atul honours thesis

R2P and Libya: Reconciling the Ethical, Legal, and Practical Challenges to

Implementing the Responsibility to Protect

By

Atul Menon

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Award of Honors in

International Studies, Department of International Studies, Simon Fraser University, Fall 2014.

December 12, 2014

Thesis Adviser:

Dr. Onur Bakiner

1

TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................................... 2

Abstract ......................................................................................................................................................... 3

Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 4

1) The Theoretical Approach: Realist Constructivism .............................................................................. 5

a) Situating Power within Realist Constructivism ................................................................................ 6

b) Situating Ethics within Realist Constructivism................................................................................. 8

Methodology: Approaching the Study of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ in Libya .................................... 11

2) Providing Context: The ‘Responsibility to Protect,’ NATO, and Resolution 1973 ............................ 13

a) The Responsibility to Protect .......................................................................................................... 13

b) The UNSC’s Mandate, the intervention in Libya, and the Dominant Narrative ............................. 16

3) Evaluating the Implementation and Legitimacy of the R2P in Libya ................................................. 20

a) Invoking the R2P in Libya .............................................................................................................. 20

b) The Ethical and Legal Legitimacy of the NATO-led Coalition ...................................................... 24

i) NATO’s Ethical Legitimacy and Failure to Encourage Peace Negotiations .............................. 24

ii) Regime Change and the Ground Component.............................................................................. 25

c) Factors Inhibiting the NATO’s Practical legitimacy: Logistical and Operational Shortcomings ... 28

i) NATO’s Operational, Logistical, and Financial Shortcomings .................................................. 28

ii) Importance of Adequate Cultural Knowledge and Operational Effectiveness ........................... 30

d) The Consequences of OUP ............................................................................................................. 31

i) Collateral Damage ...................................................................................................................... 31

ii) Spillover in Mali ......................................................................................................................... 33

iii) Post-interventionist Libya: A Human Security Failure of Local and Regional Proportions ...... 34

4) The International Stability and Conflict Monitoring Body (ISCMB) ................................................. 36

a) Legal Chamber: A Responsibility to Abide .................................................................................... 37

b) Military-Tactical Chamber: Responsibility to Plan ........................................................................ 38

c) Financial Chamber: Responsibility to Contribute ........................................................................... 39

d) Diplomatic and Regional Chamber: Responsibility for Peace and Negotiations ............................ 40

e) Post-intervention Chamber: Responsibility to Rebuild ................................................................... 41

5) Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................... 42

Bibliography ............................................................................................................................................... 44

2

Acknowledgements

This thesis could not have been completed without the assistance and constant support of

my professors, friends, family and loved ones. My utmost gratitude goes out to Professor Onur

Bakiner for his challenging critiques, thought provoking questions, guidance, and his patience. I

would also like to thank Tina for her comments, advice, and presence during the many hours

spent together, writing our theses. In addition, I would like to express the deepest love and

appreciation for my mother, Jaya, my father, Venu, my sister and her husband, Roopika and

Vinay; all of whom have shown the greatest belief in me over the course of my degree and

thesis. Special thanks to my partner, Gwen for her cheer, grammatical reviews, and for helping

me through the many stressful days that accompany the life of an undergraduate student. Lastly,

I am very thankful to all the professors and staff at the Department of International Studies for

their encouragements and for giving me the confidence to enroll in the thesis program.

3

Abstract

Although the International Commission on Interventions and State Sovereignty’s 2001

report on the Responsibility to Protect marked a seminal moment in the progress of norms

endorsing humanitarian interventions, this thesis will demonstrate that there is a disconnect

between the doctrine’s normative progress and its practical implementation. By assessing the

legitimacy of NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya, this thesis seeks to reconcile the ethical, legal

and practical challenges that face the policy implementation of the R2P. Evaluating NATO’s

operation and the failed results of its Libyan intervention, it is argued that NATO’s conduct and

erroneous application of the R2P has resulted in the doctrine’s significant delegitimization. This

in turn, has endangered the future invocation of the doctrine. Consequently, recognizing that the

R2P still offers a beneficial framework through which to rescue and protect populations facing

tyrannical regimes and supreme humanitarian emergencies, this thesis will proceed to propose an

institutional framework to aid the practical policy implementation of the R2P, through the

suggested International Stability and Conflict Monitoring Body (ISCMB). The aim of this thesis

is to reanimate discussions on the R2P and thereby aid its realization.

4

Introduction

Within the fora of global affairs and international security, questions regarding the

theory, legitimacy, and utility of humanitarian interventions tend to pervade the literature. This

literature has become more prominent in the period after the fall of the Soviet Union and the

Cold War’s end. This phenomenon has resulted from multifarious factors including, but not

limited to, the advent of globalization and technological advancements, the rise of a unipolar

international system dominated by the United States of America (US), the observed proliferation

of human security-centric norms, the emergence of various cases requiring humanitarian

interventionist responses, and so on. In addition, many distinguished scholars, policy makers,

and diplomats regarded the 2001 publication of the International Commission on Intervention

and State Sovereignty’s (ICISS) report on the Responsibility to Protect1 (R2P), as ‘marking the

dawn of a new era’2 in the normative expansion of the act humanitarian intervention. Despite this

proclamation, the application of the doctrine in the 2011 North Atlantic Treaty Organization-led

(NATO) intervention in Libya has been derided as a “model of failure”3 and as result, aspersions

have been cast over the doctrine’s future and legitimacy.

In order to ascertain the normative and practical potential of the R2P, it is of the utmost

importance to study the NATO-led intervention in Libya, as it represented the “first full-blown

test”4 for the doctrine, which has been in a process of deliberative refinement ever since its

inception. As such, this thesis seeks to uncover the various dimensions of the 2011 NATO-led

intervention in Libya, as well as the role played by the R2P over the course of the Libyan saga.

The arguments provided in this thesis will encompass the following:

Research Question: In the case of employing the Responsibility to Protect in Libya, to what

extent was the NATO-led coalition legitimate in applying the doctrine and how can we attempt to

reconcile the problems that accompany the practical implementation of the R2P?

1 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (International Development Research Centre:

Ottawa, 2001). Print. 2 Homans, Charles. "Responsibility to Protect: A Short History." Foreign Policy. The FP Group, 11 Oct. 2011. Web.

02 Jan. 2014.

<http%3A%2F%2Fwww.foreignpolicy.com%2Farticles%2F2011%2F10%2F11%2Fresponsibility_to_protect_a_sh

ort_history>. 3 Kuperman, Alan J. "A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reassessing NATO’s Libya Campaign." International

Security 1st ser. 38 (2013): 105-36. Print. 4 “Responsibility to Protect: The Lessons of Libya.” The Economist. The Economist Newspaper, 19 May 2011.

Web. 03 Feb. 2014. <http%3A%2F%2Fwww.economist.com%2Fnode%2F18709571>.

5

Thus, this thesis will investigate the legitimacy and practical dimensions of NATO’s act

of intervention in Libya. In doing so, it is primarily argued that the coalition’s legitimacy and

conduct, viewed through the framework of the R2P, were for the most part, a failure.

Furthermore, the failed nature of the Libyan intervention gravely jeopardizes the invocation of

the doctrine in potential future scenarios that may require interventionist responses. The failed

nature of the intervention in Libya and its detrimental effect on the legitimacy of the R2P, is

evaluated based on four main indicators, namely: a) the limited manner and extent to which the

R2P was rhetorically invoked and mobilized; b) the ethical and legal legitimacy of the NATO-

led coalition’s actions; c) the factors that weakened the coalition’s practical legitimacy; and d)

the intervention’s practical, doctrinal, and regional consequences. After evaluating the failures

that arose in Libya, this thesis will proceed to reinvigorate discussions on the R2P by presenting

an institutional proposal designed to reconcile the tensions between the normative progress

achieved by the R2P, and the difficulties that emerge during its practical policy implementation.

In aiming to institute the “Professionalization of R2P” through the proposed International

Stability and Conflict Monitoring Body (ISCMB), the ultimate objective is to try and aid the

realization of a norm of humanitarian intervention that is directed at the prevention of atrocities

and which is consistently invoked, legally permitted, properly implemented, and effective.

1) The Theoretical Approach: Realist Constructivism

In approaching the topic at hand, this thesis will utilize and build upon Samuel J.

Barkin’s ideas on Realist Constructivism. This section argues that the realist constructivist

approach is the most appropriate lens through which to observe, explain, and predict the goings-

on within the field of International Relations. In particular, this section will focus on two central

points in relation to realist constructivism, namely: a) The conceptualization, manifestation, and

practice of power in the international system; and b) The infusion of ethics and its role in the

aforementioned paradigm, where morality is derived from the ‘logic of liberalism, one of

humanitarian intervention’s’ main ‘ethical sources.’5 Ultimately, it is also argued that using the

5 Farer, Tom J. "Humanitarian Intervention before and after 9/11: Legality and Legitimacy." Humanitarian

Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas. By J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane. Cambridge:

Cambridge UP, 2003. 56. Print.

6

realist constructivist lens serves as a useful tool for policy makers attempting to predict

behavioral trends related to humanitarian interventions.

a) Situating Power within Realist Constructivism

When locating the role of power within the literature on international relations, realist

constructivism borrows quite heavily upon realism’s tenets on power, albeit, with a few key

changes. To start with, what is power? Power, as conceptualized by Wright, is the mechanism of

practicing influence over ‘major groups in the world so as to advance the purposes of some

against the opposition of others.’6 Furthermore, realist constructivism, like realism, continues to

hold that “power is the ultima ratio of international politics.”7 Realist constructivism therefore

places importance on how different actors within the international system exercise their power

and influence in order to attain certain desired outcomes. However, this is where the paradigm

starts branching away from realism.

Unlike most realist literature, which tends to focus on the exercise of power narrowly,

mostly by States as “actors trying to maximize their utility at the expense of others,”8 realist

constructivism contends that the manifestation of power can be broader and more dynamic. This

broadening has emerged as a result of the advent of globalization and technological

advancement, the proliferation of new human security-centric norms, and the end of the Cold

War—all of which have been able to empower a greater array of global non-state actors. These

non-state actors include the global media, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), non-

governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society organizations (CSOs), along with “people and

domestic institutions,” which matter “because they can determine how much power States will

have, and how that power will be used.”9 Additionally, non-state actors have played a key role in

mobilizing civil society voices, in order to have a bottom-up impact on State foreign policies

formulated by bureaucratic elites. Furthermore, as with the expansion of the practice and

influence of power, there has also been a broadening in the motivations that push those who

wield and practice power. This observation can be better explained through the importance of

norms, as theorized by constructivists.

6 Wright, Quincy. The Study of International Relations. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955. Print.

7 Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. "Bridging the Gap: Toward A Realist-Constructivist Dialogue." International Studies

Review 6.2 (2004): 337-52. Print. 8 Krieg, Andreas. "National Interests and Altruism in Humanitarian Intervention." Motivations for Humanitarian

Intervention: Theoretical and Empirical Considerations. Dordrecht: Springer, 2013. 37-58. Print. 9 Barkin, J. Samuel. "Realist Constructivism." International Studies Review 5.3 (2003): 325-42. Print.

7

Constructivists “focus on the impact of norms and rules on State behavior.”10

Norms in

turn, are defined as ‘collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors within a given

identity.’11

Norms are known to be able to “regulate and constrain the behavior of actors,” such

that a level of shared understandings can be achieved, which allow for the (re)constitution of

“identities and interests of the actors themselves.”12

With the rising influence of international organizations and a shifting away from the

State-centric security rhetoric that characterized the Cold-War, Deng’s “conceptualization of

‘sovereignty as responsibility’”13

serves to illustrate the manner in which new norms of human

security, human rights, and the conditional nature of state sovereignty are proliferating. Thus,

power is operating in order to encourage the proliferation and internalization of new norms,

values, and beliefs. The changing origins and practices of power are strongly emphasized in

Nicholas Wheeler’s Saving Strangers, in which Wheeler uses the example of President Clinton’s

‘apology for the international community's failure act in Rwanda,’14

to illuminate the manner in

which States are exposed “to the glare of world public opinion,”15

when they fail to act in

accordance with the newly burgeoning norms of human security.

