armor september october 1984 web

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United States Army Armor School

“To disseminate knowledge of the military arts and sciences,

with special attention to mobility in ground warfare, to promote

professional improvement of the Armor Community, and to

preserve and foster the spirit, the traditions, and the solidarity of

Armor in the Army of the United States.”

Commandant

MG FREDERIC J . BROWN

Assistant Commandant

BG GORDONR. SULLIVAN

Deputy Assistant Commandant

COLMICHAEL H. CRUMLEY

Chief of Staff

COL RALPHR. WOLFE

Command Sergeant Major

CSM J OHN M. STEPHENS

INSTRUCTIONALDEPARTMENTS

Maintenance

COL G.L. THOMAS

Command and Staff

COL J AMES M. LYLE

Weapons

COL DAVID V. HARBACH

Committee Group

COL BOBBY J . CARTER

NCO Academy/

Drill Sergeant SchoolSGM DONALD H. DEVINE

DlRECTORAlES

Evaluation and Standardization

LTC (P I J OHN C. THOMPSON

Training and Doctrine

COL DUDLEYM.ANDRES

Combat Developments

COL ROBERTW. DeMONT

UNITS

Center/School Brigade

COL WILLIAM M. BOICE

1st Armor Training Brigade

COL ROBERTL. PHILLIPS

4th Training Brigade

COL WILLIAM M. MATZ, J R.

194th Armored Brigade

COL PAUL E. FUNK



M M O R T h e agazine ofMobile W,

Edi or-i n-C h ef

MAJ (PI CHARLES R. STEINER, JR.

Managing Editor

JON T. CLEMENS

Assistant Editor

ROBERT E. ROGGE

Administrative Assistant

VIVIAN THOMPSON

ARMOR magazine(ISSN0004-2420) ispublished bimonthly by the US. ArmyArmor Center, 4401 Vine Grove Road,Fort Knox, Kentucky 401 21. Unlessotherwise stated, material does notrepresent policy, thinking, or endorse-ment by any agency of the U.S. Army.Use of appropriated funds for printing ofthis publication was approved by theDepartment of the Army 6 J anuary 1984.ARMOR is not a copyrighted publicationbut may contain some articles whichhave been copyrighted by individualauthors. Material which is not under co-pyright may be reprinted if credit is givento ARMORand the author.

Permission to reprint copyrighted mater-ial must be obtained from the author.

SUBSCRIPTION RATES: Individualsubscriptions to ARMORare availablethrough the U.S. Armor Association, PostOffice Box 607, Fort Knox.Kentucky 401 21. Telephone (502) 942-8624.Domestic:$15.00one year, $26.00 twoyears, $37.00three years. Foreign:$22.00 one year, $35.00two years. Sin-gle copies, $2.00.

CORRESPONDENCE:Address all cor-respondence to US. Army Armor Center,ATTN: ATSB-DOTD-MAG, Fort Knox,

Kentucky, 401 21. (Telephone:AUTOVON 464-224912610or commer-cia1 (502) 624-2249/2610.)

SECOND class postage paid at FortKnox, Kentucky and additional mailingoff ce.

ARMORmay be forwarded to militarypersonnel whose change of address iscaused by official orders (except at APOaddresses) without paymentof addition-al postage. The subscriber must notifythe postmaster.USPS 467-970

September-October 1984 Vol XClll No.5

FEATURES

10

13

18

21

24

30

33

37

40

Cavalry Action in Central Americaby Lieutenant Colonel Sewall Menzel and

Colonel William Said, Honduran Army

Soviet Enveloping Detachments

by Captain Gilbert0 Villahermosa

lnteroperability in NATO

by Captain Ronald M. Schrock, J r.

Killer Tank Crews

by Lieutenant Colonel J ames Crowley

COBRA: The Normandy Breakout

by Captain Stephen Borows

Thoughts on Counterattacks

by Captain WilliamD. Hewitt

New Roles for Combat Motorcycles

by First Lieutenant Patrick M. Marr and

CW3 Daniel Kingsley

Role of the Fourth Company

by First Lieutenant Ralph Peters

Dauntless Trains for War

by Lieutenant Colonel A.J . Bergeron and

Captain J osephS . Purser

DEPARTMENTS

2 Letters 43 Professional Thoughts

4 Commander’s Hatch 48 Recognition Quiz Answers

6 Driver’s Seat 49 Regimental Review

8 Master Gunner’s Corner 52 Books9 Recognition Quiz 53 Steel on Target

COVERHemmed into a small beachhead for almost two months after

the Normandy landings, the Allies finally broke out in Operation

Cobra, a classic example of armor in exploitation. Captain Ste-

phen Borows recounts this exciting campaign of 40 years ago on

page 24.



Dear Sir,On your May-J une cover I saw an

M48A5 and when I opened the magazinewas shocked to see you call it anM60A7!

Maybe you guys need a refresher onvehicle iD. After a mistake like that, Iwonder about the validity of your “Rec-ognition Quiz.”

The cover raised two questions: Why

did only the TC have his protective maskon? (Maybe he was the only one who got

the word?) And secondly, since the194th Armored Brigade has M6O-seriesvehicles, who does the tank on the coverreally belong to?

MARKHOLLOWAYNational Training Center

Fort Irwin, CA

Dear Sir,Having just returned from our annual

training at Fort Drum, I was glad to seethe current ARMOR Magazine on my

desk, as I enjoy your entire magazine.The tank shown on the cover is anM48A5, our unit‘s assigned vehicle, buton the next page, you identify it as anM60A 7. .

GORDON GARDNERSSG, VTARNG

Bradford, VT

Dear Sir,I just read your latest issue of ARMOR

Magazine and hasten to point out thatyou would not pass the section of theTGST on vehicle recognition. The tank

featured on the cover of the May-J uneissue is an M48A5, not an M60A1, asstated inside. Perhaps you should fea-ture this tank, along with other (obscure)vehicles, in your Recognition Quiz.Shame, Shame!

J .H. BOWERMilford. NJ

(We have no excuse. . .The smoke onthe cover certainly wasn’t thick enough

to obscure that curving frontal plate,those distinctive fenders, that command-er’s station. We just plain looked too fast.

Sources at the 194th tell us they drewthe M48s at Fort Drum, rather than takingtheir M60swith them. Ed.)

MILESOff Target

Dear Sir,Although we really hate to nitpick, we

must comment on the cover photo of theMay-J une issue. (Yes, we noticed that

the tank is not an M60A7. but we’re sure

w’ve heard about that already!) We re-

.-r to the MILES (Multiple IntegratedLaser Engagement Simulation) equip-ment in use by the soldiers and on thevehicle.

Obviously, we don’t know the tacticalsituation under which the action is

occurring; however, we noted some dis-crepancies which would negativelyaffect the training value of the tacticalengagement simulation exercise.

First of all, the dismounted soldier inthe lower right corner has no helmet de-tector harness installed. This has theeffect of negating the “kill” effect ofincoming fire by the opposing force. Thisdefect should have been correctedimmediately by the exercise controller. Ifan operable helmet harness was not

available, the soldier should have beeneliminated from the exercise. (See

“Rules of Engagement” in any MILESField Controller‘s Guide)The tank and its crew are cheating

both themselves and the opposing force.The commander and leader (both of

whom are riding high on the turret) arenot wearing Man-Worn Laser Detectors

(which are supplied in MILES tank kits),and are thus “un-killable” by incomingfire. Again, this is a violation of theMILES

Rules of Engagement. Secondly, the tankcannot deliver effective machinegun fire

since neither M60D machinegun isequipped with a MlLES transmitter orblank adapter (the M279 coaxial ma-chinegun has no blank fire adapter

available: hence, it cannot be used to de-liver fire.) As shown, the tank can deliveronly main gun fire.

One of theMILES cables is hanging offthe side of the turret near the rangefinderbubble. This could easily be damaged. I tshould be secured to well-applied hook

fastener tape on the turret roof.

We do not mean to “come down hard”on the soldiers in the photo, or their lead-ers; again, we don’t know exactly what’sgoing on. However, by pointing out dis-crepancies, we hope to assist MILES

users in getting the most out of theirtactical engagement simulation training.

CHARLES R. SOUZA

SFC, USATCFort Eustis, VA

Rebuttal on “A New Concept”

Dear Sir,I was struck by the ironic contradiction

between the title and content of 1LT

J ohn J . McGrath’s “A New Concept forCombined Arms” in the ProfessionalThoughts department of the J anuary-February issue of ARMOR. The body of

1LT McGrath’s contribution advocates

nothing less than the de facto abandon-

ment of the combined arms concept atbattalion level and below.

1LT McGrath envisions a major role inthe modern battlefield for the pure infan-

try battalion. This newborn indepen-

dence of the infantry results directlyfrom the fielding of the Infantry FightingVehicle (IFV):“. .. he IFV gives properly-deployed mechanized infantry the capa-bility to fight the enemy toe-to-toe with-

out tanks.”While this might be mathematically

possible under ideal conditions, say,upon a properly configured classroomterrain board, it is clearly hardly applica-ble to the European sceanrio, where theterrain more often than not precludes fullexploitation of TOW capabilities. In themiddle range band (out to maybe 2,500meters), where one can reasonablyexpect the vast majority of targets to first

appear, the traditional dominance of themain battle tank (largely as a result of itsmuch greater volume of fire) remains

unchallenged by ground missile sys-tems. Indeed, the potency of the tank hasbeen, if anything, enhanced in this rangeband through the fielding of the latest

generation of main battle tanks featuringgreatly improved fire control and stabil-

ization systems, special armor arrays,and quantum improvement in cross-country sprint capability.

One would be foolish not to acknow-ledge that the mounting of the infantry inTOW-equipped vehicles gives them anenhanced antitank capability. 1 LT

McGrath errs greatly, however, in postu-lating a pure role for IFV-mounted infan-try. The ideal employment of the IFV is asan integral component of the combinedarms team/task force, where the

Bradley’s 25-mm cannon remedies along-standing inability to deal with light-armored targets, particularily the BMP

and variants, short of tank cannon fire.The IFV/MBT mix ideally weds the long-range, heavy antitank capability of theTOW with the intense volume of antiar-mor cannon fire, both 25- and 105-mm,critically necessary to “bust” a standardSoviet armored array at normal combatranges.

That the doctrine accompanying Divi-sion 86 states that companies will fightpure most of the time is not primarily re-sultant from a recognition of theenhanced capabilities of the latest gen-eration of combat vehicles. Rather, itstems primarily from the reorganizationof the battalion into smaller, more numer-ous companies, providing the battaliontask force commander more flexibility inemploying his companies than was pre-viously the case. An avenue of approachthat might formerly have been the sole

responsibility of a single cross-attachedcompany team is now more likely to bethe shared responsibility of two pure

companies, tank and infantry, operating

2 ARMOR September-October 1984



alongside one another. In this case, theindividual companies’ unity and camara-derie (by virtue of their organic employ-ment) would heighten their combat

effectiveness while the combined arms

effect of their mutual employment wouldbe retained- t battalion level. The doc-trine writers probably went too far in pos-

tulating that companies would fight pure“most of the time.” At the Armor School,

the doctrine is being more realisticallyinterpreted to mean that one does not

automatically cross-attach platoons. The“Catch-22” is that the cross-attachment

will often prove necessary despite itsinherent reduction of unit cohesion and

its logistic headaches. The general trendis toward somewhat less frequent cross-attachment of a more temporary dura-tion, thereby minimizing the logisticsproblems and capitalizing on unit cohe-sion whenever possible. The prescrip-tion for the maneuver force is clearly thedevelopment and adoption of Army-wideSOPS specifically governing combinedarms operations at the company and bat-

talion level.1LT McGrath would retain a trace ofcombined arms capability in his concep-tual tank battalion by trading the fourthtank company for a mech infantrycompany. The combined arms battaliondoes have attractive features, not theleast of which are its enhanced cohesion

and teamwork, the inherent product ofdaily contact and far more frequent com-bined arms training opportunities. Theconcept is, however, fundamentallyflawed in that it “fixes” the infantry/

armor ratio, robbing the maneuver com-mander of the flexibility to configure his

force in order to most effectively accom-plish his mission in light of prevailing

METT considerations. One can imagine afew situations in which a brigade com-mander might desire to employ a puretank battalion, and a great many situa-tions where the single organic mech

company would prove inadequate. Anarmy that expects to fight outnumbered

and win can afford neither to squanderscarce assets where they are unneedednor field battalions whose configurationlimits their tactical employment options.

A consideration of the more complex

supply, maintenance, personnel, andweapon systems training demands of theorganic combined arms battalion wasundoubtably a further’reason for its re-

jection by the Division 86 organizationwizards.

In 1LT McGrath’s writing, I sense a

more fundamentally disturbing notion -that armor and infantry perform separateand distinct functions on the battlefield,that each arm “does its thing” alone,their sum equating to success. Thebattlefield of tomorrow demands quitethe contrary. Victory there will demand afull exploitation of the AirLand BattleDoctrine and the enhanced capabilitiesof current and future weapon systems.Armor and infantry certainly have unique

strengths and weaknesses; success de-mands, however, a closer, more funda-mental interaction than ever before. The

infantry must free itself of the mindsetthat it exists solely to clear “tank-proof

terrain” (what’s that?), “take the highground,” and “dig in.” That is not to say

that these capabilities of the infantry arenot important, but rather that our visionof the next battlefield isofone character-ized by bold maneuver and frequentmeeting engagements, violent collisionsof rapidly moving armored forces. On

that battlefield the rapid and temporaryoccupation and exploitation of favorableterrain, coupled with the synergetic mas-

sing of the firepower of complementaryweapon systems, will yield victory.

Maneuver units employed in essentiallystatic roles, particularly those astride

obviously dominant terrain, will be locat-ed by increasingly sophisticated andaccurate stand-off target acquisitionsystems and either lamed or renderedcombat ineffective by increasingly morelethal area attack cluster munitions,scatterable mines, chemical munitions,or nuclear fires.

The synergetic interaction of armor

and infantry was previously realizableonly within a relatively positional contextbecause of the battlefield vulnerability ofthe personnel carrier and the lack of fire-power of the infantry squad when operat-ing mounted. The IFV-MBT combination

opens up a dynamic new range of tacti-cal options. The IFV does not, as 1LT

McGrath would have it, free tanks “to dowhat tanks do best.” Rather, it offers the

infantry the opportunity to abandon the“battle-taxi” mentality of the M113 and

extends them the capability to maneuveralongside the main battle tank on abattlefield where the absolute difference

between attack and defend has lostmuch of its significance, at least at the

lower tactical echelons.Brother, we need each other alongside

now like never before. Have some of mymobility, shock action and firepower;

mount ’em up, let‘s roll!

PETER ALBERT HENRYCPT, Armor

Tuebingen, Germany

Ancient Tenets Still Apply

Dear Sir,

Recently I was glancing through a 41-year old book (The l n fan t ry J ournal

Reader, Doubleday Doran and Co.. Inc.,Garden City, N.Y., 1943) that I’ve re-read

a thousarfd times and I came across anarticle that I had dog-eared as beingparticularly worth re-reading.

The article is entitled “Leadership”and was the product of the combinedthinking of the country’s leading psy-

chologists of the day. It was compiledfrom a mass survey made among enlist-ed men in 1942, shortly after this nationhad gone to war against Germany and

J apan. The survey was an extensive, in-depth probing into what that citizen-sol-dier (read draftee) thought about theArmy. Undoubtedly there were somepungent comments that had not been re-

ARMOR

corded! However, one important aspectof the survey was the sub-section enti-tled “What Soldiers Think of Leaders.”The 12 points covered below are as validtoday as they were four decades ago. Iquote from the article:

“1. Ability. Competence comes first.The good officer must know his stuff, foron this depends the men’s confidence inhis leadership.

2.Next is interest in the welfare of thesoldier. The officer who can be trusted tohelp the soldier in time of need, or who

would be accessible for personal advice,is a good officer.

3. Promptness in making decisions isnext.

4. Good teacher or instructor follows.The leader who has the patience and theability to make things clear to the menunder him is valued for that reason.

5. J udgment, common sense, and theability to get things done are next in or-der.

6. The good leader does not “bossyou around where there is no good rea-sonfor it.” Soldiers dislike an officer who

throws his rank around, who tests hisown authority continually. They sense

that he is not sure of himself.7. The man who tells you when you

have done a good job rates well as aleader. Failure in commendation is acommon complaint among men in theranks. The best incentive to good work isthe prospect that it will be noticed andremembered by the leader.

8. Physical strength and a good buildcome next.

9. Good education, a sense of humorand guts or courage follow in that order.

10. Impartiality is next. Leaders who donot “save the dirty jobs for fellows they

don’t like” are valued. The good leader isfair to all in his command.

11. Next in importance is industry.Leaders who “do as little work as theycan get away with” are not respected bythe enlisted men.

12. When an officer “gives orders insuch a way that you know clearly what todo.” that, too, is a mark of merit as aleader. Soldiers also like an officer with a‘clear, strong voice.’”

These requirements of a good leader,so important to the GI of World War II , arestill vaild with today’s enlisted man.

’

ROBERTE.ROGGE

MSGT, USAF (Ret)Radcliff, KY

1Armor Trainer Update

The Armor Trainer Update will take

place 29 October to 2 November atFort Knox. In addition to briefings,

seminars, and conference time withthe leadership of the USAARMC, a full

day has been set aside for an updateon cavalry. Questions should be di-rected to Mr. Sanders, AUTOVON464-8247. Major Marshall, AUTOVON464-1240, is POC for the cavalry

update.

September-October 1984 3



These limitations have prevented us from training aswould fight. One example: our AirLand Battle doctrineafor penetrations into Threat rear areas to engage high-vatargets such as regimental artillery groups, command PO!

trains, and second-echelon units asyet uncommitted tomain battle. This task has been virtually “untrainable”the past; there was no way to realistically practice the 3degree target array, the surprise targets and the cru(maneuver necessary to win this kind of fluid battle. Thi!

about to change.Using our newly acquired simulation technology, wen

can augment the traditional, straight-ahead, Threat fiechelon-oriented training of the current live-fire range. ’can do it by teaming our new training devices with thentraining exercise we call the tactical table. Now we hcVISMODS, modified vehicles that present a more reali!Threat target signature. They will be tough to acquire, tlare evasive, and - given the potential of laser-engagemisystems MILES - capable of shooting back - a smart e.,

my.Crews will have to know how to use their own mobility

and agility to defeat the Threat targets. The tactical tables aredesignedto focus the improved capabilities of our modern-ized equipment.

Like gunnery tables, tactical tables are progressive, frombasic (the crew) through intermediate (the tank-workingwith a wingman) to advanced (the tank platoon).

Each level includes a “gate” table, which qualifies a crewto move on to the next level. The tactical tables, which carryletter designations rather than Roman numerals, culminateat platoon-level proficiency. Table India is equivalent to Ta-ble XII, the platoon-level gunnery qualification course.

Tactical Table TrainingTactical tables progress in difficulty, and in two directions.

The tables progress horizontally- rom basic to intermedi-ate to advanced - and vertically, from individual tasksthrough crew drills to crew reaction exercises. Let’s reviewthe progression with some examples.

The three basic tables, A, B, and C, take the soldier fromindividual combat-essential tasks (negotiate a route usingterrain for cover and concealment, for example) throughcrew drills (Table B) to crew reaction exercises (react toambush) in Table C. Table C uses the skills trained in tablesA andB and challenges the crew to make rapid tactical deci-sions faced with a controlled OPFOR. MILES adds a degreeof realism and stress. (When the Tank Weapons GunnerySimulation System (TWGSS) or the Full Crew InteractiveSimulator (FCIS) are available, either can be used instead ofMILES to permit reinforcement of gunnery skills whiletraining tactical tasks.) TableC is also the “gate” to the nextlevel. The three intermediate tables, D, E, andF, deal withtwo tanks supporting each other - he wingman concept.These tables progress as the crew-level tables do. TableDtrains the tasks required for coordination between tankcrews in the wingman pair; Table E drills the two crewstowork together, and Table F - ike Table C - ties it alltogether.

Further along, in TablesG, H, and I, the platoon comestogether to perfect its skills as a fighting unit. Table Indiaplaces the platoon in a scenario that simulates combat asclosely as possible: the platoon faces a MILES-equippedOPFOR as it advances through a maneuver area, reacting toa series of combat situations that can be expected in theoffense or following a friendly force penetration.

CombiningtheTablesSince gunnery skills decay and tactical application is for-

gotten quickly, the tactical tables should be trained as closely

- 11” C U ” I - 0 . l l l V W U U . L I V UllUUI.. “1 LI I I I . . . . .” .“U..”.UL..Y l ” U I

tion course with the tactical tasks set up as stations. Thetables can be run in any environment, day or night, based onthe commander’s decision and the available equipment.

The tank platoon that successfully completes the perfor-mance gates of combat tables XI1 and India will be well

prepared to take the next training step as they become part ofa combined arms team. The descriptive exercises that followcombat tables proficiency are laid out in the ARTEP MissionTraining Plan’s series of STXs, FTXs, LCXs, and FCXs.Then, combat table proficiency training and platoon/compa-ny team AMTP training come together and are demonstrat-ed on a company/team combined-arms, live-fire exercise(CALFEX). This final element on company/team unit train-ing provides for an evaluation of combat capability -fire-power, protection, maneuver, and leadership - against adesired standard. (It is, in effect, the next level of combattraining above our platoon “gates” - ables XI1 and India- nd I plan to go into it in greater detail next issue with adiscussion of ARTEPKALFEX trainingin depth.)

SummaryThe new tactical tables allow a much greater level of reai-

ism in our tank-pure training while overcoming manyof thelimitations of earlier gunnery-based training. This crew/pla-toon training will be cheaper, too, because we’re using fewerlive rounds to sustain the same level of training proficiencyat the tank level. This allows us to allocate more live roundsof our main gun ammunition to the multi-tank advanced-gunnery TablesX and XI1 and the CALFEX, where theserounds will offer a much better training payoff.

The outcome will be better trained crews, tanks with wing-man sections, and platoons. We feel that we are collectivelyheading in the proper direction with our gunnery and tacticaltraining being combined. The end result of all of this will bemore lethal combat units. Forge the Thunderbolt!

ARMOR September-October 1984 5



Please Send Your VeryBest

(The following comments by Command Sergeant Major J o-seph Bossi, CSM,. 2d Support Group, VI I Corps, Stuttgart.West Germany, are pertinent to the Armor NCO corps, Active,Reserve and National Guard. There are legitimate problemspresented here, problems that need our undivided attention i f weare to maintain our credibility as Armor force NCO instructorsand mentors to our Reserve and National Guard units who right-ful ly look to us or leadership.)

There has been a plethora of comment, both in the nation-al media and within the Armor force, regarding our Reserve

Component and our National Guard units. The majority ofthese comments have been unjustifiably negative. No mil i-tary unit isperfect in every way and it behooves each of us inthe Active Component to remember that in addition to ourprimary duty of learning how to fight and survive, we arealso responsible for passing on our hard-won knowledgesand skills to our supporting elements.

In keeping with this latter responsibili ty, we have develop-ed the Full T ime M anning Program in which Active Compo-nent NCOs (and officers) are assigned on 3-year stabilizedtours of duty to Reserve and National Guard Armor units toprovide a leavening of skil l and experience upon which thoseunits can elevate their combat readiness standards.

The selection and assignment of these NCOs to Reserveand National Guard units deserves the deepest considera-

tion on our part, for upon these men rests, li terally, thecredibili ty of the Active Component.

