animal rights by korsgaard

Sonderdruck / Offprint:

Zrich/St. Gallen 2012

Animal Law Tier und RechtDevelopments and Perspectives in the 21st Century

Entwicklungen und Perspektiven im 21. Jahrhundert

Herausgegeben von / Edited by

Margot MichelDaniela KhneJulia Hnni

3

A Kantian Case for Animal Rights

Christine M. Korsgaard *

Table of Contents

I. Introduction 3II. WhyWeMustRegardAnimalsasEndsinThemselves 6III. WhyWeHaveMoralDutiestoAnimals 14IV. WhyAnimalsShouldHaveLegalRights 18V. Conclusion 25

I. Introduction

Kantianmoralphilosophy isusuallyconsidered inimicalboth to themoralclaims and to the legal rights of non-human animals.Kant himself assertsbaldlythatanimalsaremeremeansandinstrumentsandassuchmaybeusedforhumanpurposes.Intheargumentleadinguptothesecondformula-tionofthecategoricalimperative,theFormulaofHumanityasanendinitself,Kantsays:

Beingstheexistenceofwhichrestsnotonourwillbutonnature,iftheyarebeingswithoutreason,haveonlyarelativeworth,asmeans,andarethereforecalledthings,whereasrationalbeingsarecalledpersonsbecausetheirnaturealreadymarksthemoutasanendinitself,thatis,assomethingthatmaynotbeusedmerelyasameans[](G4:428)1.

* ArthurKingsleyPorterProfessorofPhilosophy,DepartmentofPhilosophy,HarvardUniversity.

1 Kantsworksarecitedinthetraditionalway,bythevolumeandpagenumberofthestandardGermanedition,KantsGesammelteSchriften(editedbytheRoyalPrussian[laterGerman]AcademyofSciences[Berlin:GeorgeReimer, laterWalterdeGru-yter&Co.,1900],whicharefoundinthemarginsofmosttranslations.Theabbrevia-tionsIhaveusedareasfollows;forthetranslationsused,pleaseseethebibliography).C3=CritiqueofJudgment C2=CritiqueofPracticalReason CBHH=ConjecturesontheBeginningsofHumanHistory G=GroundworkoftheMetaphysicsofMorals LE=LecturesonEthics MM=TheMetaphysicsofMorals.

ChristineM.Korsgaard

4

InhisessayConjecturesontheBeginningsofHumanHistory,aspeculativeaccountoftheoriginofreasoninhumanbeings,Kantexplicitlylinksthemo-mentwhenhumanbeingsfirstrealizedthatwemusttreatoneanotherasendsinourselveswiththemomentwhenwerealizedthatwedonothavetotreattheotheranimalsthatway.Hesays:

When[thehumanbeing]firstsaidtothesheep,thepeltwhichyouwearwasgiventoyoubynaturenotforyourownuse,butformineandtookitfromthesheeptowearithimself,hebecameawareofaprerogativewhich,byhisnature,heenjoyedoveralltheanimals;andhenownolongerregardedthemasfellowcreatures,butasmeansandinstrumentstobeusedatwillfortheattainmentofwhateverendshepleased(CBHH8:114)2.

Inhisaccountoflegalrights,Kantintroducesafurtherdifficultyforthecauseofanimalrights.ForKant,thepointoflegalrightsisnot,asmanyphiloso-phershavesupposed,toprotectourmoreimportantinterests.Rather,itistodefineandupholdamaximaldomainofindividualfreedomforeachcitizen,withinwhichthecitizencanactasseemsjustandgoodtohim.InJohnRawlsslanguage,itistocreateadomaininwhicheachpersoncanpursuehisownconceptionofthegood3.Kantbelievedthateachofushasaninnaterighttofreedom,whichhedefinedasindependencefrombeingconstrainedbyan-otherschoice(MM6:237).Hearguedthatwithouttheinstitutionofenforce-ablelegalrights,ourrelationshipswitheachothermustbecharacterizedbytheunilateraldominationofsomeindividualsoverothers.Theproblemisnot,ornotmerely,thatthestrongarelikelytotyrannizeovertheweak.Evenifthestrongwerescrupulousaboutnotinterferingwiththeactionsortheposses-sionsoftheweak,still,withoutrights,theweakwouldbeabletoactontheirownjudgmentandretaintheirownpossessionsonlyonthesufferanceofthestrong(MM6:312).Sinceherinnaterighttofreedomisviolatedwhenonepersonisdependentonsomeotherpersonsgoodwill,Kantthinksitisaduty,andnot justaconvenience, forhumanbeings to live inapolitical state inwhicheverypersonsrightsareenforcedandupheld(MM6:3078)4.Nomat-terhowwell-intentionedweare,wecanberightlyrelatedtoeachotheronly

2 IhavechangedNisbetsrenderingoftheGermanPelzfromfleecetopeltal-though theGermancanbe renderedeitherway,because I think that the renderingfleecesoftensKantsharshpoint.

3 Rawls,TheoryofJustice,firstusedonxii.4 ThecontrasthereiswithLockeandHobbes,whosupposedthatweleavethestateof

natureasaremedyforitsinconveniences(thewordisLockes)andthereforefrommotivesofprudencerather thanbecauseit ismorallyrequired.SeelocKe,SecondTreatiseandHobbes,Leviathan.

AKantianCaseforAnimalRights

5

ifweliveinapoliticalstatewithalegalsystemthatguaranteestherightsofeveryone.

Butnon-rationalanimalsapparentlydonothavethekindoffreedomthatrights,on thisaccount, are intended toprotect. It isbecausehumanbeingsare ra-tionalbeingsthatweareabletochooseourownwayoflife.Rationality,forKant,isnotthesamethingasintelligence.Itisanormativecapacity,groundedinwhatKanttooktobetheuniquehumanabilitytoreflectonthereasonsforourbeliefsandactions,anddecidewhethertheyaregoodreasonsorbadones.Asrationalbeings,wereflectaboutwhatcountsasagoodlife,decidetheques-tionforourselves,andliveaccordingly.Intheliberaltradition,withitsstrongemphasisontolerationanditsantagonismtopaternalism,thiskindofautono-myhasoftenbeenregardedasthebasisofatleastsomeofourrights.Wehavethebasicrightsofpersonalliberty,libertyofconscience,andthefreedomofspeechandassociation,becauseeachofushasageneralrighttodetermineforourselveswhatcountsasaworthwhilelife,andtolivethatlife,solongasthewayweactisconsistentwithupholdingthesamerightforeveryoneelse.

ButKantextendsthisaccounttoallofourrights.Hethinksthatwemusthavepropertyrights,forexample,becauseifwedidnot,noonecouldusenaturalobjectsapieceoflandtogrowcropson,forexampletopursuehisownprojectswithoutbeingdependentonthewillingnessofothersnottointerferewiththatuse.Ourrighttopropertyisthereforenotgroundeddirectlyinourinterests,butratherisseenasanextensionofourfreedomofaction.OfcourseKantthoughtthatoneofthethingsinwhichwecouldclaimpropertyistheother animals.Their legal status asproperty is thedirect correlateof theirmoralstatusasmeremeans.

GroundingallofourrightsinfreedomisimportanttoKant,becauseonKantsaccount,rights,bytheirverynature,arecoercivelyenforceable.Itisthees-senceofhavingarightthatyoumaylegitimatelyuseforcetoprotectthattowhichyouhavetheright,orthestatemaydosoonyourbehalf.Thatishowrightssecureourfreedomagainstthedominationofothers.Kantbelievedthattheprotectionoffreedomistheonlythingthatjustifiestheuseofcoercion,becausetheprotectionoffreedomistheuseofcoercionagainstcoercionitself.AccordingtoKant,peopledonotgettopusheachotheraroundinthenameofwhatoneoranotherofus,orthemajorityofus,orforthatmatter,evenallofus,considerstobegood.Theonlythingthatjustifiesusinpreventingsome-onefromactingasshechoosesisthatheractionisahindrancetosomeoneelsesfreedom.


6

Buttheotheranimalsarenotautonomousanddonotchoosetheirownwayoflife.ThisseemstoimplythatinKantslegalphilosophy,questionsabouttherightsofnon-rationalanimalscannotevencomeup.Andofcourse,thosewhochampionrightsforanimalsarenotusuallyinterestedinsecuringtheirfree-domofaction,butratherinsecuringthemprotectionfromharm.ThisseemstosuggestthatKantsphilosophyisnottheplacetolookforaphilosophicalfoundationforanimalrights.

Nevertheless,inthispaperIwillarguethatacaseforboththemoralclaimsandthelegalrightsofnon-humananimalscanbemadeonthebasisofKantsownmoralandpoliticalarguments.Kantsviewsaboutthehumanplaceintheworldhisresistancetothepretensionsthathumanbeingshavemetaphysicalknowledgeofthewaytheworldisinitself,andtheargumentsheusestoshowthatwecanconstructanobjectivemoralsystemwithoutsuchknowledgerequireustoacknowledgeourfellowshipwiththeotheranimals.

