This article was downloaded by: [Temple University Libraries]On: 08 December 2014, At: 05:51Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Asian SecurityPublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fasi20

Assessing India's Emerging Land WarfareDoctrines and Capabilities: Prospects andConcernsHarinder Singh aa Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses , New Delhi, IndiaPublished online: 22 Jun 2011.

To cite this article: Harinder Singh (2011) Assessing India's Emerging Land WarfareDoctrines and Capabilities: Prospects and Concerns, Asian Security, 7:2, 147-168, DOI:10.1080/14799855.2011.581604

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2011.581604

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as tothe accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Contentshould not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever orhowsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arisingout of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Asian Security, vol. 7, no. 2, 2011, pp. 147–168Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLCISSN 1479-9855 print/1555-2764 onlineDOI: 10.1080/14799855.2011.581604

Assessing India’s Emerging Land Warfare Doctrinesand Capabilities: Prospects and Concerns

HARINDER SINGH

Abstract: This article attempts to locate and assess the sources of India’s land warfare doctrinesand capabilities. It begins by briefly examining the Indian army’s significant combat experiencein dealing with the external and internal security threats during the past six decades. The firstsection analyzes the security challenges and threats that presently drive the evolution of India’sland war–fighting doctrines and capabilities. The next section explains the military imperativesthat are driving this doctrinal change. In the next section, the current status of India’s landwar–fighting capabilities is discussed. The subsequent section examines the institutional limi-tations that inhibit organizational change, and the final section highlights how these doctrinaland capability gaps might be addressed in the future.

The Indian armed forces, like those of other sovereign states, are mandated to defendIndia’s territorial integrity and maintain internal security. They have thus far met thesechallenges with considerable élan and professionalism. Only on two occasions, dur-ing the Sino-Indian War in 1962 and in their peacekeeping role in Sri Lanka in 1987,did they encounter any serious challenge. Notwithstanding the Indian military’s pastoperational experience, its role is only likely to increase with India’s rising interna-tional stature and economic clout. Accordingly, it will have to organize, equip, andtrain to meet a wide range of external and internal threats.1 Consequently, the quali-tative changes underway in military technology, doctrine, and culture could transformIndia’s war-fighting capabilities during the next decade or so. These changes promptedby new and emerging threats, the development of new technologies of land, sea, andair warfare, and India’s growing economic strength, which will enable a higher allo-cation of resources for meeting the country’s defense needs, are clearly visible. Onemight therefore argue that India’s military doctrines and capabilities are undergoing anapparent transformation. Accordingly, the Indian army and the sister services can beexpected to be able to face any emerging threats and deter or, if necessary, defend thecountry against China and maintain sufficient combat superiority vis-à-vis Pakistan in

It is certified that views expressed and suggestions made in this article have been made by the author in his personalcapacity and do not have any official endorsement.

The author wishes to thank the Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, for offering anopportunity to pursue a visiting fellowship at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Singapore.Special thanks are due to Professor Rajesh Basrur, coordinator of the South Asia Program of RSIS, for his assistanceand Professor Sumit Ganguly, director of research at Indiana University and a visiting distinguished fellow atIDSA, for his wise guidance in shaping up this research article. He is also indebted to the Indian army for allowinghim to proceed on a long sabbatical and permitting him to pursue a fellowship in this field.

Address correspondence to: Colonel Harinder Singh, c/o Cdr SS Parmar, Room No. 217, IDSA Complex, RaoTula Ram Marg, Delhi Cantt 110010, India. E-mail: harinder41@gmail.com

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tem

ple

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

] at

05:

51 0

8 D

ecem

ber

2014

148 Asian Security

the medium to long term. In the foreseeable future, the Indian army could even be animportant security provider with sufficient force projection capabilities in the regionand beyond.

This article attempts to locate and assess the sources of India’s emerging land war-fare doctrines and capabilities for the future. Below, I begin by briefly summarizingthe Indian army’s significant combat experience in dealing with the external and inter-nal security threats. In the first section, I analyze the critical security challenges thatdrive the evolution of India’s land warfare doctrines and capabilities. The second sec-tion explains the military imperatives that are driving this change. In the next section, Idiscuss the current status and manifestations of India’s land warfare doctrines and capa-bilities. The subsequent section examines the institutional hurdles and limitations thatinhibit the transformational process. The final section highlights how these doctrinaland capability gaps might be addressed in the future.

The Historical ContextThe Indian armed forces are composed of the army, air force, and navy and are thefourth largest fighting force in the world.2 The Indian army’s active strength is peggedat 1,129,900, with a reserve component of around 960,000 personnel. This makes it thethird largest land war-fighting force in the world. Since India’s independence in 1947,the army has acquitted itself with distinction in several armed conflicts and confronta-tions. Its contribution in safeguarding the country’s territorial interests in Jammu andKashmir (1947–48), the amalgamation of the Hyderabad state (1948), the liberation ofGoa (1961), the Sino-Indian conflict (1962), the Nathu La skirmishes (1967), the twoIndo-Pak Wars (1965 and 1971), and the Kargil intrusions (1999) is well chronicled.3

The Sino-Indian conflict was particularly noteworthy as it brought to fore India’s lackof military preparedness in the early 1960s and the acute disillusionment that ensuedat the national level, which subsequently became a major driver for defense reforms.4

Besides these conventional border conflicts, the army has been deployed repeatedly totackle insurgencies and public unrest and has played an important role in stabilizing theinternal security situation within the country.

Extensive experience gained while combating insurgencies and limited border intru-sions in the late twentieth century contributed immensely to the development of India’sland warfare doctrines and capabilities. Notable among these have been the deploy-ments on the Siachen Glacier, in Sri Lanka, in Punjab, in Assam, and in Jammu andKashmir. Although these deployments had their share of setbacks and failures, thearmy’s rank and file learned enormously from these “small wars” of the 1980s and1990s. The two military interventions – to implement the Indo–Sri Lanka Accordin 1987 and the restoration of the elected Maldivian government in 1988 – were noless important. While the latter is often cited as an instance of India’s diplomatic andmilitary success, the intervention in Sri Lanka, the country’s first-ever stand-alone over-seas mission, did not conclude favorably and led to political fallouts and operationalinadequacies.5

At yet another level, the army has contributed immensely toward enhancing India’sinternational image.6 Since independence, India has contributed more than 85,000

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tem

ple

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

] at

05:

51 0

8 D

ecem

ber

2014

India’s Land Warfare Doctrines and Capabilities 149

troops to various UN missions across the world.7 The country has, on average, had8,000 to 9,000 troops on peacekeeping duties in recent decades. The Indian army hasalso been responsible for providing large-scale humanitarian assistance and aid duringnatural disasters and calamities within the country and abroad. Major relief operationsinclude the tsunami catastrophe of 2004, the evacuation of Indian citizens during theIsrael-Lebanon conflict (2006), and limited humanitarian assistance during HurricaneKatrina in the United States (2005), Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar (2008), and theWenchuan earthquake in China (2008).8

The achievements of this vast and varied military experience are now evident at sev-eral levels. In the recent decade, the Indian army has formulated its conventional andsubconventional war-fighting doctrines in 2004 and 2006, respectively, with increasedattention to capability development. The army’s share of the overall defense budget hasincreased from approximately US$6.7 billion in fiscal year 2000–2001 to US$16.3 bil-lion in fiscal year 2010–11.9 In addition, the increased opportunities for internationalmilitary exchanges and training opportunities with a number of militaries have addedto the army’s overall efficiency and perspective.10 Clearly, the army as an instrument ofstatecraft is only set to grow in times to come.

Security ChallengesIndia occupies a vital geostrategic position in South Asia. Some analysts have arguedthat “while India’s location makes eminent geographic sense, its natural boundariesare, nevertheless, quite weak.”11 The country shares land borders with six countries:China, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal, Bhutan, and Pakistan – a total of approxi-mately 14,863 kilometers.12 The critical security challenges that have influenced India’sland warfare doctrines involve long-term threats from China, the use of asymmetricforces by Pakistan, internal security needs and duties, and extraregional duties suchas peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. For the purpose of discussion, thesethreats are analyzed under four heads: border management, internal security, a collusiveChina-Pak posture, and possible use of disruptive technologies.