If an NCO assigned to one of these units is not the mostfuily-quali fied man in every respect, not only does the gain-ing unit suffer, so does the Active Component that assignedhim. That man is looked upon as the expert in his field. If heis anything lessthan that, everybody hurts.

There are pitfalls in the program that must be avoided. Ifthe position calls for a master gunner on the M60AI tank,then the assignee must be a fully-qualified master gunner ontheM60AI prior tohis assignment. Anything less is a disser-vice not only to the gaining unit, but to the Active Compo-nent as well.

There may be times when the job description supplied bythe gaining unit is not complete in its detailing of the duties

to be performed by the Full Time M anning NCO. I f, forexample, the ob description calls for a tank commander but,in reality, the gaining commander also expects that NCO tocoordinate and manage the unit’s training program when theunit is not drilling at inactive duty training, that fact shouldbe clearly spelled out. Such clarity is the responsibility of thegaining commander.

A lso, Reserve and National Guard units must make clearexactly the type of armor equipment they have, for it doesnobody any good to assign a highly-quali fied and motivated

NCO of M 60A3s to a unit equipped, for instance, withM48A5s. A n NCO assigned under such circumstances can-not possibly meet the criteria expected of him by the gainingcommander. A s a result, the NCO must understand thatthere are no training schools available to him and that hemust learn the system on his own. Such intensive learninghas been done in the past and undoubtedly will be done inthe future, but it should not have to happen. I t isthe cause ofmuch frustration for all concerned and denigrates the NCO’straining program. The prevention of such misassignmentslies in the domain of both the A ctive and Reserve Compo-nent personnel systems.

A nother vitally important consideration that must bethoroughly examined by the Active Component prior toassigning an NCO to a Reserve Component unit ishis pro-

ven ability to manage his personal affairs- ncluding thoseof his family. If that NCO did not think too highly of hishome base’s personnel support activities, he is in for a rudeawakening when he is assigned to a Reserve Componentunit for he will be totally dependent upon the communitywhere he lives. There will be no PX, no commissary, nobasehospital, no on-base quarters. There will be no chaplain norlegal officer, nor any of the profusion of friends, technicallibraries or “inside dope” to which he had been accustomed.He will be on his own and if he cannot manage his personalaffairs, he becomes a burden to his gaining unit and may wellbe relieved of his duty there. Once again, this reflectsadversely upon the credibility of the Active Component andit is incumbent upon that commander to ensure that everyNCO he assigns to a Ful l T ime M anning position can handle




his own affiA n addii

Manning Nses at his nease this buhighest leve

Perhaps the most important duty of an NCO in a FullTime M anning slot is that of setting the example. In no waycan this be overlooked. N ot just the standards of personalneatness and military bearing - hese are expected of everysenior NCO and need no further comment. What I am re-ferring to is the application of those standards of training,maintaining, caring and leading on which the NCO corps isbased. T hese standards have been constantly raised over theyears and many of those that applied as recently as 1982 nolonger apply. They have been raised for mission accomplish-ment and survival, not just because somebody dreamedthem up.

The selection of the right NCO for a Full T ime Manningposition to teach these standards is of vital importance andconcern to the total force. This selection can only be made bythe losing commander. He must certify that the selected

and give his total integrity and loyalty to his new commanderand unit. He will be alone, without all the influences (goodor bad) he was exposed to at his home unit. Only the

staunchest of personal characters and the most professionalof atti tudes can overcome these factors.

The above comments must be taken with due considera-tion and deliberation, for only ten percent of the Full TimeManning Force is drawn from the A ctive Component. Theremaing 90percent of these vital positions are filled by Re-serve Component personnel. Since the Active Componentpersonnel fill sofew of these positions, i t is especially incum-bent upon us to ensure that only our finest NCOs are select-ed, for we owe it to ourselves, the A rmor force, and to our

nation that only the most highly-qualified individuals areselected.

Only the best will do.

Who’s Whoat MILPERCEN’s Armor Branch

CPT Mark WilliamsLT Assignments

Mrs. Evelyn RuffinLT Asgmts Tech

LTC JamesQuinlan -Armor Branch Chief

CPT G eorgeEdwardsCPT Assignments

MAJ James D.MarlinMAJ Assignments

PHONES: AUTOVON -221 6340,6341,9696.9658

COMMERCIAL - (202) 325-

MAJ (P) Albion BergstromLTC Assignments

CPT G erald FergusonAQAC Assignments

Ms Kathy WilliamsCPTAsgmtsTech

Miss Kolleen McGrathMAJ Asgmts Tech

Mrs Gloria Johnson

LTC Asgmts Tech

Mrs Dorothy GroomeAOAC Asgmts Tech




Send Us aWinner!

I n recent years, too many administrative, academic, andunit-related problems have been adversely affecting themaster gunner program. These problems have led to com-plaints from unit commanders about the quality of mastergunner graduates.

I n many of these cases, candidates arrived at Fort K noxunqualified to attend. They failed to meet the course prere-quisites outlined in D A Pamphlet 350-1 (September 1983)and the USAARM S school catalogue and should never havebeen selected.

Because the course is expensive and few can attend, it’s inthe sending unit’s best interest to make sure that only the

best qualified N COs are selected.Briefly, they should meet these prerequisites:0 Be in the grades E6, E7 orE8.0 Have a minimum of two years’ experience as a tank

commander. T he course is vehicle-specif ic - M60A1,M 60A3, and M 1. The 2-year minimum requirement iswaived for soldiers in the M1 track. (I nstead, they must haveat least six months’ experience, but this waiver will not beauthorized once the M1 is in the field for two years.) Candi-dates from M1 units must have attended and qualified astank commanders during NETT and M 1 transition training.National Guard and Reserve component students who are toattend the M60A1 track should have two years’ experienceas tank commanderson the M 48A5.

0 Candidates must be qualified as tank commanders on

the Tank Crew Qualification Course within the preceding 24months. A ctive duty candidates must be qualif ied on TableVIII, National Guard and Reserve on Table VI I , and M1studentsonNE TT and M1 transition TableVIII.

Candidates must also have qualified on the tank com-mander’s portion of the Tank Crew Gunnery Skil ls test(TCGST) within the previous six months.

0 Additional quali fications are that the candidate hold aSE CRET security clearance, be selected by his battalioncommander, and be a true volunteer.

Once a candidate has completed the course, he is eligibleto be retained in his unit for a minimum of two years in theduty position of master gunner.

A s part of his introduction to the course, the student fil lsout a candidate survey form. This is usually when we discov-er that a prerequisite is missing. T he most common deficien-cies are too little experience in the tank commander’s slot,absence of Tank Crew Qualification Test certification withinthe preceding 24 months or failure to qualify on the TCGSTwithin the required six-month period.

A nother common deficiency is that the candidate was notselected by his battalion commander, nor was there a one-on-one interview of the candidate before selection. This mayindicate poor command level interest.

Statistics show that students who do not meet the courseprerequisites tend to be the ones who drop out, or are re-leased for academic reasons. But aside from the problem ofprerequisites, some common administrative problems alsoarise.

Leave. If students plan to take leave after completing the

course, they must obtain authority before they leave theirhome stations. The DA Form 31 is important, especially ifthe student is attending the course around the Christmasholidays.

Hold Baggage. When orders are-cut assigning the studentto the M aster G unner course, they should authorize ship-ment of his course manuals back to his home station atgovernment expense or provide an additional weight allow-ance for personal baggage.

Quarters. Upon reporting to the Student Detachment, USArmy NC O A cademy, at Building 1479, Eisenhower A ve-nue, the student will be billetted at the detachment if space is

available or, if not, may be authorized to utilize post BEQ.This may create an additional financial burden.Separate Rations. Students reporting to the Student De-

tachment should be in TDY status. Their orders should statethat separate rations are authorized because there are no

dining facilities at the Student Detachment. Without thisauthorization, the student may bear an additional financialburden.

Pay Options. Students who plan to have their paycheckssent to their units should understand that there will be adelay while checks are redirected through the finance centerat his home station.

Transportation. Classes are within walking distance of theStudent Detachment and government transportation ispro-vided to ranges during the course. While use of privately

owned vehicles isnot authorized to get to and from classes,students may wish to have their cars with them after dutyhours. If so, they must register the vehicles with the studentdetachment TA C NCO during inprocessing. Students musthave documents proving ownership, state registration, andinsurance coverage when reporting.

Some academic problems arise because students need anddo not have certain documents and data used for class pro-jects. Before leaving his home unit, the candidate shouldobtain the most recent after-action report from his unit’s lastLevel I and I 1 tank gunnery, the skill level and proficiency(SQT score) of each CM F 19 and 45 soldier in his unit, a listof his unit’s current strength, showing positions held andDEROS dates, and a copy ofeach vehicle’s 2408-4.

Other projects may require certain items that can be pur-chased at the school if the student doesn’t have them. Theseinclude a calculator, drawing compass, map protractor, ruler,notebook, pens and pencils, marking pens, paper or tablets.

Units suffer by not having their very best tankers becomemaster gunners. A nd the individuals suffer, too. They mayfeel that their units are unconcerned about their career de-velopment by placing them in situations where they may fallshort of meeting standards.

By strictly applying the course prerequisites and by goingover some of the administrative pitfalls mentioned here, wecan minimize the problems and hardships the studentencounters while learning to be a master gunner. A nd bydoing so, we can provide the units with a graduate who is a

true master gunner in every sense of the word.




Honduran cavalry defending the Amatillo Bridge used Israeli RBY armored vehicles and armed quarter-ton jeeps.

Cavalry Action in Central Americaby Lieutenant Colonel Sewell Menzel and Colonel William Said

On F riday, 29 April 1983, at 0200hours, Farabundo M arti guerrilla for-ces numbering approximately severalhundred men conducted a surpri senight attack on the Salvadoran end ofthe Amatillo International Bridge sepa-rating Honduras from El Salvador(M ap 1). This critical bridge carriesmuch of El Salvador’s trade with Pana-ma, Costa Rica, and Honduras, andwas thus a prime target for the commu-nist guerrillas fighting to bring down

the government of E l Salvador.T he first volleys of rifle and ma-

chinegun fire cut down the sentinelsguarding the bridge, decimated theSalvadoran customs officials, andwiped out the dozen-man security po-lice detachment sleeping in their wood-en billets. The commanderof the policedetachment was captured, tortured,and shot.

While this was taking place, otherguerrillas looted and burned the ninecars and commercial trucks waiting tobe processed through customs that

next morning. T he occupants, caughtby surprise and unable to fight back,

died in their cabs and seats.The remainder of the local popula-

tion, keeping low and under cover fromthe streams of bullets spattering aboutthe bridge and customs houses, clus-tered in their adobe huts trying to avoidantagonizing the guerrillas. Some werenot fortunate enough: eight houseswere grenaded and burned out withM olotov cocktails. A few terrified peo-ple made their way down the embank-ments of the Goascoran River andcrossed the semi-dry stream bed tosafety on the Honduran side of thebridge. T he screams of women andchildren were distinctly audible to theH onduran customs personnel whoattempted to observe the obvious car-nage taking place in the dim moonlightsome400meters away.

The Hondurans reported the eventstaking place on the other side of theriver to their military district com-mander some48 kilometers east, in thevicinity of San L orenzo. He ordered themen manning the border post to occu-

py observation posts and previouslyprepared security positions to detect

any intruders who might attempt tocross the bridge.

Some three hours later, at about0500, this small defense force cameunder intense rifle and machinegun fireas two squad-sized guerrilla units be-gan working their way along each sideof the bridge toward them. A thirdgroup was detected as it began to setdemolition charges along the under-pinnings of the bridge. The Honduransreturned the fire with rifles and pistols,

killing two guerril la sappers. The guer-rillas on the bridge withdrew.

A t 0600 hours a demolition chargewas fired and a six-meter span of thebridge fell into the river bed. The guer-rillas again opened intensive fire andbegan to mass for a charge across theriver bed with the objective of captur-ing the entire bridge.

T he f ire was returned at everychance as the attack preparations builtUP.

Honduran R eaction

The Honduran military district com-mander at San L orenzo was kept




abreast of the situation and at 0620ordered two platoons of light infantryfrom Co A, 11th Infantry Battalion,and two platoons of the 2d Squadron,1st Armored Cavalry Regiment, to re-inforce the beleaguered forces at thebridge. (A squadron in the HonduranArmy is equal to a troop in the U.S.Army.)

W hen the 2d Squadron, l ocatedsome81kilometers from Amatil lo, re-ceived the alert, the troopers were al-ready at their morning formation andin less than five minutes, the two pla-toons, with full combat loads, were ontheir way.

This force, basically organized for re-connaissance and screening operations,consisted of two Israeli-made RBYs,wheeled, armored reconnaissance ve-hicles, each armed with a 106-mm re-coilless rifle; three additional I sraeliRBYs scout vehicles armed with 7.62-mm machinguns, and three %ton jeep

vehicles armed with M2 SO-caliber ma-chineguns; a total of eight well-armedand highly mobile fighting vehicles -ideally sui ted for the action at hand.

Traveling at a high speed by road,the Honduran cavalry force reachedthe A matillo bridge in less than anhour. Upon arrival, the two platoonswent into covered and concealed posi-tions about 1 kilometer east of thebridge and south of Nancito Hill (M ap

Locator map, above, pinpuinis I V U I I l V ~ I I W porder checkpoint attacked by guer-

rillas in the action described. Map 2 shows how Honduran cavalry and infantry

deployed to pin guerrillas down, preventing them from crossing the river and de-

stroying the bridge, a crucial link in the Pan American Highway.

I1 o O o ~ e = M M U R ' September-October 1984 11



2). Captain Carlos Andino - a 1981graduate of the AOAC at Fort Knox,Ky., - made a quick reconnaissance toestablish contact with the local forcesand the two platoons of infantry fromCo. A that had arrived a few minutesearlier from their base a short distancefrom the bridge. Both infantry platoonswere under heavy machinegun fire and

were unable to relieve the besiegedbridge defenders.The guerrillas had now formed a

100-man force with the objective ofstorming the river bed to attack theHonduran defender's right flank (Map2).

Captain Andino, who had stationedhimself with one of his motorized pla-toons, ordered mechanized units intothe attack to relieve the infantry.

Using the highway asaguide, the 1stplatoon took the right (north) zoneandthe 2d platoon the left (south) zone.All vehicles opened fire simultaneously

and the vehicles proceeded by boundstoward the river, closing the distance tothe enemy. Automatic weapons firewas directed first at guerrilla machine-gun nests, then against antitank wea-pon sites, and finally at groupsof infan-

try.As the 106-mm recoilless rifles and

SO-caliber machineguns opened fire,the scout vehicles moved to the flanksof the moving force to screen and pro-vide early warning of any enemy move-ments (Map2).

A guerrilla machinegun nest in theformer Salvadoran customs building

was destroyed by a direct hit from a106-mm shell at800meters.

The fire from the recoilless rifles andthe heavy machineguns was an unex-pected shock to the guerrillas and theyceased fire as the Honduran cavalry-men concentrated on the machinegunnests. The force that had massed tostorm the river, had sensed the slack-ening of their supporting fires, pan-icked, and began to run away up andover the barren, grass-covered hills.They were driven by Honduran ma-chinegun fire back into the Salvadoran

houses.By 1030, the Honduran infantry hadworked its way forward and completedthe relief of the customs and militiapersonnel who were almost out ofammunition. The Honduran militarydistrict commander had by now arrivedand ordered that the bridge be defend-ed at all costs to prevent further struc-tural damage. A second order pre-served Salvadoran sovereignty by di-recting that Honduran soldiers remainon their own side of the river. TheHonduran commander believed thatSalvadoran forces would soon arrrive

to attack the guerrillas on their side ofthe river. He was wrong.

The action had been so intense andprolonged that strict ammunition con-servation was now ordered for theHonduran forces. Fire superiority hadbeen gained over the guerrillas andtheir return fire was, at best, sporadic.

Guerrilla sharpshooters and grena-

diers usingU. S.

40-mm grenadelaunchers tried to reverse the fire situ-ation and killed a civilian and woundedthree Honduran infantrymen. Thesewere the only Honduran military casu-alties of the action.

Honduran 81-mm mortars firedsup-pression missions throughout theafter-noon and, early that evening, werere-inforced by a three-piece 160-mm mor-tar battery that pounded the guerrillasinto the night.

Action TerminatedThe battle died during the night as

the guerrillas began to withdrawthrough the hills to the northwest. TheHondurans were now able to take stockof the situation.

In addition to the burned-out trucks,cars, and buildings, with the bodies ofthe slain civilians still in them, a dozencustoms and police security officialshad been killed and the bridge hadbeen damaged.

The bodies of 60 guerrillas werefound in a draw where they had beenpartially consumed by gasoline fires.

Honduran estimates of guerrillacas-

ualties ran to some 96 killed with

scores of wounded. The hard-hittingcavalry had saved the day.

SomeObservationsThe cavalry commander used the

factors of mission, enemy, terrain,time and space to quickly size-up theenemy and then he took the initiative.

0 In encounter-type engagements,the action usually goes to the side thatplasters its opponent with fire. In thiscase, the cavalry opened fire with all itsweapons simultaneously and quicklygained fire superiority.

0 The Hondurans kept the structur-

al base of the bridge (lower abutmentsand pilings) under continuous rifle fireand significantly reduced the threat offurther demolition.

The enemy snipers could havebeen better suppressed had the Hondu-ran machineguns saturated their tree-top hiding places.

It was noted that the 40-mm gre-nade launcher gave off a distinctive popwhen fired giving an alert soldier a sec-ondor two toseek cover. This time-lagwas especially true at ranges of morethan200meters.

0 Combat operations in Central

America are no different than those inother parts of the world and they dem-onstrate that, in counter-guerrillaactions, cavalry forces employed inaccordance with their capabilities, andresolutely commanded, can often de-feat enemy forces many times theirsize.

LIEUTENANT COLON EL

SEWALL MENZEL wascommissioned in artilleryfrom the Citadel in 1964when he received his bach-elor degree in history. Twoyears later he transferred toarmor and later commandedarmored cavalry units in Vi -etnam. More recently, h eserved for 2 years as Chief,Army Section, for the U.S.

Military Group in Honduras.He is fluent in Spanish andconversive in Portugese..Currently, he isassigned to'the DAMO-SSA,DCS-OPS,the Pentagon, Washington,

D.C.

COLONEL WILLIAM SAID,

a cavalry officer in the Hon-duranArmy, isa 1977grad-uate o the Command andGeneral Staff College,US.Army School o the Ameri-cas, i n Panama. H e hasbeen associated with theHonduran armored forcesince its formation in 1977and currently commandsthe 1st Honduran ArmoredRegiment.

12 ARMOR September-October1984



A Woria vvar I I FormationLiveson in Afghanistan

Soviet Enveloping DetachmentsbyCaptain Gilbert0 Vlllahermosa

The Soviet Army places greatemphasis on rapid offensive action andhas developed a number of specialformations to ensure continuousmovement of its forward elements.Some of these special formations, suchas the forward detachment and theoperational maneuver group (OMG),have been publicized in the Westernpress, but others remain unknown de-spite widespread use during WWII andin the current fightinginAfghanistan.

One such formation, the envelopingdetachment, is widely discussed in theSoviet military literature but little men-tioned in the West. Seldom a monthgoes by without an article on this type

of formation appearing in MilitaryHer-ald (Voenny Vestnik)and Military His-torical J ournal (Voenny I storicheskiyZhurnal). Indeed, it is not uncommonto find three or four articles in a singleissueon this formation.

According to the Soviet definition,the enveloping detachment can varygreatly in size, from a platoon to a regi-ment. It is administratively self-con-tained. Its mission is “to envelop theenemy with the aim of striking him inthe flanks and rear in order to seize hispositions.”

The Soviets specifically define the

enveloping detachment as an offensiveformation which-while it can be usedunder normal terrain conditions -lends itself to difficult terrain, specifi-cally mountains, deserts, forestedareas, swamps, and northern regions.

“Depending on the trafficability ofthe terrain, the enveloping detachmentis normally composed of motorized ri-

fle (platoons, companies, or battalion-size) elements reinforced with portableantitank weapons, mortars, artilleryand other special (units) such as engi-neer troops.”1

TheSoviet Military Encyclopedia also

notes that the enveloping detachmentusually operates on foot “in those sec-tors where terrain proves difficult,”working in cooperation with forcesattacking the enemy frontally.

Soviet military journals point outthat enveloping. detachments can alsobe inserted by airborne, amphibiousorairmobile operations. Pack animals areto be used in those areas where terrainlimits the use of vehicles.

Use in WWIIThe use of enveloping detachments

during WWII led to high rates ofadvance in mountain fighting. In theNorthern Caucasus, the Crimea, theBalkans, the Carpathians, in CentralEurope and in the Far East, successwas often achieved when regular infan-try troops were made the foundation ofspecial combined-arms formationswhich were used to attack the enemyflanks and rear areas after having infil-trated through gaps in his defensive po-sitions.

I n some cases, tanks were used indirect support of infantry, with decen-tralization down to single tanks in sup-port of platoons. With the use of thesespecial detachments, the Soviets wereable to achieve rates of advance of 1-2

kilometers per hour, even against thebest prepared positions.2There are a number of combat and

combat support elements that make upcompany and battalion-size envelopingdetachments. Examples are common inthe present mountain fighting inAfghanistan.

AirborneTroopsDuring the invasionof Afghanistan,

elements of three Soviet airborne divi-sions were employed. These units havesince borne the brunt of the fighting.

These troops can be employed either

ARMOR

inairborneorairmobile operations, butwere initially parachuted into action.This proved to be costly - he troopssuffered heavy losses to Afghani free-dom fighters equipped with obsoleterifles but employing very accurateaimed fire. For this reason, the Sovietsnow prefer to use airmobile operationswhenever possible.

Because airborne units seldom havethe artillery assets available to the mo-torized rifle unit, and airborne compa-ny or battalion is supported insteadwith 120-mm mortars. A battalion-sizeenveloping detachment will be rein-forced with an air defense platoon, acombat engineer platoon, and chemicalpersonnel. Companies receive similarreinforcements, butona smaller scale.

When in the role of an envelopingdetachment, an airborne battalion will

normally operate independently. It’smost typical missions include “captureof mountain passages and passes, cap-ture of positions favorable for the de-fense, and holding them until arrival oftroops from the front.”,

M otorized R ifleTroopsJust as the enveloping detachments

of WWII were based on regular infan-try units, the modern-day envelopingdetachment as used in Afghanistan is

basedon

motorized rifle troops. Be-cause they can operate on any terrainunder any conditions, the Soviets seethese troops as best suited to opera-tions in the mountains. They recog-nized that special training is necessaryfor mountain operations and intensive-ly practice negotiating mountainousterrain on foot and in vehicles, the useof weapons in the mountains, moun-tain climbing, map reading, and smallunit tactics. Great emphasis is placedon the development of a spirit of initia-tive in unior officers.

A company-size enveloping detach-




Mission: “T o capture dominant heights, pas ses and pas-sages in the depth of the enemy’s defenses . ..”

ment in support of a battalion consistsof a motorized rifle company reinforcedwith a mortar battery, a tank platoon, achemical squad, an engineer squad andan ADA sectionor squad. A battalion-size enveloping detachment consists ofa motorized rifle battalion reinforcedwith a mortar battery, an artillery bat-talion, a tank company, engineer andchemical platoons, and ADA platoon,and various service support elements.

