asymmetries in risk communication

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Asymmetries in Risk CommunicationAuthor(s): Madeleine HayenhjelmSource: Risk Management, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Feb., 2006), pp. 1-15Published by: Palgrave Macmillan JournalsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3867940 .

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ArticleASYMMETRIESIN RISKCOMMUNICATIONMadeleine HayenhjelmDepartmentf Philosophynd he History fTechnology, oyalnstitute fTechnology,tockholm,wedenCorrespondence:adeleine ayenhjelm,epartmentf Philosophynd heHistory fTechnology,Royalnstitute fTechnology,eknikringen8B,100 44 Stockholm,weden.E-mail: [email protected] riskcommunication as cometo comprisemorethanconveyingech-nical or scientific nformationo thepublic.It can also includenewer ormssuch aspublicparticipation,oint decision-making,ndtwo-way dialogue orums.Previousdiscussionsn risk ommunicationavedistinguishedetween wodifferent pproach-es, namely hedemocratic ersus he technicalone. Inthepresentpaper, t isarguedthatdespite hese recentattempts o widen hescopeandobjectives f risk ommuni-cation,risk ommunicationsprimarily,nmostcases,arelationshipetweenunequalparties. This nequality s analysedthrougha threefolddistinctionof asymmetriesin termsof communicativenitiative, nformationalrivilege,and risk nfluence.Apreliminarymodel orunderstandinghedifferentnequalitiesnthe riskcommunica-tionsituation sdeveloped.

Keywordsrisk ommunication;emocratic pproach;wo-waycommunication;influence;symmetryRiskManagement 2006) 8, 1-15.doi:10.1057/palgrave.rm.8250002Introduction

Risk communication includes a wide range of practices such ashealth campaigns; doctor-patient conversations; referenda onnuclear power; Community Advisory Committees; newsletters;

*^ RiskManagement2006, 8, (1-15) 2006 PalgraveMacmillanLtd1460-3799/06 $30.00www.palgrave-journals.com/rm

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surveys; stakeholder decision groups; public hearings, etc. Much riskcommunication esearchandtheoryhasprimarily ome to focus on large-scaletechnologicalrisks,and communicationabout these fromexpertsto the gener-al public.Risk communication n thiscontext is often framedas a response othe gap in riskperceptionbetween the expertsand the generalpublic(seee.g.,Fischhoff, 1989, p 282; Renn, 1992; Leiss,2004). This can roughlybe donein one of two ways: either as an attemptto bringthe attitudes of the publiccloserto that of the expertsor to engagethe publicin a dialoguevaluingtheircontribution as an importantcomplementarycontributionto decision-mak-ing (seee.g., Slovic, 1987; Renn, 2003; WesterHerber,2004). These differentapproaches o riskcommunicationhave beencategorizedas eithertechnicalordemocratic,dependingon whether the communicative ocus has been publicacceptanceof risks or joint decision-making Fiorino, 1990; Rowan, 1994).Anotherdistinction betweenrisk communicationapproachesmuchalongthesame line is that between one- and two-way communication,dependingonwhether nformationhas been disseminatedprimarily o thepublicor commu-nicatedin dialoguewith them(seee.g., Renn, 2003; Gurabardhi t al., 2005).In the literature,these distinctions,and others, are often used more or lessinterchangeablyo roughlymark out the differencebetweenolder and newerformsof risk communication seee.g., National ResearchCouncil, 1989, p 21;Rowan, 1994; Covello and Sandman,2001, p 175). "One-way"or "techni-cal", on the one hand, is used to denote more traditionalapproaches o riskcommunicationof public persuasionandexpert-to-laydisseminationof infor-mation. "Two-way","democratic",and expressionssuch as "riskdialogue"and "publicparticipation",denotenewerforms of communication romopenhouse activities o citizenpanelsand shareddecision-making. n the followingall attemptsof riskcommunicationcomprisingsome elementof participatorydecision-makingnclusiveof amateurswill be referred o as democraticand allcommunicationeffortsseekinga dialogueas two-way.Grunig(1984) made an earlydistinction n publicrelations studies betweenthe directionsof communication,on the one hand;that is, one- and two-way,respectively, ndthepurposeof communicationson the other;that is, asymm-etrical and symmetricalcommunicationsdependingon whether the intendedeffect of communication s a changein the publicor effects "benefitingbothorganizationand publics" (Grunig,1989, p 29). Asymmetrical ommunica-tions, accordingto Grunig,seek to "manipulate he behaviorof the publicsfor the assumed, if not actual, benefitof the manipulatedpublicsas well asthe organization" Grunig,1989, p 29). Symmetrical ommunicationby con-trast"usebargaining,negotiating,andstrategiesof conflictresolution o bringabout symbiotic changes in the ideas, attitudes,and behaviors of both theorganizationand its publics" (Grunig,1989, p 29). The ideal, accordingtoGrunig,is the "symmetric wo-way communication"combininga symmetricpurposewith a two-way process.

