assignment 9 monday's version

ALAN FISHER ASSIGNMENT 9

Introduction

Communication is an essential element to any truly representative democracy. The

citizenry should be adequately and independently informed about issues which are

being debated, policies which are being formulated and laws which are being passed

on their behalf. Citizens should be able to engage freely in public discourse about

such matters, giving them a voice and an agency to act in their best interests and in

line with their values. And in turn, politicians need to know the wishes and demands

of those they seek to represent and govern. When and where such different views,

interests and perspectives are taken into account, public exchanges are, in the view of

Curran likely to produce ‘rational and just outcomes’ (2005:p129).

This wide ranging dialogic interaction has been most prominently conceptualised in

Habermas’ theory of the public sphere – based on critical debate, openness,

democracy and the public good (Habermas 1984). Although historically debated, the

normative dimension of this concept continues to be relevant to any debate on the

relation between those in power and the public. In these modern, representative

democracies such dialogue between the public and their political representatives is

maintained primarily through the mass media (Smith 1999). McQuail describes the

relationship between the mass media and the conduct of politics as ‘an intimate

connection’ (McQuail 2005: p523) which places the mass media at the very centre of

the democratic process.

The media, and in particular television, have become for many, the main, if not the

only source of information about social and political affairs (Chaffee and Kanihan

1997, McQuail, 2005). Aware of this critical role, politicians and parties seek

maximum exposure for themselves and their arguments, creating a ‘Mediacracy’

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(Lilliker 2006;p7), a political system where most activity is media focused with the

intention of reaching and influencing as many members of the public as possible.

This in turn, has created ‘a new profession, devoted to the effective communication of

political messages’ (McNair 2007: p118) which covers public relations, marketing

and advertising and provides a link between the media and politics while profiting

from the ‘mutual interdependence which exists between the two’ (ibid: p118).

This essay will critically examine that this increasing professionalization of political

communication practices is damaging to the democratic process. I will argue that

while this is more of an evolution in political practice than a significant step-change,

it has, in several areas and in it’s current form, is damaging to the democratic process.

I will examine how by adopting tools of corporate organisations to reach voters,

political parties have driven the personalisation of campaigning based on image,

trivialisation and negativity rather than on policy, substance and detailed information

(Franklin 1994) and how this deprives the electorate of the necessary substance

required to make an ‘intelligent voting decision” (Wayne and Murray 2009: p420).

Furthermore, as mounting such a campaign has now become essential for any party or

candidate that wishes to be taken seriously (McQuail 2005), I will argue that the costs

of doing so limits access to the political arena, maintains dominant power structures

while squeezing out alternative voices and viewpoints and presents political power as

something that can be bought rather than ‘won in a democratic contest’ (McNair

2007; p37). As I will discuss in this essay, employing such political professionals, the

very essence of political ideology itself is challenged as parties and politicians seek to

modify their basic beliefs and positions to court voters and gain power. And I will

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show that the expansion of news outlets has created the opportunity for political

professionals to set the agenda and skew the debate through partial, partisan and

biased messages to defend decisions and promote opinions of their clients while

‘selling the product’ (Blumer & Kavanagh 1999: p209).

Americanization, Modernization, Professionalization

The introduction of such professionals1 and the techniques employed by them;

advertising, public relations and marketing (Blumler & Gurevitch 1995) began in the

United States and have since spread around the world (McQuail, 2005). This has led

to the transformation and professionalization of political communication to be

referred to as ‘Americanization’ (Butler & Ranney, 2005; Negrine, 2008) ‘a useful

shorthand description of global trends’ (Scammell; 1997:p4). Yet this remains a too

simplistic way of describing general campaigning changes where local socio-

economic, political and cultural circumstances could play a part in shaping the

communication to the public. Plasser (2002) suggests what has been created is a

‘shopping model’ where the relevant practices are borrowed, imported and modified

to fit the appropriate national context. What has become clear is that the United

States provides the template for how to run campaigns in a professional manner in a

number of democracies (Scammell 1998).

