any difference between indian and pakistan army
TRANSCRIPT
PART SEVEN-ANALYSIS CHAPTER OF 1965 WAR-FROM THE PAKISTAN ARMY TILL 1965 BY MAJOR AGHA.H.AMIN (RETIRED)-1999
Was there any difference in Indian Army and Pakistan Army in 1965 War
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About the AuthorAbout the Author Agha H. Amin , Retired Tank corps major who served in five tank regiments and commanded an independent tank squadron and served in various staff , instructional and research assignments. In his Pakistan Army tenure he wrote three original tactical papers on Reconnaissance Troops Tactical handling, Reconnaissance support group , and RFS Concept. His writings were published in Pakistan Armys prime journals , Pakistan Army Journal and Citadel Journal of Command and Staff College Quetta. His recommendations regarding bifurcation of officer corps into command and staff cadre advanced in 1998 were later accepted. In addition his recommendation of grouping various corps into army commands advanced in an article published in Citadel Journal in 1998 were accepted in 2005 or so. Wrote The Essential Clausewitz in 1993, Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-59 in 1998 , Pakistan Army till 1965 in 1999 ,Development of Taliban Factions in Afghanistan and Pakistan (2010) ,Taliban War in Afghanistan (2009). Served as Assistant Editor of Defence Journal ,Executive Editor of globe and Founder Editor of Journal of Afghanistan Studies . An associate of the think tanks ORBAT and Alexandrian Defense group. Carried out various oil and gas and power transmission line surveys in West Asia. Editor in Chief of monthly Intelligence Review and monthly Military and Security Review. Heads the think tank Centre for study of Intelligence Operations established in early 2010.
THE INDIAN NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY-MYTH
OR REALITYAfter the war a myth was propagated that the
Indians were defeated or checked by Pakistani forces who were numerically inferior but qualitatively more superior or more martial!Or that there was something special in Muslim soldiers !
Modern wars or even ancient wars were never won on the basis of numerical inferiority. Superior
generalship and tactics were the most important factor while morale was only second in importance ; in a situation; where two armies with equally high morale clashed;regardless of the fact whether they were Muslim Christian Atheist Pagan or Communist !
After the invention of gunpowder and artillery however numerical superiority even became less important.
Thus well drilled and organised European armies were able to defeat numerically much larger asiatic armies.
The reason for this was not that the Europeans were more martial or possessed more valour but were better organised,doctrinally superior and more proficient in combining their infantry and artillery to produce a greater net impact on their opponents.In the second world war with the introduction of tanks as the decisive weapon numerical superiority in infantry became even less important and the Germans were able to decisively
defeat the Russians with a much larger infantry component by superior use of armour based on a superior war doctrine.Technically their Centurion and Sherman tanks were relatively inferior to the Patton tanks with which the larger part of Pakistani armour was equipped.
In 1965 the Indians did not enjoy any superiority as far as the offensive capability of their army by virtue of number/quality of tanks was concernedAnother major force multiplier with which most Indian attacks were defeated was the Pakistani artillery equipped with the latest US guns.
The Indian artillery had mostly WW II vintage guns.Yet another decisive organisational force multiplier for the Pakistanis was the extremely well organised type 4 Corps Artillery Brigade which the ranker type CGS General Malik Sher Bahadur did his best to disband,and which to Pakistan's good luck survived Sher's bias playing the most crucial role in Grand Slam and at Chawinda.
The Indians were superior only as far as their infantry was concerned but infantry was no longer the arm of decision in modern war and superiority in infantry did not give the Indians any dominant offensive edge over the Pakistanis.
In addition the Pakistani infantry was mechanised and possessed the M 113 tracked Armoured Personnel Carrier 300 of which were supplied to Pakistan by USA during the period 1955-65.In addition 10 and 15 Division possessed the highly versatile and firepower wise extremely effective R & S Battalions.
These infantry battalions were completely jeep mounted and possesses 48 106 mm US recoilless rifles.It became fashionable in Pakistan after the war to criticise their role,but there is no doubt that these units played a major part at least in the Ravi-Chenab Corridor in plugging many gaps in the exceptionally wide area of responsibility of the 15 Division.