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Following the two different approaches, risk communication can be definedin two different ways. It can either be defined in terms of dissemination ofinformation about risks, that is, as a one-way communication, or in terms ofan "interactive process of information and opinion among individuals, groups,and institutions" (National Research Council, 1989, p 21) alternatively "pur-poseful exchange of information about health and environment risks betweeninterested parties" (Covello et al., 1986, p 172). The latter type of definitionallows also for a two-way approach (for a discussion, see, Gutteling and Wieg-man, 1996, pp 31-33). In between these two, there are ideas of a responsibilityfor risk managers and experts to communicate "responsibly and effectively"about risk factors but also "to promote a reasoned dialogue among stakehold-ers", including the task of working "with interested parties towards a sharedunderstanding of risk factors" (Leiss, 2004, pp 401-402). Granger Morganet al. (2002), Gutteling and Wiegman (1996), and Rowan (1994) also suggestin-between models of expert authority that involve the public at an early stage.It can be noted that two-way communication can refer to two different mod-els, both in contrast to one-way communication (see also Grunig and Hunt,1984, p 23). First, two-way communication can refer to gathering informa-tion about the public, through research or feedback, in order to evaluate andplan communication efforts with the needs of the target audience in mind(e.g., Grunig, 1989, p 29; Grunig and Grunig, 1996, p 288; Gutteling andWiegman, 1996, p 33). Two-way communication on this reading refers toputting the audience's needs and interests in focus when forming risk messages.Secondly, it can refer to the communicatively active role of both parties, thatis a mutual communicative process and exchange of information (e.g., Slovic,1987; National Research Council, 1989; Grunig and Grunig, 1996, p 289).Put differently, two-way communication can both be described as a planned"audience-oriented" (Gutteling and Wiegman, 1996, p 33) activity, with theinformation needs of the public in focus, or as making the public communi-cative partners in a dialogue.

Following the two different definitions of risk communication as either dis-semination of information or a dialogue, the involved parties can be under-stood in two different ways. The participants can thus be described either incommunicative terminology such as "sender" and "receiver", or in partici-patory terminology as "interested" or "affected" parties or stakeholders (for asimilar point see Grunig and Hunt, 1984, p 24). The first terminology describesthe internal relations between the parties in terms of communicative direc-tion and initiative. The second terminology is neutral on the internal relationsbetween the parties, but indicates a relation to the risks discussed or to thecompany responsible for risk exposure and communications. This latter neu-trality is unfortunate, since it covers a wide range of relations that may be any-where between equal stakeholders to far-reaching asymmetry between theparties. This becomes even more apparentin the professionalrisk communication

Asymmetries in Risk Communication



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between a communicating organization and different publics (rather than,for example, between experts or colleagues), where a particular organizationtries to identify which stakeholders to communicate to. Not only do differentpublics vary in terms of claims, influence, and urgency in relation to the com-municating organization (see Mitchell et al., 1997) but also relative to eachother. This becomes even more apparent when those affected are not part ofthe discourse, as is the case of inactive publics (Hallahan, 2000). When thesetwo different terminologies are used interchangeably, this makes the relations,direction, and purpose of communications opaque. This article will explorethe inequality between the participants in terms of asymmetry. It should benoted that "asymmetry" should in the following be understood as a simplenotion, implying imbalance of influence between different parties. It is thus adifferent, although related, concept from that of Grunig's, which is referring toan approach, indicating a complex set of presuppositions, or as he puts it "aworldview" (Grunig, 1989).

Asymmetry in risk communicationInfluence is, as noted above, seldom shared equally among the participantsin a risk dialogue. It is not likely that the local community exercises the sameinfluence over the operations as the operator, or that the industry has the sameinfluence over regulations as the regulator. The roles of the participants inthe risk communication process are often asymmetrical. It is however notsufficient to explain the participants' roles toward each other in the risk com-munication context solely in terms of their influence over the hazardous activitiesand the mitigations of negative impacts. With the risk communication processitself follows a new set of relations in terms of information and knowledge andin terms of the communicative situation as such. The participants are likely toplay different roles also in terms of access to information, agenda setting, andinitiative to the communication. These relations can also be asymmetrical. Notall parties are likely to have the same amount of information in all risk com-munication situations, nor will they simultaneously be initiating the communi-cation. Hallahan (2000, p 509) points out that while the two-way symmetricalmodel in Grunig's sense may make sense in describing a large organizationcommunicating to a large activist group, it makes less sense in describingcorporate-to-person communication. Referring to Coleman (1982, cited inHallahan, 2000, p 509), he points to three factors making the individual citizenand the corporation very unequal parties: "(1) corporate actors typically havelarge resources, (2) nearly always control the conditions surrounding the rela-tionship, and (3) control much of the information relevant to the interaction".According to Hallahan (2000, p 509) "...the rank-and-file members of manypublics are never likely to share the same level of knowledge and involvementabout a topic as the organization that seeks to communicate with them about