II. Why We Must Regard Animals as Ends in Themselves

IntheargumentleadingtotheFormulaofHumanity,asImentionedearlier,Kantclaimsthatthenatureofrationalbeingsorpersonsmarksusoutasendsinourselves.Assomepeoplereadthisargument,Kantissimplymakingametaphysicalclaimaboutacertainformofvalue.Rationalityorautonomyisapropertythatconfersakindofintrinsicvalueordignityonthebeingswhohaveit,andthereforetheyaretoberespectedincertainways.Lackingthisproperty,theotheranimalslackthisdignityorvalue.

ThereareseveralproblemswithunderstandingKantsargumentthisway.Oneisthatitdoesnothingtoexplaintheparticularkindofvaluethatrationalbeingsaresupposedtohave.Valueisnotaunivocalnotiondifferentthingsarevaluedindifferentways.ThekindofvaluethatKantthinksattachestopersonsisoneinresponsetowhichwerespecttheirchoices,bothinthesensethatweleavepeoplefreetodeterminetheirownactions,andinthesensethatwere-gardtheirchosenendsasthingsthataregoodandsoworthyofpursuit.ThisismadeclearbythenatureofthedutiesthatKantthinksfollowfromthein-junctiontorespectpersonsasendsinthemselves(G4:42931).Weareobli-gatednottousurpotherpeoplescontrolovertheirownactionsbyforcingortrickingthemintodoingwhatwewantorthinkwouldbebestthatis,wearenotallowedtouseotherpeopleasmeremeanstoourends.Wealsohaveadutytopromotetheendsofothers.Apersoncouldcertainlyhavesomekinds


7

ofvalueevensomekindsofvalueasanendwithoutitfollowingthathischoicesoughttoberespected.Aprince,orsomeoneheldbysomereligioustraditiontobetheembodimentoftheirgod,mightbevaluedthewayapre-ciousobjectisvaluedpreservedandprotectedandcherishedwithouteverbeingallowedtodoanythingthathechooses.

Butthemoreimportantproblemisthattheproposedclaimabouttheintrinsicvalueofrationalbeingsisexactlythesortofmetaphysicalclaimwhosepreten-sionsKantsphilosophy isdesigned todebunk.Kantdoesnotbelieve thathumanbeingshavethekindofdirectrationalinsightintothenatureofthingsthatmighttellusthatcertainentitiesorobjectsare,asamatterofmetaphysi-calfact,intrinsicallyvaluable.Speakingabitroughly,Kantthinksthatclaimsthatgobeyondtherealmofempiricalorscientificknowledgemustbeestab-lishedasnecessarypresuppositionsofrationalactivitythatis,aspresupposi-tionsofthinkingingeneral,orofconstructingatheoreticalunderstandingoftheworld,orofmakingrationalchoices.Hisphilosophicalstrategyistoiden-tifythepresuppositionsofrationalactivityandthentotrytovalidatethosepresuppositionsthroughwhathecalledcritique5.

InhisargumentfortheFormulaofHumanity,Kantaspirestoshowusthatthevalueofpeopleasendsinthemselvesisapresuppositionofrationalchoice.Theargument,asIunderstandit,itgoeslikethis6.Becausewearerational,wecannotdecidetopursueanendunlesswetakeittobegood.Thisrequire-

5 ThisroughdescriptionofKantsmethodskatesoveragreatmanycomplexitiesandcontroversiesinKantinterpretation.WhatIamcallingpresuppositionsareofvari-ouskindsconstitutiveprinciples,regulativeprinciples,andpostulates,forinstance;andtheargumentsKantgivestovalidatethemarealsoofvariouskindsthespecialkindofargumenthecallsdeduction,forone;inthecaseoftheargumentforthemor-allawintheSecondCritique,theestablishmentofacredential(C25:48)foranother,andothersaswell.Inaddition,thereisphilosophicalcontroversyoverthenatureofthespecificvalidationKantultimatelyproposedforthemorallaw,andKanthimselfchangedhismindaboutthisoverthecourseofhiscareer.Despitethesecomplications,IthinkthattheroughdescriptionofKantsmethodgenerallyfitsallthesecases. Inthispapermyfocusisonthepresuppositionsthemselves,notontheirvalidation.IwillarguethatincertainwaysKantmisidentifiedthepresuppositionsofpracticallyrationalactivity.Thatleavesitopen,Isuppose,thattherevisedpresuppositionscannotbevalidated.Becauseof thegreatobscurityofKantsmethodsofvalidation,espe-ciallyinmoralphilosophy,itisalittledifficultformetoaddressthisworryingeneralterms,butIdonotbelieveitisaproblem.IthinkKantwasrightinconcludingthatthepresuppositionsofrationalactiondonotneedadeductioninthesamesensethatthepresuppositionsoftheoreticalunderstandingdo.

6 Ifirst presentedaversionof this interpretationofKants argument inKoRsgaaRd,FormulaofHumanity.


8

mentisessentiallybuiltintothenatureofthekindofself-consciousnessthatgrounds rational choice.A rational being is one who is conscious of thegroundsonwhichsheistemptedtobelievesomethingortodosomethingthepurportedreasonsthatmovehertoadoptabelieforanintention.Becauseweareconsciousofthegroundsofourbeliefsandactions,wecannoteitherholdabelieforperformanactionwithoutendorsing itsgroundsasadequate tojustifyit7.Tosaythatthepursuitofanendisjustifiedisthesameastosaythattheendisgood(C25:60).Importantly,Kanttakesthejudgmentthattheendisgoodtoimplythatthereisreasonforanyrationalbeingtopromoteit.AshesaysintheCritique of Practical Reason:

Whatwearetocallgoodmustbeanobjectofthefacultyofdesireinthejudg-mentofeveryreasonablehumanbeing,andevilanobjectofaversionintheeyesofeveryone[](C25:61)8.

WhathemeansisnotthateveryonemustcareaboutthesamethingsthatIdo,butrather,thatifmycaringaboutanendgivesmeagenuinereasonfortryingtomakesurethatIachieveit,theneveryoneelsehasareason,althoughofcoursenotnecessarilyanoverridingone,totrytomakesurethatIachieveitaswell.

Consequently,Kantenvisionstheactofmakingachoiceastheadoptionofacertainmaximorprincipleasauniversallaw,alawthatgovernsbothmyownconductandthatofothers.Mychoosingsomethingismakingalawinthesensethatitinvolvesconferringakindofobjectiveormoreproperlyspeaking intersubjectivevalueonsomestateofaffairs,avalue towhicheveryrationalbeingmustthenberesponsive.ItisimportanttoKantsownunderstanding of the implications of this argument that it is only rationalchoicesthathavethisnormativecharacter.Onlyrationalchoicesaremadeonthebasisofanassessmentofthegroundsorreasonsforthem,andsoonly

7 This isnot tosaythatweaknessof thewillandmoralweaknessare impossible,ofcourse,butitimpliesthattheymustbeexplainedintermsofself-deception.

8 SomeonemightofcoursechallengeKantsclaimthattheadequacyofonesreasonim-pliesthatonesendisanendforeveryone.KantsassumptionisthatreasonsarewhatIhaveelsewherecalledpublic,orwhataresometimescalledagent-neutral,reasonsreasonswhosenormativeforceextendstoallrationalbeings.Ihavedefendedthisassumptioninvariousplaces,includingKoRsgaaRd,SourcesofNormativity,Lecture4, andKoRsgaaRd,Self-Constitution,Chapter9. Itwould takeme too far afield todiscussthiscomplexissuehere.Iassumethattheprimaryaudiencefortheargumentofthispaperispeoplewhoarepreparedtograntthathumanbeingsorrationalbeingshavelegitimatemoralandlegalclaimsoneachother,andwhothereforearepreparedtograntthatinsomesensewearelawstoeachother,eveniftheyareunsurewhethertheotheranimalsalsohavesuchclaimsonus.


9

rational choices represent decisions aboutwhat should be done.Theotheranimalsdonotmakechoicesinthesamesensethatrationalbeingsdo,andsuchchoicesastheydomakedonothavethecharacteroflaws.

Mostoftheendswechoose,however,aresimplytheobjectsofourinclina-tions,andtheobjectsofourinclinationsarenot,consideredjustassuch,in-trinsicallyvaluable.AsKantputsit:

Theendsthatarationalbeingproposesathisdiscretionaseffectsofhisactions(materialends)areallonlyrelative;foronlytheirmererelationtoaspeciallyconstitutedfacultyofdesiregivesthemtheirworth[](G4:428).