1 Describing those involved in modern political communication as ‘professionals’ ignores a substantial body of evidence which provides a classic sociological definition of the term. Although its meaning may have shifted and altered over the years, there are some broad criteria which are still shared by those occupations such as medicine and law which society regards as ‘professional’, namely highly trained expertise, specialist knowledge and a large degree of autonomy through peer surveillance and regulation (Wilding 1982). In this instance then professionalization is mainly used as a more flexible, catch-all descriptive term for those with skills, knowledge and specializations, often acquired outside the political sphere (Negrine 2008), who are then employed by politicians and parties to help convey their messages through the media to the public. Lilliker and Negrine argue that such a broad definition is not only highly subjective, it is confusing as fails to fully describe the ‘nuances in the complex nature of political communication’ (2002:p99).

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Adopting such professional techniques, however, is not new. McNair (2007) cites

19th Century political campaigns which used pamphlets and posters, parades and

rallies to motivate voters into supporting certain candidates. Bernays describes

political campaigns in the 1920s as ‘all sideshows, all honors, all bombast, glitter and

speeches’ (1928:p111). What we have perhaps witnessed is not so much a sudden

professionalization – by definition branding earlier attempts at political

communication unfairly as amateur – but rather a ‘constant evolution (Lilliker &

Negine 2002 : p101), an ongoing adaptation of political communication to new media

technology, new socio-cultural factors and the management of public expectation

(Negrine 2008). In such an environment, where voter choice is no longer a ‘near

automatic, socialised response based on class and party identification’ (Denver 2003:

p124) political parties are not expected to have all the skills or capacity to deal with

the demands of modern campaigning and therefore will call on the specialized

services of political consultants (Farrell et al 2001) who are hired at great expense

(Mancini 1999) to better communicate with voters, win their support with the

objective of securing victory by any means and at any cost (Kotzaivazoglu & Zotos

2006). As I will demonstrate, this makes politics and political communication less

about a democratic exchange of ideas in the public sphere by an energised public

(Sussman & Galizio 2003), more a commercial process employed by politicians and

parties in modern democracies to win and maintain power.

De-idealisation and the consumer citizen

Mainstream democratic political parties and politicians have one over-riding

objective; to hold power. To do that, they have to attract voters in sufficient numbers

to win elections (Lock & Harris, 1996). Lilliker argues that while parties may have

once relied upon ‘the support of voters with strong loyalties, this is no longer the case’

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(2009:p9). And historical socio-demographic patterns which would have been a

reasonable pointer to voting intentions and party identification have been weakened

over time (Holtz-Bacha, 2002). This decline in partisanship has led parties to seek out

and identify potential voters, to try to reach them with their political messages and

secure their support. To do this, parties and politicians have accepted a different type

of political expertise is required and have turned to a new group of political

professionals including political consultants, communications, marketing and public

relations experts and pollsters (Mancini, 1999; Webb, 1992). While Negrine

describes this transformation and professionalization as adding complexity to the

‘essentially simple matter of winning votes’ (2008:p201), Gibson and Rommele

(2001) argue that it is a necessary and proactive measure to ensure the future survival

and relevance of political parties and reflects their responsiveness to changing

external environments. The result is that political consultants and professional

communicators now become central players in election campaigns and the on-going

business of government.

Most of the consultants arrive in the political sphere with expertise gained in the fields

of business and commerce (Negrine, 2008) and bring with them skills of selling goods

and services to the public, no matter what that product is. This commercialised logic

is then applied to the electorate (Butler & Kavanagh, 1992). Lilliker suggests this

creates political campaigns designed with the intention of ‘maximizing profit for the

brand’ (2009; p28) which in this context means securing either the largest number of

votes possible or targeting those that are most important for victory. As with

corporate entities, there then follows a complex process of finding the ‘right message,

messenger and media’ (Lilliker & Richards, 2006, p4). This creates what Holtz-

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Bacha has described as the ‘de-idealisation’ (2002: p24) of politics; a diminution of

the party’s ideological profile at the expense of a growing focus on the personality

and character of its leader (ibid). The politician becomes a brand, a commodity

(Rheingold, 1994) which is positioned to exploit voter attitudes and where personality

and persona becomes more important than policy and substance (Bruce 1992, in

McNair, 2007). Bernays poetically suggests that a ‘charming candidate is the

alchemist’s secret that can transmute a prosaic platform into the gold of votes (1928,

p116’).