Infantry superiority was relatively more significant in the post breakout phase;provided it was motorised and possessed cross country mobility,while the Indian infantry was lorry borne and did not possess any such capability.In any case the Indians failed to achieve a breakthrough at Chawinda,and their superiority in infantry could not be resultantly exploited .
Since the US Civil War the defensive potential of infantry was increasinv and
infantry attack as the main means of decisive warfare was becoming more and more costlier in terms of casualties.
By the time of Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5 this trend was more pronounced and the defensive value of machine gun and offensive value of indirect artillery fire was a decisive factor in battle 7°.
At Mukden Japanese superiority in machine guns i.e. approximately 254 machineguns against 54 Russian machine guns played a crucial role in the final defeat of a numerically stronger Russian Army (approximately 276,000 Russians against 207,000 Japanese) 71.
The Russian soldier is one of the most formidable infantry man in attack and is known for immense stoicism and disregard for loss of human life.
Despite this the Japanese by superior utilisation of machine guns successfully repelled a large number of most determined Russian infantry attacks during the 17 day battle fought along 90 miles frontage 72.
By 1914-18 infantry was no longer decisive as an instrument of decisive warfare and the stalemate was broken only in 1917-18 by employment of tanks which was the major factor in the allied success against the German Army which otherwise could beat any allied infantry attack.
By WW II decisive attack without tanks was simply not possible.In 1965 no such thing like a paralysing headlong infantry attack against an enemy in defence with reasonable artillery support was possible,unless tanks and that too in considerable number were in direct support regardless of the fact whether the defender was a Muslim or Hindu or Zoroastrian or Deist Agnostic or Atheist!
It is important that the Indians were able to dislodge the 16 Punjab at Dograi only when tanks had left the 16 Punjab defended area due to confusion in orders/poor navigation It is in this context that we have to view the Indian superiority in infantry as an insufficient ingredient for success.There is no doubt that the Pakistani forces being numerically smaller as far as infantry was concerned were more motivated but infantry it must be remembered was no longer the arm of decision in 1965.
To achieve any breakthrough the minimum requirement was superiority in tanks at the decisive point and this was mot achieved at any place by the Indians in 1965 War.
lt was analytically fallacious on part of many Pakistani military writers to draw wrong conclusions from poor Indian performance in 1965 which had a deeper link with poor training,numerical inferiority in quantity and quality of tanks,inferior quality of artillery and lack of operational talent.
The Pakistanis were definitely better trained and equipped and fought well,but were equally handicapped by poor leadership beyond battalion level.
Apart from insufficient armour three other factors played a major role in the reduction of Indian numerical superiority in infantry which if properly regulated may have led to a situation seriously upsetting the delicate operational equilibrium in favour of Pakistan by virtue of possession of better and more numerous tanks.
First was " Kashmir" which absorbed some 38 out of the total of 103 infantry battalions deployed by the Indians for the war while Pakistan deployed only 15 battalions against these out of which only four were regular Pakistan Army while 11 were the Azad Kashmir Battalions well trained but not as good as the regular battalions in 1965.
In this regard Operation Gibraltar and the resultant infiltration scare was a success in the sense that it produced such a sense of insecurity in the Indians that they decided to over garrison Kashmir.Another reason why Kashmir absorbed about one third of total Indian infantry was the particular lay of the ground with bottlenecks on Pakistani side,which made defence easier, and a wide valley on the Indian side along with the fact that the Indian line of communication to Kashmir was long ,parallel to the border and required more troops for protection.
This left the Indians with just 65 more infantry battalions out of which just 29 were deployed in the Ravi-Chenab corridor while 30 were deployed in the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor and 6 south of it leaving Indians to utilise just 18 battalions out of 29 in the Ravi-Chenab Corridor to support their main 1 Corps attack.
Just imagine if 30 out of 38 battalions doing stationary guard duty in Kashmir were pumped into Pakistani territory with the 1 Corps attack.In this regard
Kashmir proved to be a political liability rather than of any military advantage to the Indians.
Second was the immense obstacle value of the BRB canal which reduced the actual combat potential of 30 Indian Infantry battalions hurled against it to just one fourth enabling the Pakistanis to economise on their relatively less numerous infantry and using it a little more decisively.
In this regard all credit goes to the Pakistani Government in early 1950 which initiated the excavation of this formidable (I would say in sub continental terms) water obstacle which played as crucial a role in saving Pakistan's political heartland from capture by the Indians; as the English Channel against Napoleon and Hitler!