Theobjectsofyourowninclinationsareonlyorratheratmostgood foryou,thatis,goodrelativetothespecialconstitutionofyourfacultyofde-sire9.AsKantthinksofit,theyare,usually,thingsthatyoulikeandthatyouthinkwouldmakeyouhappy.Nowitdoesnotgenerallyfollowfromthefactthatsomethingisgoodforsomeoneinparticularthatitisgoodabsolutely,andthatanyonehasreasontopromoteit.AsIhavealreadymentioned,Kantsup-posesthatarationalbeingpursuesanendonlyifshethinksitisgoodabso-lutely,sohethinkswedonotpursuetheobjectsofourinclinationsmerelybecausewethinkthoseendsaregoodforus.Yetwedopursuetheobjectsofourinclinations,andweoftenexpectotherstohelpusinsmallways,oratleastnottointerferewithoutsomeimportantreasonfordoingso.Thatsuggeststhatwetakeittobeabsolutelygoodthatweshouldactaswechooseandgetthethingsthataregoodforus.Whydowedothat?

ThatisthequestionfromwhichtheargumentfortheFormulaofHumanitytakesoff,andKantsansweristhatwedoitbecausewetakeourselvestobeendsinourselves.Hesays:

[]rational nature exists as an end in itself.Thehumanbeingnecessarilyrepresentshisownexistencethisway;sofaritisthusasubjectiveprincipleofhumanactions(G4:429).

Werepresentourselvesasendsinourselvesinsofaraswetakewhatisgoodforustobegoodabsolutely.Itisasifwheneveryoumakeachoice,yousaid,Itakethethingsthatareimportanttometobeimportant,period,importantabsolutely,becauseItakemyselftobeimportant.Soinpursuingwhatyouthinkisgoodforyouasifitweregoodabsolutely,youshowthatyouregardyourselfasanendinitself,orperhapstoputitinabetterway,youclaimthatstanding.Kantthencontinues:

9 Isayoratmostbecauseofcoursewemightdesirethingsthatarebadforus,thatareinconsistentwithourhappiness,andthatarenotrationaltochooseonthatground.


10

Buteveryotherrationalbeingalsorepresentshisexistenceinthiswayconse-quentonjustthesamerationalgroundthatalsoholdsforme;thusitisatthesametimeanobjectiveprinciple[](G4:429).

Kanttellsusthatatthispointintheargumentthatisjustapostulate,whichhewillprovelaterinthebook,initsfinalsection.Inthefinalsectionofthebook,Kantsetsoutthegroundsthathethinksvalidateourconceptionofour-selves,consideredasrationalbeings,asmembersofwhathecallsaKingdomofEnds,acommunityinwhichallrationalbeingsasendsinthemselvesto-gethermake lawsfor themselvesandforoneanotherwhenever theymakechoices.

Sowheneveryoumakearationalchoice,then,youpresupposethatyou,andbyimplication,everyotherrationalbeing,haveakindofnormativestanding,thestandingofalegislatorintheKingdomofEnds,whosechoicesarelawstoallrationalbeings.ItisinthissensethatKantthinksyourrationalnaturemarksyououtasanendinitself.Ofcourse,inthemoralrealm,yourrighttoconferobjectivevalueonyourendsandactionsislimitedbyeveryoneelsesrighttoconferobjectivevalueonhisendsandactionsinthesameway.(Thisisanalogoustothewaythat,inthepoliticalrealm,yourfreedomislimitedbythelikefreedomofeveryoneelse.)Soonlyifyourprincipleormaximismor-allypermissibledoesitreallycountasalaw.InKantsownlanguage,yourmaximmustconformtothecategoricalimperative:youmustbeabletowillitasauniversallaw.Kanttakesthattomeansthatultimatelyitisarationalbeingscapacityformoralchoicethatmarkshimoutasanendinhimself.AsKantsays:

Nowmoralityistheconditionunderwhichalonearationalbeingcanbeanendinitself,sinceonlythroughthisisitpossibletobealawmakingmemberinthekingdomofends.(G4:435).

Whilerecountingthesearguments,Ihaveswitchedbackandforthbetweentalkingaboutourstandingaslawmakers,andtalkingaboutourstandingasbeingswhoseendsandactionsshouldberegardedasgood,andsoasnorma-tiveforeveryone.Thatreflects thefact that thereare twoslightlydifferentsensesofendinitselfatworkinKantsargument,whichwemightthinkofasanactiveandapassivesense.ImustregardyouasanendinitselfintheactivesenseifIregardyouascapableoflegislatingforme,andsoasplacingmeunderanobligationtorespectyourchoicesortohelpyoutopursueyourends.ImustregardyouasanendinitselfinthepassivesenseifIamobli-gatedtotreatyourends,oratleastthethingsthataregood for you,asgoodabsolutely.Kantevidently thought that these twosensescome to thesame


11

thing.Forinhismostexplicitstatementaboutwhywehavedutiesonlytorationalbeings,Kantsays:

Asfarasreasonalonecanjudge,ahumanbeinghasdutiesonlytohumanbe-ings(himselfandothers),sincehisdutytoanysubjectismoralconstraintbythatsubjectswill.(MM6:442)10.

Butthatdoesnotobviouslyfollow.Theideathatrationalchoiceinvolvesapresuppositionthatweareendsinourselvesisnotthesameastheideathatrational choice involves a presupposition that rational beings are ends inthemselves,forwearenotmerelyrationalbeings.Thecontentofthepresup-positionisnotautomaticallygivenbythefactthatitisrationalbeingswhomakeit.Dowepresupposeourvalueonlyinsofaraswearebeingswhoarecapableofwillingourprinciplesaslaws?Ordopresupposeourvalueasbe-ingsfor whomthingscanbegoodorbad?Infact,Kantsargumentactuallyshowsthatwepresupposeourvalueasbeingsforwhomthingscanbegoodorbadaswemightputitforshort,asbeingswhohaveinterests.Letmeexplainwhy.

SupposeIchoosetopursuesomeordinaryobjectofinclination,somethingthatIwant.AccordingtoKantsargument,thischoicepresupposesanattitudeIhavetowardsmyself,avaluethatIsetonmyself,orastandingthatIclaim.Isitmyvalueasanautonomousbeingcapableofmakinglawsformyselfaswellasotherpeople?Orisitmyvalueasabeingforwhomthingscanbegoodorbad?

IfitisthevaluethatIsetonmyselfasanautonomousbeing,thenwhenImakeachoiceIshouldbemotivatedbyrespectformyownautonomy,mycapacity

10 ThepointofthecaveatinthefirstclauseistoleaveroomfordutiesowedtoGod,andgroundedinfaith.SinceKantthinkswecannotprovethereisaGodwhoisarationalbeingwithawill,orhavetheoreticalknowledgewhatGodswillis,wecannotowedu-tiestoGodasfarasreasonalonecanjudge.ThisisnotinconsistentwithKantsoc-casionalsuggestionthatweshouldviewGodasthesovereignoftheKingdomofEnds(G4:433,4:439).ThereisasenseinwhichKanthimselfthinksfaithitselfisgroundedin reason,but it isnot theusual sense:Kantdoesnot think that therearesuccess-fultheoreticalargumentsfortheexistenceofGodandthepossibilityofafuturelife.Rather,hethinksourmoralcommitmentsrequireustohopethatafullymoralstateoftheworldcanbeachieved,andthepostulatesofGodandImmortality,theobjectsofpracticalfaith,giveusapictureoftheconditionsunderwhichamorallyperfectworldcouldbeachieved.Sadly,Kantdidnotenvisionthatmorallyperfectworldasin-cludingeternalhappinessfortheotheranimals.Rather,hetellsthatwithoutsuchfaith,allthateventhebestpersoncanexpectisdeprivation,disease,anduntimelydeath,justlikealltheotheranimalsoftheearth.(C35:452)ForfurtherreflectionsonthisaspectofKantsmoralphilosophy,seeKoRsgaaRd,JustLikeAlltheOtherAnimals.


12

tomakelaws.ThenaturalwaytounderstandtheideathatIrespectmyownautonomyistosupposethatIconformtoalawsimplybecauseImyselfhavemadeit.KantcertainlythinksthatwheneverImakeachoiceImakeakindoflawformyself,aswellasforotherpeople,andtheideaisnotwithoutcontent:itistheessentialdifferencebetweenchoosingsomethingandmerelywantingit.Wantingsomething,whichisjustapassivestate,doesnotincludeacom-mitmenttocontinuingtowantit,butwillingsomething,whichisanactivestate, does include a commitment to continuing towill it, everything elseequal.Forexample,ifIchoose(orwill,inKantslanguage)togrowvegeta-blesinmygarden,knowingthatthiswillrequiremetoweeditonaregularbasis,thenIcommitmyselftoweedingmygardenatcertainintervalsinthefutureevenshouldithappenthatIdonotfeellikedoingso.ThisisnottosaythatIdecidethatIwillweedmygardennomatterwhatthoughtheheavensfall,asitwere.ButitistosaythatwhenItakesomethingastheobjectofmywillorchoice,itfollowsthatanygoodreasonIhaveforabandoningthisob-jectmustcomefromotherlawsthatIhavemadeorothercommitmentsthatIhaveundertaken,andnotmerelyfromachangeinmydesires.Havingwilledtogrowvegetablesinmygarden,IcandecidenottoweeditifIneedtorushtothebedsideofanailingfriend,forinstance.ButIhavenotreallydecided,orwilled,togrowvegetablesinmygardenifIleaveitopenthatIwillnotweedmygardenifIjustdonothappentofeellikeit.ForifallthatIhavedecidedwhenIdecideIwillkeepmygardenweededisthatIwillweeditifIhappentofeel likeit, thenIhavenotactuallydecidedanythingatall11.SowhenIchoosetogrowvegetablesasmyend,Ibindmyfutureselftoaprojectofregularweedingbyalawthatisnotconditionalonmyfutureselfsdesires.Inthatsense,Ihavelegislatedacategoricalimperativeformyself.Butmyfutureselfinturnalsobindsme,foritisessentialthatifsheisgoingtodothenecessaryweeding,Inowbuysomepadstoprotectherknees,andthetoolsforhertoweedwithandImustalsodothatwhetherIfeellikeitornot.Inthissimplesense,whenImakeachoice,IimposeobligationsonmyselfIcreatereasonsformyself.WhenIactonthosereasons,youcansaythatIamrespectingmyownautonomy,byobeyingthelawthatImyselfhavemade.