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it." These differentaspectsof influentialasymmetryneed to be distinguishedin orderto be addressed.The differentrolesof the participantsn the riskcom-municationcontext could, this articlesuggests,be explainedin terms of thefollowingthree factors:The communicative ole: Influence n terms of defining he agendaof what isto be debated,includingthe power to withhold informationand not raiseanissue,andthe initiativefor the communication.The informationaland epistemologicalrole: Influence n termsof expertiseand knowledge about the hazardousactivities, about the possible negativeconsequences,or about the mitigationof suchconsequences.The risk role: Influenceover the hazardousactivitiesand decisions concern-ing themand overprecautionary nd mitigatingactions.The differentparticipants n the risk communicativesituation can take ondifferentroles in relation to each other. Rather than suggestingthat one par-ticipatingpartytakes on a communicativerole and another an informationalone, the ideais that differencesbetweenthe participants hould be understoodon threescales of more or less influence n the differentroles. One party mayhave more influencethan anotherin terms of decidingthe agendaand there-fore has a strongercommunicativerole in relation to the other.Anotherpartymayhave more riskrole influence hanthe other.The threedimensionsabovecould thereforealso be said to represent hreedifferent ields of influencefor(potentiallyasymmetrical) elationsbetweentheparties.A distinctionbetweenthreetypes of asymmetrycan thus be made in accordancewith the threeroledimensions ntroducedabove:communicative symmetry, nformational sym-metry,and riskroleasymmetry.Communicativeasymmetryrefers to differentcommunicativeroles, that is,differencebetween the communicationparties in terms of definingthe risktopic to be discussed, the initial perspectiveto adopt, and the initiative forcommunication.Forexample,such an asymmetry ould be assumed o prevailbetweena professionalriskcommunicatorand his or herintendedaudience.Informationalasymmetryrefers to differences n knowledgeconcerningtheperceivedrisk in terms of impact,probability, he risk-causingactivities,andmeasures that can be taken, etc. For example, such an asymmetrycould beassumedto prevailbetween a scientificexpertandthe generalpublic.Risk role asymmetryrefers to influence over the hazardousactivities,andinfluenceover decisions andpoliciesregardingpossiblenegative mpacts.Suchan asymmetrycould, for example, be assumed to prevailbetween industry,regulators,and otherdecision-makers n the one hand and the generalpublicon the other.All cases of asymmetry ndicatean inequality n the riskcommunication,but

these roles need not fall to the same parties.It is not always the partywith amore dominatingrisk role that is also the initiator of riskcommunication.Itis also not necessarily he partywith the most influenceover the hazardousAsymmetries in Risk Communication



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activitiesor over themitigationof risksthat is alsoprivileged ntermsof knowl-edge.This three-foldasymmetry s intendedto be applicable o formalas wellas informal risk communications,among as well as betweennonexpertsandexperts,and regardingndividualrisktakingas well as large-scalerisks. Eachof the threeasymmetrydimensionswill now be explained n turn.Communicative asymmetryCommunicativeasymmetrycan roughlybe dividedinto two separatebut re-latedaspects: hatof communicativenitiative,and henceplanningandagendasetting,and that of professionalcommunicative kills. That thereis an asym-metryin communicativeroles in the first of these aspectsmay seem triviallynecessary o riskcommunication,or indeedany communication.It is hardtothink of a situationwhere two partiesintroduce he sametopic to the agendasimultaneously.But that there can be, at least in theory,cases of equalor sym-metriccommunicative oles, is indicated n an articleby Earleand Cvetkovich(1994). Theysketcha dilemmascenariowheretwo peoplewith matchingval-ues anda willingness o cooperatefail to do so due to a lack of trustand a mis-takenperceptionof the others'values,a dilemma hat could be solvedthroughtrust-creating ommunication.Despitetheir example being an illustrationofsymmetric ilencerather hancommunication, t impliesa situationwhere theinterestsand objectivesfor communicationarethe same andwhere the ques-tion of who raisesthe questionfirst s more of lessarbitrary.Otherexamplesofsymmetriccommunicativeroles would be two scientistsworkingon the sameproblemin an already on-going dialogue, or severalpeople facing the samerisk,suchas havingtheirgardensattackedby vermin,amongwhom a sponta-neouscommunication volves.Inmost casesof riskcommunication,one partyrather than anotherbringsthe issue up for communication,or initiates thatparticularseminar, eafletproduction,makes that particularphone call, etc.This initiative can also give that partya numberof additionalprivilegessuchas defining he agenda;settingup theobjectives orthecommunication; hoos-ing the topics to be addressed; electingcommunicationpartnersanddecidingtheir role in the decisionmakingprocess;choosingwhich media and formsthecommunication houldinclude;selecting nformationalmaterialandexpertise;decidingthe dates, times,intervalsandlengthof process;etc.The other aspect of the communicativerole that of communicativeskills isprominentonly in professional risk communicationand almost exclusivelyasymmetricn relationto publics.Karlberg1996) pointsto a bias withinpub-lic relationsresearch o focus almost exclusivelyon the communicativeneedsof the state and the commercial nterestsand only to address the public asrecipient,and not aspotential nitiatorsof communication.Thus,according oKarlberg1996, p 271), eventhe symmetric esearchagenda n publicrelationsstill reinforcesratherthan rebalancesasymmetriesbetween the public andorganizations.Althoughprofessionalcommunication kills and theoriesare,in




