B E R K E L E Y : H O W T O M A K E A M I S T A K E

MICHAEL P. LEVINE

Not surprisingly Berkeley's epistemology is intrinsically linked to his metaphysics. This kind of link is true of Locke and Hume as well - and indeed is generally the case with systematic metaphysicians whether empiricist, rationalist, idealist or whatever. His epistemoplogy is necessary to understanding his idealism and other aspects of his peculiar metaphysicsJ Berkeley's notion of error must be explained in the context of his theory of justification which, as will be seen, cannot be divorced from his wider idealist position. This paper is limited to an analysis of what I take to be Berkeley's strongly foundationalist position on epistemic justification of empirical knowledge. His explanation of how and when error is possible, and when it is not, follows from this.

I Berkeley says, "I do not see how he can be led into an error by

considering his own naked, undisguised ideas." On the basis of this Timo Airaksinen claims to have identified a "basic [and problematic] Berkeleyan intuition." "Because one's objects of knowledge are 'immediately given', it is natural to suppose that no ultimately paradoxical problems concerning epistemic justification and evidence may arise" (p. 236). This is misleading. Berkeley knows that errors are made despite the fact that he thinks s o m e objects of knowledge are immediately given. 2 However, on Berkeley's view error does not undermine his claim that we can be "certain" of that which is immediately given - contrary to Airaksinen's view that it does and that Berkeley apparently does not realize it. On foundationalist views of epistemic justification generally, there is no conflict in supposing that errors can be made despite our certainty in regard to the "immediately given." Furthermore, such certainty neither entails nor suggests that there may be no "ultimately paradoxical problems concerning

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epistemic justification and evidence." Foundationalists are not, for example, committed to the view that justification and truth may not diverge even on the deepest levels.

Berkeley explains error in terms of one's imagination and use of inference. Imagination and/or inference, while necessary for knowledge in all cases except those in which objects of knowledge are immediately given, are also sources of error. This pertains to simple perceptual matters as well as to more complex beliefs. The above quotation from Berkeley concerning the impossibility of error refers only to the "immediately given. ''3

According to Berkeley two sorts of ideas are immediately given. He says,

The ideas imprinted on the senses by the Author of Nature are called real things: and those excited in the imagination being less regular, vivid and constant, are more properly termed ideas, or images of things, which they copy and represent. But then our sensations, be they ever so vivid and distinct, are nevertheless ideas, that is, they exist in the mind, or are perceived by it, as truly as the ideas of its own framing. (Principles, 33)

"Real things," in Berkeley's sense (i.e. those things or ideas of sense we are made to perceive by God, and on the basis of which Berkeleyan material objects are ultimately known), and ideas of the imagination or "images of things," are immediately given according to Berkeley. 4 One can be certain in one's knowledge of both types of immediately given ideas. The "external things" in Berkeley!s world are both "real things" which are basic sensory ideas, and also Berkeleyan material objects - those objects whose existence one can know of which are not perceived directly (i.e. immediately given), but in part are imagined and/or inferred.

What is immediately given for Berkeley, and what one can be certain of, are first person psychological states. These are states in which one perceives "real things" as well as ideas of the imagination. While it is true for Berkeley that one can be certain of the way in which one is "appeared to" - in Chisholm's terminology - one cannot be certain that one is perceiving a "real thing" rather than an object of the imagination, or a genuine Berkeleyan material object (properly perceived) rather than an object that is not "external" in that it is the product of an overactive imagination (i.e. perception of it is not properly based on "real things"). To decide this one must address the

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criteria Berkeley gives for distinguishing one from the other. These include regularity, vividness and constancy - though these are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions of an immediately given ob j ec t being a "re,'fl thing" for Berkeley, or of some sensory object that is partly imagined or inferred, such as chair, being a genuine external object.