Both size enveloping detachmentshave the same mission: “TO capturedominant heights, passes, and passagesin the depth of the enemy’s defensesinorder to destroy his weapons of massdestruction and command posts and to

accomplish other tasks.”4This is to be achieved by takingadvantage of the rugged terrain andmountain weather conditions to infil-trate through gaps in the enemy’s de-fensive positions into his rear andflanks to conduct surprise attacks inorder to capture the assigned objectiveand to destroyorcapture the enemy.

The success of the battalion-sizeenveloping detachment in the Afghan-

istan fighting has apparently led to cre-ation of a new type of Soviet battalioncalled the Combined Arms ReinforcedBattalion (CARB). According to Jossef

Bodansky, who described this forma-tion in a recent articles, “These unitshave become the core unit for the con-duct of small unit military operations inmountainous terrain.”

Bodansky, one of the first to describethis new formation, noted in a relatedarticle, “The reinforced battalion is ahighly mobile force capable of carryingout autonomous operations. It is satu-rated with fire support means, especial-ly artillery and air support. It has itsown tank company.”b The compositionof these CARBs - a motorized riflebattalion, a tank company, an artillery

battalion, a mortar battery, an air de-fense company, an antitank companyand various service support elements- ssostrikingly similar to the battal-ion-size enveloping detachment thatthis author is convinced their creationwas heavily influenced by the extensiveuse and successes of enveloping de-tachments in Afghanistan. The crea-tion of these CARBs is an indicationthat motorized rifle troops are regain-ing their predominance in the field ofmountain f ighting. I t should bestressed that the CARB is presentlyemployedonlyin Afghanistan.

It is also interesting to note thatwhile there are presently 100,000 to120,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan,“only 12,000 to 15,000 of them areactively engaged in fighting Afghan re-sistance forces and of those, only anaverage of 500 to 700 are involved inoffensive sweeps on a daily basis.”’

Tank TroopsTerrain restricts tank employment in

the mountains so the Soviets seldomuse tanks on any scale above battalionlevel. Tanks are normally employedonly in support of the infantry with pla-toons and companies allocated tocompany and battalion-size enveloping

detachments. Additionally, individualtanks may support the action of motor-ized rifle platoons. During the attack,the tanks move behind the dismountedinfantry and their carriers and supporttheir assault with fires. The fires areconducted over the heads of friendlytroops and to their flanks, with thetanks moving about 250 meters behindthem.

Apparently because of problemswhen firing on the move near dis-mounted infantry, the Soviets hedgetheir doctrine by firing from the shorthaltor from stationary positions.

Other problems have been encoun-tered as well. The limited gun tube de-pression and elevation of Soviet tanks,designed for operations in relatively flatterrain, limits their use against high-angle targets. To solve this problem, anofficer writing in M ilitary Heraldsuggests that the tank be driven up onto boulders or into depressions in theground to compensate for the limitedgun elevation and depression. He alsorecommends extensive use of thetank’s antiaircraft machinegun toengage ground targets.8

Target acquisition is also a problem

for tanks working in the mountains.“The uniform color of the terrain andtargets and large numbers of boulders,caves, and other natural cover have anegative influence on the effectivenessof tank fire in the mountains and com-

plicate reconnaissance, detection, andidentification of small enemy targets.”9

ArtilleryThe artillery battalion of the envel-

oping detachment is tasked to neutral-ize any enemy systems that prevent theenveloping detachment from accom-plishing its mission. Artillery units also

provide smoke cover to mask move-ment and deceive the enemy as to thedetachment’s intentions.

According to several articles inMilitary Herald, artillery is also used inthe direct-fire role in the mountains. Inthis type of situation, the battery maybe broken up and targets allocated toindividual guns. While the Soviets nor-

mally resist this type of decentraliza-tion, they seem to have acceptedit as anecessity of mountain fighting. Whenemployed in the mobile role in supportof forces in the attack, the artillerywillmove 500 to 1,000 meters behind thetanks and personnel carriers and willengage enemy infantry and antitankassets. This compensates for the tanks’limited antipersonnel capability, whilesupplying immediate suppressive firesfor the motorized infantry. It is inter-esting that while this employment tech-nique is not approved Soviet doctrine,it is widespread in Afghanistan.

The Soviet military press makes littlemention either of multiple rocket laun-chers or FROGS, in the mountains.This isn’t surprising when one consi-ders the limited elevation of SovietMRLs and the poor cross-country per-formance of the FROGcarriers.

MortarsThe Soviets see the mortar as the

ideal weapon for mountain fire supportbecause of its light weight, theincreased lethality due to fragmenta-tion and the mortar’s ability to coverdead spaces in the terrain. They recog-

nize that there may be long periodsduring which the envelopment detach-ment commander will have to rely onmortar fire support, which accounts forthe presence of both artillery and mor-tars in the battalion-size enveloping de-tachment.

Soviet mortars range in size from the82-mm series (M-37, M-41, M-42) toits 120-mm replacement (M-38, M-43). The latter are commonly found inmotorized rifle battalions (18 tubes perbattalion) and are used extensively inAfghanistan, both by motorized rifleand airborne troops.

14 M M U R September-October 1984



junction with engineer and chemical re-connaissance patrols. I n some cases, anartillery reconnaissance patrol will tra-vel with the unit.

T he forward security element, tra-

veling 5 to 10 kilometers behind thecombat reconnaissance patrol, is toprovide “security to the main bodyagainst a surprise attack. . . andadvantageous conditions for the de-ployment of the main body.”l9 T he for-ward security element amounts to athird of the enveloping detachment’sassets and includes motorized infantry,tanks, mortar, artillery, A DA , chemi-cal and engineer troops. T his subunitalso includes the engineer route recon-naissance and obstacle clearing detach-ment, movement support detach-ments, and mobile obstacle detach-

ments.T he forward security element nor-mally operates with flank pickets inmountainous terrain. T hey occuov kev

that can be up to 5 kilometers to theflanks and 2 to 3kilometers to the rearof the main body. A s the main bodyapproaches areas where ambushes arelikely, an artillery battery deploys to

cover the movement and later rejoinsthe column.A long the march, vehicles maintain

50 to 100-meter intervals and move ata speed of 15 to 20km/hr.

TheAttackA n attack in the mountains is to be

conducted on a frontage two to threetimes greater than normal for a compa-ny or battalion. T he attack begins alongmountain roads or trails, valleys, can-yons, and along the gentle slopes of rid-ges after the enveloping detachmenthas infiltrated through gaps in the ene-

my positions or has approached a flankundetected. A n i ntense artillery or avi-ation preparation precedes the attack.

Elements of the envelooinn detach-terrain along the march route until thecolumn passes, then leap-frog forward.

The main body of the enveloping de-tachment follows 2 to 3 kilometers be-hind the forward security element withmobile flank and security detachments

ment will often operate alongseparateaxes. Whenever possible, they will tryto seizeterrain overlooking or border-ing the objective. While bringing directfires to bear from these positions, theenveloping detachment will attack the

“During the attack, motor-

ized riflemen remain

mounted as long as possi-

ble. ..”

enemy from above whenever possible

and attempt to seize his uppermost de-fensive positions. Once these positionsare captured and cleared, the detach-ment then works its way down to theenemy’s lower level positions, pro-gressing until the enemy iscaptured ordestroyed. Once the objective is seized,defensive preparations are made for apossible enemy counterattack.

During the attack, motorized rifle-men remain mounted as long as possi-ble. W hen terrain or enemy resistanceprecludes attacking mounted, the rifle-men dismount with supporting chemi-cal and engineer personnel, forming

platoon-si ze assault groups. Theyadvance on the enemy position alongcovered and concealed routes whereverpossible, supported by smoke, directand indirect fires.

T he dismounted infantry are fol-lowed by their BMPs or BTRs whichsupport the attack with ATGM s, can-non and machinegun fire. Vehicles car-rying the A GS-17 automatic grenadelaunchers are deployed with the infan-try carriers, suppressing the enemy asthe dismounted troops advance. Be-hind this first line of vehicles, follows asecond, composed of tanks which

engage the enemy using main gun andmachinegun fire. This line isabout 250meters behind the infantry. If automa-tic self-propelled mortars are available,they will be found behind the tanks,firing in both direct and indirect modes.

The Soviets prefer to use their artil-lery from stationary positions. If terrainpermits, the artillery will continue toadvance behind the tanks and mortars,

~

NOTE: The order of march of the variousA Battalion-Size

Enveloping Detachmentarms within each elemen t are not

necessarily accurate.

in March Formation

16 ARIWlPm September-October 1984

M A W (- ) (-1 (-) (-) (- ) (-1Combat ‘-) MORTAR 5 irn

Rear Detachmenteconnaissance Forward Security Element f Main BodyPatrol

Flank Detachment



“. . .They can be utilized in

any terrain that presents

gaps in the defender’s line

of resistance.. .”

firing from short halts against enemy

strongpoints, A TGM teams, and troopconcentrations, but when terrain be-gins to restrict the advance, the artillerywill take up stationary positions.

Strongpoints and other defensive po-sitions that cannot be eliminated withsupporting fire are engaged by assaultgroups, using flamethrowers, demoli-tion charges, and rocket-propelled gre-nades fired by motorized riflemen.

T he attack of the enveloping detach-ment, as described, takes place whileother forces are conducting a frontalattack, exposing the enemy topressurefrom several directions. T he Soviets

believe that this type of attack can ra-pidly destroy an enemy, even in well-prepared defensive positions. Events inA fghanistan seem to bear this out.

Problems EncounteredDespite wide use and frequent suc-

cess in using enveloping detachments,the Soviets have encountered somediff iculties, brought about by the na-ture of the terrain i tself. According toColonel K. Bregman, writing in MilitaryHerald, “T he meager nature of theroad network and the almost completeimpossibility of road movement by all

types of transport vehicles, tanks andother f ighting vehicles off the road be-

cause of the great steepness of theslopes and ascents, dense vegetation,and snow cover in the winter greatlyhinder the movement of troops andequipment, delivery of supplies needed

for combat and the evacuation of thewounded.”20A nother problem encountered is the

unreliability of radio communicationsin mountain terrain. T he mountainridges screen radio waves and causefrequent lossesof communication.21

TheNATO ProspectCreated during WWII and perfected

in A fghanistan, the enveloping detach-ment has proven itself a hard-hitting,highly mobile and flexible formationthat can operate independently inrugged terrain and under the most sev-

ere weather conditions, day and night.While this article has concentrated on

Footnotes

1Soviet Military Encyclopediu [in Russian], Mos-cow: Voyenizdat, 1978) Volume 5, p.676.2SeeA.I . Radzievsky, Army Operutions [in Rus-

sian], (M oscow: Voyenizdat, 1977). pp. 122-135.and Tuctics in Combur Exumples-Division [in Rus-sian], (M oscow: Voyenizdat, 1976). pp. 126-132.

3COL M. M uslomov, “A Battalion Seizes anObjective in the M ountains”, Militury Herald tinRussian], No. 2,1982, p. 34.

4MG S. K ovachev, “I n an Enveloping Detach-ment”, Militury Heruld [in Russianl, No. 8. 1977,p. 115.

’Y ossef Bodansky, “T he Bear on the Chess-board: Soviet M ili tary Gains in Afghanistan”.Wor/dMfuirs,Vol. 148,No. 3, Winter 1982-83, p.283.

6Yossef Bodansky, “General of the A my D. T .Y azov: V ictor in A fghanistan”, J une’s DefenseWeekly.Vol. 1, NO .12, p. 485.

7Y ossef Bodansky, “T he Bear on the Chess-board: Soviet M ili tary Gains in A fghanistan”,WorldAflairs,Vol. 148,No. 3, Winter 1982-83, p.219.

*LTC I . Sobran, “Firing from Tanks in theM ountains”, MilituryHerald [in Russianl, No. 5,1982. p. 83.

slbid, p. 83.“khristopher Bellamy. “Conventional Quick

K ill”, J une’s Defense Week&, Vol. 1, No. 19, p.783.

11“AM Vasilek Automatic 82mm M ortar”,J une’sDefense Weekw,Vol. 1, NO.5, p. 150.12LTG of Engineer T roops Gorbachev, “Engi-

neer Support of T roop Operations in the M oun-tains”, Military Heruld [in Russian], No. 3, 1981,

13Y ossef Bodansky. “ The Bear on the Chess-board: Soviet M ili tary Gains in- Afghanistan”,WorldAflairs.Vol. 148,No.3. Winter 1982-83, p.285.I llbid, p. 285.lSLTC I . M ukhin, “Chemical Support in the

M ountains”, Militury Herald [in Russian], No. 1,1982, p. 34.

pp. 95-98.

18LTC Bartkevich, “A n A dvance Party in theM ountains”, Military Heruld [in Russian], NO .2,1982, p. 26.19SovietMiliruryEncyclojwdiu [in Russian], (Mos-

cow: Voyenizdat, 1976), Vol. 2, pp. 594-595.2oCOL Bregman, “M ountains Are No Hindrance

for the Capable”, Militury Heruld [in Russian], No.2 1981,p.l.I llbid, p. 1.

22“A n E nveloping Detachment i n Battle Forma-tion”, Soviet Mili tury Review,No. 5, 1983, pp. 20-21.

ARMOR

the Soviets’ employment of these de-tachments in the mountains, they canbe utilized in any terrain that presentsgaps in the defender’s line of resis-tance.22 Such terrain is typical of NA -

TO’s northern and southern flankareas of poor mobility, sparse roadnetworks, marshes, forests, and forest-ed mountains.

A future war will see enveloping de-tachments used on a wide scale. Insert-ed by airborne and airmobi le opera-tions (and along NA TO’s northernflank by amphibious operations), enve-loping detachments will be used to se-

ize bridges, key mountain passes, andother critical objectives, holding themuntil the arrival of the main body. Theywill be seeking out and destroying com-mand and control centers and other

key installations. Enveloping detach-ments will continue to advance parallelto the main body along rugged terrain,striking the enemy unexpectedly in hisflanks and rear. Because of the key roleenveloping detachments will play inmili tary operations on NATO’s flanks,the next war may see considerablyhigher rates of advance than those ofthe last war on such terrain.

CAPTAIN GILBERT0 VIL-

LAHERMOSA isa 1980gra-duate o f U S M A . He hasserved as an armored caval-ry troop platoon leader, linetroop XO and squadron S4

in the 3-12Cavalry, FRG. H eis a graduate of the AOBC,AOAC, Airborne and JuniorO f f i cer M a in tenan ceCourse. H e is presentlyattending the J oint Firepow-er Course at Hurlburt Field,Florida and will be assignedtoXVlll Airborne Corps atFt.Bragg, N.C.

September-October1984 17



German and American troops confer at a crossroads during fall maneuvers in Europe.

Interoperability in NATOby Captain RonaldM. Schrock, Jr.

Interoperability amongst land forces in NATO suffersfrom a lack of communications and equipment standardiza-tion. Complete standardization may be beyond the realmofreality. Hc-zpver, NATO land force commanders must re-solve to seek their own mutually agreed upon operative solu-tions to interoperability needs.

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command LiaisonOflice in Cologne, Germany, publishes information dealingwith U.S. and German Army interoperability.1 To satisfy aneed for definition, the Department of Defense SteeringGroup on Rati onal i zati on/Standardi zati onz 3 within NATOagreed that the following definition for interoperability willapply: “The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide

services toand accept servicesfromother systems, units, orforces and to use the servicessoexchanged to enable themto operate effectively together.”4 It follows, having read thedetinitions of rationalization, standardization, and interop-erability, that interoperability comprises those actions need-ed to produce effective oint operations. AUSA News recent-ly noted, “The need today for interoperability in NATO isobvious- 16 nations, 15 with military forces, pledged to theproposition that an attack on one is an attack on all, mustbelieve that their forces can operate collectively, effectively.They must believe that their military leaders have developedthe policies, engaged in the training, and accomplished thepreparations essential to assure such a capability.”s Unfortu-nately, the 16 nations cannot be assured that such a belief iswelLfounded.”6

Why? There are many stumbling blocks to effective inter-operability amongst 16 nations who are also pursuing theirown national interests while professing to be part of a defen-sive alliance. Major obstacles are equipment standardizationand communications. “No nation has an adequate organiza-tion to coordinate the activities of its forces with those of itsallied neighbors. No nation has designed its communicationsequipment to net with that of its allies.”7 Without equipmentstandardization, joint logistical resupply efforts would beminimal. As a result of lack of standardization of weaponsystems and support systems, only 15-20°/o of associated sup-plies used by both (U.S. and German) armies are similarwherein some mutual support would seem possible whenneeded.* Certainly standardization of weapon systems and

support systems are complicated by national economic inter-ests and lack of a proven method to “do it together” in acooperative defense-industrial effort. Until such efforts suc-ceed to promote joint-cooperative results, the ability to netcommunications equipment amongst the NATO allies, theability to provide a common logistical support base for com-mon major weapon systems, the capability to effectivelyinteroperate remains within a void. Sixteen nations dedicat-ed to a defensive alliance can only hope to achieve theircommon goal as a deterrent force if they are able to “inter-operate” together.

The present most effective means of coordinating US/GEcommand and control communications is thru a liaisonteam. The field solution has been for units to exchangeliai-son teams, utilizing their own national radios, national fre-




“. . .The LNOmust be able to wear two hats in order to be effective. He cannot onlyrepresent the interests of his own force. . .”

quencies and CEO1 equivalents. While this duplication of‘effort may be a workable solution in some cases, it quicklybecomes wasteful of personnel, equipment and available fre-quencies. Also, by util izing a liaison team to coordinate com-mand and control, we are adding another human l ink to thecritical chain of communications between commanders.While adding a human link to the chain may be a disadvan-tage, the advantage is the capability to cover the gap ofcurrent communication difficulties through human under-standing. L eadersof liaison teams need not only to have anadequate linguistic ability, but also be well versed in thetactics, normal operational techniques, and the command-ers’ priorities in order to fully understand both units whoseoperations he is attempting to coordinate. This is complicat-ed in that there is currently no methodical or progressive

training program for liaison teams. I n order to develop anydegree of proficiency, liaison teams must be assigned inpeacetime to live and work, for the majority of their time,with their host unit.

When it comes to coordinating actual tactical operations,both US and G E forces proceed from dif ferent tactical con-cepts. While tactics will not be developed in detail in thisarticle, commanders and G3s/S3s should be aware that dif-ferences do exist, and know how to approach these differ-ences before conducting any joint ventures. I t must be re-membered that both US and GE forces in the defense havethe same objective of destroying the enemy’s offensive capa-bili ties, however dif ferent priori ties develop dif ferent meth-

ods. Tactical doctrine is a living, breathing entity as newweapons, equipment, research, and changing considerationsurge new emphasis and continuous development. G E defen-sive tactical doctrine, as is NATO’s, is based on forwarddefense. G E defensive doctrine calls for a delay followed by adefense on the FEBA and includes counterattacks when theprobability of success is high. The main emphasis is to defeatthe enemy far forward when possible, and, to be able todefend as close to the FEBA as possible.

Our “new” U.S. A rmy FM 100-5, Operations, leads usaway from the active dynamic defense to the A irL and Battlein conjunction with Division 86 transition. Such phrases as“interdiction targeting as part of an integrated eff ort tocreate time and space gaps,”9 “attacking deep is essential towinning; attacking deep and the close-in fight are insepara-ble,. . .and, extending the battlefield.”lO have become new

guidelines for A merican operations officers. The whole pur-pose of coordinating tactical operations is toallow for mutualconsultation and transfer of vital information. N A TO cannotafford to have unit commanders fighting their own individu-al battles in their assigned sectors without regard for a com-bined effort. T hrough a total effort we have the option ofcreating a synergistic effect which will overwhelm the ene-my. “W e are taught that flank security, especially in thedefense, means immediate contact with the units on our leftand right. . . n the event of an initial enemy breakthroughanywhere along an extended front l ine, this sort of thinkinghas historically led to overreaction, often a panic to scurryback to a new defensive line and attempt to reestablish anunbroken front.” ll T hrough effective coordination andexchange of vital information, our flanks would be the

strongest points on the battlefield.

T he ability of 16 nations to have plans that call for amutual shoulder-to-shoulder defense is undoubtedly themajor indicator of resolve within the NA TO alliance. A t thesame time, it demands interoperability and prior coordina-tion at the fl anks where the two shoulders meet. Within theirown boundaries, different national forces can utilize theirown SOPS; however, at the international flanks we mustresolve to coordinate our intentions with our neighbor.When we know beforehand what the other guy i s planningfor on his side of the fence we can best prepare our ownplans. T hese plans should coincide in a synergistic effect as acombat multiplier to destroy the enemy. F lanks are madeidentifiable by boundaries and coordination/contact points.Boundaries, if properly selected, are on terrain which doesnot favor any major mounted approach and can be easily

defended by friendly forces. Boundaries can be screened oroverwatched without actual positioning of forces. A t pointswhere physical coordination is established, a checklist in theappropriate languages isneeded to enhance understanding,to ensure that all mutual coordination is accomplished. I n

case of a threat from the enemy in the vicinity of the coor-dination/contact point, the senior NA TO soldier present,regardless of nationality, should be in command. Boundariesat coordination/contact points need not turn into strongpoints. I t is precisely at the fl anks where, when needed and ifavailable, we can direct the combat power of not one nation-al force, but two! A ll available combat support (attack heli-copter, close air support, artil lery, air defense and engineers)and reserve combat maneuver elements of both forces canquickly converge, preferably under a unified command, to

destroy the enemy. The boundary is a responsibil ity of bothcommanders who share it, and depending on the terrain andtheir assigned missions, they will jointly determine how bestto handle it. T he boundary may be screened at some loca-tions, established by coordination/contact points at others,and in some instances may require the joint occupation ofbattle positions. U nits should have knowledge of eachother’s intentions, and be aware of the current situation on

the “other side.”When a threat along the flanks is foreseen, commanders

should have plans prepared and be ready to react if such areaction is possible. If a flank is broken, the first reactionshould not be to back up and reestablish the flank, but todestroy the enemy’s capability to carry on his intrusion any

further. A ny combat force operatingon

or crossing aninternational boundary should come under a unified com-mand. Procedures for conducting such operations will havebeen developed in a combined Field Standard OperatingProcedures (FSOP) document, which is coordinated duringpeacetime. A lthough different national forces may have di-verse guidelines and principles for their individual employ-ment, it is the responsibility of liaison officers (LNOs) inplace during peacetime, to coordinate the procedures andincorporate them into the combined FSOP for use in war.The LNO must be able to wear two hats in order to beeffective. He cannot only represent the interests of his ownforce, but must able to adequately portray the intentions andinterests of the neighboring force to which he has beenattached. A consistent and truthful information exchange is

necessary. A combined FSOP that is exercised and revised as




. .We must have, within NATO, a renewed concerted effort to resolve to makeinteroperability a rea lity.. .”necessary, coupled with mutual trust for one anotherachieved through personal contact, is vital. Boundaries,

while in effect delineating the command responsibili ty, havehistorically been a leadership problem. Hauptmann (Cap-tain) i.G. (General Stam R. Ostermeyer, while attending theGerman Bundeswehr General Staff School in Hamburg andthru his studies, has been able to determine that- p to thebattalion level - hose leaders who have traditionally ledfrom the front have been the most effective at avoidingdanger on boundaries. I t is at brigade level and higher,where leaders are positioned more to the rear, that dangerpresented itself most often.12 Ostermeyer offers these pointsas possible sol utions to maintaining a secure boundary:

0 M ove the boundary to other points when threatened toprovide for a unity of command over the threatened area.

0 Put units sharing a boundary under a unified command.0 Have quick reacting reserves available and positioned

behind main forces along the boundary.Place counterattacking forces under a unified com-

mand.13M oving the boundary may solve the problem of unified

command. One questions, however, the practicality and theability of commanders to move boundaries whenever theyare threatened; not to mention that, by moving the bounda-ry, we still have not removed the threat! T he availability ofquick reacting reserves emplaced along the boundary is awaste of forces that may be better employed elsewhere.Emplacing units which share a boundary and unifying thecommand of counterattacking forces who must cross theboundary are certainly possible and even likely. The key,again, is prior coordination incorporated into a combinedFSOP, and interoperabil ity.