Whensomeoneelserespectsmychoice,heisalsogovernedinthiswaybyrespectformyautonomy:hetakesmychoicetobelaw.Butmyownoriginaldecisiontochooseorwillsomedesiredendisnotmotivatedbyrespectformyownautonomyinthatsense.IcannotrespectmyownchoiceordowhatisnecessarytocarryitoutuntilafterIhavemadethatchoice.Sothesensein

11 SeeKoRsgaaRd,Self-Constitution,4.5forafullerversionofthisargument.


13

whichIrepresentmyselfasanendinitselfwhenImaketheoriginalchoiceisnotcapturedbytheideathatIrespectmyownautonomy,inthesenseoftakingmychoice tobea law.WhenImake theoriginalchoice, Ihavenootherreasonfortakingmyendtobeabsolutelygood,thanthatitisgoodfor me.ThissuggeststhatthepertinentfactaboutmeissimplythatIamthesortofbeingforwhomthingscanbegoodorbad,abeingwithinterests.

Ofcourse,someonemightinsistthatIrespectmyownautonomyinadifferentsense:notinthesensethatItreatachoiceofmyownasalaw,butinthesensethatIpresupposethatwhatisgoodforautonomousrationalbeings,andonlyforautonomousrationalbeings,shouldbetreatedasgoodabsolutely.Butthatconclusionisnotdrivenbytheargument:thereisnoreasontothinkthatbe-cause it isonlyautonomous rationalbeingswhomustmake thenormativepresupposition, thenormativepresuppositionisonlyaboutautonomousra-tionalbeings.Notice,too,thatmanyofthethingsthatItaketobegoodformearenotgoodformemerely insofaras Iamanautonomousrationalbeing.Food,sex,comfort,freedomfrompainandfear,areallthingsthataregoodformeinsofarasIamananimatebeing.Soitismorenaturaltothinkthatthepresuppositionbehindrationalchoiceisthatthethingsthataregoodforbeingsforwhomthingscanbegoodorbadaretobetreatedasgoodorbadabso-lutely.Butofcoursethingscanbegoodorbad,intherelevantway,foranysensatebeing,thatis,foranybeingwhocanlikeanddislikethings,behappyorsuffer12.Thatsuggeststhatthepresuppositionbehindrationalchoiceisthat

12 Thereisasenseinwhichthingscanbegoodorbadforanyfunctionallyorganizedbeingnamely,thingscanhelporhinderitsfunctioning.Ridingthebrakesisbadforyourcar,wesayinthatsense.Thecar,however,ismadeforahumanpurpose,andthewayinwhichthingscanbegoodorbadforitisderivativefromthatpurpose:ultimately,whathappenstothecarisgoodorbadforpeople,notreallyforthecar.Thingscanalsobegoodorbadforplants,andthiskindofgoodnessandbadnessisnotderivativefromhumanpurposes(Theweedsarereallyflourishinginmygarden;allthisrainisgoodforthem.).Rather,itisgoodfortheplantconsideredasalivingor-ganism,functioningsoastosurviveandreproduce.Thewayinwhichthingsaregoodorbadforpeopleandanimalsincludesthis,butaddsanewdimension,forananimalhasapointofviewonwhichthethingsthataregoodorbadforithaveanimpacttheyarealsogoodorbadfromtheanimalspointofview.Insayingthis,Iamnotendorsingthehedonisticconclusionthatonlyexperiencesthemselvescanbegoodorbad,insofarastheyarepleasantorpainful.Iamonlysuggestingthatthereisasenseofgoodforinwhichgood-forandbad-forarerelativetotheevaluativeattitudesofthebeingforwhomthingsaregoodorbad.ByevaluativeattitudesImeandesires,pains,plea-sures,fears,loves,hates,ambitions,projects,andprinciples,andsoon,someofwhichareexperiencedbyeverysensatebeing.ThisisthesenseofgoodforthatItaketoberelevanttotheargument.ForfurtherreflectionsseeKoRsgaaRd,OriginoftheGood.


14

animals,consideredasbeingsforwhomthingscanbegoodorbadasbeingswithinterestsareendsinthemselves.

Wemightputthepointthisway.Asrationalbeings,weneedtojustifyouractions,tothinktherearereasonsforthem.Thatrequiresustosupposethatsome ends areworth pursuing, are absolutely good.Withoutmetaphysicalinsightintoarealmofintrinsicvalues,allwehavetogoonisthatsomethingsarecertainlygoodorbadforus.Thatthenisthestartingpointfromwhichwebuildupoursystemofvalueswetakethosethingstobegoodorbadabso-lutelyandindoingthatwearetakingourselvestobeendsinourselves.Butwearenot theonlybeingsforwhomthingscanbegoodorbad; theotheranimalsarenodifferentfromusinthatrespect.Soweshouldregardallani-malsasendsinthemselves13.

III. Why We Have Moral Duties to Animals

But there is anotherway tounderstandKants argument against themoralclaimsofanimals.InapassageIquotedearlier,Kantsays:

Asfarasreasonalonecanjudge,ahumanbeinghasdutiesonlytohumanbe-ings(himselfandothers),sincehisdutytoanysubjectismoralconstraintbythatsubjectswill(MM6:442).

Onemightplacetheemphasishereontheideaofowingadutytosomeone,andtakeKanttobeclaimingthatitisimpossibleforustooweadutytoananimal.Itis,afterall,notoriousthatKantclaimedthatalthoughwedohavedutiestotreatanimalshumanely,wedonotowethosedutiestotheanimals,butrathertoourselves(MM6:442;LE27:459)14.Thisclaimgoesrighttotheheartoftheissueaboutlegalrightsforanimals,sincethedutyofrespectinga

13 Themainargumentof thissectionwasfirstadvanced inKoRsgaaRd,FellowCrea-tures.

14 InfactKantsviewswereratheradvancedforhisday.Kantthoughtanimalsshouldnotbehurtorkilledunnecessarily,andcertainlynotforsport(LE27:460).If theymustbekilled,itshouldbequicklyandwithoutpain(MM6:443).Weshouldneverperformpainfulexperimentsonthemformerelyspeculativepurposes,orifthereisanyotherwaytoachievethepurposeoftheexperiment(MM6:443).Weshouldnotrequireharderworkofthemthanwewouldrequireofourselves(MM6:443).Whentheydoworkforusweshouldwetreatthemasmembersofthehousehold(MM6:443),andwhentheynolongercanworkforus,theyareentitledtoacomfortableretirementatourexpense(LE27:459).Non-humananimals,accordingtoKant,aretheproperobjectsoflove,gratitude,andcompassion,andfailingtotreatanimalsinaccordancewiththeseattitudesisdemeaningtoourselves(MM6:443;LE27:710).


15

legalrightissomethingthatissupposedtobeowedtotherightholder.Ifwecannotowedutiestoanimals,thenitseemsthattheycannothaverights.

InthepassageIjustquoted,Kantclaimsthattoowesomethingtosomeoneistobeconstrainedbyhiswill.Toseewhatthismeans,consider,first,whathap-penswhenyoumakeapromise,andsoincuranobligation.AsKantunder-stoodpromises,whathappenswhenyoumakeapromiseisthatyoutransferthe right tomake a certaindecision,which is naturallyyourown right, tosomeoneelse,inratherthesamewayyoumighttransferapieceofpropertytosomeoneelse.IfIpromisetomeetyouforlunchatthecafeteriatomorrow,Itransfermyrighttodecidewhethertogotoyou,andInownolongerhavetherighttodecidethatIwillnotgounlessyouabsolvemefrommypromise.Somydecisionnowbelongstoyouitisamatterforyourwilltodetermine,notformine.Soyouareinapositiontoconstrainmetogotothecafeteriabyyourwill.Youcanobligateme.

