bahrain's free arbitration zone

I N T E R N A T I O N A L

TThhee NNeeww BBaahhrraaiinn AArrbbiittrraattiioonn LLaaww aanndd tthhee BBaahhrraaiinn

FFrreeee AArrbbiittrraattiioonn ZZoonneeBY JOHN M. TOWNSEND

N ew arbitration legislation enacted by theKingdom of Bahrain on July 2, 2009makes it the first country in the world tocreate the equivalent of a free trade zone for arbi-tration. That legislation, Legislative Decree No. 30(The Decree), gives parties to an agreement callingfor international arbitration the option of holdingthe arbitration in Bahrain without concern that thecourts of Bahrain might interfere with, or set aside,the resulting award, as long as the parties seek toenforce the award only in another country. Theresult is the creation of what this article will callthe Bahrain Free Arbitration Zone.

Reprinted from the Dispute Resolution Journal, vol. 65, no. 1 (Feb.-April 2010), a publication of the American Arbitration Association, 1633 Broadway, New York, NY 10019-6708,212.716.5800, www.adr.org.

D I S P U T E R E S O L U T I O N J O U R N A L 75

John M. Townsend, a partner in theWashington, D.C., office of Hughes

Hubbard & Reed LLP, chairs that firm'sArbitration and ADR Group. He is also

chairman of the Board of Directors of theAmerican Arbitration Association. Mr.

Townsend consulted with the Ministry ofJustice of Bahrain concerning the enact-ment of the legislation discussed in this

article. He wishes to thank DanielMcLaughlin, an associate in the

Washington, D.C. office of HughesHubbard & Reed LLP, for his

help with this article.

!!How

Bahrains newArbitration Law and

Free Arbitration Zoneaddress concerns that multi-

national companies haveabout arbitrating interna-

tional commercial dis-putes in the Middle

East.


76 F E B R U A R Y / A P R I L 2 0 1 0

The new legislation also creates a new BahrainChamber for Dispute Resolution (BCDR), whichis intended to become both a Bahraini nationaland a Middle Eastern regional arbitration centerthat will be run with the help of the AmericanArbitration Association (AAA). Creating an inter-national arbitration center from scratch is not aneasy proposition, especially in a part of the worldin which users of arbitration have been critical ofthe judicial structure withinwhich arbitration has up to nowhad to be conducted. In spite ofthe convenience of having re-gional arbitration centers in theMiddle East, many corporationshave remained cautious about sit-ing arbitrations there out of con-cerns that local courts are inex-perienced in dealing with arbitra-tion and that awards againstinfluential local parties (especial-ly those connected with orfavored by governments) mightsimply be set aside.

The Problem: Lack of Con-fidence in the Local Courts

The primary objective of usersof arbitration in designating thesite for an arbitration in a disputeresolution clause is to select alocation from which a fair andenforceable arbitration awardmay be expected to emerge. Con-venience is important, as is theavailability of qualified arbitra-tors and counsel. There are thosewho believe that the quality ofthe local cuisine also plays a part.But overriding all other consid-erations is finding a neutralforum in which neither partyfeels at a disadvantage, and wherethe courts will support the arbitration processand not second-guess the arbitrators.

Under the Convention on the Recognitionand Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards(New York Convention), the treaty that governsthe enforcement of arbitration agreements andawards around the world, the courts of the coun-try where the arbitration takes place have juris-diction to set aside any arbitration award made inthat country.1 Selection of the site of the arbitra-tion has therefore, up until the new Bahraini law,carried with it the selection of which courts willhave a primary role in reviewing any award.

Most parties will decline to locate an arbitra-

tion in the other partys home country, especiallyif the other party is considered influential there.Rather, they will look for a neutral site, reason-ably convenient to both parties, with a friendlyarbitration law, in which the courts have acquireda reputation for respecting arbitration awards.Every drafter of dispute resolution agreementshas his or her preferred list of sites in variousparts of the world. But very few, at least from

outside the region, would includea location in the Middle East onthat list.

Users of arbitration have beenreluctant to conduct arbitrationsin the Middle East for two prin-cipal reasons. The first is that thecourts there have little or notrack record showing an under-standing of international arbitra-tion, or of respecting and enforc-ing arbitration awards. Indeed,the information available tends tocreate anxiety about the fate of anarbitration award when it reachesthe courts.

