berlusconia has never existed. on the powerlessness of ... · berlusconia has never existed. on the...

Berlusconia has never existed.On the powerlessness of Silvio Berlusconi

as Italy‘s Prime Minister

International Conference

Politics all’italiana – crisis as a permanent condition?

Universität Siegen

15-16 November 2013

Jana Edelmann – Research Assistant at Universität Siegen/ Ph.D. Student at Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München

1. Relevance & Research Interest: need of intertwined analysis of PM Berlusconi’s alleged wide rang of political power and Italy’s alleged transformation

2. Theoretical considerations & formation of hypothesis: research design based on historical institutionalism

3. Empirical analysis: institutional restrictions on the Italian PM: path-dependent development and identification of causal mechanism

4. Conclusion: persistence of the Italian Prime Minster’s political weakness also with Silvio Berlusconi in office

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AGENDA

• Empirical puzzle: inconsistency of Silvio Berlusconi’s political career

– Media-tycoon, billionaire, professional way of self-promoting, electoral successes and high approval rates

�� domination of the Italian public and socio-cultural live for decades

– Repeated political defeats and crises & poor reform output

o 1st government collapsed due to the Lega Nord’s withdrawn support

o 2nd term: forced to step back by junior partner Unione di Centro � shuffling of cabinet

o 4th term: permanent government crisis beginning in spring 2010: resignation in November 2011

o absence of overdue and urgently requested structural reform projects

�� weak political track record as regards political power

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1. Relevance and Research Interest (I)

• State of research: Silvio Berlusconi’s political influence – dangerous tendencies towards personalized democracy – with influential institutional veto-player

preventing that effort (Ginsborg 2005 & 2011)

– media dominance, but not necessarily political domination/ lack of reform and political dynamic resulting in stagnation (Rusconi, Schlemmer & Wollner 2010)

– rejection of alleged dictator-like dominance: intertwined with a variety of political actors, failure of establishing “berlusconismo” (Rusconi 2002, 2004 & 2009)

– same dynamics as in the First Republic/ no profound changes enacted (Pasquino 2003 & 2007)

• State of research: Italian institutional system & transition years – A big number of elaborate analyses of Italy’s institutional set-up of the First and Second Republic

(e.g. Bull & Newell 2005/ Bull & Rhodes 1997/ Cotta & Verzichelli 2007/ Hine 1996/ Newell 2010)

o remarkable stability of the post-war’s constitutional/institutional set-up

o partitocrazia: power centred around parties, not the executive/ parliamentary majorities

o governmental instability in connection with personnel and political continuity

o tangentopoli & mani pulite � questionable transformation from First to Second Republic

� need for analysis of PM Berlusconi’s that is grounded on an in-depth analysis of Italy’s institutional characteristics the country’s (alleged) transformation process

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1. Relevance and Research Interest (II)

• Research interest: Focus on PM Berlusconi‘s institutional room for manoeuvre

� 1) What kinds of institutional restrictions limit the Italian Prime Minister’s political scope of action and

� 2) to what extent could Silvio Berlusconi change these conditions?

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1. Relevance and Research Interest (III)

• Historical persistence of Italy’s institutional set-up despite major crises and obvious inefficiencies

� Analytical approach: Historical Institutionalism and Path Dependency

• Theoretically grounded research design – conceptual framework

1) focus on institutional restraints and inefficiencies,

2) the actor’s preference and socio-cultural imprints &

3) the institutional reproduction mechanism and the historical process

Capoccia & Kelemen 2007; Hall & Taylor 1996; Ikenberry 1994; Immergut 2005; March & Olsen 1984; Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2000; Pierson 2004; Pierson & Skocpol 2002; Steinmo & Thelen 1992; Thelen 2002

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2. Theoretical considerations & formation of hypothesis (I)

1) Institutions – “formal and informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the

organizational structure of the polity and political economy” (Hall & Taylor 1996:938)

– shaping the actor’s strategies and goals

�� institutional restraints on the Italian PM’s scope for action

o formal constitutional position

o informal parliamentary and party mechanisms

2) Preferences & socio-cultural imprints– endogenous preference formation

– integration of the actor’s socio-political orientations

�� importance of constitutional post-war set-up and traditional socio-cultural imprints

o power diffusion instead of centralized power: ‘political space’ occupied by a variety of political actors (Crouch 1986, 1993; Lehmbruch 2002)

o socio-cultural imprint of diffusion of power & defending vested interests

o preference formation of securing its own power position

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2. Theoretical considerations & formation of hypothesis (II)

