arab revolt of 1936

8/13/2019 Arab Revolt of 1936

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The 1936-1939 Revolt in Palestine

Between 1936 and 1939, the Palestinian revolutionary movement suffered a severesetback at the hands of three separate enemies that were to constitute together theprincipal threat to the nationalist movement in Palestine in all subsequent stages ofits struggle the local reactionary leadership! the regimes in the "rab statessurrounding Palestine! and the imperialist#$ionist enemy% &he present study willconcentrate on the respective structures of these separate forces and the dialecticalrelations that e'isted among them%

&he intensity of the Palestinian nationalist e'perience, which emerged since 191(,and was accompanied in one way or another with armed struggle, could not reflectitself on the upper structure of the Palestinian national movement which remainedvirtually under the control of semi#feudal and semi#religious leadership% &his wasdue primarily to two related factors

1% &he e'istence and effectiveness of the $ionist movement, which gave the

national challenge relative predominance over the social contradictions% &heimpact of this challenge was being systematically felt by the masses ofPalestinian "rabs, who were the primary victims of the $ionist invasionsupported by British imperialism%

)% &he e'istence of a significant conflict of interests between the local feudal#religious leadership and British imperialism *t was consistently in theinterest of the ruling class to promote and support a certain degree ofrevolutionary struggle, instead of being more or less completely allied withthe imperialist power as would otherwise be the case% &he Britishimperialists had found in the $ionists +a more suitable ally%+

&he above factors gave the struggle of Palestinian people particular features thatdid not apply to the "rab nationalist struggle outside Palestine% &he traditionalleadership, as a result, participated in, or at least tolerated, a most advanced formof political action armed struggle-! it raised progressive slogans, and hadultimately, despite its reactionary nature, provided positive leadership during acritical phase of the Palestinian nationalist struggle% *t is relevant to e'plain,however, how the feudal#religious leadership succeeded in staying at the head ofthe nationalist movement for so long until 19.(-% &he transformation of theeconomic and social structure of Palestine, which occurred rather rapidly, hadaffected primarily the /ewish sector, and had taken place at the e'pense of thePalestinian middle and petty bourgeoisie, as well as the "rab working class% &hechange from a semi#feudal society to a capitalist society was accompanied by anincreased concentration of economic power in the hands of the $ionist machine andconsequently, within the /ewish society in Palestine% *t is significant that Palestinian

"rab advocates of conciliation, who became outspoken during the thirties, were notlandlords or rich peasants, but rather elements of the urban upper bourgeoisiewhose interests gradually coincided with the e'panding interests of the /ewishbourgeoisie% &he latter, by controlling the process of industriali0ation, was creatingits own agents%

*n the meantime, the "rab countries surrounding Palestine were playing twoconflicting roles% n the one hand, the Pan#"rab mass movement was serving as acatalyst for the revolutionary spirit of the Palestinian masses, since a dialecticalrelation between the Palestinian and overall "rab struggles e'isted, on the otherhand, the established regimes in these "rab countries were doing everything intheir power to help curb and undermine the Palestinian mass movement% &he

sharpening conflict in Palestine threatened to contribute to the development of thestruggle in these countries in the direction of greater violence, creating a


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revolutionary potential that their respective ruling classes could not afford tooverlook%

&he "rab ruling classes were forced to support British imperialism against theircounterpart in Palestine, which was in effect leading the Palestinian nationalistmovement%

2eanwhile, the $ionist#*mperialist alliance continued to grow! the period between1936 and 1939 witnessed not only the crystalli0ation of the militaristic andaggressive character of the colonial society that $ionism had firmly implanted inPalestine but also the relative containment and defeat of the Palestinian workingclass! this was subsequently to have a radical effect on the course of the struggle%uring that period, $ionism, in collaboration with the mandatory power,successfully undermined the development of a progressive /ewish labor movementand of /ewish#"rab Proletarian brotherhood% &he Palestine 4ommunist Party waseffectively isolated among both "rab and /ewish workers, and the reactionary5istadrut completely dominated the /ewish labour movement% &he influence of "rabprogressive forces within "rab labour federations in 5aifa and /affa diminished,

leaving the ground open for their control by reactionary leaderships thatmonopoli0ed political action%

Background: The Workers

&he issue of /ewish immigration to Palestine was not merely a moral or nationalissue! it had direct implication on the economic status of the "rab people ofPalestine, affecting primarily the small and middle#income farmers, workers andcertain sectors of the petty and middle bourgeoisies% &he national and religiouscharacter of /ewish immigration further aggravated the economic repercussions%

Between 1933 and 193, 17,777 /ews immigrated to Palestine, bringing thecountry8s /ewish population to ..3,777 # or )9%6 of the total # from 19)6 to 193)the average number of immigrants per year was :,)71%1*t rose to .),9( between1933 and 1936, as direct result of ;a0i persecution in


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"nother result was the development of a competitive struggle between thePalestinian "rab and /ewish proletariats and between Palestinian "rab peasants,farmers and agricultural laborers and their /ewish counterparts% &his conflict alsoe'tended to higher classes, in as much as the Palestinian "rab small landownersand urban middle bourgeoisie reali0ed that their interests were being threatened bygrowing /ewish capital%

*n 193, for e'ample, /ews controlled (:) of a total of 1,)1) industrial firms inPalestine, employing 13,6:( workers, while the rest were Palestinian "rab#controlled and employed about .,777 workers /ewish investment totaled P@.,391,777 compared to P@ :7.,777 Palestinian "rab industrial investment! /ewishproduction reached P@ 6,777,777 compared to P@ 1,.,777 by Palestnian "rabfirms *n addition, /ewish capital controlled 97 of the concessions granted by theBritish mandatory government, which accounted for a total investment of P@,:(9,777 and provided labor for ),619 workers%6

"n official census in 193: indicated that an average /ewish worker received 1.more in wages than his Palestinian "rab counterpart "s high as .33 more in

te'tile factories employing /ewish and "rab women, and )33 in tobaccofactories -% +By /uly 193:, the real wages of the average Palestinian "rab workerdecreased 17 while those of a /ewish worker rose 17%+!

&he situation resulted in an almost total collapse of the "rab economy in Palestine,primarily affecting Palestinian "rab workers% *n his report to the Peel ?oyal4ommission, ecretary of the ederation of Palestinian "rabCorkers in /affa, indicated that 9( of Palestinian "rab workers had a +well belowaverage+ standard of living% Based on a census covering 1,777 workers in /affa in1936, the ederation had found that the income of : of "rab workers was lessthan P@ )%:7 the average minimum income required to support a family being P@11-! 1) less than P@ .%)7, 1) less than P@ 6, . less than P@ 17, 1% less

than P@ 1) and 7% less than P@ 1%9

Chen the 2andatory


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workers in ebruary 193% "fter si' months, this figure went down to ),):6, and ina year8s time, went down to 61: Palestinian "rab workers only%14"ttacks againstPalestinian "rab workers also took place% n one occasion, for instance, the /ewishcommunity forced a Palestinian "rab contractor and his workers to leave their workin the Brodski building in 5aifa% "mong those who were systematically losing their

Dobs were workers in orchards, cigarette factories, mason8s yards, construction, etc%

% %15

Between 1937 and 193, Palestinian "rab pearl industry e'ports fell from P@ 11,3)to P@ 3,::: a year% &he number of Palestinian "rab soap factories in 5aifa alone fellfrom 1) in 19)9 to . in 193% &heir e'port value fell from P@ )76,69 in 1937 to P@:9,311 in 193%16

*t was clear that the "rab proletariat had fallen +victim to British colonialism and/ewish capital, the former bearing the primary responsibility%+1

Fehuda Bauer wrote1!+n the eve of the 1936 disturbances, Palestine waspossibly the only country in the world, apart from the =%>%>%?%, that had not beenaffected by the world economic crisis! in fact, it enDoyed real prosperity as a resultof a massive import of capital over 37,777,777 in capital had entered Palestine-%&he imported capital had even fallen short of the necessary funds needed for all theinvestment programmes%+ &his prosperity, however, was based on rather shakeyfoundations, which collapsed once the influ' of private capital came to an endbecause of fears of the outbreak of war in the 2editerranean% +&he loan systemcollapsed! there were indications of serious unemployment and construction activitygreatly diminished% Palestinian "rab workers were being dismissed by both "raband /ewish employers, a number of them returning to their original villages!national consciousness was rising due to the aggravating economic crisis%+19

