attachment without fear

DAVID C. BELL Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis

Attachment Without Fear

John Bowlby hypothesized an attachment systemthat interacts with caregiving, exploration, andfear systems in the brain, with a particularemphasis on fear. Neurobiological researchconfirms many of his hypotheses and alsoraises some new questions. A psychologicalmodel based on this neurobiological research ispresented here. The model extends conventionalattachment theory by describing additionalattachment processes independent of fear. Inthis model, the attachment elements of trust,openness, and depending interact with thecaregiving elements of caring, empathy, andresponsibility.

Attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969/1982, 1973,1980) has had a phenomenal record of successin generating research on both parent-child andadult close relationships. This success has beendocumented in several edited volumes (Cassidy,1999; Simpson & Rholes, 1998; Sperling &Berman, 1994) and in a comprehensive overview(Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007). In Bowlby’sformulation, attachment is one of a numberof closely interrelated brain systems; othersinclude caregiving, exploration, and fear sys-tems. Although Bowlby spoke hypotheticallyabout these systems well before the existenceof any neurobiological corroboration, subse-quent research in the past several decades has

Department of Sociology, Indiana University PurdueUniversity Indianapolis, Indianapolis, IN 46202-5140([email protected]).

Key Words: adult, attachment, caregiver-child, caregiving,close relationships, emotion, family relationships, familytheory.

confirmed many of Bowlby’s propositions andraised some questions about others.

In this paper, I look to understand attachmentby focusing on attachment and caregiving asa dyadic system; that is, attachment is a psy-chological process directed at a specific partner(Bowlby, 1969/1982) who can be relied on forprotection and comfort, whereas caregiving is apsychological process in the partner directed atproviding protection and comfort. I begin with areview of Bowlbian attachment theory, pointingout many of the assertions of this theory that havebeen supported by research. I note several asser-tions that appear to be problematic. I then reviewthe joint evolution of caregiving and attach-ment and explore the neurobiology associatedwith attachment. This review reveals both thedistress-based form of attachment emphasizedby most attachment theorists and a nondistressform of attachment. I then propose a psycho-logical model of attachment and caregiving thatincludes both distress and nondistress forms andis congruent with the neurobiology associatedwith these systems. I end with some suggestionsfor how this expanded view of attachment caninform future research.

DISTRESS ATTACHMENT

John Bowlby created an enormously rich theoryto describe some fundamental processes ofhuman development. In particular, he describedan evolved brain system that produces andgoverns a human need to be protected andcomforted, which he called the attachmentsystem. He showed how this system producesdifferent behaviors and different cognitivemodels depending on the social environmentof a child’s development. He also described,

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178 Journal of Family Theory & Review

in considerably less detail, a corresponding‘‘caregiving system’’ that produces and governsa human need to care for others, which hesaw operating in mothers and other nurturersof children. He suggested that the attachmentand caregiving systems operate throughout life.In this section, I explore successes as wellas some problems with Bowlby’s originalformulation that emerge from evolutionary andneurobiological research.

Fear has always had an important placein attachment theory and research. Bowlby’soriginal formulation of an attachment theoryof childhood was developed from his work asa clinical psychologist in London before andduring World War II, where he was concernedwith the effects on children of separation fromparents (Bowlby, 1988; Karen, 1994; Kobak,1999). Bowlby thus formulated his conceptionof attachment by studying the consequences ofrelationship disruption, focusing on children’sfear: fear of external dangers and the unknownand the fear of loss of a significant caregiver(Bowlby, 1969/1982, 1980). For Bowlby (1973),‘‘feeling secure’’ is equivalent to not beingafraid (p. 182). Most subsequent attachmentresearchers have continued this emphasis. Forthis reason, I will refer to the traditionalBowlbian view of attachment as ‘‘distressattachment.’’

Attachment has been described as an emotion-regulation system (Hazan, Gur-Yaish, & Campa,2004; Magai, 1999; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003,2004; Sroufe, 1988); in particular, the attach-ment system is said to regulate fear and distress(Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007). It does this byseeking ‘‘comfort’’ and ‘‘relief’’ from a care-giving partner (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007,pp. 17, 22). The ‘‘urgent desire for comfort andsupport in adversity’’ (Bowlby, 1988, p. 121)produces ‘‘high intensity’’ attachment behav-iors. In children, ‘‘high intensity’’ attachmentis characterized by clinging, crying, protesting,and demanding. Such high intensity behaviorsare used to elicit caregivers’ protection and com-forting behaviors. That is, under stress, peopleoften turn to special others for support (Mikulin-cer & Shaver, 2007).

In the over half a century since Bowlby’searly publications, many aspects of the evolution(Clutton-Brock, 1991) and biology (Carter,2005; Insel, 1997; MacLean, 1990; Panksepp,1998) of attachment have been supported byresearch in multiple mammalian species. Much

of the research on caregiving, attachment, andfear has been conducted in rats, mice, guineapigs, voles, sheep, and monkeys. Until recently,few noninvasive techniques were available tostudy these systems in humans. As methodshave been developed for the study of humanneurobiology, however, similar processes havebeen reported.

But there are some assertions that Bowlbyand his theoretical heirs have made that areproblematic.

1. Attachment is a human phenomenon.Bowlby traced the evolution of caregivingand attachment back to the ‘‘environ-ment of evolutionary adaptation’’ whenhumans were organized in hunting andgathering bands (Bowlby, 1969/1982).This chronology places the critical periodof caregiving and attachment evolutionduring the Pliocene and Pleistocene geo-logic epochs starting about 5 million yearsago (Mellen, 1981). It is clear now,from their functions and from studiesof comparative evolution, that attachmentand caregiving evolved together at least180 million years ago, long before humans(MacLean, 1990). Caregiving in its rudi-mentary form evolved in the reptilianprecursors to mammals and was a pre-requisite for the evolution of attachment(Bell, 2001).

2. Attachment is a separate behavioral sys-tem from feeding. Bowlby’s functionalanalysis concluded that attachment andfeeding were separate functions and thusseparate systems (Bowlby, 1969/1982).There were historical reasons for thisemphasis (Bowlby was arguing—againstFreud—that the child’s attachment to themother was not just a matter of rein-forcement for feeding). The neurobio-logical evidence that will be examinedbelow, however, suggests strongly thatthis is an artificial separation. In its ear-liest evolution, caregiving was linkeddirectly to proximity and feeding (Clutton-Brock, 1991).

3. Emotions cannot be causal. Bowlbydescribed attachment as a cybernetic goal-corrected system. That is, the attachmentsystem pursues a goal of proximity, safety,and security (Bowlby, 1969/1982; Feeney& Noller, 1996; Sroufe & Waters, 1977).

Attachment Without Fear 179

The caregiving system pursues goalsof retrieval, protecting, and comforting(Bowlby; J. Solomon & George, 1996;West & Sheldon-Keller, 1994). Bowlbyexplicitly argued that attachment is notdriven by emotion: Emotions are ‘‘phasesof an individual’s intuitive appraisal’’(Bowlby, p. 104) Although this charac-terization was consistent with behavioristapproaches of his time, I suggest that thisis not a useful characterization. Neuro-logical research supports the propositionthat fear can cause one to run from a beareven before one has cognitively appraisedthe bear as dangerous (Damasio, 1994).Rather than tracing caregiving and attach-ment to largely cognitive decision pro-cesses, with perhaps an associated emo-tional tone, I will demonstrate the valueof conceptualizing emotional motivationsas the foundations of both caregiving andattachment.