Whether what we are perceiving is a "real thing" as opposed to an "image of a thing," or a Berkeleyan material object as opposed to an imaginary object which may have some "real things" as components, will depend on whether the ideas we actually perceive have been "imprinted on the senses by the Author of Nature." In the case of Berkeleyan material objects, it also depends upon whether they are the proper products of one's own imagination and inference (i.e. generally - those produced in accordance with past experience). 5

Nevertheless, we can "know" the existence of "real things" and Berkeleyan material objects if we believe they exist, if it is true they exist in the sense that the "real things" are imprinted on our senses by God, and the Berkeleyan material objects are properly imagined and inferred from our perceptions of "real things," and if we are justified in our beliefs on the basis of criteria such as constancy and regularity. (To avoid the Gettier problem Berkeley would also have to add a condition similar to that which other justified true belief accounts of knowledge have had to add. This would be something to the effect that the evidence or basis one has for the truth of the proposition believed must stand in a certain, possibly complex, relation to the state of affairs described by the truly believed proposition. The Gettier problem, as I see it, does not introduce any special problem for Berkeley as Airaksinen thinks it does. I discuss this further below.)

For Berkeley, it is only with non-basic beliefs, those where imagination and inference come in, that errors can be, and often are, made. Since imagination and probably unconscious inference, both of which are based on past experience for Berkeley, play a role in ordinary perceptual (non-basic) beliefs such as "I see a tree," rather than "I seem to see a tree," (i.e. we do not perceive the whole of a tree on Berkeley's account, but only part of it when we say "I see a tree") these beliefs may be mistaken. 6

Airaksinen says that according to Berkeley, ...the construction of a complex and continuous body

on the basis of sense-ideas and their location in space and time is possible to perform,...the evidential building

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blocks {i.e. sense ideas} are given to S and that makes S capable of performing constructive inferences. (p. 243)

How does the fact that the "evidential building blocks are given to S" make S capable of performing the constructive inference? This foundation may be necessary to avoid skepticism according to Berkeley, but it does not make S capable of the required inferences. The capacity for such inferences is simply given. If it requires explanation, I would expect that for Berkeley, the explanation must be extra- epistemic (i.e. metaphysical in terms of God).

More significantly, Airaksinen says the "...absolutely crucial epistemic problem is that the sensory building blocks of bodies are of such a varied nature that their reality tends to remain an open problem. No certainty about S's mental constructions would ever result" (p. 244). This claim requires explanation. Why are the "building blocks" of "such a varied nature?" Are they not momentary sense impressions confined to the five senses? Why does their "reality tend to remain an open problem"? Berkeley states criteria for distinguishing illusory from veridical sense experience, and it is not clear what Airaksinen means by "reality." He is not using the term "real thing" as Berkeley does in Principles 33.

The problem here results from Airaksinen's conflating issues of justification with those of certainty. Berkeley does not think that one can be certain of one's mental constructs, but he does think that one can be justified in believing things about such a construct. Airaksinen raises the question of certainty with regard to mental constructs of complex things in the context of his discussion of whether one could be certain of the evidential building blocks that are the basis of constructive inferences to complex things. However, these are distinct issues.

The reason no certainty can be attained concerning knowledge of complex things for Berkeley is not because of the variety of momentary sense-ideas that are themselves certain for the perceiver, but because of the presence of possible grounds of error - namely, imagination and inference. These are sometimes adequately grounded in former experience and sometimes not. One may not be justified in a knowledge claim about a Berkeleyan material object for Berkeley even if one's belief is true, not because there is no certainty, but because the imaginative construct and related inferences are not adequately based in experience "grounded on former perceptions."

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If S knows p (i.e. the existence of a Berkeleyan material object), then the justification of the belief will ultimately be grounded on sensory ideas that S is certain of, though S will not be certain of p because of possible sources of error. The evidence for the existence (and nature) of some complex external thing such as Berkeleyan material object will not always be clear and uncontested. However, S's justification must be based on sensory ideas (evidence) that S is certain of according to Berkeley. If S turns out to be mistaken, it is not because S did not perceive, with certainty, those sense ideas that are the basis of S's incorrect knowledge claim. Rather, it is either because those sense ideas were not "imprinted" by God and are therefore not "objective" or "external," or because of faulty imagination and/or inference.