Bauer, however, omits the primary factor continued /ewish immigration% >ir /ohn

5ope >impson stated in his report that, +*t was a bad, and perhaps a dangerouspolicy, to allow large sums of money to be invested in unprofitable industries inPalestine to Dustify increased immigration%+ *n effect, Bauer8s statement wasbasically unfounded% since the influ' of /ewish capital continued during the years hereferred to and, in fact, reached its clima' in 193! the number of immigrants alsoincreased during these years% 4apital invested in /ewish industries and commercefirms increased from P@ ,3:1,777 in 1933 to P@ 11,63:,377 in 1936! op% cit% p%3)3-% 2oreover, the dismissal of "rab workers by /ewish employers had begun longbefore that time%2" *n the meantime, large masses of Palestinian "rab peasantswere being evicted and uprooted from their lands as a result of /ewish coloni0ationof rural areas%21&hey immigrated to cities and towns only to face increasingunemployment% &he $ionist machine took full advantage of the rivalry between

Palestinian "rab workers and their fellow /ewish workers% +*sraeli+ leftists laterobserved that not once, in a period of fifty years, were /ewish workers mobili0edand rallied around material issues or the struggle of @abor ederation, to challengethe +*sraeli+ regime itself% +&he /ewish proletariat could not be mobili0ed around itsown cause%+22

&he fact is that the situation was fully the result of efficient $ionist planning, torecall 5er0l8s words +Private land in areas allocated to us must be sei0ed #from itsowners% Poor inhabitants are to be quickly evacuated across the border after havingsecured for them Dobs in the countries of their destination% &hey are to be deniedemployment in our country! as for large property#owners, they will ultimately Doinus%+23&he 5istadrut summed up its policy by declaring that +to allow "rabs to

penetrate the /ewish labor market meant that the influ' of /ewish capital would beemployed to service "rab development, which is contrary to $ionist obDectives%
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urthermore, the employment of "rabs in /ewish industries would lead to a classdivision in Palestine along racial lines capitalist /ews employing "rab workers!should this be permitted, we would have introduced into Palestine the conditionsthat had led to the emergence of anti#semitism%+24&hus the ideology and practicesthat underlined the process of coloni0ation, with the escalation of the conflict withthe "rab society in Palestine, were developing fascist characteristics in $ionist

organi0ations! fascist $ionism was using the same tools as the mounting fascism inAurope% &he "rab worker was at the bottom of a comple' social pyramid and hiscondition grew worse as a result of the confusion within the "rab labor movement%uring the period between the early twenties and early thirties, the progressivelabor movement # "rab as well as /ewish # suffered crushing blows, which, togetherwith the impact of purely subDective weaknesses, resulted in its virtual paralysis% nthe one hand, the $ionist movement which was rapidly becoming fascist incharacter and resorting to armed terrorism sought to isolate and destroy the4ommunist Party, most of whose leaders were /ews, and that resisted beingcontained by $ionist labor organi0ations% n the other hand, the Palestinian feudalreligious leadership could not tolerate the rise of an "rab labor movement that wasindependent of its control% &he movement was thus terrori0ed by the "rab

leadership% *n the early thirties, the 2ufti8s group assassinated 2ichel 2itri,President of the ederation of "rab Corkers in /affa% Fears later, >ami &aha, atrade unionist and President of the ederation of "rab Corkers in 5aifa was alsoassassinated% *n the absence of a economically and politically strong nationalbourgeoisie, the workers were directly confronted and oppressed by the traditionalfeudal leadership! the conflict occasionally led to violent confrontations which werereduced whenever the traditional leadership managed to asssume direct controlover trade union activities% "s a result, labor activity lost its essential role in thestruggle% 2oreover, with the sharpening of the national struggle, a relative identityof interests united the workers with the traditional "rab leadership% 2eanwhile, the4ommunist Party occasionally succeeded in organi0ing political action% n oneoccasion on 2ay 1st, 19)7, a group of demonstrating communists clashed with a

$ionist demonstration in in &el#"viv and were forced to flee the city and take refugein the "rab quarter of 2anshiya in /affa! later a confrontation took place with aBritish security force that was sent to arrest the Bolsheviks%25*n a statementdistributed on the same day, the A'ecutive 4ommittee of the Party declared +&he/ewish workers are here to live with you! they have not come to persecute you, butto live with you% &hey are ready to fight on your side against the capitalist enemy,be it /ew, "rab or British% *f the capitalists incite you against the /ewish worker, it isin order to protect themselves from you% o not fall into the trap! the /ewishworker, who is a soldier of the revolution, has come to offer you his hand as acomrade in resisting British, /ewish and "rab capitalists% % %Ce call on you to fightagainst the rich who are selling their land and their country to foreigners% ownwith British and rench bayonets! down with "rab and foreign capitalists%+26

&he remarkable thing in this long statement was, not only the idealist portrait ofthe struggle, but also the fact that nowhere did it mention the word +$ionist+! yet$ionism represented to the Palestinian "rab peasants and workers a daily threat, aswell as to the /ewish communists, fifty#five of whom were attacked by $ionists in&el#"viv and e'pelled to /affa%

&he Palestine 4ommunist Party remained isolated from the political reality until theend of 1937, which was the year its >eventh 4ongress was held% *n the resolutionspassed by the 4ongress, the Party admitted that it had +essentially adopted anerroneous attitude towards the issue of Palestinian nationalism, and the status ofthe /ewish national minority in Palestine and its role vis#a#vis the "rab masses% &heParty had failed to become active among the Palestinian "rab masses and remainedisolated by working e'clusively among /ewish workers% *ts isolation was illustratedby the Party8s negative attitude during the Palestinian "rab uprising of 19)9%+2
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"lthough in practice the Party systematically attacked the Palestinian bourgeoisie #which at the time was in a difficult position # and although it never adopted thepolicy of popular fronts and alliances with the revolutionary classes, the records ofthe >eventh 4ongress held in 1937#1931 provide a most valuable political analysis%"s shown in these records! the Party considered solving the Palestinian "rabnational question as one of the primary tasks of revolutionary struggle *t viewed

its isolation from the Palestinian "rab mass movement as the result of a +$ionist#influenced deviation that prevented the "rabi0ation of the Party%+ &he documentsmention +opportunist efforts to block the "rabi0ation of the Party%+ &he 4ongressadopted the view that it was the duty of the Party to e'pand the cadres of therevolutionary forces capable of directing the activity of the peasants that is, cadresof revolutionary Palestinian "rab workers%- &he +"rabi0ation+ of the Party, itstransformation into a real party of the toiling Palestinian "rab masses was the firstcondition of the success of its activity in the rural areas%2!

&he Party, however, proved incapable of carrying out the task of mobili0ingPalestinian "rabs, and the revolutionary slogans adopted by the 4ongress werenever translated into action +;ot a single dunum to the *mperialist and $ionist

usurpers,+ +the revolutionary e'propriation of land belonging to the government, torich /ewish developers, $ionist factions and big "rab landowners and farmers,+ +;orecognition of agreements on the sale of land,+ +the struggle against $ionistusurpers%+29&he 4ongress had also decided that +it is possible to solve all theburning issues and end oppression only through armed revolution under theleadership of the working class%+3"&he Palestine 4ommunist Party was thus never+"rabi0ed%+ &he field was open for the domination of the Palestinian "rab massmovement by the feudal and religious leaderships% Perhaps one reason behind theline and practices of the Party at that time was the uncompromising revolutionaryattitude for which the 4omintern was famous between 19)( and 193.% But despitetheir small number, their relative isolation and their failure to reach the Palestinian"rab masses, particularly in the rural areas, the communists threw all their weight

into the 1936 revolt% &hey showed great courage, cooperated with some of the localleaders, and supported the 2ufti! many of them were killed and arrested% But theydid not succeed in becoming an influential force% "pparently the slogan of+"rabi0ation+ got lost somewhere later on! nearly ten years later, on /anuary )),19.6, *0vestia dared to compare the +struggle of the /ews+ in Palestine with theBolshevik struggle before 191:%

*n any case, the resolutions of the >eventh 4ongress of the Palestine 4ommunistParty have only been revealed recently! the process of "rabi0ation did not takeplace, and despite the educational role played by the Party and the contributions itmade to the struggle in this field, it did not play the role proDected for it by its>eventh 4ongress in the Palestinian national movement at that time% uring the

1936 revolt the Party split% &here was also another fundamental split in 19.(, andanother in 196, for reasons connected with "rabi0ation! the dissidents advocateda +constructive+ attitude towards $ionism%