One common realist criticism is the argument that moral considerations are a cover for

self-interest and that even those politicians who hold moral positions genuinely, will simply give

in to self-interest in demanding situations. The framework of realist constructivism counters this

by arguing that the proliferation of the newly emerging norms of human rights, human security,

and humanitarian intervention – are still a work in progress. The propagation of these new

values, beliefs, and ideas began shortly after the establishment of the post-1945 world order and

continued with renewed vigor after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. In the relatively short

timeframe between 1991 and 2014, the discourse on humanitarian intervention and its practice

has experienced rapid growth and progress. Even the ‘UN’s adoption of R2P as part of its

10

Ibid 11

Katzenstein, Peter J. "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security." The Culture of National

Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. New York: Columbia UP, 1996. 5. Print. 12

Glanville, Luke. "Norms, Interests and Humanitarian Intervention." Global Change, Peace & Security 18.3

(2006): 153-71. Print. 13

Weiss, Thomas G. "New Thinking: The Responsibility to Protect." Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action.

Cambridge, U.K.: Polity, 2007. 98. Print. 14

Wheeler, Nicholas J. Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society. Oxford: Oxford UP,

2000. 241. Print. 15

Ibid

8

unanimous approval of the 2005 World Summit outcome document, and the concept’s

subsequent endorsement by the UNSC,’16

are relatively recent manifestations of a newly

emerging norm. With global governance mechanisms and multilateral acts of intervention having

taken place with regards to the establishment of the International Criminal Court, along with

interventions in Kosovo (1999), Iraq (1991) and Libya (to name a few), realist constructivism

argues that the norms endorsing humanitarian interventions will only continue to proliferate in

their intensity and influence.

b) Situating Ethics within Realist Constructivism

The paradigm of realist constructivism internalizes ethical considerations from both

realist and constructivist thought. With regards to interventions, here, these ethical considerations

are rooted in the understandings of a liberal international order17

. While realism is generally

denigrated for allegedly being “completely hostile to the ethical and political notions of

humanitarian intervention,”18

key realist scholars such as Hans Morgenthau have maintained that

ethics do have a role to play in realism, since ‘all political acts have ethical significance.’19

Morgenthau argues that this can be facilitated through the use of “moral and political

pragmatism,” in order to visualize a world in which interventions could occur while having a

16

Morris, Justin. "Libya and Syria: R2P and the Spectre of the Swinging Pendulum." International Affairs 89.5

(2013): 1265-283. Print. 17

Fernando Tesón provides a suitable description for “morally justified” cases of humanitarian intervention that rest

upon the tenets of “liberal political philosophy.” Tesón explains that according to the logic of the liberal

international order, “a major purpose of States and governments is to protect and secure human rights” which are

“rights that all persons have by virtue of personhood alone.” Furthermore, leaders in power “who seriously violate

these rights” and undermine the “reason that justifies their political power,” cannot be protected by international

law. In other words, “Sovereignty serves valuable human ends, and those who grossly assault them should not be

allowed to shield themselves behind the sovereignty principle.” Thus, abuse of power through “tyranny and

anarchy” leads to the “moral collapse of society.” In such situations, where populations are being oppressed on a

horrendous scale by political leaders, it is justifiable to initiate a “proportionate international use or threat of military

force, undertaken in principle by a liberal government or alliance, aimed at ending tyranny or anarchy, welcomed by

the victims, and consistent with the doctrine of double effect .” However, I would only add that interventions can

and should be undertaken by any alliance or State willing to act on the behalf of the international community and in

the name of human security-centric values, who intend to prevent or attend to supreme humanitarian emergencies. In

addition, global governance bodies are designed to uphold and protect these very same values of human rights. For

more information, see Fernando R. Tesón, “The liberal case for humanitarian intervention,” in J.L Holzgrefe and

Robert O. Keohane eds., Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge UP,

Cambridge, 2003), pp 93-129, and authors cited therein. 18

Fiott, Daniel. "Realist Thought and Humanitarian Intervention." The International History Review 35.4 (2013):

766-82. Print. 19

Morgenthau, Hans J. Scientific Man versus Power Politics. Chicago Etc.: U of Chicago, 1965. 177-78. Print.

9

minimal detrimental effect on the “necessities of the balance of power.”20

The understanding that

even realist tenets include ethical evaluations, allows us to better construct a realist

constructivism without encountering the pitfall assumption ‘that morality must be banished from

the realm of international affairs.’21

Furthermore, this empowers realist constructivism to

envision prescriptive policies that are both pragmatic in accounting for the realities of the

international system, as well as ethically driven to ensure a legitimate standing.

There exists already a powerful infusion of ethical considerations within the

constructivist discourse. Ethical considerations allow for prescriptive and permissive norms of

humanitarian intervention to proliferate, not only from State policies, but from other domestic

and international non-state origins: concerned citizen groups, the global media, IGOs, NGOs,

civil society organizations (CSOs) etc. Globalization and technological advancements have

facilitated the rise of a global public sphere and the embodiment of a “common humanity,” 22

through which such non-state groups can openly and articulately voice their opinions. The

proliferation of prescriptive norms, aided by the efforts of such sources, has the power to

“(re)constitute state interests so that norm compliant behavior is seen as being in the State’s

interest.” 23

Castells postulates that globalization along with the “decreased ability of nationally based

political systems to manage the world’s problems on a global scale,” have given rise to a “global

civil society.” 24

This has also shifted ‘the space of debates on public affairs’ from the ‘national to

the global.’25

The R2P should also fall under a globalized public sphere of debate. Even the

recent establishment of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court (ICC) is

momentous given that a global civil society of various NGOs, CSOs, and activists played a key

role in its institutionalization. Marchetti highlights that CSOs and transnational networks are

20

Molloy, Sean. "Truth, Power, Theory: Hans Morgenthau's Formulation of Realism." Diplomacy & Statecraft 15.1

(2004): 1-34. Print. 21

Hendrickson, David C. "In Defense of Realism: A Commentary on Just and Unjust Wars." Ethics and

International Affairs 11.1 (1997): 19-53. Print. 22

Tesón, Fernando R. "The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention." Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical,

Legal, and Political Dilemmas. By J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003. 93-

129. Print. 23

Glanville, Luke. "Norms, Interests and Humanitarian Intervention." Global Change, Peace & Security 18.3

(2006): 153-71. Print. 24

Castells, M. “The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication Networks, and Global Governance.”

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616.1 (2008): 78-93. Print. 25

Ibid

10

‘characterised by their advocacy in promoting normative change in politics,” where the

establishment of the ICC (1995) and the “approval of the Rome Statute” (1998) are exemplars of

their “success in influencing policy on global issues.”26

Similarly, with the ICC being able to

“prosecute individuals, from common soldiers to heads of state, for genocide, war crimes, and

crimes against humanity,”27

Glasius lionizes global civil society actors for infusing a “dimension

of morality and idealism”28

to the ICC. While many may question the ICC’s effectiveness today,

it must be stressed that the role played by civil society actors was itself an impressive feat,

especially considering that powerful States such as the U.S. and India were opposed to its

establishment. Despite the ICC’s shortcomings, such normative changes are indicative of a still

emerging trend, where global civil society will be increasingly looked upon to pressure States

into complying with human security-centric norms.

The above two sections have therefore argued that a realist constructivist approach can

account for both the role of power and ethics within the international system. With classical

realist theories being far too narrow and constructivist theories not sufficiently accounting for the

role played by those wielding power, realist constructivism demonstrates how a norm of

humanitarian intervention can exist within the confines of the international system. Here, the key

point to adhere to is that power can be both rooted in and exercised through a broader and more

dynamic manner. Though it manifests in an asymmetrical manner, in the twenty-first century,

power can be concentrated in and exercised from both States and non-state groups, where

traditionally power was observed to emanate solely from the top echelons of State bureaucratic

policy circles. Nowadays, both domestic and global civil society groups have been empowered

by globalization and technological advancements to play a greater role in foreign policy

formulations and international relations. Moreover, with numerous non-state groups and civil

society actors being motivated by human security-centric considerations, policies framed by

bureaucratic elites can be influenced by the pressures exerted through bottom-up mechanisms.

Moving forward, as the forces generating these norms continue to strengthen over time,

26

Marchetti, Raffaele. The Role of Civil Society in Global Governance: Report on the Joint Seminar Organised by

the EUISS, the European Commission / DG Research, and UNU-CRIS. Brussels and Rome: European Union

Institute for Security Studies, 2010. 15. Print. 27

Glasius, Marlies. "Global Civil Society Influence on the Statue for an International Criminal Court." Global Civil

Society Yearbook 2002. By Marlies Glasius, Mary Kaldor, and Helmut Anheier. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002. 137-68.

Print. 28

Ibid

11

discussions on the subject of humanitarian interventions will become more salient. Additionally,

realist constructivism, in accounting for power and ethics in such a manner, can justify an

international system in which humanitarian interventions and the ISCMB, both have a role and

position.

Methodology: Approaching the Study of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ in Libya

The first phase of the research pertains to the history, legality, and ethics of humanitarian

intervention. Once a fuller understanding of the subject is attained, this phase also includes the

evaluation and comparison of academic works and policy briefs related to the R2P, its history,

and its application in regards to the NATO-led intervention in Libya. The academic literature is

obtained through the use of key search phrases such as “humanitarian intervention,” along with

“ethics,” “R2P and Libya,” “security,” “liberalism,” “criticism” on the databases of prominent

journals such as International Studies Review, Ethics and International Affairs, International

Security, Diplomacy & Statecraft, and International Affairs. The journals represent a wide range

of interdisciplinary social scientific sub-fields ranging from political philosophy, to political

science, history, and international relations. The academic literature is complemented by an

analysis of primary and secondary research, which include books, organizational reports (by

NATO, Human Rights Watch29

, Amnesty International, ICISS, UNSC, think tanks), global news

media reports (such as The Guardian, New York Times, Reuters, BBC etc.), speeches, and

analytical pieces by major international affairs publications such as Foreign Policy, Foreign

Affairs, and the Belfer Center.

The second stage of the research focuses on uncovering existing gaps in the current

literature pertaining to the subject of humanitarian intervention. The secondary source literature

was compiled and compared in terms of how well it applied to the intervention in Libya. Much

of the literature that suggested possible solutions to challenges that arise in interventions, could

not be directly applied to rectify the errors of the Libyan intervention because of their narrow

scope. While the literature did attempt to provide solutions to the challenges that arise in

implementing interventionist operations, the proposed solutions were often narrow in their focus.

In other words the offered solutions tended to address micro-level challenges to implementation.

29

From this point on, Human Rights Watch will be referred to as HRW.

12

For example, proposed solutions ranged from how to choose or encourage interventionist

participation, to focussing on the economic origins of conflicts, to paying attention to post-

conflict statebuilding etc. The literature was feeble in connecting the different solutions and

bringing them together to envision a fuller picture (macro-level) of the problems that arise in the

totality of the R2P’s practical policy implementation and how its complex components would

function together. Based on this recognition, a proposal was devised which sought to attend to

the practical challenges of implementing the R2P. This thesis, presented in the form of an

extended literature review, will seek to contribute to the literature by addressing these gaps

through the formulation of the International Stability and Conflict Monitoring Body (ISCMB).

While the first portion of the thesis will seek to discuss the legitimacy and practical utility of the

R2P in Libya, in the latter portions of this thesis, an attempt will be made to produce a macro-

level institutional solution aimed at the “Professionalization of R2P,” by addressing the diverse

challenges that arose in the Libyan intervention. It must be noted that a lack of field experience

and the usage of potentially biased western dominated literature on the subject might weaken the

validity of this paper’s findings. However, an attempt has been made at mitigating these biases

through the heavy use of more primary source documents in the analyses.

