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able of contents1. Risk and power use: Constraints on the use of coercion in exchange......................................................... 1

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Risk and power use: Constraints on the use of coercion in exchangeAuthor: Molm, Linda DPublication info:American Sociological Review 62.1 (Feb 1997): 113-133.ProQuest document link

Abstract Abstract): Molm investigates how risk and fear of loss constrain the use of coercive power innonnegotiated social exchange relations. An analysis of the use of strategic power helps explain why exchange

partners in previous research have rarely used coercive power, even when their incentives and capacities to

coerce were high.

Full text: HeadnoteI investigate how risk and fear of loss constrain the use of coercive power in nonnegotiated social exchange

relations. An analysis of the use of strategic power helps explain why exchange partners in previous research

have rarely used coercive power, even when their incentives and capacities to coerce were high. Using power isrisky, and actors fear losses from the potential retaliation of their partners far more than they value the prospect

of increased rewards. The risks of coercive power use are especially great in the context of relations of mutual

exchange because of the high reward dependence of actors who have the strongest incentive to use coercion.

Two experiments show that when risk is reduced, particularly the risk of reward loss, both the use of coercion

and the effects of variations in the structure of coercive power increase.

RISK AND POWER USE: CONSTRAINTS ON THE USE OF COERCION IN EXCHANGE*

For the past 15 years, theory and research on social exchange have concentrated on the effects of structural

power on behavior while paying minimal attention to the decision-making processes of actors. Emerson's

(1972a, 1972b) theory of power

dependence relations provided the impetus for the focus on structural power by proposing that structure

determines power use, regardless of actors' intentions to use power or their awareness of the power structure.

The validity of Emerson's thesis has been supported by numerous studies in a variety of experimental settings,

varying along such important dimensions as the information actors have about the power structure, whether

exchanges are negotiated or nonnegotiated, the manipulation of power, and so forth (see Molm and Cook 1995

for a review). Support for his prediction that an imbalance or inequality in structural power produces a cor

responding inequality in exchange benefits that favors the less dependent actor in an exchange relation is one

of the more robust findings in the social science literature.

Recent experimental research suggests, however, that this conclusion does not hold for coercive power in

social exchange relations. When actors in nonnegotiated exchange relations control both rewards and

punishments for each other, their interaction is influenced primarily by the structure of reward power (Molm

1988, 1990).1 The structure of coercive power (actors' control over negative outcomes for each other) has

almost no effect on exchange behavior. A structural advantage on coercive power does not lead to a more

favorable rate of reward exchange for the advantaged actor, nor does it lead to an increased use of coercion.

Actors rarely punish each other, even when their partners fail to provide rewards on which they are highly

dependent.

I develop and test a theory arguing that risk and fear of loss constrain the use of coercion in social exchange.

Actors who have the strongest incentive to use coercion in exchange relations are disadvantaged on reward

power and thus face greater risk of retaliation from their advantaged partners. This structural disadvantage,combined with an aversion to loss (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), inhibits coercion in most relations of mutual

reward dependence. Two experiments show that when risk is reduced by changing the structure of

dependence, both the use and effectiveness of coercive strategies increase.

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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Social Exchange and Reward Power

Emerson's (1972a, 1972b) theory of social exchange, commonly called "power-dependence theory," predicts

that behavioral patterns of exchange are determined by the structural relations of dependence among actors.

The theory's scope is restricted to four conditions:2 (1) actors who seek to increase outcomes they positively

value and decrease outcomes they negatively value, (2) outcomes that obey a principle of satiation or decliningmarginal utility, (3) relations of mutual dependence in which the rewards obtained from others are contingent on

rewards given in exchange, and (4) recurring exchanges over time between the same actors or sets of actors

(Emerson 1981; Molm and Cook 1995).

The simplest form of social exchange occurs between two actors, A and B, who can be either individual actors

or collective actors whose members behave as a unit. Each actor must be able to provide some reward

(positively valued outcome) to the other (e.g., advice or status); that capacity is the actor's resource in that

relation. Each actor is dependent on the other to the extent that the outcomes valued by one actor are

contingent on exchange with the other. When an actor provides rewards for another, he or she incurs cost--

minimally, opportunity costs (i.e., rewards foregone by not pursuing other alternatives) and sometimes other

costs (e.g., investment costs, the actual loss of a material resource, or costs intrinsic to the behavior itself).

The mutual dependence of actors on each other for rewards provides the structural basis for their exchanges

with one another and for their power over each other. A's power over B is defined as the level of potential cost

that A can impose on B (Emerson 1972b). Four assumptions state the core ideas of power-dependence theory:

Assumption 1. A's power over B derives from and is equal to B's dependence on A.

Assumption 2. B's dependence on A increases with the value of the rewards that A can produce for B and

decreases with B's alternative sources of those rewards.

Assumption 3. Actors initiate exchanges by giving rewards to other actors on whom they are dependent.

Assumption 4. Actors increase exchanges that are relatively more rewarding or less costly, decrease those that

are relatively less rewarding or more costly, and change behaviors when rewards decline or costs increase.

The alternatives that reduce dependence (Assumption 2) typically take the form of other exchange partners who

are potential sources of the same (or equivalent) rewards (e.g., alternative dating partners or alternative sources

of expert advice). When connected by a focal actor, alternative relations form larger exchange networks, which

consist of three or more actors (e.g., B-A-C). If B and C are alternative exchange partners for A, then the B-A

and A-C relations are negatively connected: The more frequently A exchanges with B, the less frequently A

exchanges with C.

Within a relation, each actor's dependence (and power) can vary independently of the other's. Their joint or

relational dependence is described by two dimensions: average power and power imbalance. Average power

(the average of the two actors' dependencies on each other) is a measure of the absolute strength of the actors'power over each other; power imbalance (the difference between the two actors' dependencies on each other)

is a measure of their relative power over each other. Two friends may have high average power over each

other, for example, but low power imbalance. In a power-imbalanced relation, the less dependent and more

powerful

actor has a power advantage in the relation, and the more dependent actor is power disadvantaged.

The structure of power and dependence in a relation affects the behavioral pattern of exchange that develops

over time. When actors engage in recurring exchanges with partners in negatively-connected networks,

Assumptions 1 through 4 imply the following relations between structural power and the frequency and

distribution of exchange:

Theorem I. A's initiations of exchanges with B increase as A's dependence on B increases (and B's power over

A increases).

Theorem 2. The average frequency of exchange in a relation increases as average power and dependence in



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the relation increases.