&his failure of the 4ommunist Party, the weakness of the rising "rab bourgeoisieand the disunity of the "rab labor movement meant that the feudal#religiousleaderships were cast to play a fundamental role as the situation escalated to thepoint of e'plosion in 1936%

Background: The Peasants

>uch was the situation concerning the workers at the outbreak of the 1936 revolt%

5owever, what we have considered so far dealt only with one domain in which the
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conflict raged between the /ewish and "rab societies in Palestine and later insideeach of these societies%

&he other domain is the rural areas, where the conflict assumed its primarilynationalist form because of /ewish capital pouring into Palestine% espite the factthat a large share of /ewish capital was allocated to rural areas, and despite the

presence of British imperialist military forces and the immense pressure e'erted bythe administrative machine in favor of the $ionists, the latter achieved only minimalresult a total of 6,:) new coloni0ing settlers- in comparison to $ionist plans toestablish a /ewish state% &hey nevertheless seriously damaged the status of thePalestinian "rab rural population% wnership by /ewish groups of urban and ruralland rose from 377,777 dunums in 19)9 to 1,)7,777 dunums in 1937% &hepurchased land was insignificant from the point of view of mass coloni0ation and ofthe solution of the +/ewish problem%+ But the e'propriation of nearly one milliondunums # almost one#third of the agricultural land # led to a severe impoverishmentof "rab peasants and Bedouins% By 1931, )7,777 peasant families had been evictedby the $ionists% urthermore, agricultural life in the underdeveloped world, and the"rab world in particular, is not merely a mode of production, but equally a way of

social, religious and ritual life% &hus, in addition to the loss of land, the Palestinian"rab rural society was being destroyed by the process of coloni0ation%

=ntil 1931, only 11 per thousand /ews depended on agriculture for a living,compared to 63: per thousand "rabs% f nearly 119,777 peasants, about 11,777were /ews%31Chereas, in 1931, 19%1 of the /ewish population worked inagriculture, 9 of the Palestinian "rabs lived off the land% &he economic basis forthis clash is very dangerous of course but to comprehend it fully we should see itsnational face%

*n 19.1, 37 of the Palestinian "rab peasants owned no land, while nearly 7 ofthe rest owned plots that were too small to meet their living requirements% Chile

)7 feudal landlords owned . million dunums, ),777 peasant families werelandless, and .6,777 owned an average of 177 dunums% 1,777 hired agriculturallaborers worked for landlords% "ccording to survey of 3)) Palestinian "rab villagesconducted in 1936, .: of the peasants owned less than : dunums and 6 lessthan )7 dunums the minimum required to feed an average family was 137dunums%- 32

"lthough they lived under the triple pressure of $ionist invasion, "rab feudalownership of the land and the heavy ta'es imposed by the British 2andatory


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an area of .7,777 dunums, the village of >hatta with its 16,777 dunums and manyother villages where the land was sei0ed by $ionists after having evicted itsinhabitants% "s a result, the 7,777 /ews who lived in agricultural settlementsowned 1,)77,777 dunums # an average of ). per inhabitant # while 77,777 "rabsowned less than 6,777,777, an average of 1) dunums per inhabitant%34&he case ofthe (,:37 peasants evicted from 2arD *bn "mer ).7,777 dunums-, where the land

was sold to $ionists by the Beirut feudal family of >ursock, remained suspendeduntil the end of the 2andate in 19.(% 35

+Avery plot of land bought by /ews was made foreign to "rabs as if it had beenamputated from the body of Palestine and removed to another country%+36&hesewords were those of a big Palestinian feudal leader% 5e added +"ccording to the/ews, 17 of the land was purchased from peasants, and the rest from biglandlords%%%But in fact ) of the land belonged to peasants%+3&his apologeticattitude on the part of the feudalist does not change the fact that as reported by/ewish sources- of the total land acquired by three large /ewish companies by 1936which accounted for half the land purchased by /ewish capital up to that date-,)%6 belonged to absentee landlords, ).%6 to residing landlords, 13%. from

the government, churches, and foreign companies, and 9%. from individualpeasants%3!

&his transfer of land ownership created an e'panding class of dispossessedpeasants who turned to seasonal salaried labor% &he maDority eventually made theirway to the cities and sought unskilled labor% +or a peasant who was evicted fromhis land, it was impossible to secure other land, and the compensation was usuallyvery small e'cept in cases where the 2ukhtar 2ayor- or other village notableswere involved%+39

&he maDority of dispossessed peasants thus moved to cities and towns% +*n /affa,most of the street cleaners were e'#villagers! the "rab 4igarette and &obacco

4ompany in ;a0areth reported that most of its workers were also of villageorigin%+4"&he following illustrates the fate of migrating peasants +Ce asked the4ompany how many workers it employed and the answer was )17% &he totalweekly wages paid to the workers were P@6), amounting to an average of )9%piastres per worker per week%+41"t that time, the average weekly wages of a/ewish woman worker in tobacco factories ranged from between 1:7 and )37piastres a week%42Aven in government employment, an average /ewish workerearned over 177 more than his "rab counterpart%43*n 1937, the /ohnson#4rosbycommission estimated the average annual income of a peasant at P@31%3:, beforeta' deductions% &he report further indicated that average ta' deductions amountedto P@ 3%(:% *f we further deducted the P@( that the average peasant paid as intereston his loans, the net income would amount to P@19% annually% "ccording to the

same report, the average sum required to cover the e'penses of a peasant familywas P@)6% +&he peasants, in fact%%%were the most heavily ta'ed group inPalestine%%%the policy pursued by the government clearly aimed at placing thepeasant in an economic situation that would ensure the establishment of a /ewishnational home%+44

4learly then, /ewish immigration and the transformation of the Palestinian economyfrom an essentially "rab agricultural economy to an industrial economy dominatedby /ewish capital, affected primarily the small Palestinian "rab peasants% &a'e'emptions were granted meanwhile to /ewish immigrants, as well as e'emptionscovering the imports related to /ewish industries, such as certain raw materials,unfinished products, coal%%%etc% 4ustoms duty on imported consumer goods rose%

&he average import ta' rose from 11 at the beginning of the 2andate to morethan )6 by 1936! 117 on sugar, 1.9 on tobacco, )7( on petrol, .77 onmatches and )6 on coffee%45
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"n illustration of government policy is provided by the following story told by"rchbishop


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chief agent, because it had found a better qualified, more firmly established andmore highly organi0ed agent in the $ionist movement%

*n this way, the main outlines of the fundamental role that the feudal#clericalleadership was to play were established # it was to be a +struggle+ for a betterposition in the colonialist regime% But they could not engage in this +struggle+

without rallying around their support, the classes that were eager to freethemselves from the yoke of coloni0ation% Cith this end in view, they drew up aprogramme that was clearly progressive, adopted mass slogans, which they wereneither willing nor able to push to their logical conclusions, and followed a patternof struggle which was quite out of character%

f course these leaderships did not have absolute freedom of action, as manypeople like to suggest! on the contrary, they were e'posed to all the pressures thatwere shaping the course of events, to the increasing intensity of the conflicts and toall the influences we have already discussed% &his e'plains why there developedfrom time to time partial contradictions between their interests and those of theruling classes of the "rab countries surrounding Palestine, although they upheld the

same class interests% *t also e'plains their widescale alliances within the classstructure of Palestine%

Background: The #ntellectuals

*n 1937, after thirteen years of British occupation of Palestine, the irector ofAducation admitted in his report that +>ince the beginning of the occupation, thegovernment has never undertaken to provide sufficient funds for the building of asingle school in the country,+ and in 193, the government turned down .1 of theapplications by Palestinian "rabs for places in schools% *n the (77 villages inPalestine there were only fifteen schools for girls and )69 for boys and only fifteenvillage girls got as far as the seventh elementary grade%

&here were 1: Palestinian "rab villages which had neither boys8 nor girls8 schoolsand there was not one secondary school in the villages% 2oreover, the government+censored books and obDected to all cultural links with the "rab world, and didnothing to raise the educational level of the peasants%%%+5"

&hus in 1931 among Palestinian 2uslims )1 per thousand males and 33 perthousand females had attended school, and among the Palestinian 4hristians :1per thousand males and ..1 per thousand females for /ews the figures were 9.3per thousand males and :(: per thousand females%-51

&hese figures give an idea of the educational situation in the rural areas, but not ofthat in Palestine as a whole, which had played a pioneering role in education sincethe start of the "rab resurgence at the beginning of the )7th century% *n fact, alarge number of printing presses had been established in Palestine before theBritish occupation, about fifty "rabic newspapers appeared between 197. and19)), while at least ten more with a wide circulation made their appearance beforethe 1936 revolt%