First, India’s long and porous land borders present a significant security challenge.The employment of multiple agencies that include the Indian army, the Border SecurityForce, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police, the Sashastra Seema Bal along the India-Nepalborder, and the Assam Rifles (AR) compound the security problem. Issues of unevencontrol and efficacy among these security agencies are a serious concern. It is thereforeaxiomatic that the inadequate management of the country’s land borders has createdvolatile internal security situations. Experience shows that gaps in border managementhave exacerbated existing insurgencies in the states of Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, andNagaland. Separately, borders with countries such as Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Nepalhave allowed in a mix of illegal migrants, political asylum seekers, and terrorist groups.In the case of Bangladesh, the issue of Indian enclaves within Bangladesh and vice versaremains particularly sensitive. Similarly, sporadic Chinese intrusions continue despitethe many confidence-building measures undertaken in Arunachal Pradesh and easternLadakh. In the west, infiltration by Pakistan-abetted terrorist groups continues to bean important security issue.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tem

ple

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

] at

05:

51 0

8 D

ecem

ber

2014

150 Asian Security

Second, the tenuous internal security situation in several parts of the countryremains another significant security issue. India has witnessed diverse levels of seces-sionist insurgencies, armed rebellions, and public unrest since its independence.13 Theseinclude early insurrections in Telangana (1946–51) and Naxalbari (1967), followed bythe insurgencies in the northeast (in Nagaland, Mizoram, Manipur, and Tripura), andwanton acts of terror in the states of Punjab (1978–95) and Assam (1979–2000). Inrecent times, the menace of leftwing extremism, referred to as Naxalism or Maoistinsurgency, has been characterized as the single biggest challenge to India’s nationalsecurity.14 A recent report indicates that Naxal activity has been observed in 158 dis-tricts across the country and against 133 districts in the last year.15 Over time, therehas been a steep rise in Naxal violence and indoctrination of their cadres.16 Morereassuringly, the scourge of Pakistan-sponsored militancy in Kashmir has reduced sub-stantially compared with previous years, though growing instances of public unrest anddisaffection are a cause for concern.17

Third, the collusive nexus between China and Pakistan poses another strategicchallenge.18 China is supposed to have provided technical assistance to Pakistan for itsnuclear weapons program.19 In the past, Chinese leaders have claimed that the friend-ship between the two is “higher than the mountains and deeper than the oceans.”20

China’s unfettered access to the Northern areas underlines the growing China-Pakcomplicity.21 Conversely, China and India have failed to resolve their boundary dis-pute since the 1962 war.22 Border patrol face-offs are frequent, and an armed clashor skirmish, if not contained, could lead to conflict. More importantly, the Chineseexpansion of rail and road infrastructure in the Tibetan Autonomous Region raisesconcerns in India regarding its military implications.23 Indian forces, therefore, haveto be sufficiently prepared to contend with China and Pakistan in the medium to longterm.24

Fourth, the use of emerging technologies such as nanotechnology, biotechnology,information technology, and dual-use innovations by adversaries is yet another causefor concern – more so if in the possession of transnational and nonstate actors.25

Exploitation of disruptive technologies by our adversaries in the form of improvisedexplosive devices to more sophisticated cyber attacks and electronic warfare, battlefieldrobotics and precision munitions, and long-range guided missiles could have seriousimplications. China’s technological advancement especially in the use of asymmetrictechnologies such as cyber, electronic, and space warfare has grave implications forIndia’s security.

Clearly, India’s security challenges will continue to be defined by hostile neigh-bors, transnational terrorism, religious fundamentalism, social and ethnic upheavals,and low-intensity conflicts.26 The threats are likely to be complex and couldmanifest themselves in various forms. Nonetheless, the major armed threat toIndia will continue to come from Pakistan and China. Though full-scale con-ventional wars are less likely in the foreseeable future, short and sharp conflictscannot be ruled out. Other experts, however, argue that as India grows econom-ically, the focus of Indian security concerns will increasingly shift “seawards.”27

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tem

ple

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

] at

05:

51 0

8 D

ecem

ber

2014

India’s Land Warfare Doctrines and Capabilities 151

Nevertheless, the Indian army will continue as a credible deterrent against poten-tial adversaries in the subcontinent and will continue to counter acts of terror andinsurgencies.

Military ImperativesIndia aspires to be recognized as an economic power of some consequence. The funda-mental prerequisite for unhindered socioeconomic growth is an environment of peaceand stability. This, in turn, requires putting in place appropriate military structuresand strategies to reduce the risk for war and deter potential adversaries. The primarynational concern will always be the prevention of an armed conflict, be it conventionalor subconventional, regular or irregular, full scale or limited.28 This section attemptsto explicate India’s national security objectives and military imperatives, the likelyoperational roles and tasks that might be assigned to the land-based force, and the mil-itary implications that will drive the formulation of future land warfare doctrines andcapabilities.

National Security ObjectivesTo ensure durable peace and security, the country needs to maintain a credible andaffordable conventional war-fighting capability. The prevailing security environmenttherefore demands the military’s attention at three levels. First, the Indian armed forceshave a two-front obligation that requires them to safeguard India’s borders againstChina and Pakistan. Second, because India is not a member of any military alliance,it must maintain an independent deterrent capability. And third, the continued externalsupport for cross-border terrorism demands that the armed forces remain committedto internal security duties on a relatively larger scale. A clear understanding of thesenational security objectives alone can help India fashion its hard power in the immediateand foreseeable future.

The Indian army will have to grapple with two conflicting national security demands– namely, the prevention of war through creation of credible levels of conventional andnuclear deterrence and the defense of the national territory and interests should deter-rence fail. This will call for creation of appropriate war-fighting capabilities that areflexible while remaining cost-effective. A few issues, therefore, merit attention. Firstly,future war are likely to be limited in space and time to avoid uncontrolled escalation andrisks of destruction.29 Above all, military conflicts will have to be concluded in keepingwith the stated political aims and objectives and with the least number of civilian andmilitary casualties. Conventional military operations are therefore likely to focus oncreating a favorable political situation so that the postconflict negotiations and media-tion can take place.30 This brings into question the use and efficacy of large corps-sizedarmy formations for delivering the desired politico-military objectives in an adversarialmilitary situation.

Secondly, future conflicts are likely to be driven by high technology and inno-vation and marked by high rates of attrition, physical degradation, and casualties.The introduction of force multipliers and sophisticated weapon systems, battle sen-sors, communications, and networks would consequently define the nature of conflict

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tem

ple

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

] at

05:

51 0

8 D

ecem

ber

2014

152 Asian Security

and parameters for success or failure.31 There will be increased emphasis on real-timesurveillance and target acquisition, integrated command and control systems, net-works and communications, cyber and electronic warfare, and lethal precision-guidedmunitions to provide a decisive combat edge. The proliferation of technologies suchas guided missiles, unmanned aerial assets, and robotics could drastically alter theoutcome of future conflicts. This will demand efficient combat and logistic supportunits, which will have to be prepared to fight future wars, ranging from conven-tional to subconventional operations, and that too in a nuclear setting.32 Importantly,the future battlefield environment would necessitate significant levels of interser-vice and intraservice integration in terms of the choice, utility, and application offorce.

Thirdly, India has been living in a nuclear neighborhood for a long time, and thereare serious debates about regional stability.33 To compound matters, China is mod-ernizing its nuclear weapons and delivery systems to include medium- to long-rangeballistic missiles and the Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV)capabilities, which can have a devastating effect.34 Pakistan, on the other hand and withthe tacit support of China, has been successful in acquiring a nuclear strike capability.35

Pakistan’s ballistic missile program has continued to benefit from significant Chineseassistance. It has now moved forward toward the serial production of short- andmedium-range ballistic missiles such as the Shaheen, Abdali, and Ghaznavi series.Pakistan’s nuclear policy, as its leaders have often emphasized, is to counter India’sconventional military superiority.36 The country’s military leadership has repeatedlyargued that, “. . . in a deteriorating military situation . . . it will be left with no optionbut to use nuclear weapons,”37 and “. . . to defeat the [breakup] of the nation . . . itmust have a declared strategy of using nuclear weapons.”38 The country’s civilian lead-ership, too, has made similar pronouncements to warn India that Pakistan has a lownuclear threshold.39 In other words, their ambiguity on nuclear red lines significantlyimpinges upon India’s political decision making and consequently its ability to retaliatemilitarily.