Here, legitimacy is defined through three merging perspectives. In the first sense “the

contemporary legitimacy of humanitarian intervention is based on UN Security Council

authorization of the use of force,”30

international law, and the extent to which a legal mandate is

followed. The second lens adopts Pattison’s conceptualization in which he states that “an

intervener's effectiveness is the primary (and a necessary) determinant of its legitimacy.”31

For

the purpose of this thesis, effectiveness is measured based on two central sub-criteria, namely: a)

the extent to which an intervener is “likely to promote or harm the enjoyment of basic human

rights” among members of a political community in which an intervention takes place; and b) a

‘global external effectiveness’ which is the extent to which an “intervener is likely to promote or

harm the enjoyment of basic human rights in the world at large.”32

Thirdly, the term “legitimacy”

also encompasses the ethics of jus in bello (justice in war) and jus ad bellum (justice of war)

30

Kahler, M. "Legitimacy, Humanitarian Intervention, and International Institutions." Politics, Philosophy &

Economics 10.1 (2011): 20-45. Print. 31

Pattison, James. "Legitimacy and Humanitarian Intervention: Who Should Intervene?" The International Journal

of Human Rights 12.3 (2008): 395-413. Print. 32

Ibid

13

structures of just war theory (JWT), as conceptualized by Michael Walzer. Thus, this thesis

adopts an understanding of legitimacy that covers intermixing legal, practical, and ethical

dimensions, which taken together have a powerful role in influencing the course and validity of

any intervention under the R2P.

2) Providing Context: The ‘Responsibility to Protect,’ NATO, and Resolution

1973

a) The Responsibility to Protect

The build-up and spread of human security-centric discourse at the end of the Cold-War

contributed to the release of the ICISS’s report on the Responsibility to Protect in 2001. At the

UN General Assembly (UNGA) meetings of 1999 and 2000, ‘Secretary-General Kofi Annan

made compelling pleas to the international community to try to find consensus on how to

approach’33

the issues surrounding the need for humanitarian interventions. Annan had

emphasized that the international community needed to reach a solution on how to respond to

“gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common

humanity.”34

In response, the Canadian government, “together with a group of major

foundations,”35

aided the formulation of the R2P doctrine.

The doctrine has sought to reconceptualise the notion of state sovereignty, such that the

concept of sovereignty was viewed as “a responsibility, the responsibility to uphold one’s

citizens’ basic human rights,”36

where if a State was “unwilling or unable”37

to grant this

protection, the sovereignty of the State in question would be temporarily suspended, thereby

33

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the


Ottawa, 2001). Print. 34

Ibid 35

Ibid 36

Pattison, James. "Humanitarian Intervention and International Law: The Moral Importance of an Intervener’s

Legal Status." Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 2007th ser. 10.3 (2007): 301-19.

Print. 37



Ottawa, 2001). Print.

14

moving to an “international responsibility to respond.”38

Within the first decade of the twenty-

first century, the doctrine had experienced some bitter-sweet moments. At the 2005 World

Summit, while States generally agreed that there was “a universal responsibility to protect

populations”39

against “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity,”40

the version of the doctrine agreed to was criticized as being ‘watered down’41

in form. There

were certain essential differences between the original document produced by the ICISS and the

World Summit Outcome that was agreed to by the international community.

Heinze highlights how the original document stated that the responsibility to protect

‘transferred from individual States to the international community in cases where a State was

“unable or unwilling” to protect its citizens,’ whereas the World Summit Outcome defined a

“clearly higher threshold for action” in changing the wording to ‘cases where the State in

question is “manifestly failing”’ to protect its citizens42

. Similarly, whereas the ICISS has

defined the just cause threshold for military intervention as cases of “serious and irreparable

harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur,”43

the World Summit Outcome

changed this wording to reflect “the more limited circumstances of genocide, war crimes, ethnic

cleaning, and crimes against humanity.”44

Next, though the ICISS clearly designated that the

international community has a “responsibility”45

to take affirmative action when States fail to

carry out their outlined responsibilities, the World Summit Outcome ‘tempers’ this language to

reflect that ‘the international community need only be prepared to take action on a case-by-case

38

Pattison, James. "Humanitarian Intervention and International Law: The Moral Importance of an Intervener’s

Legal Status." Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 2007th ser. 10.3 (2007): 301-19.

Print. 39

Pattison, James. "Legitimacy and Humanitarian Intervention: Who Should Intervene?" The International Journal

of Human Rights 12.3 (2008): 395-413. Print. 40

UN General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, 24 October

2005, A/RES/60/1, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/44168a910.html [accessed 7 October 2014] 41

Bellamy, Alex J. "Realizing the Responsibility to Protect." International Studies Perspectives 10.2 (2009): 111-

28. Print. 42

Heinze, Eric A. "Humanitarian Intervention, the Responsibility to Protect, and Confused Legitimacy." Human

Rights and Human Welfare 11 (2011): 17-32. Print. 43

This threshold includes the “large loss of life” or “large-scale ethnic cleansing.” For more, see refer to:



Ottawa, 2001). 44





Ottawa, 2001). Print.

15

basis.’46

Lastly, the World Summit Outcome affirms “the authority of the Security Council to

mandate coercive action to maintain and restore international peace and security,”47

which stands

in contrast to the ICISS’s own position, which permits interventions in extreme cases without the

approval of the UN Security Council (UNSC). Though this thesis supports the wording presented

within the ICISS’s original publication, the arguments presented will revolve around the

framework adopted in the 2005 World Summit Outcome, since it has been affirmed by the

international community and is thus the version that is currently (supposedly) being exercised.

According to the UNSG’s 2009 report on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, the

implementation of the R2P is encapsulated within a three-pillared strategy. Pillar I of the report,

outlines the “protection responsibilities of the State,” where every State within the international

community has a responsibility to protect its “populations, whether nationals or not, from

genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and from their

incitement.”48

Pillar II is designed to express “the commitment of the international community to

assist States in meeting,” their Pillar I obligations, and advises cooperation with “Member States,

regional and sub-regional arrangements, civil society and the private sector.”49

Subsequently,

Pillar III, the hard military pillar, conveys “the responsibility of Member States to respond

collectively in a timely and decisive manner when a State is manifestly failing to”50

uphold its

Pillar I and II commitments. Pillar III allows for the summoning and use of the coercive Chapter

VII (“use of armed force”51

) and VIII (“regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement

action”52

) provisions of the UN Charter.

Still, despite the strong changes made to the original doctrine’s phrasing, numerous

initiatives were taken by UN Secretary General (UNSG) Ban Ki-moon in attempting to further

establish international normative consensus on the doctrine, which included reports that

46



UN General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, 24 October

2005, A/RES/60/1, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/44168a910.html [accessed 7 October 2014] 48

UN General Assembly, Implementing the responsibility to protect : report of the Secretary-General, 12 January

2009, A/63/677, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4989924d2.html [accessed 8 October 2014] 49

Ibid 50

Ibid 51

United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, available at:

http://www.unwebsite.com/charter [accessed 9 July 2014] 52

Ibid

16

discussed ‘early warning assessments, the need for global-regional collaboration to help

implement the doctrine, the need for timely and decisive response, and the necessity of focussing

on conflict prevention.’53

Furthermore, in the Secretary-General’s 2010 report, the Office of the

“Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect” was established and charged with “the

development and refinement of the Responsibility to Protect concept,” along with “fostering

political dialogue”54

among Member States and other stakeholders, to ultimately progress on the

path towards the successful implementation of the doctrine.

b) The UNSC’s Mandate, the intervention in Libya, and the Dominant Narrative

The emergence of turmoil under the Libyan dictatorship of Muammar Gaddafi provided

the first full-fledged test for the implementation of the R2P. The Libyan uprising, which began

in February 2011, started as an off-shoot from similar people’s revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt.

Driven by the cries “Ashsha‘b yurıd isqat. an-nizam”55

(the people want to bring down the

regime), as the civilian unrest in the region increased, it was soon termed as the “Arab Spring,” 56

and referred to the uprising flamed by the people’s discontentment with the ruling dictatorship

and the bureaucratic elite. In Libya, the revolution against the dictatorship of Gaddafi began

during the middle of February, with ‘protests breaking out in Libya’s second largest city,

Benghazi.’57

Within a few short days the protests had swiftly spread to the other Libyan cities of

Tripoli, Al Bayda, Misurata and even smaller regional towns. As the instability intensified, the

levels of violence continued to expand and escalate, with anti-Gaddafi rebels on one side and the

pro-Gaddafi loyalists and mercenaries, on the other.

Gaddafi’s responses were televised across the world by various news media

organizations, who reported that Gaddafi had launched “assaults on peacefully demonstrating

53

United Nations. "Background Information on the Responsibility to Protect." UN News Center. UN, n.d. Web. 05

Mar. 2014. <http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgresponsibility.shtml>. 54

United Nations. "Office of The Special Adviser on The Prevention of Genocide." UN News Center. UN, n.d. Web.

05 Apr. 2014. <http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/>. 55

Hehir, Aidan, and Robert W. Murray. Libya: The Responsibility to Protect and the Future of Humanitarian

Intervention. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 4. Print. 56

Kuperman, Alan J. "A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reassessing NATO’s Libya Campaign." International

Security 1st ser. 38 (2013): 105-36. Print. 57

CNN Library. "Libya Civil War Fast Facts." CNN. Cable News Network, Updated on 25 Mar. 2014. Web. 27

Mar. 2014. <http://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/20/world/libya-civil-war-fast-facts/>.

17

citizens.”58

On February 22nd

, Gaddafi called on his supporters to “come out of” their homes and

“attack [the opposition] in their dens,” in addition to having referred to the protestors as

‘cockroaches and rats’59

who deserved to die. In spite of a roadmap sponsored by the African

Union (AU), that called on the regime to implement ‘an effective cease-fire and initiate, in a

peaceful and democratic manner, political reforms that meet the aspirations of the Libyan

people,”60

Gaddafi issued televised statements in which he elucidated his refusal to “leave this

land” and instead preferred to “die as a martyr at the end.”61

At the time, journalistic reports were

even cautioning the type of language being used by Gaddafi, as being “language chillingly

reminiscent of the broadcasts of Radio Mille Collines,” which was famously known to have

“spurred on the perpetrators of Rwanda's genocide in 1994.”62

This sort of aggressive rhetoric

continued to increase in lethality and urgency, as Gaddafi threatened to “cleanse Libya house by

house.”63

The perception of Gaddafi’s rhetoric created a sense of urgency, which was further

galvanized by his stationing of “a large concentration of armored vehicles” towards Benghazi,

which was “the headquarters of the revolution and home to 750,000 people”.64

In the midst of

military build-up and aggression, key defections were taking place within the Libyan

bureaucracy, with many Libyan State service officials unhesitatingly calling for the ‘overthrow

of the tyrant’65

Gaddafi. By now, there was a sufficient basis for the UN to invoke the doctrine

58

Gaub, Florence. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Libya: Reviewing Operation Unified Protector.

Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2013. vii. Print. 59

"Responsibility to Protect: The Lessons of Libya." The Economist. The Economist Newspaper, 19 Mar. 2011.

Web. 16 Feb. 2014. 60

African Union. The African Union Ad Hoc High‐Level Committee On Libya Convenes Its Second Meeting In

Addis Ababa. 2011. Print. 61

Black, Ian. "Gaddafi Urges Violent Showdown and Tells Libya 'I'll Die a Martyr'" The Guardian. Guardian News

and Media, 23 Feb. 2011. Web. 02 Mar. 2014.