4. Fear is an inherent part of attachment andcaregiving. One of the oldest brain sys-tems is the fear system (Damasio, 1994;MacLean, 1990; Panksepp, 1998). Thefear system is tied into perception to detectdanger, to memory to remember danger-ous places and situations and to the angersystem for escaping from danger. With thedetection of actual or potential threat, thefear system activates other systems to pre-pare for defense or flight. It also activatesthe attachment system to solicit protec-tion. Thus, fear has had a central partin the conceptualization of attachment.Prominent contemporary conceptualiza-tions of attachment still view attachmentas only activated under conditions ofthreat. ‘‘We assume that every eventperceived by a person of any age as threat-ening tends to activate the attachment sys-tem’’ (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007, p. 32).Most other attachment researchers followthis model (Ainsworth, 1989; Berman &Sperling, 1994; Bowlby, 1973; Cassidy,1999; Mikulincer & Shaver; Simpson &Rholes, 2000; Sroufe & Waters, 1977).This approach draws a conceptual bound-ary that restricts attachment to proximityseeking and security seeking under condi-tions of fear and distress. In this conceptu-alization of distress attachment, anything

that happens in the absence of distress isnot considered to be attachment.

Contemporary views of the caregiving systemare not quite so restrictive. Mikulincer andShaver (2007) described the goals of thecomplementary caregiving system as ‘‘to reduceother people’s suffering, protect them fromharm, and foster their growth and development’’(p. 326). Consistent with the distress attachmentview, they asserted that the caregiving systemprovides comfort, protection, and support to apartner in danger or distress. But, in addition,once security from distress has been established,the caregiving system provides support forexploration, autonomy, and growth (Mikulincer& Shaver).

In the context of this discussion of the associ-ation between attachment and fear, it is useful tonote that Bowlby actually described two forms inwhich attachment is manifest. In addition to highintensity, distress-elicited attachment, Bowlby(1969/1982) also described ‘‘low intensity’’attachment characterized by ‘‘smiling, relaxedlocomotion, watching, and touching’’ (p. 250).It seems to be low intensity attachment thatis being described when attachment is seen asinvolving ‘‘comfort’’ (as opposed to ‘‘comfort-ing’’) ‘‘depending,’’ ‘‘closeness,’’ and ‘‘love’’(Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007, pp. 17, 19, 22, 27,39) and as ‘‘being understood and accepted’’(Rothbaum & Kakinuma, 2004, p. 36). Nondis-tress, low intensity attachment leads a child torespond to the caregiver’s caregiving behav-iors such as rocking and being talked to withcontentment (Bowlby, 1969/1982, pp. 294, 295)or comfort (Bowlby, 1973, p. 180). Nondis-tress attachment produces emotions of joy, love,happiness, and pleasure. In adulthood, nondis-tress attachment leads one ‘‘to collaborate with[another] person in such a way that a mutuallyrewarding relationship is initiated’’ (Bowlby,1979, p. 104).

An implicit focus on nondistress attachmentis seen in the work of theorists who have empha-sized the ‘‘secure base’’ function of attachmentrather than the ‘‘safe haven’’ function (Sroufe,2005; Sroufe & Waters, 1977; Waters & Cum-mings, 2000). In the context of a dyadic rela-tionship, a ‘‘secure base’’ describes a situationin which a person’s exploration system is active(while the attachment system is inactive) andsupported by the partner’s caregiving system.There is an apparent contradiction in describing


secure base phenomena as attachment phenom-ena because the attachment system is explicitlysaid to be inactive for exploration to occur. Thisapparent contradiction can be resolved by rec-ognizing that the attachment system is both asystem for securing proximity and protectionand a system for choosing a partner to pro-vide that support. It is clear from the centralityof the secure base concept in attachment the-orizing that the attachment choosing-a-partnerfunction applies to both achieving proximityand safety and also to achieving explorationsupport. It would not seem a difficult step forattachment theory to recognize that the attach-ment choosing-a-partner function should alsoapply to getting feeding support, shelter support,developmental support, and maybe any otherkind of help. For example, Waters and Cum-mings described such support as evolving overthe course of a child’s relationship to a parentfrom ‘‘explicit secure-base teaching in infancy,to a supervision partnership beginning in earlychildhood, to service as an experienced listenerand testing ground for emerging beliefs aboutthe self, others, and relationships’’ (p. 166). Thebehaviors described are, of course, mostly thebehaviors of the caregiver and the caregivingsystem, but these behaviors are said to be in apartnership with the supported person’s attach-ment system.

Evolution of Caregiving and Attachment

In the discussion of the evolution, neurobiology,and psychology of attachment and caregiving, Iuse the term ‘‘system,’’ as Bowlby did, to refer tocoordinated emotions, goals, and behaviors, andI use ‘‘circuit’’ to refer to the biological source ofthe system in the brain. Thus, in the terminologythat I use, the ‘‘attachment circuit’’ refers to thebrain’s neurons that are consolidated to producethe motivation to seek security and comfort froma particular partner. The attachment circuit iscentered in the medial hypothalamus (Panksepp,1998). The caregiving circuit is centered in theparaventricular nucleus of the hypothalamus.

Caregiving is a system that nurtures particularothers. It is thought to have evolved in the earliestmammals out of a preference for the smell ofone’s offspring (Del Cerro, 1998). Thus, thecaregiving system was, from the first, orientedtoward a particular other. Initially, the systemappears to have operated only in mothers andonly toward offspring (Clutton-Brock, 1991).

The attachment system in early mammalsappears to have been a thermoregulation systemactivated by cold and terminated by warmth(Panksepp, 1998). A young pup emitted anultrasonic squeak that was not audible topredators but was heard by its own species.This attachment system was neither dyadic (itresponded to cold, not to a particular other) norgoal directed (the cold pup was not purposivelytrying to call for help).

Although caregiving and attachment evolvedseparately, in the sense that the evolution of eachinvolved different brain locations (discussedbelow), their evolution was coordinated inthe sense that each served as the socialcontext for the other. There were tremendoussurvival benefits that accrued when mutationsin the maternal caregiving system enabled aretrieval response to cold-based attachmentcries emitted when the pup wandered fromthe warm nest. Additional survival benefitsaccrued in later species when attachment becameproactively oriented toward a particular partner,thus allowing a mammal to elicit its ownprotection and nurturance. Of course, thisbenefit depended on a corresponding evolutionof the caregiving system in which its scopeexpanded beyond simple preference to includeprotecting, comforting, and training of the young(Bell, 2001). Furthermore, the caregiving systemgeneralized beyond the parent-child dyad inmany species to include adult-adult caregivingin the form of grooming and helping. In humans,with our expanded symbolic capability, thecaregiving system supports nurturance to meet avery wide range of partner needs (Bell; Bell &Richard, 2000).

Over the course of the mutual evolutionof the caregiving and attachment systems andtheir generalization from a mother-offspring toa general adult-adult relationship, the caregivingsystem came to be connected with a partner’sattachment system (providing a ‘‘safe haven’’).Other coevolution also occurred. In additionto its complementarity with the attachmentsystem, the caregiving system also came tointeract with the exploration system (providing a‘‘secure base’’; Bowlby, 1988). The safe havenfunction of a person’s caregiving system maybe activated by a partner’s (child or adult)attachment behaviors; the resulting felt securitydeactivates the attachment system (Mikulincer& Shaver, 2007) so that secure base explorationis activated.


The Neurobiology of Distress Attachment

A simplified model of distress attachment andrelated systems emerging from neurobiologicalresearch is presented in Figure 1. In thismodel, the fear system continuously assessesenvironmental threat (arrow 1 in Figure 1).The earliest mammals were small animalssurrounded by large predators, and the branchof mammals that has led to humans has neverhad strong physical defenses, so being afraid hasalways been an important survival mechanism.