SPRINGEX is an annual interoperabil ity exercise con-ducted between elements of the 4th (GE) PunzepGrenadierDivision (M echanized Infantry), and the 1st (US) A rmoredDivision. The first SPRINGEX was conducted in 1984 undera U.S.-developed plan. Subsequently, exercises have beenheld each year, alternating responsibility for planningbetween participating US and G E units. A major byproductof the exercise isa “Combined FSOP”. SPRINGEX is nor-mally conducted in the Spring at the Hohenfels ManeuverTraining A rea. T he exercise has traditionally involved jointtraining from individual soldier to brigade unit level, andculminates with a joint field training exercise. This pastyear’s exercise, SPRINGEX 83, involved participating unitsfrom the 2d Brigade, 1st A rmored Division, and the 12thPunzer (T ank) Brigade, of the 4th (GE) Punzer GrenadierDivision. T he planning responsibil ity for the exercise restedwith the 12th Punzer Brigade. Traditionally, the exercise wasdesigned to devote four days to interoperabil ity training andthree days for a joi nt FTX . This year’s FT X was designed toexplore methods of conducting oint defensive operations.

There are many impediments within N A TO to achievinginteroperabil ity. However, we cannot let these blind us fromthose actions that commanders can take to achieve the inter-operabili ty that they need. W e are not living under the sameconditions as existed as when the United Nations reacted tothe North Korean invasion of the Republic of Korea (ROK )on 25 J une 1950, where, “it may be stated fairly, however,that some rationalization, standardization and interopera-bility had occurred through integration of US doctrine,

equipment, armament and training.”l4 US doctrine, equip-


ment, armament and training is not, cannot, be the guidancefor other NA TO countries to follow. T he ROK /US Com-

bined Forces Command no longer has the U.S.-controlledrationalization, standardization and interoperabili ty that wasonce possible. These three areas are now a national coordi-nated responsibil ity. W e must have, within NA TO, a re-newed concerted effort to resolve to make interoperabili ty areality. T o be successful, it will take a major effort, not onlyby the military leadership, but by civi lians as well.

Interoperability would not always mean utilization of thesame systems, but that at least the major systems would becompatible as much as possible. Until the time comes wheninteroperability actually becomes a real capability withinNA TO, mili tary commanders must resolve to seek their ownoperative solutions to interoperabil ity within the needs thattheir subordinate commanders may jointly require with theirpartners. Commanders can achieve the coordination they

need with their allies through dedication and by understand-ing the importance of interoperability.

Footnotes1For information write TRA DOC L iaison Office, AT TN: ATFE -L O-GA ,

Box 115, APO New York 09080 and ask for a copy of Periodic Index Number13.

2J CS Pub 1, DOD Dictionary of Mi/ itur y und Associuted Terms.Rationaliza-tion; A ny action that increases the effectiveness of A ll ied forces through moreefficientor effective use of defense resources committedto the A lliance.

3lbid. Standardization: T he process by which member nations achieve theclosest practicable cooperation among forces.

41bid.5Defense Report, “I nteroperability - T he Glue of Coalition Warfare,”

61bid.’]bid.*lst (US) Armd Div, 4th (GE) PzGren Div. “G-4 Wor k Group” study

9TR ADOC PAM PHL ET 525-5, U. S. Army Operational Concepts, “T he

IOIbid,pp. 23-24.“Peters, Ralph H. J r.. 1st L t., “Battlefield Initiative and the Small Unit,”

I2MS., “Grenzen als Fuhr ungsproblem” (Boundaries as a Leadership Prob-

I3Ibid, p. 5.14Cooling,9. Fr anklin, “A llied Interoperability n the K orean War,” Milirory

AUSA News, August 1983, p. 7.

results based upon G E review of U .S. supplycatalogs.

AirLand Battle and Corps 86,” 25 March 1981, p. 20 (7).

Army, December 1983. p. 50.

lem). Maj. I .G.W . K orte (FR G), Amberg, FR G, 27 December 1983, p. 4.

Review. J une 1983, p. 27.

CAPTAIN RONALD M.

SCHROCK, JR . was com-missioned into armor as adistinguished military grad-uate from Northeast Mis -

souri State University. H e isa graduate of the AOAC andhas served in a TRADOCBCT battalion, a FORSCOMarmor battalion and in th e1stArmored Division, USA-REUR. H e iscurrentlyone oftwo liaisonofficersfrom the1stArmored Division to theBundeswehr’s 4th PanzerGrenadier Division.

‘L



Killer Tank Crewsby Lieutenant Colonel James Crowley

Tank battles at the National T rainingCenter (NTC), like real battles in realwars, have shown that a very specialbreed of tank crew exists within theU.S. A rmy. T hese are the comparative-ly small number of tank crews thathave proven to be superstars. T heseelite crews often win battles for their

company or battalion. They avoid get-ting killed while they kill great numbersof enemy tanks. Their presence in thebattle and their effect on the battle iscritical. A t times they have literallychanged defeat into victory.

These Killer Tank Crews have con-firmed again and again what combatleaders have been saying for a longtime: the key element in winning warslies at the crew/platoon level - hepeople who do the shooting. A s such,they must be trained to survive.

To examine how these crews operatewe must look at the tank-versus-tankbattle. T he battle is won by the side thatwins the individual tank-versus-tankfights. Usually, these fights are of anattacker versus a defender, or a movingattacking tank versus a stationary de-fending tank.

Proper offensive and defensive posi-tioning are vital to survival. Good posi-tioning allows the defending tank to killa large number of attacking tanks with-out itself being killed.

A n attacking tank crew’s survival isdirectly related to its acquiring the, de-fending tank, which means knowing

where to look. For the defender. survi-

val lies in not being acquired or, ifacquired, moving fast, for the phrase“what can be seen can be hit,”although trite, is very true. Here aresome tried and true positioning tech-niques:

0 Have a backdrop and avoid any-thing that catches the eye. A skylined

tank isa dead tank. A lso, if a tank posi-tions itself by a large boulder, it can beacquired by association.

0 Use a full -hide position and stay init until the enemy is where you wanthim for engagement. A proneor dug-inforward observer gives a very smallsignature compared to a tank even onein a good firing position. A lso, the idealfiring position that puts the tank in fulldefilade against all possible return fireis very rare.

0 Use covered routes into and outofyour firing position. M ore tanks arekilled at the NTC moving into and out

of firing positions than are killed inopen battle. Experienced crews put ahigher priority on covered routes thanon the firing position itself.

0 A t night, no lights. Night visiondevices can detect red dome lightsthrough periscopes. T hey can seeblackout markers and even the reticlelight in a gunner’s sight. In MI ’S his isa real problem. There are some lightsthat can’t be turned off. Tape them.

0 Use window or keyhole position-ing. This isprobably the most success-ful positioning technique to come outof NT C training. Simply stated, this is

deliberately limiting a tank’s sector offire in order to limit its exposure. Be-cause the tank’s fields of fire are deli -berately limited, dependence upon OPsand mutual support with other posi-tions are vital to avoid being blindsi-ded.

0 M ove into position carefully.

Quick movements are easily seen. Hotrodding can throw up diesel fumes anddust. In this respect it is vital to keepthe air filters clean or excess dieselplumeing will result when you gun theengine.

0 Shoot, then move. Every shotfired increases the probabil ity of attack-ing tanks acquiring and engaging thedefending tank. Four or five rounds isthe maximum that can safely be firedfrom one position. Only if the crew iscertain that they have not beenacquired can they remain in that posi-tion. When you see the attacking tank’s

turrets starting to turn toward you, youhave been acquired -move.

0 Avoid shine. Plastic map cases,goggles, binoculars, eyeglasses, all cangive you away. Use eyeglass shades anduse the other items only when needed.Then stow them inside the tank.

The Defensive Techniques0 Use wingmen. T he wingman tech-

nique works. Both tanks cover thesame sector of fire. When one tank isout of action for any reason, the othercontinues to cover the sector. Wing-men also sense each other’s rounds.

ARMOR september-October1984 21



I ‘ . . .Ta get acquis i t iona n d p o s i t i o n i n g m ove-m e n t a r e a t l e a s t a si m p o r t a n t a s s t e e l - o n -target gunnery. . ”0 Tanks must be able to cover all

mounted approaches. T he companycommander must assign all tank sec-tions primary and secondary sectors offire. H e must ensure all mountedapproaches can be covered by tank fire.T he tank crew’s responsibil ity then isto select exact positions to cover thosesectors of fire, along with coveredroutes toand from those positions. Thecompany commander should go to thefront and observe his tanks’ positionsfrom the enemy side. Exact distancesto target reference points (TRPs) areranged. Dead space can be identified.

0

Practice movements. This practicemust be done as it will be done in bat-tle: buttoned up, in MOPP, and withgun tubes to the rear. M arking andwalking the routes is the driver’s res-ponsibility since he will have to do itduring battle while the tank command-er (TC) is watching the enemy.

0 Dispersion. The NTC guideline of75 meters or more between primaryand secondary positions is a provenitem. Wingmen must also be dispersedto prevent both being blinded bysmokeorboth being kil led together.

0 Don’t use berms. A berm must be

at least 20 feet thick to protect you tankagainst an APFSDS round. Instead, digthe tank down. With enough time andequipment, both a hide and firing posi-tion can be constructed. There havebeen instances when such well-con-structed positions allowed tanks to suc-cessfully fight from unfavorable openterrain. I n fact, there often is a surpriseeffect gained by occupying terrainwhere you’re not expected to be.

Now let’s take a look at techniquesthat have proven effective for attackingtanks.

The biggest need has already been

covered - he attacker must acquirethe defender. Ideally, defending tanksare acquired before they begin shoot-ing, but certainly they should beacquired after the first round. Eachtank in an attacking formation musthave an assigned sector of observation.Flanks and rear must be covered be-cause that’s where anti tank (A T )weapons will be positioned. T he naturaltendency to observe only in the direc-tion of travel must be overcome. Bino-culars should always be used and thegunner must use his sight for search-ing. The use of optics is difficult when

1

moving crosscountry. T he stabil izedsight on the M60A3/M1 solves the

problem for the gunner, but not for theTC. M any tanks use the short-halttechnique during which the tank haltsfor 5-10 seconds, a quick scan of thesector of observation is made, and thetank moveson.

0 T hings to look for. T he samethings you would avoid in the defense:shine, skylining, diesel plumesor dust,straight lines, anything different fromthe natural terrain. A lso, knowing howyou would position yourself if you werethe defender helps.

0 Stay together. Tanks achieve theirmaximum effect from mass shock.

Breaking up the mutual support of theattacking formation by moving too fastor too slow is a fatal error.

Never skyline yourself. K eep lowand try to keep some cover betweenyourself and the enemy. Perfect routesjust don’t exist, but every little bit ofcover helps.

0 React quickly. W hen you comeunder fire, you have two alternatives:stop and kill the enemy tank, or moveto cover. Y ou cannot ignore the firebecause modern A T weapons are tooaccurate and too deadly and have toohigh a rate of fire for you to ignore

them. Y our best answer is to kill thedefender. If you simply try to avoid hisfire, he will stil l be ali ve when you passhim and he will put one through yourgrill doors. I t is the abili ty to deliverkilling tank f ire while on the move thatseparates the winners and the losers atthe NTC.

0 Avoid kil ling zones. I f you see atank that has been killed by A T fire,give it a wide berth because if youmove closer than 75-100 meters to it,you are in the same sight picture thatkilled that tank. If you seea group ofdestroyed vehicles -move elsewhere,


fast; you are looking at a killing ground.A lso be careful when bypassing A T

ditches, mines or wire. Often the by-pass route isinto a kill zone.

CrewDuties

While the basic crew duties do notchange, the experience of Killer Tank

Crewsat the NT C indicate that a shift inemphasis is necessary. T he tasks offighting the tank, picking firing posi-tions, looking for the enemy, maintain-i.ng contact with friendly elements andall the tactical aspects of operating thetank are very much a fulltime job andrequire the TC’s full attention. The restof the crew must be able to perform

their functions with the minimuminvolvement of the T C to allow this fo-

Gunner. H e handles all functionsof hitting the target once he announces“identif ied.” T he gunner senses hisown and his wingman’s rounds. Thegunner, with his higher resolutionoptics, must assist the TC in acquiringtargets. T he gunner will often takecommand of the tank when moving offthe firing position if he sees the ene-my’s turrets turning toward his tank.

0 L oader. Helps the TC acquire tar-gets and servesas air guard. D irects the

driver when reversing so that the TCcan keep watch over the battlefield.T he loader is often assigned close-inareas of watch while the TC concen-trates on areas farther afield. Becausehis job of loading the gun ishard workin a ‘target rich’ environment, heshould be the best conditioned man inthe crew.

0 Driver. H e is probably the mostunderrated crew member. Good terraindriving requires a good driver. He se-lects the exact route based on the TC’sgeneral directions. H e must knowwhere the enemy isand keep the tank

cus.



as much hull -down as possible. H emust be alert to ground conditions toprevent track throwing. H e must checkthe route for mines. H e must do all thisindependent of T C supervision. Thedriver of the M6OAS/MI’is almost asimportant in hitting a target as the gun-ner when firing on the move. H e must

drive smoothly and steadily.

Steel onTargetSo far, we have gone over lessons

that have come out of engagement sim-ulation, or M IL ES force-on-forcebattles at the NTC. A lot of live-firelessons have been learned as well andthey include:

0 Know the ranges to TRPs and useprecision gunnery. The gunner shouldmemorize TRP ranges. With a laserrangefinder, use the TRP to confirmthe target range.

0 Reload the turrret. During any

break in the battle, transfer roundsfrom the hull to the turret. If you fireonly three rounds, replace them.

L earn to use the 105D It is amore robust sight than the M32. It isharder to use and requires more effort,but gunners mustknow how to use it.

0 Check defilade from the gun, notthe sight, because the M 32 is wellabove gun tube level.

Boresight. A nytime you move,boresighting may be required. Bore-sight three times a day - t first light,at midday, and at last light.

Odds and EndsWhile not fitting into any single cate-

gory used before, there are numerousother tricks used by Killer Tank Crewsat the NTC:

0 Use of onboard smoke is fatal ifnot used properly. T hree keys to suc-cessful use of smoke are touse it onlywhen someone is shooting at you, putit between you and the enemy, anddon’t use it longer than necessary.

0 Thermal IDat night is even moredifficult than daylight ID.

Ballistic shields down. T he firstthing to do when receiving indirect fi reis to close your ball istic shields to pre-vent damage to your optics.

Tie down antennas. Point themaway from the enemy. This reducesboth the visual and electronic signa-ture.

0 V ehicle recognition. T here havebeen many battles where tanks havekilled almost as many friendly as ene-my tanks. Gunner/T C knowledge ofvehicle recognition i s vital. T he oldtechnique of keeping the gun tube to-ward the enemy gives a better chanceof recognizing a withdrawing friendlytank from an attacking enemy tank.

How To Get ThereSo far we’ve described some of the

tactics, techniques and tricks that KillerTank Crewsuse. N one of them is hardto understand; however, their applica-tion and execution against a real enemyisgoing to be difficult.

How do we train our tank crews to

execute their jobs properly on thebattlefield? T he answer is simple:MILES. The techniques presented herewere not developed at the A rmorSchool; they were developed by tankcrews who learned from their M ILESexperience what worked and whatdidn’t work. Crews that are trained of-ten with MILES learn the arts of targetacquisition, positioning, good move-ment and all the other techniques thatmake the difference between the livetank crew and the dead tank crew and itmakes the training fun and challenging.

However, suffi cient MI LES equip-

ment is not always available, nor areadequate training areas or time. Hereare some suggestions to help overcomethese deficiencies:

0 Concentrate on crew/section/pla-toon-level training first of all. Trainingat these levels must be learned to stan-dard before advanced training can beundertaken. If individual crews aren’tadequately trained it is impossible totrain at higher levels. M ulti-echelontraining isyour ultimate goal, but thehigher you go, the fewer the number ofindividual crew actions that can betrained for. A t platoon level, perhaps

three or four exercises can be run aday. A t battalion level, one exercise perday is the norm.

0 U se the after-action review(A A R). A great deal of crew trainingtakes place after the exercise when theopposing crews and evaluators discusswhat has happened, why it happened,and how it could be done better. Unitsof ten ski mp on providing trainedevaluators. Don’t. A A R every trainingevent!

0 KISS. K eep it simple, son. Thereis no real need to develop elaboratescenarios or to get all wrapped up inOP FO R tactics. A t the NT C, theOPFOR tank battalion uses simplegames li ke “tank tag,” where twotanks are placed at opposite sides of apiece of terrain and told to take it. Or“king of the hill,” where a couple oftanks are positioned on a hill and therest of the company surrounds andattacks.

0 Train your crews to use MILES.How to mount, boresight, and shootM ILES must be mastered if crews areto be effectively trained.

Change tanks and rotate crewsrather than taking time to remount the

ARMOR

M IL ES and re-boresight it. Alwaysboresight the M IL ES when changingtanks.

SummaryEngagement simulation with MILES

is the proven method of improvingtank crew performance. The only prob-lem is the lack of M ILES equipment,

especially if M ILES is to be used as anintegral part of tank gunnery programs.We must expand our definition of

tank gunnery skills. Target acquisitionand positioning movement are at leastas important as steel-on-target gun-nery. I n fact, as our gunnery systemsbecome moreand more rapid and accu-rate, the tactical aspects of gunnery be-come even more critical. We shouldformally include M IL ES engagementsimulations in expanded gunnery pro-grams.

The revisions of FM 17- 12- 1, TankTactical Tables, are a step in the right

direction but don’t go far enough.T hese tables are li ve-f ire gunnerytables using MILES. We should usefree play force-on-force to train tankcrews in the basic gunnery skills. Thiswould require less lead and preparationtime and less OPFOR training andcoordination than the tactical tables inthe manual.

Force-on-f orce training is morebattlefield-oriented. I t teaches crews tofunction with the flexibility and initia-tive they will need to win in rea1,battle.I t provides the motiviation and feed-back required for tank crews to build

themselves into Killer Tank Crews.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL

JAMES CROWLEY grad-uated from USMA in 1967.

He has served as a tank pla-toon leader in RVN, tankc o m p a n y a n d H H T com -mander, and battalion andsquadron S-3 in USAREUR.He is presently assigned asC h i e f , A n a l y s is B r a n c h ,NTC Division, at the Com-bined Arms Center at FortLeavenworth, KS.




COBRA: The Normandy Breakoutby Captain Stephen D.Borows

One month after D-Day, A ll ied plan-ners had envisaged controlling the

whole of N ormandy, including the ma-jor town of Caen. But by July, a mill ionAll ied troops were still bottled up in abeachhead only 3% miles deep thatcould be pushed back into the sea bythe opposing 650,000 Germans. Only17All ied airfields were in operation inthe beachhead area with just thirty-onefighter squadrons. A nd the airfieldswere subject to periodic shell ing.

General E isenhower, Supreme Com-mander, Allied Forces in Europe,wrote to the A rmy’s Chief of Staff,General George Marshall, of his diffi-

culties in achieving a breakout. H eattributed his lack of success to threefactors: One, the superior fightingqualities of theSSand parachute troopsof the German Seventh A rmy; two, theNormandy countryside that was idealfor defense and precluded the massiveuse of armor and, three, the terribleweather in the English Channel whichhad inflicted horrendous damage onAllied equipment, had broken up theartificial harbors at the beaches and, ingeneral, infl icted five times the damageto A ll ied equipment than the enemyhad doneon D-Day.

A mong other negative results of theweather, the A ll ied ammunition supplyhad been reduced by one-third.

The Normandy countryside was anextensive patchwork of tangled shrubsand trees up to fifteen feet in heightand three to four feet thick. T hesehedgerows, called bocuge. had been set

by French farmers generations beforeto mark the boundaries of their fieldsand to protect their crops from the seawinds. The bocuge severely restrictedmobility and visibili ty and, combinedwith the fact that few good roads exist-ed in the area, gave the enemy greatadvantages in his defense. I t seems thatthe D-D ay planners had paid less atten-tion to the Normandy bocuge than theyhad to the beaches.

I t would fall to American ingenuity

and technical know-how to solve theproblem of cutting through thehedgerows that imposed a style of warthat the Americans were unsuited for,both by temperment and training. Thiswas to be a war that demanded com-bined arms operations, something theAmerican Army had not practised to

Hit by an 88-mm antitank gun as it

approached Avranches, an M4A3 of the

U.S. 4th Armored Division burns in a

field.

any great degree prior to the invasion.A solution to the bocuge problem

came from Sergeant Curtis Culin of the2d A rmored Division’s 102d CavalryReconnaissance Squadron. Sergeant

Two Panther tanks of the Panzer Lehr

Division knocked out in early July,

1944, when they attempted to counter-

attack.




Shaded area on map of France pin-points tiny beachhead held by theAllies prior to Operation COBRA

breakout. Several earlier attemptsmade little headway.

Culin welded steel prongs to the frontof Allied tanks, which allowed thetanks to dig in and uproot a portion of

the hedges. T he prongs were hastilywelded up from steel girders that hadbeen part of the German beach defens-es.

General Omar Bradley, 1st U.S.Army Commander, saw the Culin de-vice on J uly 14 and ordered it mass-produced. During the breakout opera-tions, three out of five U. S. tanks wereequipped with the “rhinoceros hedge-cutter” which proved to work, provid-ing much better mobility for the armor.

Other improvisations, like externaltelephones on the rear decks of thetanks and infantry-frequency radiosinside the tanks, increased the Ameri-cans ability to tight as tank-infantryteams. T he leading tanks in the offen-sive were equipped with V HF aircraft-frequency radios, and every armoredcolumn had an on-station patrol of 3 to4 P-47 fighter-bombers orbiting over-head on half-hour shifts, ready forimmediate air strikes. Very rarelywould the Luftwaffeever contest Alliedair superiority over Normandy. Thisadvantage would have a dramatic,

though not decisive, effect in thebreakout.

The Germans, despite the need forforces to contain the Soviet armies inthe East and to block Allied advancesin Italy, had amassed 20 divisions tooppose the 34 Allied divisions in Nor-mandy. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel,Commander of Army Group B, wouldvery effectively check the A ll iedadvance and would prevent them fromquickly breaking out onto the openplains where they could employ theirarmored superioritytoadvantage.

On 28 J une, the Germans dividedtheir forces into two groups to accomo-date their newly-arriving reinforce-ments and to meet the likely Alliedbreakthrough attempts.

The logical place for a breakout wasin the east, in the British Second A rmysector around Caen. The ground therewas flatter and more open, and a break-out there would threaten the commu-nications of all the German forces inNormandy. Therefore, Rommel placedfour corps under control of PanzerGroup Westin the Caen sector.