" number of factors, which it is not possible to deal with at length here, had madePalestine an important center of "rab culture, and the persistent efforts ofintellectuals migrating into and out of Palestine were a basic factor in establishingthe cultural role of Palestine and in the establishment of literary associations and

clubs which began to appear in the early twenties%
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&his cultural development, which was constantly fed by a flow of "rab graduatesfrom Beirut and 4airo, was accompanied by an e'tensive activity in the field oftranslation from rench and Anglish% &he foreign missions that were primarilyattracted to Palestine for historical and religious considerations, placed a prominentrole in disseminating an atmosphere of education in the cities% 5owever, it is notthe general cultural climate in Palestine during that period that is of concern to us,

but rather, in particular, the influence of the aggravating economic and politicalcrisis on the literary movement% &he development of a certain +popular culture+ wasvery significant% *t represented a certain awareness that e'isted in rural areasdespite the widespread illiteracy, an awareness that was spurred by the rapidlydeveloping economic and political reality% Popular poetry in particular reflected agrowing concern on the part of the rural masses over the course of events% &hisspontaneous awareness led to a spirit of mobili0ation in the villages%

&he maDority of urban intellectuals, for their part, were of a feudal or commercialpetty#bourgeois class affiliation% "lthough they basically advocated a type ofbourgeois revolution, the obDective conditions were by no means favorable to thedevelopment of the class that would logically lead such a struggle% "s political

activists, they thus remained under the control of the traditional leadership% &heirwork nevertheless reflected a degree of awareness that, in general, was not sharedby their counterparts in other "rab countries%

&he struggle between advocates of revolution and reactionaries in the rural areas,and between revolutionary militants and defeatist elements in the cities wasdeveloping in favor of the revolution% Ce do not know of a single Palestinian writeror intellectual in that period who did not participate in the call for resistance againstthe colonial enemy% &here is no doubt that the intellectuals, even though they werenot, in general, mobili0ed by a revolutionary party, played an important role in thenational struggle%

&he position of Palestinian intellectuals was unique% 5aving completed their studiesand returned to their towns, they became aware of the incapacity of the class theybelonged to of leading the national struggle% But at the same time they sufferedfrom their own inability to participate and benefit from the process of industrialdevelopment that was essentially controlled by an alien and hostile community% nthe other hand, in the rural areas of Palestine, the peasants, who for centuries hadbeen subDect to class and national oppression, lived in a most archaic society wherelocal feudal and religious leaders e'ercised absolute authority% Popular poetry oftenreflected the submissiveness of peasants$, which the Palestinian intellectuals, andin particular the poets, could not combat easily% 4ertain intellectuals attempted toovercome the submissive mood of the rural masses and played a prominent role indisseminating progressive awareness%

Cadi al#Bustani, a poet of @ebanese origin who graduated from the "merican=niversity of Beirut and settled in Palestine, played an important role as aprogressive intellectual% 5e was the first to warn against the Balfour eclarationand its challenges, the very month it was issued% 5is period as Palestine was onthe verge of armed revolt- produced a powerful vanguard of revolutionary poetswhose works became part of the cultural heritage of the masses%$$n /anuary )9,19)7, the British 2andatory


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+/uda8s+ speechG r acts of witchcraftG "nd ?asafi8s sayingG r lies ofpoetryFour poetry is of the choicest words, you are well#acquainted with the

Dewels of sea verseBut this sea is one of politics, if Dustice spreads high its low tidebegins

FesH 5e who has crossed the /ordan ?iver is our cousin but he whocomes from across the sea is suspicious%53

&his long poem, which became very famous at the time, was in fact a uniquepolitical document! it not only made "l#?isafi look a fool, but also asserted, even atthat early date, political facts of great importance% *t not only mentioned /ewishimmigration and the danger it constituted, but also the role played by Britain infragmenting the Palestinian "rabs, the Balfour eclaration, and its implications, etc%

" short time before this, on 2arch )(th 19)7, "l#Bustani had himself led ademonstration, which chanted a song that he had composed himself% 5e wassummoned to an inquiry, and the following appears in the records of the inquiry

conducted by the Public Prosecutor

Public Prosecutor:>tatements have been made that you were carriedshoulder#high, and that you said to the people who were followingbehind you +h 4hristians, h 2uslims+%The Accused:Fes%Public Prosecutor:"nd you also said +&o whom have you left thecountryG+The Accused:Fes%Public Prosecutor:&hen you said +Eill the /ews and unbelievers%+The Accused:;o% &hat violates the meter and the rhyme% * could not

have said that% Chat * said was both rhyming and metrical% *t is calledpoetry%54

*n the subsequent periods poetry played an increasingly important role ine'pressing, on all sorts of occasions, feelings of the helpless masses% &hus, whenBalfour came from @ondon to attend the opening ceremony of the 5ebrew=niversity in 19):, the ceremony was also attended by "hmad @utfi al#>aid, as thedelegate of the Agyptian government, and the poet *skandar al#Ehuri wrote thefollowing lines addressed to Balfour

+?unning, from @ondon you came to stir the fire of this battle

h @ord * cannot blame you for you are not the source of our misery%or Agypt is to be blamed as it only e'tends to us empty hands%+$$$

*brahim &uqan, "bu >alma "bd al#Earim al#Earmi- and "bd al#?ahim 2ahmudwere, since the beginning of the thirties, the culmination of the wave of nationalistpoets who inflamed the whole of Palestine with revolutionary awareness andagitation% "s8af al#;ashashibi, Ehalil al#>akakini, *brahim al#abbagh, 2uhammed5asan "la al#in, Burhan al#"bbushi, 2uhammed Ehurshid, Iayasar al#Ehuri, thepriest hihada, 2utlaq "bd al#Ehaliq and others%

&he work of these three, &uqan, al#Earmi and 2ahmud, displays an e'traordinarypower of appreciation of what was going on, which can only be e'plained as a

profound grasp of what was boiling in mass circles% Chat appears to be ine'plicableprophecy and a power of prediction in their poems is, in fact, only their ability to
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e'press this dialectical relationship that linked their artistic work with themovement that was at work in society%

&he fact that we have concentrated on the role played by poetry and popular poetrydoes not mean that other manifestations of cultural activity in Palestine did not playany role, or that their role was insignificant% @iterary newspapers and articles,

stories and the translation movement all played a significant pioneering role% ore'ample, in an editorial published by Fusuf al#*sa in "l#;afa8is in 19)7, we read+Palestine is "rab # its 2uslims are "rab # its 4hristians are "rab # and its /ewishciti0ens are "rab too% Palestine will never be quiet if it is separated from >yria andmade a national home for $ionism% % %+

*t was e'pressions of this kind at the beginning of the twenties that fashioned therevolutionary cultural tide in the thirties, which was to play an important role inpromoting awareness and sparking off the revolt # writers such as "rif al#"rif, Ehalilal#>akakini a mocking writer of fiery prose, and son of a master carpenter-, "s8afal#;ashashibi a member of the upper bourgeoisie who was influenced by al#>akakini and adopted many of his views-, "rif al#"00uni, 2ahmud >aif al#in al#

*rani and ;aDati >idqi one of the early leftist writers who, in 1936, e'tolled thematerialism of *bn Ehaldun and deplored idealism%- 5e was probably the firstchronicler which the "rab nationalist movement had from the beginning of therenaissance who used a materialist analysis of events% 5e published his researchesin "l#&ali8a in 193: and 193( "bdullah 2ukhlis who in the middle thirties startedcalling for the view that colonialism is a class phenomenon, and maintaining thatartistic production must be militant-, ?aDa al#5urani, "bdullah al#Bandak, Ehalil al#Badiri, 2uhammad *00at arwa0a and *sa al#>ifri whose eulogy of the death of al#Iassam had a profoundly revolutionary significance%-

&his effervescence in the Palestinian cultural atmosphere which reached its clima'in the thirties, was e'pressed in a variety of forms, but for many reasons related to

the history of "rabic literature, the greatest influence was always e'ercised bypoetry and popular poetry%

&his alone e'plains the role which poetry took upon itself in this period, which wasalmost direct political preaching%

*brahim &uqan, for e'ample, commenting on the establishment, in 193), of the+national fund+ to save land in Palestine from being sold to the $ionists this wasthe fund established by the feudal#clerical leadership on the prete't of preventingthe land of poor peasants from falling into the hands of the $ionists- says +Aight ofthose responsible for the fund proDect were land brokers for the $ionists%+