The second concern is howcourts in the Middle East arelikely to treat awards that may beseen as inconsistent with Sharialaw, which in many MiddleEastern countries has the force ofpublic policy. For example, Sharialaw forbids the charging or pay-ment of interest. Since manyother legal systems deal with thetime value of money in terms ofinterest, this can create specialproblems in enforcing arbitrationawards that emerge from thosesystems.

The Bechtel Case. The Bechtelcase presents a vivid example ofwhat parties fear about siting an

arbitration in the Middle East.2 In July 2000,International Bechtel Co. Ltd. and the De-partment of Civil Aviation of the Government ofDubai submitted a contractual dispute to arbitra-tion at the Dubai Chamber of Commerce andIndustry.3 The Dubai Chamber appointed aprominent Swiss lawyer as the sole arbitrator,and the arbitration was conducted under the lawsof Dubai at the Dubai Chamber.4 On Feb. 20,2002, after hearing evidence and statements fromat least 15 witnesses, the arbitrator issued anaward in favor of Bechtel for $24.4 million.5

The Dubai government sought to overturn theaward. It filed a complaint in the Dubai Court of

One reason forthe reluctanceto site interna-tional commer-cial arbitration

in the MiddleEast is that the

courts therehave little or no

track record showing an

understandingof internationalarbitration or respecting andenforcing arbi-tration awards.


First Instance, arguing that the arbitrators warn-ing to the witnesses at the hearing that they werebound to tell the truth and could face severeconsequences for not doing so was insufficient,because Dubai law requires witnesses to declare,I swear by the Almighty to tell the truth andnothing but the truth.6 On Nov. 16, 2002, theDubai Court of First Instance ruled in the gov-ernments favor and vacated the award becausethe arbitrator did not administer the oath to wit-nesses in the proper local form. Bechtel appealedto the Dubai Court of Cassation, which affirmedthe lower courts decision.7

While its appeal in Dubai was pending,Bechtel also filed petitions for judicial recogni-tion and enforcement of the arbitration award inthe United States and France. The U.S. federaldistrict court initially denied a motion by theDubai government to dismiss and stayed pro-ceedings pending the appeal to the Dubai Courtof Cassation, while noting that the reasoning ofthe Dubai lower court in nullifying the awardregisters at the hypertechnical fringe of whatAmericans would call justice.8 Nevertheless,after the Dubai Court of Cassation affirmed thelower courts decision, the U.S. court dismissedBechtels petition on grounds nearly as technical.The court concluded that Bechtel was not enti-tled to relief under the New York Conventionbecause the United Arab Emirates, of whichDubai forms a part, was not then a signatory tothat convention. The court also found that reliefwas unavailable under the Federal Arbitration Actbecause the parties had not agreed that a judg-ment on the award could be entered in anAmerican court, as required by Section 9 of theFAA.9

Bechtel fared better in France, where the ParisCourt of Appeal affirmed the ex parte enforce-ment order issued by the Paris Court of FirstInstance on the ground that the annulment bythe Dubai Court of Cassation applied only to theUAE and was without international effect.10 ButBechtels ultimate success in France did little toallay fears that Middle Eastern courts mightagain interfere unduly with arbitrations sited inthe region. Users of arbitration remainedalarmed by the decisions of the courts of Dubai,which received widespread negative attention.11

Set-Aside Proceedings under the New York Con-vention. The New York Convention provides forthree kinds of interaction between the courts ofcontracting states and parties to an arbitrationagreement or award. First, Article II.1 requirescontracting states to recognize and enforceagreements to submit to arbitration differencesthat are capable of being settled by arbitration.

Article II.3 requires a court of a contracting stateto refer to arbitration a dispute brought before itthat is the subject of such an arbitration agree-ment.

Second, Article III of the New York Con-vention requires courts of contracting states torecognize and enforce awards made in anothersignatory country. Article V.1 of the conventionprovides a limited list of reasons for which acourt may refuse to enforce an award, includingtechnical or procedural deficiencies in the arbi-tration agreement or process. Article V.2 of theconvention permits, but does not require, a courtto refuse enforcement based on the law or thepublic policy of the enforcing state.12 Article VIpermits a court to stay proceedings while anapplication to suspend or set aside is pending, asthe U.S. court did in its first Bechtel decision.