Thirdly the Indian obsession with security rather than dynamic attack and the resultant inability to concentrate their infantry to support the main attack led to under employment of their infantry.
Thus 38 of their battalions deployed in the area north of Chenab river apart from those in 10 Division area hardly saw any fighting.
Their utter disregard for properly utilising their infantry can be gauged from the fact that they concentrated 11 infantry battalions in their 26 Infantry Division sector against just 4 Pakistani battalions and three of these battalions opposite Marala Headworks remained largely inactive during the war.
One major factor which went against Indian numerical superiority was qualitative superiority of Pakistani tanks and artillery over the Indians.
The major part of Pakistani Armour consisted of M-47/M-48 tanks 400 of which were supplied to Pakistan by the USA during the period 1954-65.
This tank was far superior to the best two Indian tanks i.e. the Sherman and the Centurion.The M-47/M-48 Tank had a more powerful gun than both Centurion
and Sliermans.M-48 had much greater armour protection than any other tank i.e. its frontal armour was 170 mm as against the frontal armour thickness of 152 mm of Centurion and 100 mm of Sherman.The M-48 had far superior mobility than any Indian tank by virtue of having an engine of 820 Horse Power against a total weight of 45 Tons.
Whereas the Power to Weight Ratio of Centurion was 650 Horse Power to 51 Tons and that of Sherman,450 Horse Power to 33 Tons.Both M-47 & M-48 were one of NATOs principal Main Battle Tanks in 1965.
In addition the Pattons as both M-47 & M-48 were called had a range finder and night vision capability.As per Indian accounts however the penetration of the Armoured Piercing ammunition fired by this tank was not as good as that of as APDS ammunition which the Indian Centurion tank could fire .
However India had just 210 Centurions as compared to 400 M-47/M-48 supplied to Pakistan by USA.The
other major tank on both sides was the Sherman.180 Sherman Mark-4 were supplied to India by USA in the period 1953 while a large number of the more antiquated Sherman 75 mm version were supplied before I953.
Pakistan was supplied with at least 200 Mark-4 Shermans by USA in the period 1954-55 74..AMX-13 with which the Indians defended Chhamb with its thin armour of 40 mm was an apology of a tank and its lack of protection robbed its crews of any offensive or will to manoeuvre potential.PT-76 was another light tank and of little value.
Thus Shermans were of little consolation and did not give the Indians any marked advantage in the battles fought opposite Lahore.The 244 Independent Armoured Brigade opposite the 151 Pakistani Armoured Division had just one regiment of Centurions and the other of AMX-13 tanks.
The above mentioned figures are self explanatory .The best Indian antidote against Pattons i.e. Centurions consisted of just 12 squadrons as against 29 Patton Squadrons Only three of the total 12 Centurion Squadrons were in Khem Karan as against fifteen Patton Squadrons in Khem Karan.While at Chawinda the Pakistanis brought 11 Patton Squadrons by 11 September and a further six more by 13th September as against nine Centurion Squadrons.
Thus
there is no doubt that Pakistani armour was far superior qualitatively and relatively superior numerically as compared with the Indian armour and definitely acted as a tremendous force multiplier in reducing the negative impact of Pakistani numerical inferiority in infantry and in addition providing the Pakistanis far greater offensive potential than the Indians.
At Chawinda it was superior armour as well superior artillery which provided the "Cordon Sanitaire" apart from Indian foolhardiness in repeatedly launching frontal attacks which ensured that the Indians failed to achieve a breakthrough despite significant superiority in infantry.Infantry it must be remembered becomes decisive only once armour achieves a breakthrough and mere superiority in infantry alone without relative superiority in armour cannot lead to a breakthrough.The only short cut to this situation was military talent in Indian higher commanders but this sadly although luckily for
Pakistan was absent.Gul Hassan the Pakistani DMO and later C in C frankly admitted the fact that Pakistan enjoyed numerical superiority in tanks at Chawinda and that the Indian handling of armour was so poor that a sizeable part of Pakistani armour,which was readily available for action; was never even utilised at Chawinda right till ceasefire!Gul thus admitted the fact that the 10 Pakistani Armoured Division was never fully committed at Chawinda..Gul thus wrote; "When it (15t Armoured Division) reached
Sialkot ,except for some of its units which were employed in panic,it remained uncommitted " 76 .19 Lancers (except at Jassoran which was a minor affair keeping in view the casualties of 19 Lancers!) and 5 Horse were hardly utilised and the bulk of the fighting was done by just four armoured regiments!