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principle,open to all, it is in practicemostly the governmentand commercialinterests who have the experienceand the economicalresourcesrequiredtomakeuse of such research Karlberg,1996, p 267).All persuasivemodels of risk communication mply a communicativeasym-metry; he risk communicatorbeingthe privilegedpartyin termsof the initia-tive to communicate, he privilege o decidewhat is to be communicated,howand to whom. Wheneverthere is a decisionto communicate,whether to in-volve a targetaudience n a dialogueor to informthem,there s an asymmetricrelationship n this sense.The activistgroupoccupyinga plantor distributingleafletsarerisk communicatorsn this sense as much as an industryrepresenta-tive or governmentalagencydisseminatingnewslettersor starting ocusgroupsor publichearings.Informational asymmetryInformationalasymmetrycould manifest itself in differentways: one partymayhave more information hanthe other;moreknowledgeand competencethan the other;betteraccessto informationthan the other;more accurate n-formationthan the other or more controlover information hanthe other.It isthis informationalasymmetry hat is the motivatingforcebehindthe technicalrisk communicationapproachor any one-way approach,whether the goalis public information,persuasion,change of behaviour,acceptanceof risks,or publiceducation.In short, informationalasymmetryrefers to a privilegedaccess to, or bettermeans for interpreting,nformationthan other partiesinrisk communication.From the technicalpoint of view, it is this asymmetryin technical competenceand knowledge that legitimatize an asymmetryindecision-making.Severalcircumstancesenforce informationalasymmetrybetween organiza-tions and the public.First,researchand informationcost money.Governmentsand the industryhavethe resources hat enable themto conduct research hatactivistsgroupsseldom have(Karlberg, 996). Theyalso havegreateraccess tothe researchresultsof othersthrougha closer contact with the researchcom-munity and the skills to interpretthose results (National ResearchCouncil,1989, p 114f). Grunigmentions the problemsof subsidized nformation rominfluential ourcesreinforcinghis imbalance n influence Grunig,1989, p 36).Hallahan (2000, p 507) speaksof severalasymmetries n processing nforma-tion for the "novice" n contrastto the expert:theyhave to "exertmore effortto makesenseof information";heyhave more "difficultyn placinginforma-tion in context";they are more likely to misinterpretnformation;they aremore prone to accept argumentswith less discriminationand less likely "tochallengethe validity"of information.

In someof the two-way anddemocraticapproaches o riskcommunication nwhich the exchangeof information s stressed,there is an idea that both par-ties have something o learn fromeach other(seee.g., Slovic, 1987). TechnicalAsymmetries in Risk Communication