British intelligence, however,

underestimated the depth of the Ger-

- - -NUKMANDY oPariS

5 BR ITANY

France

If”The AlliedBeachheadJuly, 1944 1wpain -cale ,01

man front as well as the number of re-serves the Germans would be able to

commit to their area. Of the 13 divi-sions of Panzer Group West, 10wereconcentrated on the 35-mile Caenfront. Among these were fiveSS PanzerDivisions, including 250 mediumPanther and 150 heavy Tiger tanks.All ied tanks were hopelessly outclassedby the Tigers.

On 18 uly the British opened Opera-tion Goodwoodwith three armored divi-sions commanded by L ieutenant Gen-eral Sir Richard O’Connor. The attack,made east of Caen, followed a massive,2,100 plane air strike.

The German defenses in the Caenarea were organized in depth, withinfantry forward and the panzers back,east of Caen. A t a crucial moment ofthe attack, a Panther battalion of the 1stSS Panzer Division came up on the dis-engaged side of an armored brigade ofthe British 11h Armored Division andoccupied critical high ground. Whenthe British brigade topped the open riseeast of Caen, near Cagny, it cameunder murderous antitank and tankgun fire. The British pushed forwardlong after they had lost their initialmomentum, and the 11th A rmored

lost 126 tanks in the first day. They lost

ARMOR

a further 200 tanks before repulsing acounterattack that ended Goodwoodon

21 July.Operation Goodwood was regarded as

a failure by General Eisenhower be-cause it failed to break out and to reachits tactical objectives. Goodwood didclean out the area east of Caen but at acost of 500tanks. Tothe British SecondArmy paradoxically, the bloody Britishrepulse made the eventual A mericanbreakout possible by confirming theGerman hunch that Caen was the cru-cial area. This contributed to the weak-ness of the German front in the US.First A rmy sector where the Germanshad placed only two corps.

General Bradley was already plan-ning his version of a breakout to bemade on 8 July. He planned an attackon a limited front close to the westernend of the beachhead area. I t was to cutoff the German troops and pin themagainst the coast of the Cherbourg pen-insula. The plan was finalized on 13 J u-ly and Operation Cobra was to begin on18 uly.

The area chosen for this attack wason Major General Lawton Collins’ V I1U.S. Corps front of about 4.5 miles.General Bradley concentrated three

infantry divisions (9th, 4th and 30th)

September-October1984 25



for the assault with the 1st Infantry and

2d and 3d A rmored Divisions poisedfor exploitation and pursuit. A vailableartil lery tubes amounted to 83 for each1.6 miles of f ront.

However, the key to Cobra was amassive aerial bombardment to satu-rate a zone of 7,000 yards by 2,500yards. This area was to be pounded forthree hours by more than 1,500 B-17and B-24 heavy bombers dropping3,300 tons of HE; more than 380 medi-um bombers dropping fragmentationbombs, and more than 550 fi ghter-bombers dropping 200 tons of HE andnapalm. T he purpose of this air strikewas to severely disrupt, if not destroy,communications and create havoc inthe German lines.

Once the initial rupture had beenmade, the U.S. VI11 and X IX Corpswould launch limited attacks to tiedown the surviving Germans and pre-vent their redeployment to seal off thegap. The 9th and 30th Infantry Divi-sions and part of the 4th Infantry Divi-sion of VI1 Corps were to make theinitial penetrations and secure theflanks of the breach, creating a “de-

fended corridor.” The tanks would besent in through this corridor. The mo-torized 1st Infantry Division, with partof 3d Armored Division, was to boltthrough the hole and attack towardCoutances, while the remainder of 3dA rmored Division was to make a wideend sweep toward that town and 2dA rmored Division would sweep evenwider to the southeast.

T he Germans were already in amuch weakened state. I n the fiercefighting since the invasion, PunzerGroup Westand Seventh Army had suf-fered nearly 117,000 casualties, but

had received less than 12,000 replace-

ments. Similarly, of the total 250 tanks

lost during this period, only 17 replace-ments had arrived at the front. A ll iedair strikes had destroyed most if not allof the German reinforcements on theirway to the front.

Counting upon this sheer numericaladvantage in troops and equipment,the All ies set the target date for theattack as 20 July, a two-day postpone-ment from the original date. A furtherpostponement until 1300 hours, 24 J u-ly, was caused by bad weather. Thatmorning, however, A ir Chief MarshalSir Trafford L eigh-Mallory, command-er of the A ll ied Expeditionary A irForce, decided that the weather wastoo overcast and unsuitable and can-celled the air strike. Unfortunately, theorder did not reach all the air units andmore than 300 bombers went aheadwith the mission. The results were trag-ic.

The bombers were given a clearly-defined coordination Doint. the road

from St. L o to Periers, but we

allowed to bomb only on a north-souline, rather than parallel to the frowhich was roughly east-west. GenerBradley had withdrawn his troops 8yards from the marker road, but sombombs were released short of the aiming point and 25 A mericans were killand 131 wounded. The infantry divsions launched probing attacks aftthis abortive bombing, but achieved signif icant results. A fresh start wordered for 1100 the next day.

Paradoxically, this miscarriage of thCobra plan made the Germans oveconfident; they believed they hathwarted a major attack, and subsquently relaxed their vigil. When thfull air bombardment began 22 houlater, the Germans were doubly suprised. M ore than 4,150 tons of bomwere dropped and Punzer Lehr Divsion, which took the brunt of the aassault, ceased to function as an effetive force. L ieutenant General FriJ

I * n h * . ) above, and at left and right,U9 units surge into Coutances

4 early oDjective of the COBRA breakoThe- tank above is a howitzer-arm

Sherman, favored for its 105-mm f

power and heavier armor. Light tanlike the M5A1 and Shermans with

more common 75-mm gun often fac

murderous antitank fire from heav

German guns in well-concealed def

sive positions.




An American 57-mm antitank gun crew,

mounted in a halftrack, rolls past theshell-pocked village church at Villeidieu

les-Poeles.

General Collins nevertheless decid-ed to commit his armor and the tankswent in soon after daybreak on 26 July.M ajor G eneral Edward H. Brookes,commanding 2d Armored Division onthe left flank, took St. Gilles by theafternoon. They made good progressand, in fact, achieved the greatestpenetration on VI1 Corps front. A t thesame time, the 1st Infantry Division,with Combat Command B of 3dA rmored Division under Major Gener-

al ClarenceA. Huebner, attacked tow-ard Marigny, aiming to capture thattown quickly and push on toward Cou-tances.

The main attack was held up by stub-born resistance, and was finallyblocked when the commander of theGerman 84 Corps, L ieutenant Generalvon Choltitz, rapidly switched ele-

ments of 17 Panzer Division south toblock the roads to Coutances. On 27July, the rest of 3d A rmored Divisonwas committed, but inadequate andbomb-cratered roads did not permiteffective deployment.

The initial Cobraforces of VI1Corpshad achieved only a disappointing andpartial success. What they had done,however, was to attract the slim Ger-man reserves to their area from the Bri-tish area. Thus, whenVI11Corps underMajor General Troy Middleton beganits holding attack on the morningof 26July, it found little German opposition.By the 27th, the enemy had disengagedfrom the VI1 Corps front. Despitesuspicion about a possible Germanwithdrawal, the Americans were toocautious (after the hedgerow fighting)to prevent it.

On 28 July, Brigadier General IsaacD. White’s CCB , 2d A rmored Divi-sion, was dispatched southeast to cutoff the German retreat. The 82d Re-connaissance Battalion of White’s CCBpushed through the defenses beforethe Germans were aware of what wasgoing on and seized blocking positionssouth of Coutances. A ny oppositionwas eliminated by the combined armsteam perfected in the hedgerow fight-ing -infantry-armor-artillery support-ed by fighter-bombers.

By 28 July, General Bradley sensed

that the door had been kicked open,

and ordered General GeorgeS. Patton,whose Third A rmy was scheduled tobecome operational at 1200 hours, 1

August, to “supervise” the advance ofMiddleton’s VI11 Corps on the coastalflank. This command arrangement

would establish a useful continuitybetween the exploitation of the Cobra

breakout and future operations in Brit-tany.

General Patton immediately tookover. Even in his limited supervisingrole, he began to embellish the attackplan with his own brand of audacity. H ewithdrew his infantry spearheads andreplaced them with two armored divi-sions, the 4th, commanded by M ajorGeneral J ohn S. Wood, and the 6th,commanded by M ajor General RobertW. Grow.

Grow’s force, attacking south along

the coast, was to exert the main effort.M idd le ton’ s armored d iv is ionadvanced more than eight miles a dayagainst weak opposition. T he maineffort had now shifted from VI1 Corpsto VI11 Corps as the flow of the battleovertook the attack plans. By the even-ing of 28 July, the German 84th Corpshad lost effective control of its units.Most of the survivors were trying toescape and evade to the southeast. Onthe 29th, A merican fighter-bomberspounced on a traffic jam and destroyedmore than 500German vehicles.

In the original plan, Coutances hadbeen the pinnacle, but the situationhad changed drastically. With theentire German Seventh A rmy on therun, and Coutances already taken byColonel Bruce C. Clarke’s CCA , 4th

Armored, on the 28th, Avranches had

28 ARMUR September-October 1984

~



These cavalry troopers attached to the4th Armored Division get a welcome anda cool bottle of Normandy cider as theypass through L e Repas on the push to-ward Avranches. A t left is an Ope1 Blitztruck registered to a German SS divi-

sion. The cavalrymen are in M- 8armored cars, mounting 37-mm guns.

become the primary objective- t wasthe gateway to Brittany, and, in view ofthe resistance being encountered nowin all other sectors, itwas probably theonly way out of Normandy for the Ger-mans.

On 29 July, with their sights set firm-ly on Avranches, 6th and 4th ArmoredDivisions again moved south, with themore experienced 4th assigned the taskof taking Avranches itself and securing

bridge crossings over the Selume Riverto the east.CC B of the 4th Armored advanced

18 miles on 30 J uly to captureAvranches, the vital point in the areafor both attack and defense. It con-tained the only road south within tenmiles of the coast; it was bordered onthree sides by water; and it stood on aheight of 200 feet that gave artillerycommanding fieldsof fire overlookingthe bridges over the Selume at Pontau-bault. This allowed General Patton,with his newly-activated Third Army,to push seven divisions over that

bridge within the next three days andget behind the German front.

The Cobra breakout was complete.First and Third Armies of GeneralBradley's newly-designated 12th Army

Group could now pour through the gapand begin to end the war in westernEurope.

Overall, German losses in the Nor-mandy campaign were 2 10,000 prison-ers and230,000 other casualties. How-ever, neither the aerial bombardmentnor the unplanned advance of V 11

Corps had succeeded in destroying theGermans in western Normandy. Thesuccess of Operation Cobra resultedfrom the Allied preponderance of forcerather than a novel application of stra-tegic airpower.

It is interesting to note that theU. S.

Army in Europe avoided the useof car-pet bombing in its operational planningthroughout the rest of WW 11.Strategically, however,Cobrabroke theNormandy stalemate and prepared theway for the rapid liberationof Paris on25 August.

J ust as at Sedan in 1940, whenFrance succumbed to the radical Ger-man blitzkrieg tactics, it would be thespeed of an armored advance and adeptuse of combined arms that would disor-ganize and confuse an enemy who wastoo large to destroy with a head-onfrontal assault.

CAPTAIN STEPHEN D. BO-ROWS is a 1976 graduate ofVirginia Military Instituteand was a candidate for amasters degree at the Uni-versity of Louisville in 1983.

He was an instructor and

military historian at Com-mand, Staff and DoctrineDepartment, USAAR MS,Fort Knox from 1980, to1981. He is a graduate ofthe airborne and rangerschools and the FrenchCommand School No. 4. Heserved as a tank and caval-ry platoon leader, a brigadeheadquarters company XO,an armor battalion assistantS1 and assistant54, andanAIT company commander atFort Knox in 1982 and 1983.




Thoughts on Counterattacksby Captain William D. Hewitt

Successful counterattacks at the bri-gade level and below reduce the attack-er’s initiative and present opportunitiesfor division and higher commanders tobegin in-depth operations against theenemy’s follow-on echelons.

Current U.S. doctrine, as stated inFM 100-5, Operations, states that coun-terattacks “are based on reasonableassumptions about the enemy and on

the battlefield conditions. Once theconditions are met or nearly met, thecommander launches the attack. . .”and “companies and larger forces maylaunch counterattacks.”

This brings us to several meaningfulquestions that must be answered be-fore proceeding.

0 Exactly what are the assumptionsand the conditions to be consideredand when are they met?

0 Should lower-level commandersnot consider the planned counterattackas part of their defensive plan? If so,they should then be concerned onlywith seizing the initiative if and whenan opportunity presents itself.

0 If counterattacks can be planned

as part of the overall defense, are theyonly effective against weakened forces?

Can counterattack be used duringany phase of the defensive battle?

The lower-level commander has amission to perform counterattacks be-cause seizing the initiative is his con-stant goal. The planning for a counter-attack, however, requires him to knowand understand the overall situation.

Our doctrine and planning assumewe will fight the Soviets in Europe. Theonly history we have of counterattacksagainst Soviet breakthrough tacticscomes from the Germans.

After WWII, the Department of theArmy published studies with inputfrom senior German ofiicers that offer

an illuminating picture of the SovietArmy and the evolution of its tacticsfrom1941to 1945.The Germans knewthat the Soviets “will go forward no

matter what the consequence”,l thatthe weakest element (of the Sovietforce) was the intermediate and lowercommanders;z and that counterattacksat every level had a profound effect ondelaying advances and causing confu-sion up through the chain of com-mand.3

Armed with this insight, the Ger-mans identified the tactical considera-tions in planning and executing coun-

terattacks. Being severely outnum-bered, with the order to fight for everymeter of ground, the Germans turnedfrom the linear defense to the mobile,elastic defense with reserve forces forcounterattacks. They accepted penetra-tions and planned for them.

Preparation for the counterattack be-gan in training which was “aimed atimparting toughness, independence,and willingness to accept responsibility,and the molding of self-reliant indivi-dual fighters as wel as leaders who are

willing to take chances”4 in fighting theRed Army. Counterattacks wereplanned and the battlefield was organ-izedsothat it contributed to the coun-terattack effort. Deceiving the enemyas to friendly intentions and as to thelocation of the forward line of defensewas critical.5

Using infantry in the static (holding)area to shape the battlefield with sup-porting artillery and antitank weapons,the counterattack forces were com-posed of units with firepower and mo-bility.6 The Germans believed thatcounterattack forces must be concealed

from enemy detection until the time ofcommitment, with the size of that forcenot exceeding one-third that of theenemy force.’ The holding force anddefensive plan had to be such to with-stand a 1:s enemy superiority for ashort period.*

Timing was crucial. If the counterat-tacking force was committed too early,the goal of attacking the flankor rear ofthe enemy was lessened or lost alto-gether. If the force was committed toolate, it exposed its flanks to follow-onechelons, or the breachof the penetra-tion became too wide for the counterat-




‘ I . . .Remember that the Soviet second echelon followsthe main thrust by 4 to 6 kilometers. That translates to 12to 18 minutes. . .”tack force to have the desired effect. In

planning, the Germans knew that thedanger to the counterattacking forceswas less serious than anticipated be-cause the Russians usually committedtheir forces almost exclusively alongthe axis of advance with little attentionto their flank@ in executing, the Ger-mans realized that it was not a cavalrycharge but rather an attack by fire fromstationary positions which might thenbefollowed by an assault.10 Assaults wereconducted cautiously as there were nu-merous incidents of Soviet tank crewsand individuals who played dead orappeared to surrender only to begin fir-

ing at an opportune time.”The German actions at Kirovograd

in 1944, where 56 tanks and 109 assaultguns held and finally neutralized aforce of 620 Soviet tanks. and theactions of the 15th Punzer Regimentnear Stalingrad, where 24 tanks des-troyed 72 tanks without the loss of asingle man, are worthy of our study.The Germans made counterattackseverybody’s business from companylevel through army group.

And Today?Are these tactics still applicable, and

are the Soviets and their allies still sus-ceptible to these tactics? METT consi-derations determine whether or not acounterattack is possible. Obviously, ifyour mission is to hold a strongpoint,you’ll probably not be counterattack-ing. Missions to delay or defend, how-ever, open the door.

Looking at the Soviet Army of today,there are striking similarities with theRed Army of the past. With regard tothe command environment, low-levelcommanders still suffer from lack ofinitiative.12 Speed is still an obsessionand is preferred over maneuver andaccurate fire, and flank security is bestobtained by aggressive advance.13 Thecommander must maintain the offen-sive and forward movement - theobjective must be taken on time be-cause delays lead to a breakdown inplans.14 Although the Soviet regimen-tal commander is less inclined to takerisks, he would prefer theU.S. defend-well-forward concept, since it thins thedefense in depth and hinders lateralmovement and counterattacks.lsAlthough the Soviet commander maybe a bit more sophisticated than his

father, he is still limited by his doctrine.

According toour intelligence, Soviet

doctrine has not significantly changedwith regards to frontages and depthsince WWII. At present, the divisionalbreakthrough attack has a 4-7 kilomet-

er front, while in 1941 it had a 4-6 kilo-meter front and in 1945 it had a 2-5kilometer front.16 The depth of a divi-sion mission (intermediate objective)is 20-30 kilometers today; in the laterstages of WWII the mission was 10-15kilometers from the point of contact.The flanks of this breakthrough attackwere not heavily defended and could beattacked with available resources.17

The effectiveness of Soviet weapon

systems and personnel strength levelshave certainly increased over the past40 years. In WWII, a 500-meter shotfor a tank required some Kentuckywindage.

Today, a 1,500-meter shot is com-mon and the range of ATGMs exceedeven that of tanks. Thousands moremen and many more tanks have signifi-cantly affected the factor of mass inSo-viet units.

Knowing to some degree of certaintywhat effects this mass can have againsthim, the U.S. commander should de-termine whether he can afford to risk a

counterattack, whether or not he canafford to lose the counterattack force,and how big the counterattack forcehas to be to ensure success. Situationaltemplating, event templating and ter-rain analysis will give the commandersome idea as to how many targets will

face him at any one time.Open, flat terrain with little vegeta-

tion and wide avenues of approach les-sen the possibility for planned counter-attacks, because the attacker has moreavailable maneuver options. Europe’sundulating, canalizing terrain withthick vegetation along the flanks ofavenues of approach offers numerousopportunities. Desert wadis and gulliespresent similar opportunities.

Finally, let’s look at troops available.With the current discussion concerningpenetrating power, special armor char-acteristics, and actual probability of hitfactors versus the published factors,the weapons of the holding force mustbe able to penetrate the front slope ofSoviet tanks in order to keep sufficientpressure on the enemy. The weaponsof the counterattacking force must beable to penetrate the sides of Soviet

tanks. Tank-heavy forces should usual-

ARMOR

ly be used in the counterattack. Before

my infantry friends lose interest, let’slook at the numbers. TOWs-whethermounted in M113s, improved TOWvehicles, or Bradleys - require moretime for reloading than tanks and theround requires a longer time of flightthan the tank round. Graphically, theeffectiveness of the TOW roundcatches and surpasses the APDS roundat extended ranges. Using the proba-bility of hit (Ph) factor in FM 71-2, theTOW becomes more effective at rangesover 2,000 meters. A word of cautionabout published Ph factors: These arebased on the weapons systems charac-

teristics, not on battlefield experience.My computations from observing aunit at the National Training Center(NTC) for a two-week period indicatethe Ph factors drop dramatically in thatenvironment. Every unit will have dif-fering Ph factors, determined by train-ing and experience, and type of weap-ons and vehicle systems.

Air assets for the counterattack are apowerful factor. They are, however, aconstant for the ground commander,applicable with the same statisticswhether in support of tanks or TOWs.Engineer assets in the defense should

be used for countermobility. Theirefforts slow the enemy, protect theholding force from penetration and thecounterattack force from being out-flanked, and force the enemy into thearea where you want him.

Planning and ExecutionAfter considering METT and deter-

mining that a counterattack is feasible,the commander begins his preparationand planning. Templating and terrainanalysis will provide the requiredinformation. Remember that the Sovi-et second echelon follows the main

thrust by 4 to 6 kilometers. That trans-lates to 12 to 18 minutes. This windowtells the commander how many weap-ons systems to commit to the counter-attack force.

In planning, remember that as thesize of the counterattack force increas-es, the risk to the parent unit increasesbecause it lessens the size of the hold-ing force. If the size of the counterat-tack force is too small for the mission,it increases the risk to the counterat-tack force; i.e., if situational templatingindicates that you will be facing one

regiment in the pocket, a company size

september-October 1984 31



‘ I . . .A dismounted unit should be detailed to ensure allenemy forces are dead within the pocket.. .”

forceisenough. If you can anticipate abattalion-size enemy force in the pock-et, perhaps due to narrow avenues ofapproach or other constraints, then aplatoon is sufficient.

Because of the enemy’s doctrinalfixation to the front, his target acquisi-tion problem, the element of surprise,the advantage of being in well-preparedpositions (if the engineers have timeafter their countermobility mission),and the need for high rates of fire for abrief period of time, firing from oneposition should be considered. Oncethe enemy begins to bring effective fire

against the force, then movement toalternate positions must be executed. Ifa large force is required, the command-er may decide to have an element oneach side of the penetration. This addsto the confusion, but it also adds to thesecurity problem. Protecting the flanksand rear of the counterattack force isthe mission for security forces usinghasty minefields along trails and atchokepoints.

The placement of the force duringthe counterattack shoul d al lowobservation and fields of fire extendingover the engagement area, and shouldobviously not surpass the effectiverange of the weapons. The locationshould allow the entire lead echeloninto the pocket, and provide rear (pre-ferably) and flank shots for the coun-terattacking force. This force may be inhide positions along the enemy axis ofadvanceso that it is either bypassedormoves forward from the forward line oftroops. The first alternative lessens thetiming problem. The commander canmore accurately anticipate the time re-

quired for movement into firing posi-tions. Specific orders and signals mustbe prearranged.

Finally, the fire support officer(FSO) needs to initially plan supportfor the holding force, to include air-bursts to keep the enemy buttoned up.The FSO must also specifically targetenemy overwatch positions outside themouth of the engagement area for thepurpose of isolating the first echelonwith smokeorWP.

In executing the counterattack, thetime of commitment is during the win-dow between enemy echelons. As the

enemy approaches the obstacle protect-ing the holding force, the counterattackforce should be in firing positions, andbegin firing either on orderorupon sig-nal. The FSO shifts some of the firesusing smoke, to the key terrain outsidethe pocket, while maintaining airburstfires above the engagement area. Se-curity forces protect the flanks withambushes and emplaced mines. Again,I would recommend that the forceengage targets continuously from oneposition rather than changing to alter-nate positions until the enemy bringseffective fire against them.

After the counterattack, the com-mander must decide whether to movethe counterattacking force back to theholding force lineor use it as an anchorto move the rest of his forces back intooriginal positions to begin a generaloffensive against the follow-on echelonbefore it deploys. A dismounted unitshould be detailed to ensure all enemyforces are dead within the pocket, if anadvance into original positions is de-sired.

FootnoteslDepartmentof the Army Pam 20-230, Russian

Combut Methou3 in World War I I , Department ofthe Army, W ashington, D.C ., November 1950, p.‘4.

zIbid, p. 16.3Ibid, p. 35.41bid, p. 116.SGeneral (Retir ed) William Depuy, ‘%enemls

Bolck ond Yon Mellenthin on Toctics: mplicotions orNATO M i l i to~ octrine”, BDM Corporation, 19December 1980. pp. 7-21.