Theorem 3. The asymmetry of exchange in a relation increases as power imbalance increases and favors the

more powerful (less dependent) actor. If A has a power advantage, then A's use of power will increase over

time (until restrained by A's own dependence), as evidenced by either (1) increased rewards to A from B (i.e.,

increased costs for B), or (2) decreased rewards to B from A (decreased costs for A).3

In short, in imbalanced relations, exchange rates change in favor of less dependent, more powerful actors(Cook and Emerson 1978; Cook et al. 1983; Markovsky, Willer, and Patton 1988; Molm 1990). Underlying this

structural effect is the same law that governs economic exchange: When demand is high (high value) and

supply is scarce (few alternatives), one pays more for the things one values.

Punishment and Coercion in Social Exchange

Traditionally, social exchange theory and its analysis of power assumed an additional scope condition: that only

rewards or posi

tively valued outcomes were exchanged (Blau 1964; Emerson 1972a, 1972b; Homans [1961] 1974). The costs

of exchange were restricted to opportunity costs, and punitive actions by one actor toward another were

excluded. As Heath (1976) and others (Blalock 1987; Molm 1988) have argued, however, there is no logical

reason for this restriction. Although an exchange "enables both participants to be better off than they would

have been without it . . ., they need not necessarily be better off than they were before" (Heath 1976:19). For

example, a spouse might prefer to spend more time at the office than at home, and might begin working more

hours. But if family members react with anger and disapproval, the pattern is less likely to persist: Cutting back

on work hours becomes preferable to enduring unpleasant family interactions. Consequently, the spouse begins

to spend more time at home, and the disapproval stops. The spouse is not better off than before the coercion

began--remem

ber, more hours at work are preferred--but he or she is better off than persisting with more work hours and

enduring frequent battles at home.

I define coercion as the use of punishment to obtain rewards from another. B coerces A by punishing A's failure

to reward B and withholding punishment when A's rewards to B are forthcoming.4 Thus, in exchanges involving

mutual rewards actors engage in mutually contingent (but not necessarily equal) exchanges of rewards,

whereas in coercive

exchanges one actor provides rewards to another in exchange for the other's withholding of expected

punishment.

An actor's capacity to obtain rewards from another through either reward exchange or coercive exchange is

determined by their power to reward or to punish the other. Structurally, forms of power based on control over

positive outcomes (reward power) or negative outcomes (coercive power) are parallel, and both can be

conceptualized in terms of dependency. When A controls rewarding outcomes for B, B is dependent on A forobtaining the things B finds desirable; when A controls punishing outcomes for B, B is dependent on A for

avoiding the things B finds aversive. This structural comparability between reward power and coercive power

makes it possible to define parallel dimensions of power and power imbalance for the two power bases, and to

extend Assumptions 1 through 4 to coercive power.

Rewards and punishments are defined in relation to an actor's current situation (Van Houten 1983). In general,

actions that increase positive value or decrease negative

value are rewarding; those that decrease positive value or increase negative value are punishing. A move to a

small house might be rewarding to a homeless person, for example, but punishing to a person accustomed to a

manor.

Analytically, the two bases of power share a common foundation that enables them to be transformed from one

into the other. If rewards are regularly given, they can be withheld as punishment; if punishments are regularly

given, they can be withheld as rewards (Bacharach and Lawler 1981; Blau 1964). As we shall see, the capacity



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of an actor to punish another using either form of power, through either direct punitive action or the withholding

of rewards, is central to this analysis: This capacity provides the means to use either reward power or coercive

power to retaliate against a partner for using coercion.

The Research Program

This study is part of a broader program that compares the effects of reward power and coercive power in social

exchange relations. The aim is to incorporate punishment and coercion into the framework of social exchange theory. The unit of analysis is the dyadic relation, which is embedded in a larger exchange network. In

addition to the four scope conditions described earlier, several other conditions define the boundaries of this

research program:

First, coercive power is studied in the context of relations in which actors have the capacity both to reward and

to punish each other. Such relations are distinct from purely coercive relations (Willer and Anderson 1981),

which do not provide the opportunity for mutual reward exchange. Second, actors' resources are capacities to

perform behaviors that produce valued outcomes for others-- not to provide tangible goods. I assume that the

only costs of performing such behaviors are opportunity costs.5 Third, exchange transactions are reciprocal, not

negotiated. In reciprocal exchanges, actors' contributions to the exchange are separately performed and

nonnegotiated (Blau 1964; Emerson 1981)-- actors initiate exchanges without knowing what they will receive in

return, and the reciprocity of exchange is determined over time.

Fourth, all actors have alternative partners with whom they can exchange; they also have alternative behavioral

choices (i.e., they can reward or punish). Therefore, both the use of reward or coercive power and responses to

power use are voluntary. Fifth, although actors can cease exchanging with a partner, they cannot "leave the

field" of influence (i.e., they cannot avoid another's rewards or punishments); nor can they change the structure

of the network. And sixth, actors have full information about the values governing the relative dependencies in

their own exchange relations, but not in distal relations in the network.

Earlier experiments in the program systematically compared the effects of average power and power imbalance

for reward

power and coercive power under these conditions (Molm 1988, 1989, 1990). Results from these experiments

repeatedly showed that the predicted relations between structural power and behavioral exchange (Theorems 1

through 3) held only for reward power. The structure of coercive power had almost no effect on exchange; in

particular, actors with greater power to inflict losses on their partners obtained no greater benefits from

exchange. Even actors with a coercive power advantage equal to and opposing a partner's reward-power

advantage ended up on the losing end of the exchange.

These findings seemed to confirm the position of the classical exchange theorists, who excluded punishment

and coercion from the scope of their theories. Both Homans ([1961] 1974) and Blau (1964) argued that coercion

is ineffective and produces resistance and retaliation rather than compliance. Other theorists also share thisposition (Boulding 1989; Deutsch 1973; Tedeschi, Schlenker, and Bonoma 1973), suggesting that the power to

punish has different effects than does the power to reward because of the con

sequences of its use (i.e., the effects of punishment on the target of coercion).

Subsequent experiments have failed to support this explanation, however. When computer-simulated actors

were programmed to use strong and consistent strategies of coercion against real subjects (by inflicting

monetary losses whenever subjects failed to reward them), their coercive power was highly effective (Molm

1994). Simulated actors who were disadvantaged on reward power successfully coerced their advantaged

partners to exchange with them most of the time. Other researchers (e.g., Willer 1987) have also found that

coercive power, when used, is effective.

But real subjects do not apply coercion consistently in exchange relations. Subjects in both strong and weak

power positions typically punish their partners on fewer than 5 percent of all opportunities, and these

punishments include both coercive punishment (punishment contingent on the other's failure to reward) and



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retaliatory punishment (punishment contingent on the other's prior punishment).