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informationon risk assessmentmaynot be the most important,f, for instance,the objective s social trust from a communityrather hanan understandingfscientificgrounds or technicaldecisions.Theentranceof NGOs intothe indus-trial riskcommunication ontextoftenindicatesdiversityn the framingof therisk situationandconflictingnterpretationsf what is in fact the case. "Who-evercontrolsthe definitionof risk controlsthe rationalsolutionto the problemat hand"(Slovic,1999, p 411). It seemsreasonable o assume hatthe valueof aspecifickind of information s closelyrelated o theagendaandobjective or riskcommunication, incethese definewhichkind of information s relevant.All cases of riskcommunicationneed not include an informationalasymme-try.Therecan be symmetry or examplewhen two equallyinformedscientists(in the same or in differentfields)discuss how to proceedwith that infor-mation, or when an organizationhas an informationalprivilegeregardingtsreleaseswhereas scientistshavemoreinformationon theirimpact.Risk role asymmetryRisk role asymmetry efers o one party havinga moreinfluentialrole regard-ing the potentiallyhazardousactivityand/or controlover its impactsthan theother.Forinstance, n most cases,the operatorof an industrialplanthas a riskroleprivilegeover thegeneralpublic.Inthe case of a referendum n the justifi-cation of such a potentiallyhazardousactivity, hese rolesmaybe reversed:hegeneralpublichavingmore influenceover the decision than the industry.Riskrole asymmetryhas to do with the operationaldecisions for hazardousactivi-ties as in the case of technicalrisks,or carryingout riskyactionsas in the caseof individualrisktaking,or makingdecisionsconcerningalternative auses ofaction, preventivemeasures,mitigations,regulations,etc. When it comes tostakeholdernvolvement n the decisionmaking processthis canchangeor re-balance he risk rolerelationship,but a partial nfluentialnputis not the sameas creatingrisk role symmetry.Even the more participatory orms of publicinvolvementssuch as CitizenAdvisoryCommitteesvary in terms of risk roleasymmetry: romresembling hose of a "vehicle or persuasion" o being veryclose to a negotiatingprocess (LynnandBusenberg,1995).All risk communicationdoes not entail risk role asymmetry.There can forexamplebecommunicationon an unavoidablerisk thatis not man-made, uchas a tornado, in which cases no partyhave more influenceover the cause ofeventsthan the other. In such a case, risk communicationmay springfrom acommunicativeasymmetryon the one hand, and one partyraises the issue,and an informationalasymmetryon the other,and one party possessesmoreknowledgeof the implicationsof such a disaster,but not a risk role asym-metry.However, even in such cases, there may be asymmetries n terms ofpreparedness nd emergencyplanning.In cases of industrialor technologicalrisks,there s often an unequaldistributionof power regardinghe risk andthedecisionsmade to dealwith it.




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Typology of asymmetries and risk communicationsThe dimensionsof asymmetry n risk communicationcan now be exploredfurther.Three dimensionsof influence n risk communicationhave beenidenti-fied:the communicative, he informationaland the risk role dimensions,re-spectively.Asymmetrieshave been analysed along the same dimensions.Thisenables a furtheranalysis of the relationshipbetween the participants n arisk communicationcontext. The asymmetriescan namely tilt to a singularparty's advantageor in a more distributedway. Drawing upon the discus-sion above, threedifferenttypes of risk communicational ituations can nowbe distinguishedbased on the involvedparties'differentpositions in terms ofknowledgeor information,communicative nitiative,and risk influence.Thesewill be referred o as: symmetricalrisk communication,scatteredasymmetry,and clusteredasymmetry.Thesymmetric elationship ndicatesa balancebetweentheparties; heyhavethe same amountof communicativepower, information,knowledge,and op-erational influence.Examplesof the symmetricrelationshipcould be two sci-entists discussinghow to proceedwith a particular ask; they have the sameamount of knowledge (possiblyfrom differentfields)and the same influenceover it. It could also be the informal communicationof two neighbourshear-ing on the news of a meteorite that may hit the earth, that neither of themhas much knowledge of or any influenceover. These symmetricconditionsare the preconditionsfor an equal exchange of ideas, and mutual debate incase knowledgeis shared.In such cases, the purposeof communicationmaybe the exchangeof knowledgefrom different ieldswideningthe scopefor un-derstandingand action, or to completethe others'knowledgeabout relevantmatters.This would also be an idealstartingpoint for democraticapproachesto risk communication.The symmetric iskcommunicationpointsthus to twodifferentkinds of communication: hese can be called mutualexchange of ex-pertiseandinformalrisk communication.Commonlynone of these two kindsof communicationconcerningrisk is referred o as riskcommunication.Scatteredasymmetry ndicates a risk communicative ituation where one ofthe partieshas a relativeadvantageover the otherparty(orparties) n at leastone dimension,whereas the other(s)has (have) an advantage n at least oneof the other dimensions. In the simplest cases, one party has more knowl-edge and the other more directinfluenceover the risk taking.This could bethe governmentinformingthe public on the health hazardsof sun bathing.Sucha case would representone partywith moreinfluenceand the other withmore information and communicative nitiative. Most campaigns n ordertochangepublic risk behaviour,whetherconcerningusing seat belts or bicyclehelmets,consumingsaturated at, or concerning he effectsof usingthe toiletas a waste, bin areexamplesof scatteredasymmetry. n suchcases, thosewiththe informationalprivilegeare also the ones to initiate the communication,