These factors are sufficient to explode the myth that Chawinda was a miracle!On the other hand Gadgor fought on 8th September 1965 was a miracle ;where the Pakistani 25 Cavalry under
tremendous odds of nine to one and without the directions of any higher brigade or division headquarter did stop the Indian 1° Armoured Division.This had a deeper connection with imperfection of human perception and irresolution at higher level than any superior or inferior level at squadron troop or tank commander level.The Indians fought with equal valour and the rot that led to their unheroic and disgraceful withdrawal on the fateful 8'1'
September developed from brigade and division downwards!
Thank God that no Pakistani brigade or division was controlling 25 Cavalry in this battle I 77
NO DIFFERENCE IN HIGHER AND MEDIUM LEVEL LEADESHIP AS FAR AS BOTH PAKISTAN AND INDIAN ARMIES WERE
CONCERNED
Leadership beyond battalion/regiment level was equally incompetent on both sides.All major failures on both sides had a far greater link with poor higher leadership than any enemy action.Thus the major reason for the Pakistani failure at Khem Karan was not Indian resistance but failure to concentrate maximum strength of the 1° Armoured Division across Rohi Nala because of poor staff work and confused higher leadership.Similarly the major reason for the Indian failure at Chawinda was the fact that Commander I° Indian Armoured Brigade lost his nerve without having employed one fourth of his available armour and meekly stopped both the Indian regiments from advancing on 8th September and staying on the defensive on 9th and 10'1' September without any tangible reason!The other Indian failures at Chawinda from 11 to 18 September also had a direct link with a highly unimaginative and mediocre leadership who unnecessarily exhausted their troops in pointless frontal attacks at Chawind and surrounding villages.
Harbaksh Singh Abrar and Sarfaraz were some of the leaders who performed
relatively better.Harbaksh Singh's resolution in face of demoralisation in 4 Mountain Division on 7th and 8th September and on 10th September when the Indian Chief asked him to readjust his position rearwards were
one of the most resolute decisions on the Indian side.Abrar's decision to stand at Chawinda despite advice to withdraw by some armour advisers was the finest operational decision on the Pakistani side for which Abrar was richly rewarded later by not being promoted! l0 Division also performed well and its counterattack on Li September was one of the
most bold feat of the war.RELATIVE PERFORMANCE OF TROOPS ON
BOTH SIDES OR ANSWERING THE QUESTION WHETHER THERE WAS ANY MAJOR INHERENT
QUALITATIVE DIFFERENCE BETWEENINDIAN AND PAKISTANI TROOPS?There is a myth in Pakistan that the Indian soldier
was less brave because he was a Hindu than the
Pakistani who was braver because he was a Muslim!The authors of this ridiculous assertion cited examples of many Indian units who disintegrated in face of fire in 1965 war or instances where the Indians performed poorly despite overwhelming numerical inferiority.The authors of these outwardly clever but essentially pedantic theories were either unaware of or simply disregarded certain essential facts of military history.Soldiering is a unique calling which asks those who follow it to put at stake the most precious or supposedly most precious fact of a man's existence i.e. human life itself!Abstract ideas like "Glory" "Heroism" "Nationalism" "Ideology" etc were employed with considerable success by kings generals leaders of all sorts on the other side aim at conditioning the human mind to regard survival of the individual as less important than collective ideals or vague concepts.The monotheistic religions brought the concept of life in the next world.Nationalism in Europe brought the concept of the state organised on ethnic lines .The French Revolution brought the concept of a secular ideology transcending race and
langauge.Men fought and died for all sorts of ideas and this process has gone on since time immemorial.The essential problem of all armies throughout history has been "How to maintain an orderly military tactical formation in face of emotions of fear of death and horrible dismemberment as a result of the weapons of destruction of the post gunpowder discovery era".
"Discipline" was thus invented and this discipline based on abstract ideals including authority of civil institutions was the foundation of supremacy of the "Greek City States" and of the "Roman Republic". "Military Discipline" enabled the Roman Legions to defeat the otherwise impregnable savage tribes of east and west Europe and West Asia.