In short, coercion is effective when used, but most actors do not use it enough to influ

ence another's behavior. Understanding why coercive power is ineffective, therefore, requires understanding

why actors use it so seldom. In the remainder of this paper, I develop and test a theoretical explanation

proposing that coercion in the context of relations of mutual exchange is risky, and that risk constrains its use.

A THEORY OF COERCION IN SOCIAL EXCHANGEI develop four main arguments. First, unlike reward power, the use of coercive power is not structurally induced

by power advantage but is behaviorally motivated by the receipt of insufficient rewards from an exchange

partner. Second, a disadvantage on reward power provides the incentive to use coercion in exchange relations,

but it also increases the risk of retaliation by the advantaged partner. Third, loss aversion heightens this risk by

increasing the subjective value of losses. Fourth, risk is reduced and coercion increased only when the partner's

exchange frequency is so low that there is little to lose.

Structurally-Induced Power Use versus Strategic Power Use

As power-dependence theorists have long asserted, the use of reward power is structurally induced by a

reward-power advantage, regardless of actors' intent to use power or to influence another's behavior (Cook and

Emerson 1978; Emerson 1972b). Structural power advantage leads to power use (Theorem 3) because

advantaged actors have access to more or better alternative partners (Assumptions 1 and 2); when they pursue

exchanges with these alternative partners (Assumption 3), they inadvertently withhold rewards from their more

dependent partners (i.e., they "use power" over them). In the process, they drive up others' opportunity costs of

obtaining the rewards they control, while lowering their own opportunity costs of obtaining their partners'

rewards. As long as actors respond by following the behavioral principles in Assumption 4--increasing rewarding

exchanges and avoiding costly exchanges--the inequality predicted by Theorem 3 will result.

In short, in power-imbalanced relations, the use of reward power is an unintended byproduct of advantaged

actors' exchanging more frequently with alternative partners. For example, a business that favors one supplier

may not intend to decrease another supplier's price for the same product; a person who spends more time with

one friend may not intend to acquire another friend's favors at lower cost. Nevertheless, these actions will have

such effects if the actors are structurally advantaged in the relations. Their greater access to alternative partners

provides both the capacity and the incentive to use reward power.

A structural advantage on coercive power, in contrast, provides the capacity to impose costs on a partner, but

no incentive to use that power. An imbalance in coercive power induces the disadvantaged actor to give

rewards to the advantaged partner to prevent punishment (Assumption 3, extended to coercive power), but the

imbalance does not induce the advantaged actor to use power (i.e., to punish the disadvantaged actor for failure

to provide rewards). If coercive power is not used, any effects of the potential to punish are unlikely to bemaintained.

Not all power use is structurally induced, however. Actors also can use power strategically by selectively giving

or withholding rewards and punishments contingent on a partner's prior behavior. Thibaut and Kelley (1959)

assumed the strategic use of power when they discussed the conversion of fate control (structural dependence)

to behavior control (actual influence over another's behavior), and strategic power use has been the focus of

researchers studying the sanctioning of free riders and defectors from cooperation (e.g., Axelrod 1984, 1986;

Yamagishi 1995). When actors use power strategically, they create contingencies that produce predictable

consequences for their partners' behaviors, rather than simply respond to the consequences of their own

behaviors.

Such contingencies are particularly useful in the absence of joint decision-making and negotiated agreements.

In ongoing relations, these contingencies create what Axelrod (1984) called "the shadow of the future"-- the

likelihood that what actors do at any particular time will influence how other actors will respond to them later.



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This form of in

fluence is possible only when actors exchange repeatedly with one another (the fourth scope condition).

The distinction between structurally-induced and strategically-performed power use has important implications

for predicting when actors will use coercion. Developing the significance of this distinction requires extending

Emerson's model of the actor as learner to comprise a model of the actor as both learner and teacher. Actors

who use power strategically are responding to others' behaviors, but they are attempting to influence theirbehaviors as well.6

Assumptions about Strategic Actors

To analyze strategic power use, I draw on two theories of strategic action and decisionmaking under conditions

of risk and uncertainty: Axelrod's work (1984, 1986) on the evolution of cooperation, and Kahneman and

Tversky's (1979) prospect theory. These two theories and the empirical work on which they are based suggest

four additional assumptions for deriving predictions about the strategic use of power:

Assumption 5. Actors initiate strategic power use by imposing costs on other actors who fail to provide rewards

in exchange.

Assumption 6. Strategies are dynamic and adaptive (Axelrod 1984); once initiated, they are shaped by the

consequences produced by partners' responses.

Assumption 7. The potential consequences of strategic power use include both gain (from compliance) and loss

(from retaliation); the probabilities of both are unknown but they are greater than zero.

Assumption 8. Actors evaluate exchange outcomes (both anticipated and experienced) by a value function that

has three

main characteristics: referent dependence, diminishing sensitivity, and loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky

1979):

(a) Referent dependence. Outcomes count as gains (or rewards) if they improve an actor's current outcome

level (the status quo); they count as losses (or punishments) if they worsen it.7

(b) Diminishing sensitivity. The marginal value of gains and losses decreases with their distance from the

reference point (i.e., the status quo).

(c) Loss aversion. The negative subjective value of a loss is greater than the positive subjective value of an

equivalent gain.

Assumption 5 is parallel to Assumption 3, recognizing that strategic power is not based on the expectation of

reciprocity that underlies Assumption 3 or on the inadvertent use of structurally-induced reward power, but on

an application of the behavioral principles in Assumption 4. Rather than giving rewards to obtain benefits in

return, actors impose costs (by administering punishment or withholding rewards) on partners who fail to pro

vide them with sufficient benefits. Once initiated, strategies--like other patterns of exchange behavior--should

increase or decrease in frequency according to their consequences; thus, Assumption 6 is parallel toAssumption 4.

Assumption 7 makes explicit the risk and uncertainty involved in the strategic use of power. The exchange

partner may respond with either compliance (increased rewards) or retaliation (decreased rewards or increased

punishment). Complying with coercion produces the immediate benefits of decreased punishment, but in a

continuing relation retaliating against coercion can reduce the likelihood of coercion in the future.

Assumption 8 specifies the value function, taken from Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) prospect theory, which

describes how actors evaluate gains and losses (both actual and

anticipated)8 under conditions of risk and uncertainty. The first two properties of this value function are already

implied, respectively, by contemporary definitions of reward and punishment and by the second scope condition

(declining marginal utility) of exchange theory. The third property, loss aversion, is new and important, and its

validity is supported by numerous studies (Fishburne and Kochenberger 1979; Gray and Tallman 1987;

Hershey and Shoemaker 1980; Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 1984; Molm 1991). Researchers typically have



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reported coefficients of loss aversion in the range of 2 to 2.5, indicating that the slope of the value function for

losses is roughly twice the slope for gains over the same range (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1991; Tversky

and Kahneman 1991). In contrast, most exchange theories implicitly assume that rewards and costs carry equal

weight. The assumption that they do not has important implications for understanding the use and effects of

coercive power.