The fear system is centered on the cen-tral nucleus of the amygdala (Carter, 1998;Damasio, 1994; LeDoux, 1996). With the detec-tion of actual or potential threat, the fearsystem activates two other systems (arrow2). First, the fear system activates the fast-acting sympathetic nerves (Porges, 2005):Adrenaline is released, the heart rate increases,muscles tense, and respiration, scanning, andvigilance increase. Second, the amygdala acti-vates the longer-lasting hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal stress system (the HPA axis), whichcontrols reactions to stress and regulates theimmune system and moods (Panksepp, 1998).Thus, the body is prepared for a fight-or-flightresponse. The fight-or-flight response may beenhanced in interaction with androgen and thusis more easily activated in males (Taylor, 2006).

Fear is a brain system that can be activatedat different levels, and English speakers havedifferent terms for these levels of fear. These

terms include ‘‘terrified’’ to describe the highestlevels of fear and ‘‘anxious,’’ ‘‘afraid,’’ and‘‘cautious’’ to describe lower levels of fear.Some situations that activate the fear system inthe brain are not usually labeled as fear; theresponse to these situations is frequently labeledas ‘‘distress.’’ It is perhaps for this reason thatBowlby and other attachment researchers oftenrefer to ‘‘fear and distress’’ as the compoundactivator of the attachment system. It is clear,however, that it is the brain’s fear system thatreacts, whichever English terms are used todescribe it.

The social effects of attachment and care-giving are mediated by the hormone oxytocin(Uvnas Moberg, 2003). Oxytocin is synthesizedin two areas in the hypothalamus (Carter, 2005;Insel, Young, & Wang, 1999; Panksepp, 1998;Uvnas Moberg). Oxytocin is released in womenduring birth and nursing and in all humans withclose personal contact and interaction (Carter,1998; Hrdy, 1999, 2005; Insel et al.; Light et al.,2000; Nissen et al., 1996; Panksepp, 1998).Although oxytocin is a neurochemical in a singleperson’s brain, it is social interaction that largelystimulates oxytocin production and that largelyis the target of the functioning of the system.Nature and nurture are mutually reinforcing.Oxytocin promotes development of an emo-tional bond associated with both caregiving andattachment (arrow 3). Mothers who have skin-to-skin contact with their infants immediatelyafter birth bond with them more strongly (Klaus,

FIGURE 1. A SIMPLIFIED MODEL OF DISTRESS ATTACHMENT.

Fear system (amygdala)

Sympathetic and HPA stress

systems

Attachment system

(hypothalamus, oxytocin)

Presence of and contact with supportive,

responsive partner

Threat(dangerdistress

frustration)

[1] [2]

Painsystem

[4]

[8]

[3]

[6 Separation]

[10]

[7 Separation]

Parasympathetic calm system

[5]

Dopamine system

(happiness)

[9]


Kennell, & Klaus, 1995; Uvnas-Moberg, 1998).Furthermore, oxytocin is provided to the infantin the mother’s milk and is further producedin the infant as a result of being held. Strengthof relationship in monogamous human adults isassociated with higher levels of oxytocin (Carter,2003; Grewen, Girdler, Amico, & Light, 2005;Light, Grewen, & Amico, 2005). Intranasallyadministered oxytocin increases trust in a part-ner (Kosfeld, Heinrichs, Zak, Fischbacher, &Fehr, 2005).

The attachment system makes the fear systemless sensitive to distress and reduces emotionalreactivity in both the short term and the longterm. Fear reduction is achieved by oxytocin(arrow 4), which inhibits the fear system inthe amygdala and thus down-regulates the HPAaxis (Carter, 1998; Heinrichs, Baumgartner,Kirschbaum, & Ehlert, 2003; Uvnas-Moberg,1998) and the sympathetic nervous system(Porges, 2005) to reduce adrenalin and otherfight-or-flight responses. It has been shownthat, in a variety of species, the presence of abonded partner inhibits the fear system, at leastunder moderate levels of fear and uncertainty(Carter, 2005; Hennessy, 1999; Sachser, 2005;Sachser, Durslag, & Hirzel, 1998). In humans,breastfeeding mothers, compared with bottle-feeding mothers, produce more oxytocin ininteraction with their infants and show lowerreactivity to a stressful situation (Light et al.,2000) and tend to have lower levels ofstress hormones (Amico, Johnston, & Vagnucci,1994). Infant monkeys raised without a motherto down-regulate their fear system show alifetime increase in fear and depression (Harlow& Harlow, 1965). Because females tend toproduce higher levels of oxytocin, they mayhave a reduced fear response compared to males(Taylor, 2006).

Some assertions of attachment theory implythat only long-term bonded partners moderatethe fear system. It has been found, however, thatnonbonded familiar partners can also reducefear. Familiar partners who are not bonded(e.g., who do not create separation distress) alsoreduce the fear process, although the reductionis not as immediate as it is with bondedpartners (Uvnas Moberg, 2003). In guinea pigs(Hennessy, 1999; Sachser et al., 1998) andsquirrel monkeys (Hennessy & Kaplan, 1982),surrogate mothers act like familiar partners, butnot like bonded partners. Gump and colleagues(2001) found that female college students had

higher stress responses (higher blood pressure)when they experienced a stressor with astranger than with a romantic partner. Such adifferential response did not occur, however,when the stranger was supportive (Carpenter& Kirkpatrick, 1996). Bonded partners may bepreferred, but persons under stress are likelyto turn even to relative strangers (Shaver &Klinnert, 1982). Fontana, Diegnan, Villenueve,and Lepore (1999) found supportive strangers tobe as effective as friends in reducing the stressresponse.

In counterpoint to the way that attach-ment reduces fear, fear activates the attach-ment system to increase oxytocin levels (arrow5). This is what Taylor (2002) referred toas the ‘‘tend and befriend’’ response to dis-tress. Taylor and colleagues (2006) found thatadult women with lower levels of contactwith their social network (and thus presum-ably higher separation distress) had higherlevels of oxytocin. Simpson, Rholes, and Nel-ligan (1992) found that, for female under-graduates who expected a stressful experi-ence, level of anxiety was associated withthe level of seeking comfort from their maleromantic partners. Adrenal steroids, producedin response to fear from stressful experi-ences, appear to facilitate the formation of abond (Carter, 2005; Montagu, 1986). Thesefindings suggest that persons who are understress are more susceptible to developing newrelationships.

Separation increases fear (arrow 6; Panksepp,1998). Brain scans show that the amygdala andrelated areas are highly active when peopleexperience social exclusion, a form of socialseparation (Eisenberger, Gable, & Lieberman,2007). A second effect of separation from anattachment partner comes largely from circuitsthat are not related to fear (Panksepp, 1998).Separation leads to activation of parts ofthe attachment circuit in the periaqueductalgray, an area where physical pain processingoccurs (arrow 7; Eisenberger et al., 2007;Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003;Panksepp, 2003). Thus the painful feelingsof grief that Bowlby (1980) described inpersons who lost an attachment partner donot involve just metaphorical pain: Theyappear to involve a genuine pain sensation(Panksepp, 1998).


THE NEUROBIOLOGY OF NONDISTRESSATTACHMENT

In addition to high intensity distress attachment,neurobiological research points to a parallel lowintensity attachment process that is not a reactionto distress. This section describes that processand considers its implications for the conceptualboundary that is appropriate for attachment andthe related caregiving system.

In addition to its relationship with fear andpain, the attachment system is also associ-ated with other important neural systems. Theattachment system operates on the parasym-pathetic nervous system (arrow 8 in Figure 1;Uvnas-Moberg, 1997). Neurons using oxytocinas a neurotransmitter extend from the attach-ment system in the medial hypothalamus tothe parasympathetic system, producing calmingeffects (Porges, 1998; Uvnas-Moberg, 1998).This activation of the parasympathetic systemis not associated with fear. Activation of theparasympathetic system results in a drop inblood pressure and a slowing of the heart rateand, in general, produces calm (Porges, 2005).Levels of oxytocin are associated with loweredblood pressure in humans as well as with theself-reported number of hugs in a monogamouscouple, although only for women (Grewen et al.,2005; Light et al., 2005). Breastfeeding womenproduce oxytocin at high rates. Such womenare calmer and show increased levels of socialinteraction compared to bottle-feeding women(Uvnas-Moberg, 1998). In a study of cohabitingand married couples, blood pressure monitorswere worn for a week (Gump et al., 2001). Theresearchers found that, compared to interactingwith a person who was not a significant other,interacting with a spouse or other significantother was associated with lower blood pressureand less arousal as well as greater intimacy andemotional support (Gump et al.).