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perhaps most often in the form of one-way information campaigns. In othercases, those with influence over the risk taking seek out information from whatthey perceive as reliable and trustworthy sources. Sources perceived thus by anindividual risk taker may not primarily be official or even expert knowledge,but what is at hand through the usual channels of information. For example,I may seek the advice of someone more experienced than myself, my localdoctor, a specialized Internet forum on the topic, specialized magazines onthe topic, the books in my local library, etc. Similarly, the management of anindustry may seek expert knowledge or information from other industries.The purpose of communication in these two cases is often different: in the firstcase information is judged to be important to spread to risk takers in orderfor them to avoid such risks or minimizing them. In the second, information isoften sought out by someone who wants to be better prepared and make betterchoices concerning a risk.In yet other cases, the person who initiates the communication may neitherhave the informational nor the risk role privilege. A concerned neighbour liv-ing next door to a chemical factory may ask the management to explain whatthe discharges causing bad odours are all about, or send an upset letter to thelocal newspaper or even start a campaign to shut the factory down. It mayalso be a reporter or a local NGO reacting to emissions or waste programsfrom pieces of information that they have gathered. In such cases, the partywith a communicative privilege starts the communicative process with thosewith influence or knowledge. Hence, three different kinds of scattered asym-metric risk communication have been discussed: advice to the public, personalinquiry, and public reactions. Most typically it is only the first of these that isreferred to as risk communication.

The clustered asymmetric relationship can indicate one of two possible asym-metries. First, all privileges can be clustered with only one party leaving theother with no privileges. Second, as above, there is one party without any privi-leges, but in relation to two (or more) parties sharing the clustered privileges.The internal relationship between the two privileged parties may range fromdependency to open conflict; the point is that there is one party who is also partof the communication process but without any of the influential advantagesthat the two others have. In such a case, one may say that it is the disadvan-tages rather than advantages that are clustered. In the first case, this wouldmean that the party who initiates the communicative process is also the partywith the most knowledge and influence over the situation or activities thatmay cause unwanted effects. An example of this would be a risk inducing in-dustry or a regulating governmental agency informing the local community orgeneral public. In the second case, influence, knowledge, and communicativeinitiative is scattered between several parties, leaving one party without anyinfluential privilege. For example, media or scientists reporting on industrialhazards to the general public. If the risk role influence is separated from the in-




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formationaland communicativenfluence, his typeof riskcommunication aninthat sensebe called ndependent; owever, his does not meanthatit could notbe biased.Clusteredasymmetry an thus be divided nto these two subgroups:informationromthe decision makerandinformation roma thirdparty.Bothkinds arecomprisedn the commonunderstandingf riskcommunication.Hence, seven kinds of exchange of informationconcerningrisks have beenidentified:mutualexchangeof expertise, nformalriskcommunication,adviceto thepublic, personal nquiry,publicreactions, nformation romthe decisionmaker,and information roma thirdparty.Theremaywell be others.It is nev-ertheless nteresting o note thatonly three of the seven arecommonlyreferredto as risk communication;namelyadvice to the public, informationfromthedecisionmaker,and information roma thirdparty.It is interesting,however,that of those three kindsthatarecommonlyreferred o as riskcommunicationtwo are also those where the inputfromthe publicis least influentialaccord-ing to our three-dimensionalanalysis. These are the two kinds of clusteredasymmetricrelationships.Advice to the public is, on the other hand, not anexampleof clusteredasymmetrydueto the public's nfluenceover its own riskbehaviour,but this kindof riskcommunication s on the other handthe primeexample of one-way communicationfrom expertto the general public. Thisseems to imply that most commonlythereis little room for risk communica-tion to be two-wayin a substantialway.Does asymmetry matter?These asymmetry/symmetryypes are of course simplificationssince one ofthese role aspectsmay provemuch more influential han the others. Thistypo-logy does not distinguishbetweentrivialandcrucialasymmetries.Nor does ittake into account when one-wayinformation basedon solid knowledgeis tobe preferred o a democraticdialogue.It is thereforenot obvious that asym-metry n risk communicationvaries n severitydependingon its kind,with themost severeinequalityalways beingin the cases of clusteredasymmetry.Noris it obvious that asymmetricrisk communication s always a problem.It is,however,noteworthythat the typical cases of technicalrisk communicationfall into this category,especially f the differences n terms of educationamongthe populationare very large. If the sole purposeis to changethe behaviourof the disadvantagedparty or change its attitude,the audience'dependenceon the informationand riskperformanceof the communicatingpartyis quiteextensive.In such cases, it seemslikelythat clusteredasymmetry s significantfor understandinghe risk communicationprocess.Most of the practicesusu-ally referred o as risk communicationabouttechnologicalrisks areexamplesof full three-foldasymmetry,where the initiative,the informationand the riskinfluenceconstitute an advantageto one party;the "sender", n relation to adisadvantaged"audience".Moreinteresting,however, s that most attemptsat