There never was an empire established for so long a period as the mighty Roman Empire!Once discipline decayed and military virtue was undermined the Romans were defeated first by Barbarians and much later by Arab Muslims when the Byzantines did not even
have one tenth of the military prowess of the mighty Roman Empire.
The myth creation found in todays Pakistan was started by the early Arab Muslim historians who cited the defeat of the Romans by Arabs as triumphs of ideology!They ignored the fact that many Barbarian tribes had succeeded against the Romans long before the Arabs did and that even the Arabs could not defeat the Byzantines apart from wresting their eastern provinces from them!
Religion is an important factor in terms of morale but it is just one of the many factors among others like superior military leadership military organisation ,tactics ,equipment etc.As the lethality of weapons increased following the introduction of gunpowder as an important factor in armaments discipline in face of fire became a greater problem.Ardant du Picq not a great philosopher of war but a great philosopher of infantry combat summed the soldier's inner resolve as a feeling ; "Man does not enter battle to fight,but for victory.
He does everything that he can to avoid the first and obtain the second ". 78 Ardant gave certain basic principles like he said; "These contests generally lasted but a short time. With like morale ,the least fatigued always won ".19 Ardant's principal achievement was singling out the fact that human nature at the bottom was essentially similar ; whether it was the "Calm English" "The Dashing French" or "The Russian stoicism".As modern weapons grew more destructive fighting became more expensive by virtue of much higher casualties and finally in the first world war many armies mutinied once the soldiers found that they were being aimlessly hurled against the enemy .
The reason was not that one race or men from one religion were less brave but because military efficiency was undermined by lack of faith in leaders or their tactical ability to led the rank and file to victory or at least in a reasonable manner whatsoever it was.The role of the officer in the European Armies of 18th and 19th Century became more important as means of
destruction grew more powerful.Successfully standing enemy fire had a deeper link with good military tactics,sound leadership and intelligent utilisation of weapons than with race or religion.The same Hindus whose conduct was found by pedantic military observers like Brigadier GuIzar 'had fought much better under British officers.lf there
were inure instances of Indian units disintegrating under fire as was admitted by Indian commanders like Harbaksh Singh it was so because of situational factors and had no link with religion.
There were more such cases of units disintegrating and bolting from line of battle because the Indian Army resorted to infantry attack with much larger frequency than the Pakistanis.Units disintegrated mostly once under artillery fire and when in the open or when attacked by tanks and not yet in deliberate defence.That this happened more with Indian units was because the Indians were on the offensive on most
fronts in the war and used their infantry with phenomenal inefficiency in attack.
Most of these cases occurred in the 15 Indian Division because they failed to concentrate at Dograi on 6th September because of lack of darkness which is a pre requisite for infantry to dig in ,in order to go into deliberate defence.The best infantry of the world would disintegrate once attacked by artillery fire and when not dug in..Conversely it is literally impossible to dislodge well dug in infantry supported by tanks and artillery.There were cases of demoralisation and units disintegrating of similar type in the Pakistan Army too..
According to Brigadier Z.A Khan there was a total morale breakdown in 6 Lancers when Colonel Sahibzad died and none of the other officers was willing to lead the unit.In the same area commanding officer of 24 Cavalry also collapsed because of strain of Indian shelling and his unit went out of control. 8°
Such cases as a matter of fact had a more direct relation with human nature than with Islam or Hinduism!
Clausewitz recognised this most natural fear in man once he said ; "But wild as is the nature of War it still wears the chain of human weakness,and the contradiction we see here,viz.that man seeks and creates dangers which he fears at the same time will astonish no one ".81
Thus troops on both sides fought equally well.Further both sides performed well in defence and poorly in attack.There were various reasons for this out of which the most important was the enormous destructive power of modern weapons .Military history proves that decisive victories or decisive breakthroughs were achieved in two broad sets of conditions .
Firstly in case of overwhelming numerical superiority and superior airpower as was the case in allied battles against the axis powers in WW II,or because of a markedly superior way of warfare like the Blitzkrieg which enabled the Germans to win even in face of no numerical superiority or even parity.Here in the Indo Pak war none of the two conditions were present .Neither was one side having overwhelming numerical or material superiority and nor was any side having a superior operational philosophy Most attacks were defeated not by actual physical combat between the opposing infantry but by weight of artillery fire or by water obstacles .