Berkeley's view of "real things" as "direcdy given basic evidence" is criticized by Airaksinen. Yet the criticism is indicative of a fundamental misunderstanding not only of Berkeley's epistemology, but of the role of basic beliefs in foundationalism generally. He says,

Actually different types of (single-modality) sensory qualities are given to S in such a manner that some reasoning is needed in order to make sense of their epistemic value concerning bodies. Thus, the 'real', or merely immediately perceived things are not S's incontestable basic evidence concerning the world of ordinary bodies. This may look surprising. One should be able to distinguish between two types of real things, namely those which are merely immediately given and those which are immediate and non-imaginary. My point is that one cannot do it in the manner which would grant the status of basic evidence to any ideas. (p 245)

On Berkeley's definition of "real things" he can and does maintain that they are S's directly given basic evidence for the existence of Berkeleyan material objects. Imaginary. ideas, though directly perceived, are not imprinted by or related to God's mentalistic activity in this way. Nevertheless, they too may be prima facie sensory evidence for Berkeleyan material objects. They too may be directly given basic sensory evidence, and one may be justified in believing in the existence of an object, in part, on the basis of such evidence. The fact that there are two types of "real things" (i.e. "those which are merely immediately given and those which are immediate and non- imaginary"), and that one that one cannot immediately distinguish

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between these "two types of real things," does nothing to indicate that one's perception of either of these two kinds of real things cannot be "basic evidence." One can in principle distinguish between the two types on the basis of higher order beliefs. The evidential value of basic beliefs for existential beliefs can, in principle always be defeated (i.e. overridden etc.) according to foundationalism.

On Berkeley's view merely because one cannot immediately (i.e. at the level of basic beliefs) distinguish between the two types of "real things" the status of any sensory idea as "basic evidence" is not undermined. On a foundationalist interpretation of Berkeley, the basic evidential elements (corresponding to first person psychological states) are both sensory objects that are "real" and some sensory "images of things." "Real" is not an inferred quality. To know a "real" thing to be "real" one must make inferences. However, "real" as Berkeley uses it is not an inferred property, but a property that some of our sense ideas have in virtue of their origin. Airaksinen's account confuses Berkeley's ontological characterization of "real" with an epistemic one. "Real things" are among those things that are immediately given for Berkeley, though to know them as such an appeal to non-basic evidence is required. On the level of non-basic evidence one is no longer dealing with "immediately given objects of sense" - whether "real things" or "images."

Consider the following: Airaksinen says, S actually perceives more or less coherent patterns of single-modality sensory ideas and somehow concludes that the most solid of them are the real things. Next S actively constructs complete multi-modality complexes like apples. S recognizes the fact that sometimes both external and imaginary ideas form (spontaneously) complexes that are so convincing that S can also call them 'real things.' But this means that S must make inferences. There are many ways of making the required inferences...For instance, one does not know exactly what combination of real and imaginary elements are sufficient and necessary evidence for forming multi- modality ideas of ordinary apples. S's imagination may be too active. S's world may therefore become intolerably unpredictable... It cannot be 'real'... Yet our experience tends to show the world is orderly... Why this is so cannot be accounted for within Berkeley's epistemic

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framework. It is simply a psychological and pragmatic fact. (pp. 247-248)

There are two important points here. First, Airaksinen is using "real thing" to mean ideas of apples, chairs etc. - Berkeleyan material objects. This is not how Berkeley uses the term. These objects are always combinations of "real" and imaginary ideas on Berkeley's account, since the entire object will never be perceived in all of its sensory dimensions at once.

Second, it is of course true that external ("real") and imaginary ideas form complexes that are not only Berkeleyan material objects, but also objects that are not external or objective that are mistakenly taken to be Berkeleyan material objects. On Berkeley's account an object such as an apple may look completely like an apple should (i.e. completely like an ordinary Berkeleyan material apple), but still not be one. This is the case when finite spirits' experiences of it over time do not meet criteria associated with objective experience - for example, if it turns out to vanish, no similarly situated finite spirit can perceive it etc. However, given these facts there is no reason why Berkeley's epistemic framework cannot (or does not) account for the fact of orderliness and predictability in S's experience. There is no ground for supposing, as Airaksinen does for example, that this has to be taken as merely a "psychological and pragmatic fact" as Airaksinen does. Is it not rather a metaphysical fact - one essential to Berkeley's entire epistemology? God is responsible for the order since God is the one that imprints ideas of sense upon S in accordance with the laws of nature.