Roles and TasksThe Indian army defines its role at two levels: primary and secondary.40 These areexplained in the army doctrine of 2004. Briefly, these two roles can be broken down intofive important tasks. First, the army should be able to deter the potential adversaries,principally the states of China and Pakistan in the neighborhood, from undertakinga military misadventure by building strong land war-fighting capabilities. Second, theland force should be able to plan, prepare, and undertake small- to large-scale con-ventional military operations in the subcontinental context. Third, it should be able toassist the civil authorities, when called for, in preservation of law and order and duringdisasters and calamities or any other circumstances. Fourth, it should be prepared toparticipate in peacekeeping missions in consonance with India’s commitment to pre-scribed UN mandate(s). And finally, it must be prepared to render military assistanceto any friendly foreign country, if required to do so.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tem

ple

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

] at

05:

51 0

8 D

ecem

ber

2014

India’s Land Warfare Doctrines and Capabilities 153

Several former chiefs of army staff and retired generals have spelled out the army’sfuture role and tasks. These are largely in conformity with the Indian army doctrine.Thus, according to General Shankar Roy Chowdhury, a former chief:

The world will continue to remain an uneasy place and the Indian army wouldrequire land warfare capabilities to operate across the entire spectrum of con-flict. . . . [and] that over the next decade or so, the role of the Indian armed forceswill remain unchanged, and shall continue to focus on protection of India’s ter-ritorial integrity by land, air and sea. While acknowledging the need to maintainindividual service identities and aspirations, . . . [and] that there is a need to orga-nize, equip and train the Indian Army, in conjunction with the Indian Air Force andIndian Navy, to fully exploit its combat potential and utility in future conflicts.41

General S. Padmanabhan, a former chief, explains the army’s role in the context ofthe primary and secondary tasks.42 He asserts that the Indian army in its primary roleshould be capable of “deterring external aggression, and if deterrence fails, defeat it byforce.” In the secondary role, the army should be able to “assist the government inovercoming internal threats, foreign-sponsored or indigenous, and aid the civil author-ities when requisitioned.” A few other retired generals, however, visualize a largerregional role, where the land forces are able to deploy and protect India’s national inter-ests at home and abroad by building sufficient force projection capabilities.43 WalterC. Ladwig, an American scholar, however, has recently argued that India’s traditionalforeign policy orientation precludes the projection of military power in the medium.44

ImplicationsEvidently, the land war–fighting capabilities required by the army are threefold: con-ventional, subconventional, and nontraditional. First of all, it is pertinent to note thatregardless of India’s threats and challenges, the conventional land war-fighting capa-bilities will continue to remain important. This will necessitate the maintenance ofcombat superiority against a belligerent Pakistan and a sufficient deterrent capabilityto dissuade China from undertaking any military misadventure. The capabilities andbehavior of the adversaries will influence the actual combat strength, and it will have tobe balanced in light of the overall resource availability. Besides a numerical expressionof force levels required, the qualitative requirements in terms of weapon systems andsupport platforms will have to be clearly identified.

Secondly, the Indian army also needs to possess the capacity to undertake subcon-ventional operations, without diluting its conventional edge. These conventions includetackling a range of threats such as cross-border terrorism and festering insurgencies, aswell as assisting the paramilitary and state police forces in containing domestic unrest.45

These subconventional concerns underline the need to create and train sufficient coun-terinsurgency units.46 The fielding of 60-plus Rashtriya Rifles (RR) battalions inJammu and Kashmir and another 40-plus AR battalions in the northeastern states hasimmensely enhanced India’s counterinsurgency capabilities.47 Subconventional threats

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tem

ple

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

] at

05:

51 0

8 D

ecem

ber

2014

154 Asian Security

reinforce the need to augment the army’s reconnaissance and surveillance capacitiesand communication networks for dissemination of actionable intelligence and conductof surgical operations.

And finally, the Indian army has consistently fielded a large complement of troopsto support UN peacekeeping missions worldwide. At any given time, it maintains asignificant complement of officers and men to staff the several UN mission headquartersand observer teams. Their experience in the planning and conduct of peacekeeping andenforcement operations is fairly extensive. Consequently, the army has developed strongorganizational capacities to enable timely and tailored deployment of UN contingents,ranging in size from an infantry battalion to a brigade-sized group. This has enhanced itsunderstanding of nontraditional military roles and ensured adoption of best practicesthat enable handling of large-scale humanitarian assistance. In time to come, thisworldwide experience could be translated into viable force projection capacities toundertake conflict stabilization and state reconstruction tasks in a stand-alone mode.

Land Doctrines and CapabilitiesThe Indian armed forces have undertaken considerable doctrinal change and capabil-ity development during the past decade or so. Several factors account for this change.The lessons learned from the two US wars in the Middle East ushered in the initialchange. The spectacular use of air force, precision-guided munitions, battlefield com-munications, and increased transparency made a huge impression on Indian militaryplanners and practitioners. Subsequently, the nuclearization of the Indian subcontinent,the spurt in insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir, and the Indo-Pakistan military crises of1999 and 2001–2 contributed to sharper doctrinal thinking within the army. The Indianair force was the first service to release its operational doctrine in 1995. The Indianarmy introduced its new war-fighting doctrine in 2004 to alter the basic approach toland warfare by leveraging advanced technology to fight short-duration conflicts in anuclear environment.48 Later in the same year, the Indian navy too released its doctrine,which set out a road map for a blue-water role for its fleet.49

The doctrines reflected India’s expanding regional and global role and thus envisageda corresponding increase of military capability and capacity. Currently the tenth largestdefense spender in the world, with an estimated 2 percent share of the global militaryexpenditure in 2009, it is predicted that the country’s armed forces are likely to spendUS$100 billion on the purchase of military hardware during the current five-year plan(2007–12) and another US$120 billion during the next plan period (2012–17).50 In thefiscal year 2010–11 alone, US$32.03 billion have been earmarked for national defense,and of this, US$13.04 billion is to be spent on acquisition of new weapon systems andequipment alone. Some experts, however, argue that “while India has been one of thebiggest importers of advanced conventional weapons in the last thirty years, this sus-tained rearmament has not altered India’s strategic position [in the region].”51 In spiteof its rapidly expanding economy and access to Western technology previously denied,the dysfunction in India’s strategic culture and civil-military relations has affected thetransformation of the armed forces. How the Indian armed forces overcome this chal-lenge will eventually define the evolution of military doctrines and capabilities in the

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tem

ple

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

] at

05:

51 0

8 D

ecem

ber

2014

India’s Land Warfare Doctrines and Capabilities 155

future. The following section discusses the doctrinal evolution of the army at two lev-els – namely, the conventional and subconventional – and the pace and trajectory ofcapability development in the Indian Army.

Conventional Doctrine(s)Most defensive war–fighting doctrines revolve around two common strategies: attritionand maneuver.52 Attrition is largely focused on destroying the enemy’s strength, whilemaneuver is about breaking the enemy’s will and organizational cohesion. Some schol-ars have claimed that the Indian army’s posture has fundamentally been defensive.53

They argue that the army is organized only for “defensive or pre-planned offen-sives to attrite the enemy’s strength through tactical engagements.”54 Clearly, theseexplanations fail to take into account the country’s territorial concerns and boundarysensitivities. Pakistan’s continued support to militancy and repeated acts of terror inthe Indian hinterland led to a full-scale military mobilization in 2001. Subsequently,the realization that future conflicts could be “incident” driven led to new oper-ational thinking within the army, colloquially referred to as “Cold Start.”55 Thenew land warfare strategy, which also includes proactive military response options,emphasizes speed and maneuver. By maneuvering the mechanized forces to unpre-dictable locations and faster than the adversary, these highly lethal field formationswould seek to disrupt enemy combat formations on the battlefield.56 The proactivewar strategy aims at leveraging the Indian army’s conventional strength by regroup-ing the offensive and defensive formations into six to eight integrated battle groups(IBGs) to launch multiple strikes to make shallow territorial gains, which could laterbe used to extract concessions on termination of hostilities. It is even averred thatthe strategy suggests the launching of three to five IBGs within 70 to 94 hoursfrom the time mobilization is ordered and that can subsequently be exploited byone or more strike corps to make territorial gains well below the Pakistani nuclearthresholds.57

How this new doctrine helps in achieving India’s broader national security con-cerns in a nuclear neighborhood has been an issue of some debate. Several experts haveargued that the new doctrine is risky, and its implementation can have serious ramifica-tions for stability in South Asia.58 The strategy could even exacerbate regional securityby way of uncontrolled nuclear escalation. And because a benign military outcomecannot be guaranteed in a conflict, the idea of fighting a limited war between the twocountries under a nuclear overhang may not be very practical.59 Another analyst assertsthat Pakistan’s “asymmetric” nuclear posture has deterred the Indian leadership fromundertaking conventional retaliatory strikes.60 Some experts argue that any attempt tostrengthen the proactive war strategy to redress India’s perceived shortcomings in con-ventional deterrence would simply push the Pakistani military to an even higher levelof conventional and nuclear alertness and in turn might spawn greater instability in theregion.