< http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/22/muammar-gaddafi-urges-violent-showdown>. 62


Web. 16 Feb. 2014. 63

Daalder, Ivo H., and James G. Stavridis. "NATO's Victory in Libya." Foreign Affairs. Council on Foreign

Relations, Mar.-Apr. 2012. Web. 03 Mar. 2014. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137073/ivo-h-daalder-and-

james-g-stavridis/natos-victory-in-libya>. 64

Fogh Rasmussen, Anders. "NATO After Libya: The Atlantic Alliance in Austere Times." Foreign Affairs. Council

on Foreign Relations, Inc., 1 July 2011. Web. 11 Feb. 2014. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67915/anders-

fogh-rasmussen/nato-after-libya>. 65

"TIMELINE-Libya's Uprising against Muammar Gaddafi." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 28 Mar. 2011. Web. 08

Feb. 2014.

18

by first “urging the regime to meet its ‘responsibility to protect’ its people.”66

This failed as the

regime’s rhetoric continued to display a flagrant refusal to heed the warnings of the UNSC.

Finally, on February 26th

, the UNSC “unanimously” passed Resolution 1970 (UNSCR)

authorizing the “implementation of an arms embargo on Libya,” along with ‘travel bans,

sanctions, and financial asset freezes’67

placed on Gaddafi and key members within his circle.

Then on March 17th

, after weeks of tense fighting, failed sanctions, embargoes, and

Gaddafi’s adamant refusal to obey the directives suggested by the UNSC, the Council decided to

authorize “the use of force”68

under chapter VII of the Charter. UNSCR 1973 permitted certain

legitimate actors “to take all necessary measures” to ‘protect civilians and civilian populated

areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.’69

Furthermore, such an intervention

was to be conducted “while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of

Libyan territory.”70

In addition, Resolution 1973 also mandated the establishment of a no-fly

zone and an arms embargo.71

On March 19th

, a coalition led by the US, consisting of France and Great Britain (UK),

began launching “air and missile strikes against Libyan forces”72

on their way to vital rebel

strongholds. Subsequently, by March 22nd

, the responsibility to carry out the provisions of the

mandate was passed onto NATO to implement.73

On March 24th

, NATO announced that it would

take over all aspects of the Libyan intervention, which later led to the start of NATO’s

66


Web. 16 Feb. 2014. 67

UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1970 (2011), 26 February 2011, S/RES/1970 (2011), available

at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4d6ce9742.html [accessed 8 October 2014] 68

Sands, Philippe. "UN's Libya Resolution 1973 Is Better Late than Never." The Guardian. Guardian News and

Media, 19 Mar. 2011. Web. 24 Feb. 2014. 69

UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1973 (2011) [on the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya],

17 March 2011, S/RES/1973(2011), available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4d885fc42.html [accessed 8

Ocober 2014] 70

Ibid 71

Ibid 72




Poort, David, and Ismaeel Naar. "Timeline: Three Years after Libya's Uprising." Aljazeera. Aljazeera, 19 May

2014. Web. 19 June 2014. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2014/02/timeline-three-years-after-libya-

uprising-201421691755192622.html>.

19

“Operation Unified Protector,” (OUP) on the 31st of March, and in doing so, also signalled “for

the first time in its history,” NATO’s declaration of war against an “Arab country.”74

The campaign, which spanned from 23rd

March 2011 to 31st October 2011, lasted 222

days.75

Mission figures released by NATO report that the campaign was waged with ‘8000

troops, 260 air assets, 21 naval assets, 26500 sorties, and 9500 strike sorties,’ along with

engaging ‘5900 military targets, including over 400 artillery or rocket launchers and over 600

tanks or armored vehicles.’76

Moreover, OUP came with a hefty price tag amounting to “$1.1

billion for the US and several billion dollars overall.”77

OUP was carried out by 28 NATO-

member States, of which “14 committed military assets, but only 8 were prepared to fly ground

attack sorties.”78,79

Besides NATO member countries, four non-NATO States contributed to OUP

as well.80

In the months immediately after the end of OUP, the general sentiment being expressed

by the leaders of the operation was one of success. With NATO “financially drained by the debt

crisis,” OUP was described as “a much-needed success for an alliance fatigued”81

by its

engagement in Afghanistan over the past decade. Towards the end of the operation, General

Jodice (Air Component Commander for OUP) congratulated the coalition for displaying

“professionalism and tremendous effort” in producing an “air campaign that saved thousands of

Libyan lives.”82

Additionally, OUP was also considered as a diplomatic success, with NATO

praised for working in conjunction with The Arab League, in what amounted to “the first-ever

74


Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2013. Print. 75

NATO. "Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR Final Mission Stats." North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO, 2

Nov. 2011. Web. 28 Mar. 2014. <http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_11/20111108_111107-

factsheet_up_factsfigures_en.pdf>. 76

Ibid 77




Davis, Dr. Ivan. How Good Is NATO after Libya? Rep. no. Briefing Paper No. 20. Gairloch: NATO Watch, 2011.

Print. Ser. 2011. 79

The 8 countries that carried out ground attack sorties were: France, UK, US, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Italy

and Canada. 80

The non-NATO members were Jordan, Qatar, Morocco, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). 81

Brzezinski, Ian. "Lesson From Libya: NATO Alliance Remains Relevant." National Defense. National Defense

Industrial Association, Nov. 2011. Web. 02 Apr. 2014.

<http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nationaldefensemagazine.org%2Farchive%2F2011%2FNovember%2FPages%2FLessonFr

omLibyaNATOAllianceRemainsRelevant.aspx>. 82

Phinney, Todd R. "Reflections on Operation Unified Protector." JFQ 73 2014th ser. 2 (2014): 86-92. Print.

20

NATO-Arab combat partnership.”83

Phinney praises ‘Jordan, Qatar, and the UAE’ for playing a

vital role in contributing “personnel and aircraft.”84

What is more, many had deemed the

intervention as a success for the R2P. Former Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, who

played an important role in the construction of the R2P, had opined that “the stars were well and

truly aligned in the Libya case,” even adding that “all the criteria were satisfied.”85

However, contrary to the narrative pursued by the West, in the months following the end

of OUP, Libya continued to unravel with increased instability and violence. The next section of

this thesis will discuss the legitimacy of NATO’s intervention, along with the various challenges

it faced. In doing so, this thesis will use the lessons of Libya to try and reconcile the clear gap

between the normative and discursive progress that the R2P has achieved, and the challenges that

face its policy implementation.

3) Evaluating the Implementation and Legitimacy of the R2P in Libya

To examine the legitimacy and challenges encountered in employing the R2P in Libya,

the following section will cover four investigative segments: a) The extent to which the R2P in

was rhetorically invoked and mobilized in Libya; b) The shortcomings of the ethical and legal

legitimacy of the NATO-led coalition’s actions; c) The factors that inhibited the coalition’s

practical legitimacy; and d) The intervention’s destructive consequences for Libya, the R2P, and

the larger region.

a) Invoking the R2P in Libya

For an intervention to be accepted as functioning under the R2P, an expectation exists

that nations should be able to explicitly justify ‘their policy positions and the apparent relevance

of the R2P to these”86

policies. Embarking on an interventionist operation without explicitly

invoking the doctrine could hamper the doctrine’s normative expansion. With the doctrine

having been formulated to better organize and validate the occurrence of humanitarian

interventions, a failure to cite the doctrine also has the potential to weaken the legitimacy of any

83

Ibid 84

Ibid 85

"Responsibility to Protect: The Lessons of Libya." The Economist. The Economist Newspaper, 19 May 2011.

Web. 03 Feb. 2014. <http%3A%2F%2Fwww.economist.com%2Fnode%2F18709571>. 86


(2013): 1265-283. Print. Ibid

21

undertaken intervention. In addition, Morris opines that even if the doctrine were invoked in the

UNSC to justify the need for an intervention, an intervener’s callous and erroneous

implementation of the doctrine could be “seized upon by those sceptical towards R2P in order to

delegitimize the concept.”87

Thus, before evaluating the legitimacy of the OUP, the following

section focusses on understanding the extent to which the R2P was invoked with regards to

UNSCR 1973. This is done in order to ascertain the normative status of the R2P, to aid the

further evaluation of the intervention’s legitimacy, and to aid the design of the ISCMB.

During deliberations in the UNSC, though UNSCR 1973 was passed by the Council, it

was met with significant resistance. The resolution’s success was exceptional in that the People’s

Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation “were willing to acquiesce in the passage”

of Resolution 1973 “by abstention,”88

instead of expressing their discontentment by resorting to a

veto of the draft. While this was the case with Libya, it is worth noting that Russia and China

were swayed into abstaining, through pressure exerted by regional bodies including the “League

of Arab States, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference,”89

all of whom had growing economic ties (leverage) with the two nations. An awareness of such

circumstances and factors are required for those looking to formulate policies that aim at

encouraging the passage and implementation of resolutions relating to the R2P.

Morris observes that the doctrine, as it links to Libya, was invoked in a limited manner,

where “only France and Colombia referred to the concept”90

during the deliberation period, and

even then, only in reference to Libya’s Pillar I responsibilities. There was almost no mention of

the Pillar II and III responsibilities that fell upon the international community, when the primary

State in question is unable to fulfil its Pillar I responsibilities. In fact, Morris adds that in

discussions occurring in the UNSC between February 2011 and May 2013, clear references to

the R2P were made only by “six council members,” where Libya’s Pillar I responsibilities were

explicitly referred to by ‘the US, France (twice), Columbia (twice), and Germany’ and where the

Pillar III responsibilities of the international community were explicitly referred to by ‘France

87

Ibid 88

Hehir, Aidan, and Robert W. Murray. Libya: The Responsibility to Protect and the Future of Humanitarian

Intervention. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 110. Print. 89

Ibid., 152. 90


(2013): 1265-283. Print.

22

(twice), Lebanon, and Rwanda.’91

For Morris, this observation potentially suggests two things: a)

that “States did not cite R2P in the debates over Libya simply because it did not figure

significantly in their thinking,” or more plausibly, b) that States were unwilling to “cite the

concept, especially in pillar three guise, given the controversy which still surrounds it.”92

In

either case, the evidence implies that those celebrating the normative expansion of the R2P, may

have done so prematurely. The unwillingness or inability to adequately discuss the hard Pillar III

aspects of the R2P was also evidenced by the extent to which the doctrine was weakened in the

World Summit Outcome meeting, where nations were mostly willing to deliberate only the Pillar

I aspects of the doctrine.

Beside the difficulties faced during the actual drafting and ratification of UNSCR 1973,

many scholars also question the intent and motivation of those key powers pushing for the

intervention. Here, the US that played a central role in calling for international action. However,

even the American government’s invocation of the doctrine was quite vague and limited.

President Obama, instead of talking about the R2P, based the need to intervene on a

“responsibility to act.”93

President Obama’s justification was therefore clearly conditioned upon

the presence of American geopolitical “interests and values.”94

Additionally, the refusal to

invoke the doctrine in name is surprising, given that Obama’s former US Permanent

Representative to the UN, Susan Rice, while giving a speech in New York in 2009, had

described the principle as ‘bold and important’ and that the US “welcomed it.”95

Mohamed

therefore argues that America’s actions were “guided primarily by U.S. interests and only

secondarily by a sense of responsibility regardless of interest.”96

Still, Mohamed follows this

same line of argument in suggesting that perhaps there was a ‘deep sense of moral duty at the

91

Ibid 92

Ibid 93

Obama, Barack. Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya. National Defense University,

Washington D.C. 28 Mar. 2011. The White House. Web. 28 Sept. 2014. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-

office/2011/03/28/remarks-president-address-nation-libya>. 94

Ibid 95

Rice, Susan E. Remarks by Ambassador Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative, on the UN Security

Council and the Responsibility to Protect, at the International Peace Institute Vienna Seminar. U.S. Mission to the

United Nations, New York. 15 June 2009. United States Mission to the United Nations. Web. 2 Oct. 2014.

<http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/2009/125977.htm>. 96

Mohamed, Saira. "Taking Stock of the Responsibility to Protect." Stanford Journal of International Law 48.2

(2012): 319-39. Print.