Thereisanotherwaytounderstandthissametransaction,whichisagainintermsofthemakingofalaw.Aswewillseelater,Kantenvisionstheoriginalacquisitionofapieceofpropertyasthemakingofakindoflawthatbindseveryone.Forexample,whenIclaimapieceoflandasmyown,Iineffectsay:noonemayusethislandwithoutmypermission,everyoneisboundbymywillabouthowthislandmaybeused.ButKantthinksthatIcannotmakelawsforeveryoneelseunilaterally,sinceotherpeoplearefreeandnotboundbymywill.SoifIamabletomakelawsofthiskind,toclaimthingsformyown,itcanonlybebyspeakinginthenameofwhatRousseaucalledtheGen-eralWill,thatis,inthenameofthelawswewilltogether15.SowhenImakeapromise,andsotransfermyrighttomakeadecisiontoyou,wecanunder-standthatasourmakingalawtogether:whenIpromisetomeetyouandyouacceptmypromise,wemakealawtogetherthatmydecisionwhethertomeetyoushouldbelongtoyouandnottome.Ifourpromisesaremutualifwepromisetomeeteachotherforlunchtomorrowwebothwillthelawthatbothofusshouldshowupatthecafeteriatomorrow,andnowneitherofuscanrescindtheplanunilaterally.IfIwanttodosomethingelse,Ihavetogetyourpermission,andifyouwanttodosomethingelse,youhavetogetmine.Hav-ingjoinedourwillsundercommonlaw,wecanonlychangethingsbymakinganewlawtogether.

Thisgivesusawaytounderstandthoserightsthatarenotincurredbypar-ticularactions,likethestandingrightnottobeusedasameremeanstosome-

15 Rousseau,SocialContract.ThetermisfirstusedinchapterVII,26.


16

oneelsesends.Aswehaveseen,Kantsupposesthatallofuswillthatra-tionalbeingsshouldbetreatedasendsin themselves,since(hethinks) thepresupposition that rational beings should be treated as ends is built intoeveryactofrationalchoice.Sothisisalawthat,insofaraswearerationalbeings,wewilltogether.Thefactthatwewillittogetheriswhatmakesitpos-sibleforustomakeclaimsoneachotherinitsname:wecanbindonean-otherthroughourwills.Buttheotheranimalsneitherparticipateinmakingmoral laws,norare theyunder theauthorityof those laws.They thereforecannot obligate us in the name ofmoral laws, and so cannotmakemoralclaimsonus.

Sounderstood,KantsargumentisaversionofwhatIcallareciprocityargu-ment.Areciprocityargumentholdsthathumanbeingshaveeithernodutiesatall,ornodutiesofjustice(i.e.,dutiesassociatedwithrights),totheotheranimals, because such duties depend on relations of reciprocity.There arevariousversionsoftheargument.Oneisacrudepictureofmoralityasakindofsocialcontractorbargain,whosecontentissomethinglike:Iwillactwithacertainkindofrestrainttowardsyou,ifyouwillactwithasimilarrestrainttowardsme.Thisversionpromptstheobviousquestionhowwearetoex-plainourdutytokeepthesocialcontractitself.Thatdutycannotbegroundedinthecontract.

AnotherversionisassociatedwithDavidHumesargumentthattherequire-mentsofjusticeonlyholdincertainconditions,conditionswhichJohnRawlslater calledthe circumstancesof justice16.Humemakes the argument inordertoprovethattherequirementsofjusticearegroundedinconsiderationsofutility.Weexpectpeople toconformto therequirementsof justiceonlyundercertainconditions,heargues,andthoseconditionsareexactlytheonesinwhichconformingtotherequirementsofjusticeisusefultoallconcerned.Thereforeitmustbetheutilitythatgroundstherequirements.Oneoftheseconditionsisanapproximateequalityofpowerbetweenthepartiestotheso-cialcontract,whichrendersitintheinterestofallpartiestomakeandmaintainthecontract.Onthesegrounds,Humearguesthatwedonothavedutiesofjusticetotheotheranimals.Hesays:

Werethereaspeciesofcreaturesintermingledwithmen,which,thoughra-tional,werepossessedofsuchinferiorstrength,bothofbodyandmind,thattheywereincapableofallresistance,andcouldnever,uponthehighestprovo-cation,makeusfeeltheeffectsoftheirresentment;thenecessaryconsequence,Ithink,isthatweshouldbeboundbythelawsofhumanitytogivegentleus-

16 Rawls,TheoryofJustice,22.


17

agetothesecreatures,butshouldnot,properlyspeaking,lieunderanyrestraintofjusticewithregardtothemOurintercoursewiththemcouldnotbecalledsociety,whichsupposesadegreeofequality;butabsolutecommandontheoneside,andservileobedienceon theother.Whateverwecovet, theymust in-stantly resign:Ourpermission is theonly tenure,bywhich theyhold theirpossessions:Ourcompassionandkindnesstheonlycheck,bywhichtheycurbourlawlesswill:Andasnoinconvenienceeverresultsfromtheexerciseofapower,sofirmlyestablishedinnature,therestraintsofjusticeandproperty,beingtotallyuseless,wouldneverhaveplaceinsounequalaconfederacy.

Thisisplainlythesituationofmen,withregardtoanimals;andhowfarthesemaybesaidtopossessreason,Ileaveittootherstodetermine17.

Humesversionoftheargumentseemssubjecttotheobjectionthatifsomegroupofpeopleacquiredsufficientpowerovertherestofus,theywouldceasetooweusjustice.Suppose,forexample,thatasmallcoterieofpeopleobtainsjointcontrolovertheonlyweaponcapableofblowingupcertainmajorcities,andusesthethreatofdoingsotoblackmailtherestofusintosubmissiontotheirwill.Sinceitisnotintheirinteresttocooperatewithus,byHumesargu-ment,theyarenotobligatedtoactjustlytowardstherestofus.Humeseemseventoinvitethatobjection,forheemphasizesthatinordertohavethekindofsuperiorpowerthatfreespeoplefromtheobligationtoconcederightstoothers, it isnotenoughthat themembersofonegrouptobestrongerindi-viduallythanthemembersoftheother:theymustalsobesufficientlyorgan-ized among themselves tomaintain their force against themembersof theweakergroup.Hesays:

Inmanynations,thefemalesexarereducedto[]slavery,andarerenderedincapableofallproperty,inoppositiontotheirlordlymasters.Butthoughthemales,whenunited,haveinallcountriesbodilyforcesufficienttomaintainthisseveretyranny,yetsucharetheinsinuation,address,andcharmsoftheirfaircompanions,thatwomenarecommonlyabletobreaktheconfederacy,andsharewiththeothersexinalltherightsandprivilegesofsociety18.

Iwillcomebacktothispointlater,becauseitbringsoutsomethingimportantabout our relationship to the other animals.Meanwhile, notice thatKantsargumentmaybeseenasaversionofthereciprocityargument,forhethinksitisonlythosewhostandinacertainkindofreciprocalrelationwitheachotherwhocanbindeachotherbylaw19.

17 Hume,SecondEnquiry,19091.18 Hume,SecondEnquiry,191.19 ForamoredetailedaccountofKantsargumentasareciprocityargument,seeKoRs-

gaaRd,InteractingwithAnimals.Notice,however,thatKantsversionoftheargumentdoesnotfallpreytotheobjectionIhavejustmadetoHume.InKantsargument,it


18

Ifthereciprocityargumentworks,itcapturessomethingrightaboutKantsthought that thehumane treatmentofanimals issomething thatweowetoourselves.Atleast,insofarasthepartyto whomweoweadutyistheonewhoissuesthelawthatgivesustheduty,itisabovealltoourselvesthatweoweittotreattheotheranimalshumanely20.Butthetroublewiththisthought,atleastasfarasmoralobligationisconcerned,isthatKantthinksthattheultimatefoundationofmoralobligation in general isautonomy,therationalbeingscapacity for issuing laws tohimself.EvenonKantsownaccount,we areboundbythemorallawbecauseweourselveswillthatrationalbeingsshouldbetreatedincertainways.Morallyspeaking,youhavethecapacitytoobligatemethroughyourwillonlybecauseitisthelawofmyownwillthatIshouldrespectyourchoices.Supposemyearlierargument iscorrect,andweour-selvesarecommittedtotheprinciplethatallbeingsforwhomthingscanbegoodorbad,allbeingswithinterests,shouldbetreatedasendsinthemselves.Thenevenifanimalscannotobligateusthroughtheirwills,theycanobligateusthroughtheirnatures,asbeingsofthatkind.Foraccordingtothatargument,everyactofourownwillcommitsustheviewthatsuchbeingsareendsinthemselves,andassucharelawstous.

