And the winner is—Acquired. Entrepreneurship as a contest yielding radical innovations

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<ul><li><p>R</p><p>Ar</p><p>Ja</p><p>b</p><p>c</p><p>d</p><p>e</p><p>a</p><p>ARRAA</p><p>KREIAMG</p><p>1</p><p>aTptidaaem</p><p>af</p><p>m</p><p>h0</p><p>ARTICLE IN PRESSG ModelESPOL-3052; No. of Pages 16Research Policy xxx (2014) xxxxxx</p><p>Contents lists available at ScienceDirect</p><p>Research Policy</p><p>jo ur nal ho me page: www.elsev ier .com/ locate / respol</p><p>nd the winner isAcquired. Entrepreneurship as a contest yieldingadical innovations</p><p>oachim Henkela,b,, Thomas Rndec,b,1, Marcus Wagnerd,e,2</p><p>Technische Universitt Mnchen, TUM School of Management, Arcisstr. 21, 80333 Munich, GermanyCenter for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), London, UKCopenhagen Business School, Department of Innovation &amp; Organizational Economics, Kilevej 14A, K3.72, 2000 Frederiksberg, DenmarkUniversitt Augsburg, Chair in Innovation and International Management, Universittsstr. 16, 86159 Augsburg, GermanyBureau dEconomie Thorique et Applique (BETA), Strasbourg, France</p><p> r t i c l e i n f o</p><p>rticle history:eceived 16 December 2013eceived in revised form 9 September 2014ccepted 9 September 2014vailable online xxx</p><p>eywords:adical innovationntrantncumbent</p><p>a b s t r a c t</p><p>New entrants to a market tend to be superior to incumbents in originating radical innovations. Weprovide a new explanation for this phenomenon, based on markets for technology. It applies in industrieswhere successful entrepreneurial firms, or their technologies, are acquired by incumbents that thencommercialize the innovation. To this end we analyze an innovation game between one incumbent anda large number of entrants. In the first stage, firms compete to develop innovations of high quality. Theydo so by choosing, at equal cost, the success probability of their R&amp;D approach, where a lower probabilityaccompanies higher value in case of successthat is, a more radical innovation. In the second stage,successful entrants bid to be acquired by the incumbent. We assume that entrants cannot survive ontheir own, so being acquired amounts to a prize in a contest. We identify an equilibrium in which thecquisitionarkets for technologyame theory</p><p>incumbent performs the least radical project. Entrants pick pairwise different projects; the bigger thenumber of entrants, the more radical the most radical project. Generally, entrants tend to choose moreradical R&amp;D approaches and generate the highest value innovation in case of success. We illustrate ourtheoretical findings by a qualitative empirical study of the Electronic Design Automation industry, andderive implications for research and management.. Introduction</p><p>What is the division of labor in the production of innovationsmong large established firms and small entrepreneurial ventures?his fundamental question has attracted the interest of scholars andolicy makers alike, and has spawned a broad literature going backo Schumpeter (1912) and as far as Say (1827). While the evidences somewhat mixed, the overall picture is that incumbent firmsevelop most of the incremental innovations but that entrants playn important role in the creation of breakthroughs (e.g., SchererPlease cite this article in press as: Henkel, J., et al., And the winner isAcRes. Policy (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2014.09.004</p><p>nd Ross, 1990; Van Praag and Versloot, 2007). Baumol (2010, p. 25)xplains this as the result of a process where [T]he giant companiesay account for the major share of the economys R&amp;D financing,</p><p> Corresponding author at: Technische Universitt Mnchen, TUM School of Man-gement, Arcisstr. 21, 80333 Munich, Germany. Tel.: +49 89 289 25741;ax: +49 89 28925742.</p><p>E-mail addresses: henkel@wi.tum.de (J. Henkel), thr.ino@cbs.dk (T. Rnde),arcus.wagner@wiwi.uni-augsburg.de (M. Wagner).1 Tel.: +45 3815 2573.2 Tel.: +49 931 318 9046.</p><p>ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2014.09.004048-7333/ 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.</p><p>but these better established firms tend to minimize risk by special-izing in incrementally improving the most promising of the radicalinnovations they purchase, license or adapt from the smaller firmsthat created them.</p><p>Early theoretical studies point out that incumbents have weakerincentives than start-ups to invest in R&amp;D in situations where theywould replace their own products (Arrow, 1962) but that theyhave stronger incentives to invest if their market power is threat-ened by entry (Gilbert and Newbury, 1982; Reinganum, 1983).However, there is an important distinction with respect to howthe innovations of start-ups are commercialized. The abovemen-tioned models assume that start-ups enter the product marketand compete with incumbents. Yet, as Baumol (2010) pointsout, a cooperative agreement between an entrant and an incum-bent regarding commercialization, in general should be superiorboth because of increased market power and because entrantstypically lack the broad resource bases of incumbents. Reflect-quired. Entrepreneurship as a contest yielding radical innovations.</p><p>ing this point, some more recent theoretical studies allow fora successful entrant to be acquired by (or to license its inven-tion to) an incumbent (Gans and Stern, 2000; Kleer and Wagner,2013).