23

heart of the (U.S.) decision to intervene,’ and that it was ‘political expediency’ that motivated the

talking points’ subordination of the R2P to other interests.’97

Despite the American unwillingness to definitively refer to the doctrine, the ICISS clearly

acknowledges that “the absence of any narrow self-interest at all may be ideal, but it is not likely

always to be a reality,” and that the costs and risks of investing in interventions may make it

“politically imperative for intervening States to be able to claim some degree of self-interest in

the intervention, however altruistic its primary motive might be.”98 Tesón also promotes the idea

that the doctrine “requires humanitarian intention to be one reason for intervening, but not

necessarily the only one.”99

Similarly, Pattison stresses the importance of ‘intention,’ which is

“the contemplated act, what the agent wills to do”; so, regardless of the presence of self-

interested (primary) motives, if the “kind of military intervention we are discussing is a good

action performed out of a bad or non-altruistic motive,”100

it can still be legitimate since it has

the potential to save lives and end suffering. In linking this reasoning to Obama’s public rhetoric,

it is found that Obama wanted to prevent a “massacre that would have reverberated across the

region and stained the conscience of the world.”101

Thus, having ascertained that the US did

purportedly want to save lives and that the limited invocation of the R2P, while weak, was

seemingly sufficient to authorize UNSCR 1973, the next sections will judge the overall

legitimacy of the intervention conducted under the R2P.

97

Ibid 98



Ottawa, 2001). Print. 99

Tesón, Fernando R. "Humanitarian Intervention: Loose Ends." Journal of Military Ethics 10.3 (2011): 192-212.

Print. 100

Pattison, James. “Humanitarian Intervention and International Law: The Moral Importance of an Intervener’s

Legal Status.” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 2007th ser. 10.3 (2007): 301-19.

Print. 101

Obama, Barack. Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya. National Defense University,

Washington D.C. 28 Mar. 2011. The White House. Web. 28 Sept. 2014. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-

office/2011/03/28/remarks-president-address-nation-libya>.

24

b) The Ethical and Legal Legitimacy of the NATO-led Coalition

i) NATO’s Ethical Legitimacy and Failure to Encourage Peace Negotiations

While discussing the legitimate use of force in interventions, the ICISS’s doctrine advises

the ‘full exploration of all peaceful means of resolving a conflict.’102

With the formulation of the

R2P having “drawn from traditional just war theory,’103

the NATO-led coalition’s approach and

faulty application of the R2P seemingly weakens the overall legitimacy of the intervention.

According to Kuperman, NATO should have carried out its mandate and enforced “the no-fly

zone, bombed forces that were threatening civilians, and attempted to forge a cease-fire.”104

Instead, short of peace through outright military victory, NATO seems to have thwarted most, if

not all other political avenues through which to bring the conflict to a peaceful close. De Waal

stresses that the AU roadmap did include provisions for a “cease-fire and negotiations,” but the

rebel “TNC (Transitional National Council) leadership rejected the plan”105

outright. Kuperman

also lambasts NATO for aiding “the rebels who rejected this peaceful path and who instead

sought to overthrow Qaddafi.”106

The TNC were also “flushed with military support from

NATO,” which ostensibly led to the ‘hardening of the rebel’s intransigence and delays in”107

achieving a political resolution. Beyond rejecting the AU’s roadmap to peace, which Gaddafi

himself “accepted,”108

when Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez struggled to ‘broker a truce

between the rebels and Muammar Gaddafi,’109

the rebels responded by vowing “never to

102



Ottawa, 2001). 1. print 103

Nye, Joseph S. "The Intervention Dilemma." Aljazeera. Aljazeera, 15 June 2012. Web. 24 Nov. 2014.

<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/06/201261292523651706.html>. 104

Ibid 105

De Waal, Alex. "‘My Fears, Alas, Were Not Unfounded’: Africa’s Responses to the Libya Conflict." Libya: The

Responsibility to Protect and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention. By Aidan Hehir and Robert W. Murray. New

York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 68. Print. 106



Steele, Jonathan. "Why No Mention of a Ceasefire for Libya, Obama?" The Guardian. Guardian News and

Media, 28 May 2011. Web. 02 Apr. 2014. <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/may/27/ceasefire-

libya-obama-nato-mistake>. 108

Fadel, Leila. "Libyan Rebels Reject African Union Cease-fire Proposal." Washington Post. The Washington Post,

11 Apr. 2011. Web. 21 Nov. 2014. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/gaddafi-accepts-road-map-for-peace-

proposed-by-african-leaders/2011/04/10/AFbrtuJD_story.html>. 109

Chulov, Martin. "Libyan Rebels Reject Hugo Chávez Mediation Offer." Theguardian.com. Guardian News and

Media, 03 Mar. 2011. Web. 24 Mar. 2014. < http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/03/libyan-rebels-reject-

hugo-chavez>.

25

negotiate with him.”110

Ultimately, had NATO been serious about achieving peace and

protecting civilians, it would have “conditioned its aid to the rebels on their sincerely exploring

the regime’s offers.”111

NATO’s support for the rebels, in spite of their refusal to engage in

political negotiations, not only opens them to the criticism of prolonging the violence and

primarily aiming for regime change, but it also creates a dent in their ethical legitimacy and

thereby also threatens the R2P, by contributing to its delegitimization.

ii) Regime Change and the Ground Component

Next, the onset of regime change in Libya was viewed unfavorably by many States112

as a

Western neo-colonialist project. In referring to the doctrine, Kuperman starts off by establishing

that “the situation in Libya did not seem serious enough to provide just cause113

for regime

change- or, more precisely, forcible regime change by an external party in support of a rebel

movement.”114

Walzer would seemingly support this position, as he states that any proposed

intervention must be “as much like non-intervention as possible,” where the goal is either ‘to

balance or to rescue’115

an imminently threatened population. Relatedly, Pattison opines that

“making regime change the primary objective would be morally problematic,” not only because

it would fail to meet many qualities required for the ethical legitimacy of an intervention, but

also because “it would most likely lead to a large number of innocent casualties,”116

thereby

purposefully undermining the ethical legitimacy and effectiveness of the intervention.

110

Ibid 111



Such as India, Brazil, Russia, China and later, South Africa. For more information, refer to: Charbonneau, Louis.

"U.N. Chief Defends NATO from Critics of Libya War." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 14 Dec. 2011. Web. 8 Oct.

2014. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/14/us-libya-nato-un-idUSTRE7BD20C20111214>. 113

Just cause is one of the six decision making criteria considered by the R2P. The rest of the six include right

authority, right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects. When considering that Gaddafi

was willing to negotiate with the rebels and that the rebels refused to even come to the table, it is difficult to justify

NATO’s stance of failing to encourage the TNC into a negotiated peace settlement, and instead providing support

for a rebel movement intent on continuing the violence. For more information on the six criteria, refer to the ICISS’s

doctrine. 114



Walzer, Michael. "Humanitarian Intervention." Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical

Illustrations. 4th ed. New York: Basic, 1977. 101-08. Print. 116

Pattison, James. "The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention in Libya." Ethics & International Affairs 25.03

(2011): 271-77. Print.

26

While McMahon and others may argue that “regime change should sometimes be part of

the process of protecting populations,”117

Gaub reminds us that the legal mandate’s ‘military

rules of engagement very clearly excluded regime change as a mission objective.’118

He adds that

OUP was planned to be conducted “purely from the air and sea to protect civilians,” but that ‘the

difference between regime change and civilian protection became more unclear the longer the

operation lasted.’119

Pattison supports this argument by claiming that the “primary objective” of

NATO’s OUP may have “become regime change rather than the protection of civilians,”120

given

observations such as NATO’s attack on “Libyan forces that were retreating and therefore not a

threat to civilians, who were far away.”121

Similarly, aggressive aerial strikes were conducted in

areas (e.g. Sirte) that represented “no threat to civilians,”122

and which constituted actions that

were described by Libyan government officials as “a far cry from the United Nations

mandate.”123

Thus, NATO’s aggressive conduct and failure to abide by its mandate in this

manner erodes both its ethical and legal legitimacy. This in turn also provides fodder for those

looking to criticize the legitimacy and purpose of the R2P itself.

By partaking in other activities that constituted breaches of the coalition’s legal mandate,

NATO has once again polluted its legal legitimacy. UNSCR 1973’s provisions were very

particular regarding the exclusion of a “foreign occupation force of any form on any part of

Libyan territory.”124

Though UNSG, Ban Ki-moon, in 2011, ‘rejected claims that NATO had

117

McMahon, Robert. "The Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention." Council on Foreign Relations. Council on

Foreign Relations, 12 June 2013. Web. 08 Nov. 2014. <http://www.cfr.org/humanitarian-intervention/dilemma-

humanitarian-intervention/p16524>. 118



Ibid 120

Pattison, James. "The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention in Libya." Ethics & International Affairs 25.03

(2011): 271-77. Print. 121

Fahim, Kareem, and David D. Kirkpatrick. "Rebels Retake Libyan City As Airstrikes Clear a Way." The New

York Times. The New York Times, 26 Mar. 2011. Web. 30 Mar. 2014.

< http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/27/world/africa/27libya.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>. 122

Swami, Praveen, Rosa Prince, and Toby Harnden. "Coalition Forces Strike Sirte; Leader’s Home Town." The

Telegraph. Telegraph Media Group, 28 Mar. 2011. Web. 20 Mar. 2014.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8410250/Libya-coalition-attacks-Sirte-for-

first-time.html>. 123



UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1973 (2011) [on the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya] ,

17 March 2011, S/RES/1973(2011), available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4d885fc42.html [accessed 8

Ocober 2014]

27

exceeded its mandate in Libya,’125

Gaub reasons that there was in fact a ‘crucial ground

component that can be attributed to any claimed success achieved by NATO.’126

Even though

UNSCR 1973 forbade coalition boots on the ground in Libya, and though the UNSC demanded

“transparency and accountability”127

from NATO, OUP members such as Qatar and the UAE did

not “notify the UN in time or adequately”128

of its actions on the ground. These actions

constituted the ground based stationing and transfer of “weapons to the rebels, military

technology, and military personnel.”129

In fact, it was only in October 2011 that Qatari Major-

General, Hamad bin Ali al-Atiya, admitted to stationing ‘hundreds of Qataris in every region of

Libya’ to ‘support the Libyan rebels who overthrew’130

Gaddafi. When questioned about similar

allegations, the UAE replied that “NATO would be in a better position to answer those

questions,”131

thus implying NATO’s implicit consent regarding the legal breach. Moreover,

reports that NATO members such as the UK, in announcing the terrestrial deployment of

‘military experts to advise the rebels in eastern Libya’132

and the US, in ‘approving covert aid to

the rebels,’133

clearly display a further blatant violation and disrespect for both the R2P and the

parameters set by the mandate.

125

Shabi, Rachel. "Nato Accused of War Crimes in Libya." The Independent. Independent Digital News and Media,

27 Oct. 2014. Web. 08 Dec. 2014. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/nato-accused-of-war-crimes-

in-libya-6291566.html>. 126



Final Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011)

Concerning Libya. Rep. United Nations Security Council, 20 Mar. 2012. Web. 19 Feb. 2014.

<www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/163>. 128

Ibid 129



Black, Ian. "Qatar Admits Sending Hundreds of Troops to Support Libya Rebels." The Guardian. Guardian News

and Media Limited, 26 Oct. 20111. Web. 13 Oct. 2014.

<http%3A%2F%2Fwww.theguardian.com%2Fworld%2F2011%2Foct%2F26%2Fqatar-troops-libya-rebels-

support>. 131

Borger, Julian, and Martin Chulov. "Al-Jazeera Footage Captures 'western Troops on the Ground' in Libya." The

Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 31 May 2011. Web. 28 Mar. 2014.

< http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/may/30/western-troops-on-ground-libya>. 132

Wintour, Patrick, and Richard Norton-Taylor. "Libyan Opposition Leaders to Get Advice from UK Military."