6Department of the Army Pam 20-233, GermonDefense TocricsAgoinstRussian Breokfhroughs,De-partmentof the Army, Washington, D.C ., October1951,p. 3.

’I bid, p. 9.*I bid, p. 57.

%bid, p. 9.1°Depuy, op.citp.22.“Department of the Army Pam 20-269, Smoll

UnitActions During theGermonCompuign nRussio.Department of the Ar my, Washington, D.C., J uly1953. p.4.

lZM ajorRobert M . Frasche. TheSovietMotorizedRifleBottolion.DDB-1100-197-78, Defense I ntelli-gence Agency, November 1978, p. 46.

13FieldM anual 30-102, pp.2-8.I 4A .A . Sidorenko, The Offensive -A Soviet

Vi ew US Government Printing Office, Washing-ton D.C., 1970, p. 72

l3Major (P) Donald L. M e a . The Soviet Regi-mentol Commonder, M ilitary Review, VolumeLXI I , No. 8, August 1982. p.37.

I 6A.A . Sidorneko,op.cit.p.81.1’LTC J ohn Baker, J r ., “Where the Soviets Are

Vulnemble”,Army Magazine, August 1978. p. 25.

This is an attempt to identify techni-ques and considerations. M y observa-tions from the NTC indicate that smallunits should be prepared to be by-passed, and should be conditioned tocontinue offensive actions into theflanks and rear of bypassing forces.These small unit actions can have sig-nificant impact in taking the initiativeaway from the attacker.

All sizes of units should be preparedto conduct counterattacks if the situa-tion arises; units should also plan coun-terattacks as part of their general defen-sive plan. Because of their lethality and

effect on our morale, small unit leadersneed to understand how to apply thetechniques and considerations becausecounterattacks are not for the light-hearted. Senior commanders musthave confidence in their subordinatesand need J i ngerspi tzengefuei (a feel forthe battlefield and the enemy in his fin-gertips) to conduct or supervise thecounterattack.

CAPTAIN WILLIAM D.

H E W I T T was a Distin-guishedMilitary Graduate atPenn State University in

1976. He served as platoonleader, battalion executiveofficer and company com-mander. He isa graduate othe Armor Officer AdvancedCourse and recently com-manded B Company. 1stBattalion, 66th Armor at FortHood, Texas. He attendedthe Army Command andGeneral Staff College, FortLeavenworth, Kansas, andis currently a project officerat the A rmy Training Board,FortEustis. Virginia.




Two motorcycles scouts in training practice off-road driving in remote Western Oregon.

New Roles for Combat Motorcyclesby First Lieutenant Patrick Marr and CW 3 Daniel Kingsley

Two Wheelers MasterCavalry MissionsIn9th ID Test

Battlefield employment of the mo-torcycle is not a new concept. Motor-cycles have seen action in every majortheater of war fromWW I to Grenada.While not new, the development of

motorcycle operational concepts hasbeen one of continuous evolution andchange. Their capability has nowreached a new high, and the applicationof their inherent mobility, speed andmaneuverability offers exciting poten-tial to the enterprising combat com-mander.

HistoryWW I saw the motorcycle commonly

used as a courier vehicle. It proveditself in providing rapid battlefield mes-senger service. It was durable, cheap,and easy to maintain, but its adaptabili-

ty and speed were its major strongpoints.

During WW 11 the motorcycle wascommonly used in the German Army,which employed motorcycle battalionspearheads in the attack on Poland.These motorcycle units raced acrossthe German-Polish frontier to capturekey river crossings, bridges, intersec-tions and even small towns.1 Mean-while, the U.S. Army decided to dis-continue the use of motorcycles be-cause they were considered unreliableand unsuited to off-road operations. Inspite of that, 5,000of them were used

by the Army during WW 11 mostly incourier and traffic control operations.*Although some were fitted with ma-chineguns, the Allies never caught thesame offensive spirit in motorcycleemployment that the Germans did.

After the war, military interest in theutility of the motorcycle waned,although many soldiers returned to thecivilian world smitten by the motorcy-cle bug. Interest in motorcycle racingcontinued to grow in Europe andspread to the U. S. In the late 1950s,cross-country motorcycles grew in so-phistication and became more distinct

from the heavy road versions used dur-ing the previous years. Moto-cross andrecreational cross-country motorcycleriding continued to grow in popularity,and the need for better trail bikes grewin demand as well. In fact, the researchand development effort by the privatesector has now reached a state of the artthat can meet the military need for atactically-employable motorcycle andfor nearly any associated equipment.The U.S. Army has adapted civilianmotorcycle technology for militaryapplication at the Army DevelopmentEmployment Agency (ADEA) of the

9th Infantry Division (Motorized) withremarkable success.

Current DoctrineMany commanders still view the mo-

torcycle solely in the liaison/couriermission role. But the modern motorcy-cle can provide some amazing answersin other uses too.

The Army has had difficulty in thepast marrying reconnaissance unitswith a suitable, uncontroversial vehi-cle. TheA4113 armored personnel car-rier, the A4151 %-ton, the Sheridan

ARAA V (A rmored Reconnaissance/

ARMOR september-October 1984 33



A motorcycle reconnaissance trooper

negotiates a rugged Oregon logging

road wearing night vision goggles in

second stage of NVG training. Effective

training can qualify a man within a week.

~

A irborne Assault Vehicle) and theM 3Cavalry Fighting Vehicle have beenemployed by scout and cavalry recon-naissance units, and have proven to beadaptable to conventional cavalry re-connaissance operations. But eachvehicle has its own set of limitationsand none of them meet all reconnais-sance requirements.

A nother problem is even more

acute: motorizing long-range recon-naissance patrols. M any avail ablemethods of insertion, extraction andmission execution rule out the presentreconnaissance vehicles.

Reconnaissance units required tooperate forward of the FL OT ordeep inthe enemy's rear area require a form oftransportation that is easily transportedand supported by helicopter; one capa-ble of being inserted by parachute; easyto repair in a tactical environment with-out support personnel; fuel eff icient,quick, and mobile in broken terrain. I tmust also be highly reliable, cost effec-

tive, and easy to destroy if left behind.I t must be suited to all -weather, limitedvisibility operations, be quiet in itsoperation, and have a low profile, mak-ing it difficult to locate and destroy.These requirements can best be met bya number of commercially-manufac-tured cross-country motorcycles.

M otorcycle reconnaissance unitshave appeared in a number of divisionsthroughout the A rmy. The Cavalry Bri-gade (A ir Attack) organization of Divi-sion 86 has a 14-man motorcycle re-connaissance platoon in the headquar-ters troop of the air cavalry squadron.

The air cavalry squadron of the 9thCavalry Brigade (A ir A ttack) at FortLewis, W ashington, tested the employ-ment of motorcycles for reconnais-sance from November 1981 throughM ay 1982. T he motorcycle platoonproved that it can perform convention-al cavalry missions such as: zone recon,area recon, route recon, screeningoperations, maintaining contactbetween adjacent units, and courierservice.

Additionally, the motorcycle platoonproved that it can be very effective insuch (non-A RTEP) missions as: path-

tinder operations, raids into enemyrear areas, stay-behind reconnais-sance/harassment, NBC recon, con-duct of NBC warfare and, hasty vehi-cle/armor ambushes.

TrainingThe 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry mo-

torcycle reconnaissance platoon has fo-cused i ts training and resources in fourareas; the operation of the motorcycleover various types of terrain duringlimited visibility with AN/PVS-5 night

vision goggles (NV G),drivedmechan-ic training, the development of protec-tive clothing and, mission assessmentand evaluation.

The reconnaissance platoon startedaggressive night vision goggle trainingin J uly, 1982. T he platoon went toCamp Rilea, Oregon, located on thePacific Ocean, to conduct its initialNV G training. R iders famil iarizedthemselves with NV Gs by riding alongthe beaches at Camp Rilea. A s the rid-er's confidence grew, he was requiredto negotiate increasingly difficult obsta-cle courses on the beach. A fter all rid-

ers were famil iarized with operating themotorcycle while wearing NV Gs, theplatoon moved to the rugged mountaintrails and logging roads of western Ore-gon. Within a week, the entire platoonwas capable of negotiating any type ofterrain wearing NV Gs.

The platoon continued to maintainits NV G proficiency at Fort Lewis be-fore going to the Yakima Firing Centerin central Washington five weeks later.The Yakima Firing Center is similar to

a Middle East/National Training Cen-ter envi ronment and provides an excel-lent testing ground for all types of tacti-cal training. Results of the tactical test-ing at Yakima proved the validity of theNV G training.

The motorcycle platoon has develop-ed an NV G qualification checklist thathas been invaluable in the training pro-gram. The instruction begins in theclassroom with the maintenance andadjustment of the AN/PVS-5 NV G andprogresses through a series of opera-tions on smooth surfaces with daylightfilters to riding at night over rough ter-




rain using NV G’s. T he NV G qualifica-tion culminates with the logging of 24-hours of NVG operation in a tacticalenvironment. Training is carefullymonitored, and the reconnaissance pla-toon has not sustained a reportableinjury to date inNV G operations. NV Gproficiency ismaintained by a squadronrequi rement to conduct an FT X

monthly.

Dr ive and M echanic TrainingThe Fort L ewis School Command

has introduced two programs of in-struction (POI) for the motorcycleoperator since May 1983.The first is an18-hour course on motorcycle main-tenance. I t includes brake repair, clutchand valve adjustment, tire repair andreplacement, engine and chassis lu-brication and overall vehicle troub-leshooting.

The second POI is a five-day mo-torcycle driving and safety program.

The course is administered in both anon- and off-road environment, and is

designed to train an unskilled operatorand make him a safe, competent andconfident motorcycle operator.

The 3- 5 Cavalry motorcycle platoongoal is to become 100-percent trainedin both of these courses. M ission readi-ness has significantly increased sincethe inception of these programs. Unitsdesiring additional information aboutthe POI can obtain it by getting intouch with MSG Sabourin at Head-quarters, School Command, FortLewis.3

Protective ClothingThe reconnaissance motorcycle pla-

toon has been working extensively withthe U.S. A rmy Materiel Developmentand Readiness Command (DA RCOM )to obtain and develop protective equip-ment. The area of most concern is hel-met and communica t ons develop-ment. Conventional civilian motorcy-cle helmets have not been adapted foruse with military radios. On the otherhand, the Army’s K evlar helmet withH- CC A PS (Helmet-Capabi l i ty/

Communication/A ural Protective Sys-tem) does not afford protection fromthe head injuries that could be sus-tained in a motorcycle crash. The mo-torcycle rider needs a helmet thatmeets Department of Transportation(DOT) head protection requirements,affords ball istic protection, can be cor-rectly worn while wearing the MI 7A2NBC protective mask or NV Gs and,has built-in earphones to monitor radi-

The communication requirement isfor a two-radio-net capability with avoice-activated boom microphone pro-

os.

i!

Commercial motorcycle protective gear was adoptedfor use in 9th ID test. In

two photos above, a soldier wears the commercial protective items used inthe test. The two photos below show how this equipment is integrated with

traditionaluniform.

ARMUR September-October1984 35



tected by the face shield when worn. Atransmitting switch on the handlebarswould be needed so the rider does nothave to remove his hand to communi-cate.

Sound attenuation and amplificationdevices in the helmet could provide thescout with a method to adjust and iso-late external noises: for example, to re-

duce external noise when monitoringhis radio while riding, or to increase hisability to hear outside the helmet whendismounted.

A suitable helmet has been develop-ed by the Gentex Corporation andfielded by DA RC OM at Fort L ewis. I tmeets DOT protection standards andoffers limited ball istic protection. I t iselectronically compatable with thePRC-77 and can be worn with theMI 7A2 or the AN/PVS-5. Communica-tions are now limited to the range of thePRC-77. M ore effort is needed on alonger-range communication capabili-

ty.The motorcycle platoon is currently

using commercial protective clothing,including shin guards, arm and shoul -der pads, kidney belts, i nsulated glovesand protective boots. T he research anddevelopment of protective clothing hasbeen completed by the commercial sec-tor. T he A rmy needs to adapt andconfigure the protective clothing tomeet A rmy uniformity requirements,but otherwise, the needed equipmentcan be fielded now.

M ission AssessmentT he fourth priority of the motorcycleplatoon is mission assessment andevaluation. I n addition to the conven-tional cavalry missions stated, the mo-torcycle platoon isassigned to pathfin-der missions, downed pilot recovery,search and rescue missions and exten-sive air assault operations.

Through numerous field exercises,the 9th Cavalry Brigade (A ir Attack)and the 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry haveevaluated and assessed the employ-ment of motorcycles in conjunctionwith aviation.

M otorcycle employment in the aircavalry mission has shown itself to be anatural extension of A rmy aviationassets. A combat-loaded 14-man mo-torcycle platoon can be inserted by oneCH -47 Chinookor three UH- 60 lack-hawks, or by any other conventionalmethod of insertion, including airbornedrops. Two-man teams can be insertedby upgraded OH-58sfitted with cargohooks, as has been demonstrated atFort Lewis.

Four motorcycles have been organic-ally assigned to the experimental L ightA ir Cavalry Troop (L ACT ) that is con-

cerned with developing aerial tacticsusing an armed scout aircraft. The mo-torcycles assist the aeroscouts by classi-fying and clearing routes, lateralapproaches and trails and obstructions,while the aerial elements conduct theroute or zone reconnaissance. T he mo-torcycles have been indispensable as anextensionof the air troop commander’s

battlefield eyesand ears. The capabil i-tiesof the motorcycle are ideally suitedfor incorporation into the air cavalrymission.

L imitationsM otorcycles are not wi thout their

limitations. The most serious inherentlimitations are inability to cross waterobstacles of any appreciable depth,poor performance in excessive snow ormud, operator vulnerability to extremeweather conditions and lack of armorprotection from small arms fire andartillery fragments.

There are also significant organiza-tional limitations. Command and con-trol of the motorcycle is difficult be-cause suitable radios and monitoringequipment do not exist. Equipmentreadiness status is subject to fluctua-tion because of lack of operator main-tenance knowledge or instruction. Andthere are insufficient spare parts availa-ble at DISCOM .

The majority of these limitations aresimply resolved, especially in the areasof communictions, helmets and protec-tive clothing. The Fort L ewis SchoolCommand istaking active and effective

measures to reduce operator-inducedproblems and limitations in the areas ofmaintenance, services and vehicleoperation.

Despite these current limitations,the motorcycle isready to assume a sig-nificant reconnaissance role in theA rmy. T he motorcycle, as it was re-cently employed in the Grenada opera-tion, was relegated to the role of mes-senger and command and control vehi-cle. These missions are minimal in thelight of the overall capability of the ma-chine. Field commanders have not yetrecognized the many possible employ-ment options available for motorcycleassets.

Scouts mounted on motorcycles areamong the most valuable sources ofintelligence the combat commanderhas at his disposal.

Footnotes

1 Panzer Leader by General H einz Guderian. Bal-lantine Books, New York, 1980.* ARMOR, Sept-Oct 1982, “The M ilitary Mo-torcycle” by CaptainRobertR. Sigl, pp. 26-28.3 M SGSabourin

HQ. School Command,Ft L ewis,WA 98433.(AV 357-2310/23O4/4607

FIRST LIEUTENANT PAT-RICK M. MARR was com-missioned in armor from theU S M A i n 1981. H e hasattended the Armor OfficerCavalry Basic Course, theI nfantry M ortar P latoonCourse, the Junior Officer

M aintenance Course, Air-borne, Ranger, and A i rAssault School courses. H ehas served as motorcyclereconnaissance platoonleader, cavalry platoon lead-er, cavalry troop executiveofficer and is currentlyassistant S3 for 3d Squa-dron, 5th Cavalry, FortLewis,WA.

CW3 DANIEL KINGSLEY

holds a bachelor degree insociology from New Y orkState University. He served

in t h e U.S. Marine Corpsfrom 1968 to 1974 andentered the Army to attendflight school , graduating in1975.Hegraduated from theU.S. Army Aviation SafetyCourse in 1982and is cur-rently serving as the avia-tion safety officer for 3/5Cavalry, Fort Lewis. H e is

also the winner of the Avia-tion Digest Annual WritingAward for 1983.




The Roleof the FourthCompanyby First Lieutenant Ralph Peters

Despite th fanfare, much of theU.S. Army’s response to its new tacti-cal and organizational doctrine can besummed up as, “It really doesn’tchange anything.”

But the addition of the fourth linecompany does change things if properlyemployed on the battlefield.

First, i t offers a commanderjTexibiIi@, f it offers nothing else. But itdoes more than that, too, bringing intofocus new possibilities in depth, con-centration, sustainability and speed.

There are many ways to operational-ize flexibility. One of the most basic isthe designation of a local reserve. Un-

fortunately, our present idea of a res-erve is both overblown and unneces-sarily passive, partly because in Eu-rope, forward commanders have beenconditioned to get every weapons sys-tem into a good firing position early on.

While the rear echelon of battle posi-tions are, defacto, a reserve, we thinkof them as committed, if only to de-fending a position.

Reserves are casually viewed as adistant force tucked away in a rearassembly area, more understudy thanactor on the corps- and division-levelstage. This should not be the case.

At very least, the fourth company isa localreserve, ready to be factored intothe commander’s battle plan. Whileawaiting its turn in the battle, this res-erve may be gainfully employed in pre-paration of alternate and subsequentbattle positions, but what the reservedoes before its commitment is lessimportant than how the commanderthinks of it. It is the commmander’smental attitude about his reserve thatmatters. Rather than seeing this forceas a unit married to a specific piece ofterrain, he should perceive it as his freeplayer to kill the enemy, a force capableof maneuver and movement, a respon-sive tool to alter or accentuate thecourse of the battle.

Even when designated as a local re-serve, the fourth company providesnew depth to the defense (figure1).

Whether the task force commanderintitially organizes with two up and twoback, two up and two back in echelon,three up and one back to cover an espe-cially broad front, or in any other ter-rain- or Threat-driven combination,there is a depth to the battalion taskforce defense that did not previously

exist.

ALP/OP

nIi&\ 0

u‘

Defense in DeDth:

ALP/OP

Rearward companies may

prepare positions, but are

considered as local re-

serve for limited-objective

counterattacks.

Figure 1.

x

Along with that depth, flexibility isimproved: the decision to shift acompany team is simply not the mo-mentous decision it was before.

Improvements in flexibil ity anddepth apply to the offense as well. Areserve is often every bit as critical incarrying through a successful attack asit is to a defense. In the offensive,depth is achieved with echelonment,

offering the potential of greater con-centration and sustainability (figure2).

Echelonment allows the concentra-tion of sufficient force- f local mass- o overcome the defender’s advan-tage. Furthermore, echelonmentallows the sustainment of that concen-tration. Of the countless variables inthe attack, perhaps only surprise hasproven to be of such constant value ashaving concentration of fires and phy-sical mass on the decisive point.

Mass is another concept we don’tfully appreciate. It summons up imagesof the Red Hordes, shouting “Ura!” as

“ . .Perhaps only surprisehas proven to beof such con-stant value as having concen-tration of fires and physical

mass on the decisive point. .J 9

they crowd toward the slaughter. Butproperly understood and applied, massis more valuable to the outnumberedforce: the smaller element’s most fool-ish course of action would be to try tobe everywhere at once. Mass andeconomy of force complement eachother.

Elevated to the level of a principle of




SCTS

(Pass forward after

penetration is made)

Echeloned Attack:

In the echeloned attack,

the mechanized infantry

battalion task force isorganized as a balanced

task force. Fiaure 2.

war, mass means the disciplinedapplication of more physical force atthe decisive point, coupled with thecommitment of that force so swiftlythat the enemy cannot respond i n time.

A phrase in current vogue is “opera-ting within the enemy’s decision cy -cle,” but in the simplest terms, itmeans getting the other guy on theropes and keeping him there.

There is a resultant multiplication offorce in the echeloned attack that can-not be explained in terms of highschool physics. Perhaps it is the sus-

tainability of the echeloned attack, themomentum of the fresh, follow-onforce, that keeps the enemy on theropes.

The echeloned attack gives the com-mander another advantage; it allowshim to take that most dangerous ofsteps, changing the plan in mid-coursewhen it becomes clear the original planisn’t working. With the additional timeand forces available, he can considerthis kind of option when, otherwise, itwould expose his force to great danger.

The fourth company also contributes

the potential of greaterspeed.The reor-

ganization into four lean direct-firecompanies is intended to simplify thecommander’s troop-leading proceduresto give him a more manageable organ-ization. These four lean elements canload up and go when the situation re-quires.

The overall speed of a battalion taskforce movement should also increase,despite the additional maneuver ele-ment. More responsive sub-elementswill mean a quicker total organization,as long as commanders and operationsofficers thoroughly grasp the changedcoordination requirements at the bat-talion level. Thiswill require attention,planning, and practice. Just as mecha-nized infantry company commanderstoo often forgot their 81-mm mortarsas the pace of operations accelerated,the fourth company might also be moreeasily forgotten than a glancing consi-deration suggests.

The task force commander will needto issue this new maneuver elementclear orders and give it meaningful mis-sions. Facing a high-tempo, confusedbattlefield, subordinate commanders

will have to have a sure grasp of their

commander’s overall intent.This presupposes that the command-

er himself knows what he wants toaccomplish, which is not always thecase. But without well-defined goalsand effective synchronization, much ofwhat the commander has potentiallygained in flexibility, concentration, andspeed will remain undeveloped or gen-

erate into confusion. In this one re-spect, the commander’s ob will be har-der than before. I t will be especiallyhard on commanders who have not yetlearned to integrate their own combatmultipliers, their engineers, air defensetroops, or even their organic antitankforces.

Having considered the role of thefourth company in the offense and thedefense, let us turn to two more spe-cialized situations, the movement tocontact and the covering force fight.How will the added element changethings?An

advantage in the movement tocontact is that the commander has animproved capability to balance hisadvance over multiple axes. He canshape his movement to fit the missionas never before. He can tailor his attackto provide the greatest possible shockeffector the fullest flank protection. Hecan narrow his frontage to penetratethe expected enemy force or he canopen up his frontage to locate a moreelusive enemy. O he can seek any de-gree of balance between theseextremes.

In the movement-to-contact mis-

sion, several recent elements come tothe commander’s aid. He has a greaternumber of more agile formations andthe increased speed, firepower and pro-tection of the new generation of com-bat vehicles. As a result, the advanceguard task force of a brigade-sizedattack could, for example, move up onthree parallel axes and still retain anintegral reserve of company size. Uponcontact, there are more maneuver ele-ments available to turn the enemy’sflank or envelop him. If the enemy isencountered in superior force, theU. S.commander should have better inter-

nal security and the ability to fight amore coherent delay until the brigademain body arrives at the scene.

These new opportunities certainly donot come without attendant dangers,however, There is no question: thefourth element makes the command-er’s role more complicated in certainrespects, but he must resist the tempta-tion to make his plans and orders morecomplicated as wel. While simplicity isnot always preferable, it generally isbest. If the overall plan cannot avoidsome complications, then the missions

to subordinate elements must be kept




Dauntless Trains for Warby Lieutenant ColonelA.J. Bergeron and Captain J.S. Purser

The National Training Center(NTC) at Fort Irwin, CA affords thefinest training experience available toany army in the world. A dedicatedopposing force (OPFOR), highlyskilled observer-controller-evaluators(OCEs), irtually unlimited maneuverroom and state-of-the-art computertechnology combine to offer an unpar-allelled opportunity for training andevaluation. The charged realism of bat-tle in the unforgiving environment ofthe desert against a skilled and re-sourceful foe reinforces success and

attaches tangible costs to mistakes. TheNTC can appreciably minimize the po-tential for future Kasserine Passes anddo a tremendous job in preparing us forwar.