IV. Why Animals Should Have Legal Rights

TheargumentIhavejustgiven,however,appliesonlytothemoralclaimsofanimals.In thecaseof legalorpoliticalrights, there isagainanadditionalproblem,closelytiedtotheproblemsImentionedatthebeginningofthepa-per.AccordingtoKant,thesenseinwhichotherscanobligateuslegallyisdifferentfromthesenseinwhichtheycanobligateusmorally(MM6:218-221).ThesenseinwhichotherscanobligateuslegallydoesnotgothroughourownautonomyinthewayIdescribedabove.Rather,thesenseinwhichpeoplecanobligateuslegallyisthattheymaylegitimatelyusecoercionto

iseveryonesfreedom,noteveryonesinterest,whichisatstake,andyoucannotle-gitimatelyclaimarightwithoutupholdingeveryoneelsesfreedom.Sothecoterieofpowerfulpeoplewouldstillowetherestofusjustice.

20 Kantalsosometimessuggeststhatthereasonweowehumanetreatmenttotheotheranimalsisthatourtreatmentofotherhumanbeingsislikelytobeinfluencedbyourtreatmentoftheanimals(MM6:443;LE27:459).Althoughitisnownotoriousthatthereisaconnectionbetweenseriouscriminalbehaviorandanimalabuse,thesugges-tionisapeculiaroneforKanttomake.Afterall,ifreasonreallydidtellustheanimalsufferingdoesnotmatter in theway thathumansufferingdoes,whywouldwebetemptedtotreathumansinthesamewaywetreatanimals?


19

enforce their rights.Coercion,asImentionedat thebeginning,maylegiti-matelybeusedonlyforthesakeofprotectingfreedom,akindoffreedomthattheotheranimals,notbeingrational,apparentlydonothave.Ifthepointofanimalrightsissimplytoprotecttheirinterests,nottoprotecttheirfreedom,thenthereseemstobenoroomforanimalrightsinaKantianaccount.

ButacloserexaminationofKantsownargumentagainrevealsgroundsforquestioningthisconclusion.EarlierwesawhowKantgroundsourclaimtobeendsinourselvesbyshowingthatitisapresuppositionofrationalchoiceaclaimthatisinasensebuiltintoeveryactofrationalchoice.WhenIpursuethethingsthataregoodformeasiftheyweregoodabsolutely,Icommitmy-selftotheprinciplethatbeingsforwhomthingscanbegoodorbadareendsinthemselves.Inmuchthesameway,Kanttriestoshowthatacommitmenttoenforceablerightsforeveryone,andthereforetoapoliticalstatewithalegalsystem,isbuiltintoeveryclaimofrightthatImakeformyself.

Hereishowtheargumentgoes.Alegalorpoliticalright,asKantunderstandsit, isanauthorizationtousecoercion.Tosaythatyouhavealegalrighttosomepieceofpropertyistosaythatifsomeoneattemptstouseitwithoutyourpermission,youmaylegitimatelyuseforcetopreventhimfromdoingso.Butcoercionisonlylegitimatewhenitisusedintheserviceoffreedom.Whythenmayweuseittodefendourproperty?Likeothersinthesocialcontracttradi-tion,Kantenvisionsastateofnatureinwhichpeoplelayclaimtopartsofthecommonsfortheirownprivateuse21.Ifitwerenotpossibletoclaimobjectsasourown,Kantargues,wecouldnoteffectivelyusethemwhentheywerenotinourphysicalpossession.Orevenifwecould,ouruseofthemwouldbesubjecttothewillofothersinawaythatisinconsistentwithourfreedom.Icannoteffectivelygrowwheatonmylandifyoumightmoveinatanytimeandgrowbeansthere,andIcannotdosofreelyiftheonlywayIcandoitisineffecttogetyourpermission.InordertomakefreeuseofthelandImustbeabletoclaimarighttoit.Apieceofpropertyisakindofextensionofonesfreedom.Todenythepossibilityofclaimingobjectsinthiswaywouldamounttoplacinganarbitraryrestrictiononfreedom(MM6:246).Thereforewemustconcedethatsuchclaimsclaimsofenforceablerightarepossible.Kantcallsthisthepostulateofpracticalreasonwithregardtorights(MM6:246).

SoIcanmake ita lawforyou thatyoucannotuseacertainpieceof landwithoutmypermission.ButIcannotdothisunilaterally,sinceIamnotyourmaster.Rather,aswesawbefore,myclaimsofrightmustbemadeinthename

21 Iwillcomebacktotheroleoftheideaofthecommonsintheseargumentsbelow.


20

oflawsthathaveauthorityforusboth,lawsthatwemaketogether.InRous-seauslanguage,myclaimmustbeinmadeinthenameoftheGeneralWillinorder for it tohave the forceof law.Rights,Kantargues,areonlyprovi-sionalinthestateofnature,sincetheycannotbefullyrealizeduntilevery-onesrightsareprotectedbyactual,coercivelyenforcedlaws,byastatewithalegalsystem(MM6:255257).Thisiswhyitisadutyforustoleavethestateofnatureandliveinpoliticalsociety.KantcallsthatthePostulateofPublicRight(MM6:307). Iamgoing tocallKants twopostulates takentogetherthePresuppositionofEnforceableRights.

Sincewemustsurvive,wehavetoclaimpiecesofpropertyforourownuse,justassincewemustact,wehavetomakerationalchoicestopursuecertainends.IftherationalpursuitofmyendsinvolvesthepresuppositionthatIhavetherighttousecertainobjectsinpursuitofmyends,andthatinturninvolvesthepresuppositionthateveryonesrightsshouldbeupheldandenforced,thenthePresuppositionofEnforceableRightsisbuiltintotherationalpursuitofmyends.Thisexactlyparallels thewaythat thepresuppositionthatbeingswithinterestsshouldbetreatedasendsinthemselvesisbuiltintotherationalpursuitofmyends.

Butwhoexactlyistheeveryonewhoserightsshouldbeenforced?Itisonlyrationalbeingswhomustlayclaimtorights,andonlyrationalbeingswhoholdoneanothertothepresuppositionsofthoseclaims,justasitisonlyrationalbeingswhochoosetopursuetheirends,andarerationallyboundbythepre-suppositionsoftheirchoices.Beforewesawthatitdoesnotobviouslyfollowthatthepresuppositionbehindrationalchoiceisthatrational beingsareendsinthemselves,andinfactwhenwelookedmorecloselyatthecontextinwhichthepresuppositionoperatesatthemostbasiclevelnamely,inmydecisiontopursuesomethingsimplybecauseIthinkitwillbegoodformeitdoesnotseemtofollowatall.RatherwhatfollowsisthatIamcommittedtotheideathatifIamthesortofbeingforwhomthingscanbegoodorbad,abeingwithinterests,thenIshouldbetreatedasanendinitself.Inthiscasetooweneedtolookmorecloselyatthecontextinwhichthepresuppositionofenforceablerightsfirstoperates,whichisthecontextoforiginalacquisition.

Butherewerunintoaproblem.Althoughtheproblemisageneralproblemaboutownershiprights,itwillbeusefultoposeitfirstasaproblemaboutourrights(thatis,therightsofhumanbeings)toownanimals.Thiswillenableustoaskaquestionwhichweshouldbeaskinganyway,whichisthis:evenifitwerenot thecase that theotheranimalscouldhave rightsagainstus,howexactly is it suppose to follow thatwehave rights over them?Putting the


21

problemmoregenerally,whyisitsupposedtofollowfromthefactthatweneedtoclaimobjectsasourowninordertousethemeffectivelyandfreely,thatwecanclaimanythingwefindintheworld,evenananimatebeingwithalifeofitsown,thatisnotalreadyclaimed?

In the traditionaldoctrinesof rightsdeveloped in the17thand18thcentury,especiallyinthetheoriesofLockeandKant,itisperfectlyclearwhythisissupposedtofollow.Itfollowsfromtwotheses.ThefirstisavieworiginallyderivedfromGenesisthatfounditswayintothesetheories.ThatistheviewthatGodgavetheworldandeverythinginittohumanitytoholdincommon22.Thesecondisapictureofwhatarightingeneralis,apictureassociatedwiththereciprocityargument.ToclaimthatIhavearightistomakearelationalclaim;andtherelationisnotbetweenmeandtheobjecttowhichIhavearightitisbetweenmeandotherpeople.Whenweputthesetwoclaimstogether,wegetacertainpictureofwhatthegeneralproblemofindividualrightsis,apicturewhichisexplicitinandfamiliartousfromtheworkofLocke,butalsoimplicitly atwork in theKantianviewswehave just been reviewing.Theproblemofindividualrightsisconceivedasaproblemaboutwhatgivessome-onearighttotakesomethingoutofthecommons;or,toputitmorecarefully,abouthowIcantakesomethingoutofthecommonsinawaythatisjustifiabletoeveryoneelse.BothKantsinsistencethatrightsmustbeestablishedinac-cordancewiththeGeneralWillandLockesfamousprovisothattheonewhoclaimsarightmustleaveenoughandasgoodforothersarebasedinpartonthispicture23.IndeedKantinsistsontheessentialroleofthisassumptioninhistheory.Therealdefinitionofarighttoathing,Kantsays:

[]isarighttotheprivateuseofathingofwhichIamin(originalorinsti-tuted)possessionincommonwithallothers.Forthispossessionincommonistheonlyconditionunderwhichitispossibleformetoexcludeeveryotherpossessorfromtheprivateuseofathing[],since,unlesssuchapossessionincommonisassumed,itisinconceivablehowI,whoamnotinpossessionofthething,couldstillbewrongedbyotherswhoareinpossessionofitandareusingit(MM6:261).