For the voter, political choice is then not based so much on intellectual ability and

qualifications to do the job, but on the personal relationship the voter feels they have

with the individual candidate (Swanson & Mancini 1996). There is some academic

dispute if this turns ideal citizens of a democratic society - characterised as politically

active, informed and acting in the common good (Gamble 1981) – into consumers

who are individual, isolated and adopt an egotistical perspective in their political

choices (Lilliker 2009, Blumler & Kavanagh 1999, Rheingold 1994). Yet the two are

not mutually exclusive. It is possible to be both at the same time. And with the

growth of the consumerist society, it is perhaps unreasonable to expect the average

individual who is more familiar with the consumer role to act differently when

making political choices (Scullion, in Lilliker, 2009). It has however, allowed

political parties to exploit this consumerist sentiment and target their communication

in a complimentary fashion (Lilliker &Scullion 2008). This approach inspires a

‘short-term perspective […] to political messages’ rather than any ‘long term

ideological loyalty’ (ibid, p:232) from the voter, and as such undermines the basic

integrity of politics and the democratic political system.

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Politicians may welcome such a move, allowing them to deal in superficial soundbites

and staged events, avoiding any definitive political commitments they may have to

honour (Holtz-Bacha, 2002). However, this reduces the quality of information that is

required by the electorate to make substantive and informed choices between

competing political and ideological ideas (Scammell & Langer 2006), displaced by

image, simplification and trivialisation (Franklin, 1994). And where the delivery of

the message becomes more important than the content this becomes a potential threat

to the continuing existence of a truly representative democracy as principals are set

aside in the pursuit of power.

The Opinion Poll Trap and The Permanent Campaign

There are those (Lilliker & Lees-Marshment 2005; Arceneaux 2005. Norris 2000)

who argue that such developments actually strengthen democratic interaction and

civic engagement, exposing people with little political knowledge to political

messages, creating awareness of the election process or providing a platform through

focus groups, opinion polling or market intelligence to express in clear terms what the

they would like current or future governments to do on their behalf. Lees-Marshment

(2006) argues that when a political party develops such a marketing philosophy it

hopes to gain an insight into voters needs and desires which it will then tailor to match

its own message, and in so doing attempt to gain the electoral support it requires to

meet its own targets and objectives. Lock and Harris (1996) argue that the decline in

party membership has made such two-way interaction much more important to the

parties while Lilliker and Lees-Marshment (2005) suggest that this puts voters in

prime position to get what they want from political parties. Such interaction was

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believed to have contributed to a shift in Labour policy in the UK, transforming a four

time loser into a winner with a landslide majority in 1997 (Jackson 2010).

Yet this suggestion that parties are now employing Grunig and Hunt’s two-way

symmetrical model of public relations practice (1984) which they maintain is the most

ethical and effective method of dialogic interaction with strategic publics, is rejected

by Jackson (2010) who believes it is instead an asymmetrical approach which is used,

not to incorporate public demand, but to shape a saleable message and ‘test the

effectiveness of their political propaganda’ (Sussman & Galizio 2003: p314). Further,

McNair (2007) warns that politicians sensitive to public opinion ‘become prisoners of

that public opinion’ (p36), allowing principals to be diminished or set aside or values

to be adjusted, simply to reflect what they think the public wants to hear to win

approval, to improve their level of support in the opinion polls and with it the chance

of electoral success. This clearly has a detrimental impact on democratic debate.

In addition, any impact is intensified by the fact that such public interaction is no

longer a short term tactic confined to the period immediately before election

campaigns when parties strive to define and articulate the policy platform they believe

will garner them maximum support. Instead, this marketing approach is employed

constantly in what Sidney Blumenthal, an advisor to US President Bill Clinton

described as the ‘Permanent Campaign’ (1980), a longer-term permanent process to

ensure the acquisition of power in the first instance, and then its continuance (Smith

& Hirst, 2001). While Scammell (1995) believes this can improve the flow of

communication from the voters to the political parties, making them more sensitive to

their needs, she also accepts the danger of placing unelected consultants at the centre

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of the political process, believing it could lead to the engineering of public opinion

and consent. Lilliker and Lees-Marshment (2005) believe if parties are guided

completely by public opinion, there is little sense of how they may act when put in the

position of making a decision on their own. Further, the public believing it has voice,

a stake in important decisions, fosters a hope and expectation in the political process

and what it can deliver. Lilliker argues that this is rarely realised, thereby creating

‘mistrust, disengagement, disillusionment in the process’ (2009: p30). This cynicism

leads to decreased levels of political participation, making the whole electoral process

much less representative and less democratic.