"s early as 19)9, *brahim &uqan disclosed the role that the big landowners wereplaying in connection with the land problem

+&hey have sold the country to its enemies because of their greed formoney! but it is their homes they have sold% &hey could have beenforgiven if they had been forced to do so by hunger, but


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*n the same year, &uqan had written his epic on the death sentences passed by the2andatory afad, and2uhammad /umDum and "ta al#$ir of "cre% &his poem became e'tremely famous,and came to be regarded as part of the revolutionary heritage, like the poem of "bdal#?ahim 2ahmud written on "ugust 1., 193 in hich he addressed the "mir >audwho was visiting Palestine

+5ave you come to visit the "qsa 2osque, or to say farewell to it before it isdestroyedG+

&his poet was to lay down his life in the battle of "l#>haDara in Palestine in 19.(,but before that he was to play a prominent role, along with "bu >alma and &uqan%*n laying the foundations of Palestinian resistance poetry which later, under *sraelioccupation, was to become one of the most conspicuous manifestations of theendurance of the Palestinian masses%

Poetry and popular poetry accompanied the mass movement frm the early thirties,e'pressing the developments that preceded the outbreak of the revolt%

&he poem of "bu >alma, in which he chronicled the 1936 revolt, courageouslydescribes the bitter disappointment caused by the way the "rab regimes abandonedit

+Fou who cherish the homeland revolt against the outright oppression@iberate the homeland from the kings liberate it from the puppets% % %* thought we have kings that can lead the men behind them>hame to such kings if kings are so lowBy god, their crowns are not fit to be shoesolesCe are the ones who will protect the homeland and heal its wounds%+

2ention must also be made of the popular poet +"wad+ who, the night before hise'ecution in 193:, wrote on the walls of his cell in "cre a splendid poem endingwith the lines

+&he bridegroom belongs to us! woe to him whom we are fightingagainst # we8ll cut off his moustache with a sword% >hake the lancewith the beautiful shaft! where are you from, you brave men% Ce aremen of Palestine # welcome with honor%

+ather of the bridegroom, do not worry, we are drinkers of blood% *nBal8a and Cadi al#&uffah there has been an attack and a clash ofarms% % % h ye beautiful women sing and chant% n the day of thebattle of Beit "mrin you hear the sound of gun#shooting, look upon usfrom the balcony%+56

&he anger felt against all three members of the enemy trinity # the $ionist invasion,the British mandate and "rab reaction, both local and otherwise, grew constantly asthe situation grew more critical%

"t that time the countryside, with the escalation of the conflicts and the outbreaksof armed uprisings, was developing its new awareness through the contacts of its+cultural+ elements, with the towns and the multiplication of factors inducing suchawareness

+


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with the salesman * say my heart will never rest till * buy it 5is rifle got rusty fromlack of use but still longing for its fighter%+

*ndeed, the inflammatory call to revolt went to such e'traordinary lengths that,after all the inherited proverbs which counseled submissiveness, and constituted alead with the infallible authority of traditions, popular poetry suddenly became

capable of saying +"rab, son of weak and poor woman, sell your mother and buy agun! a gun will be better than your mother when the revolt relieves your cares%+5!

"s the conflict became more and more acute, the +gun+ was to become theinstrument which destroyed the age#old walls of the call to submissiveness andsuddenly became able to pierce the heart of the matter, and the revolt became thepromise for the future # better than the warmest things in the past, the mother andthe family%

But over all this effervescence the patriarchal feudalism was ossified with itsimpotent leadership, its authority and its reliance on the past%

*n the midst of these complicated and heated conflicts, which were both e'pandingand growing more profound, and which mainly affected the "rab peasants andworkers, although they also pressed heavily on the petty and middle bourgeoisieand the middle peasants in the country, the situation was becoming ever morecritical, e'pressing itself in armed outbreaks from time to time 19)9#1933-% n theother hand, the Palestinian feudal#clerical leaders felt that their own interests toowere threatened by the growing economic force # /ewish capitalism allied with theBritish 2andate% But their interests were also threatened from the opposite quarter# by the poor "rab masses who no longer knew where to turn% or the "rab urbanbourgeoisie was weak and incapable of leadership in this stage of economictransformation which was taking place with unparalleled rapidity and a smallsection of this bourgeoisie became parasitic and remained on the fringe of /ewish

industrial development% *n addition both their subDective and obDective conditionswere undergoing changes contradictory to the general direction "rab society waspursuing%

&he young intellectuals, sons of the rich rural families, played a prominent role ininciting people to revolt% &hey had returned from their universities to a society inwhich they reDected the formula of the old relationships, which had becomeoutdated, and in which they were reDected by the new formulas which had startedto take shape within the framework of the $ionist#colonialist alliance%

&hus the class struggle became mi'ed, with e'traordinary thoroughness, with thenational interest and religious feelings, and this mi'ture broke out within theframework of the obDective and subDective crisis which "rab society in Palestine wase'periencing% ue to the above, Palestinian "rab society remained a prisoner of thefeudal#clerical leaderships% *n view of the social and economic oppression which wasthe lot of the poor Palestinian "rabs in the towns and villages, it was inevitable thatthe nationalist movement should assume advanced forms of struggle, adopt classslogans and follow a course of action basd on class concepts% >imilarly, faced withthe firm and daily e'pressed alliance between the invading society built by the/ewish settlers in Palestine and British colonialism, it was impossible to forget theprimarily nationalist character of that struggle% "nd in view of the terrible religiousfervor on which the $ionist invasion of Palestine was based, and which wasinseparable from all of its manifestations, it was impossible that theunderdeveloped Palestinian countryside should not practice religious

fundamentalism as a manifestation of hostility to the $ionist colonialist incursion%
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4ommenting on the emergence of the Black Panther movement in +*srael,+ theleftist 5ebrew#language maga0ine Matzpen;o% , "pril 19:1- says +4lassconflicts in *srael sometimes tend to take the form of confessional conflicts% 4lassconflicts, even when translated into the language of confessionalism, have from thestart lain at the heart of $ionism%+ f course this statement applies to an evengreater e'tent to the role played by religion against the $ionist incursion, as being

a form of both national and class persecution% or e'ample +ne of the results of$ionism was that celebrations of the Prophet8s Birthday were turned into nationalistrallies under the direction of the 2ufti of 5aifa and the poet Cadi8 al#Bustani andwere attended by all the 4hristian leaders and notables, not a single /ew beinginvited% *n this way, saints8 days, both 2uslim and 4hristian, became popularfestivals with a nationalist tinge in the towns of Palestine%+

&he feudal#clerical leaderships proceeded to impose themselves at the head of themovement of the masses% &o do this they took advantage of the meagerness of the"rab urban bourgeoisie, and of the conflict which was, to a certain e'tent, boilingup between them and British colonialism, which had established its influencethrough its alliance with the $ionist movement! of their religious attributes, of the

small si0e of the "rab proletariat and the meagerness of its 4ommunist Party,which was not only under the control of /ewish leaders, but its "rab elements hadbeen subDected to oppression and intimidation by the feudal leadership ever sincethe early twenties% *t was against this complicated background, in which theinterlocked and e'tremely complicated conflicts were flaring up, that the 1936revolt came to the forefront in the history of Palestine%

%&T'(

JA'amples of such proverbs 5e who eats from the >ultan8s bread, strikes by hissword! @et no grass grow after mine! &oday8s egg is better than tomorrow8s hen "bird in the hand is worth two in the bush-!Chen we started selling coffins people

started dying! &he most severe of pains is the present one! 5e runs after the loaf ofbread and the loaf of bread runs before him! @ife goes well with the well to do%52

$$)ccording to Tau*i+ ,iad. a resistance /oet in occu/ied Palestine0%aareth: &ur revolutionar /oetr 0ahud ar7ish. (aih al-8asi

and sel* is an etension o* the revolutionar /oetr o* #rahi Tu+an.)d al-Rahi ahud. utla+ )d al-;hali+ and othersifri6", >alih 2as8ud Buwaysir61and >ubhi Fasin62, the first

spark was lit when an unknown group of Palestinian "rabs >ubhi Fasin describes itas a Iassamist group including arhan al#>a8udi and 2ahmud airawi- ambushedfifteen cars on the road from "nabta and the ;ur >hams prison, robbed their /ewish
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and "rab passengers alike of their money, while one of the three members of thegroup made a short speech to the Palestinian "rabs, who formed the maDority ofthe passengers, in which, according to al#>ifri, he said +Ce are taking your moneyso that we can fight the enemy and defend you%+63

r% "bd al#Cahhab al#Eayyali thinks that the first spark was lit before that # in

ebruary 1936, when an armed band of Palestinian "rabs surrounded a schoolwhich /ewish contractors were building in 5aifa, employing /ewish#only labor%64