The Status Quo BiasWhen actions can produce either gains or losses and the probabilities of both outcomes are either unknown or

equal, loss aversion produces a phenomenon known as the status quo bias (Kahneman and Tversky 1984),

applied here to strategic power use:

Theorem 4. When the potential losses from retaliation are roughly equal to the potential gains from compliance,

strategic power use is unlikely. Actors will accept the status quo of a relation rather than risk the consequences

of using power to change it.

Empirically, choices favoring the status quo tend to dominate decision-making under uncertainty (Samuelson

and Zeckhauser 1988). As long as actors stand to lose as much as they might gain and both outcomes are

uncertain (Assumption 7), the subjective overweighting of losses relative to gains (Assumption 8c) will constrain

the strategic use of either reward power or coercive power in social exchange relations. Thus, loss averse

actors will opt for the certainty of the status quo, accepting their current position in a relation rather than risking

the use of power to improve their outcomes. As potential gains increase and potential losses decrease, the

status quo bias should decrease and the use of coercion should increase. Potential gains and losses will vary

with the structure of power and dependence.

Dependence, Risk, and Coercion

Actors' dependencies affect the probability that they will initiate coercion, the probability that their partners will

respond with compliance or retaliation, and the magnitude of gains and losses attached to these alternative

outcomes. Actors' relative dependencies-- their positions of power advantage or disadvantage--influence both

the probability of coercion and the probability of retaliation against coercion.

Theorem 5. The probability that B will initiate a coercive-power strategy to influence A increases as B's reward-

power disadvantage in the relation increases.

This theorem follows directly from Theorem 3 and Assumption 5. Reward-power disadvantage provides the

motivation to use coercion to improve one's outcomes from exchange. A structural imbalance in reward power

reduces the advantaged partner's reward frequency, which in turn motivates the disadvantaged actor to try to

change that behavior and increase rewards from the partner. In contrast, actors who are advantaged on reward

power have little need to use coercion to get what they want.

The notion that a disadvantage on reward power produces the incentive to use coercion appears contrary to

traditional assumptions that it is the "strong" who coerce the "weak." Legitimated and institutionalized forms ofcoercion are, of course, typically used by powerful actors such as the state. But results from both experimental

and nonexperimental studies suggest that noninstitutionalized forms of coercion are more common among

actors who are disadvantaged on reward power and who lack other means of influencing those on whom they

depend for rewards (e.g., low-level managers, low-status spouses, minority political factions, and children)

(Kanter 1977; Molm 1990; Patterson 1982; Raush et al. 1974; Stets 1995).

Power advantage or disadvantage not only affects the probability that B will use coercion against A, it also

affects the probability that A will retaliate. Power-advantaged actors gain more by retaliating and lose more by

complying than do power-disadvantaged actors. Consequently, the probability that a partner will retaliate should

increase with that partner's power advantage:

Theorem 6. The probability that A retaliates rather than complies in response to B's use of coercion against A

increases with A's power advantage in the relation.

Theorem 6 applies to both bases of power: A partner who is advantaged on either reward power or coercive



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power is more likely to retaliate. A partner who controls rewarding outcomes can retaliate by withholding those

rewards; a partner who controls punishing outcomes can retaliate by administering punishment. A partner who

controls both can do either.9

Together, Theorems 5 and 6 imply the same result as Theorem 4: a bias against the use of coercive power, and

in favor of the status quo. A coercive-power advantage reduces the risk of retaliation against the coercer

(Theorem 6) but provides no incentive to use coercion. A reward-power disadvantage provides the incentive touse coercion (Theorem 5) but also increases the risk that the partner will retaliate by decreasing rewards rather

9 The relation between coercive power and risk of retaliation also underlies theories of deterrence, which

propose that the risk of retaliation keeps actors from using punishment when they have equal power to punish

each other (Morgan 1977; Schelling 1960). Lawler's (1986, 1992) extension of deterrence theory, however,

suggests the deterrence effect begins to erode when power is unequal.

than increasing them (Theorem 6). For example, the family that coerced the workaholic spouse to spend more

time at home might, instead, have provoked the workaholic to spend even less time.

This, then, is the dilemma that constrains the use of coercive power in exchange relations: Actors who have the

incentive to use coercive strategies are often too dependent on their partners to risk doing so. As Blalock (1987)

observed, "... substantial degrees of dependence will lead to both a high level of motivation to employ negative

sanctions to the other party and high potential costs of such actions." He suggested that reward-power

disadvantage increases the risk of retaliation, in general, but also noted, "Where exchanges of positively valued

goods accompany the punitive actions, the more dependent party is especially vulnerable to a cutoff of the

exchange relation altogether" (p. 13).

This conflict between incentive and risk exists only for coercive power. For reward power, the condition that

increases the incen

tive to use power--reward-power advantage--simultaneously reduces the risk of the partner's retaliation.

Consequently, whether the use of reward power is strategic or structurally induced, it should increase with

reward-power advantage. For this reason, researchers studying reward-based networks have rarely analyzed

how risk affects actors' decisions to use power (for an exception, see Kollock 1994).

To the extent that actors anticipate retaliation, the risk of reward loss can prevent them from initiating coercion.

If they do initiate it, their reward-power disadvantage increases the chance of retaliation, regardless of their

relative coercive power. Most actors initially do retaliate against a partner's punishment (Lawler and Bacharach

1987; Molm 1990), even though such responses are often shortlived (Molm 1994).

For actors who are uncertain how their partners will respond to coercion and who adapt their strategies to their

partners' behaviors over time (Assumption 6), initial retaliation is likely to suppress further coercion. Like all

behavioral contingencies, coercive strategies take time to work, and to be effective they must be applied

consistently over repeated interactions. But in theface of immediate retaliation, loss-averse actors are unlikely to persist with strategies whose long-term

consequences are uncertain. Thus, retaliation is not an irrational response. If swift retaliation can suppress

another actor's attempts to coerce, the costs of both continued coercion and compliance can be avoided.

Reducing risks and increasing incentives.

While actors' relative positions of power affect the probabilities that one actor will initiate coercion and the other

will either comply or retaliate, their absolute dependencies (i.e., A's dependence on B and B's dependence on

A) affect how much the coercive actor stands to gain or lose from the partner's compliance or retaliation.

Analyzing these dependencies reveals that under some conditions the actual cost of retaliation can be low

enough to encourage coercion, even when the probability of retaliation is high.