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democratic approaches to risk communication in terms of two-way dialogueor participatory forums also seem to fall into this category.There is a slow but steady trend towards more stakeholder involvementand more democratic risk communication procedures (Chess et al., 1995;Gurabardhi et al., 2005). Different approaches to risk communication are of-ten normatively ordered in the literature. Democratic and two-way approachesare described as more ethical, effective and conflict resolving than more tech-nocratic approaches (see e.g., Slovic, 1987; Fiorino, 1990; Grunig and Grunig,1996). Fischhoff (1995) describes risk communication efforts in several de-velopmental stages where traditional methods of informing about risk assess-ment and risk management decisions and risk comparisons are followed bydialogue and partnership with the audience. Slovic (1987, p 231) maintain that"risk communication and risk management efforts are destined to fail unlessthey are structured in a two-way process" and Sandman that "effective riskcommunication is a two-way activity". Similarly, Grunig and Grunig (1996)describe the symmetrical approach as superior to the asymmetrical one, beingboth more ethical, more effective and hence an example of "excellent" com-munication management. But democratic or participatory approaches to riskcommunication can take many forms and seek different goals. What is soughtafter in between the lines of democratic expressions such as "joint decisionmaking", "shared values", and "cooperation" can be several objectives, suchas mutual understanding, community input into decision making, or an idealof symmetry. Symmetry can again be of different kinds: symmetry in commu-nicative roles (equal two-way communication, public initiatives), symmetry ininformational roles (educated mutual understanding), symmetry in risk roles(shared power), or a combination of these.There are several arguments for the value of keeping asymmetry; such as thatdecisions made by elected officials and experts are better (see Fiorino, 1990,p 227) or that sharing power is detrimental to accountability for decisions(see National Research Council, 1989, p 10, 145, 155). On the other hand,as Grunig (1989, p 32) pointed out, the decisions that the public are expectedto accept sometimes include negative effects on health, environment, socialrights, etc., indicating a need for public involvement in such decisions ratherpersuasion from an expert elite:

Althoughthe asymmetricalperspectivemay sound like a reasonableposition,keep in mind that organizationsoften expect publics to accept strange thingsas a result of "cooperation":pollution, toxic waste, drinking, smoking, guns,overthrow of governments, dangerous products, lowered salaryand benefits,discriminationagainstwomen and minorities,job layoffs,dangerousmanufac-turingplants,risky transportationof products, higherprices,monopoly power,poor product quality,political favouritism,insidertrading, use of poisonouschemicals,exposureto carcinogens,nuclearweapons, and evenwarfare.




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The democraticresponseto this problemis more involvement of the public,but this involvement can be regardedas a continuum from public hearings,open houses,public surveysto negotiationsbetweenpartiesthat are as equalas possible.Asymmetryas such need not be a problem.If the sole concern of risk com-munication is to provide the public with impartial informationconcerningrisksthey mayface, as a public agencyproviding mpartial nformationaboutlevelsof dischargesn the atmosphereor risks of radon,the informationalandcommunicativeasymmetriesbetweenexpertsandpublicare not a problem.Insucha case informationalasymmetry an be an asset,since its oppositewouldnot be two partieswith similaramount of informationbuttwo parties ackinginformation.The mere fact that someone who has influence and knowledgealso takesan initiative o communicateneednot, in itself,be a problem.Butincasesof decision-makingprocessesor in legitimacyquestions,the asymmetriesneedto be handledwith care and discernmentn ordernot to bias the expecta-tions, processes,andoutcomesof the communication.ConclusionsRisk communications often framed n termsof beingtechnicalandone-wayordemocratic ndtwo-way. n thiscontext,democratic ndtwo-waycommunicationis oftenpreferreditheras an idealforbuildingmutual rustbetween,orexample,anindustry nd thelocalpopulation,or two-waycommunications regarded s acomplementaryr a moredevelopedormof communication.However, venthisdemocraticwo-waycommunications often npracticear from he referreddealof equal participantsxchangingdeas.Often the initiative or the dialogue, hebackground nowledge, ndthe influence verthe communicationrocessandtherisk nducing ctivitys asymmetric. hisasymmetryan be understoodntermsofthreeaspects: ommunicativenitiative, nformation, nd risk roles. Theseaspectscan,however,trengthenrcounteractheasymmetryependingn howthe nfluenceandinformations distributed etween heparties.Themost commonasymmetrydistribution etween he communicative arties s probably lustered symmetry,with communicativenfluence,nformation, nd risk role influence iltingto oneparty's dvantage.Thisclustered nfluence istribution oes notonlymarkoutthepreconditionsorexistingriskcommunication, utalsopointsout a directionorfurtherdevelopmentsf riskcommunicationlongthedemocraticines norder orealize he idealsof jointdecisionmakingandtwo-waycommunication.ReferencesChess, C., Salomone, K.L., Hance, B.J. and Saville, A. (1995). Results of a National Sym-posium on Risk Communication: Next Steps for Government Agencies. Risk Analysis15 (2), pp. 115-125.