Returning now to the Gettier problem in relation to Berkeley's epistemology, I find Airaksinen's discussion problematic. He says,

Dog-ideas are dog ideas and S's belief concerning sheep on their basis cannot be adequately and ultimately justified although the belief is not false. Even if one's epistemology were phenomenalistic such an error implies a gap between S's evidential grounds and his beliefs. The former may all be wrong even if the beliefs were true. (p. 252)

Airaksinen thinks that Berkeley's epistemology is phenomenalistic, but what does this mean? Clearly there is a gap between one's evidential grounds and one,s beliefs according to Berkeley. This does not undermine his phenomenalism however, or the role that it plays in his epistemology. Phenomenalism is one feature of Berkeley's epistemology, and I do not see why Airaksinen thinks that this feature,

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combined with the fact that there is a gap between one's evidential grounds and beliefs, presents the Gettier problem in a particularly intractable form for Berkeley. Why, according to Airaksinen, the Gettier problem cannot be handled in Berkeley's case (given his phenomenalism) as it is in other "justified true belief" accounts of knowledge, is unclear.

II Berkeley's account of how we make mistakes can be further

illustrated by considering S's perception of the hot iron bar. Berkeley's view is that "solidity and heat of the iron are not the objects of sight, but suggested to the imagination by the colour and figure ... suggested to the mind by experience grounded on former perceptions" (Berkeley, p. 242). 7 This quotation illustrates the way in which Berkeley thinks imagination and inference properly and necessarily contribute to our perception of Berkeleyan material objects. It also suggests the way in which perceptual errors may be made due to their operation - even when they do operate in accordance with past experience. If the bar turned out to be a fake, Berkeley does not think that one would have necessarily reasoned improperly in judging it to be a hot iron bar, even though one is actually only perceiving some of the sensory ideas associated with the complex of sensory ideas that are constitutive of it and not others. On Berkeley's view most of them are not perceived.

If a sufficient number of sensory ideas are actually perceived (and what constitutes a sufficient number is indeterminate and may even be context and person relative), then these will suggest (and sometimes lead One into error) the other ideas, those not actually sensory but imaginative, that one has found through veridical experience to be usually associated with the complex of sensory ideas constitutive of the iron bar. On Berkeley's account one can mentally construct a complex object correctly and be justified in believing in its existence and still be mistaken in that belief. This would be the case if what is immediately given is not "real" but only "imagined."

However, Airaksinen criticizes Berkeley's view that ideas "could actively suggest something to S" (p. 242). He notes that ideas are passive according to Berkeley. If this criticism were correct it would undermine Berkeley's epistemology irreparably. If ideas could not "suggest" other ideas to S, then Berkeley would be left without an explanation as to how we perceive Berkeleyan material objects and also how perceptual errors can be made.

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Ideas are passive according to Berkeley, but this cannot mean that they do not suggest ideas of sense that are not immediately given. The passivity of ideas refers to causal passivity for Berkeley. They cannot cause other ideas because there is no causal connection among ideas. They can suggest, or the mind operating upon them can suggest, but they cannot cause. Berkeley has a necessitarian account of causation. (Whether it is also a type of logical entailment account is unclear.) Leaving the question of a Berkeleyan analysis of the meaning of causal statements aside, for A to be the cause of B there would have to be an "intelligible" connection between the two. A cause must be linked to its effect in such a way as to explain why the effect must follow, or what the necessary connection is. It is only on this peculiar Malebranche-Berkeley account of causation, an account that formed the basis (i.e. by way of reaction against) of Hume's even stranger and more implausible account, that ideas must be seen as "causally" passive.