But all sources rightly believe that the Iassamist rising, sparked off by >heikh *00al#in al#Iassam was the real start of the 1936 revolt%

5owever, the report of the ?oyal 4ommission @ord Peel- which Fehuda Bauerregards as one of the more authoritative sources written about the Palestineproblem, sidesteps ignores- these immediate causes for the outbreak of the revolt,and attributes the outbreak to two main causes the "rabs8 desire to win nationalindependence and their aversion to, and fear of, the establishment of the +/ewishnational home+ in Palestine%

*t is not difficult to see that these two causes are really only one, and the words inwhich they are couched are inflated and convey no precise meaning%

5owever, @ord Peel mentions what he calls +secondary factors+ which contributed tothe outbreak of the +disturbances%+ &hese are

1% &he spread of the "rab nationalist spirit outside Palestine%)% *ncreasing /ewish immigration since 1933%3% &he fact that the /ews were able to influence public opinion in Britain%.% &he lack of Palestinian "rab confidence in the good intentions of the British

government%% &he Palestinian "rabs8 fear of continued land purchases by /ews%

6. &he fact that the ultimate obDectives of the 2andatory government were notclear%65

&he way the then#leadership of the Palestinian national movement understood thecauses can be deduced from the three slogans with which it adorned all itsdemands% &hese were

1% "n immediate stop to /ewish immigration%)% Prohibition of the transfer of the ownership of Palestinian "rab lands to

/ewish settlers%

3. &he establishment of a democratic government in which Palestinian "rabswould have the largest share in conformity with their numericalsuperiority%66

But these slogans, in the bombastic versions in which they were repeated, werequite incapable of e'pressing the real situation, and in fact to a great e'tent allthey did was to perpetuate the control of the feudal leadership over the nationalistmovement%

*n fact the real cause of the revolt was the fact that the acute conflicts involved inthe transformation of Palestinian society from an "rab agricultural#feudal#clericalone into a $ionist Cestern- industrial bourgeois one, had reached their clima', as

we have already seen%
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&he process of establishing the roots of colonialism and transforming it from aBritish mandate into $ionist settler colonialism, as we have seen, reached its clima'in the mid#thirties, and in fact the leadership of the Palestinian nationalistmovement was obliged to adopt a certain form of armed struggle because it was nolonger capable of e'ercising its leadership at a time when the conflict had reacheddecisive proportions%

" variety of conflicting factors played a role in inducing the Palestinian then#leadership to adopt the form of armed struggle

irstly the *00 al#in al#Iassam movement%

>econdly &he series of failures sustained by this leadership at a time when theywere at the helm of the mass movement, even with regard to the minor and partialdemands that the colonialists did not usually hesitate to yield to, in the hope ofabsorbing resentment% &he British took a long time to see the value of thismanoeuvre! however, their interests were safeguarded through the e'istence ofcompetent $ionist agents%-

&hirdly $ionist violence the armed bands, the slogan of +/ewish labor only,+ etc% -in addition to colonialist violence the manner in which the 19)9 rising had beensuppressed%-

*n any discussion of the 1936#1939 revolt, a special place must be reserved for>heikh *00 al#in al#Iassam% *n spite of all that has been written about him, it isnot too much to say that this unique personality is still really unknown, and willprobably remain so% 2ost of what has been written about him has dealt with himonly from the outside and because of this superficiality in the study of personalityseveral /ewish historians have not hesitated to regard him as a +fanatical dervish,+while many Cestern historians have ignored him altogether% *n fact it is clear that itis the failure to grasp the dialectical connection between religion and nationalisttendencies that is responsible for the belittling of the importance of the Iassamistmovement%

5owever, whatever view is held of al#Iassam, there is no doubt that his movement1)th#19th ;ovember 193- represented a turning point in the nationalist struggleand played an important role in the adoption of a more advanced form of strugglein confrontation with the traditional leadership which had become divided andsplintered in the face of the mounting struggle%

Probably the personality of al#Iassam in itself constituted the symbolic point ofencounter of that great mass of interconnected factors which, for the purposes ofsimplification, has come to be known as the +Palestine problem%+ &he fact that hewas +>yrian+ born in /abala on the periphery of @atakia- e'emplified the "rabnationalist factor in the struggle% &he fact that he was an "0harist he studied at "l#"0har- e'emplifies the religious#nationalist factor represented by "l#"0har at thebeginning of the century% &he fact that he had a record of engaging in nationaliststruggle took part in the >yrian revolt against the rench at /abal 5oran in 1919#19)7 and was condemned to death- e'emplified the unity of "rab struggle%

"l#Iassam came to 5aifa in 19)1 with the Agyptian >heikh 2uammad al#5anafiand >heikh "li al#5aDD "bid and immediately started to form secret groups% Chat isremarkable in al#Iassam8s activities is his advanced organi0ational intelligence andhis steel#strong patience% *n 19)9, he refused to be rushed into announcing that hewas under arms and, in spite of the fact that this refusal led to a split in theorgani0ation, it did succeed in holding together and remaining secret%


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"ccording to a well#known Iassamist6, al#Iassam programmed his revolt in threestages, psychological preparation and the dissemination of a revolutionary spirit,the formation of secret groups, the formation of committees to collect contributionsand others to purchase arms, committees for training, for security, espionage,propaganda and information and for political contacts # and then armed revolt%

2ost of those who knew al#Iassam say that when he went out to the Fa8bad hillswith ) of his men on the night of 1)th ;ovember 193, his obDect was not todeclare the armed revolt but to spread the call for the revolt, but that an accidentalencounter led to his presence there being disclosed, and in spite of the heroicresistance of al#Iassem and his men, a British force easily destroyed them% *tappears that when he reali0ed that he could no longer e'pand the revolt with hiscomrades, >heikh al#Iassam adopted his famous slogan +ie as 2artyrs%+

*t is due to al#Iassam that we should understand this slogan in a +heikh al#Iassam%

&hese leaders were as conscious of the challenge as was the British 2andate%

"ccording to one Iassamist, a few months before al#Iassam went into the hills hesent to 5aDD al#"min al#5ussaini, through >heikh 2usa al#"0rawi, to ask him tocoordinate declarations of revolt throughout the country% 5ussaini refused,however, on the ground that conditions were not yet ripe%6!Chen "l#Iassam waskilled his funeral was attended only by poor people%

&he leaders adopted an indifferent attitude, which they soon reali0ed was amistake% or the killing of al#Iassam was an occurrence of outstanding significancewhich they could not afford to ignore% Proof of this is to be found in the fact thatrepresentatives of the five Palestinian parties visited the British 5igh 4ommissioneronly si' days after the killing of al#Iassam, and submitted to him an e'traordinarilyimpudent memorandum in which they admitted that +if they did not receive ananswer to this memorandum which could be regarded as generally satisfactory,they would lose all their influence over their followers, e'tremist and irresponsibleviews would prevail and the situation would deteriorate%+69&hey obviously wantedto e'ploit the phenomenon of al#Iassam to enable them to take a step backwards%

5owever, by his choice of the form of struggle al#Iassam had made it impossiblefor them to retreat, and this in fact is what e'plains the difference between theattitude of the Palestinian leaders to the killing of >heikh al#Iassam immediatelyafter it happened, and the attitude they adopted at the ceremony held on thefortieth day after his death% uring these forty days they discovered that if they didnot try to mount the great wave that had been set in motion by al#Iassam, itwould engulf them% &hey therefore cast off the indifference they had displayed athis funeral and took part in the rallies and speeches at the fortieth day ceremony%

4learly 5aDD "min al#5ussaini was to remain aware of this loophole in later times%Aven more than twenty years later the maga0ine Filastine, the mouthpiece of the"rab 5igher 4ommittee, tried to give the impression that the Iassamist movement


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was nothing but a part of the movement led by the 2ufti, and that the latter and al#Iassam had been +personal friends%+ "

"s for the British, they told the story of al#Iassam in the report on the incidents of193 that they submitted to yria who enDoyedconsiderable prestige as a religious leader% 5e had been the obDect of strongsuspicion some years before, and he was said to have had a hand in terroristactivities%+

+>heikh al#Iassam8s funeral in 5aifa was attended by very large crowds, and inspite of the efforts made by influential 2uslims to keep order, there weredemonstrations and stones were thrown% &he death of al#Iassam aroused a waveof powerful feelings in political and other circles in the country and the "rabicnewspapers agreed in calling him a martyr in the articles they wrote about him%+1