3) Historical process: continuity and change – past historical circumstances shape the character of institutional set-ups

– historical sequences: “periods of continuity punctuated by ‘critical junctures’” OR understanding of incremental changes

– path-dependent pattern of institutional reproduction

– possibility of the occurrence of a critical juncture lacking subsequent change differentiation between the institution’s circumstances of creation (critical juncture) and its reproduction mechanism (pathway)

�� three critical junctures during the Italian Republic’s institutional pathway

o post-war years 1943-1948: critical juncture I

o tangentopoli & mani pulite 1992-1994: critical juncture II

o escalation of finance and debt crisis 2011-2012: critical juncture III

(Cappoccia / Kelemen 2007; Hall & Taylor 1996; Lehmbruch 2002; Mahoney & Thelen 2010; Mahoney 2000; Pierson & Skopcol; Schmidt

2013)

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2. Theoretical considerations & formation of hypothesis (III)

• Hypothesis � Italy’s institutional set-up established in 1948 subsequently developed according to the

logic of path-dependency

� Silvio Berlusconi acted within an institutional structure heavily restricting his political assertiveness and influence as Italy’s PM

• Qualitative methodical approach� process tracing & counterfactual analysis: identifying causal mechanism over a period

of time

o analysis of secondary literature - media analysis - document analysis

• Variables

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2. Theoretical considerations & formation of hypothesis (IV)

� independent variable I: constitutional set-up� independent variable III: party and electoral system� independent variable II: governing majority’s cohesion

dependent variable: Italy’s PM capacity to act

3.1 Analysis of the institutional pathway following the post-war years 1943-1948

I. Characterization of 1943-1948 as critical juncture I

– re-establishment of a divided and devastated state following the Fascist regime and the WWII armistice of 1943

– importance of the socio-cultural imprints for the future institutional set-up

1) north-south division, localism and lack of national identification �� defending vested interests

2) anti-fascist alliance between ideologically polarized and antagonistic parties in order to (re)build the country’s constitutional setting/ Cold War

�� diffusion of power

(Clark 2009; Cotta & Verzichelli 2007; de Siervo 2001; DiScala 2009; Duggan 2007; Ginsborg 2003 & 2006; Hine 1993; Newell 2010; Rotelli

1990)

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3.1 Empirical analysis (I)

3.1 Analysis of the institutional pathway following the post-war years

1943-1948

II. Institutional restrictions on the PM’s political scope for action (1)

– constitutional set-up

1) weak position of the Presidente del Consiglio (Art. 92, 94, 95): coordinator instead of leader, whilst the two other core constitutional institutions such as the

2) Presidente della Repubblica (Art. 87, 74, 88, 92) and the

3) Camera and Senato (Art. 55-58, 70-72, 77, 94) with its bicameralismo perfetto were explicitly strengthened

� socio-cultural imprint: diffusion of power & defending vested interests

� constitutional base of the power-driven preference

(Capano & Giuliani 2001; Cotta & Verzichelli; Bull & Newell 2005; DiPalma 1977; Giuliani 2008; Hine 1988 & 1993; Koff & Koff 2000; Köppl

2006; Newell 2010; Pasquino 2007; Sartori 1976; Ullrich 2009; Woller 2008)

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3.1 Empirical analysis (II)


1943-1948


– party and electoral system

1) PR system (electoral law 1947) lacking an effective threshold/ preference votes

2) fragmented party system: 9 – 13 parties achieving parliamentary representation during the First Republic � “polarized pluralism” (Sartori 1976)

3) lack of stable parliamentary majority with only very restricted capacity to act

�� socio-cultural imprints: diffusion of power & defending vested interests

�� applied preference of securing its own power position

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3.1 Empirical analysis (III)


1943-1948


– governing majority’s cohesion

1) continuity of – formal or informal – coalition governments due to the part and electoral system : sharp programmatic heterogeneity between the governing parties

2) the parties’ divisive factional character (correnti) and the MP’s clientele orientation

3) partitocrazia structures

� Indications for the government’s weakness : consociativismo & decreti legge

�� socio-cultural imprint: defending vested interests

�� applied preference of securing its own power position

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3.1 Empirical analysis (IV)