KantsassumptionisslightlydifferentfromLockes,becausehedistinguishespossessionfromownershipproperlyspeaking,anditiscommonpossessionthatheposits.Whensomethingisinmyphysicalpossession,anyone(thatis,anyonewhoisnotitsrightfulowner)whotriestouseitwithoutmypermissionwrongsme,becausehehastouseforcetogetitawayfromme.Thismuch

22 Actually,inGenesis1:2930,Godgivestheplantstoanimals,andtheninGenesis9:3,Godgiveseverythinglivingandmovingtohumanbeings.

23 locKe,SecondTreatiseofGovernment,ChapterV,paragraph33,21.


22

followssimplyfrommyinnaterighttofreedom,whichKantunderstandstoincludecontrolovermyownbody.WhenIownsomething,someonewhousesitwithoutmypermissionwrongsmeevenwhenIamnotinphysicalposses-sionofit.Theassumptionofcommonpossessionseemslessextravagant,forinawayitissimplytheclaimthatnoonehasapriorrightthatwouldmakeitlegitimateforthemtoexcludeusfromusingtheearthanditsresources,andthereforetoexcludeusfromdividingitupintoproperty.Eitherway,however,theroleoftheassumptionistoansweranobviousquestion:Howcouldouragreementtodividetheworldupinacertainwayhaveanyauthority,ifwehadnorighttoitinthefirstplace?

Despiteitsreligiousformulation,theclaimthatGodgaveustheworldincom-moncapturesanideathatgoesrighttotheheartofthemoraloutlook,andcanbeformulatedinsecularterms.Itistheideathatothershavejustasgoodaclaimontheresourcesoftheworldaswedo,andthatitbehoovesustolimitourownclaimswiththatinmind.Buttheideaoftheworldasownedorpos-sessedincommonby humanityalsorepresentstheworld,andeverythinginit,includingtheanimals,asonebigpieceofproperty.ThatKantwaspreparedtorepresenttheworldthiswayisimportant,becauseitshowsthatKanthadnoprincipledreasonforregardinganimalsaspossibleproperty.Hesimplyas-sumedthatthatiswhattheyare.

Atthebeginningofthispaper,IsaidthatitisinconsistentwithKantsmeth-odology simply to accept metaphysical claims about value. Claims aboutvalue,likeanyclaimsthatgobeyondtherealmofempiricalexperience,mustbeestablishedinacertainway.Theymustbeshowntobenecessarypresup-positionsofrationalactivity.Theclaimthatworldisgiven to usincommoniscertainly such a claim, not scientifically provable. Is it just a religious ormetaphysicalclaimthatreallyshouldhavenoplaceinKantsphilosophy?Orcouldweregarditinsteadasapresuppositionofrationalactivity?Infact,initsmodifiedformasthepresuppositionofcommonpossession,Kantexplic-itlyclaimsthatwecan.Hesays:

Allhumanbeingsareoriginally(i.e.priortoanyactofchoicethatestablishesaright)inapossessionoflandthatisinconformitywithright,thatis,theyhavearighttobewherevernatureorchance(apartfromtheirwill)hasplacedthem.Thiskindofpossession [] is apossession in common because thesphericalsurfaceoftheearthunitesallplacesonitssurface[].Theposses-sionbyallhumanbeingsontheearthwhichprecedesanyactoftheirsthatwouldestablishrights[]isanoriginal possession in common [],thecon-ceptofwhichisnotempirical[].Originalpossessionis,rather,apracticalrational concept which contains a priori the principle in accordance withwhichalonepeoplecanuseaplaceontheearthinaccordancewithprinciplesofright(MM6:262).


23

Beforethereareanyotherrights,beforewestartdividinguptheworldforourpurposes,eachofushasarighttobewhereheorsheis,wherevernatureorchancehasplacedus24.Therighttobewhereyouareisanaspectofyourright tocontroloveryourownbody, since itmeans that in theabsenceofpriorclaims,noonehasarighttoforceyoutomoveon.Sincearighttotheearth,forKant,goeswitharighttouseitsresourcesforyoursupport,thatmeansthateachofushasarighttotakewhatheorsheneedsinordertolive.

Inotherwords,wearethrownintotheworld,andhavingnochoicebuttousethelandanditsresourcesinordertosupportandmaintainourselves,wehavenochoicebuttoassumeatleastthatwearedoingnothingwrongindoingthat.Butwearenottheonlycreaturesthusthrownintotheworld,withnochoicebuttousetheearthanditsresourcesinordertolive.Ifthisisthebasisofthepresumptionofcommonpossessionorownership,whynotassumethattheearthanditsresourcesarepossessedincommonbyalloftheanimals25?

Again,itistruethatrationalbeingsaretheonlyanimalswhomustconceiveoftheirsituationinthesenormativeandmoralterms,andthereforetheonlybeingswhomust presuppose thatwehave a right to use the earth for ourmaintenance.Butitdoesnotfollowthatwhatwehavetopresupposeisthatrationalbeings,andrationalbeingsalone,havethatright.Intheabsenceofapriorreligiouscommitment,itisarbitrarytomakeanyassumptionexcepttheassumptionthattheworldbelongsincommontoallofthecreatureswhode-pendonitsresources.Onlysomesortofmetaphysicalinsightintoaspecialrelationshipthathumanbeingsstandintotheuniversecouldjustifytheas-sumptionthatitbelongsonlytous,andthatisexactlythesortofmetaphysicalinsightthatKantdeniesthatwehave.Totheextentthatthekindoffreedomthatisatstakeinrightsissimplythefreedomtouseyourownbodytocarveoutsomesortofadecentlifeintheworldwhereyoufindyourself,thenthefreedomoftheotheranimalsisthesortofthingthatcouldbeprotectedbyrightsafterall26.

24 ReadersofdicKensBleakHousemayrememberthepoorboyJo,whodoesnothavearighttobewhereheisheisalwaysbeingtoldbytheconstabletomoveonandconsequentlyhasnorightsatall.

25 AsImentionedinnote20,intheGenesisaccounttheplantsoftheworldaregiventotheanimalsbeforetheanimalsaregiventohumanbeings.

26 OfcourseIamnotsuggestingthatthecorrectwaytoprotectthelivesofanimalsisarrangeforthemtothemownproperty.Noristhereanyhopeofdividinguptheworldinawaythatleavesenoughandasgoodforeveryanimatecreatureswhensomeofthemmustlivebypreyingonothers.Butinthecaseofwildlife,wemightthinksomedutiesofhabitatpreservationdofollow,anddomesticanimalscertainlyhavearightnottobestarved.Themostsuggestivethoughthereisthatifanimalsdohavethiskind


24

Ofcourse,despitewhatKantplausiblysaysaboutitsnecessity,wecoulddropthepresuppositionofcommonpossessionorcommonownershipaltogether.Butifwedropthepresuppositionaltogether,wemustalsodroptheversionofitthatcomesdowntousfromGenesis.Inthatcase,theworldwasnotgiventohumanbeingsincommon,becauseitwasnotgiventoanyone.Thatmeansthatwhathumanbeingshaveovertheotheranimalsisnot,ingeneral,aformofrightfulownership.It is simply power.

NowrecallthatthestartingpointforKantstheoryofwhywemustconceiveourselvestohaverightsisthewrongnessoftheunilateraldominationofsomeindividualsbyothers.Itisthewrongness,toputitmorecolloquially,oftheviewthatmightmakesright.Thereasonwhythepoliticalstateanditslegalapparatusexistsatall,accordingtoKant,isnotthatfightingovereverythingall thetimeisinconvenient,orthat lifeinthestateofnatureis,asHobbesfamouslyremindedus,nasty,brutish,andshort.Itistheurgencyofstandinginrelationswithothersthatwecanregardasrightfulthatpromptsustoestab-lishasystemofenforceablelegalrights.

Buthumanbeings,collectivelyspeaking,dostandinrelationsofunilateraldominationovertheotheranimals.Iamnottalkingnowaboutarelationinwhichweasaspeciesstandtothemasspecies.Iamtalkingaboutarelationinwhichhumanbeingsstandasanorganizedbodytoindividualanimalswhoarenotpartofanysuchbody.Toustheotheranimalsareasubjectpopulation,renderedalmostcompletelyatourmercybyourintelligence,power,andor-ganizationalskills27.