Skewing the message

The growing cynicism of voters has also been linked to the mass media’s coverage of

the ‘game of politics’ (McNair 2007, p:128) which, as we have established, is an

important conduit between parties and politicians in political communication. The

importance has grown as political dialogue has moved from the simple face-to-face

interaction of the past to the ‘media-constructed public sphere’ (Blumler & Kavanagh

1999, p: 211) which exists today. Gilboa presents ‘television in particular, as being

the most important power broker in politics’ (2002:p5). Coverage has often meant a

focus on the mechanics and processes of an election campaign rather than substantial

coverage of policy proposals and the arguments and debates that would invoke

(McQuail, 2005, McNair, 2007). While some (Fallows, 1997 Lloyd, 2004) blame the

media for misleading coverage, tending to opt for merely entertaining the public

rather than engaging it, what has become clear is the politicians have learned how to

use the supremacy of the media for their own purposes (Kotzaivazolu & Zotos, 2006).

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The whole process of media production has been studied and understood by

politicians and their professional advisors. They have learned how to manipulate it, to

‘get into the news, shape the media agenda, and project a pre-planned “line” in press

conferences’ (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999, p:212). New technology has made

possible the expansion of media outlets, increasing a need, particularly on news

channels and web sites, for material to fill the airtime and the space (McNair, 2007).

Politicians have been happy to oblige. They establish ‘pseudo-events’ (Boorstin,

1962 in McNair, 2007, p:25) such as party conferences, policy launches and press

conferences, (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999) all aimed at taking airtime, creating

momentum and attempting to frame the news agenda in their favour. At the recent

leaders’ debates for the UK General Election, all three parties adopted pre and post

event ‘spinning’ (Kirkup, 2010) to try to ensure their reading of the event was

featured most prominently and interpreted to their advantage. This attempt at agenda

setting, to drive the focus of the story, is made easier by the privileged position the

parties, politicians and professional advisors enjoy as ‘primary definers’ (Hall et al

1978). This confers upon them a de-facto legitimacy from journalists who need

reliable sources to provide information on deadline (Smith, 1999). News outlets are

targeted specifically by political consultants as they are aware these are often viewed

by the public as credible and independent of the parties (McQuail, 2005).

Communication managers, or ‘spin doctors’ as they’ve become known, encourage

politicians to place soundbites, succinct news friendly statements summing up their

position (Franklin 1994), into their speeches. This all plays a part in establishing what

Kaid et al described as ‘the construction of political reality’ (Kaid et al, in Franklin,

1994, p:22).

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Journalists are as aware as academics of the efforts to influence their coverage

through spin and manipulation, and often include the analysis of such efforts in their

reportage. In his book ‘The End of the Party’ political correspondent Andrew

Rawnsley (2010) highlights a number of attempts by professional advisors of Prime

Minister Gordon Brown to ‘spin’ coverage in his favour, including the day when he

made the decision in October 2007 not to call a general election. While this editorial

awareness between what is presented and the true meaning behind it may be laudable,

explicitly exposing ‘the interdependence yet strained interactions between politics and

the press’(de Vreese & Elenbaas 2008, p:287) it is another example of journalists

concentrating on strategy and process rather than policy. It diverts citizens’ attention

from what McNair describes as the ‘real issues’ (2007, p: 128) and adds to growing

public cynicism about politics and politicians. The reporting of politics is arguably

the most important function of journalism. It is ‘how societies have a conversation

about power’ (Beckett 2008, p90) and failure to do it properly, to concentrate on

substance, is also a failure for democracy.

The Cost of Political Communication

The number of people employed as ‘spin doctors’, professional communication

specialists, and public relations experts by political parties has grown substantially in

recent years. Negrine (2008) quotes a 2006 UK report which suggests there was a

significant increase in the number of press officers and P.R. staff employed by the

Labour Government compared to the former Conservative administration. While the

changing media environment may be partially to blame for such an increase – the

number of outlets demanding a reaction from government has also grown

significantly in the intervening period, and the media has become truly 24/7 in nature

– it is clear that more effort now goes into communication and correspondingly ‘more

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staff are dealing with communication activities, and more money is spent on those

activities’ (ibid, p: 123). Parties have to pay for such operations. Declining party

numbers (Lilliker 2009) has forced the politicians to seek external sources of funding,

mainly through corporate backers. And many companies are happy to support

political parties, not necessarily because they are ideologically linked but because

they are looking for a return on their investment in the first instance through access

and influence to those formulating public policy (Rheingold 1994), and secondly they

would like to be closely associated with success (Monck 2008).