Assume that B's disadvantage on reward power provides the incentive for B to coerce A. B's reward

dependence on A determines the range of potential outcomes that A can produce for B by either increasing or

decreasing the frequency of A's rewarding. This range represents the rewards at stake for B.



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If B's reward dependence is high, changes in A's behavior (for better or worse) can affect B's rewards

substantially. If B's reward dependence is lower, increases or decreases in A's rewarding matter less.

Within this range, the actual rewards A provides for B constitute B's current outcome level. Holding B's

dependence on A constant, according to Theorem 1 this outcome level should increase with A's dependence on

B (i.e., the greater A's dependence on B, the more frequently A should reward B). By Assumption 8a, increases

in this outcome level count as potential gains for B, and decreases are potential losses. Consequently, potentialgains increase and potential losses decrease as A's dependence on B (and the frequency of A's rewarding)

decrease. When the frequency of A's rewarding becomes low enough that potential gains outweigh potential

losses (taking loss aversion into account), coercion should increase:

Theorem 7. The positive effect of rewardpower disadvantage on both the incentive to use coercive power

(Theorem 5)

and the risk of retaliation (Theorem 6) will constrain B's use of coercion against A unless the proportion, p, of

opportunities on which A rewards B, multiplied by the coefficient for loss aversion, c, is less than I - p: pc


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used in previous experiments in this program: Each actor could exchange with two of the three other actors in

the network; thus, each actor had two alternative partners (see Figure 1). Subjects could act toward only one

partner on each exchange opportunity.

Each actor in the network could perform behaviors to produce monetary gains (reward power) or monetary

losses (coercive power) for each partner. Thus, subjects were mutually dependent on one another for their

earnings in the experiment; they gained or lost money solely as a result of the other subjects' behaviors. Thisbehavioral capacity to affect

another's earnings--not money per se--was the exchange resource in the experiment. In contrast to economic

exchange, money was not transferred from one actor to another-- adding to another actor's earnings did not

reduce a subject's own earnings, and subtracting from another actor's earnings did not increase the subject's

own earnings. The only cost of initiating an exchange was the "opportunity cost" of not exchanging with the

alternative partner. To assure that money was valued, subjects were recruited on the basis of their desire to

earn money and instructed that their only concern should be maximizing their own earnings. Other potentially

valued outcomes were removed from the experimental setting (i.e., subjects were seated in isolated rooms and

interacted with each other only through computers).11

An "earnings schedule" displayed at the top of each subject's computer screen informed subjects of the

amounts of money (in points, one point equalled one cent) that they and their two partners could gain or lose

from each other on each exchange opportunity. (These point values are displayed in Figure 1.) The points that

each actor could either add or subtract were fixed by the experimental condition; subjects could vary how much

value they added to or subtracted from a partner's earnings only by varying the frequencies of their rewarding or

punishing behaviors.

Subjects engaged in reciprocal (nonnegotiated) exchanges for 250 exchange opportunities. On each

opportunity, all actors simultaneously chose (1) which of their two potential partners they would act toward, and

(2) whether to add to or subtract from the earnings of that partner. In effect, these two choices gave each

subject four behavioral options. Because each side of the exchange was individually performed, subjects could

gain (or lose) money from one, both, or neither of their partners on each opportunity. The potential for obtaining

rewards from both partners at the same time in reciprocal exchanges makes an asymmetrical exchange of

rewards beneficial to the actor who exchanges less often.



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After all subjects made their choices on each opportunity, they were reminded on the screen of their own

choices and informed of their partners' choices (they were told that each partner added n points to their

earnings, subtracted n points from their earnings, or did not act toward them). Their own point totals changed to

reflect any gains or losses; their partners' total points were not shown.

The Manipulation of RiskThe experiment manipulated the risk of power use within a basic network structure in which actors B and D

were highly dependent on A and C respectively for rewards, reward power was imbalanced in the A-B and C-D

relations in favor of A and C, and coercive power was imbalanced in these relations in favor of B and D (see

Figure 1). That is, in all four conditions, B and D could potentially gain more from A and C (8 points per

opportunity) than from each other, but A and C

could gain more from each other (6 points) than from B and D. B and D's greater dependence on A and C for

rewards gave A and C a reward power advantage over B and D. The opposite was true of coercive power: B

and D could inflict greater losses on A and C (a loss of 8 points) than A and C could inflict on each other, but

they could potentially lose more from each other (6 points) than from A and C.This basic structure provided both the incentive (reward-power disadvantage) and the capacity (coercive-power

advantage) for B and D to use coercion to obtain increased rewards from A and C. Within this structure, I

manipulated the risks that B and D incurred if they did so, (1) from their partners' retaliatory punishment, and (2)

from their partners' reduction of the rewards on which B and D are highly dependent.

I manipulated the risk of retaliatory punishment by varying A and C's capacity to punish B and D. This risk is

present and moderate in the networks in Figures la and

1b, in which A and C have moderate coercive power over B and D (A and C control 4/10 of B and D's potential

losses), and absent in the networks in Figures lc and ld, in which A and C's coercive power over B and D, and

hence the risk of their retaliatory punishment, is reduced to zero. By Theorem 8, eliminating A and C's power to

punish B and D should increase B and D's use of coercion.

As the theoretical analysis indicated, the reward-power disadvantage that provides B and D with the incentive to

coerce rewards from A and C can also constrain coercion. To reduce potential losses and increase potential



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gains, I reduced A and C's reward dependence on B and D (which, in turn, should reduce the frequency of their

respective rewards to B and D). In the networks in Figures la and lc, A and C's reward dependence is moderate

(B and D control 4/10 of A and C's potential gains); in Figures lb and ld, their reward dependence is reduced to

zero (B and D have no reward power over A and C). When A and C's reward dependence is zero, the frequency

of their rewards to B and D should be minimal, and B and D's potential losses from a reduction in the frequency

of those rewards should be lower than their potential gains. Consequently, by Theorem 7, B and D's use ofcoercion should increase.

When actors had no capacity to reward or punish another actor, they could still choose the option of adding or

subtracting zero points. The instructions informed subjects that choosing to add or subtract zero points was

equivalent to not acting toward that partner and would be displayed as such on the other's screen. Thus, such

choices carried no symbolic value and gave subjects a "no action" option; coercion was always voluntary.