China too poses serious economic, diplomatic, and military challenges. Althoughthe experts debate the pace and trajectory of China’s economic rise, it has alreadymade its military presence felt in the neighborhood.61 Several countries in the region

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tem

ple

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

] at

05:

51 0

8 D

ecem

ber

2014

156 Asian Security

including India are deeply suspicious of its growing military assertiveness. China’sengagement with India can at best be termed deceptive. The issue of stapled visas, ter-ritorial claims over Arunachal Pradesh, and now a statement about the length of theborder explains their rather misleading stance.62

Several experts argue that although the salience of trade and commerce as a catalystfor interstate cooperation cannot be denied, China’s military modernization, devel-opment of rail, road, sea, and air infrastructure in the Himalayas and Indian Oceanregion, and military posturing and assertiveness could lead to a crisis or conflict.63

Coupled with the strategic road infrastructure built through Pakistan and Myanmar,the “dragon’s hug” over the Indian state seems to be complete. If that was not enough,China’s increased political, economic, and diplomatic influence in the neighboringstates of Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka are now a matter of more than a passingconcern.

Three aspects assume importance in the doctrinal context. The conventional landwarfare to counter threats from China and Pakistan must be factored into the country’snational security objectives and political decisions. Second, these land warfare strategiesmust offer a wide range of military options spread over volume, time, and space tobe of any use to the political hierarchy. And third, these land strategies will have tobe formulated in conjunction with the air force and naval doctrines to cope with theextant and emerging security threats. These diverse threats from China and Pakistanwill have to be balanced against the myriad subconventional threats that are discussedin the following subsection.

Subconventional DoctrineIndia has been combating internal threats since independence. Sumit Ganguly andDavid P. Fidler assert that India’s counterinsurgency experience is far too rich to bereduced to any easy formulation. They argue that the country has often managed to findthe right combination of political action and military pressure to manage terrorist orinsurgent violence.64 These policies were influenced by two factors: Nehruvian think-ing, which underplayed the use of military force to suppress insurgencies, and lessonsdrawn from the Malayan insurgency. The early army operations in Nagaland andMizoram were tempered by this political concern and were in several ways responsiblefor shaping India’s subsequent counterinsurgency practices.65

The Indian army’s subconventional warfare doctrine issued in 2006 codified thislong military experience. The doctrine focuses on the principles and practices bestsuited for subconventional operations, including counterterrorism and low-intensityconflicts. In a comparative study of Indian and US counterinsurgency practices, DavidP. Fidler argues that because the two countries are likely to increasingly confront sub-conventional threats, these doctrines assume greater significance.66 In the case of theUnited States, it becomes imperative in view of its current operations in Iraq andAfghanistan.

Of particular relevance here is Pakistan’s ongoing campaign of asymmetric warfareagainst India. Consequently, it is being argued that India needs a sound strategy to dealwith Pakistan’s continued support of acts of terror on Indian soil and make use of their

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tem

ple

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

] at

05:

51 0

8 D

ecem

ber

2014

India’s Land Warfare Doctrines and Capabilities 157

policy prohibitively costly.67 However, India faces a severe time and space dilemmawhen it comes to retaliating militarily against any such act of wanton terror. The Indianarmy requires “time” to mobilize its field formations, which in turn reduces the ele-ment of strategic surprise and allows the international community to restrain Indiafrom undertaking any retaliatory action. In the “space” aspect, it cannot take any mil-itary action against Pakistan beyond a certain territorial threshold without potentiallytripping on the country’s nuclear red lines. The fundamental challenge therefore lies inresolving the disconnection between time and space.

The Indian army’s strategy of a proactive response has attempted to address thisproblem. But is this the best way to operationalize a punitive strategy in the currentgeopolitical circumstances? And does the new strategy solve the twin problem of timeand space? Some have argued that this newly articulated proactive war strategy suffersfrom severe limitations. Although it departs from the earlier conventional doctrine, itis still inadequate to deter or defeat an asymmetric threat. A better approach would beone that overcomes the constraints of time and space to fashion a punitive strategy thatcan cause real harm without crossing the nuclear threshold.

So how does the Indian army reconfigure its conventional and subconventionalwar-fighting doctrines? This possibly involves three major aspects. First, it is impor-tant to weld the army’s wide-ranging counterinsurgency experience into an overarchingsubconventional warfare doctrine for the future. Second, it involves the creation of suit-able conventional military and counterinsurgency forces without drastically upsettingeither of its war-fighting capabilities, and third, the ability of the land forces to be ableto apply the doctrinal learning uniformly, albeit rightfully nuanced over geographicalspace and time. Having analyzed the doctrinal lacunae, the following subsection exam-ines the army’s capability concerns that impact the efficacious use of the conventionaland subconventional warfare doctrines.

Capability IssuesMilitary doctrines can be credible only if backed by commensurate war-fighting capa-bilities. India’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) asserts that only “a pragmatic vision of theshape, size and role of the [Indian] army” can orient the army’s modernization processtoward the development of a “threat-cum-capability” based force.68 Accordingly, itneeds to prepare for a multitude of continental threats, and to that extent, remain readyand relevant. In the past decade and a half, three major provocations from Pakistan – theKargil intrusions of 1999, the attack on the Indian parliament in 2001, and the Mumbaiattacks of 2008 – brought the two countries close to a major crisis. These episodesclearly emphasize the need to maintain a high level of operational readiness. A credibleland-force capability for its territorial defense and a force tailor-made for tackling inter-nal security situations that lie beyond the capacities of central paramilitaries and statepolice forces is therefore vital. However, India’s efforts to modernize its land forceshave been frequently thwarted because of inadequate resources and institutional stasis.It is therefore no surprise that the combat edge that India enjoyed along its Westernborders has recurrently degraded due to the lack of a focused development of its landwarfare capabilities.69

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tem

ple

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

] at

05:

51 0

8 D

ecem

ber

2014

158 Asian Security

There are several reasons for this. First, serious limitations in budgetary processesand acquisition priorities impede effective capability development and technologi-cal innovation within the armed forces. Second, the systemic inefficiencies and alabyrinthine bureaucracy for handling the acquisition process have led to large time andcost overruns.70 These, in turn, have affected the overall preparedness of the army forboth conventional and subconventional operations. Capability development, especiallyin terms of state-of-the-art infantry weapon systems, mechanized weapon platforms,artillery pieces and air defense guns, guided munitions and missile systems, and forcemultipliers, has been rather mixed. A few acquisitions have been made, but some glaringdeficiencies as discussed below continue to plague the army’s capability.71

InfantryThe modernization of infantry weapon systems needs urgent attention in the light ofits large-scale commitment for border management and internal security tasks. Whilethe army has initiated the Future Infantry Soldier (F-INSAS) project, which aims atequipping the infantryman as an all-terrain, networked, lethal, and survivable soldierfor the future, the project will likely take some time to take off. At yet another level,not much progress has been made for fulfilling the technical qualitative requirementsof small arms. The INSAS 5.56-mm assault rifle, which has been in service for nearlyten years, has several shortcomings. Similarly, the INSAS light machine gun version isstill facing teething troubles, and the close-quarter battle version has not found favorwith the army. Perhaps the only important acquisition has been the Kornet-E guidedmissile with thermal-imaging sights that has enhanced the antitank warfare capabilityof infantry battalions.

Mechanized ForcesIn 2000, India negotiated a deal to acquire T-90S tanks to replace its aging tank fleet.Subsequently, India began to assemble these tanks, and it recently acquired a few hun-dred T-90S tank kits for assembly within the country. Separately, the indigenouslydeveloped Arjun Main Battle Tank has been in the pipeline for nearly two decades,and to date, only a few dozen tanks have been ordered for manufacture. The mech-anized infantry is now being equipped with BMP2 infantry combat vehicles, severalvariants of which are under development. Most important, the mechanized forces havesuffered from acute night blindness and lack of adequate base overhaul capacities. Nightblindness, especially among the T-72 tank fleet, has been a significant constraint.72 Inan interview to the media, the then-Army Chief General Deepak Kapoor in January2010 had stated that this deficiency might take three to four years to rectify.73 The T-90 tanks too are reportedly suffering from lack of “tropical-ization” of their FrenchCatherine night thermal-imaging cameras. Fielding a highly lethal mechanized forcethat is capable of sustained day and night operations is critical.

ArtillerySince the last major acquisition of 155-mm FH-77B BOFORS howitzers in the mid-1980s, there has been no further modernization of the artillery. A global tender

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tem

ple

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

] at

05:

51 0

8 D

ecem

ber

2014

India’s Land Warfare Doctrines and Capabilities 159

that had been floated for purchase of the towed version of these guns to be fol-lowed by indigenous manufacture is hampered by the blacklisting of many vendors.74

Another proposal for purchase of self-propelled guns for deployment in supportof mechanized forces in the plains and semidesert terrain is awaiting finaliza-tion. In addition, an acquisition proposal for a towed howitzer weighing less than5,000 kg for the mountain divisions has been issued. Some pieces of 130-mm M46Russian medium guns have been up-gunned to 155-mm caliber in collaboration withSoltam Industries of Israel. A few ANTPQ-37 weapon-locating radars were pro-cured from Raytheon in 2002, but these are considered inadequate in numbers foreffective surveillance along both the fronts with China and Pakistan. As one expertargues, “Artillery and aviation are force multipliers, giving commanders enhancedfirepower to strike in the enemy’s depth. The modernization of these two vital[combat] arms continues to hang fire, affecting the army’s overall combat potential.”75

This critical war-fighting deficiency needs to be seriously addressed in the nearfuture.