&he British, too, were aware of the challenge represented by the killing of al#Iassam, and they too tried to put the clock back, as is shown by the viewe'pressed by the 5igh 4ommissioner in a letter he wrote to the 2inister for the4olonies% *n this letter he said that if the demands of the "rab leaders were notgranted, +they would lose all their influence and all possibility of pacification, by themoderate means he proposed, would vanish+%2

But it was impossible to put the clock back, for the Iassamist movement was, infact, an e'pression of the natural pattern that was capable of coping with theescalation of the conflict and settling it% *t was not long before this was reflected ina number of committees and groupings, so that the traditional leadership wasobliged to choose between confronting this escalating will to fight among themasses or to quell their will and to put them under their control%

"lthough the British took rapid action, and proposed the idea of a legislativeassembly and mooted the idea of stopping land sales, it was too late &he $ionistmovement, whose will began to crystallise very firmly at that time, played its partin diminishing the effectiveness of the British offer% "ll the same, the leadership ofthe Palestinian nationalist movement had not yet decided its attitude, but wase'traordinarily vacillating, and up to "pril )nd, 1936 the representatives of thePalestinian parties were prepared to form a delegation to go to @ondon to tell theBritish government their point of view%

5owever, things blew up before the leadership of the nationalist movementintended, and when the first flames were ignited in /affa in ebruary 1936, theleaders of the Palestinian nationalist movement believed that they could still obtainpartial concessions from Britain through negotiations%

But they were surprised by the following events% "ll who were closely associatedwith the events of "pril 1936 admit that the outbreak of violence and civildisobedience was spontaneous and that, with the e'ception of the acts instigatedby the surviving Iassamists, everything that happened was a spontaneouse'pression of the critical level that the conflict had reached%


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Aven when the general strike was declared on 19th "pril 1936 the leadership of thenationalist movement lagged behind% 5owever, they soon got on the bandwagonbefore it left them behind, and succeeded, for the reasons already mentioned in ouranalysis of the social#political situation in Palestine, in dominating the nationalistmovement%

rom the organisational point of view the Palestinian nationalist movement wasrepresented by a number of parties, most of which were the vestiges of the anti#ttoman movements that had arisen at the beginning of the century% &his meantboth that they had not engaged in a struggle for independence as was the case inAgypt, for e'ample- and that they were no more than general frameworks, withoutdefinite principles, controlled by groups of notables and dependent on loyaltiesrooted in and derived from the influence they enDoyed as religious or feudal leadersor prominent members of society! they were not parties with organised bases%

"part from al#Iassam himself and the 4ommunists, naturally- not one of theleaders of the Palestinian nationalist movement at this time possessed anyorganising ability! even 5aDD "min al#5ussaini, who had unusual administrative

abilities, had no conception of organisation as applied to struggle%

rganisational responsibilities were most often based on individual talents in thesubcommittees and among the middle cadre% 5owever, they were usually incapableof transforming their abilities into policy%

n the eve of the revolt the situation of the representatives of the nationalistmovement in Palestine was as follows with the dissolution of the "rab A'ecutive4ommittee in "ugust 193. si' groups emerged

1% &he "rab Palestine Party, in 2ay 193, headed by /amal al#5ussaini! it moreor less embodied the policy of the 2ufti and represented the feudalists andbig city merchants%

)% &he ;ational efence Party, headed by ?aghib al#;ashashibi! founded inecember 193. it represented the new urban bourgeoisie and the seniorofficials%

3% &he *ndependence Party, which had been founded in 193), with "uni "bd al#5adl at its head% *t included the intellectuals, the middle bourgeoisie andsome sectors of the petty#bourgeoisie! this contributed to its left wingplaying a special role%

.% &he ?eform Party which, founded by r 5usain al#Ehalidi in "ugust 193,represented a number of intellectuals%

% &he ;ational Bloc Party, headed by "bd al#@atif >alah%6% &he Palestine Fouth Party, headed by Fa8qub al#


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the urban compradors and certain sectors of the intellectuals! they were alwayssubDect to the leadership of the 2ufti and his class, which represented the feudal#clerical leaders, and was more nationalist than the leadership which representedthe urban bourgeoisie% &he latter was represented by the effendis at a time whenthey were starting to invest their money in industry this trend became morepronounced after the defeat of the 1936#1939 revolt-%

&he petty#bourgeoisie in general small traders, shopkeepers, teachers, civilservants and craftsmen- had no leadership% "s a class they had had no influenceand no importance under the &urkish regime, which depended on the effendi class,to which the &urks gave the right of local government, due to the fact that it hadgrown in conDunction with the feudal aristocracy%

&he labour movement was newly established and weak and was, as a result,e'posed to oppression by the authorities, crushing competition from the /ewishproletariat and bourgeoisie, and persecution by the leadership, of the "rabnationalist movement%

Before the "rab 5igher 4ommittee was8 formed, with, 5aDD "min al#5ussaini at itshead, on ) "pril 1936, /amal al#5ussaini, the leader of the "rab Party, had beendissatisfied by people8s growing belief that the Anglish were the real enemy, andthe ;ational efence Party which represented, first and foremost, the growingurban comprador class, was not really disposed for an open clash with the British%

nly two days earlier, on )3 "pril 1936, Cei0mann, the leader of the $ionistmovement, had made a speech in &el#"viv in which he described the "rab#$ioniststruggle, which was beginning to break out, as a struggle between destructive andconstructive elements, thereby putting the $ionist forces in their place as theinstrument of colonialism on the eve of the armed clash% &his was the position onboth sides of the field on the eve of the revoltH

*n the countryside the revolt assumed the form of civil disobedience and armedinsurrection% 5undreds of armed men flocked to Doin the bands that had begun tofan out in the mountains, ;on#payment of ta'es was decided on at the conferenceheld in the ?audat al#2a8aref al#Cataniya college in /erusalem on 2ay :, 1936 andwas attended by about 17 delegates representing the "rabs of Palestine% " reviewof the names of the delegates made by *sa al#>afri 4shows that it was at thisconference that the leadership of the mass movement committed itself to anunsubstantial alliance between the feudal#religious leaderships, the urbancommercial bourgeoisie and a limited number of the intellectuals% &he resolutionadopted by this conference was brief, but it was a clear illustration of the e'tent towhich a leadership of this kind was capable of reaching%

+&he conference decided unanimously to announce that no ta'es will be paid asfrom 2ay 1th, 1936 if the British government does not make a radical change inits policy by stopping /ewish immigration%+

&he British response to civil disobedience and armed insurrection was to strike attwo key points the first was the organi0ational cadre which was, for the most part,more revolutionary than the leadership, and the second the impoverished masseswho had taken part in the revolt and who in fact had nothing but their own arms toprotect them%

&his goes a long way towards e'plaining why the only two people who werecomparatively proficient at organisation # "uni "bed el#5adi and 2ohammad "0atarwa0eh # were arrested, while the rest were subDected either to arrest or to
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harassment to the e'tent that they were totally paralysed% &his is shown by the factthat 61 "rabs responsible for organising the strike the middle cadre- were arrestedon 2ay )3rd% 5owever, these arrests did not prevent Britain from giving permits tofour of the leaders of the revolt, /amal al#5ussaini, >hibli al#/amal, "bd al#@atif>alah and r *00at &annus to travel to @ondon and meet the 2inister for the4olonies, which took place on /une 1)th% &here was nothing unusual about this

incident, which was to be constantly repeated throughout the subsequent monthsand years% &he British 5igh 4ommissioner had observed with great satisfaction that+the riday sermons were much more moderate than K* had e'pected, at a timewhen feelings are so strong% &his was mainly due to the 2ufti+%5

rom the outset the situation had been that the leadership of the Palestiniannationalist movement regarded the revolt of the masses as merely intended toe'ert pressure on British colonialism with the obDect of improving the conditions ofthe masses as a class% &he British were profoundly aware of this fact, and actedaccordingly% &hey did not, however, take the trouble to grant this class theconcessions it desired! @ondon persisted in meeting its commitments as regardshanding over the colonialist heritage in Palestine to the $ionist movement and,

moreover, it was during the years of the revolt # 1936#1939 # that Britishcolonialism threw all its weight into performing the task of supporting the $ionistpresence and setting it on its feet, as we shall see later%