These findings show how the oxytocin of theattachment system produces calm independentlyof fear and distress. This nondistress attachmentcreates short-term and long-term calm, content-ment, relaxation, and dyadic trust and love(Uvnas-Moberg, Arn, & Magnusson, 2005).Although the activation of the HPA axis ofthe sympathetic nervous system can facilitatean attachment bond (arrow 5 in Figure 1),parasympathetic activation also facilitates anattachment bond. Panksepp (1998, p. 223) usedreinforcement terminology to describe how theattachment system provides ‘‘satisfying feelings

of social gratification’’ in the presence of thepartner (arrow 9). Thus ‘‘comfort seeking’’ rein-forces attachment bond, creating ‘‘a conditionedassociation between the mother and feelingsof security’’ (Hazan, Campa, & Gur-Yaish,2006, p. 55). Hazan and colleagues suggestedthat this association conditions a person to pre-fer a calming partner (see also Carter, 1998).Thus, the rewarding experience of attachment-driven calming acts to maintain and strengthenattachment relationships (arrow 10).

As Panksepp (1998) pointed out in hissummary of research on the neurobiology ofemotions, social comforting is the positiveside of the same coin for which separationdistress is the negative side. We know thatthe attachment process associated with fearpromotes survival: Children who are protectedfrom predators and other dangers are more likelyto survive. The attachment process generatingcalm also promotes survival. Feeding andcuddling nondistress infants also has survivalvalue. Reducing the effects of stress improveslong-term and short-term health (Lovallo, 2005).Holding when a child is not afraid, as well aswhen the child is afraid, is a prototypical formof nurturance (Doi, 1986).

Boundaries of Caregiving and Attachment

By referring to a calming process as ‘‘nondistressattachment,’’ I am making two claims. First, Iidentify a term that can be used to describethe process by which the attachment systemaffects the parasympathetic nervous system.Second, I claim that this process should beaccepted as a part of the attachment system.That is, I suggest that the boundary implied bycontemporary descriptions of attachment needsto be enlarged. An associated recommendation isthat attachment associated with the fear systembe renamed ‘‘distress attachment’’ to indicatethat it is only one form of attachment.

Furthermore, although Bowlby himself mostoften equated caregiving behaviors with retrievaland the provision of felt security, evolutionaryevidence as well as brain biology nowsuggest that the caregiving system providesfor many additional functions, from feedingand retrieval to protection and providingsecurity to teaching and encouragement. Currentattachment-caregiving theory (e.g., Mikulincer& Shaver, 2007) would generally agree thatthe caregiving system is operating when a


parent hugs a child before the child goesout to explore the neighborhood; the parent’scaregiving provides the child’s secure base. Butmany attachment researchers would not considerthe parent’s buying the child new shoes thatthe child would wear during exploration to beunder the control of the caregiving system,because buying shoes is not easily classifiedas a secure base activity. Because I havesuggested that human caregiving is best seenas oriented toward meeting the needs of theother, I would classify meeting the child’s needsfor nutrition, shoes and clothing, exploration,education, and self-esteem all under the directionof the caregiving system. Ultimately, of course,the boundary around caregiving will be settledby research that combines behavioral measureswith neurobiological data.

AN EXPANDED MODEL OF THE ATTACHMENTAND CAREGIVING SYSTEMS

I now turn to an examination of the psychologyof attachment and caregiving that is consistentwith neurobiological understandings of thesesystems. In so doing, I propose to expandcurrent caregiving-attachment theory to includeboth distress attachment and calm (nondistress)attachment in a single theoretical model ofattachment. I end this section by relating theproposed model of attachment and caregiving totraditionally described styles of attachment andcaregiving working models.

In trying to understand the full operationof the attachment and caregiving systems, Iincorporate what is known of the biologicallocations of attachment and caregiving circuits.These circuits are located in ‘‘lower’’ partsof the brain (the ‘‘limbic system’’; MacLean,1990), where emotions are located, althoughthese circuits also extend into the neocortex,where cognitive perception and decision makingoccur. In the theoretical models presentedhere, I disagree with Bowlby’s claim thatemotions cannot be motivational. This is tosome degree simply a disagreement overterminology. Although one could interpret mydifference with Bowlby as merely a differencein language (Bowlby, 1969/1982, p. 116, talksabout cognitively ‘‘appraising the baby assomething to be comforted,’’ whereas I talkabout caring emotionally for the child andthe child’s needs), I believe this distinction isimportant. Thus, I will examine attachment and

caregiving as complementary systems motivatedby emotion. That is, instead of interpreting thecaregiving system in terms of a goal of protectingthe partner, I will ask what is the motivation ofthe caregiver that generates this goal. Instead ofasserting that the goal of the attachment systemis proximity to a partner and felt security, I willask what is the motivation that leads a personto pursue this goal with this partner. Why doesthe caregiver choose to nurture a specific other?Why does a person seek and accept help froma particular caregiver? I will thus focus on theemotional motivations that energize the systems(Figure 2).

In the discussion that follows, I willemphasize Bowlby’s assertion that attachmentis an inherently dyadic phenomenon. Theattachment system thus governs behaviors thatare directed at a special other, and theseattachment behaviors are only successful inachieving felt security if the other’s behaviors aregoverned by the other’s caregiving system. Asthis passage suggests, the language of attachmentis a dyadic language, and it is necessary forclarity to make an explicit distinction betweenthe two persons in the dyad. I will refer tothe support-giving (nurturing) person in whomthe caregiving system is operating as ‘‘thecaregiver’’ or ‘‘alter.’’ I will refer to the support-seeking (nurtured) person as ‘‘the person’’ or‘‘ego’’ depending on context.

A Model of the Caregiving System

Many clues to the psychological configuration ofattachment can be found in the complementarycaregiving system. In the model proposed here,caregiving is seen as a psychological systembased on a caregiving circuit centered in theparaventricular nucleus of the hypothalamus inwhich signals are sent using the neurotransmitteroxytocin (Panksepp, 1998). Like attachment,caregiving can sometimes occur in the contextof fear. A parent seeing a child run into the streetor a spouse seeing a partner with an addiction areboth fearful of the potential consequences of thechild’s or partner’s action. The parent or spouseis motivated by his or her fear or distress toprotect and comfort. With caregiving, however,we most often see action that occurs without fear(Bell & Richard, 2000), as when a parent ties achild’s shoes or when an adult prepares a mealfor a significant other.


FIGURE 2. A MODEL OF THE CAREGIVING SYSTEM.

Attachment system in ego

Trust

Openness

Depending

Caregiving system in alter

Ego's exploration

and self- interest systems

Individuationsupport

Ego's needs

Caring

Empathy

Responsibility

Acceptance

Nurturance

Ego's securitysecure base

safehaven

One of the psychological manifestationsproduced by the neurons of the caregivingcircuit is an emotional preference for a particularother person. I refer to this preference as theemotion of caring. Note that I distinguish, on theone hand, ‘‘caregiving’’ as a functional systemembodied in a network of neural circuits from,on the other hand, ‘‘caring,’’ the name I giveto the motivation produced by these circuits.In this paper, I use the noun ‘‘caring’’ andthe verb ‘‘to care’’ exclusively to refer toan emotional motivation; thus I use the terms‘‘emotion’’ and ‘‘motivation’’ interchangeably.I use the noun ‘‘nurturance’’ and the verb ‘‘tonurture’’ to refer to the behavior of providingfor the needs of the partner; I do not use either‘‘caring’’ or ‘‘caregiving’’ to refer to behaviors.I use ‘‘caregiving’’ as a noun and adjectiveexclusively to refer to the overall system thatincludes the emotion of caring, the intentions ofempathy and responsibility, and the behavior ofnurturance.

