motor(Rifle(Brigades(5(Naval(Infantry(Brigades(
1(Tank(Division(3(Tank(Brigades(1(ArMllery(Divi(&(12(Bdes(
4(Airborne(Divisions(4(Airborne(Brigades(8(Spetsnaz(Bdes/Regt(
Russian'Ground'Forces'
Russian)Heavy)Mechanized)Brigade)
II!
II!
Full$Manpower$=$4,500$$typical$=$3,000$
Tanks$=$40880$BMP$=$123$Mort$=$18$MLRS$=$18$Med.$Arty$=$36$
SP!122/152!
II!
II!
II!
II!
SAM/Gun!
II!
ATGM!
II!
MLRS!
Lessons(of(Asymmetric(War(in(Chechnya(&(Georgia(
Problems,wit,has(ly,mobilized,Conscripts:,,TT,Low,effec(veness,
,TT,Poor,morale,
,TT,High,casual(es,
,TT,Unpopular,losses,at,home,
Replace,Conscripts,with:,TT,Highly,trained,professionals,
,T,Spetsnaz,&,Airborne,“tank,riders”,
,T,Contract,branch,specialists,
TT,Expendable,Infantry,
,T,Mercenaries,(Chechens,&,Cossacks),
,T,Bonus,“volunteers”,
,T,Local,rabble,&,dra[ees,
TT,Mo(vated,&,reTtrained,“Separa(sts”,
Battalion)Tactical)Group)(BTG))Composite)CombinedYArms)Unit)
I!
I!
Manpower$=$4008700$Tanks$=$10815$BMP/BTR$=$30840$Mort$=$6$MRLS$=$6$SP$Arty$=$6812$SP$Air$Defense$=$4812$
zz!
z!
SP!122/MLRS!
I!
I!
I!
I!
SAM/Gun!
I!
ATGM!
PARENT$FORMATION$
(Motor.Rifle(Division(
(Motor.Rifle(Brigade(
(Tank(Division((Tank(Brigade(
(Airborne/Air(Assault(Div.((Air.Assault(Brigade(
(Spetsnaz(Brigade(
(Naval(Infantry(Brigade((ArMllery(Brigade(
Tajikistan(
Russian'Battalion'Tactical'Groups'from'Brigades'1((of(2)(Motor(Rifle(Divisions((20((of(38)(Motor(Rifle(Bdes(3((of(5)(Naval(Infantry(Bdes(
1((of(1)(Tank(Division(3((of(3)(Tank(Brigades(7((of(12)(ArMllery(Bdes(
4((of(4)(Airborne(Divisions(2((of(4)(Air(Assault(Brigades(5((of(8)(Spetsnaz(Bdes/Regt(
What)is)Needed)to)save)Minsk)II?)
• !Western!appeals!to!Pu:n!seem!to!encourage!his!arrogance!DD!have!not!
inhibited!his!military!buildup!or!restructuring!for!deeper!offensive!op:ons;!
• !Economic!sanc:ons!are!a!crude!instrument!–!exDpostDfacto!punishment!is!
not!a!subs:tute!for!deterrent!effect!of!ceasefire!enforcement;!
• !The!OSCE!is!wrong!organiza:on!&!poorly!equipped!to!monitor!ceasefire;!
•! !The!only!ins:tu:on!capable!of!enforcing!the!Minsk!II!ceasefire!is!the!
Ukrainian!Army,!but!it!needs!American!help!with!defensive!systems:!
!DD!An:Dtank!Guided!Missiles!(Javelin!&!TOWDII)!capable!of!stopping!Russian!tanks;!
!DD!UpDarmored!reconnaissance!vehicles!(HUMVEE)!to!patrol!ceasefire!line;!
!DD!Secure!communica:ons!(Harris!digital!radios);!
!DD!LongDrange!counterDbaKery!radar!(ANTPQD36)!to!keep!Russian!ar:llery!at!bay;!
!DD!HighDal:tude!UAV!for!deep!surveillance!and!strategic!warning.!
• !Providing!hundreds!of!defensive!systems!is!neither!provoca:ve!nor!
escalatory!–!it!offers!the!only!means!of!saving!Minsk!II;!
• !Ukraine!is!a!already!a!“proxy!war”!–!one!which!Pu:n!is!learning!from!&!his!
success!there!will!only!embolden!further!ac:on!against!NATO!members.!
Dr. Phillip A. Karber President, The Potomac FoundaRon & Professor, Georgetown University Phillip Karber graduated from Pepperdine College , has a PhD from Georgetown University and cerPficates from Wharton Business School, the JFK School and Harvard Business School. A former US Marine, in 1968 Karber was brought to Washington by Admiral Arleigh Burke to serve as NaPonal Security Assistant to the Ranking Republican Member of the Congressional Joint CommiHee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) In 1974 Karber was named Director of the PresidenPal mandated Na(onal Security Study Memorandum 186 -‐-‐ the NaPonal Security Council inter-‐agency study of U.S-‐Soviet mulPpurpose forces. In 1981 Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger recruited Karber to serve as “strategy advisor” -‐-‐ reporPng directly to the Secretary and JCS Chairman. Subsequently, he served as an external advisor to BriPsh Prime Minister Thatcher, the Secretary General of NATO, and CEO of Ford Motor. As a senior execuPve of the BDM CorporaPon, Karber was responsible for internaPonal business in 28 countries and in 1990-‐91 organized, trained and delivered the Free Kuwait Army in support of Desert Storm. With a technical background in internaPonal transportaPon, he has led major efforts in air traffic control, aviaPon infrastructure and studying the terrorist threat to global aviaPon. For seven years, Karber served as Chairman of JFK Interna(onal Air Terminal -‐-‐ the internaPonal consorPum selected to privaPze, rebuild and operate New York’s Kennedy Airport InternaPonal Arrivals facility. An Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University since 1978, Karber’s latest academic wriPngs have appeared in the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, Journal of Diploma(c History, and Proceedings of the American Society of Interna(onal Law. His most recent publicaPon is the 2013 monograph “Net Assessment for Sec Def.” In March 2014, at the request of the Ukrainian government, Karber joined Gen. (ret.) Wesley Clark in conducPng a series of assessments of the security situaPon in Ukraine and evaluaPng their military requirements for a successful defense. These have been presented to several commiLees and senior members of the US Congress. Over the last year, Dr. Karber has made eight trips to the front lines, and this report is based on his latest visits in both January and February of 2015.
Gen. (ret.) Wesley Clark & Dr. Karber, presenPng their bi-‐parPsan assessment to the House Armed Services CommiLee (Jul. 2014).
Karber with front line troops of the Dnepr-‐1 volunteers in eastern Ukraine at the start of the Russian Winter Offensive (Jan. 2015).