Some hoped inexpensive access to communication through new media might

eventually lower the bar for entry for less established candidates, and Obama’s

mobilisation of grassroots support through social media during the last US

presidential campaign fanned this hope for a while, but new media still has not had

nearly enough impact on political communication to significantly change the power

relations described above. Indeed looking at the US presidential campaign in detail

reveals why Obama’s ability to raise a significant part of his campaign budget through

small donations from citizens mobilised online proves difficult to replicate elsewhere.

Beckel highlights the contention that Obama ‘was a particularly charismatic candidate

and benefited from increased interest in his attempt to become the nation’s first black

president. For other candidates to emulate this success […] public policy changes are

necessary to create additional institutional support for small-donor contributions and

increased citizen participation’(Beckel 2010, OpenSecrets Blog).

As paid-for media assumes greater importance (McNair, 2007) those on the margins

of the mainstream, without significant political support but with a right to be heard,

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find access to the political process severely limited. Finance-driven campaigning

insulates the existing system from any serious challenge by radical or dissenting

voices (Sussman & Galizio, 2003), as equal access becomes something which has to

be purchased rather than taken as a democratic right (McNair, 2007). This has the

consequence of reinforcing existing power structures. And so candidates without

significant personal resources or wealthy corporate backers find themselves largely

shut out of the political process. And in turn, the democratic process is damaged as it

is no longer a true public engagement which incorporates a wide range of views and

perspectives and promotes equal opportunity access but is instead another element of

corporate, non-elected power openly influencing the public and political sphere.

Conclusion

In this essay, I have critically examined the evidence for claims that increasing

professionalization of political communication practices in recent decades is

damaging to the democratic process. I have argued that Habermas’ theory of the

public sphere provides a useful framework for political interaction and the public

good. The fact that it does so in a historically contested way – at no point did the

emerging Bourgeois culture of political debate and criticism of the urban European

coffee houses and salons offer a public sphere genuinely representative in a modern

democratic sense – does not render its normative implication less valuable. I have

demonstrated that despite what looks like a radically transformed relationship

between media and politics, current practice does not represent a break with history

but has evolved out of the political communication of the past to meet current

technological and socio-cultural circumstances.

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In the present environment, I have argued, a decline in party partisanship has led

political actors to employ outside specialists in communication to actively cultivate

supporters who can be sold a political message and pay for it with their votes. In this

context, I have argued that the need to secure power has led to the de-idealisation of

political parties seeking the widest possible support, and this in turn has led to a

superficiality in the political debate which has become dominated by personality and

trivia rather than policy. As a result political actors and their advisors actively seek

out public opinion and tailor policies according. The consequence of this, as I have

demonstrated, is an undermining of the political process, with political parties

providing the public with what it wants to hear; depriving it of a true dialogic debate

and the quality information it needs to make an informed political decision. I have

argued that attempts to influence the political agenda in the media have led to a

growing public cynicism about the political process. And finally I have shown that

the growing cost of political communication has forced out marginal or radical voices,

re-emphasising existing power structures and giving corporate paymasters a

significant say in the public political process.

As we have seen, modern methods of political communication have led to a growing

public disengagement with the political process. According to the Power Report2 into

the 2005 UK General Election, the Labour Party, which was returned to government

with a majority of 66 seats, polled 9.5 million votes. However, 17 million registered

voters did not take part in the election. This raises questions about political

legitimacy and the consequences for social consensus. Unless the political actors find

a new way to be more inclusive in the political debate, this continued disengagement

2 The POWER Inquiry was set up in 2004 to explore how political participation and involvement can be increased and deepened in Britain. Its work is based on the primary belief that a healthy democracy requires the active participation of its citizens.

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has serious consequences for the exercise of democracy and for society in general.

More will be left with a feeling of political exclusion, of being part of society, but not

invested in the decisions made by it.

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ALAN FISHER ASSIGNMENT 9 16

assignment 9 monday's version

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