Missiles and Air DefenseThe MoD annual report states that in terms of air defense equipment, the priority isto “acquire and replace vintage air defense missile systems; find a common successorfor air defense gun systems; enhance the surveillance and fire-control capabilities byprocuring three dimensional tactical control radars and a successor of existing fire-control radars.”76 However, the preparedness of the air defense systems has sufferedseriously in recent decades. Besides gaps in the air defense coverage, India is handi-capped in terms of radar coverage. In particular, the air defense needs of the mechanizedforces are a major area of concern. The SAM-6 and SAM-7 missile systems, whichhave been the backbone of the Indian army’s offensive formations since the 1970s, arein urgent need of replacement. Similarly, the OSA-AK and Shilka air defense missilesystems are aging and inadequate for high-quality low-level air defense. The DefenseResearch and Development Organization’s AKASH and TRISHUL missile systemshave not made much headway. However, the Brahmos supersonic missile developedwith Russia and possessing a cruise speed of Mach 2.8 to 3.0 and precision strike at arange of 290 km has been quite a success story.

Force MultipliersAn efficient battlefield information management system is crucial for the army.Although there has been qualitative improvement in combat communications at theoperational level, the development and fielding of integrated tactical command, control,and communication systems is still lacking. Similarly, the integration of high-resolutionsatellite imagery to such command and control platforms is yet to be made avail-able to field commanders. The Israeli Searcher-I and Heron unmanned aerial vehiclesintroduced into service are too few in number to make any real qualitative differencein real-time surveillance. The following section details the hurdles that constrain thearmy’s war-fighting doctrines and capabilities in the emerging context.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tem

ple

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

] at

05:

51 0

8 D

ecem

ber

2014

160 Asian Security

Limitations and HurdlesIndia has no formal document that systematically articulates the country’s nationalsecurity objectives, strategy, and policy.77 Successive governments, the ParliamentaryStanding Committee on Defense, and the strategic community have acknowledged thisshortcoming. In its recommendations, the National Security Advisory Board too hasemphasized the need for a coherent documentation of India’s national security con-cerns, objectives, and strategy.78 The absence of strategic guidance handicaps defensepolicymakers, planners, and practitioners and leads to unwise choices that at timesmay not have the sanction of the government. It is therefore no surprise that severaldefense analysts and experts in the country have argued that a strategic defense review isessential.79 The following steps in the key areas of policy, doctrine, and strategy wouldhelp to define the size, shape, and role of the armed forces.

Policy and StrategyThere have hardly been any radical departures in India’s defense policy apart from thosethat occurred in the aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian War.80 Ever since its indepen-dence, most changes have been slow, limited, and incremental and have not produced adramatic shift in threat perception, budgetary allocations, and military responses. Thishas happened despite several adverse developments in the neighborhood. The Indiandefense establishment suffers from a long-term vision and the policymaking appara-tus has yet to develop requisite skills, capacities, and mechanisms for making strategicshifts. Fashioning a strategic outlook will require far better coordination between thebureaucratic and institutional entities, the civil services, and the strategic community.81

The absence of a skilled body of defense policymakers has been a disadvantage, andtherefore, many decisions have been made on the basis of political whims. Only if Indiaforges a synergy in its defense policy and decision making will it be able to address themilitary readiness concerns for the twenty-first century.

The Kargil Review Committee (KRC) and Group of Ministers (GoM) Report hadstressed the need for defense reforms.82 Among several other recommendations, theysuggested the appointment of senior armed forces personnel of requisite expertise in theMoD to make use of their operational experience in national security structures on poli-cymaking. This would not only enable superior decision making at the highest level butalso promote much-needed integration among the three services. Considering that thekey to success lies in the integration of the three services, it is essential to have a chiefof defense staff (CDS) to provide single-point military advice. It is also necessary toidentify the common operational and logistical footprint among the three military ser-vices, with a view to evolve mutually shared and cost-effective joint operating practices.Ever since its raising in 2004, HQ Integrated Defense Staff (IDS) has made a significantcontribution to various joint planning initiatives and procedures, and the army, too, iscommitted to leveraging its combat strength through mutual cooperation. At anotherlevel, the armed forces also need to reevaluate their teeth-to-tail ratio to maintain anefficient war-fighting machine for the future. The rightsizing of existing force struc-tures alone can enable them to recast some of the components and to forge additionalcapacities for the twenty-first century.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tem

ple

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

] at

05:

51 0

8 D

ecem

ber

2014

India’s Land Warfare Doctrines and Capabilities 161

At the doctrinal level, the Indian army’s ability to fight a one-front, one and half-front or a two-front war has been debated for quite some time. Existing force levels canenable it to fight only a single-front battle. The commitments for counterinsurgencyoperations have eroded the conventional land war-fighting capabilities. In this context,the argument for reduction of conventional force levels is misplaced. It can only takeplace in the case that a rapprochement with China gathers momentum and the Kashmirissue moves toward resolution. Because neither seems to be likely in the near future,the operational necessity to maintain land war-fighting forces for both fronts cannotbe wished away. While the army’s readiness along India’s western front with Pakistanis taken care of, the northern frontier still lacks strategic defense infrastructure and anappropriate force structure and posture.83 In that context, the raising of new moun-tain formations and construction of border roads makes good sense, as these wouldconsiderably enhance India’s deterrence capabilities in the Himalayas.84 In an era whenfuture threats are difficult to predict, it would be important to recast several compo-nents of the army for a “capability”-based role. These highly networkcentric and airmobile or seaborne forces could enable rapid deployment both at home and abroad forhumanitarian assistance and relief and other such contingencies. Maintaining and sus-taining a fair mix of “threat” and “capability”–based force levels shall be the primaryorganizational challenge that the army faces in times to come.85

Funding and Capability DevelopmentPursuant to recommendations made by the GoM Committee constituted in February2001 on reform of the national security system, several important decisions weremade.86 These include the institution of the Defense Acquisition Council to stream-line the defense procurement process.87 Another significant development has been thecreation of the HQ IDS to enable triservice planning on a range of issues.88 Ever sincethen, the HQ IDS has been involved in developing a long-term integrated perspec-tive plan (LTIPP) that looks at the capability development across a 15-year perspective.While the LTIPP prepared is supposed to be the basis of the Defense Five-Year plans,and ultimately the annual defense budget, these perspective plans have never beenapproved. The Defense Five-Year Plans sometimes do not get sanctioned, and as aresult, the linkage between long-term planning and budgeting does not get established.Even the annual defense budget does not flow from approved programs, and the pasttrend in military expenditure forms the main basis of future budgeting. As a conse-quence, capability development in the army continues to be hampered by inadequateresource commitments and procedural stasis.

In terms of defense budgeting and expenditure, India spent an average of 1.6 percenton defense until the 1960s, when the expenditure spurted to 3.8 percent as a conse-quence of the disastrous 1962 Indo-China War. In the late 1980s, the defense budgetagain saw a reasonable growth. Lately, the defense expenditure has once more fallen toroughly 2 percent, and despite several assurances to maintain it at 3 percent, there seemsto be no accretion. In fact, the defense allocation pegged at 2.12 percent of the grossdomestic product in fiscal year 2010–11 is likely to erode to 1.76 percent in fiscal year2014–15.89 A firm budgetary commitment with the ability to roll forward unexpended

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tem

ple

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

] at

05:

51 0

8 D

ecem

ber

2014

162 Asian Security

allocation alone can ensure continued development of the land, sea, and air warfarecapabilities.90

In the Tenth Plan (2002–7), the army’s modernization priorities were focused on theinfantry and special forces, night-fighting capabilities, and augmentation of surveillanceequipment and artillery guns.91 Currently, the core areas of capability improvement arefirepower and increased mobility, all-weather surveillance equipment and capabilities,night-fighting and firing capabilities, and enhanced capability for the special forces,network-centric warfare, and nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) protection.92

However, the development of the capabilities is slow and suffers from several insti-tutional and procedural deficiencies. In terms of the procurement processes, thereis an urgent need to graduate beyond the first-generation reforms centered around“procedure-ization” and toward the timely delivery of capability needs. Learning fromthe Western experience as outlined in the recent Bernard Gray report in the UnitedKingdom93 and the recommendations of the US House of Representatives’ HouseArmed Services Committee on military readiness might be helpful.