Caring is a dyadic emotion; that is, it alwayshas a specific target. Caring is an emotionalcherishment of another person in which thatperson’s needs are meaningful and consequentialto the caregiver. It is caring that motivatesthe caregiver’s caregiving system (Bell &Richard, 2000). Caring is a natural response(Noddings, 1984), a human response (Doi,1981). J. Solomon and George (1996, p. 186)invoke a dyadic ‘‘need to protect and nurturethe child.’’ Shaver and Hazan (1988, p. 479)describe ‘‘wanting best for other, wanting togive to other’’ as ‘‘reactions’’ to feelings of love

for another. I use the term ‘‘caring’’ to refer to theemotion behind these feelings of love. For Miller(1991), it is wanting to preserve and be in therelationship that is the motivation. The commondenominator in these interpretations is that thecaregiver has a motivation to meet the needs ofthe partner (Klaus et al., 1995). Caring is seenas a proactive as well as a reactive emotion.Caring can autonomously motivate nurturance,and it can react to demands for nurturance froma partner.

An advantage of conceptualizing caring asa motivation is that a number of intentionsand goals can be derived from it. In thepsychological model of the caregiving systemproposed here, the motivation of caring has twodirect consequences. First, the caregiver’s caringdirectly energizes the caregiver’s empathy,an intention to know the partner (ego) andego’s needs (Batson, 1991). Empathy is oftencharacterized by attachment researchers as‘‘sensitivity,’’ an attribute of caregivers thatcontributes to the partner’s secure attachment(George & Solomon, 1999). Empathy is seenin the proposed model as an emotionalconsequence of the caregiver’s dyadic caringemotion toward ego. It is close to Kohut’s (1984)‘‘capacity to think and feel oneself into theinner life of another person’’ (p. 82). It involvesbeing emotionally receptive to the other’s reality(Noddings, 1984), taking an ‘‘empathic stancetoward another person’s need’’ (Mikulincer& Shaver, 2007, p. 327). This model of thecaregiving system sees empathy as always activeat some level, proactively monitoring the other’s


needs. Thus, empathy is seen as active in theparent who anticipates that a child will be hungryor tired at a future time and active in the adultwho anticipates a partner’s disappointment oranger and acts to forestall it. It is also active inany caregiver who decides to nurture another outof love or ‘‘just because,’’ even when the otheris not distressed. And, of course, it is active whenthe caregiver is aware that the other is afraid orotherwise distressed.

Second, the caregiver’s emotion of caringdirectly energizes the caregiver’s responsibil-ity, the intention that ego’s needs be met. Likecaring and empathy, responsibility can be proac-tive as well as reactive. Because the caregivercares emotionally for ego, the caregiver takesresponsibility that ego’s needs are met. Respon-sibility is both an awareness of an emotionalcontact and a foundation for the nurturance ofthat contact (Befu, 1986). ‘‘Caring requires meto respond to the initial impulse with an act ofcommitment: I commit myself either to overtaction on behalf of the cared-for (I pick upmy crying infant) or I commit myself to think-ing about what I might do’’ (Noddings, 1984,p. 81; see also Ruddick, 1989). The respon-sibility described here is related to Johnson’sconcept of personal commitment focused on aparticular other (Johnson, Caughlin, & Huston,1999; Kapinus & Johnson, 2003). Attachmentresearchers have been consistent in recognizingthat ‘‘responsiveness’’ is a major component ofcaregiving (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall,1978; Bowlby, 1969/1982; Feeney & Noller,1996; J. Solomon & George, 1996). Georgeand Solomon (1989, p. 225) describe a parent’sinternal working model of caregiving in termsof responsibility (‘‘willingness to respond’’),empathy (‘‘ability to read and understand thechild’s signals’’), and effectiveness (see a similardiscussion in Heard & Lake, 1997). To the extentthat the caregiver empathically understands thepartner’s needs and takes responsibility to helpthe partner meet those needs, the caregiver willbe able to provide effective nurturance.

Note that the caregiving system in thismodel has a more general motivation than thatdescribed by most attachment theorists. In themodel presented here, the caregiving systemis conceptualized as focused not only on thepartner’s needs for security (to reduce distressand support exploration). In this model, thecaregiving system is seen as focused on allof the partner’s needs. Furthermore, this model

encompasses proactive caregiving (anticipatingthe other’s unexpressed needs) as well as reactivecaregiving (responding to the partner’s directattachment behaviors). In this model, attachmentcan vary from low intensity to high intensity. Thecaregiver can be both ‘‘comforter and protector’’(Bowlby, 1973, p. 201) when the partner is indistress but can also provide warmth and comfortwhen there is little or no distress.

A Model of the Attachment System

The model of the caregiving system justdescribed can provide a useful template for amodel of the attachment system. In particular,it shows the importance of identifying anemotional motivation for attachment. Bowlby,writing in a historical time where behaviorismwas in the ascendancy, described attachment interms of behavioral goals of proximity and feltsecurity. This formulation begs the question ofwhy a person should select this goal and whythe person should select a particular partner as ameans to the attainment of this goal.

In the model of attachment proposed here,the emotion underlying attachment behaviorsis trust. I use the term ‘‘trust’’ to describethe unconscious preverbal emotional processproduced by attachment neurons. At the psycho-logical level, I see trust as the basic motivation ofthe attachment system. Bowlby himself referredto this trust as ‘‘confidence’’: For Bowlby, con-fidence in availability (sensitivity, accessibility,and responsiveness) underlies the attachmentbond (Bowlby, 1973, p. 202). Trust has oftenbeen noted as a concomitant of attachment(Ainsworth et al., 1978; Berlin & Cassidy, 1999;Bowlby, 1969/1982; Zeifman & Hazan, 1997)but has not previously been seen as a motiva-tion by attachment theorists. As we will see,however, trust make sense as a basis for attach-ment because it explains both the choice of acaregiver and the intentions and behaviors thatare expressed in an attachment relationship.

This conceptualization of trust as a dyadicemotion is congruent with ‘‘security’’ describedin attachment theory as the set-goal of theattachment system. Attachment theorists havelong recognized that security depends on thelevel of nurturance from a caregiver. In Figure 2,this effect is represented by the arrow fromalter’s emotion of caring to ego’s emotion oftrust, a process similar to ‘‘perceived partnerregard’’ (Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 2000;


Reis & Shaver, 1988) and ‘‘perceived partnerresponsiveness’’ (Reis, Clark, & Holmes, 2004).When caregivers show a high level of caring,their partners develop a high level of trust.When caregivers show a low level of caring (asby being insensitive or inconsistent), partnersdevelop a low level of trust. Ego, observingalter’s actions of nurturance in support of ego’sneeds, infers alter’s caring and thus comesto trust alter to respond to weakness andvulnerability with support and nurturance ratherthan exploitation (Rempel, Homes, & Zanna,1985). Ego’s trust (‘‘I am confident that you willhelp me meet my need’’) is the direct emotionalcounterpart of alter’s caring (‘‘I want your needto be met’’).

Having identified the intentions of caregiving,one involving information (empathy, intendingto know about the partner) and a secondinvolving strategy (responsibility, intending thatthe partner’s needs will be met), we can moreeasily identify the intentions of attachment.As a direct result of ego’s trust in the alter’scaring, ego is motivated to reveal his or herneeds, described in this model of attachmentas openness. Openness is complementary toempathy. Because the caring partner is empathicand thus emotionally receptive to ego’s needs,ego can feel secure in revealing those needs.Thus, trust enables openness.