&he British succeeded in achieving this in two ways by striking at the poor peasantrevolutionaries with unprecedented violence, and by employing their e'tensiveinfluence with the "rab regimes, which played a maDor role in liquidating the revolt%

Firstly:&he British Amergency ?egulations played an effective role% "*#>ifri cites agroup of sentences passed at the time to show how unDust these regulations were+si' years8 imprisonment for possessing a revolver# 1) years far possessing a bomb# five years with hard labour for possessing 1) bullets# eight months on a charge of

misdirecting a detachment of soldiers% nine years on a charge of possessinge'plosives# five years for trying to buy ammunition from soldiers# two weeks8imprisonment for possessing a stick % % % etc%+6

"ccording to a British estimate submitted to the @eague of ;ations, the number ofPalestinian "rabs killed in the 1936 revolt was about one thousand, apart fromwounded, missing and interned% &he British employed the policy of blowing uphouses on a wide scale% *n addition to blowing up and destroying part of the city of/affa /une 1(th, 1936- where the number of houses blown up was estimated at))7 and the number of persons rendered homeless at 6,777% *n addition onehundred huts were demolished in /abalia, 377 in "bu Eabir, 37 in >heikh 2uradand : in "rab al#audi% *t is clear that the inhabitants of the quarters that were

destroyed *n /affa and of the huts that were destroyed in the outskirts were poorpeasants who had left the country for the town% *n the villages, according to al#>ifri8s estimate% 1.3 houses were blown up for reasons directly connected with therevolt%&hese houses belonged to poor peasants, some medium peasants and avery small number of feudal families%

Secondly:"mir "bdullah of &ransDordan$and ;uri >aid started to take action tomediate with the "rab 5igher 4ommittee% 5owever, their mediation wasunsuccessful, despite the readiness of the leadership to accept their good offices%But the movement of the masses was not yet ready to be domesticated in 1936although these contacts did have a negative effect on the revolt, and left a feelingthat the conflict then in progress was amenable to settlement, "nd in fact this

initiative which started with failure was to be completely successful in ctober ofthe same year, only about seven weeks later%
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;ot that these contacts were the only form assumed by the dialectic of the relationsbetween Palestine and the neighbouring "rab countries% &his dialectic was morecomplicated and reflected the comple'ity of the conflicts, Ce have already seenwhat al#Iassam represented in this field! and in fact the Iassamist phenomenon inthis sense continued to e'ist% @arge numbers of "rab freedom fighters poured intoPalestine! among them were >a8id al#"s, who was killed in ctober 1936, >heikh

2uhammad al#"shmar and many others% &his influ' also comprised a number ofadventurist nationalist officers, the most prominent of whom was au0i al#IawuqDiwho shortly after entry into Palestine at the head of a small band in "ugust 1936declared himself commander in chief of the revolt%

"lthough these men improved and e'panded the tactics of the rebels, the greaterpart of the burden of revolutionary violence in the country and of commando actionin the towns, continued to be borne by the dispossessed peasants% *n fact it wasthe +officers+ who emerged from the ranks of the peasants themselves whocontinued to play the maDor role, but most of them were subDect to the leadershipof al#2ufti% &hey also represented legendary heroism for the masses of therevolution%

"lthough the British officials in Palestine did not completely agree with @ondon8spolicy of reckless support for the $ionist movement, and thought that there wasroom for an "rab class leadership whose interests were not linked with the revolt,to cooperate with colonialism% Britain finally accepted, so it seems, on /une 19th,1936, the +importance of the organic link between the safety of British interestsand the success of $ionism in Palestine+%!Britain decided to strengthen its forcesin Palestine and to increase repressive measures%

rightened by this decision, the leadership of the Palestinian nationalist movementvacillated and lost its nerve% 5aDD "min al#5ussaini, ?aghib ;ashashibi and "uni "bdal#5adi hastened to meet the British 5igh 4ommissioner, and it is clear from

reports he sent to his government at the time they confirmed that they wereprepared to end the revolt if the "rab kings asked them to do so% &hey did not,however, dare to admit to the masses that they were the originators! of thistortuous scheme, and repeatedly denied it%

"fter this large numbers of British troops, estimated at twenty thousand, pouredinto Palestine, and on 37th >eptember 1936, when they had all arrived, a decreewas issued enforcing martial law% &he mandatory authorities stepped up their policyof relentless repression, and >eptember and ctober witnessed battles of thegreatest violence # the last battles, in fact, to cover nearly the whole of Palestine%

n 11th ctober 1936, the "rab 5igher 4ommittee distributed a statement calling

for an end to the strike, and thereby the revolt +*nasmuch as submission to thewill of their 2aDesties and 5ighnesses, the "rab kings and to comply with theirwishes is one of our hereditary "rab traditions, and inasmuch as the "rab 5igher4ommittee firmly believes that their 2aDesties and 5ighnesses would only giveorders that are in conformity with the interests of their sons and with the obDect ofprotecting their rights! the "rab 5igher 4ommittee, in obedience to tire wishes oftheir 2aDesties and 5ighnesses, the Eings and amirs, and from its belief ill the greatbenefit that will result from their mediation and cooperation, calls on the noble "rabpeople to end the strike and the disturbances, in obedience to these orders, whoseonly obDect is the interests of the "rabs%+9

A'actly a month later on 11th ;ovember 1936- the +


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anything liable to disturb the atmosphere of the negotiations, which the "rab nationhopes will succeed and obtain the full rights of the country%+!"&en days later thesame command issued another statement in which it declared that it had +left thefield, from its confidence in the guarantee of the "rab kings and amirs, and toprotect the safety of the negotiations+%!1

"s /amil al#>huqairi says +>o, in obedience to the orders of the kings and amirs,the strike was called off, and the activities of the revolt came to an end within twohours of the call being published+%!2

"lthough at that time Britain was challenging the Palestinian leaderships onprecisely the point over which they had deceived the masses # the question of/ewish immigration to Palestine # and although these leaders decided to boycott the?oyal 4ommission the Peel 4ommission-, the "rab kings and amirs obliged theseleaderships to obey them for the second time in less than three months% Eing "bdul"0i0 "l >a8ud and Eing


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groups of dispossessed peasants and unemployed workers in the cities and thecountryside%

&hus the only course left to the 2ufti was to flee% 5e avoided arrest by takingrefuge in the 5aram al#>harif, but events forced him into a position which he hadnot been able to take up a year earlier% *n >eptember 193: "ndrews, the istrict

4ommissioner of the


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their organisational link, to a certain e'tent, with the +4entral 4ommittee for>truggle+ /ihad- in amascus, not only because of their traditional loyaltyto it, but also because they depended on it to some e'tent for financing%

*n the whole history of the Palestinian struggle the armed popular revolt was nevercloser to victory than in the months between the end of 193: and the beginning of

1939% *n this period the British forces8 control of Palestine weakened, the prestigeof colonialism was at its lowest, and the reputation and influence of the revoltbecame the principal force in the country%

5owever, at this time, Britain became more convinced that it would have to rely on$ionists who had provided them with a unique situation that they had never foundin any of their colonies # they had at their disposal a local force which had commoncause with British colonialism and was highly mobilised against the local population%

"t this time Britain began to be alarmed at the necessity of diverting part of itsmilitary forces to confront the ever more critical situation in Aurope% &hereforeBritain viewed with increasing favour +the rapid organisation of a /ewish volunteerdefense force of 6,77 men already in e'istence%+!!*t had already gone some wayin pursuing a policy of relying on the local $ionist force and handing over to it manyof the tasks of repression, which were increasing% 5owever, it did not destroy thebridge which it had always maintained with the class led by the 2ufti, and it was inthis field and at this time in particular that the British played a maDor role inmaintaining the 2ufti as the undisputed representative of the Palestinian "rabs%&heir reserves of the leadership on the right of the 2ufti were practically e'haustedso that if the 2ufti were no longer regarded as the sole leader, this would +leaveno#one who can represent the "rabs e'cept the leaders of the revolt in themountains+, as the British 5igh 4ommissioner for Palestine said%!9&here can be nodoubt that this, among other reasons, contributed to keeping the 2ufti at the headof the leadership of the Palestinian nationalist movement in spite, of the fact that

he had left his place of refuge in the "qsa 2osque in a hasty manner, and had beenin amascus since the end of /anuary 193:%

British oppression, which had escalated to an une'pected level, and the escalationof police raids, mass arrests and e'ecutions throughout 193: and 193( weakenedthe revolt but did not end it% &he British had come to realise that both in essenceand substance, and as regards its local leadership, it was a peasant revolt% "s aresult of this, the revo

arab revolt of 1936

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