How the Indian army creates the necessary conventional and subconventional capa-bilities is therefore the key organizational challenge that needs to be addressed. Theanswer perhaps lies in creating sufficient indigenous capacities – both in the publicand private sectors – for defense research, development, and production. India haseight defense public sector undertakings (DPSUs) under the control of Department ofDefense production and MoD.94 These entities along with 40 defense ordnance facto-ries (OFs) form the backbone of India’s defense production.95 Unlike the OFs, whichproduce low-end items, the DPSUs cater to the strategic needs of the armed forces.The OFs in particular are responsible for manufacture of arms, ammunitions, armoredvehicles, and ordnance stores.96 These factories have performed inadequately becauseof their below-par internal management, their limited range of production items, andtheir quality and delivery schedule. Various governmental reviews have recommendedmeasures to energize the management of these factories, but so far, not much has beendone to corporatize them.97 Improving the efficiency of these factories is critical to thearmy’s long-term capabilities. Improving indigenous defense industrial competitive-ness through increased participation of the private sector and foreign direct investmentcould go a long way in making up for the production deficiencies.98

Institutional CultureCivil-military relations lie at the core of the national security framework and decision-making process. Although explicit political control over the military cannot bequestioned, the need to involve the senior leadership as equal partners in the decision-making process is critical. Leveraging military knowledge, experience, and capacitiescan only contribute to the larger well-being of the state. Clearly, there is a need tostrengthen the civil-military dynamic to ensure that instruments of force can respondto emerging challenges and threats. Cross-pollination of national security structureswith military expertise could pave the way for institutional equity. This, in turn, couldcontribute to the growth of strategic thinking and culture. It will entail functional inte-gration of the MoD and the service headquarters, creation of a CDS, representation

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tem

ple

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

] at

05:

51 0

8 D

ecem

ber

2014

India’s Land Warfare Doctrines and Capabilities 163

of military staff on national security structures, leveraging military diplomacy in pur-suit of India’s foreign policy objectives, ensuring consistency in defense resources andexpenditure, significant reforms in the acquisition process and defense industry, andpreparedness for a range of military threats.

The Indian army is engaged in modernizing its forces with an increased emphasison mobility, firepower and battle-space awareness. The current operating environmentcalls for a transition from intensive manpower to a more technologically capable force.This will be in terms of network centricity, maneuverability, lethality, and survivabilityunder adverse battle conditions. Greater reliance on technology and innovation wouldimply a corresponding shift in organizational culture, training, and education. Frequentforeign military exchanges and overseas deployment for peacekeeping operations havecontributed to the development of new organizational thinking. However, there is alsoa continuing need for greater professional learning through formal academic educationand not merely routine military training. While “military training” focuses on the abil-ity of military organizations and individuals to perform specific operational or tacticaltasks and functions efficiently and effectively, focus on “military education” partic-ularly enhances professional knowledge, reasoning abilities, interpretation of diversestrategic perspectives, innovative thinking, and complex problem solving. Exposure tostrategic studies at universities and reputed think tanks at home and abroad could pro-vide the much-needed impetus for development of doctrinal thought and change andtechnological inclination and infusion.

While the Indian army has made significant strides in terms of doctrinal thought andcapability development, the future challenges and threats demand timely and precise useof military force, which makes it imperative that the policy and planning impedimentsare resolved as early as possible. In that context, it is vital to remove these barriers tofacilitate adequate levels of operational and structural readiness in the Indian army. Abalanced and long-term doctrinal evolution and capability development planning alonecould contribute to desired readiness levels.

Bridging the GapHistorically, India has demonstrated a lack of interest in maintaining requisite levelsof defense preparedness. From the initial delay in sending troops to defend Kashmirin 1948 to the two and a half-decade-long pause in the testing of the nuclear weapons,India’s use of military force has been slow and only in response to grave internal andexternal threats. India’s disastrous border war with China in 1962, the consequenceof an ill-conceived “forward policy,” exemplified its incapacity to fix the imperativesof military readiness to its foreign policy.99 The much-acclaimed success in libera-tion of Bangladesh in 1971 too was marked by a lack of readiness, when the thenarmy chief sought to delay the military campaign until desired levels of prepared-ness were achieved.100 The Kargil intrusions of 1999 highlighted several gaps in thecoordination of intelligence inputs.101 India’s strategic ambivalence was once againbrought to the fore in 2001–2, when a hastily ordered mobilization plan and the subse-quent decisional dilemma at the highest level denied the country an opportunity topunish an errant neighbor.102 A course correction based on its past experience and

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tem

ple

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

] at

05:

51 0

8 D

ecem

ber

2014

164 Asian Security

learning from modern militaries is therefore necessary. More funds must be allocatedto buy military technology, translating this enhanced technological access into capabil-ity development and formulating appropriate war-fighting doctrines and strategies toleverage the operational readiness levels in times of crisis.

How could the Indian army possibly bridge these gaps and deficiencies betweenthe national security objectives and land war-fighting capabilities? Three issues assumeimportance. First, the economic growth and access to technology appear to be changingthe strategic perspectives within the country. India’s capital expenditure on procure-ment of military hardware is expected to grow from US$13.1 billion in 2010–11 toUS$19.2 billion by 2014–15.103 This implies a compounded annual growth rate of10 percent. The Indian army’s acquisition plans include upgrades and purchases ofartillery, tanks and infantry-tracked vehicles, missiles and air defense guns, and severalinfantry upgrades. It is also investing in surveillance devices, electronics, communi-cations, and information technology systems to enable network centricity in combatoperations. However, the critical issue is that the army’s readiness is not about technol-ogy alone but the creation of an efficient response framework that can genuinely meetthe security challenges of the future. Experts therefore argue that India’s technocraticapproach toward transforming military capabilities alone can be misleading because itcan lead to complacency and finally a lack of preparedness with regard to its security.104

Second, India’s military challenge lies in translating the enhanced economic oppor-tunity and technological prowess into defense preparedness.105 For instance, India’sconventional military balance with Pakistan and China continues to suffer despite thequadrupling of the size of the Indian economy during the last decade and a threefoldincrease in the defense expenditure. One expert argues that India’s capacity to masterthe creation and use of instruments of military force is still not assured at this point intime.106 Whether it will succeed in this endeavor will depend greatly on how it resolvesa few macro and micro issues. At a macro-level, these are identified as the country’scontinued economic growth, clarity in strategic vision, and the ability to engage theinternational system to its own advantage. In terms of micromanagement, the abilityto tackle internal unrest, defend the country from external threats, provide regionalsecurity, and build an effective nuclear deterrent and defense industry will assumeimportance.

Third, the Indian army needs to prepare a “two”-front doctrine to counter thecollusive threat from Pakistan and China. In the subconventional context, the chal-lenge will be to sustain and refine the existing counterinsurgency capabilities of theRR and AR units without unjustifiably diluting the conventional war-fighting capa-bilities. To respond to nontraditional roles that might range from managing a naturaldisaster to accidental oil spills or nuclear and chemical leakages, to legitimate requestsfor assistance from governments in the neighborhood, it would be necessary to createout-of-area force projection capabilities based on a wide range of military and civiliancompetencies.

The foregoing analysis establishes the demands that might be placed on the armyin the short, medium, and long term. Conventional and subconventional threats fromPakistan require “operational” readiness (that is, short to medium term) to deal withany misadventure in the hills, plains, and desert sectors, while simultaneously tackling

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tem

ple

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

] at

05:

51 0

8 D

ecem

ber

2014

India’s Land Warfare Doctrines and Capabilities 165

incidents of crossborder terror in the states of Jammu and Kashmir or domestic unrestelsewhere. The Chinese threat, being medium to long term, will require “structural”readiness in terms of mountain war-fighting capabilities, strategic rail and road infras-tructure in the border areas, and asymmetric capabilities. Nontraditional engagementssuch as humanitarian aid, disasters, nontraditional and transnational threats will requirecapable and readily deployable military units and assets to include the special forces, thefirst-response units, intelligence inputs, and relief material.