Just as ego responds to alter’s empathy withopenness, ego responds to alter’s responsibilitywith depending. Trusting in alter’s caring andresponsibility, that is, in alter’s cherishment andcommitment to ego’s needs, ego feels secure toask for alter’s help in meeting these needs andcan expect that alter will comply (Doi, 1986;Fairbairn, 1952; Rempel et al., 1985). Trustenables depending. Bowlby (1979) referred tothis as ‘‘a capacity to rely trustingly on otherswhen occasion demands’’ (p. 105).

Depending can be either passive or active. Achild can passively expect to be fed; an adult canpassively expect that a spouse will be supportivewhen disappointments occur. Depending canalso be quite active. A child throws a tantrumwhen a parent won’t buy a desired toy. Anadult angrily demands an accounting of apartner’s failure to fulfill a commitment. Butwhen needs are met, ego, depending on alter forthis nurturing behavior, responds to nurturancewith satisfaction and a sense of overall security.Bowlby (1969/1982) himself avoided the term‘‘dependency’’ for this process because of

its association with immaturity and pathology(p. 228). It is for a similar reason that I prefer theterm ‘‘depending.’’ In the model I present here,depending has a healthy positive connotation asgiven in the Japanese concept of amae (Doi,1981). ‘‘Depending’’ in this view correspondsto ‘‘I can depend on you’’ and ‘‘you aredependable’’ instead of ‘‘I am dependent onyou.’’

In this model, the attachment system can beactivated for multiple needs related to distress,such as sickness, boredom, safety, and fear. Inaddition, a person’s trust in a caregiver canlead that person to depend on the caregiverfor supportive nurturance for fatigue, hunger,learning, play, clothing and shelter, and love. Thecaregiver can become aware of these and otherneeds through the person’s direct openness. Thecaregiver can also become aware in other ways:A parent may know about a child’s patterns ofhunger and fatigue and plan meals and napsahead of the child’s awareness of these needs.The caregiver may thus perceive needs of whichego is unaware. For example, a parent mayprospectively anticipate a child’s developmentand thus encourage the child’s exploration andlearning of skills. The caregiver can encourageexploration passively by being a safe haven thatreduces ego’s fear as well as by proactive supportfor exploration and other forms of individuation,even when this encouragement also raises ego’sfears. A spouse can give a partner a hug, not justwhen the partner ‘‘needs’’ it but also when thespouse wants to express love.

Brain Circuits Associated With Variable Levelsof Attachment and Caregiving

Recognizing that attachment behavior is pro-duced through a neural circuit in the brainemphasizes that brain circuits are constructedand consolidated (intensified) as a result ofinternal (genetic, developmental) factors as wellas environmental (nutritional, social interac-tional) experiences. Within the model proposedhere, both caregiving and attachment are treatedas variable concepts. The level of attachment isseen as a reflection of the concentration of attach-ment neurons in the hypothalamus and relatedlocations. If no neurons have been consolidatedtoward a given other, we would say that there isno attachment bond with that other. Observationof institutionalized children who did not receiveconsistent caregiving during the first 2 years


of life shows that lack of sensitive caregiv-ing creates conditions in which the attachmentsystem is not consolidated and recognizableattachment behaviors do not emerge (Zeanah,Smyke, Koga, & Carlson, 2005). Toward aperson perceived as somewhat caring, someneurons may have been consolidated to cre-ate a partial or low-level attachment bond. Theterms ‘‘stranger,’’ ‘‘acquaintance,’’ ‘‘friend,’’and ‘‘best friend’’ can be used to label variouslevels of caregiving-attachment (increasing lev-els of caring, empathy, and responsibility on thecaregiving side of the relationship and increas-ing levels of trust, openness, and depending onthe attachment side). When a very large numberof neurons have been consolidated, there is astrong attachment involving high levels of trust.Likewise, when a large number of neurons havebeen consolidated in the caregiving circuit, thereis a high level of caring.

Attachment Styles

Clearly a person’s expectations (their internalworking model) of others have an importantimpact on how he or she approaches relation-ships. Internal working models of attachmentdescribe the cognitive and emotional residue ofprevious dyadic attachment experiences. Inter-nal working models affect new and ongoingrelationships, as these expectations shape bothperceptions and behavioral tendencies.

Secure attachment. Secure attachment producesa balance between closeness and autonomy(Bartholomew, 1990; Feeney & Noller, 1996).A secure attachment working model involvesseeing others as trustworthy and altruistic(Feeney & Noller, 1990). At the dyadic level,there is trust in the caregiver and a willingnessto depend on him or her. ‘‘Attachment figuresare one’s most trusted companions’’ (Ainsworthet al., 1978, p. 20).

In a stressful situation, the fear system ofa securely attached person is partially damped.Thus, in traditional distress attachment theory, asecurely attached style involves a lower level offear in a given situation and thus lower activationof the attachment system than other attachmentstyles under the same conditions because of thisdamping effect. Ainsworth et al. (1978) notedthat when a child feels secure, ‘‘his attachmentbehaviors may be at a low level of activation’’(p. 22). This makes sense because traditionally

conceived attachment behaviors are fear- anddistance-reducing behaviors. Thus, to be securein the traditional view means to have a minimallyactivated attachment system because a secureperson has less need to seek proximity or feltsecurity.

The biological-psychological model of attach-ment proposed here differs from the traditionalview in that attachment is seen as variable,associated with varying levels of consolidationof brain neurons. This model also includes thepossibility of activating the attachment systemwithout high levels of distress. This model con-siders that hugs, touches, glances, and othersupportive behaviors of a caregiver may nurturenondistress attachment. Nondistress interactionsprovide ongoing oxytocin production that mod-ulates the fear system (arrow 4 in Figure 1).

Avoidant and disorganized attachment. Thegoal of avoidant attachment is said to bemaintaining distance and preventing others fromgetting too close (Feeney & Noller, 1996).‘‘Individuals with this style passively avoidclose relationships; they place much valueon independence and assert that relationshipsare relatively unimportant’’ (Bartholomew,1990, p. 164). There is ‘‘discomfort withpsychological intimacy and the desire tomaintain psychological independence’’ (Rholes& Simpson, 2004, p. 4). Avoidant attachmentis a ‘‘secondary attachment strategy’’ that aperson uses when the ‘‘primary’’ secure-basescript of secure attachment does not work(Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007). There are atleast two views of avoidant attachment, whatwe may think of as the ‘‘deactivated’’ and‘‘basal’’ views of avoidance. Bartholomewnoted that avoidant attachment may reflect‘‘either fear of intimacy or a lack of interestor motivation to become intimate with others’’(p. 149). In the deactivated view of avoidantattachment, the attachment system in the brainis ‘‘deactivated’’ or repressed. The person’sreported preference for independence is a sham:The person ‘‘really wants’’ to be close andto depend, but this desire is repressed becauseof previous hurtful experiences (Bowlby, 1980;Mikulincer & Shaver).

The deactivating view of attachment avoid-ance raises two questions: (1) Where do theattachment circuits come from before they aresuppressed and (2) what is the source of thesuppression? Is every brain born with full


attachment circuits, or are these circuits cre-ated and consolidated in response to interactionexperiences that do not occur for all persons?Attachment researchers answer the first questionimplicitly: All human children develop attach-ments normally in their families. It has beenassumed that attachment is a biological systemthat exists in all humans. Attachment researchershave answered the second question by describ-ing how children learn from dismissing parentsthat attachment behaviors will not be met withcaregiving because of parent hostility or dis-interest. These children then learn to suppress(deactivate) their attachment systems in orderto avoid the frustration of expressed but unmetneeds.