The NTC exposes a unit’s strengthsand weaknesses as only actual combathas done before. If the deploying bat-talion’s training program has not beenwell-planned and boldly executed, thatorganization begins much lower on theNTC learning curve, and that unit’sopportunity to derive maximum bene-fit from the experience is limited by theprogress which must be made to

achieve a basic level of combat readi-ness.

A productive training program canbe based upon what is known in the 3-37th Armor (the “Dauntless Battal-ion”), as the train-to-fightphilosophy.This approach involves focusing thelimited materiel, time and personnelresources of the unit towards a specific,well-articulated set of individual andcollective tasks inherent in the unit’swartime mission. The plethora of tasksspelled out in FM 21 -2 and ARTEP 712 can thus be boiled down to the essen-tial tasks the unit must execute to be

successful. These critical tasks arecalled the No-Slack Ten within 3-37

Armor and include what the unit mustdo to win in combat.

The tasks are: to conduct emergencydeployment readiness exercises(EDL REs); to draw prepositionedoverseas materiel configured in unitsets (POMCUS); to conduct tacticalroad marches; to organize a deliberateattack; to conduct a passage of lines: toorganize a defense; to maintain C3; toconduct sustaining operations; to con-duct NBC operations and to maintain

equipment in a combat ready status.Each can be fleshed out as neededthrough use of the appropriate docu-ments and training literature to formu-late plans for effective battalion train-ing management. The train-to-fightmental process followed by every soldi-er in the battalion includes feedback asan inherent part of the process of pol-ishing the training, testing relevance,and ensuring the best possible resultsconsistent with the stated trainingphilosophy.

A review of theNo-Slack Tenrevealsthat in training for war, the battalion is

also obviously training for the NTC.The battalion has taken a combinedarms, multi-echelon approach, inte-grating infantry, engineers, fire sup-port, ground surveillance radars (GSR)and, when available, tactical air sup-port. In working with the slice of sup-port assets that the battalion can expectto receive in wartime, each learns towork effectively with the other. Eachsegment becomes adept at anticipatingrequirements and working jointly as aproductive member of the task forceteam.

The tank force will not operate with-

1

out attachments in combat; therefore,it should not doso in training.

Immediately following REFORGER’82, 3-37 Armor designed a train-to-fight program that would incrementallydrill, refine and test every aspect of theNo-Slack Ten. Crews, sections, pla-toon, companies and the battalionwould be challenged, each exercisebuilding on the one before, to mold aformidable fighting force, sure of itselfand its capabilities. This training pro-gram was slated to occur over an eight-

month period, with the battalion pre-pared to fully accomplish its wartimemissionin the crucible of the NTC.

Platoon ARTEPs, dubbed Cajun’sChallenge,were held in January, 1983.They were designed to sustain collec-tive and individual skills built duringREFORGER, and featured maneuver,live-fire and NBC training. Each pla-toon, to include mortars, scouts,Redeye and support was evaluated inthe following areas:

Pre-combat inspection; defense;attack and NBC collective protectivemeasures.




skills within the battalionhask forcestaff, the battalion held an extensiveseries of command post exercises(CPXs) specifically designed to test the

‘: . In maneuver, the battal-ion proved adept at seeing thebattle and in fighting as acombined arms team. . . ’

ability of the SZ-S3-engineer-air liasonofficer (FSO-ALO) group to functionas an entity. In most cases, theS4, bat-talion maintenance officer (BMO) andsupport platoon group were forced toaccomplish the tactical tasks whichwere required to support the operation,limiting their participation in the staffprocess.

As part of the division field CPX pro-gram, the battalion tactical operationcenter (TOC) and trains complementestablished themselves in a field envi-ronment and operated around the clockfor a 3-day period.

This tasked each element to main-tain constant communications with ahigher headquarters through reportsand battlefield information and causedthe various staff heads to coordinatewith each other in the planning andexecution of missions.

Additionally, the battalion tookadvantage of the army training and bat-

tle simulation system (ARTBASS)traveling computer road show offeredby Fort Leavenworth’s CombinedArms Center (CAC). This computer-driven simulation exercise allowed thecompany commanders to interface withthe battle staff via FM radio. Again, theentire support and service support slicewas included.

Lastly, the battalion, as part of thebrigade, conducted a simulation exer-cise on the available NTC terrainboard. The staff and slice componentwas again deployed in a tactical modeand communication between company

and brigade was via FM radio. Theexercise tested the ability of the staffand support apparatus to anticipate,plan for and conduct the required coor-dination and continue the reporting tohigher and lower elements that provedsocrucial at the NTC.

To aid in the preparation of theindividual soldiers to face the rigors ofthe NTC, the battalion published sev-eral informative pamphlets. The S2produced a document in handy pocketform that explained in graphic detailwhat a soldier was likely to see as hefaced a Soviet motorized rifle regiment

in the attack or a motorized riflecompany in defense. The article includ-ed photographs of the actual NTCOPFOR visual modification (VIS-MOD) mock-up Soviet vehicles andOPFOR uniforms. In a similar vein,the S3 published a pamphlet entitled“Winning in the Desert” to provideimmediate information to the soldier

on living, operating, and maneuveringin a desert environment. It includedhints on vehicle maintenance, dealingwith dangerous animals of the desert,and survival techniques. These twopublications, allied with the battalion’stactical standard operating procedures(TACSOP), provided all the relevantinformation that soldiers and leaderswould need for successful operations.

At the NTC, the battalion discoveredthat it did many things well. Staffplanning was generally excellent, re-sulting in the expeditious issue of or-ders. I n maneuver, the battalionproved adept at seeing the battle and infighting as a combined arms team.

A major problem was encountered inthe employment of artillery. Fireplanning, unit use of fire support teams(FISTS), integration of 107-mm mor-tars, and effective fires all arose asareas of concern and the necessaryobjects of further training. The NTCdrilled actions on contact better thanany home station exercise. Tasked withthe need to simultaneously return fire,deploy, report and develop the situa-tion, one element or the other some-

times suffered. Most damaging to thetask force were inadequate or improperactions on contact when faced with theneed to conduct breaching operationsof obstacles.

All of the exceptionally valuablefeedback highlighted in an extensivetake-home packet supplied by the NTCwill find its way into the battalion’straining plan. That training programwill sustain those items deemed ade-quate as well as fix those things that theNTC showed to be deficient.

Overall, the battalion enjoyed anextremely successful NTC rotation and

benefitted immeasurably. Commentsby the NTC leadership indicated thatthey were singularly impressed by theunit’s training program and its ability toexecute its mission and respond to cor-rections and suggestions. This can beattributed primarily to the train-to-fightphilosophy which shaped the battal-ion’s approach to training, emphasizingthe collective and individual skillsneeded to be combat ready. Trainingmust provide the crucial bridgebetween our normal peacetime activi-ties and the execution of the battalion’swartime mission.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL

A.J. BERGERON is a 1966

graduate o Louisiana StateUniversity. He commandedseveral cavalry troops inVietnam and the U . S . ,served as squadronS3andXO and as he regimentalS3of the 2d A CR for nearlythree years. H e has beenthe Armor majors assign-ment officer at MILPERCENand served as an assistantPMS at the University ofMississippi. H e is a gradu-ate o the Command8 Gen-eral Staff College and holdsa masters degree in interna-tional relations and politicalscience from the Universityo Mississippi. H e currentlycommands the 3d battalion,37th Armor and has beenselected for attendance atthe National War CollegeinWashington,D.C.

CAPTAIN JOSEPH S. PUR-

SER isa graduate o Colora-do State University with abachelor’s degree in politi-cal science. He has servedas a cavalry platoon leaderand troop XO in USAREURand as a SMO and cavalrytroop commanderin theU S .

He is currently assigned asthe S3, 3d battalion, 37thArmor at FortRiley, Kansas.He is a graduate of t h eAOBC and th e AOAC at FortKnox,K y.




truction.L et us now analyze the various forms of maneuver to see

how each, used alone, effects the enemy’s freedom of action.I n the face of a frontal attack, the enemy commander

has the freedom of action to use his reserve to stem anysuccess developed by the attacker.

In the face of a penetration, the enemy maintains free-dom of action to use his reserve and flanking units against

the attack.Faced by an envelopmentorfrank attack, the enemy canmaintain f reedom of action with his reserve and unengagedflank.

A nd faced with a frontal attack and a penetration, theenemy retains his reserve to use against the penetration.

The Napoleonic concept, by using the various formsof maneuver in combination to complement eachother - irst the frontal attack, then the attempt atenvelopment, and finally the penetrating thrust intothe gap created by the threat of the envelopment -takes away the enemy commander’s freedom of actionat the penetration stage. Thus, the final maneuver, thepenetration, cannot be stemmed before the enemyforce’s lines of communication are cut. This brings

about a breakdown in the enemy equilibrium, and vic-tory.Note that it was threeforms of maneuver, used in dynamic

combination,that brought success. T he concentration of fireand the opening of the breach areonly the means to the trueend -the psychological destruction of the enemy’s will to

continue resistance. M aneuver is used to produce psycho-logical effect, l ike uncertainty, fear for l ines of communica-tion, security requirements for command and communica-tion centers, and the physical presence of enemy troops inrear areas.

Our objective is to influence the mind of the enemy com-mander. M ental impressions are more important than physi-cal damage. A favorable decision i s achieved when a psycho-

logical effect has been produced on the enemy and he be-comes convinced that to continue his present course ofaction isuseless.

Since it is impossible to destroy all the enemy force, ourefforts should be concentrated in those areas where physicaldestruction will produce the greatest psychological damage.This concept, with some modifications, can be used at thetactical, operational, and strategic evels of war.

M aneuver, the dynamic el ement of combat whenemployed in its three forms, creates a weak area ripe forexploitation. This weakness in the enemy line can be createdas a calculated effect of our own dispositions and is not left tochance to be discovered as the attack progresses. Initiativeallows us to attack. These maneuvers then help us maintainour freedom of action. Through this freedom of action we

keep the initiative.

WALL ACE P. FRANTZColonel, Infantry

USA WC, Carlisle Barracks, PA

The Close Combat Armored Vehicle

As we seek solutions to the problems we will face onfuture battlefields, we begin to seesigns of the merging ofdesign requirements for armored vehicles. This merge iscaused by the absolute necessity of totally integrated opera-tions in which all combat command elements will be usedtogether. On an extremely lethal, high-intensity battlefield,we will not have the luxury of fielding a wide variety ofvehicles of vastly different armor and firepower modes andof dif fering production levels.

Looking back, it isinteresting to seehow long it has taken

to reach a point where the concept of true inter-operationalcapability became a matter of success and survival, ratherthan just a tactical goal. I n WWI , the tank broke the trenchstalemate and brought mobility back to the battlefield. In thebetween-wars period, the tank was produced in infantry andcruiser versions. Infantry tanks were heavily armored andgunned and were slow moving so that they could support theslow-moving infantry. Cruiser tanks were lightly armed andarmored and used primarily as reconnaissance and flank se-

curity elements.These concepts did not jell on the early WWII battlefields

and tank designs evolved the U.S. M-4Sherman, the RussianT-34 and the German Panther. These medium tanks hadgood firepower and armor and, compared to the infantrytanks, great mobility. Infantry now rode in trucks or lightly

armored halftracks, and direct-fire artillery support was

track-mounted. The tanks stil l needed infantry support, butnow the infantry had to keep pace with the armor and beavailable when strong points delayed the momentum of theattack.

WWII ended before a full concept of armored infantrytook shape. However, the concept of the main battle tank(MBT) took hold, and the light and super-heavy tanks fellaside. The infantry went from trucks and halftracks to fullyarmored, tracked, amphibious vehicles. These personnelcarriers were a great improvement, but they remained essen-

tially battle taxis.The basic problem was that each branch was preparing tofight the next war from a different approach. The tankerswere going to arrive at the point of contact in an armoredvehicle and they would engage the enemy in mounted com-bat. The artillery would move to their point of contact andfight from protected, mobile platforms, but the infantry wasto ride i nto battle, then dismount and fight unprotected andwithout mobility.

Very little armored combat took place in K orea or Viet-nam, and those wars did not present the opportunity toproperly evaluate these new theories. However, two factsthat were made abundantly clear in V ietnam were the terri-ble vulnerability of infantry personnel carriers and our totallack of a suitable cavalry vehicle. T he Vietnam enemy did

not use air support or highly sophisticated antitank weapons,




ment if they had been more successful (and cheaper) and ifthe vehicle had been conceived as something different froma “tank”.

The present test rigs for external-gun type tanks beingproposed by the U. S. ,Switzerland, and others will undoub-tedly have at least an effect on tank design by lowering allcrew members into the hull armor structure. Tactical andfunctional changes may ensue from this change, but the

limited change of replacing a turret by an external gunshould also limit the change to tactics and functions.Perhaps the Israeli Merkava will have a more profound

and lasting impact on tank design and use. T he most notablefeature of the Merkava is that the engine is placed in thefront of the vehicle- he normal placement in a personnelcarrier or light tank, but rather radical for a main battle tank.

Two opposite trends in the degree of armor protectionmay herald a change in tactics. O ne extreme sees lightlyarmored, mobile vehicles. They are the modern day equiva-lents of the WW I 1 M-18Hellcat tank destroyers and arerepresented by the A nti-A rmored Vehicl e Evaluation(ARM VAL ) test vehicles at TACOM . The other extremeincludes theMI tank, the Chieftainand some new proposalswhich emphasize improved armor protection. Since counter-

tank capabilities continue to be emphasized for U.S. tanks,these developments could either represent a new generationof tank destroyers, or they could compel new developmentsin tactics.

Any change in tactics which seesvehicles dedicated to thetank destroyer role will certainly cause a change in the func-tions a tank performs as well. T he same functions will beperformed, but the priority of functions will be altered.Tank-versus-tank capability will most likely remain as theprime function of a tank, but it will not be stressed to thesame degree that it is now. Indeed, some of the changes thatare being made may be the result of the heavy emphasisplaced on tank-versus-tank capabil ity.

Tanks normally operate with other vehicles and the totalof functions which all of these vehicles perform must be

considered as well as the individual functions. A mong thesefunctions are reactions to threats against each type of vehicleand to the group as a whole.

The problem is that there is a void between the main battletank and the armored infantry fighting vehicle that needs tobe filled. The Israeli Merkava and the German Geleitzpanzerare approaches to filling this gap. On the one hand, it isquestionable whether the armored infantry fighting vehicle,such as the M2, can adequately accompany the main battletank in close enough proximity to protect it from infantry-directed antitank weapons. T he Germans, at least, also seemto have realized that the armored infantry fighting vehicleneeds support that is not given by the main battle tank. T heMerkava, therefore, has the capability of carrying riflemen,and the Geleitzpanzer is armed with a 57-mm gun on a

Murderchassis.Given all these trends, making judgments about their

importance and contemplating their impact on tank design,one can come up with any number of future tank designs.

The antitank role has not been emphasized as strongly asit is with most tank designs, and other functions that tankshave been required to perform have been given greaterattention. Chief among these is the ability to deliver indirectartil lery fi re. A t the same time, the ability of the tank todefend itself against helicopters and other aircraft isimproved by the capability of engaging air targets with themain gun.

Additional antiaircraft capabil ity would be provided by acompanion support tank which would use essentially thesame hull. The support tank would provide the protection

needed against infantry antitank weapons. I t would not takethe place of the armored infantry fighting vehicle, but wouldaccomplish a task that the A IFV is not capable of doing. Thesupport tank would also provide control and target acquisi-tion functions and would have an antitank missile capabili ty.The functions a tank performs are thus divided between twovehicles, with some functions expanded; and increased capa-bility has been incorporated fordealing with certain threats.

The hull of the battle and support tanks would feature afront-mounted power plant with front-drive sprockets, hy-dropneumatic suspension, rear access doors, and laminatedarmor, an arrangement similar to that of the Merkava. Thepower plant is placed at the front, primarily for packagingconsiderations. If it isdesired to efficiently use the interiorofthe tank, and if ammunition or fuel isnot to be stowed in thefront of the hull, it is almost imperative that the engine bemounted there.

If a high-speed diesel engine is used, the air exhaust grillsfor engine cooling might present a ball istic problem; but if anarmor of ceramic shingles were used, with an air cushionbacking, the exhaust air could be sent out through the aircushion. This could provide a lightweight and very efficienttype of armor protection.

The battle tank would have a three-man crew. I t would usea three-section turret and a semi-externally mounted gunwith an automatic loader. I n this turret, the center sectioncontains the main gun ammunition magazine, the automaticloader and the gun. It isseparated from the two other turretsegments by armored vertical partitions. T he main gun, ram-mer, and coaxial machinegun are mounted in a cradle. Thetrunnions are attached to the cradle at the rear of the gunbreech. Elevation cylinders are attached to the cradle at thecenter of gravity of the gun-cradle system and provide a 45-degree elevation capabil ity. T he main gun, preferably a 110-mm caliber, could use a sliding wedge breech, but a breechmechanism based on the 1894 Hall carbine would simplifyloading and be more compatible with caseless ammunition.Additional ammunition stowage and fuel tanks would be at

the rear of the vehicle, giving the tank extensive compart-mentation. Total vehicle weight should be about45 tons.

The support tanks would serve both to support the mainbattle tank and as a platoon leader’s vehicle. I t would havetwo offset turrets and a 6-8 man crew. The forward turretwould be offset on the left of the vehicle and would be armedwith a short-barreled 35-mm cannon and a coaxial machine-gun to provide suppressive fi re against infantry and helicop-ters. The rear turret would be armed with TOW and Stingermissiles and would provide antitank and antiaircraft missileprotection. The vehicle commander/pl atoon leader would beat the right front of each vehicle next to the forward turret,and there would be two rifl emen.

It is now left to the reader’s judgement to decide if theseare tanks or not. The roles they perform are similar to, but

not identical to, the traditional roles of tanks. They rely oncrew positions, compartmentation, and special armor, ratherthan weight of armor, for defense. They have assumed someof the functions of artillery, antiaircraft artillery, andarmored infantry vehicles and split them between two com-plementary vehicles. Still , they perform the functions of atank. Future developments in armor, armament, power-plants, and suspension systems will surely provide the tankwith greater capabilities and provide more of an overlap inthe roles of armored vehicles. I t wil l thus become even moredifficult to say -What is a tank?

ROGER SMTHUSA Tank-A utomotive C omand,

Warren, M I

46 AIPMUR September-October1984



Guides to Speaking and WritingIn my 40 years service as a general officer, I have neverserved in the Pentagon, but have been in many positions

where I could orally coach, teach, train, direct, and speak toa great many people, military and civilian. Conversly, I havebeen on the receiving end of a great number of poorly deliv-ered speeches.

Recently, an officer contacted me and said that I had onceput out a one-page guide on how to write. He asked me if Ihave ever prepared such an outline on how to deliver a talkand I had to reply “No, but1’11 put one together for you.”

I am constantly amazed at the poor physical set-ups thatoften force guest speakers to operate under adverse condi-tions of acoustics and seating arrangements for the audience,many of whom can neither seenor hear the speaker. Thisarea, as much as the included outlines, needs to be seriouslyinvestigated.

BRUCEC.CLARKEGeneral, USA (Ret.)

McLean, VA

EFFECTIVE WRITINGPutting one’s thoughts down on paper can be harder

than it need be unless you are prepared beforehand.There is a logical order of progression for writing justas there is for speech making. Writing is simply tellinga story with a beginning, a middle, and an end. Hereare some pointson how to prepare yourself:

Subject0 If you have a choice, pick a subject that youknow and have an urge to tell someone about. Ifyou are assigned a subject, learn all you can about itbefore you begin to write.

Audience0 Select a person in your mind to whom you wantto tell your story. As you write, keep that person inmind and tell your story so that he or she willunderstand and follow you.

L istsMake a list of all facts and points that you want to

emphasize. Select key points from these for empha-sis.

OutlineArrange your facts and pointsin chronological or

other logical ordersoas to introduce your story, tellit, and finish with a strong conclusion.

DraftingWrite a paragraph on each factor point. Read it- referably aloud. Is it generally what you wanted

to say? Does it tell its part of your story? Does it fit

in with your other paragraphs?

RewritingThis is the heart of writing. Check for spelling,

punctuation, grammar, capitalization, etc. (use agood dictionary). You may wish to rearrange someparagraphs into a more logical order at this time.0 Rewrite several times until you are satisfied andbelieve that your selected readerwill like it.

Finale0 If you are enthusiastic about your story, type itclean and present it.

If you are not enthusiastic about it, rewrite ituntil you are.

SPEECH MAK INGThe art of speechmakingisessential to anyone in a leader-

ship role in any profession, and especially in the military.Speeches can be, and often are, presented in many placesand under many conditions, from the formal atmosphereofthe auditorium to the extemporaneous exigencies of thefield. The really good speechmaker can deliver his productunder any of these conditions and achieve equal audienceinterest- nd comprehension.

In order to achieve this modicum of success, there are anumber of essential preliminary, presentation, and follow-on steps that must be taken as follows:

Pre-Speech ConsiderationsKnow your audience: size, subject expertise; vol-

unteer or forced attendance; civilian or military.Know your subject: This s anabsolute.How much time will you have, and what time of

dayornight?0 Will you speak from notesora prepared text?

Have all indoor physical arangements been takencare of: audiovisual equipment, podium, water,lights, etc.?0 Will your talk be recorded?0 Will the press be present?

The SpeechAsk for a brief introduction only.Tell your audience what you are going to tell

them and whyit is important to them.Talk up,never down,to your audience.Belogical in your presentation.Summarize your topic, hit the high points, don’t

go into excessive detail- t bores your audience.Keep within your time limits.

0 Keep your language and terminology simpleunless you are addressing a highly sophisticated au-dience- and then be certain that you know thesubjectwell enough to use sophisticated terms.

Add a touch of humor now and then, but keep itrelevant.

Avoid too much use of the pronoun I.Conclusion

0 Give a short summary of your speech.Have a“Qand A” period.

0 If you have a “handout,” distribute it now.Express your appreciation to your audience.




Spirit: Essence of Leadership

Leadership is the most important element in the Armyand in the nation today. Periodically, Congress tries to de-cide if the military academies are worth the high per capita

cost of a single graduate. They study the school’s academicprogram, its sports program, its extracurricular program,and its military program and they see little difference withthe ROTC programs of the nation’s civilian universities.

But they may be failing to study the real reason the acade-mies exist: leadership. Different forms of leadership, fromthe authoritarian to the ingratiating, are available for theserious young cadet to study and observe. The best adviceany leadership instructor can give a young man is to studythose leaders you want to be like, see what they do, how theydo it, and why they do it, and then incorporate their besttraits into your own style.

Military leadership classes repeatedly describe traits ofgreat leaders in the hope that students will incoporate thesetraits into their style. There are many desirable traits, but themost important are honesty, loyalty, and winning.

Honesty is the strong inner feeling a man has against lyingcheating, stealing, and tolerating a man who does. There isno reason for compromise in this area. Dishonesty cannot betolerated among professional men and the nation cannotremain strong if it is.

Loyalty is the strength to stand up for what is right. Philos-ophers argue what is right and wrong. But, I believe thatdivine force guides us and man needs only to appeal to it tobe shown the moral way.