13I Finally, consider the role that coherence plays in Berkeley's account

of how to distinguish real from imaginary things. Airaksinen refers to this, but he mistakes this role for a type of coherence account of justification. The role that coherence plays for Berkeley is easily accommodated within his strong foundationalist account and in no way mitigates it. Coherence always has a role to play in well-developed foundationalist accounts (e.g., in formulating correct epistemic principles relating properly basic beliefs to non-basic beliefs) but this does not make them coherence theories of justification.

Airaksinen claims that "...at most Berkeley is an epistemological 'modest foundationalist': all ideas carry some intrinsic epistemic weight because they are given.., but this intrinsic weight needs complimentation from the side of coherence considerations" (p. 246). Even if the justification of a very wide range of beliefs does require coherence considerations for Berkeley, he nevertheless remains a strong foundationalist in that all beliefs are ultimately justified not in terms of coherence, but either immediately (i.e. they require no justification in terms of other beliefs, but are self justifying and, certain as well), or they are justified in terms of the relationship they bear to the foundational beliefs. It is in terms of these relationships that coherence considerations play crucial roles, g

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I conclude that apart from the idealist underpinnings which are a necessary ingredient of Berkeley's epistemology, his foundationalism is consistent with, indeed a version of, classical foundationalism. His account of error can be understood only in that context.

THE UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA NEDLANDS, WESTERN AUSTRALIA 6009

AUSTRALIA

NOTES

1 In "Berkeley and the Justification of Beliefs", Timo Airaksinen critically exposits a number of important issues concerning Berkeley's epistemology, I think Airaksinen is mistaken in his basic interpretation and I critique aspects of that interpretation in what follows. Quotations, except for those from Berkeley, refer to Timo Airaksinen, "Berkeley and the Justification of Beliefs," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research XLVIII (1987), pp. 235-256.

2 Airaksinen himself points out that Berkeley knows we make mistakes despite the objects of knowledge which are "immediately given."

3 Given my strong foundationalist interpretation of Berkeley's epistemology I disagree with George Dicker's claim about Berkeley conflating the concept of immediate perception in the psychological sense with that of immediate perception in the epistemic sense, and the way he interprets Berkeley as adhering to the latter. See, George Dicker, "The Concept of Immediate Perception in Berkeley's Immaterialism," in Colin Turbayne, ed., Berkeley Critical and Interpretive Essays (Minneapolis: Univ. Of Minnesota Press, 1982), pp. 48-66.

4 Berkeley refers to one type of idea as "real things," but this is a stipulation meant to distinguish it from another type of idea. He does not mean that ideas of the imagination are not really ideas at all. In Berkeley's terminology, chairs etc. are not "real things" but this does not mean that they do not really exist in the Berkeleyan manner.

5 Airaksinen criticizes Berkeley for saying "real things are what are directly perceived." He says that this cannot be correct since "imaginary fictions are also perceived directly." However, Airaksinen also says in a note (i.e. note 16), that there is an ambiguity in Berkeley's account of "real things" as that which are directly perceived. In Principles 33 Berkeley says, "The ideas imprinted on the sense by the Author of Nature are called real things." The ambiguity is resolved by combining the assertions. It is not sufficient for

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something to be a "real thing" for it to be perceived directly. It must also be imprinted by God.

6 Airaksinen claims that "There is nothing that is alone conclusively. evident for S...no privileged access to evidence is available. All evidence is just prima facie ...no absolute epistemic certainty is possible" (p.17). It is not clear that Airaksinen is putting forward the view that all evidence is primafacie as Berkeley's own view, or rather as what he believes Berkeley is entitled to say. At any rate, I disagree both with the claim that there is no privileged access, and that all evidence is primafacie according to Berkeley, for reasons that I have a'ied to make clear in this paper.

7 Airaksinen is critical of Berkeley's view, but mistakes the sense i n which Berkeley thinks ideas are passive.

8 Nothing I have said in expositing Berkeley's views in this paper should be interpreted as an endorsement of Berkeley's views (i.e. as asserting that Berkeley's theory of justification is correct).

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