The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 05 Mar. 2011. Web. 28 Mar. 2014. < http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/04/libyan-opposition-leaders-advice>. 133

Hosenball, Mark. "Exclusive: Obama Authorizes Secret Help for Libya Rebels." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 01

Mar. 30. Web. 28 Mar. 2014. < http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/30/us-libya-usa-order-

idUSTRE72T6H220110330>.

28

c) Factors Inhibiting the NATO’s Practical legitimacy: Logistical and Operational

Shortcomings

The following section will evaluate NATO’s financial, logistical and operational

shortcomings in Libya, and their consequences for the intervention. Studying this practical aspect

of the intervention is vital as it strongly relates to NATO’s effectiveness and thus, its practical

legitimacy. With the intervention being carried out under the framework of the R2P, albeit in a

limited manner as observed in section 3(a), an effective NATO also serves to bolster the

normative growth and legitimacy of the R2P. Conversely, NATO’s failure to legitimately,

efficiently, and effectively establish a stable human rights system through its conduct, can

detrimentally affect the validity, purpose, and future of the doctrine.

i) NATO’s Operational, Logistical, and Financial Shortcomings

With the US purportedly “leading from behind,” NATO’s OUP was praised for being

‘driven by Britain, France,” 134

and other EU nations. However, this was not an accurate

depiction. Ideally, with the coalition relying heavily on the resources of closely stationed EU

member States, NATO’s independence from US resources was important to increasing their

operational effectiveness. Nevertheless, NATO major-general Marcel Druart, during an address

to the European Parliament Subcommittee on Security and Defense, stated that “Nato relied

heavily on US military expertise on intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)

capabilities.”135

This point was reiterated by NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen,

when he stated that OUP had “demonstrated significant shortfalls in a range of European

capabilities – from smart munitions, to air-to-air refuelling,”136

and ISR.

During the course of the intervention, on many occasions, NATO ran out of strategic

resources. Davis cites US conservatives, who “censured NATO” (especially the EU-NATO) for

134

Erlanger, Steven. "Libya’s Dark Lesson for NATO." Editorial. The New York Times. The New York Times

Company, 3 Sept. 2011. Web. 17 Mar. 2014. < http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/04/sunday-review/what-libyas-

lessons-mean-for-nato.html?pagewanted=all>. 135

Neilsen, Nikolaj. "Nato Commander: EU Could Not Do Libya without US." EUobserver /. EUobserver, 20 Mar.

2012. Web. 7 Sept. 2014. <http://euobserver.com/defence/115650>. 136

Fogh Rasmussen, Anders. "Speech to the Chairpersons of the Foreign Affairs Committees of the European Union

Member’s States Parliaments." Folketing, Copenhagen. 15 Mar. 2012. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Web. 16

June 2014. <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_85119.htm>.

29

conducting operations “too slowly and with inadequate resources.”137

Similarly, Erlanger

expounds the scope of NATO’s shortcomings by stating that the alliance faced problems of

“running out of ammunitions and targets, with inadequate means to achieve stated political

goals.”138

Erlanger adds that even from the “eight of the 28 allies engaged in combat…most ran

out of ammunition, having to buy, at cost, ammunition stockpiled by the United States.”139

Phinney supplements this critique and adds that not only was there “an immediate lack of skilled

staffing across each of the CFAC divisions” (Command Force Air Command), the US’s decision

to “take a secondary role in OUP exposed NATO’s ISR shortcomings.”140

Stavridis and Daalder

emphasize how the U.S. had contributed “75 percent of the refueling planes used throughout the

mission,” without which ‘strike aircraft could not have responded quickly to hostile forces

threatening to attack civilians.’141

Consequently, the weaknesses within the NATO’s ISR

division hampered its targeting purposes, where it became “impossible to distinguish”142

the

regime’s forces from civilians and rebel forces.

In terms of finance, numerous politicians, military advisers, and policy makers within the

US bureaucracy have blamed NATO’s operational weaknesses on the NATO-EU member’s

unwillingness to increase their defense spending. Rasmussen asks, with “European NATO allies

drastically reducing their defense spending,” would NATO ‘still be able to afford responding to

such complex emergencies?’143

Rasmussen observes that European defense spending had fallen

by ‘almost 20 percent since the end of the Cold War,’ even though figures show that the EU-

NATO member’s “combined GDP grew by 55 percent.”144

Moreover, while EU-NATO

137

Davis, Dr. Ivan. How Good Is NATO after Libya? Rep. no. Briefing Paper No. 20. Gairloch: NATO Watch, 2011.

Print. Ser. 2011. 138

Erlanger, Steven. "Libya’s Dark Lesson for NATO." Editorial. The New York Times. The New York Times

Company, 3 Sept. 2011. Web. 17 Mar. 2014. < http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/04/sunday-review/what-libyas-

lessons-mean-for-nato.html?pagewanted=all>. 139

Ibid 140

Phinney, Todd R. "Reflections on Operation Unified Protector." JFQ 73 2014th ser. 2 (2014): 86-92. Print. 141






Fogh Rasmussen, Anders. "NATO After Libya: The Atlantic Alliance in Austere Times." Foreign Affairs.

Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 1 July 2011. Web. 11 Feb. 2014.

<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67915/anders-fogh-rasmussen/nato-after-libya>. 144

Ibid

30

members are expected to spend “2 percent”145

of their GDPs on national defense, on average,

“Europe now spends just 1.6 percent of their GDPs on their militaries, and many spend less than

one percent.”146

For the US, which spends “4 percent of its GDP” on its military, this was a

rather disappointing trend, especially considering that Washington spends “nearly three times as

much on defense as the other 27 NATO allies combined.”147

This trend is significant for the R2P,

given that a well-resourced intervener also has a stronger propensity to carry-out its mandate

efficiently, thereby saving lives. Therefore, a well-funded NATO could have prevented the

observed shortfalls in its ISR capabilities (which are supposed to have increased civilian

casualties), while simultaneously strengthening its practical legitimacy, which in turn could have

fortified the R2P’s perception as well.

ii) Importance of Adequate Cultural Knowledge and Operational Effectiveness

Next, with regards to NATO’s operational effectiveness in Libya, NATO Commander of

OUP, Lt. General Bouchard, proudly claims the Arab countries “helped” the alliance

“understand the culture” in Libya so as to allow NATO to ‘continue their mission and interpret

what they saw on the ground.’148

Furthermore, Bouchard believes that this aspect of the

operation helped make the mission “a success.”149

However, in claiming that NATO had “no

cultural advisers on the staff of OUP,” Gaub criticizes NATO for paying “rather limited attention

to Libya’s cultural terrain.”150

Subsequently, the improvised use of advice “that OUP relied on

turned out to be a failure,” with NATO personnel admitting that they lacked the capacity to

‘predict several of the turns the operation took.’151

These turns include “Qaddafi’s holding on to

power, the comparable weakness but surprising resilience and adaptability of the armed forces,

145

Freyer-Briggs, Zachary. "US Pushes NATO Allies To Boost Defense Spending." Defense News. Gannett

Government Media Corporation, 3 May 2014. Web. 02 Dec. 2014.

<http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140503/DEFREG01/305030021/US-Pushes-NATO-Allies-Boost-Defense-

Spending>. 146




Ibid 148

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Newsroom. Press Briefing on Libya. NATO: Speeches and Transcripts.

NATO, 24 Oct. 2011. Web. 8 Sept. 2014. <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_79851.htm>. 149

Ibid 150



Ibid

31

and apparent passivity shown by the population of Tripoli, whose uprising was expected.”152

Gaub vehemently argues that success in Libya could have come earlier (with fewer civilian

casualties), had there been a better understanding of the local culture, which would have aided

the coalition in ‘anticipating rebel and civilian population behavior, be it in Tripoli or Misrata, on

the basis of sound judgment rather than speculation.”153

With practical legitimacy judged by the manner in which an intervener is able to

efficiently establish a stable human rights system, NATO’s discussed operational, logistical, and

financial shortcomings seriously compromises its effectiveness (and thus, its legitimacy). Once

again, it is stressed that NATO’s faulty conduct in Libya also becomes representative of the

R2P’s status and role in the international system. The following section will evaluate the

practical legitimacy of NATO’s OUP by looking at the intervention’s consequences and its

effects on the doctrine’s legitimate standing.

d) The Consequences of OUP

i) Collateral Damage

According to Walzer, during times of war, “non-combatants cannot be attacked at any

time.”154

However, they are often “endangered” during conflicts “because of their proximity to a

battle that is being fought against someone else.”155

While collateral damage may be a part and

parcel of war, Walzer contends that “some degree of care must be taken not to harm civilians”

and that “we recognize their rights as best as we can within the context of war.”156

Stavridis and

Daalder congratulate NATO for conducting ‘air campaigns of unparalleled precision, which

greatly minimized collateral damage.’157

Similarly, O’Donnell and Vaïsse argue that NATO was

152

Ibid 153

Ibid 154

Walzer, Michael. "Noncombatant Immunity and Military Necessity." Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument

with Historical Illustrations. New York: Basic, 1977. 151-52. Print. 155

Ibid 156

Ibid 157


Relations, Mar.-Apr. 2012. Web. 03 Mar. 2014.

32

able to “keep the level of collateral damage remarkably low” as a result of “the extensive and

skilled use of precision guided munitions.”158

In contrast to NATO’s narrative, Cock affirms the indisputability of the fact “that

airstrikes on a number of legitimate military targets might have caused some collateral

damage.”159

Phinney adds that during the preliminary stages of its aerial campaign, ‘NATO

severely lacked ISR capabilities,’160

which greatly increased the probability of collateral damage.

Furthermore, a 2012 report published by Amnesty International argues that though NATO did

make “significant efforts to minimize the risk of causing civilian casualties” in a variety of ways,

‘dozens of civilians have been killed (and injured) in NATO airstrikes on private homes in

residential and rural areas, with no evidence of military objectives at the strike locations at the

time of the strikes.’161

It also holds NATO guilty for violations of “International Humanitarian

Law” (IHL) and for failing to ‘investigate, acknowledge and mend’ the injustice perceived by

innocent civilian victims of NATO’s actions.162

These claims were also substantiated by the

ICIL163

, which “confirmed civilian casualties and found targets that showed no evidence of

military utility.”164

Though the ICIL concluded that “NATO did not deliberately target civilians in Libya,”165

NATO’s abject refusal to “address these incidents appropriately including by establishing contact

and providing information to the victims and their relatives about any investigation which might

have been initiated”166

—severely damaged its purpose and moral standing in Libya. A 2012

report published by HRW determined that though “civilian deaths in Libya from NATO strikes

were low,” NATO air strikes killed “at least 72 civilians, one-third of them children under age

158

O'Donnell, Clara M., and Justin Vaïsse. "Is Libya NATO's Final Bow?" The Brookings Institution. The

Brookings Institution, 2 Dec. 2011. Web. 12 Aug. 2014. <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/12/02-

libya-odonnell-vaisse>. 159

Cock, Chris De. "Operation Unified Protector and the Protection of Civilians in Libya." Yearbook of

International Humanitarian Law 2011th ser. 14 (2011): 213-35. Print. 160

Phinney, Todd R. "Reflections on Operation Unified Protector." JFQ 73 2014th ser. 2 (2014): 86-92. Print. 161

Amnesty International. Libya: The Forgotten Victims of NATO Strikes. London: Amnesty International

Publications, 2012. Print. 162

Ibid 163

ICIL is an abbreviation for Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya (mandated by the UN

Human Rights Council) 164

UN Human Rights Council, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya , 2 March

2012, A/HRC/19/68 , available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ffd19532.html [accessed 12 August 2014] 165

Ibid 166


Publications, 2012. Print.