3.2 Checking the development of a new institutional pathway following the state crisis 1992-1994

I. Characterization of 1992-1994 as critical juncture II

– implosion of the party system in response to

1) the end of the Cold War and respectively of the society’s ideological polarisation, 2) the tangentopoli scandals uncovered by the magistrates’ mani pulite investigations,3) the emergence and electoral success of the separatist and anti-systemic Lega Nord

protesting against the corrupt and inefficient central state and 4) civil society’s referendum movement regarding the electoral law’s modification

(Bull & Rhodes 1997; Clark & Clark 2008; Della Porta & Vannucci 1999; Diamanti 1993; Duggan 2007; McCarthy 1995; Nelken 1996; Parker 1996)

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3.2 Empirical analysis (I)


II. Counterfactual analysis

– development of new institutional pathway in response to the critical juncture situation1) end of Cold War � revision of socio-cultural imprint of diffusion of power 2) response to corruption scandals � revision of socio-cultural imprint of defending

vested interest3) rise of LN� revision of socio-cultural imprint of defending vested interests4) success of referendum movement � revision of socio-cultural imprint of diffusion of

power

�� socio-cultural imprints of good governance and concentration of power� changing the institutional restrictions on the PM’s scope for action� strengthening of the PM

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3.2 Empirical analysis (II)

3.2 Checking the development of a new institutional pathway

following the state crisis 1992-1994

III. Empirical result

– response to critical juncture: path-dependent institutional adaption

1) Electoral law (1993): despite mixed system - persistence of PR paradigm

o development of bipolar alliance structure lacking internal cohesion

o no party system’s revision: equally high number of parties represented

2) Parties: new organizational structures

o acceptance of clientelism and corruption practices - lack of a ‘new identity’

3) Constitution: failure of parliamentary commissions’ reform attempts

� continuity of the socio-cultural imprint of diffusion of power

� continuity of the actors’ preference of securing its own power position

(Bartolini & D’Alimonte 1997; Bull & Newell 1997; D’Alimonte 2001 & 2005; Della Porta & Vannucci 1999; Ginsborg 1996; Katz 2001; Nelken

1996; Parker 1996)

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3.2 Empirical analysis (III)


IV. Berlusconi’s will to institutional change

– convenient conditions for political assertiveness

1) distancing from the First Republic’s structures: claim of political renewal o aim of “far funzionare lo stato” (discesa in campo speech, 1994)o end of the “old political class” following tangentopoli (discesa in campo speech,

1994)2) electoral success of personalized parties Forza Italia/ Popolo della Libertà

o winner of three parliamentary elections (1994/ 2001/ 2008)o head of four governments o Italian PM with longest term of office

3) concentration of powero head of government, party leader & media mogul

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3.2 Empirical analysis (IV)


V. Berlusconi’s attempts of institutional change: constitutional reform

– strengthening the PM’s constitutional role: premierato forte project 20051) from “Ministro del Consiglio” to “Primo Ministro” (revised Art. 88, 92, 93, 95)2) abolishment of bicameralismo perfetto (revised Art. 55-59, 70 and 117)

– failure due to the political actor’s persistent preference structure 1) adopted in November 2005 – failed due to abrogative referendum in June 2006

o need of satisfying various political claims of all 4 coalition parties: “cattle market” rather than rationale negotiations

o disapproval largely due to devoluzione – major rejection rates in the South o weak role of Berlusconi: coordinator rather than coalition leader

� persistent preference of securing its own power position as underlying causation forthe finally failed reform

(Camera dei Deputati’s documents/ Italian media analysis/ Bull & Pasquino 2007; Bull 2007; Pasquino 2007; Sartori 2006; Vassallo 2005)

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3.2 Empirical analysis (V)


V. Berlusconi’s attempts of institutional change: founding of new parties

– Forza Italia (1994)o organization: electoral club, professional PR & marketing, centralized & personalized

structureo programmatic orientation: neo-conservative & anti-communist: re-vitalization of the

First Republic’s ideological polarization as recurrent theme of Berlusconi’s rhetorico personnel: career springboard for the First Republic’s previous political actors

– Popolo della Libertà (2009)1) focus on leader Berlusconi 2) Linkage to Democrazia Cristiana traditions – symbolic and personnel references 3) anti-communism as unifying factor – heterogeneous political views and actors