Previous experiments in this program studied networks like the one in Figure la, in which both sources of risk

are present. In this structure the low use of coercion has been particularly puzzling because actors B and D

have both the incentive and the capacity to coerce, and their risk of punitive retaliation is reduced (but not

eliminated) by B and D's punishment advantage. Because reward-advantaged actors typically reward their

disadvantaged partners about 35 percent of the time in this and similar networks (Molm 1990), however, the

potential loss from A and C's withholding of rewards, weighted by loss aversion, is higher than the potential gain

from an increase in A and C's reward frequency. This is true even if we generously assume that compliance is

as likely as retaliation and ignore the additional loss that might result from A and C's retaliatory punishment.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is the average frequency with which B and D use their coercive power. I divided the

frequency of each actor's punishing behavior toward the focal partner (A or C) by the number of exchange

opportunities (250), thus standardizing the measure to vary from 0 to 1. I then averaged the standardized

frequencies of B's punishment of A and D's punishment of C to create a single measure of their use of

punishment.

Hypotheses

The experiment tests two hypotheses:

H^sub 1^: B and D will punish A and C more frequently when the risk of reward loss is low than when it is

moderate.

H^sub 2^: B and D will punish A and C more frequently when the risk of retaliatory punishment is zero than

when it is moderate.

Results



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Table 1 shows the mean use of punishment in the four experimental conditions. A twoway analysis of variance

on these means found a strong and significant effect of the risk of reward loss (F^sub 1,36 = 19.77, p


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reward frequency to zero, but it did re

duce it enough (from .39 to .23, based on means during the first 100 trials) that B and D's potential losses from

a decrease in A and C's rewarding were well below B and D's potential gains from an increase in their

rewarding, even with losses weighted for loss aversion.

While removing the risk of retaliatory punishment had little effect by itself, it enhanced the effects of reducing the

risk of reward loss over time. Reducing the risks of both retaliatory punishment and reward loss produced thehighest frequency of punishment, increased (rather than decreased) punishment over time, and increased the

reward frequency of the target of coercion over time. No other condition produced all of these effects. Note,

however, that reducing both sources of risk--by removing A and C's coercive power, and B and D's reward

power-- created a structure of pure coercion (Willer and Anderson 1981 ) in which neither mutual reward

exchange nor mutual punishment was possible. In the structures that are the focus of this research program

(i.e., networks in which actors can engage in the mutual exchange of both rewards and punishments), risk

constrains the use of coercion.

The lack of an overall effect of the risk of punitive retaliation is surprising in some respects, but supports results

of earlier experiments in this program. Molm, Quist, and

Wiseley (1994) found that the structure of only reward power, not coercive power, affected subjects' tendencies

to retaliate against a programmed partner's use of coercion. Reward-power-advantaged actors were more likely

to retaliate, using both reward reduction and retaliatory punishment, regardless of their relative coercive power.

The interaction between the two sources of risk and trial block suggests that reward loss and retaliatory

punishment may affect the use of coercion at different times. Because insufficient rewards from a partner

motivate coercion in the first place, the prospect of changes in those rewards, for better or worse, may be the

only salient factor in the initial decision to use coercion. Once coercion is initiated, its actual consequences,

including punitive retaliation, determine its subsequent use.

EXPERIMENT 2:



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THE EFFECTS OF COERCIVE POWER UNDER LOW RISK

Experiment 1 showed that reducing risk, particularly the risk of reward loss relative to reward gain, increases the

use of coercion. It could not examine, however, how increased use of coercion affects the impact of structural

variations in coercive power. Apart from the manipulation of risk, the absolute or relative strength of coercive

power remained stable. Experiment 2 was designed to address that question.

Experiment 2 tested how a target of power use responds to varying levels of reward power and coercive power

when the risks of using both bases of power are equivalent for the user. With risk reduced and punishment

increased, the effects of coercive power should also increase. Actors with relatively greater coercive power

should be more successful than relatively weaker actors at increasing their partners' reward frequency.

Design

Because reducing the risk of reward loss leaves actors with only coercive power over their partners, this

experiment cannot compare the effects of reward power and coercive power in networks in which all actors

have both. Instead, I compared the effects of the two bases of power when each is an actor's sole power source

by placing an actor with only coercive power (B) and an actor with only reward power (C) in direct competition

with each other for exchange with a third actor, A, who has only reward power (Figure 3). (The fourth actor in

the network, D, provides an alternative for B and C, but D offers only minimal rewards and thus D's behavior is

not of interest.)

In all conditions, both B and C are highly and equally dependent on A for rewards; both actors have a strong

(and equal) incentive to secure A's rewards through strategic power use. And, in all conditions, both sources of

risk for B's use of coercion are equal to those in the lowest risk condition of Experiment I (i.e., Figure ld). A has

no power to punish and no reward dependence on B. Thus, both the incentive to use power and the risks of

power use are equal for both reward power and coercive power, and both bases of power must be used

strategically.

The completely randomized design compares three conditions that vary B's power

over A relative to C's power over A: (1) B with lower power than C (low coercive, high reward power, Figure 3a)(2) B and C with equal power (Figure 3b), and (3) B with greater power than C (high coercive, low reward

power, Figure 3c). Subjects exchanged for 200 opportunities.

The main dependent variable is the relative frequency with which A rewards B, computed by dividing the

frequency of A's rewards to B by the total frequency with which A rewards both B and C.

Hypotheses

Initially, A should prefer to exchange with C, the actor with the power to reward A, in all conditions. But over

time, if B punishes A when A fails to reward B, A's rewards to B should increase in proportion to B's relative

power over A. The initial effects of the base of power that B and C control should disappear; only their relative

power should matter.

H1: The relative frequency with which A rewards B rather than C will vary directly with B's relative power over A.

H2: Support for Hypothesis 1 will increase over time.



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H3: By the last 50 opportunities, the frequency of A's rewards to B when B's coercive power is high and C's

reward power is low will equal the frequency of A's rewards to C when C's reward power is high and B's

coercive power is low.

As Figure 4b shows, in the first trial block the frequency with which B punished A did not vary by condition. But

in successive trial blocks, the three conditions diverge as actors with low coercive power punish more frequently

in response to declining rewards from A, while actors with high coercive power decrease their punishment asA's rewards increase. A comparison of Figures 4a and 4b shows that the timing of these increases and

decreases in B's punishment of A corresponds closely with changes in the relative frequency of A's rewards to

B. Thus, in the high-coercive-power condition, when A's rewarding increases sharply in the third trial block, B's

punishment also declines markedly. And, in the low-coercive-power condition, the decrease in A's rewarding in

the second trial block prompts an increase in B's punishment. When increased use of punishment fails to

compensate for B's weak coercive power, however, B's punishment again declines, although it remains

substantially higher in the low-coercive-power condition than in the high-coercive-power condition.



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The contingency of punishment. These results show, as predicted, that coercive power is more effective when

used more frequently. But frequency per se is a poor measure of coercion. To use punishment to coerce re

wards, actors must make their punishment contingent on the partner's failure to reward.