The basal view of avoidant attachmentproposes that the attachment system has to bebuilt in the brain out of experience, and thuspersons who never have the required experienceswill never build an attachment system at all.Consider the infant who receives only custodialcare—a bottle for feeding, a quick change ofdiaper, and limited or nonexistent holding. Suchcan be the plight of children from overcrowdedand understaffed orphanages (O’Connor, 2005;Zeanah et al., 2005). Children who never havea consistent caregiver and resulting nurturingexperience may never consolidate attachmentneurons, and thus they may have a very low oreffectively zero level of attachment potential.

The standard procedure for measuring attach-ment in young children is the Strange Situation(Ainsworth et al., 1978), where the child’s reac-tion to separation from a caregiver is assessed.The Strange Situation procedure is designed todetect deactivated avoidant relationships, but ithas no procedure to detect basal avoidant rela-tionships (Carlson & Earls, 1999; Chisholm,2000; Chisholm, Carter, Ames, & Morrison,1995; O’Connor, 2005; Zeanah et al., 2005).Thus, in Zeanah et al.’s study of institutionalizedchildren, 78% did not fit into any of thethree most common attachment styles (secure,avoidant, or anxious) and were instead clas-sified as having a ‘‘disorganized’’ attachmentstyle. Because attachment styles are designed tomeasure the organization of attachment behav-iors (Sroufe & Waters, 1977), the existenceof a ‘‘disorganized’’ style suggests that somechildren may never have formed an attachmentsystem at all. From the point of view of theattachment model proposed in this paper, basal

avoidance represents the lowest level of attach-ment. Because an attachment system has notbeen consolidated in the brain, the psychologicalexperience of trust is missing, and the individualdoes not exhibit openness and does not dependon others for nurturance.

Anxious attachment. Anxious attachment ex-presses a desire for proximity to and felt securityfrom a caregiver while at the same time it isassociated with a fear of rejection and aban-donment by that caregiver (Feeney & Noller,1996). It involves ‘‘a strong need for careand attention from attachment figures coupledwith a deep, pervasive uncertainty about thecapacity or willingness of attachment figuresto respond to such needs’’ (Rholes & Simp-son, 2004, p. 4). Anxiously attached individualshave a ‘‘hyperactivation strategy’’ (Mikulincer& Shaver, 2007). Anticipating the caregiver’sinconsistency of caregiving, they tend to bevery forceful in making demands for nurturancebecause of expected resistance.

Levels of trust, openness, and depending mayvary greatly among anxiously attached persons.Some may have relatively high levels of trust anddepending because they recognize that, althoughnurturance from the caregiver is not automatic,they are able to activate that nurturance withhigh intensity efforts. Other anxiously attachedpersons may have quite low levels of trust anddepending, as they recognize that the caregiver’scommitment to them is low, so that effortsto activate nurturance from the caregiver areanticipated to have a low probability of success.

Caregiving Styles

The traditional model of caregiving has beenconstructed in juxtaposition with the traditionalmodel of attachment largely as a result ofempirical investigations of the characteristicsof the mothers of children whose attachmentstyles have been measured. Thus mothers ofchildren classified with secure attachment havebeen classified as ‘‘secure’’ caregivers, mothersof avoidant children have been classified as‘‘rejecting’’ or ‘‘dismissing’’ caregivers, andmothers of anxious children are ‘‘uncertain’’or ‘‘preoccupied’’ caregivers (Bartholomew,1990; George & Solomon, 1999; Main, Kaplan,& Cassidy, 1985; Main & Solomon, 1986;Rothbard & Shaver, 1994).


Secure caregiving. Attachment researchers havelong identified sensitivity and responsivenessas the primary characteristics of ‘‘good’’ care-givers, those who produce securely attachedchildren (Ainsworth et al., 1978; George &Solomon, 1999). The traditional discussion ofcaregiving sees the goal of caregiving as protec-tion (George & Solomon, 1999; Heard & Lake,1997; J. Solomon & George, 1996) or security(Bowlby, 1969/1982; Bretherton, 1980; Sroufe& Waters, 1977) as well as support and com-fort directed toward the partner’s exploration(Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007). In the caregivingmodel proposed in this paper, secure caregivingderives from caring toward a partner, conceivedas an emotional cherishment of the partner and acommitment to the satisfaction of the partner’sneeds. From this motivation, one can deriveempathy, the intention to know the partner’sneeds (‘‘sensitivity’’), and responsibility, theintention to help meet those needs (‘‘respon-siveness’’). High levels of caring, empathy, andresponsibility produce nurturance, the quality ofwhich depends on the accuracy of empathy andthe competence of responsibility to develop andimplement nurturant strategies. Secure mothersare flexible, positive, and realistic about theirchildren (George & Solomon, 1999).

Uncertain caregiving. Uncertain mothers(whose children are anxiously attached) areinsensitive to children’s cues, exhibiting ‘‘cogni-tive disconnection’’ (George & Solomon, 1999,p. 661, italics in original). The mother’s ownfear is seen to degrade her empathic ability.Mothers may be ‘‘so focused on their own vul-nerability that they lack the mental resourcesnecessary to attend compassionately to others’needs for help and care’’ (Mikulincer & Shaver,2007, p. 329). These mothers tend to be highlyactive, but ineffective. It could be that uncer-tain mothers have low levels of empathy (theyare insensitive to the child’s cues, they do not‘‘attend compassionately’’) or that they havehigh but inaccurate empathy, overinterpretingthe child’s cues and thus producing high levelsof inappropriate or misdirected nurturance.

Rejecting and abdicated caregiving. Rejectingcaregiving (by mothers whose children areavoidantly attached) are described in terms of‘‘cognitive deactivation’’ (George & Solomon,1999, p. 661, italics in original). ‘‘The mothers

dismissed or devalued their children’s attach-ment needs, thus deactivating their caregivingsystem; they never, however, abandoned theirrole in providing care and protection.’’ Abdi-cated caregiving (by mothers whose childrenare described as disorganized) describes par-ents with extremely low levels of empathy andresponsibility. These parents have a disabledcaregiving system (George & Solomon). Theseparents see themselves as helpless. These moth-ers either have no organized caregiving systemor have a caregiving system that has been sup-pressed or disabled. Parenting behaviors appearto be motivated by a desire to follow socialnorms, by attachment needs to be cared for bythe child, or by fear (George & Solomon; Main &Hesse, 1990). This pattern may also account forthe still culturally common script of the incom-petent and disengaged father who has little timeor physical contact with the child and thus doesnot develop deep emotional caring, perhaps con-sidering himself to be incompetent or availinghimself of a perceived cultural permission toabdicate caregiving responsibility or both. Theparents who exhibit these patterns either do notseem to care or (which may be the same thing)are motivated by other things besides caregiving(George & Solomon).

DISCUSSION

Many of Bowlby’s ideas have been supported byneurobiological research. Research in mammalshas demonstrated that attachment is oftenassociated with fear, that fear activates theattachment system under certain conditions, andthat the attachment system down-regulates fear.This research, along with human studies, hasshown that bonded partners can reduce fear inboth the short term and the long term and thatactual or threatened loss of a partner can increasefear, distress, and pain.

No theoretical system, however, can answerall relevant questions in its early development.Strategic decisions to avoid certain questions cankeep attention focused on questions where earlyprogress can be demonstrated. For example,Bowlby found it expedient to deflect attentionfrom parents feeding children because thatwas where Freudian theory held sway at thetime (Karen, 1994). Similarly, to distinguishattachment theory from drive theory (Bowlby,1969/1982) and dependency theory (Ainsworth,1972), attention was focused on the organization


of attachment (in particular, its organizationjointly with fear) rather than the level ofattachment. Although these decisions nurturedthe early development of attachment theory,they have also placed certain limitationson further development of the attachment-caregiving theoretical system.