In Article V.1(e), the New York Conventionprovides for the thirdand most important forthose selecting a site of arbitrationtype ofinteraction with the local courts. That articlepermits a court to refuse to enforce an award thathas been suspended or set aside by the courts of(1) the country in which ... the award wasmade, or (2) the country under the law ofwhich the award was made.13 By recognizingjudicial set-aside as a reason why an enforcingcourt may refuse to recognize an arbitrationaward, the New York Convention indirectly, buteffectively, confers the power to set aside or sus-pend an arbitration award on either the courts atthe site of the arbitration or the courts of thecountry whose law the parties have chosen togovern the arbitration.

The New York Convention articulates nostandard to guide a court in deciding whether tosuspend or set aside an award, nor does it provideusers of arbitration with insight regardingwhether or when courts might decide to exercisethat power. The absence of guidelines in the con-vention itself has greatly influenced users ofinternational arbitration to prefer to arbitrate injurisdictions with well-established records forexercising restraint in using the power to setaside awards.

Designing a Solution to the Problem: The Free Arbitration Zone

For its new international arbitration center tosucceed in attracting business from outside thecountry, Bahrain needed to provide assurance tothe international community that its courtswould show appropriate respect for the decisionsmade by arbitrators. One way to do that wouldbe to wait 20 or 30 years, to allow time forBahrain and the BCDR to be written into a few


78 F E B R U A R Y / A P R I L 2 0 1 0

arbitration agreements and to allow the resultingawards to be respected by the courts.

Instead, Bahrain chose to address these con-cerns directly by removing its courts altogetherfrom the picture (except when awards are to beenforced in Bahrain), thus creating the FreeArbitration Zone. To understand how it did so, itis necessary to look at the structure of LegislativeDecree No. 30.

The BCDRs Two Types of Jurisdiction. TheDecree confers two types of jurisdiction on thenew BCDR. The first is called Jurisdictionunder the Law, and the second is called Juris-diction by Party Agreement. As discussed below,each represents a different facet of Bahrainsmodernization efforts.

Jurisdiction under the Law authorizes referralsto the BCDR of two types of disputes that wouldotherwise have been heard by the Bahrainicourts. The first type comprises disputes broughtby or against financial institutions licensed underthe terms of the Law of the Central Bank ofBahrain when the amount in controversy exceeds500,000 Bahraini Dinars (approximately US$1.33million).14

The second type of dispute to be sent to theBCDR as part of its Jurisdiction under the Lawconsists of all international commercial dis-putes in which the same amount or more is indispute. The Decree specifies that:

A dispute is international if the headquarters ofone of the parties to the dispute, the placewhere a substantial part of the obligations aris-ing from the relationship is performed, or theplace with which the subject matter of the dis-pute is most closely related, is located outsidethe Kingdom (of Bahrain).15

A dispute is commercial:if its subject matter concerns relationships of acommercial nature, whether contractual ornot, including any transactions or agreementsfor the supply, exchange, or distribution ofgoods or services; commercial management oragency; leasing; factory construction; consul-tancy services; engineering projects; licensing;investment and financing; banking transac-

tions; insurance; franchising; joint ventures;other forms of industrial or commercial coop-eration; and transporting goods or passengersby air, sea, or land.16

Disputes administered under the BCDRsJurisdiction under the Law will be heard by pan-els of three arbitrators, two of whom will bejudges of the Bahraini courts who will have re-ceived special training from the BCDR and theAAA.17 The third arbitrator will be appointedunder the rules of the BCDR. The arbitratorswill be required to respect the parties agreementon the governing substantive law only so long asthe provisions of that law are not inconsistentwith the public policy of Bahrain; in the absence

of such an agreement, the arbitrators will applyBahraini law.18 Non-Bahraini lawyers may repre-sent parties to these cases only if Bahraini counsellicensed to appear before the Cassation Courtalso participate.19

These provisions effectively create a special-ized international commercial court in Bahrain.The Bahraini judiciary will control decision-mak-ing by a margin of two to one, but the judgeswho hear the financial and international com-mercial disputes will be trained to deal withthem. This alone should enhance Bahrainsstanding as a Middle Eastern banking and finan-cial center.

Jurisdiction by Party Agreement, by contrast,depends on contract. The Decree permits partiesto agree to arbitrate a dispute before the BCDR,with no requirement as to the amount in contro-versy, and no requirement that the dispute beinternational or commercial. It is only necessarythat the parties agree in writing to settle itthrough the chamber.20

Disputes referred to the BCDR for arbitrationunder its Jurisdiction by Party Agreement will begoverned by arbitration rules developed by theBCDR in cooperation with the AAA, and will beadministered by the BCDR under a joint venturewith the AAA called the BCDR-AAA.21 Thisarrangement was designed to give the BCDRaccess to both the AAAs experience in adminis-tering international arbitrations and its panels of

Legislative Decree No. 30 permits parties to agree to arbitrate a dispute before the BCDR, with no requirement

as to the amount in controversy, and no requirement that the dispute be international or commercial.


arbitrators. Both organizations will stand behindarbitrations administered under the Jurisdictionby Party Agreement provisions of the Decree.