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Coleman,J.E.(1982). TheAsymmetric ociety,Syracuse,NY:SyracuseUniversityPress,citedin Hallahan,K. (2000). InactivePublics:The ForgottenPublics n PublicRela-tions. PublicRelationsReview26 (4),pp.499-515.Covello, V.T. and Sandman,P. (2001). Risk Communication:Evolution and Revolu-tion. InWolbarst,A.B. (ed.)Solutions or an Environmentn Peril. Baltimore: ohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,pp. 164-177.Covello,V.T.,vonWinterfeldt,D. andSlovic,P.(1986).Risk Communication: Reviewof the Literature.Risk Abstracts (4),pp. 171-182.Earle,T.C. and Cvetkovich,G. (1994). Risk Communication: he SocialConstructionof MeaningandTrust.InBrehmer, . andSahlin,N.-E. (eds.)FutureRisks and RiskManagement.Dordrecht nd London:KluwerAcademicPublishers.Fiorino,D.J. (1990). CitizenParticipationndEnvironmental isk:A Surveyof Institu-tional Mechanisms. cience,Technology& Human Values15 (2), pp.226-243.

Fischhoff,B. (1989). Risk:A Guide to Controversy,AppendixC in National ResearchCouncil. ImprovingRisk Communication.Washington:National AcademyPress,pp.211-319.Fischhoff,B. (1995). RiskPerception nd CommunicationUnplugged:TwentyYearsofProcess.RiskAnalysis15 (2),pp. 137-145.GrangerMorgan,M., Fischhoff,B., Bostrom,A. andAtman,C.J.(2002). Risk Commu-nication A MentalModelsApproach.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Grunig, .E.(1984).Organizations, nvironments,ndModelsof PublicRelations.Pub-lic RelationsResearch& Education1 (1), pp. 6-29.Grunig,J.E. (1989). Symmetrical resuppositionss a Framework or PublicRelationsTheory. nBotan,C.H. andHazleton,V.(eds.)PublicRelationsTheory.Hillsdale,NJ:LawrenceErlbaumAssoc.Publishers, p. 17-44.Grunig,J.E.andGrunig,L.A. (1996). Models of PublicRelationsand Communication.InGrunig,J.E.,Grunig,L.A., Dozier,D.M. andMeyer,J.K.(eds.)Excellencen Pub-lic Relationsand CommunicationManagement.Hillsdale,NJ: LawrenceErlbaumAssociatesPublishers, p. 285-325.Grunig, .E.andHunt,T. (1984).ManagingPublicRelations.New York:Holt, RinehartandWinston,Inc.Gurabardhi, ., Gutteling, .M. andKuttschreuter,M. (2005).An EmpiricalAnalysisofCommunication low,Strategy,nd Stakeholders' articipationn the Risk Communi-cation Literature 988-2000. Journalof Risk Research8 (6),pp. 499-511.Gutteling,J.M. and Wiegman,0. (1996). ExploringRisk Communication.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers.Hallahan,K. (2000). InactivePublics:The ForgottenPublics n PublicRelations.PublicRelationsReview26 (4),pp.499-515.Karlberg,M. (1996). Rememberinghe Public in Public Relations Research:FromTheoretical o OperationalSymmetry. ournalof Public Relations Research8 (4),pp.263-278.Leiss,W. (2004). EffectiveRiskCommunication ractice.ToxicologyLetters149 (1-3),pp. 399-404.Lynn,EM. andBusenberg,G.J.(1995).CitizenAdvisoryCommittees ndEnvironmentalPolicy:WhatWeKnow,What'sLeftto Discover.RiskAnalysis15 (2),pp. 147-162.Mitchell,R.K.,Agle,B.R. andWood,D.J.(1997).Towarda Theoryof Stakeholderden-tificationand Salience:Defining he Principleof Who and WhatReallyCounts.TheAcademyof ManagementReview22 (4),pp. 853-886.NationalResearchCouncil(1989). ImprovingRisk Communication.Washington,DC:NationalAcademyPress.




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Renn,0. (1992). Risk Communication: owardsa rational discoursewith the public.Journalof HazardousMaterials 9 (3), pp.465-519.Renn,0. (2003). Hormesisand Risk Communication.Human& ExperimentalToxico-logy22 (1),pp. 3-24.Rowan,K.E.(1994).TheTechnical nd DemocraticApproacheso RiskSituations:TheirAppeal,Limitations, ndRhetoricalAlternative.Argumentation (4),pp. 391-409.Slovic,P. (1987). Perceptionof Risk,Reprinted n Slovic,P. (2000). ThePerceptionofRisk.London:Earthscan ublications.Slovic,P. (1999). Trust,Emotion,Sex, Politics,and Science:Surveyinghe Risk-Assess-ment Battlefield,Reprinted n Slovic, P. (2000). The Perceptionof Risk. London:EarthscanPublications.WesterHerber,M. (2004). Talking o Me? Risk Communication o a DiversePublic,DoctoralDissertation,OrebroUniversity,OrebroStudiesn Psychology .


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