Recent neurobiological and psychologicalresearch has provided a basis for extendingattachment theory. Panksepp’s analysis of theattachment system in the brain, while respectfulof Bowlby’s formulation, expands on it inways contemporary attachment researchers havenot (Panksepp, 1998; Panksepp, Nelson, &Bekkedal, 1999). Research has shown that, justas bonded partners can reduce fear, persons whoare not bonded partners can also reduce fear.And it has shown that, both in the presence offear and in the absence of fear, attachment hasthe effect of increasing calm and comfort.

Part of the reason for the lack of interest innondistress low intensity attachment may be itsstrong similarities to affiliation, and Bowlby haddecided on functional grounds to declare thataffiliation was a different system from attach-ment. For Bowlby, ‘‘[a]n ‘attachment interac-tion’ is one in which one person is threatened ordistressed and seeks comfort and support fromthe other. An affiliation interaction is one inwhich both people are in a good mood, do notfeel threatened, and have the goals of enjoyingtheir time together or advancing common inter-ests’’ (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007, p. 19; seethe related discussion in Weiss, 1998). The neu-robiological evidence, however, suggests thataffiliation, like caregiving and attachment, isregulated by oxytocin (Young, Lim, Gingrich,& Insel, 2001). Serious consideration needs tobe given to the question of whether affiliation,instead of being a separate system, may be betterunderstood as a manifestation of (nondistress)attachment.

In this paper, I have looked to expandattachment-caregiving theory in the light of thebiological research. I have presented models ofthe evolution and neurobiology of attachmentas it interacts with other systems, noting boththose places where neurobiological evidencesupports current attachment theory and placeswhere there is a discrepancy. I have proposeda psychological model of attachment andcaregiving that accommodates varying levelsof fear and distress.

One of the hallmarks of successful theoreticaldevelopment is that it not only accounts forwhat is known but it also suggests some newand surprising predictions. The new dyadicpsychological model of attachment-caregivingproposed here suggests a number of ideas thatfall outside the boundaries of most contemporaryattachment-caregiving theory.

First of all, the model proposed here conceptu-alizes varying levels of attachment. Attachmentresearchers have frequently conceptualized highand low levels of activation of the attachmentsystem, but many have argued against concep-tualizing low levels of attachment (Ainsworth,1972; Ainsworth et al., 1978; Cassidy, 1999;Main, 1999; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007; Sroufe& Waters, 1977; Weiss, 1982). This conceptu-alization works when applied to demonstrablystrong attachment relationships. It appears, how-ever, to be based on an assumption that apreexisting attachment bond necessarily existsin certain relationships. There is now significantevidence from studies of institutionalized chil-dren (Chisholm, 2000; Chisholm et al., 1995;Zeanah et al., 2005) that under some circum-stances attachment circuits simply do not form.Such children do not have a deactivated attach-ment system (Mikulincer & Shaver); they havelittle or no attachment system. By focusing onlevels of caregiving and attachment, the pro-posed model is a candidate as a ‘‘core organizingprinciple’’ (Reis et al., 2004) for families in par-ticular and for personal relationships in general.

The model also describes direct parallelsbetween the psychological components of thecaregiving and attachment systems. In the modelproposed here, attachment elements of trust,openness, and depending match up with thecaregiving elements of caring, empathy, andresponsibility. This model shows that opennessis a response within ego to a caregiver’sempathy and that depending is a response tothe caregiver’s responsibility.

Third, the model proposed here includes bothattachment in the context of fear and distress andattachment that does not involve fear or distress.It is attachment behavior when a frightenedchild seeks nurturance from the parent, andit is also attachment behavior when a hungrychild or a bored child seeks nurturance from theparent. The neurobiological data now comingavailable, however, show that, although the fearand attachment systems are mutually connected,they also stand on their own, and it is time to


begin understanding the attachment system in itsown right.

Ultimately, the boundary around attachmentand caregiving will be determined empiricallyby attachment researchers working with neuro-scientists. This empirical work will eventuallyverify the conditions under which the neuronsof the attachment system are activated. Untilthis test is possible, scientists will be limited tospeculating about what will be found.

Future Directions

Dynamics of attachment and caregivingrelationships. The new models of caregivingand attachment proposed here suggest a numberof new directions for future research on fam-ily and other personal relationships. The vastmajority of attachment studies have focused ontrait-level attachment, that is, on the organiza-tion of attachment conceptualized as an enduringworking model of relationships. This has beena very productive line of research. Recognizingthe attachment system as embodied in a neuralattachment circuit that may be activated towarda particular partner in a particular environmentsuggests the importance of also studying state-level (contextual) attachment and caregiving.

Research on dyadic attachment has doc-umented how attachment relationships differacross a person’s relationship partners (Brum-baugh & Fraley, 2007; Cozzarelli, Hoekstra,& Bylsma, 2000), but more research on thedynamic interplay of attachment and caregivingin adult relationships is needed. A recommendedfocus of this research will be on variations in trustand caring across relationships and across timewithin relationships. Such studies will comple-ment studies of relational turbulence (Knobloch,Miller, & Carpenter, 2007; D. H. Solomon &Knobloch, 2004) that focus on the cognitiveproblems of relational uncertainty by addinga focus on the emotional issue of trust. Anapproach based on levels of attachment and care-giving variables in addition to types of workingmodel will support a focus on the positive ele-ments of attachment and caregiving (trust andcaring) as well as the traditional fear-based nega-tive elements (anxiety and avoidance). Researchon attachment in adults has largely focused onromantic relationships. There is an importantopportunity to expand this research to look attrust, openness, and depending among friends,

acquaintances, and strangers. How is affilia-tion quantitatively different from attachment andcaregiving? Longitudinal studies might examinethe dynamic neurochemical, emotional, and cog-nitive changes that precede as well as those thatfollow changes in trust and caring.

Attachment-caregiving balance. Studies of thebalance between caregiving and attachmentwould also be useful. These would extend lifecourse studies of how caregiving and attachmentroles differ from childhood attachment toadult caregiving toward a parent (Rossi &Rossi, 1990). These studies could includeinvestigations of parent-child balance duringchildhood: Is caregiving really unilateral (onlythe parent does caregiving, the traditionalassumption); is it ever mutual (parent and childnurture each other at the same time); is it cyclical(sometimes the child nurtures, sometimes theparent)? Studies of adult relationships mightfocus on the match or mismatch between ego’sattachment and alter’s caregiving. For example,how does a person’s caregiving react to a partnerwho is too trusting, too open, and too demanding(e.g., Dailey, Pfiester, Jin, Beck, & Clark, 2009;Roland, 1988)?

Research instruments. To carry out these inves-tigations, researchers will need new instrumentsfor measuring attachment and caregiving. Inaddition to instruments for distress attachmentthat are common today to measure workingmodel styles (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991)and dimensions (Brennan, Clark, & Shaver,1998), scientists will need more work on dyadicattachment and caregiving in specific ongoingrelationships (e.g., Cozzarelli et al., 2000; Kunce& Shaver, 1994). Scientists will need measuresof levels of trust, openness, and depending for theattachment system and levels of caring, empa-thy, and responsibility for the caregiving system.To support longitudinal studies, researchers willneed reliable state-level measures that are sensi-tive to both short-term and long-term changes incaring and trust.

The history of attachment has shown greatresiliency and flexibility (dare I say sensitivityand responsiveness?) as the early ideas ofattachment have evolved and been enhancedand validated. The model presented here isintended as just such an enhancement ofcurrent attachment theory. By showing howthe neurobiological underpinnings of attachment


and caregiving have broader connections thanwere guessed at in the early formulation ofthe theory, this effort validates extensions ofattachment research into a more extensiveanalysis of nondistress, including secure base,attachment phenomena.

REFERENCES

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