The Decree grants parties great flexibilityunder the Jurisdiction by Party Agreement. First,unlike disputes submitted under the Jurisdictionunder the Law, the Decree provides no publicpolicy constraints for the choice of substantivelaw. Rather, it provides that the tribunal shalldetermine the appropriate substantive law toapply only if the parties do not agree on theapplicable choice of substantive law.22 Second,for disputes submitted under this jurisdiction, theDecree permits party representation by non-Bahraini lawyers without the need to associatewith local counsel.23

The Free Arbitration Zone. Under the BCDRsJurisdiction by Party Agreement, the parties havethe additional option of conducting their arbitra-tion within the Free Arbitration Zone, cutting offall recourse to the courts of Bahrain to challengeany subsequent arbitration award, unless thataward is to be enforced in Bahrain. To takeadvantage of this option, the parties must agree inwriting that: (1) a law other than that of Bahrainwill govern any dispute between them, (2) theparties will not challenge any award that mayresult before the courts of Bahrain, and (3) anychallenge will, instead, be brought only before thecourts of the country whose law has been chosento govern the dispute. The source of this authori-ty is Article 25 of the Decree, which provides:

Without prejudice to the procedures set forthin Articles 23 and 24 of this law concerningthe enforcement of the Dispute ResolutionTribunal award, parties to the dispute shall not beentitled to appeal for the annulment of the DisputeResolution Tribunal award in accordance withArticle 24 of this law if the parties have agreed inwriting [1] that foreign law will govern the dis-pute, [2] that they will not challenge the awardbefore the courts of Bahrain, and [3] that any chal-lenge against the award shall be before the compe-tent authority in another state.24

The New York Convention, as has been seen,permits a proceeding to vacate an arbitrationaward to be brought before either the courts ofthe country in which the arbitration has takenplace, or the courts of the country under the lawof which the award was made.25 Article 25 cre-ates the Free Arbitration Zone by permitting theparties to elect the latter of those options, to theexclusion of the former, in their agreement.26Thus, for example, if the parties agree that anydispute between them will be submitted to arbi-tration in Bahrain, but under Swiss law, and that

any challenge to the award must be brought inthe courts of Switzerland and may not be broughtin the courts of Bahrain, then they may conducttheir arbitration in Bahrain without any concernabout interference from the Bahraini courts.

The Arabic text of the Decree creates a slightambiguity by using the phrase b-il-buTlaan( ) to provide that the parties shall notbe entitled to appeal for annulment of the

award. One might have expected the Decree to use either bi-naqD ( ) (to set aside) or b-ilghaa` ( ) (to cancel), which are the termsused in the Arabic versions of the New YorkConvention27 and the UNCITRAL Model Lawon International Commercial Arbitration,28respectively. Practically speaking, however, thelegislation should have the same effect as if themore conventional terms had been used. Theonly provision of any Bahraini law that grantsjurisdiction to local courts to hear appellate chal-lenges to BCDR-AAA awards issued pursuant tothe chambers Jurisdiction by Party Agreement isArticle 24 of the new Decree, which uses thesame phrase b-il-buTlaan to allow parties toappeal to the Cassation Court for the annulmentof the Dispute Resolution Tribunal award.29 Ifthe parties have entered into the written agree-ments necessary to take advantage of the FreeArbitration Zone, however, Article 25 providesthat the parties are not entitled to make suchappeals, cutting off the only jurisdictional routeprovided by law to the Bahraini courts.

A Remaining Role for the Courts Although proper invocation of the Free

Arbitration Zone will prevent the Bahraini courtsfrom entertaining a proceeding to set aside anarbitration award between parties that elect it,that election does not remove the local courtsfrom all contact with BCDR-AAA awards andproceedings, or their attendant arbitration agree-ments.

First, under Article II of the New York Con-vention, the Bahraini courts will retain jurisdic-tion and the obligation to enforce an agreementto arbitrate.