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To examine whether the effectiveness of B's coercive power did result from an increase in contingent

punishment (as the patterns in Figure 4 suggest), rather than random, or noncontingent, punishment, I

regressed the relative frequency with which A rewarded B in the last 50-trial block on measures of the frequency

and the contingency with which B punished A during the entire

200 trials. The effects of the frequency and contingency of B's punishment were estimated after controlling for

the effects of the experimental manipulation of coercive power and reward power (represented by two

dichotomous variables). I computed the contingency of B's punishment on A's nonrewarding by the difference

between two conditional probabilities:

the conditional probability of punishment from B (P^sub B) given no rewards from A ( R^sub A^) on the previous

opportunity, minus the conditional probability of punishment from B (P^sub B^) given prior rewards from A

(R^sub A^). Overall, the mean contingency of B's punishing A was .33, and this mean did not vary by power

condition.



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The results, summarized in Table 2, show the strong effects of coercive and contingent punishment. Not only

does the contingency of B's punishment have an independent effect on the distribution of A's rewards, but the

contingency of B's punishment is the strongest predictor of the relative frequency of rewards from A. The

greater the contingency of B's punishment on A's nonrewarding, the more likely A was to reward B rather than

C. With contingency controlled, the frequency of punishment has a negative effect on A's rewarding, as would

be expected.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

I have examined how risk of retaliation and fear of loss constrain the strategic use of coercive power in social

exchange relations. Theories of choice in situations involving risk and uncertainty, particularly Axelrod's (1984,

1986) evolutionary theory and Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) prospect theory,

help explain why actors rarely use coercive power, even when their incentives and capacities to coerce are

high. Power use is risky (i.e., it may produce either gains or losses), and actors fear loss far more than they

value gain. Consequently, actors in imbalanced exchange relations will accept insufficient and unequal rewards

rather than risk the consequences of using their power, and they will reduce their use of power strategies that

produce immediate retaliation, sometimes at the cost of long-term gains.

In general, a structural advantage on either reward power or coercive power reduces risk by reducing losses

from retaliation by partners holding that same base of power. Thus, actors with greater coercive power face less

risk of loss from another's punitive retaliation, and actors with greater reward power face less risk from the

other's reward withholding. But because the incentive to use coercion comes not from the power to coerce but

from dependence on another for rewards, coercion is still risky, even for actors who are advantaged on coercive

power. Reward dependence creates the desire to make the partner give more, but it also creates the fear that pressuring for more will lead to losing what the partner is currently

giving. This conflict between potential gain and potential loss constrains coercion until the partner's reward



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frequency is low enough that potential losses from the partner's reward withholding, even when weighted by

loss aversion, are lower than potential gains.

The results of both the theoretical analysis and Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that actors are more likely to use

coercion in purely coercive structures, or at least in relations in which one actor's reward dependence is too low

for that actor to benefit from exchange. In purely coercive structures, there is no mutual reward exchange to risk

losing. These forms of coercion, while highly visible (master and slave, mugger and victim, torturer andprisoner), are relatively rare. My interest throughout this research program has been, instead, in the use and

effects of coercive power in relations of social exchange in which both actors are dependent on each other for

rewards. This analysis suggests that if the average reward power of the actors is high enough to sustain a

mutually beneficial exchange relation (albeit an unequal one),

then the risk of losing a partner's rewards, however insufficient and unequal those rewards might be, is likely to

be great enough to keep coercion relatively low and, consequently, relatively ineffective.

There are two interesting ironies to this analysis. First, the same principle that should make coercive power

highly potent when it is used--the preference for minimizing loss over maximizing gain--instead actually

constrains its use. Loss aversion can prevent an actor from punishing a negligent business partner, for

example, even though the partner's same aversion to loss should increase the effectiveness of punishment. As

previous experiments have shown, coercive power applied contingently and consistently is highly effective in

increasing rewards from a partner, even when the partner's coercive power is equal (Molm 1994).

A second irony is that the structural conditions that encourage the use of coercion by

reducing risk should decrease its effectiveness. Actors are more likely to sanction an exchange partner who

rarely rewards them than one who rewards them more frequently, but their chances of successfully coercing

such an uninterested partner are also less. In general, the lower a partner's reward dependence (and the more

infrequent the partner's rewarding), the more likely and the less successful coercion becomes. Coercion can be

effective even under these conditions, as Experiment 2 demonstrated, but the coercer must rely solely on the

threat of punishment to maintain the other's rewarding rather than use coercion as a tool to establish a rate of

reward exchange that is more favorable to the coercer. Punishment is far more effective when combined with

rewards (e.g., punishing low levels of exchange but rewarding high levels) and when used in a structure in

which actors' joint dependence, or average power, is high enough that both can benefit from the relation (Molm

1994; Van Houten 1983).

While this analysis implies that coercion will be used only sporadically in relations of

mutual reward dependence, there are some conditions under which its use, even in these relations, should

increase. First, coercion should be more likely when either norms or lack of alternatives constrain a partner from

withdrawing from the relation, thus reducing the risk of reward loss. (The partner's fre

quency of rewarding could still decline, of course.) In long-term or committed relations, various combinations ofsocial norms, contractual obligations, and restricted alternatives tend to keep people in relations such as

marriages, friendships, and business or political partnerships. The reduced risk of losing a valued exchange

relation in a contractual relationship such as marriage may be one reason why researchers have found that

punitive and coercive behavior is more common among family members than among strangers or casual

acquaintances (Birchler, Weiss, and Vincent 1975; Halverson and Waldrop 1970; Winter, Ferreira, and Bowers

1973).

Second, a decline in a partner's reward dependence and reward frequency can prompt coercive tactics. When

mutual reward dependence is relatively high, as it must be when relations are first established, coercion is

unlikely. But over time, actors' dependencies on one another can decline, and they often decline unequally. As

a result, it is not un

common to see coercive tactics employed by workers who are about to be laid off, individuals whose marriage

partners have ceased to care for them, or political factions that have lost their clout with mainstream parties.



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When a decline in mutual dependence and an increase in power imbalance are combined with barriers to

dissolving relations, coercion should be particularly likely to increase.

Third, although I have argued that coercion is most beneficial for those actors disadvantaged on reward power,

there may be some conditions under which advantaged actors, who have less to lose from the partner's reward

withdrawal, can also benefit from coercion and will be more likely to use it. One condition is when an actor has

much stronger coercive power than reward power; a second is when reward exchange entails substantial costs, over and above opportunity costs. Under these

conditions, coercion may be more effective and less costly than reward exchange, even asymmetrical

exchange. Both conditions exist, for example, in the case of slavery: The coercive power of slaveholders

typically exceeds their power in the economic marketplace; and paying workers involves real costs. When these

conditions exist, actors are likely to replace reward exchange with coerced exchange (as we see in the example

of slavery), or at least to reduce

their rewarding below the level that would be necessary to maintain the partner's rewards without coercion.

