b747-400 engineering continuation q3 and q4 2015.pdfmodel 747-100, 747-100b, 747-100b sud,...

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  • FOR REFERENCE ONLY

    B747-400

    ENGINEERING

    CONTINUATION TRAINING

    Q3 & Q4 2015

  • FOR REFERENCE ONLY

    FOR REFERENCE ONLY

    Contents:

    1 Changes to the B747 Approval

    2 B747-400 Landing Gear Door Incident

    3 ADs

    4 MOR review

    5 B747-400 Gear Actuator fitted upside down (Serious Incident)

  • FOR REFERENCE ONLY

    1 Introduction / Changes to the B747 approval

    The B747 approval has been reactivated. The approval being made active is reflected in MOE Part 1.9 as follows:

    MAINTENANCE ORGANISATION EXPOSITION

    1.9.3 Aircraft Type / Station Location Listing

    Aircraft type listed in the table above includes passenger & freighter variants. The scope of work includes the APU relevant to the aircraft type within the scope permissible under the A1 rating. A shaded cell denotes a passive approval and as such is subject to the requirements of Technical Procedure 14 for monitoring and re-activation.

  • FOR REFERENCE ONLY

    FOR REFERENCE ONLY

    2. B747 Landing Gear Door.

    18th June 2015 (Memo) B747-400 - Preventing Body Landing Gear Door / Tire Contact (Note to Engineers and Mechanics)

    Hello Gents, Please be aware that a recent maintenance error involved contact between the body landing gear door and tire. As the aircraft was fuelled and loaded, the oleo extension was insufficient to guarantee clearance between the door and tires when the doors were closed post maintenance. There were a number of factors that led to the problem and this memo addresses the technical element of the error. The attached maintenance tip from Boeing clarifies the need to check the oleo extension prior to operation of the landing gear door ground release handle.

    Many thanks in advance, Neil Shepherd Technical Director See over for maintenance tip on this subject

  • FOR REFERENCE ONLY

    FOR REFERENCE ONLY

    Commercial MAINTENANCE TIP

    Aviation Services CUSTOMER SUPPORT ENGINEERING . BOEING COMMERCIAL AIRPLANES . P.O. BOX 3707 SEATTLE . WASHINGTON 98124-2207

    747 MT 32-052

    747-400 MT 32-030

    747-8 MT 32-001

    28 February 2011

    SUBJECT PREVENTING BODY LANDING GEAR DOOR / TIRE CONTACT

    AND DAMAGE

    APPLICABILITY All 747 Series Airplanes CONDITION Body landing gear inboard doors may contact the body gear outboard tires during door

    opening/closing when the airplane is on the ground (i.e. not flying and not on jacks). Extension of the shock

    struts when the airplane is flying or is on jacks provides additional clearance between the doors and tires and

    contact should not occur. RECOMMENDED

    ACTION

    Prior to moving the landing gear doors by means of ground door release handle movement, normal gear

    extension/retraction, or alternate extension, check that both body landing gear shock strut X dimensions (or

    minimum exposed chrome dimensions, as applicable) meet the minimum requirement shown on the

    placards. The placards are located on each large body gear strut door (refer to the Attachment which shows

    the 747-8 example). If the X dimensions are not acceptable, offload weight from the airplane and/or service

    the shock struts, per AMM 12-15-04, to achieve acceptable X dimensions before moving the main gear

    doors.

    Note: Concurrent servicing of the wing gear shock struts per AMM 12-15-03 may be necessary to achieve

    minimum body gear X dimensions.

    BACKGROUND Operating the body landing gear doors when the landing gear shock strut X dimension is

    too small may result in the doors contacting the tires. This contact can result in damage to the body gear

    inboard doors and body gear outboard tires. Also, landing gear doors opened when the airplane is lightly

    loaded may not be able to be closed once the airplane weight is increased MAINTENANCE

    MANUAL ACTION

    Notes to ensure that landing gear shock strut X dimensions are acceptable (prior to door operation) currently

    exist throughout the various AMM procedures. The AMMs are being reviewed again to ensure that all

    affected procedures contain these notes and that the notes are clear. Any revisions that result from this

    review will be included in the following Master AMM revisions:

    747-Classic (-100/-200/-300) 5 October 2011

  • FOR REFERENCE ONLY

    FOR REFERENCE ONLY

    747-400 Series 15 July 2011

    747-8 15 July 2011 CMC/EICAS None. MESSAGE

    Attachment: Typical X Dimension Placard 747-8 Example

    ATTACHMENT To: 747 MT 32-052

    747-400 MT 32-030

    747-8 MT 32-001

    28 February 2011

    Page 1 of 1

    Typical X Dimension Placard 747-8 Example

  • FOR REFERENCE ONLY

    FOR REFERENCE ONLY

    3. B747-400 (PW4000) Airworthiness Directives

    (Note that engine shop visit ADs are not listed) AD 2014-15-14

    ATA 28 Fuel Inspecting certain fuel tank access doors for installation of impact-resistant doors, stencils and index markers

    Manufacturer

    The Boeing Company

    Applicability This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 747-100, 747-100B, 747-100B SUD, 747-200B, 747-200C, 747-200F, 747-300, 747-400, 747-400D, 747-400F, 747SR, and 747SP series airplanes; certificated in any category; as identified in Boeing Service Bulletin 747-28-2315, dated January 11, 2012.

    Reason This AD was prompted by report of a standard access door installed instead of an impact-resistant access door and stencils missing from some impact-resistant access doors and adjacent wing skin. We are issuing this AD to prevent foreign object penetration of the fuel tank, which could cause a fuel leak near an ignition source (e.g., hot brakes or engine exhaust nozzle), consequently leading to a fuel-fed fire.

    4. Maintenance Related MOR

    The following are maintenance related MOR from the UK CAA MOR digest. As the information is protected and strictly controlled by the UK CAA, it is respectfully requested that this information is not circulated. B747-400 Forward drain mast heater wiring damaged and not connected. The aircraft was previously parked for D Check from 17 Oct 2014 to 16 Nov 2014. As report received from operator, the FWD Drain Mast Heater wiring was damaged and not connected, which resulted in the drain mast was being blocked and a lot of flooding in the galleys and toilets. The following actions have been taken by operator: Wiring reconnected with Blue Ray 20's 18 Gauge crimps and heat shrinks wraps, and earth wire connected to stand-off on skin. Defect rectified. The case is under investigation, details of which will be reported later. CAA Closure:

  • FOR REFERENCE ONLY

    FOR REFERENCE ONLY

    The drain mast had been replaced at the previous D Check by a contracted foreign EASA Part 145 organisation, but the wiring had not been properly completed and connected to the aircraft at that time. The investigation established that the organisation did not raise a separate work card for the disconnect of the mast wiring therefore no closure action was carried out. The operator has recommended that the organisation issue a quality notice and training actions to address this issue.

    B747-400 Electrical burning smell in the cabin. Cabin crew reported burning smell around seat 17A. Cabin crew were instructed to turn off IFE and Seat power switches in CSDs office. The smoke fire and fumes QRH was actioned. Utility power switches were turned off. Cabin crew reported smell lessening as soon as initial actions of QRH were completed. After discussion with Maintrol it was decided to re establish utility power with the IFE and Seat power isolated in the CSDs office. As soon as utility power was reselected the burning smell returned. Utility switches were turned off and remained off for the remainder of the flight. After discussion with Maintrol and Ops Control the flight continued. The passengers were moved from 17a and the adjacent seat and the seat was monitored for the remainder of the flight. CAA Closure: It is now confirmed post investigation that the chiller boost fan was defective, no further reports have been received since the chiller boost fan was made inoperative after the incident, so failure of the chiller boost fan is the most likely caused of the fumes and odours reported.

    B747-400 Spoiler actuator rod end found detached. Report into outstation and back into main base of #9 spoiler not deploying. Subsequent inspection revealed rod end had detached from actuator causing actuator to fall and rub on fwd flap assy. Actuator assembly replaced, area of flap inspected iaw SRM. DD raised for corrective action to be carried out next 'A' Check. Actuator replacement c/o satisfactory. All function satisfactory iaw AMM. Off: P/N - 3320550-4, S/N 3376. Maintenance Engineers Report: Surprised to see rod end pulled from actuator, suggest fleet inspection. CAA Closure: Investigation revealed water ingress into the actuator rod threads leading to corrosion. AMM task 27-60-00-200-801 (spoiler actuator corrosion prevention) will be scheduled in for the other aircraft on the fleet at their next 1C check. Long Term Action; Known issue by OEM. Non flight safety. MOOG SIL-27-01 addresses this issue for awareness, for aircraft beyond 75,000 Hrs. Subject aircraft is at 86,000 flt hrs. NB This is the first of this failure modeof this type for the operator. OEM doing an investiga