Infact,whenHumedescribestherelationsinwhichpeoplestandtoanimals,heisdescribingexactlythesortofunilateraldominationofsomebeingsbyothersthewrongnessofwhichisthestartingpointofKantspoliticalphiloso-phy.Andwhenhe talksabout therelations inwhichmenstand towomen,Hume,withhischaracteristicpoliticalrealism,bringsouttheimportantthingthatmakessuchunilateraldominationpossible.Itisthatthedominantgroupbeabletoorganizeitselfasagroup,whilemembersofthedominatedgroupcanonlyresistasindividuals,ifindeedtheycanresistatall.Thisisanessen-tialfeatureoftherelationshipinwhichhumanbeingsstandtotheotherani-

offreedom,wedonothavearighttotheirbodies:thosearenotourstodowithasweplease.Butthedetailsofwhatisrequiredbytheargumentsofthispaper,ofwhichrightsanimalsshouldhave,remaintobeworkedout.

27 Here it is important to remember that Iamtalkingabouthowhumanbeingsstandcollectivelytoanimalsindividually.Asspecies,manyofthemarealsosubjecttoourdominationitisuptouswhethermanyspecieswillsurvive.Butthatcertainlyisnottrueofallofthem.Collectivelyspeaking,themosquitoesmaydefeatusyet.


25

mals.Andthewaythatweuniteandorganizeourselvesisbyconstructingourlegalsystems.

EarlierIpointedoutthattheproblemKanthasinmindwhenheconstructshisaccountofrightsdoesnotconcerntheprobabilityofbadbehavior.Hethinksitiswronginitselfforonepersontobecompletelysubjecttoanotherpersonswill.Unilateraldominationisamoralwrongwhetheritisabusedornot.ButIdidnotsaythatunilateraldominationisnotthesourceofbadbehaviorandnotoriously,it is.Youneedonlylookatwhatgoesoninsideofourfactoryfarmsandexperimentallaboratoriestoseewhatthepossibilityofsuchdomi-nationtheabilitytodowhateverwelikewithanotheranimalcanleadto.Solongasthereareprofitstobemade,andthetantalizingprospectofexpand-ing thehuman lifespanbyexperimentson theotheranimals, therewillbepeoplewhowilldoanything,nomatterhowcruelitis,toacaptiveanimal.Andwhatmakesthispossibleisthelegalstatusofanimalsasproperty.Itisnotplausibletohopethatthehumanracewillsomedayhaveacollectivehu-manitarianconversionandbringallsuchpracticestoanend,withoutanyhelpfromthelaw.Butevenifitwere,theargumentwouldstand.Nomatterhowwell-intentionedweare,wecanonlyberightlyrelatedtoourfellowcreaturesifweofferthemsomelegalprotections.

Ifwemustpresupposethattheworldandallthatisinispossessedbyuscom-mon,so thatwemayuse it rightfully, thenweshouldpresuppose that it ispossessedbyallofitscreaturesonthesameground.Theotheranimalsarenotpartofwhatweown,touseasweplease,butratherareamongthosetowhomtheworldanditsresourcesbelong.Ifwerejectthepresuppositionofcommonpossessionorownership, thenwecannotpretendthat thewaywetreat theotheranimalsisanythingbutanexerciseofarbitrarypower,thepoweroftheorganizedovertheweak.Inthatcase,Isupposeitisuptoushowwetreatthembutthemoralargumentstillholds.Theotheranimalsare,justasmuchasweare,beingswithinterests,beingsforwhomthingscanbegoodorbad,andassuchtheyareendsinthemselves.Eitherway,theonlywaywecanberightlyrelatedtothemistograntthemsomerights.

V. Conclusion

Despite his own views about animals and their claims,Kants philosophycapturessomethingaboutourownexistentialsituationthatproclaimsourfel-lowshipwiththeotheranimals.ItisthecentralinsightofKantsphilosophythatthelawsofreasonareourlaws,humanlaws,andthatwecannotknow


26

whethertheworldasitisinitselfconformstothemornot.Thefactthatwearerationaldoesnotrepresentaprivilegedrelationshipinwhichwestandtotheuniverse.Kantalsobelievedthatmoralityisakindofsubstituteformeta-physics, givingusgrounds tohope forwhatwecannotknow throughanymetaphysicalinsightthattheworldcan,throughourefforts,bemadeintoaplacethatmeetsourstandards,thatisrationalandgood28.Thatmeansweshareafatewiththeotheranimals,forlikethem,wearethrownintoaworldthatgivesnoguaranteesandarefacedwiththetaskoftryingtomakeahomehere.Itisapresuppositionofourownrationalagencyandofourmoralandlegalsystemsthatthefateofeverysuchcreature,everycreatureforwhomlifeinthisworld canbegoodor bad, is something thatmatters.That iswhyweshouldconcedethemoralclaimsoftheotheranimals,andprotectthoseclaimsasamatteroflegalright29.

Bibliography

dicKens cHaRles,BleakHouse,NewYork1977(cit.dicKens,BleakHouse).Hobbes tHomas,Leviathan,in:cuRley edwin(Ed.),Indianapolis1994(cit.Hobbes,Le-

viathan).Hume david,EnquiryConcerningthePrinciplesofMorals,in:selby-bigge l. a./nidditcH

P. H.(Ed.),EnquiriesConcerningHumanUnderstandingandConcerningthePrinciplesofMorals,3rdedition,Oxford1975(cit.Hume,SecondEnquiry).

Kant immanuel,CritiqueofJudgment,Trans.PluHaR weRneR s., Indianapolis1987.Kant immanuel,CritiqueofPracticalReason,Trans.gRegoR maRy, in: gRegoR maRy

(Ed.),CambridgeTextsintheHistoryofPhilosophyseries,Cambridge1997.Kant immanuel,Groundwork of theMetaphysics ofMorals,Trans.gRegoR maRy, in:

gRegoR maRy (Ed.), CambridgeTextsintheHistoryofPhilosophyseries,Cambridge1998.

Kant immanuel,KantsGesammelteSchriften,in:RoyalPrussian,Berlin1900.Kant immanuel,LecturesonEthics,Trans.HeatH PeteR,in:HeatH PeteR/scHneewind J. b.

(Ed.),NewYork1997.Kant immanuel,TheMetaphysicsofMorals,Trans.gRegoR maRy, in: gRegoR maRy(Ed.),

CambridgeTextsintheHistoryofPhilosophyseries,Cambridge1996.

28 Seenote10.29 Anearlierversionofmanyoftheargumentsinthispaperwasdiscussedinaworkshop

onmyworkonethicsandanimalsatNewYorkUniversityinSeptember2011andbyanethicsreadinggroupatStanfordinOctober2011.IwouldliketothankCharlotteBrown,TomDoherty,LoriGruen,BeatriceLonguenesse,PeterSingerandJeremyWaldronforcomments.


27

Kant immanuel,ConjecturesontheBeginningsofHumanHistory,Trans.nisbet H. b.,in:Reiss Hans (Ed.),KantsPoliticalWritings,2ndedition,Cambridge1991.

KoRsgaaRd cHRistine m.,FellowCreatures,KantianEthicsandOurDutiestoAnimals,in:PeteRson gRetHe b.(Ed.),TheTannerLecturesonHumanValues,Volume25(2005),SaltLakeCity2005(cit.KoRsgaaRd,FellowCreatures).

KoRsgaaRd cHRistine m., InteractingwithAnimals,AKantianAccount, in:beaucHamP tom/FRey R. g. (Ed.),TheOxfordHandbookofAnimalEthics,Oxford2011(cit.KoRs-gaaRd,InteractingwithAnimals).

KoRsgaaRd cHRistine m.,JustLikeAlltheOtherAnimalsoftheEarth,in:HarvardDivin-ityBulletinSummer2008(cit.KoRsgaaRd,JustLikeAlltheOtherAnimals).

KoRsgaaRd cHRistine m., KantsFormulaofHumanity,in:KoRsgaaRd cHRistine m. (Ed.),CreatingtheKingdomofEnds,NewYork1996(cit.KoRsgaaRd,FormulaofHumanity).

KoRsgaaRd cHRistine m.,TheOriginofTheGoodandOurAnimalNature,in:ReicHaRdt bastian (Ed.),ProblemsofGoodness,NewEssaysonMetaethics, forthcoming(cit.KoRsgaaRd,OriginoftheGood).

KoRsgaaRd cHRistine m.,Self-Constitution,Agency,Identity,andIntegrity,Oxford2009(cit.KoRsgaaRd,Self-Constitution).

KoRsgaaRd cHRistine m., TheSourcesofNormativity,Cambridge1996(cit.KoRsgaaRd,SourcesofNormativity).

locKe JoHn,SecondTreatiseofGovernment, in:macPHeRson c. b. (Ed.), Indianapolis1980(cit.locKe,SecondTreatise).

Rawls JoHn,ATheoryofJustice,2ndedition,Cambridge,MA1999(cit.Rawls,TheoryofJustice).

Rousseau Jean-Jacques,OntheSocialContract,in:cRess donald a.(Ed.),Indianapolis1987(cit.Rousseau,SocialContract).

animal rights by korsgaard

Documents

animal rightschristine

critiqueofpracticalreason

table of contentsi

sonderdruck offprint