We have the example of the Iran-Iraq war fought in between two third world countries where because of similar reasons two armies fighting for ten years failed to achieve any decisive breakthrough but performed equally well in defence .
The reason for this phenomenon was not that one army was braver or one less brave but the fact
that the immense rise in the lethality of modern munitions as well as mobility of forces made offensive operations more difficult and defensive operations easier where both sides did not have a decisive edge over each other either martially/numerically or by virtue of having a conceptually superior military organisation/doctrine.
Clausewitz the greatest philosopher of war singled out three factors which were the "Chief Moral Powers" of an army i.e. "Talents of the Commander" "The Military Virtue or Esprit de Corps of the Army" and "Its National Feeling".As far as "Talents of the Commanders" was concerned both the armies were equally handicaped.It appears that the "Military Virtue" of the Indian Army to some extent was undermined by the negative attitude of the Indian political leadership towards the army during the period 1947-62.Thus in 1962 when the Sino Indian conflict took place the Indian Army was poorly equipped specially as far as its infantry's basic weapon i.e. the rifle was concerned.After the war the Indian Army was rapidly expanded and many units which
fought the 1965 war were newly raised units.lt is incorrect to think that newly raised units are bad units.But there is no denying the fact that it is more difficult to train a newly raised unit and produce in it esprit de corps and mutual understanding than in an older unit.Some of the best units of the war on both sides were newly raised units like 25 Cavalry etc.This negative aspect may have slightly undermined the military virtue of the Indian Army as a whole.The Pakistan Army on the other hand had a smaller number of newly raised units than the Indian Army and concentration was on acquiring sophisticated equipment thanks to US aid rather than on new raisings.The typical Pakistani myth that the Hindus were less brave was false.A truer explanation which explains some Indian failures at unit level as far as military cohesion in face of fire;a case of lack of military virtue ;which was the result of a political leadership's negative attitude towards the army during the period 1947-62 and was bound to affect any army in a similarly adverse manner regardless of religion.Clausewitz offered some advice
about fostering military virtue,he said; "This sprit can only be generated from two sources,and only by these two conjointly;the first is a succession of campaigns and great victories;the other is an activity of the Army carried sometimes to the highest pitch.Only by these the soldiers learns to know his powers.
The more a General is in the habit of demanding from his troops,the surer
he will be that his demands will be answered.The soldier is as proud of overcoming toil as he is of surmounting danger.Therefore it is only in the soil of incessant activity and exertion that the germ will thrive,but also only in the sunshine of victory.Once it becomes a strong tree,it will stand against the fiercest storms of misfortune and defeat,and even against the indolent activity of peace,at least for a time" . 82
The fact that the same people qualified as martial races by many Pakistani hi storians,were ruled by the qualitatively superior Sikhs who were just a ten percent minority minority from 1799-1849 proves that martial fervour had much lesser relation with both race or religion and a much greater link with peculiar situational
circumstances including the net psycho-social historical experiences of a particular community.
Thus both sides performed equally well in defence in own territory and equally poorly in offence in enemy territory.Thus Pakistanis did well in defence inside own territory with the safety of BRB acting as a force multiplier or at Chawinda where parity in tanks and superior artillery led to Indian failure in achieving a breakthrough-The initial reason for success of Grand Slam was local numerical/material superiority particularly in tanks which were both more numerous and more technically superior ,at the decisive point combined with superior artillery made further more lethal by dynamic leadership of Akhtar Malik while the pace of advance slowed down later when the Indians brought in two more brigades.Tbe Indians performed well in defence at Assal Uttar but poorly when again tasked to resume offensive operations in Khem Karan after withdrawal of Pakistani 1' t Armoured Division after 12 September.Pakistanis who did well in defence similarly performed equally
poorly when in offensive role at Khem Karan during the period 7-10 September.Offensive operations required more executive competence in officers and this was lacking in both the armies-Defence was simple as an operation and thus easier to execute-Offensive operations to be successful required ,a capacity to act decisively without waiting for orders,something which was beyond the potential of the orders oriented Indian and Pakistan Armies!This was not something just peculiar to the subcontinent but a tendency found in plenty in many armies all over the world including many European armies.Thus Montgomery after Alamein,despite all the overwhelming numerical and material superiority that he enjoyed, decided in favour of cautious advance rather than quick advance because he thought that, the standard of training of the Eighth Army formations was such that he was not prepared to loose them headlong into the enemy-In words of an eminent British military analyst Captain Miller "Montgomery knew that he could not risk handling
his divisions with the boldness expected of a German commander" and that "British senior commanders,painfully aware of the executive weakness of their staffs and subordinates,could never confidently run comparable operational risks". 83 If this was the condition of the army of a more advanced European country,due allowance has to be given to both the Indo Pak armies fighting a war involving tanks and quick movements with little leadership tradition in the officer rank and poor staff procedures and an unimaginative battle doctrine.