Second, the Bahraini courts will also retainjurisdiction, and an obligation to enforce, anaward resulting from such an arbitration, if eitherparty chooses to enforce it in Bahrain. But theDecree distinguishes for purposes of enforcementbetween tribunal awards, depending on the typeof jurisdiction exercised by the BCDR. Article 15provides that an award issued pursuant to theBCDRs Jurisdiction under the Law shall bedeemed a final judgment by the courts of Bahrain [and] shall be enforceable unless the Cassation


80 F E B R U A R Y / A P R I L 2 0 1 0

1 New York Convention, art. V.Bahrain ratified the New York Conven-tion in 1988. The text of the New YorkConvention is available on the UNCI-TRAL Web site at www.uncitral.org.

2 Bechtel is not the only such example.A decision of the Egyptian Court ofAppeal nullifying an arbitration awardagainst the Egyptian Air Force led to thefamous Chromalloy decision, which en-forced the award in the United States inspite of its having been set aside inEgypt. In re Arbitration between Chro-malloy Aeroservices, Inc. and the ArabRepublic of Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907(D.D.C. 1996).

3 The Bechtel arbitration is describedin two decisions of the U.S. DistrictCourt for the District of Columbia, towhich the award was submitted for en-forcement. See In re Arbitration betweenIntl Bechtel Co. Ltd. & Dept of CivilAviation of Govt of Dubai, 300 F. Supp.2d 112 (D.D.C. 2004) (Bechtel I); 360 F.Supp. 2d 136 (D.D.C. 2005) (BechtelII).

4 See Renewed Motion to Dismiss

Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award,Bechtel II (No. 03-0277).

5 Bechtel I, supra n. 3, 300 F. Supp.2d at 114-15.

6 Id. at 114 (quoting Intl Bechtel Co.Ltd. v. Dept of Civil Aviation of Govt ofDubai, Case No. 288/2002 (Dubai Courtof First Instance)); Renewed Motion toDismiss Petition to Confirm ArbitrationAward, Bechtel II (No. 03-0277), supran. 4 (quoting the Dubai Court of Cassa-tion Judgment dated May 15, 2004).

7 Bechtel II, supra n. 3, 360 F. Supp.2d at 136-37.

8 Bechtel I, supra n. 3, 300 F. Supp.2d at 118.

9 Bechtel II, supra n. 3, 360 F. Supp.2d at 137 & n.3. The UAE ratified theNew York Convention on June 13,2006.

10 Direction Gnrale de lAviation Civilede lmirat de Dubai v. Socit Intl Bechtel,2006 Rev. Arb. 695 (Paris Court of Ap-peal, Sept. 29 2005).

11 See, e.g., Raid Abu-Manneh,Dubai: A Regional Arbitration Center?available at www.mondaq.com (Aug. 20,

2009) (The low point for arbitration inDubai was possibly the UAEs Court ofCassations decision in Dubai AviationCorporation v. Bechtel); Alan Scott Rau,Fear of Freedom, 17 Am. Rev. of IntlArb. 469, 481, n.38 (2006) (the fact thatthe courts of Dubai had annulled anaward against the states own civil avia-tion authority, and in favor of a foreigncompany, was perhaps not totally irrele-vant to a true understanding of thecourts decision (quoting Thomas Clay,Note, 2007 J. Droit Intl (Clunet) 1236,1248); some foreign statesneophytesin the recondite world of internationalarbitrationare not yet able to under-stand the proper standards for thereview of awards).

12 The public policy provision is inArticle V.2 of the New York Conven-tion, it provides:

Recognition and enforcement of anarbitral award may also be refused ifthe competent authority in the coun-try where recognition and enforce-ment is sought finds that:

ENDNOTES

Court orders its suspension .30 Article 23 pro-vides that an arbitration award issued pursuant toJurisdiction by Party Agreement shall be en-forced like any other arbitrationaward subject to the New YorkConvention.

Therefore, if asked to enforcean award resulting from theBCDR-AAAs Jurisdiction byParty Agreement in Bahrain, theBahraini courts retain the abilityto refuse enforcement or stayproceedings for any of the rea-sons enumerated in Articles Vand VI of the New York Con-vention. These grounds areechoed in the Decree.31 And oneof the grounds on which recog-nition and enforcement of anaward may be refused is if thetribunal award contradicts thepublic policy of Bahrain.32 Theuse of the Free Arbitration Zonethus only prevents Bahraini courts from settingaside an arbitration award destined to be en-forced elsewhere; it does not require them toenforce that award within Bahrain.33

By allowing the Bahraini courts to refuseenforcement of an award for all of the reasonspermitted by the New York Convention, includ-

ing that of public policy, Legislative Decree No.30 should ensure that the adoption of the FreeArbitration Zone will not result in the enforce-

ment within Bahrain of anyaward offensive to the countryspublic policy, including Sharialaw. Of course, one would hopethat an award destined to beenforced in Bahrain would bewritten with sufficient sensitivityto local concerns that it wouldavoid offending Bahraini policyin the first place.