ConclusionIndia’s grand strategy, which has political, economic, and military dimensions, is grad-ually evolving and making significant strides. In this context, India’s long-term securityneeds cannot be seen in terms of resolving its longstanding territorial and boundarydisputes alone. Other factors that need to be taken into account are the dangers arisingfrom nuclear proliferation, the presence of extraregional and potentially hostile pow-ers, and the growth of conventional and nuclear capabilities of inimical powers in theregion. The subconventional and nontraditional dimensions too will continue to engageIndia’s armed forces. It will therefore have to be ready and relevant across an entirespectrum of conflict, ranging from high-intensity conventional wars under a nuclearbackdrop to low-intensity conflicts. The Indian army, as an institution, will have toadapt itself to the emerging security environment, but this transformation will have tobe rapid and driven by doctrine and technology. Because future conflicts will primarilyaim at gaining political advantage, the traditional doctrinal thought of capturing andretaining territories, or destruction of the adversary’s forces and their strategic assets,might require reconsideration. Consequently, the transformation in the Indian army’swar-fighting doctrines and capabilities will call for significant changes in its institutionalethos and outlook and for the melding of organizational capacities.

NOTES

1. “PM: Imminent Attack Alerts a Cause of Worry,” Asian Age [Delhi ed.], October 21, 2009. India’s primeminister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, while addressing the triservice annual Combined Commanders Conferenceon October 20, 2009, stated that “. . . the armed forces must be fully equipped to deal with all threat sce-narios. Our troops should be trained to fight anywhere, anytime and under any conditions. Their ability todeal with non-traditional threats must receive greater attention.”

2. The Military Balance, 2010, pp. 1, 359. The Indian armed forces comprise an active and reserve componentof 1,325,900 and 1,155,000 personnel, respectively.

3. Gurmeet Kanwal, Indian Army Vision 2020 (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2008).4. D. K. Palit, War in High Himalayas: The Indian Army in Crisis 1962 (Calcutta: Eastern Book Corporation,

1991), pp. 368–422; Steven Hoffman, India and the China Crisis (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,1990).

5. Depinder Singh, The IPKF in Sri Lanka (New Delhi: Trishul Publications, 1991), pp. 167–199.6. Major missions in which Indian troops have participated: Korea (1953–54), Vietnam (1954–70), Gaza

(1956–67), Congo (1960–64), Cambodia (1992–93), Mozambique (1992–94), Somalia (1993–94), Angola(1994–97), Rwanda (1995–96), Sierra Leone (1998–2000), Lebanon, Democratic Republic of Congo, andSudan.

7. Arvind Dutta, “Role of India’s Defence Cooperation Initiatives in Meeting the Foreign Policy Goals,”Journal of Defence Studies Vol. 3, No. 3 (2009), p. 39.

8. Significant among these have been the relief material dispatched over long distance by military aircraft tothe United States and People’s Republic of China in September 2005 and May 2008, respectively.

9. Figures sourced from Laxman Behera, research fellow, Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses, NewDelhi.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tem

ple

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

] at

05:

51 0

8 D

ecem

ber

2014

166 Asian Security

10. Kapil Kak, “India’s Defence Cooperation with Other Countries,” in Satish Kumar, ed., India’s NationalSecurity: Annual Review 2009 (New Delhi: Taylor & Francis Group, 2010), pp. 223–228.

11. Robert Kaplan, South Asia’s Geography of Conflict (Center for New American Studies, 2010), p. 4.12. Kanwal, Indian Army Vision, pp. 90–91.13. Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report 2009–2010 (New Delhi: Government of India, 2009–10),

pp. 5–10.14. “Naxalism Gravest Internal Security Threat to Nation: PM,” Indian Express, April 27, 2010. Available at

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/naxalism-gravest-internal-security-threat-to/60930315. “Naxals Kill More Than Terrorists Each Year,” Indian Express, November, 11, 2010. Available at

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/naxals-kill-more-than-terrorists-each-year/646729/016. P. V. Ramana, “A Critical Evaluation of the Union Government’s Response to the Maoist Challenge,”

Strategic Analysis Vol. 33, No. 5 (2009), pp. 745–759.17. Harinder Singh, “Kashmir: Time to Ring the Bell,” IDSA Commentary, October, 13, 2010. Available at

http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/KashmirTimetoRingtheBell_hsingh_13101018. Sandeep Uninathan, “The ChiPak Threat,” India Today, October 23, 2010. Available at http://indiatoday

.intoday.in/site/StoryPrint?sId=117399&secid=150&page=null19. “Whither Pakistan: Growing Instability and Implications for India,” IDSA Pakistan Project Report, June

2010, pp. 118–122.20. Mohan Guruswamy, “Pakistan-China Relations: Higher than the Mountains, Deeper than the Oceans,”

CLAWS Journal (Summer 2010), pp. 92–107.21. Selig Harrison, “China’s Discreet Hold on Pakistan’s Northern Borderlands,” New York Times, August 26,

2010.22. Gurmeet Kanwal, “India-China Strategic Relations,” CLAWS Journal (Summer 2010), p. 14323. Monika Chansoria, “Trend Lines in China’s Infrastructure Development in Tibet,” CLAWS Journal

(Summer 2010), pp. 177–183.24. John H. Gill, “India and Pakistan: A Shift in the Military Calculus,” in Ashley J. Tellis, ed., Strategic Asia:

Military Modernisation in an Era of Uncertainty, Expanded Executive Summary (The National Bureau ofAsian Research, 2005–06).

25. “International Conference on Emerging and Disruptive Technologies,” S. Rajaratnam School ofInternational Studies, Singapore, September 13–15, 2009. Available at http://www.rsis.edu.sg/cens/publications/conference_reports/RSIS_ICEDT%20Report_171109.pdf

26. Vijay Oberoi, “Approach Paper,” in Lt. Gen. Vijay Oberoi, ed., Army 2020: Shape, Size, Structure andGeneral Doctrine for Emerging Challenges (New Delhi: KW Publishers, 2005), p. 14.

27. P. S. Das, “Contours of India’s Emerging Security Environment,” in Oberoi, Army 2020, p. 57.28. Jasjit Singh, “Synchronising Military Power with National Aspirations,” in Oberoi, Army 2020, p. 93.29. Jasjit Singh, “Dynamics of Limited War,” Strategic Analysis Vol. 24, No. 7 (2000), pp. 1205–1220.30. Kanwal, Indian Army Vision, pp. 62–63.31. Oberoi, “Approach Paper,” p. 15.32. V. K. Kapoor, “A Perspective on Force Re-Structuring and Doctrinal Challenges,” in Oberoi, Army 2020,

p. 221.33. Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb (New Delhi: Penguin, 2010), pp. 1–5.34. US Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the

People’s Republic of China 2010 (Washington, DC: Author, 2010), pp. 34–35.35. Unclassified Report to the United States Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons

of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, July 1 through December 31, 2000.36. Kanwal, Indian Army Vision, p. 35.37. S. F. S. Lodhi, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine,” Pakistan Defence Journal (1999).38. Ismat Saeed, “Strategy for Total Defence: A Conceptual Nuclear Doctrine,” Pakistan Defence Journal

(2000).39. Agha Shahi, Zulfiqar Ali Khan, and Abdul Sattar, “Securing Nuclear Peace,” News, October 5, 1999.40. Kanwal, Indian Army Vision, p. 59.41. Shankar Roy Chowdhury, “Indian Army 2020,” Indian Defence Review Vol. 19, No. 4 (2004), pp. 36–42.42. S. Padmanabhan, “Indian Army 2020,” Indian Defence Review Vol. 20, No. 4 (2005), pp. 37–46.43. Kapoor, “A Perspective on Force Re-Structuring.”44. Walter C. Ladwig, “India and Military Power Projection: Will the Land of Gandhi Become a Conventional

Great Power?” Asian Survey Vol. 50, No. 6, (2011), pp. 1162–1183.45. R. K. Bhonsle, “India’s National Aspirations and Military Capabilities 2020: A Prognostic Survey,” in

Oberoi, Army 2020, p. 141.46. Bharat Karnad, “Firming up the Critical Capability Triad,” in Oberoi, Army 2020, p. 247.47. The Rashtriya Rifles (literally translated as National Rifles) were raised in the early 1990s to supplement

the counterinsurgency effort in Jammu and Kashmir. Ever since, these units have emerged as the principalcounterinsurgency arm of the army.

48. Walter C. Ladwig, “The Challenge of Changing Military Doctrine,” Seminar Vol. 599 (July 2009). Availableat http://india-seminar.com/2009/599.htm

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tem

ple

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

] at

05:

51 0

8 D

ecem

ber

2014

India’s Land Warfare Doctrines and Capabilities 167

49. Ashok Sawhney, “India’s Naval Effectiveness for National Growth,” RSIS Working Paper No. 127,S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore, May 2010, pp. 22–24.

50. Confederation of Indian Industry (CII)-Deloitte, Prospects for Global Defence Export Industry in IndianDefence Market (CII Indian Defence Industry Mission EUROSATORY 2010), pp. 5–6; CII-KPMG,Opportunities in the Indian Defence Sector: An Overview, (London: Brookings Institution, 2010).

51. Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, “The Drag on India’s Military Growth,” Policy Brief No. 176,Confederation of Indian Industries, New Delhi, India, 2010.

52. Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrines (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 13–33.53. Ladwig, “The Challenge.”54. Walter C. Ladwig, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine,”

International Security Vol. 32, No. 3 (2007–08), pp. 158–190; Ladwig, “Cold Start: India’s New StrategicDoctrine and Its Implications,” Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, May 2008.

55. The phrase “Cold Start” is a misnomer, and no such term exists in the Indian army’s lexicon. In an interviewwith the NDTV, the Indian army Chief General V. K. Singh recently clarified the army’s position on thisand said, “I think it started with the media playing on words – there is nothing called Cold Start. . . . welook at all contingencies – defensive and offensive. . . . [and] it is not a military term if I can say that.”

56. Gurmeet Kanwal, “Cold Start and Battle Groups for Offensive Operations,” ORF Strategic Trends Vol. 4,No. 18 (June 2006).

57. Gurmeet Kanwal, “India’s Cold Start Doctrine and Strategic Stability,” IDSA Commentary, June, 1, 2010.Available at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/

58. S. Paul Kapur, “India and Pakistan’s Instability Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia Is Not Like Cold WarEurope,” International Security Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), p. 138; Tariq M. Ashraf, “Doctrinal Reawakeningof the Indian Armed Forces,” in Combined Armed Center Military Review (Fort Leavenworth, KS: USArmy Combined Arms Centre, 2004), pp. 52–62.

59. S. Paul Kapur, “Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia,” International Security Vol. 33, No. 2(2008), pp. 71–94.

60. Vipin Narang, “Posturing for Peace? Pakistan’s Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability,” InternationalSecurity Vol. 34, No. 3 (Winter 2009–10), pp. 38–78.

61. Workshop report entitled, Assessing China’s Rise: Power and Influence in the 21st Century, MassachusettsInstitute of Technology, February 27–28, 2009.

62. C. Raja Mohan, “The Mystery of Missing Thousand Miles in J&K,” Indian Express, December 19, 2010.63. Jonathan Holslag, China and India: Prospects for Peace (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010),

pp. 1–7.64. Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler, “Conclusion,” in Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler, ed., India and

Counterinsurgency Lessons Learned (London: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2009), pp. 225–229.65. Rajesh Rajagopalan, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” Seminar Vol. 599 (July 2009). Available at

http://www.india-seminar.com/2009/599/599_rajesh_rajagopalan.htm66. David P. Fidler, “The Indian Doctrine for Sub-Conventional Operations,” in Sumit Ganguly and David P.

Fidler, eds., India and Counterinsurgency Lessons Learned (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 207–224.67. G. D. Bakshi, Limited Wars in South Asia (New Delhi: KW Publishers, 2010), pp. 19–36.68. MoD, Annual Report 2008–2009 (New Delhi: Government of India), p. 22.69. S. Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia (New Delhi:

Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 23.70. Harinder Singh, “Defence Acquisitions: The Question of Systemic Inefficiencies and Effectiveness,” IDSA

Commentary, December 3, 2009. Available at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/DefenceAcquisitions_HSingh_031209

71. Gurmeet Kanwal, “Modernising the Indian Army,” Seminar Vol. 599 (July 2009). Available at http://www.india-seminar.com/2009/599/599_gurmeet_kanwal.htm

72. “Army Tanks Battle Night Blindness,” Times of India, September 1, 2010.73. “80 Percent of India’s Battle Tanks Were Night Blind: Indian Army Chief,” Asian Defence, January 15, 2010.

Available at http://theasiandefence.blogspot.com/2010/01/80-percent-of-indias-battle-tanks-were.html74. “CBI for Blacklisting of Six Defence Firms: Govt,” Hindustan Times, August 16, 2010.75. S. K. Chatterjee, “Elusive Guns,” Tribune (Chandigarh), November 3, 2010.76. Ministry of Defence, Annual Report 2008–2009.77. N. S. Sisodia, “What Ails Defence Planning in India?” in Comprehensive Security for an Emerging India

(New Delhi: KW Publishers, 2010), p. 82.78. Sisodia, “What Ails Defence Planning,” p. 83.79. Sisodia, “What Ails Defence Planning,” p. 84.80. Lorne J. Kavic, India’s Quest for Security: Defence Policies, 1947–1965 (Los Angeles: University of

California Press, 1967).81. Sumit Ganguly, “Indian Defence Policy,” in The Oxford Companion to Politics in India (London: Oxford

University Press, 2010), p. 550.82. The KRC was constituted on July 24, 1999, by the Government of India to review the events that led to the

Pakistani aggression in the Kargil district of Ladakh in Jammu and Kashmir and to recommend measures

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tem

ple

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

] at

05:

51 0

8 D

ecem

ber

2014

168 Asian Security

as considered necessary to safeguard national security against armed intrusions. The KRC called for a full-scale review of the national security mechanisms and this later took the form of a GoM Report. The GoMcompleted the review of the country’s security mechanisms in May 2001. Its recommendations are based onthe findings of four task forces on intelligence, internal security, border management, and defense issues.

84. “India Arms for the Future: Wider Strategic Horizons Broaden Defence Procurements,” StrategicComments Vol. 15, No. 1 (March 2009).

86. MoD, Twenty-Second Report, Standing Committee on Defence (2006–07). Available at http://164.100.47.134/lsscommittee/Defence/14ls22ndreport.pdf MoD, Thirty-Second Report, Standing Committee onDefence (2008–2009). Available at http://164.100.47.134/lsscommittee/Defence/32nd%20Report-ATR%20Kargil.pdf

87. MoD, Sixth Report, Standing Committee on Defence (2005–06), Procurement Policy and Procedure.Available at http://164.100.47.134/lsscommittee/Defence/6threp.pdf

88. MoD, Thirty-Sixth Report, Standing Committee on Defence (2008–2009), Status of Implementationof Unified Command for Armed Forces. Available at http://164.100.47.134/lsscommittee/Defence/36th%20Report-UNIFIED%20COMMAND.pdf

89. Minister of Finance, Government of India, The Indian Thirteenth Finance Commission Report, December2009.

90. A. K. Ghosh, Defence Budgeting and Planning in India: The Way Forward (New Delhi: KW Publishers,2006), p. vii.

91. Lok Sabha Secretariat, 2nd Report of the Standing Committee on Defence, Demands for Grants(2005–2006), p. 32.

92. MoD, Annual Report 2007–2008 (New Delhi: Government of India), p. 16.93. MoD, Review of Acquisition. Available at http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/

CorporatePublications/PolicyStrategyandPlanning/ReviewOfAcquisition.htm94. MoD, Ninth Report, Standing Committee on Defence (2005–06), Defence Public Sector Undertakings.

Available at http://164.100.47.134/lsscommittee/Defence/9threportof14th.pdf/archive_reports.aspx?lsnum=14

95. MoD, Seventh Report, Standing Committee on Defence (2005–06), Defence Ordnance Factories. Availableat. http://164.100.47.134/lsscommittee/Defence/7threp.pdf

96. MoD, Twentieth Report, Standing Committee on Defence (2006–07). Available at http://164.100.47.134/lsscommittee/Defence/14ls20threport.pdf

97. The views expressed here are based on an interaction with Laxman Behera, research fellow at the Instituteof Defense Studies and Analysis, New Delhi.

98. MoD, Thirty-Third Report, Standing Committee on Defence (2008–2009), Indigenisation of DefenceProduction – Public–Private Partnership. http://164.100.47.134/lsscommittee/Defence/33rd%20Report-ID-PPP.pdf

99. Palit, War in High Himalayas, pp. 155–185.100. J. F. R. Jacob, Surrender at Dacca: Birth of a Nation (New Delhi: Manohar, 1997), pp. 181–182.101. V. P. Malik, Kargil: From Surprise to Victory (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2006), Chap. 2, 4, 5, and 9.102. V. K. Sood and Pravin Sawhney, Op PARAKRAM: The War Unfinished (New Delhi: Sage, 2003),

pp. 145–170.103. CII-Deloitte, Prospects for Global Defence Export Industry.104. CII-Deloitte, Prospects for Global Defence Export Industry.105. Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, Arming without Aiming: India’s Military Modernisation (London:

Brookings Institution Press, 2010).106. Ashley J. Tellis, Future Fire: Challenges Facing Indian Defense Policy in the New Century, transcript of

a speech made at the India Today Conclave, New Delhi, March 13, 2004. Colonel Harinder Singh wasformerly a Research Fellow at the Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, India.

Colonel Harinder Singh was formerly a research fellow at the Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses,New Delhi, India.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Tem

ple

Uni

vers

ity L

ibra

ries

] at

05:

51 0

8 D

ecem

ber

2014