Coming back to the highly erroneous and essentially fallacious view that prevails in Pakistan that the Pakistani troops (Particularly those from north of Chenab river ) were intrinsically more brave than the Hindus!There was no racial difference racially between the two armies and religion has little connection with individual bravery or even the military virtues of an army as a group.
The races that inhabited Pakistan had no connection with Muslim invaders of India except in having a common religion.In any case India was invaded by many invaders before the Muslims who conquered India despite being non Muslim !So being Muslim
was not the governing factor but being from north of Hindu Kush may be classified as a common factor!
However hard Shaukat Riza may have tried to prove that the ancestors of Pakistan's soldiers were Arab Mongol or Turkish the the fact remains all the races that constituted the Pakistan Army had no connection with invaders of India.Even the Pathans had little connection with the last predator from the north i.e. Ahmad Shah Abdali since most of Ahmad's army was recruited from Pathan territories outside Pakistan.
This settles the first ridiculous assertion!We have already seen how the Punjabis became a martial race or came to be classified as a martial race!This had less to do with proven fighting qualities as far as the Punjabi Muslims were concerned (The Sikhs by on ground military achievements from 1700-1849 had proved that they were the most martial race of the entire region India-Afghanistan) and more to do with reliability and availability of eligible manpower at a time when the British were challenged by the most formidable armed insurrection in India.The second question i.e. whether the Muslims of the areas inhabiting Pakistan were more brave than the Hindus or any non Muslims in the Indian Army is not difficult to resolve.In the first place individual bravery has nothing to do
with race or religion.We are left with collective bravery or group cohesion in face of fire.This has to do with a large number of factors out of
which motivation based on some idea may beNationalism.,Ideology both based on religion or
based onother secular beliefs like socialism communismetc,Regimental spirit etc,is just one of the manyfactors.The other factors being common historicalexperience,quality ofleadership,training,doctrine ,doctrine,operationalstrategy,organisation etc.Man can fight for anything
and
the important fact here is not whether what he is fighting
for is essentially Islam or Christianity or Hinduism orBuddhism or Nationalism or Communism but theintensity with which he believes in it and is willing tosacrifice his life for it.Thus there may be the case of
amore motivated communist army against Muslims or
amore motivated Hindu Army against Muslims or viceversa but nothing else.A simple quantitative way ofcomparing relative performance of Hindus Muslims
Sikhs etcis their performance in the pre 1947 British Indian
Army.At least 50 % of the fighting arms in that army on the
average were Muslims.We will compare combatperformance at random by studying the figures of
thereligious groups awarded the Victoria Cross for which
the Indians became eligible from 1911.85
It is important to keepthis year in mind since we have already discussed
that by1911 the Indian Army was a Punjabi dominated
army inwith fighting arms that had at least 50 % Muslims
from
Punjab and Frontier in their total strength.The contention
before us is whether the non Muslim soldier of the Indian
Army ,was less brave than a Muslim soldier and inparticular
the Punjabi Muslim who constituted three fourth of the
fighting arms of the Pakistan Army as well as the Pathan
Muslim who constituted the second largest ethnic group
in the fighting arms of the Pakistan Army.