ConclusionParties who qualify for and

elect the Free Arbitration Zone,and who do not intend to en-force the resulting arbitrationaward in Bahrain, have a signifi-cant new option. They mayagree to hold their arbitration inone of the most friendly and

convenient locations in the Persian Gulf, underany law other than Bahrains to which they mayagree, and under rules written and administeredby the BCDR with the help of the AAA. Andthey may do so without concern that the courtsof Bahrain will interfere with or set aside theaward of the arbitrators. "

The legislativedecree creates aFree ArbitrationZone by allowingthe parties to

agree not to seekenforcement or annulment of the award in Bahrain.


(a) The subject matter of the differ-ence is not capable of settlementby arbitration under the law ofthat country; or

(b) The recognition or enforcementof the award would be contraryto the public policy of that coun-try.

13 Article V.1(e) of the New YorkConvention states that recognition andenforcement of the award may berefused if [t]he award has not yetbecome binding on the parties or hasbeen set aside or suspended by a competentauthority of the country in which, or underthe law of which, that award was made.(Emphasis added.)

14 Legislative Decree No. 30 , art.9(1) (2009) (Bahr) (hereafter referred toas Decree). The translations in this arti-cle of provisions in this Decree are byDaniel McLaughlin. They are not offi-cial translations.

15 Decree , supra n. 14, art. 9(2)(emphasis added). 16 Id..

17 Article 1 of Decree, supra n. 14,requires a majority of the tribunal incases arising under the Jurisdictionunder the Law to be judges.

18 Decree, supra n. 14, at art. 11(a)19 Decree, supra n. 14, at art. 30(a).

20 Decree, supra n. 14, at art. 1921 The Arbitration Rules for disputes

brought under the BCDR's Jurisdictionby Party Agreement and Jurisdictionunder the Law are available in Englishand Arabic, respectively, at http://bcdr-aaa.org/Rules.asp.

22 Decree, supra n. 14, art. 20.23 Decree, supra n. 14, art. 30(b).24 Decree, supra n. 14, art. 25 (em-

phasis and bracketed numerals added).25 New York Convention art. V.1(e). A

notorious example of the exercise of thatpower by a court in the country whoselaw applied was the 2008 decision of theSupreme Court of India in VentureGlobal Engineering v. Satyam ComputerServices, permitting a challenge beforean Indian court on the basis of Indianpublic policy to an arbitration awardhanded down in the United States undera contract governed by Indian Law.

26 Such an agreement will be effectiveonly if: (1) the law of the country that isa party to the New York Convention isspecified, and (2) the courts of thatcountry will accept the jurisdiction soconferred.

27 Cf. New York Convention art.V.1(e), available at www.uncitral.org/pdf/arabic/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/NY-conv-a.pdf (Arabic) (using ( )

to refer to awards that have been setaside).

28 Cf. UNCITRAL Model Law onInternational Commercial Arbitration art.36(2), available at www.uncitral.org/pdf/arabic/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86996_Ebook.pdf (Arabic) (using the word tocancel ( ) in the translation of theEnglish phrase If an application for set-ting aside an award has been made ( )).

29 Decree, supra n. 14, art. 24(A).30 Id. at art. 15.31 These reasons include deficiencies

in the arbitration agreement (Decree,supra n. 14, art. 24(A)(1); cf. New YorkConvention art. V.1(a)), process (De-cree, supra n. 14, art. 24(A)(2); cf. NewYork Convention art. V.1(b)), and award(Decree, supra n. 14, art. 24(A)(3); cf.New York Convention art. V.1(d)).

32 Decree, supra n. 14. art. 24(A)(5);cf. New York Convention art. V.2(b).

33 The Cassation Court of Bahrainhas jurisdiction over proceedings to setaside awards in disputes submitted pur-suant to the chambers Jurisdictionunder the Law, as well as for disputessubmitted under Jurisdiction by PartyAgreement when the parties have notelected or do not qualify for FreeArbitration Zone treatment.

bahrain's free arbitration zone

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