33

8.”167

Again, like Amnesty International, HRW’s report accused NATO of failing to

“acknowledge these casualties or to examine how and why they occurred.”168

The report’s

author, Fred Abrahams, condemned NATO for refusing to “acknowledge the deaths” and for

‘offering no compensation for the families.’169

Bassiouni argues that NATO was “not

forthcoming with information when it came to strikes that led to civilian casualties or the

destruction of civilian infrastructure” and that it had to rely on ‘news outlets to account for and

report on its own violations of IHL because it did not have the mandate or the disposition to do

so.’170

NATO’s refusal to concede its mistakes and face the legal accusations levelled against it,

further erodes its legal, ethical and practical legitimacy, which consequently delegitimizes the

R2P and endangers its future. Also, as claimed by realist constructivism, NATO’s actions have

been challenged by the rise of global non-state actors, who place pressure on interveners to

justify their actions.

ii) Spillover in Mali

NATO’s intervention in Libya also led to a regional spillover in Mali, which garnered

severe condemnation from the international community. Since NATO’s mandate in Libya

forbade the presence of ground forces, the mandate made possible a situation where ‘hundreds of

Malian combatants who had fought to defend Gaddafi, fled back home’ to form ‘the most

powerful Tuareg-led (minority) rebel group the region,’171

known as the Azawad National

Liberation Movement (MNLA). The rebellion was facilitated by the smuggling of “large

quantities of weapons and ammunition”172

out of Libya by retreating members of the Libyan

army, mercenaries and other groups in the region. This Tuareg rebellion, which imposed heavy

losses on the Malian security forces, resulted in Malian President, Amadou Toumani Toure,

167

Abrahams, Fred. Unacknowledged Deaths: Civilian Casualties in NATO’s Air Campaign in Libya. Rep. United

States of America: HRW, 2012. Print. 168

Ibid 169

BBC. "Nato Hits Back at Libya's Civilian Deaths Report." BBC News. BBC, 14 May 2012. Web. 12 Aug. 2014.

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18062012>. 170

Bassiouni, M. Cherif. "The NATO Campaign." Libya, from Repression to Revolution: A Record of Armed

Conflict and International Law Violations, 2011-2013. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2013. 270. Print. 171

Fessy, Thomas. "Gaddafi's Influence in Mali's Coup." BBC News. BBC, 22 Mar. 2012. Web. 16 Feb. 2014.

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17481114>. 172

George, Princy M. "The Libyan Crisis and the Western Sahel: Emerging Security Issues." Institute for Defense

Studies and Analyses. IDSA, 14 Aug. 2012. Web. 01 Apr. 2014.

< http://www.idsa.in/backgrounder/TheLibyanCrisisandWestAfricanSahel_140812.html>.

34

being “deposed”173

as a consequence of internal military pressures and the actions of radical

groups. The instability in Mali was then compounded by the rise of radical Islamist forces,

dominated by “Ansar Dine”174

and other elements affiliated with Al Qaeda in the Islamic

Maghreb (AQIM).

Kuperman notes that before the instability in Mali brought about by OUP, Mali was

hailed by “many diplomats and scholars as the region’s exceptional example of peace and

democracy.”175

Douthat acknowledges the practical problems for the future of R2P posed by the

spillover, in stating that these events “should complicate the Libya hawks’ easy moralism.”176

Furthermore, Douthat concludes that ‘interventionists who want to claim credit for saving lives

in Benghazi’ are obligated to ‘recognize how the adverse effects of their choices lead to deaths in

Timbuktu.’177

With terrorists having come in to fill the power vacuum created by the Tuareg

movement, Kaplan lamentably notes that the human rights situation in Mali has only deteriorated

with increased violence and the ‘flourishing of criminal enterprises.’178

The expansion of

regional instability and the increase in human insecurity resulting from OUP illustrates the duty

that the UNSC and chosen interveners have, in remedying the negative effects of their actions.

Additionally, by inducing a regional human rights crisis, NATO’s practical legitimacy has

observably taken a beating.

iii) Post-interventionist Libya: A Human Security Failure of Local and Regional

Proportions

The state of post-interventionist Libya is a harrowing sight. The intervention, along with

NATO’s disengagement had “left a vacuum in the wake of Gaddafi’s death,” leading to the

173

Lye, Ian, and Monika Roszkowska. Insurgency, Instability, Intervention: A Snapshot of Mali and the Sahel

Region Threat Landscape. N.p.: Thomson Reuters Acceleus, 2013. Print. 174

Douthat, Ross. "Libya’s Unintended Consequences." The New York Times. The New York Times, 07 July 2012.

Web. 13 Mar. 2014. <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/08/opinion/sunday/libyas-unintended-

consequences.html?_r=0>. 175



Douthat, Ross. "Libya’s Unintended Consequences." The New York Times. The New York Times, 07 July 2012.

Web. 13 Mar. 2014. <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/08/opinion/sunday/libyas-unintended-

consequences.html?_r=0>. 177

Ibid 178

Kaplan, Seth. "Libya Spillover: Mapping Northern Africa’s Growing Chaos." Fragile States. Seth Kaplan, 2013.

Web. 10 Oct. 2014. <http%3A%2F%2Fwww.fragilestates.org%2F2014%2F07%2F14%2Flibya-spillover-mapping-

northern-africas-growing-chaos%2F>.

35

emergence of “alternately governed spaces” and “regional security threats.”179

These threats

include tribal clashes, the rise of extremist Islamist groups, as well as other militia groups

looking to gain influence and power. In addition, since 2011 Libya has also been marred by ‘a

failed democratically elected prime minister, a string of politically motivated assassinations,

rebel perpetuated reprisal killings, attacks on journalists and foreign diplomatic missions, the

emergence of established non-state actor strongholds, the forcible displacement of more than

35000 people, and a general state of violent instability.’180

Along with all these problems,

Libya’s system of human rights has been damaged as well. Beside human rights violations

perpetuated by militias in large areas outside the current government’s control, the interim

government has also displayed a dismal human rights record.181

Such reports clearly suggest a

failure in NATO’s ability to institute a locally effective human rights system.

When it comes to evaluating OUP’s global external effectiveness, a study of the regional

instability seems to suggest that NATO’s intervention has failed in terms of its practical

legitimacy. Beside the previously discussed spillover in Mali, Laroussi points out that the

intervention, in exacerbating regional instability, had encouraged the rise of ‘safe havens’ for

‘international armed groups, criminal enterprises, and other illegal activities,’ including ‘arms,

drugs, and human trafficking networks.’182

Noting the deteriorating human rights and insecurity

in the region, it is easy to conclude that NATO’s intervention has thus failed in its practical

legitimacy. In addition, Morris argues that “criticisms made in debates over Libya of the manner

179

Okeke, Jide M. "Why NATO Intervention in Libya Is Not a Victory for Responsibility to Protect." Institute of

Security Studies Africa. ISS, 10 Apr. 2012. Web. 8 Nov. 2014. <http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/why-nato-

intervention-in-libya-is-not-a-victory-for-responsibility-to-protect>. 180


Security 1st ser. 38 (2013): 105-36. Print.

*Kirkpatrick, David D. "Libya’s Prime Minister Is Dismissed." The New York Times. The New York Times, 07 Oct.

2012. Web. 08 Apr. 2014. <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/world/africa/libyas-prime-minister-is-

dismissed.html?_r=0>.

*Gordts, Eline. "Libya Instability Only Deepens." The Huffington Post. TheHuffingtonPost.com, 03 Mar. 2012.

Web. 6 Apr. 2014. <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/03/libya-instability_n_1318469.html>.

*“Human Rights in Libya.” Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch, n.d. Web. 10 Nov. 2014.

<http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/libya> 181

For example, this includes 300 detainees “held in relation to the 2011 armed conflict,” who have “no access to

lawyers or judicial reviews.” For more information see: "Human Rights in Libya." Human Rights Watch. Human

Rights Watch, n.d. Web. 10 Nov. 2014. <http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/libya>. 182

Laroussi, Mohammed Issam. "An Analysis of the Deteriorating Situation in Libya and Its Geopolitical Impact on

the Maghreb." Middle East Monitor. The Middle East Monito, 21 June 2014. Web. 13 Sept. 2014.

<https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/africa/12272-an-analysis-of-the-deteriorating-situation-in-libya-and-

its-geopolitical-impact-on-the-maghreb>.

36

in which NATO had implemented its Council mandate” had in turn “contaminated

discussions”183

over the use of the R2P in Syria. While the geopolitical context of the Syrian case

is quite different from that of Libya, Morris further states, quite appropriately so, that the

“prospects for future invocations of R2P as a basis for intervention by force” were now

“significantly diminished.”184

Regardless of the Syrian crisis, NATO’s erroneous conduct had

tarred its ethical, legal and practical legitimacy, which in turn has severely dented and

delegitimized the doctrine of the R2P itself.

4) The International Stability and Conflict Monitoring Body (ISCMB)

Based on the lessons learnt in Libya, this section will attempt to reconcile the challenges

that accompany the practical implementation of the R2P. With Libya serving as the first full-

fledged test of the doctrine, based on the quality of the intervention, interveners, and the

international response—one gets a sense of the whole process as being rather haphazard,

inefficient, and poorly planned. Thus, in accordance with realist constructivism’s explanation of

the role that non-state actors and institutions play in constraining state behavior, the ISCMB is

designed to achieve the “Professionalization of R2P,” so that future interventions may exhibit a

level of adequate planning, proper response mechanisms, appropriate conduct displayed by the

intervening parties, a mandate that is followed, clearly defined goals, and the fulfillment of post-

interventionist obligations. By institutionalizing the “Professionalization of R2P,” the ultimate

objective is to save lives by reanimating discussions on the doctrine, aiding its realization, and

adding to the academic literature.

The ISCMB has been designed to bridge the gap between the normative (and discursive)

expansion achieved by the R2P and the challenges facing it practical policy implementation.

Recognizing that no institutions currently exist, that could help the practical application and

legitimacy of the R2P, the ISCMB would ideally function as an institution that works together

with the UNSC, intervening bodies, and any other relevant actors (NGOs, IGOs, think tanks,

local actors etc.) While acknowledging that the UNSC has a broad purview, the ISCMB would

serve as a centralizing mechanism encompassing specialized chamber to attend to the specific

183


(2013): 1265-283. Print. 184

Ibid

37

needs that arise in interventions. It would include the following chambers: Legal, Military-

Tactical, Financial, Diplomatic and Regional, and Post-intervention Chambers. It is proposed

that the ISCMB, by enhancing an intervener’s capabilities, effectiveness, efficiency, and

conduct, would strengthen the legitimacy of the R2P, and thereby save lives. This proposal is

considered as the first step towards formulating an organized institutional response to assist the

effective policy implementation of the R2P and as such, the ideas presented here are still

considered as preliminary plans in need of further refinement and testing.

a) Legal Chamber: A Responsibility to Abide

As discussed earlier, during the period of its intervention in Libya, the NATO-led

coalition had undertaken actions that constituted both a breach of its mandate and perhaps even

of IHL. These actions included the stationing of coalition troops on the ground (who supplied

rebels with arms, manpower, and intelligence assistance) and possible violations of IHL, which

NATO did not sufficiently investigate or acknowledge. Such accusations damage the legitimacy

and purpose of the intervention, the intervener, and the R2P.

To attend to and prevent the occurrence of such legally erroneous actions, the ISCMB

will be responsible for collecting information, investigating, monitoring, advising, and reporting

to the UN, the various legal facets of any authorized intervention. More specifically, the

ISCMB’s Legal Chamber is tasked with helping interveners and the UN keep track of and abide

by any established mandate. Based on its investigations, the Legal Chamber will report to the

UN, any observed breaches of International law and mandate. If culpability is established by the

UN, legal proceedings can be brought against the intervener, under an international court of law,

to ensure that justice is granted to the innocent victims of any intervention. In the Libyan context,

statements of proper investigations, apologies, and reparations for the aggrieved parties, could

have done a great deal to bolster NATO’s ethical legitimacy. Thus, the Legal Chamber has been

envisioned to properly ‘investigate, acknowledge, and mend’185

any potential errors or breaches

conducted by an intervener.