In addition to observing strong leaders and mastering thetraits of honesty and loyalty, a leader must be a winner.

Winning is the American norm. We love to win; it is in ourblood. We detest the loser and cannot stand to be near him.This national spirit must be tapped by today’s leader. Hemust be a winner.Todo this, we must be the best and havethe best working with us. All men have the capability to bethe best. The leader must develop this capability in himselfand in his men. Expert coaching, good equipment, enthusi-

asm and charisma can do this. Technical expertise and goodequipment can be acquired by most men but it is enthusiasm

and charisma that drive a team. They are not gimmicks orspecial uniforms. They are the twinkle in your eye, the spiritwithin your body, your soul. You should be proud of yourinner strength and allow it to shine. As a result, men willflock to your banner. Theywill actually start to imitate you aswell as brag about you like a little brother does about hisolder brother.

Finally and most importantly, a leader must cultivate thecommon spirit between himself and his subordinates. Spiritemanates from the leader and shines upon his men. Theybask in its light and reflect it back to the leader. Spirit isbased on sincere concern for one’s men. This concern is sodeep it resembles love. For example, if you loved your son

and you were teaching him how to play football, you wouldnot just throw him a football one day and say, go learn howto play football. You would coach him, help him, run withhim, watch him, correct him, and ensure he had everyopportunity to become the best. You care about him. Suchcare must be manifested for one’s troops.

On the other hand, if a leader exhibits the opposite feeling- ne of disconcern and insincerity- e cannot help but torepulse his men. Apathy cannot be hidden; it emanates fromthe leader like a light from a demon’s eyes. He cannot dis-guise it. No matter how deceitful he is, his men will know.Therefore, if a leader cares about his men, they will careabout him.

I n conclusion, a winning leader must observe other lead-ers and emulate those dynamic traits he sees. He must be

honest and loyal. Furthermore, he must tap the winningspirit of Americans by being the best himself and allowinghis inner soul to shine. Finally, he must love his men with allhis heart and care for them like a father for his son.

JOHN PRESTON MITCHAM1st Lieutenant, Armor

Fort Benning, Ga.

Recognition Quiz Answers

I . PANHARD EBR HEAVY-ARMORED CAR 4. 1 5 2 - M M S P G U N /H O W IT Z E R M -

(29,767 Ibs); maximum road speed, 105 kmlh; maximum Ibs); maximumroad speed, 55 km/h; maximumroad range,road range, 650 km; maximum fording depth, 1.2 m; 12- 300km; maximumwater fording depth, 1.1 m; v-12 diesel,cylinder. air-cooled, gasoline,200-hp engine; mangun, 1 X 520 - h~ ngine; man gun, 1 x 152.4-mm; antiaircraft, 1x90-mm; coaxial and antiaircraft, 2 x 7.5-mm machineguns; 7.62-mmmachinegun; gun elevation,+65degrees, maxi-smoke capability; hull and turret front armor,40-mm; hull mum depression, -3degrees; possible autoloader; reported

maximumrange, 37,000 meterswith HE/RAP ammunition.ides,16-mm; turret sides,30-mm; turret rear,20-mm.

2. RHElNSTAHL MARDER MlCV (FRG). Crew, 4 5. LEOPARD II (Can.). Crew,4; combat weight 42,400plus 6 infantrymen; combat weight, 28,200kg (56,978 bs); kg (87,492 Ibs); maximumroad speed, 65 km/h; maximummaximumroad speed (forwardand reverse),75kmlh; maxi- road range, 600 km; maximum fording depth (wlprepara-mum road range,520km; maximumfording depth,2.5 m; 6 tion) 2.25 m; 10-cylinder, multi-fue, 830-hp engine; mancylinder, liquid-cooled, diesel,600-hpengine; man gun,1X gun,1x 105 -m~; oaxial and antiaircraft,2x 7.62-mm ma-20-mm; coaxial and hull 2 X 7.62-mm machineguns; smoke chineguns; smoke capability; maximum hull armor,capability. no data on turret armor.

3. AMX-30 MBT (Fr.). Crew, 4; combat weight, 40.000 6. MLRS (U.S.). Crew, 3; loaded weight, 24,564 kgkg (88,200 bs); maximumroad speed, 65 kmlh; maximum (54,163 bs);maximumroad speed,64km/h; maximum roadroad range, 530 km; 12-cylinder, water-cooled, super- range, 483 k; maximumfording depth, 1.02 m; €!-cylinder.charged, multi-fuel, 700-hp engine; man gun, 1 x 105-mm; turbocharged,500-hpengine; ull rocket load, 12; maximumcoaxial and antiaircraft,2 x 7.62-mm machineguns; smoke firing rate (full load) less than one minute; cab armoredcapability; spaced, conventional and composite armor. against small arms and shell splinters.

(Fr.). Crew,4; 8 x 8wheel drive; combat weight, 13.500 kg 1~ ~ ~ ( u s s R ) .rew,6; combat weight, 23.000kg (26.271

4 8 ARMolp September-October 19 8 4



3d Armored Cavalry Regiment CelebratesThe 3d ACR was to celebrate Organization Day on9-

11 October at Fort Bliss, TX. Former Brave Rifles and

fellow cavalrymen were invited. Activities included a

parade, military and sports competitions and family

activities.The 3d ACR Regimental Museum, also located at Fort

Bliss, is open under a new curator and visitors are cor-

dially invited.

Three Guard Units to Get M1 TanksThree Army National Guard armor units will receive

the M7 Abrams main battle tank during the next 16months, according to National Guard sources. FourGuard units will then equipped with the Army’s newest

tank. The 2d Battalion, 252d Armor, North Carolina, wasthe first unit to get the new tanks.

Scheduled to receive the Mlsare: 1st and 2d Battal-ions, 198th Armor, Mississippi, and 1st Battalion, 108thArmor, Georgia.

Three MsBack Up Armor on the RangeMess, Medics and Maintenance, those are the 3 Ms

that keep armor units fighting, well-fed, and cared for ifthey are hurt. Without them, no unit could function.

When the 2/77th Armor deployed to the Yakima Firing

Center near Fort Lewis, Washington, their support per-sonnel were there in strength to see that the tankers

were well cared for in every way.The 2/77 cooks take their job seriously. “In some

units, being a cook is considered a sham job,” said Sp5Robert Crah, a shift leader, “but it‘s not around here.Everybody here,” he said, “is away from home andworking long, hard hours. Having good food helps mor-ale, it gives people something to look forward to.”

The unit’s 15-man aid station, augmented by 10med-ics from Co. C,2 FSB, provided health care around theclock for the tankers. “We haven’t had a major injury,”said SFC Steven Ambler, medical platoon sergeant,“but we keep pretty busy what with sore throats, eyeproblems (due to dust), allergies, hay fever and the nor-mal run of cuts and bruises.” The aid station isequipped with basic life support equipment and a Med-

Evac helicopter is available at all times.

Without roundLthe-clock maintenance, the unit’s

tanks would be permanently in the garage. CW2 Ri-chard Dolado, battalion maintenance technician, says

about his men, “We have some of the best mechanics inthe Army right here and I mean that. These guys are

willing to work any amount of hours to make sure thebattalion’s vehicles are ready to shoot, move and com-municate. Some of them are young, but what they lack

in experience they make up for in motivation.”Besides CW2 Dolado’s 21 mechanics working on the

2/77 vehicles, there was a slice element from Co. B, 2dFSB to help out. The support battalion provided techni-

cal supply, armament, mechanical, communication,

recovery, engineer and inspection sections.

Cadets Awarded Cavalry Sabers

Two cadets of the 140 who graduated in June from

the USMA and who were commissioned into armor

were recipients of the Cavalry Saber, presented by the

Armor Association in recognition of their outstanding

scholastic and leadership achievements. Shown above

are: Cadet Robert L. Demont, left, and Cadet Christo-

pher Wilson, right, with their sabers. Colonel Jack W.Dice, deputy director, Department of Military Instruc-

tion, USMA, made the presentations. This marks the52d year that selected cadets have been so honored

by the Armor Association.

37th Tank Battalion Honored With French AwardsThe 37th Tank Battalion, a part of the 4th Armored

Division during World War II,was recently awarded two

French Croix de Guerres and a Fourragere for its WW II

actions by Colonel Andre Rilhac, French Liaison Officerat Fort Knox, KY, in the name of the French Govern-ment.

At Investiture Ceremonies held at Fort Riley, Kansas,

the 39th Tank Battalion was twice awarded the Croix deGuerre with Palm, each award accompanied by anappropriate battle streamer: Normandy and Moselle

River. The 37th also received the Fourragere that everymember of the unit during the above campaigns is enti-tled to wear on his uniform.

J ames H. Leach (Col. USA, Ret.) Honorary Colonel ofthe 37th Armored Regiment, accepted the awards onbehalf of the unit that served as the spear point of Gen-eral Patton’s Third Army during its drive across France,the relief of Bastogne and the subsequent combats inGermany.




~

Air Conditioned UniformsDue for M1E l Crews

An air-conditioned, micro-climate, cooling clothingsystem will permit combat vehicle crewmen wearingcomplete NBC protective clothing to continue their mis-sion for extended periods in more comfort.

Present NBC clothing induces considerable heatstress when worn in hot environments and can causeheat casualties in less than thirty minutes.

The new system, developed by Individual ProtectionLaboratory, US . Army Natick Research and Develop-ment Center, Natick, MA, will be connected to a refri-geration source within the vehicle and will distributeconditioned air over the wearer’s torso. Tests have

shown that crewmen can continue with their operation-

al tasks for up to 12 hours without experiencing any illeffects from heat.

The new development will be incorporated in al l M7E7tanks coming off the production line in 1985.

M60A3 Sample Data Collection (SDC)

The M60A3 Sample Data Collection began in Novem-ber 1979 at the 1/32 Armor Battalion and the 1/70

Armor Battalion in USAREUR. During the followingyears the program has collected data on 343 tanks that

have accrued in excess of 500,000 miles. The objective

of the SDC is to increase the reliability, availability,maintainability and durability (RAM-D) of the M60A3

tank by providing field performance data to assist in thedesign and logistics decision-making process.

The process demands valid, current information andthe M60A3 SDC can assist by supplying a fast flow ofaccurate, current data to those personnel needing thatinformation.

The single most important point in the informationstream is the source. In each participating tank compa-

ny a representative of PECO Enterprises collects therequired M60A3 data, relieving military personnel ofthis additional duty. Each collector records the detailsof an M60A3 maintenance incident on a form which isthen sent to a centralized location to be added to the

computer data base. Once in the data base, the

information can be accessed for review and used byanyone having the proper computer code.

When time is critical, the rapidly accessible data canprovide information within 24 hours on the equipment’sRAM-D performance.

The M60A3 SDC has proven to be a prime source of

information in the RAM-D decision-making process.

The data so far collected are the basis for severalimprovements that will result in P IPS or ECPs to theM60A3 tank, according to a spokesman for the US.Army DARCOM Material Readiness Support Activity in

Lexington, KY .SDC data also assists decision-makers in evaluating

such things as new versus overhaul performance, oper-ating and support costs, training costs, clean air com-

pliance, useful life, effects of combat vehicle evaluationon operational readiness rates, effects of TMDE on

maintenance time and many other programs. A ll theseprograms can produce viable cost savings andimproved readiness through enhanced equpment per-formance.

The M60A3SDC program fulfils a need that so far has

not been met elsewhere.




Blackhawks Move, Win Award, Change COSDelta Troop, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry, 2d Armored

Division, has gone as a unit to Garlstadt, FRG wherethey joined 2AD Forward. C Troop (Ground) 2-1 Cavalryis being disbanded under the new Division 86 T08E.Echo Troop, 2-1 Cavalry, recently received the 2AD’s304th Light Tank Brigade Trophy. As one of the fewNight Vision Goggle-qualified air troops in the Army,Echo Troop won out over more than 100 company-sizedunits in the competition. On 16 August, LieutenantColonel Harold W. Schmid, J r., took over the colors of 2-1 Cavalry, the Blackhawks, as he assumed commandfrom Lieutenant Colonel William S. Huff, I l l . Colonel Huffsupervised the squadron’s reorganization from H-seriesto J -series TOE and it became the first Division 86armored cavalry squadron in the Army. Colonel Huff willattend the Armed Forces Staff College. Colonel Schmidis the former XO of 2-1 Cavalry. The ceremony wasperformed entirely by noncommissioned officers withCSM Albert White as commander of troops.

CO B, 5th Bn, 32d Armor is “Best of the Best”

Major General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander,24th Infantry Division, awarded the prestigious DraperArmor Leadership Award to Company B, 5th Battalion,32d Armor and named the unit the “best of the best.”

The ceremony, held at Fort Stewart, GA, honored theunit for its performance during the past year and thejudging was based upon such things as tank gunnery- -

scores, unit performance in ARTEPs and individual The Command Post Vehicle Test Bed,now under study

at Aberdeen Proving Ground, is based on M109-chas-arksmanship scores.

First Sergeant David W. Tart, received engraved pla-ques and a statue of a mounted cavalryman will be dis-played in the unit’s orderly room for one year.

Captain J ohn N. Duquette, company commander, and sis components.

70th Armor Remembers D-Day in NormandyOn 6 J une 1984, the 40th anniversary of the Norman-

dy landings, soldiers of the 2d Battalion, 70th Armortook part in 24th Infantry Division ceremonies at Fort

Stewart, GA in remembrance of those landings.Normandy marked the 70th ’~hird amphibious

assault landing in WW II, the unit having taken part inthe North African landings and the Sicilian campaign.For the D-Day landings, Companies A and B wereequipped with duplex-drive (DD) swimming tanks,Company C was equipped with dozer-bladed Shermansand Company D went ashore in M-5 Stuart tanks. The

unit landed at Utah Beach and for its actions that daywas awarded the Presidential Unit Citation.

2d ACR Replaces M60A3s with M1sG Troop, 2d Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment

took over the first M i tank on J une 12 to mark the

2ACR’s transition from the M60A3 model. Colonel Willi-am W. Crouch, the 2 ACR’s 62d colonel, christened the

Abrams tank in a ceremony attended, among others, byLieutenant Colonel Thomas M. Molino, 2d Squadroncommander, and Captain David J . Shroer, G Trobp com-mander. The 2d Squadron completed its transition on

15 uly.

Command Post Vehicle Test BedA “generic” command post vehicle that will be used

as a test bed to study command, control, and commu-nications operations in nuclear and chemical battlefieldenvironments has been built by the U.S. Army HumanEngineering Laboratory at Aberdeen Proving Ground,MD. This vehicle is equipped with computers, radios, anauxiliary power unit and an environmental control unit

to permit its use in either the open or closed hatch modefor continuous periods of up to 72 hours. Crews willwear special protective clothing that can be heated orcooled and will use onboard facilities for eating and

personal hygiene when hatches are closed. The testbed vehicle will be used to gather data for use in future

large-scale field tests.

2/66th Concludes NETT with M1 Abrams TanksThe 2d Battalion, 66th Armored Regiment recently

concluded its M i New Equipment Transition Training(NETT) at Vilseck, Germany. The 2/66 is the forward-based tank battalion of the 66th Regiment and is home

stationed in Garlstedt, FRG.The battalion wound up its training in J une and is now

fully equipped with the M i Abrams. Further field train-ing for 2/66 on its new tanks was to include crew quali-fication gunnery in J uly, an FTX on August, a battalion-level ARTEP with the Dutch 42d Brigade in October and

a PBR gunnery in November of this year.

ARMOR September-October1984 51



C O M M A N D , C O N T R O L &COMMUNICATIONS (C3)by A.M.Willcox, M.G. Slade and P.A. Ramsdale.Brassey’s Defence Publishers, Oxford,England. $12.50 softback, $27.00 hard-

back. 150 pages.

The sixth volume in Brassey’s battle-field technology series is concerned withthe ability to gather intelligence. formu-late decisions, and issue commands at arapid pace in a potentially hostile elec-tromagnetic environment. This volume

provides an excellent introduction to keytheories and technologies. It is aimed atboth military and civilian readers who re-quire knowledge of current or futurecommunications technology as it relatesto military applications. No in-depth prior

technical knowledge or mathematicalskill is required to understand the dis-cussions and presentations.

It begins with a brief overview of thegeneral topic and a review of basic radio

concepts. Aspects of combat net radioare discussed followed by a look at trunkcommunications, including facilities,

techniques, relay systems and switch-ing. The various components of electron-ic warfare (EW) are presented in topics

such as direction finding, jamming andencryption. The book closes with a dis-

cussion of strategic communications,touching on speech compression, adap-

tive cancellations and signal processing.

The volume is written in textbook stylewith self-test questions after each chap-ter. The appendices include answers tothe questions and a glossary of abbrevi-ations. Many figures and illustrations

augment the text and the only drawback

is its lack of references to other works in

the field.

DONALDJ . BUTZBattelle Laboratories,

Columbus, Ohio

PANZERS IN NORMANDY-THEN AND NOW by Eric Lefevre.Battle of Britain Prints International Ltd.,

London, England, 1983. 212 pages.S33A 5

This volume gives a brief history of the17 panzer units that fought in Normandy

in June-August 1944. It specifically de-tails each regiment in each panzer divi-sion, as well as independent battalions.

The book is essentially in two parts.The first contains a chart showing thetheoretical composition of a 1944-erapanzer regiment, descriptions of thearmor used by them and the uniforms of

army and Waffen-SS armor crewmen.The second part deals with the battles in

Normandy.

The book is quite accurate, though afew discrepancies were noted. One

interesting bit of information unearthedduring the extensive research for thebook was the discovery of the grave ofMichael Wittman, the legendary tank“ace” who had been missing in actionsince August 8, 1944. His grave, along

with those of two of his crewmen, wasdiscovered and the remains reinterred atthe German war cemetery at LaCambe,France.

The book’s principal interest is to

those who are students of the Normandy

battles from the German point of view.Many of the photographs are of the

“then and now” variety showing Norman

scenes during or shortly after the battlesand also today.

ROBERT HODGEBloomington, IL

RED ARMOUR by Richard Simpkin,Pergamon - Brassey’s International De-fense Publishers, McLean. Va, 224 pag-es. $36.

In this new book, Brigadier (Ret.) Ri-chard Simpkin attempts a much neededunderstanding of the maneuver theory onwhich Soviet land operations are based.Simpkin, a 30-year veteran of Britain’sRoyal Tank Regiment, is a leading expert

in the field of armored vehicle develop-

ment and a prolific writer on armor andits employment.

His major point is that Soviet conceptscan be accurately expressed in termsfamiliar to the Western reader andunderstood by soldier and politicianalike. He is convinced that “by using lit-eral translations of Soviet terms, thehandful of (Soviet) specialists. . . have

created an arcane and detail-ridden lan-guage which blocks, rather than pro-motes communication of their expertise”and thus fails to answer “the Western’s

soldier’s need to know his potential ene-my.” His writing style leaves little doubtthat he intends the book for a well-edu-cated military or technical audience witha good grasp of Soviet military organiza-tions and equipment.

The author’s technical expertise is evi-

dent in the language and style of thebook, which takes on the format of atechnical report, using such terms as“mass center” to describe the enemy’scenter of mass, “attraction” betweenattacking and defending forces, and“lever arm” when referring to the separa-tion distance between a “hammer force”and an “anvil force.” The diagrams illus-trating Soviet technical concepts evensuggest the engineer’s blueprint.

The first part of the book, with its vol-

uminous technical data on the Soviet

Army, tends to bog the reader down, butfor those with an interest in Soviet mobileoperations, the payoff comes ina section

labeled “Concepts”. Here, Simpkin dis-

cusses the Soviet concept of the “deepbattle.” “the tank force concept,” Sovietmobile operations and their applicabilityto the NATO center.

He presents a wealth of new ideas onconcepts such as the operational ma-neuver group and Soviet use of airborne,

airmobile, and amphibious forces, whilecommenting on how these subjects have

been treated by other Western authors.

GILBERT0 VILLAHERMOSACaptain, ArmorFort Bragg, NC

ARMS TRANSFERS UNDERNIXON; A POLICY ANALYSISby Lewis Sorley. University of Kentucky,Louisville, 1983.231 pp.

Growing attention is being paid to the

increasingly vital role of Security Assis-tance (SA) in the total spectrum of U.S.national security policy. SA is an umbrel-

la term for a variety of arms transfer

measures (Foregin Military Sales-FMS,Military Assistance Program-MAP) and

related programs (International MilitaryEducation and Trainig-IMET; Peace-

keeping Operations-PKO; EconomicSupport Fund-ESF).

Major issues in the contemporary SAarena include: the sale of aircraft(AWACS, F-74, F -75 , F- 76, €-2C,etc.) toMideast nations; concern over loss ofsensitive hardware and technology if a

purchaser’s government falls, as Irandid; the proper balance between moral-ethical values, such as human rights,and other considerations in the total“sell-no sell” equation. The author alsoexamines whether the U.S. Governmentshould encourage private sector devel-

opment of “designed for export” equip-ment; what percentage of an arms trans-

feree’s GNP should be dedicated to

acquiring, operating and maintaininghighly sophisticated military hardware;and the competition accorded the U S . byother arms suppliers. In addition to theUSSR, United Kingdom, and France,these include a number of smaller na-

tions now emerging as arms sellers,

particularly of small arms, antiarmor mis-siles, light armored vehicles (LAVs), pa-

trol boats, and transport aircraft, wea-pons categories which are of great inter-

est toThird World buyers.

J OHNA. HURLEYLieutenant Colonel, USAFR

HQ. USAF




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ChchcAn;

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fie/with titles like, “Dressing For Success,” “Searching For Excellence,”andeven “Winning Through Intimidation.”

Not long ago, however, a sense of gloom pervaded our country. Successseemed to evade our nation. But, our leaders and people looked inward, sawwhat needed doing, pulled up their socks, and went to work.

Today our nation looks about the world with a renewed sense of pride,optimism and a spirit of winning. Our Olympians measured their success notsomuch by the medal count as by a phrase we kept hearing - chieving their“personal best.”

As our nation and Army renew the spirit of winning, achieving our personalbest should be a motto adopted by every officer, NCO and soldier.

Winning is not simply an outcome. Were it so, many in this world who don’tplay fair and square, who make their own rules, who bully those weaker thanthemselves and avoid picking on those their own size, would be called win-ners. But they delude themselves; so they are born losers.

Winning is a state of mind, an outlook, a way of life. And, it seems to be

catching on, for the men and women joining our ranks today see themselvesas winners and view the Army as a winning team.

Forty years ago, our soldiers also saw themselves as a winning team. Theyhad cracked the Atlantic Wall, entered Fortress Europe and drove the enemybefore them. They were so successful, in fact, that they outran their suppliesand had to halt. In the lull that followed, those winners became complacent.Taking advantage of that attitude, Hitler launched a massive counteroffensivethat took thousands of lives and became known as the Battle of the Bulge.Complacency turned to desperation as U S . forces fought overwhelming odds.In the end, leaders like Patton and Clarke turned the tide by sheer determina-tion and hard work. Winning doesn’t come easily and is never guaranteed. It is

always hard work.In our optimism today, let usnot fall prey to complacency. Whatever our job,wherever we serve, we must strive for our personal best every day. Whateverthe odds, however the outcome, winners play hard all four quarters and fightevery round.

Lombardi probably said it best. “Winning isn’t everything, it’s the ONLYthing.” The “Pack”came back. So have we! Good shooting.

armor september october 1984 web

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