Thus, in some cases, the use of reward power may depend on the structure of coercive power, just as the use

of coercive power depends on the structure of reward power.

These considerations suggest several directions for further research, such as how coercion is affected by

barriers to leaving relations, changes in reward dependencies, or variations in the costs of exchange. Studies of

such effects should benefit from the analysis of risk introduced in this study. As I have shown, the use of

coercive power cannot be predicted from the structure of coercive power alone. Incorporating coercion within

the framework of social exchange theory requires considering the risk of power use, the dynamic effects of

changing reward levels in relations, and interactions between reward power and coercive power.

Footnote* Direct correspondence to Linda D. Molm, Department of Sociology, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721

([email protected]). This work was supported by two grants from the National Science Foundation (SES-

8921431 and SES-9210399). I thank Phillip Wiseley, Theron Quist, David Richmond, Angelina Quesada, Anne

Lane, Lisa O'Laughlin, and Lawrence Ducchesi for their assistance in conducting the research, and the ASR

Editors and anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.

Footnote1 Studies of bargaining relations also report noncomparable effects of reward power and coercive power on

concession behavior (Bacharach and Lawler 1981; Lawler and Bacharach 1987).

Footnote2 The scope conditions of a theory describe the set of conditions under which the theory is assumed to hold;

power-dependence theory is restricted to social interaction that meets these four scope conditions.

Footnote3 Theorists have recently developed several formal models based on power-dependence or alternative theories

that predict exact distributions of exchange benefits in imbalanced relations under certain conditions of

negotiated exchange (see Social Networks, vol. 14, June 1992).

Footnote4 Some theorists include other elements in their definitions of coercion. Many political theorists restrict coercion

to the threat or use of severe deprivation, physical violence, or loss of life (Bachrach and Baratz 1963; Bierstedt

1950; Dahl 1957). Some also specify that coercion must entail restriction of freedom (Bierstedt 1950; Etzioni

1968). And some define coercion only as threatened sanctions, arguing that if the threat is carried out, coercion

has failed (Bachrach and Baratz 1963; Willer and Markovsky 1993). Because my aim is to compare structures

of reward and punishment power that differ only on whether the sanction is positive or negative, 1 exclude these

additional stipulations. Threat is an essential element in "one-shot" coercive transactions, but not in repeated

exchanges between the same actors. Instead, the contingency of punishment on nonreward gradually induces



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compliance over time.

Footnote5 Unlike an exchange of material goods (e.g., money for food), performing a behavior that produces valued

outcomes for another (e.g., commenting on a colleague's paper or visiting a sick friend) involves no actual

transfer of resources, does not deplete the actor's supply of resources, and primarily entails opportunity costs.

To simplify the analysis, I further assume that enacting such behaviors involves only opportunity costs (othercosts might include fatigue, effort, investment costs, etc.).

Footnote6 While coercive strategies are typically purposive attempts to increase the partner's rewarding, they are

sometimes shaped without awareness. Some punitive behaviors, for example, are initially elicited by emotions

and then maintained by the rewards they produce. This seems to explain the rapid development of coercive

strategies employed by young children, who quickly learn to cry, whine, or throw tantrums to increase attention

from adults (Patterson 1982).

Footnote7 This principle is shared, more generally, by all theories that posit some process of value adaptation. In

particular, see Thibaut and Kelley's (1959) analysis of the comparison level (CL) of exchange relations.

Footnote8 Although the value function was originally drawn to account for patterns of decision-making about future

events, Tversky and Kahneman (1991) suggest it is equally valid for describing reactions to past experience. My

research on subjects' affective responses to their exchange partners' behavior supports this view. I measured

affect by a scale comprised of five semantic-differential items. Averaged across different power positions, I

found that the negative affect produced by one unit of punishment from an exchange partner was 2.3 times

stronger than the positive affect produced by an equivalent unit of reward (Molm 1991).

Footnote10 Gender effects were not of theoretical interest in this study; gender was included as a block variable solely

for control purposes. Preliminary data analyses found no effects of gender, and gender is omitted from the

analyses reported here.

Footnote11 The exchange of "money for money" is, of course, descriptively unlike exchanges in natural

Footnotesettings, whether these involve exchanges of similar benefits (e.g., friendship for friendship) or different benefits

(e.g., advice for approval). Because exchange theory assumes that the domain of value does not affect

theoretical predictions (i.e., actors behave in similar ways to obtain the outcomes they value, whether those

outcomes are money or approval or something else), what isFootnoteimportant for testing the theory is assuring that the benefits used in the exchange are valued by the subjects.

Exchange researchers typically meet this assumption by using money as the exchange benefit in experiments

and recruiting subjects on the basis of their desire to earn money. In this study, the use of money also makes it

possible to create parallel forms of reward and punishment by operationalizing these concepts as gains and

losses of the same valued outcome. Earnings in the experiment averaged $15 for a two-hour session. Subjects

were guaranteed a minimum of $6 and could earn a maximum of $25 in some positions of some networks.

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Allyn and Bacon.AuthorAffiliationLinda D. Molm is Professor of Sociology at the University of Arizona. Her primary research interest is the

experimental analysis of theories of social exchange and power. Her recent book, Coercive Power in Social

Exchange (Cambridge University Press, 1997), summarizes her decadelong study of coercive power. She is

now engaged in a project comparing reciprocal and negotiated forms of exchange. She is co-editor (with Lynn

Smith-Lovin) of Social Psychology Quarterly.

Subject: Risk; Sociology; Power;Publication title:American Sociological Review

Volume: 62

Issue: 1



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Pages: 113-133

Number of pages: 21

Publication year: 1997

Publication date: Feb 1997

Year: 1997Publisher:American Sociological Association

Place of publication:Albany

Country of publication: United States

Publication subject: Psychology, Sociology, Population Studies, Social Sciences: Comprehensive Works

ISSN: 00031224

CODEN:ASREAL

Source type: Scholarly JournalsLanguage of publication: English

Document type: Feature

Accession number: 03161444

ProQuest document ID: 218821543

Document URL: http://search.proquest.com/docview/218821543?accountid=15859

Copyright: Copyright American Sociological Association Feb 1997

Last updated: 2012-07-24Database: ProQuest Central

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BibliographyCitation style: APA 6th - American Psychological Association, 6th Edition

Molm, L. D. (1997). Risk and power use: Constraints on the use of coercion in exchange. American Sociological

Review, 62(1), 113-133. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/218821543?accountid=15859

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