Furthermore, with the Legal Chamber composed of international legal practitioners and

policy analysts, the chamber would also have the potential for advising interveners before and

185


Publications, 2012. Print.

38

during interventions. In such a manner, the ISCMB aims to monitor the legal aspects of any

intervention and report its findings to the UN. It is hoped, that the Legal Chamber would also

deter interveners from purposely breaching their mandate and/or international legal

requirements. It is worth noting however, that such a monitory chamber may also discourage

potential interveners from offering their services to the UN. In response, it is stressed that the

ISCMB does not exist to issue dictates to interveners. Instead, the ISCMB will attempt to work

with interveners to improve their operation, avoid and fix mistakes, learn from past errors, and

ultimately help the victims of tyrannical systems. A conscious effort is therefore made to instill

in interveners, a responsibility to abide by set mandates.

b) Military-Tactical Chamber: Responsibility to Plan

Based on the discussions in sections 3(c-d), NATO’s intervention in Libya was

seemingly marred by poor planning. OUP exposed many of NATO’s operational and logistical

shortcomings, which in turn jeopardized the efficiency with which it carried out its mandate.

Since acts of humanitarian intervention are sensitive by nature, it is of the utmost importance that

an intervener is able to recognize its strengths and shortcoming before embarking on an

operation. The ICISS states that military interventions require “careful advance planning,” which

include ‘the need to build an effective political coalition, devise a common plan of operations,

and marshal the necessary resources.’186

While recognition of this aspect of interventions is vital

to its success, this prescription does no translate to a practiced reality.

The ISCMB’s Military-Tactical Chamber concentrates on the strategic and military

features of an intervention. It is tasked with aiding and ensuring (to the best extent possible) that

an intervener is aware of, has planned (strategized) for, and is capable of carrying out an

intervention. Through research, interviews, and data collection—the chamber has the ability to

evaluate the performance of an intervener. In evaluating past interventions and an intervener’s

current performance, the chamber plays both, an advisory and monitory role for the UN and

intervening body. Military strategists, weapons experts, lawyers, war specialists, regional

experts, commanders, and other relevant professionals will make up the chamber; they will

ensure that evaluations are critical and through.

186



Ottawa, 2001). 58. Print.

39

A Military-Tactical Chamber composed of experts within the field of military and

conflict studies, would be well poised to work with an intervener to determine the extent to

which they could militarily and successfully carry out a mandate. Based on these evaluations, the

chamber will offer further suggestions to the UNSC and the international community, on how

best to approach a proposed case of intervention. Moreover, the chamber will also work together

with other chambers in order to devise strategies that abide by international law, are conscious of

cultural sensitivities, are aware of diplomatic peace dialogues and related initiatives, and so on.

In addition, the Chamber will also possess a research wing that evaluates regions of potential

volatility, devise strategies for military engagement, and suggest ways to better the operational

conduct of an intervener. The chamber’s role will relieve the UN from having to oversee the

military aspect of interventions; especially when considering that the UN already has a broad

purview. Over all, the chamber aids interveners, to the best extent possible, in fulfilling their

responsibility to plan an intervention. This is the duty it owes to all those for which it operates.

c) Financial Chamber: Responsibility to Contribute

The ICISS recognizes that “any operation to protect in response to large scale”

humanitarian emergencies requires “the allocation of sufficient resources.”187

It adds that

sufficient resources are “indispensable for success,” where the failure to attain adequate

resources “has been a major problem in the past.”188

Section 3(c) explored how in Libya the

resource and finance based weaknesses of NATO’s operations were clearly discernable through

the nature in which the coalition conducted its operations. Even before the intervention in Libya,

pro-interventionists often brought up the worry that the European NATO members’ reduced

defense spending encouraged “legitimate fears as to whether they could still afford to respond to

such complex emergencies.”189

Rasmussen contends that these fears were further fanned by,

among other reasons, “reports early on that the operation lacked sufficient strike capabilities.”190

The ISCMB’s Financial Chamber would be tasked with evaluating the monetary aspects

of proposed interventions. The Financial Chamber’s purposes would be considerably narrower

187

Ibid., 60 188

Ibid 189

Fogh Rasmussen, Anders. “NATO After Libya: The Atlantic Alliance in Austere Times.” Foreign Affairs.

Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 1 July 2011. Web. 11 Feb. 2014.

<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67915/anders-fogh-rasmussen/nato-after-libya>. 190

Ibid

40

than the rest of the chambers. It would primarily devise policies through which to help

intervening bodies meet their monetary necessities. It is acknowledged that this is a difficult, and

many would argue, an unrealistic expectation. However, affirming that interveners are given

their mandate by the international community and that they are representative of this global

community of states, it is proposed that an international fund be set up. This fund is called the

Human Security Fund (specifically for interventions) and would be financed by the contributions

of the international community. Contributions would not be made mandatory, but rather on an

incentivized basis. Any intervener in need of the fund will be required to justify its funding needs

(to the UNSC) and how its plans to use the funds. A rigorous and transparent process would be

required to achieve this. This thesis acknowledges that such endeavors are difficult to achieve

and notes that greater planning is needed in this arena. Thus, the Financial Chamber has been

structured to help build consensus around the international community’s responsibility to

contribute resources to potential interventions.

d) Diplomatic and Regional Chamber: Responsibility for Peace and Negotiations

Diplomacy is an important component of peace negotiations, cease-fires, political

transitions, and other governance and peace related mechanisms. Much of the criticism within

the diplomatic analyses of the Libyan intervention pertains to two related activities: NATO’s use

of “disproportionate force”191

against the pro-Gaddafi fighters and its almost non-existent efforts

to forge a cease-fire or negotiations between the opposing sides. Kuperman questions the

legitimacy of NATO’s policies in Libya, especially when considering that NATO continued to

support the rebels even when “Libya’s government offered not merely a cease-fire, but

negotiations toward a constitutional government and compensation to victims,” which the rebels

“demurred” in favor of war.192

In addition, NATO’s operation also exposed its lack of cultural

knowledge on the Libyan terrain; such cultural knowledge could have greatly aided the forging

of a cease-fire.

Having recognized that future interventions in different parts of the world will require the

aggregation of adequate regional-cultural knowledge and diplomatic initiatives, the ISCMB will

191

Okeke, Jide M. "Why NATO Intervention in Libya Is Not a Victory for Responsibility to Protect." Institute for

Security Studies. ISS, 10 Apr. 2012. Web. 26 Mar. 2014. 192


Security 1st ser. 38 (2013): 105-36. Print.

41

also embody a Diplomatic and Regional Chamber. The chamber is composed of regional experts

and diplomats with the skills and knowledge to aid interveners in making sincere efforts at

brokering peace between warring factions. Just as the other chambers, the Diplomatic and

Regional Chamber is designed to function as an advisory entity that would liaise with the UN,

the chosen intervener, relevant NGOs, IGOs, and the warring parties. The Chamber will aim to

work in conjunction with regional organizations, IGOs, and NGOs in order to formulate better

informed policies and strategies. While the UN already facilitates negotiations during times of

conflict, it is argued that this chamber could do this more thoroughly193

and benefit greatly from,

information sharing and working with the other specialized chambers of the ISCMB. This

chamber has a responsibility for engaging in peace and negotiations to bring conflicts to a quick,

efficient, negotiated and peaceful end.

e) Post-intervention Chamber: Responsibility to Rebuild

The ICISS’s report clearly entails that military forces are often required in post-

intervention operations to institute a “safe environment necessary for the restoration of good

governance and the rule of law.”194

Section 3(d) has elaborated on how the international

community’s failure to help rebuild in the aftermath of OUP and Gaddafi’s downfall, produced a

calamitous and volatile situation of unrest in Libya. The lack of proper governance,

peacekeeping forces, along with the lack of peacebuilding and statebuilding projects in post

interventionist Libya resulted in the worsening of the regions instability and human rights status.

Since regime change can be a by-product of interventions, as was the case in Libya, the

international community has a responsibility to rebuild. Butler argues that “amidst the furor over

the justifications for and conduct of military intervention,” states often ‘overlook their post-

conflict obligations.’195

Furthermore, Butler finds that the onset of regime change creates a

twofold obligation for intervening bodies and the international community: a) the onset of

regime change “triggers a legal obligation on the intervening” body to “establish security in the

host territory, promote representative local government, ensure the protection of human rights,

193

For example, by working with the Military-Tactical Chamber, the Diplomatic and Regional Chamber could

partake in negotiations based upon the on the ground knowledge provided by the former. 194



Ottawa, 2001). 80. Print. 195

Butler, Jay. "Responsibility for Regime Change." Columbia Law Review 114.3 (2014): 504-81. Print.

42

assist with post-conflict reconstruction, and safeguard minority groups”; and b) the intervening

body has a responsibility to ensure that a successor regime that emerges from an act of

intervention, “respects international human rights law.”196

Recognizing that the international community and interveners may fail to fulfil their post-

interventionist duties, the Post-intervention Chamber has been tasked with advocating for and

assisting in the fulfilment of these duties. While the Chamber has no authoritative power, though

its advocacy work, it is hoped that the Chamber can build normative consensus among the

international community, that policies of abandonment (such as those witnessed in Libya) cannot

be justified or accepted. Also, The Post-intervention Chamber would work alongside non-state

actors, the other chambers, locally representative groups, the UN, and the international

community—to establish strict statebuilding goals, a clear time frame of disengagement (exist

strategy, should post-interventionist peacekeeping troops be needed), and that any stationed

peacekeeping troops firmly abide by its mandate and international laws.

5) Conclusion

The doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect has come a long way since its conception in

2001. Numerous scholarly articles, reports, dialogues, and initiatives have been encouraged by

and in the name of the doctrine. However, evaluating application of the R2P in Libya, this thesis

has sought to show that the doctrine’s normative progress has not translated to success when

implemented. The NATO-led coalition’s intervention in Libya, under the R2P’s framework, was

fraught with legal, operational and conduct based, resource based, and strategic errors. Bearing

in mind that NATO’s primary objective was civilians rescue and protection, the current abysmal

state of insecurity, instability, and human rights in Libya, leaves much to be desired from the

manner in which NATO has conducted OUP. Having observed that NATO’s intervention was

haphazard, inefficient, disorganized, and ineffective, this thesis then went on to propose an

institution responsible for aiding the practical implementation of the R2P. This took the form of

the International Stability and Conflict Monitoring Body (ISCMB).

The ISMB has been envisioned to institutionalize the “Professionalization of R2P” and in

doing so, aims to attend to, prevent, and rectify the erroneous application of the R2P, as was the

196

Ibid

43

case with OUP. Housing a set of specialized chambers to meet the specific practical challenges

that interveners face, the ISCMB has been structured to overcome the complexities inherent

within interventions. It should be noted that the ISCMB’s purpose and design are still in their

preliminary stages of planning and will require more research, structuring, and consideration in

order to achieve its realization and tap into the institution’s full potential. Beyond the

institutional proposal, this thesis does recognize that there are a whole host of other problems

facing the normative growth and implementation of the R2P. Some of these include the need for

proper conflict prevention strategies, the role played by States such as China and Russia (who

exercised their veto in the UNSC, with regards to intervention in Syria), the failure to attend to

the economic roots of conflicts (as opposed to political roots), and so on. Many of these

considerations, while still important, were beyond the scope of this paper. The author thus invites

others to continue considering the problems that face the R2P and how best to overcome them.

In the end, the hope is that his paper will add to the discourse on the R2P, aid its

realization, and overcome the significant challenges that pervade the implementation of the

doctrine. What is most at stake is not the scholarly life of the literature on the subject or even the

future of security alliances such as the NATO, rather, it is the lives of thousands and millions

around the world who live in fear, suffering and constant doubt about how long they will be able

to survive. In attempting to reanimate discussions on the R2P, it is the plight of these people that

is kept in mind, so that one day, they may enjoy the freedoms that so many of us already do.

44

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