We will examine the number of Victoria Crosses awarded
to both Muslim as well as non Muslim soldiers in the
Indian Army.We will exclude Gurkhas,who althoughHindu by religion , were a small part of Indian Armyinfantry in 1965.In principle at least 50 % or 40 % of
theVictoria Crosses awarded to the Indian Army in the
period1911-1945 should have gone to the Muslims in
generalsince they were more than 40 % of fighting arms
of IndianArmy with at least 45 to 50 % representation in the
fighting arms.Further more than three fourth of these
Victoria Crosses should have gone to the Punjabi Muslims
who were more than three fourth of the total Muslimfighting arm component in the period 1911-45.We
areonly interested in ascertaining whether these figures
provethat the non Muslims were less brave or equally
brave.The following table may enable the dispassionate
reader in arriving at some conclusions:--
ETHNIC/RELIGIOUS ORIGINS OFINDIAN RE
CIPIENTS OF VICTORIA CROSS FROM THE INDIAN ARMY-1911-1945 86
RELIGIOUS GROUP
WORLD WAR ONE
WORLD WAR TWO TOTAL
GURKHA-HINDU 210 12
SIKH 13 4HINDU -INDIAN 49 13
MUSLIM 24 6TOTAL 926 35
NOTE:--This table may not be wholly correct but is
the result of going through various books
Note-86 Some of the figures or facts are based on the authors' approximate personal assessment.
None of these figures prove that the Punjabi Muslims or Pathans were braver than Hindus or Punjabi Sikhs.The Hindu percentage in the fighting arms in the Indian Army in WW One was approximately half of that of
Muslims but Hindus got four Victoria Crosses as against two Muslim VCs and two of these were from Garhwal which was not part of Punjab,while the third was again a non Punjabi from Rajputana.
The fourth Hindu in WW One was a Punjabi Hindu Dogra.This Clearly illustrates that bravery had no connection with being from Punjab or being a Hindu or a Muslim!
Something which may be equated with blasphemy in Pakistan,but all the same true!The same is true for WW Two.It is absolutely ridiculous to equate religion or ethnic origin with valour!
To conclude and wind up this most ridiculous controversy propagated in both the countries by superficial historians and in Pakistan in particular by men like Brigadier Gulzar and Altaf Gauhar ; a closer and more dispassionate examination of the various battles reveals that the differences in unit performance in both sides had a far more closer link
with situational factors than with religion or race which although relatively important were not as important as many other factors like the "particular tactical situation", "personality of the higher commanders", nature of operation whether "attack or defence". Material or numerical factors like number of men ,tanks,guns and quality of equipment played a relatively significant role but again this too depended on the quality of higher leadership and doctrine.Some units like 3 Jat 25 Cavalry 7 Punjab (Pakistani) etc performed outstandingly well but their successes depended more on the situational factors listed above than on which country they hailed from.
There were some general tactical rules of the thumb which
explained all successes and failures like "Infantry Attack
against an enemy in deliberate defence whether behind a
natural obstacle or artificial obstacle reasonably well
supported by artillery and armour was a far more
difficult operation as far as likelihood of success was
concerned ; than lets say an attack mounted by one side
while both sides were in the process of advancing and
the enemy attacked was not in deliberate defence as was
the case in Khem Karan when both the Indian and
Pakistani troops were attacking each other
simultaneously on 6th September.The same Pakistani
troops found it more difficult to dislodge the same
Indian infantry division once it occupied deliberately
defended infantry positions at Assal-Uttar.Similarly the
same Indian division found it difficult to dislodge the
Pakistanis in the same area afterl2th September once the
Indians attacked Khem Karan later to evict the
Pakistanis out of Khem Karan. This explains the 4 Sikh
and 2 Mahar fiasco of 12th September.The only major
breakthrough of the war achieved during Grand Slam
can also be similarly explained.
The Pakistanis achieved
total surprise,possessed six to one superiority in
tanks ,were
well led and were not impeded by any natural
obstacle.Their failure to maintain their initial impetus
had a
far greater connection with Ayub and Musa's hesitation
out of fear of provoking India into starting a full scale war
which resulted in delaying the progress of the operation
hidden under the pretext of change of
command.Another rule of the thumb in all unit actions
was the fact that no major breakthrough was achieved
both sides once surprise was lost.Yet another rule of the
thumb was the fact that the enemy was defeated not by
direct physical assault but by mental dislocation.
Thus 3
Jat's success at Dograi ; which was well executed by an
otherwise excellent unit ; had more to do with a brilliant
plan involving attack from the flank ,and absence of
Pakistani tanks .