� continuation of the First Republic’s party characteristics of ideological polarization and inner-party fragmentation tendencies – diffusion of power

(Brusattin 2007; Calise 2010; Fix 1999; Grimm 2009; Hopkin & Paolucci 1999; von Kempis 2009; Pasquino 2007; Poli 2001; Raniolo 2006)

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3.2 Empirical analysis (VI)


V. Berlusconi’s attempts of institutional change: reforming the electoral law

– the new electoral law’s (2005) characteristics: “Porcellum”/ “Proportionellum” o reintroduction of a pure PR system & reintroduction of closed lists o introduction of majority bonus (55% of seats for the winning alliance )o thresholds: not preventing fragmentation, but only favouring bipolar party alliances � continuation of the extremely fragmented party system� continuation of partitocrazia structures instead of focus on an overarching leader

– the reform’s negotiation process1) partisan interests of the governing Casa delle Libertà2) blackmailing of the coalition’s junior partner Unione di Centro

� persistent preference of securing its own power position

(Bull & Pasquino 2007; Newell 2010; Pasquino 2007; Ullrich 2009; Verderami 2005)

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3.2 Empirical analysis (VII)


V. Institutional restrictions on PM Berlusconi’s scope for action (1)

– party and electoral system: path-dependent characteristics

o persistence of PR paradigm o persistence of party fragmentation

(Bardi 2007; Camera dei Deputati documents; Cotta & Verzichelli 2007; D’Alimonte 2005; Pasquino 2007)

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3.2 Empirical analysis (VIII)

Berlusconi governments

Parties represented (Camera)

Groups represented (Camera)

Berlusconi I 21 10

Berlusconi I & II 12 8

Berlusconi IV 9 6

� socio-cultural imprint of diffusion of power

� preference of securing its own power position



– governing majority’s cohesion (1): path-dependent characteristics

o continuity of programmatic heterogeneous and antagonist and coalition governments o intra-party fragmentation: atomization of the coalition’s groups (instead of correnti)

(Camera dei Deputati documents; Carboni 2010; Diamanti 2007; Diamanti & Lello 2005; Ministero dell’Interno documents; Newell 2010;Pasquino 2007; Verzichelli 2006)

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3.2 Empirical analysis (IX)

Legislature Governing majority: electoral result

Governing majority:end of legislature

Number of lost MP‘s

Leg. XII 366 328 38

Leg. XIV 368 331 37

Leg. XVI 340 260 80

� socio-cultural imprint of defending vested interests




– governing majority’s cohesion (2): path-dependent characteristic

o clientele orientation of the MPs

(Camera dei Deputati documents; Weber 2008)

(Camera dei Deputati documents)

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3.2 Empirical analysis (X)

Legislature MP legislativeinitiatives (N)

Share of the laws adopted (%)

Governmental legislativeinitiatives

Share of the laws adopted (%)

Leg. XII 3.251 9.49% 819 88.47%

Leg. XIV 5.667 19.94% 636 78.46%

Leg. XVI 5.281 16.93% 360 80.37%

� socio-cultural imprint of defending vested interests




– governing majority’s cohesion (3): path-dependent

o party dominanceo consociativismo: from committee to chamber & decreti legge

(Capano & Vignati 2008; Capano & Giuliano 2001; Giuliani 2008; Governo italiano documents; Italian Media Analyisis; Vassallo 2007)

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3.2 Empirical analysis (XI)

� socio-cultural imprint of diffusion of power and defending vested interest


Legislature decreti leggeconverted (N)

Share of the lawsapproved (%)

Leg. XII 122 41.35%

Leg. XIV 200 29.11%

Leg. XVI 108 29.03 %

Persistence of the Italian Prime Minster’s political weakness also with Silvio Berlusconi in office

– Path-dependent persistence of the independent variables despite the critical juncture

– Institutional reproduction mechanism: socio-cultural imprints and actor preference

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4. Conclusion

� independent variable I: constitutional set-up� independent variable III: party and electoral system� independent variable II: governing majority’s cohesion

dependent variable: Italy’s PM capacity to act

o defending vested interestso diffusion of Powero securing its own power position

berlusconia has never existed. on the powerlessness of ... · berlusconia has never existed. on the...

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