</p><p>dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2014.09.004dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2014.09.004http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00487333http://www.elsevier.com/locate/respolmailto:henkel@wi.tum.demailto:thr.ino@cbs.dkmailto:marcus.wagner@wiwi.uni-augsburg.dedx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2014.09.004</p></li><li><p> ING ModelR2 ch Poli</p><p>onbnstcvwtapplcbbpltmc</p><p>bdtgpchlbts</p><p>epaeetinrwlrbirttbtthhi</p><p>tTdaao</p><p>shadow of acquisition (or, technology licensing) was first analyzedtheoretically by Gans and Stern (2000). They modeled in detailthe negotiations between an incumbent and an entrant over anARTICLEESPOL-3052; No. of Pages 16 J. Henkel et al. / Resear</p><p>Our paper contributes to this stream of literature. However,ur approach differs in two respects from earlier work. First, weote that in many industries the number of start-ups seeking toe acquired is, for each technological innovation, higher than theumber of start-ups that eventually succeed. In such a market,tart-ups compete to be acquired. Second, with the notable excep-ion of Frnstrand Damsgaard et al. (2009), the previous studieshoose innovation efforti.e., budget spentas the players choiceariable. However, selecting an R&amp;D project is often a question ofhich path to follow rather than how much to invest. As an illus-</p><p>ration, consider Vertex Pharmaceuticals (Pisano et al., 2006). With given R&amp;D budget, the biotech firm had to pick two from fourromising drug candidates, each characterized by its own successrobability, and value in case of success. In addition, the typicallyimited financial resources of entrants make it unlikely that theyould achieve more radical innovations by outspending incum-ents. Furthermore, in many industriesamong them software andiotechnologycapital requirements in the early phases of R&amp;Drojects are modest, and so budget spent is not the most relevantever for innovation radicalness. It is thus a plausible assumptionhat entrants distinguish themselves from incumbents by choosingore radical R&amp;D approaches with lower success probability andoncomitant higher value in case of success.</p><p>In our model, we consider an industry consisting of one incum-ent and N entrants. The firms conduct R&amp;D with the aim ofeveloping an innovation at a fixed cost normalized to zero. Onlyhe incumbent can commercialize an innovation, so the entrantsoal is to be acquired. The firms choice variable is the successrobability of their R&amp;D projects, with projects with lower suc-ess probability having a higher value in case of success. All firmsave access to the same R&amp;D possibilities, described by a functioninking the projects value in case of success to its success proba-ility. In the first stage of the game, firms select their projects; inhe second stage, after the outcomes of the projects are realized,uccessful entrants compete to be acquired by the incumbent.</p><p>The main results of our analysis are the following. There alwaysxists an equilibrium in which all entrants choose more radical R&amp;Drojects than the incumbenti.e., projects with lower success prob-bility, and in case of success, higher value. In this equilibrium, allntrants choose pairwise different strategies; competition betweenntrants drives the radicalness of their innovation in the sensehat a larger number of entrants leads to an increase in the valuen case of success of the most radical innovation project. In turn,o equilibrium exists in which the incumbent chooses the mostadical project. Furthermore, for a specific value function and N 3e show that the equilibrium in which the incumbent chooses the</p><p>east radical project is unique. We show that our key results areobust to changes in the timing of the R&amp;D decisions, the distri-ution of bargaining power in the market for acquisitions, and thentroduction of more incumbents. We thus obtain the rather robustesult that, overall, entrants pursue more radical innovations thanhe incumbent. The economic intuition behind this result is relatedo the value of having the second best technology. The incumbentenefits from its technology both when it is best (and it is usedo produce) and when it is second best (and it is used to reducehe price paid for the best technology). Therefore, the incumbentas an incentive to pursue a more incremental technology with aigher success probability than an entrant who only benefits fromts technology when it is the best one and is acquired.</p><p>We illustrate this, using a qualitative empirical study of the elec-ronic design automation (EDA) industry to support our analysis.his industry, which develops software tools for the automatedPlease cite this article in press as: Henkel, J., et al., And the winner isAcRes. Policy (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2014.09.004</p><p>esign of computer chips, consists of three large incumbentsnd numerous start-ups. It features those characteristics that wessume in our modelstart-ups that compete in R&amp;D with eachther and with incumbents, and that need to be acquired if they PRESScy xxx (2014) xxxxxx</p><p>are successfuland shows outcomes that are predicted by our the-oretical analysis, in particular, start-ups that go for R&amp;D projectswith lower success probability and higher value in case of success.Also in other industries we observe acquisitions that are consistentwith the predictions of our model. The business press reports thatbiotech firm Gilead acquired Pharmasset since the latter had a bet-ter therapeutic concept against Hepatitis C virus (Bloomberg, 2011),and that Bristol-Myers Squibb acquired Inhibitex in the same mar-ket in order to improve its own offering (Wall Street Journal, 2012).We will discuss the applicability of our results to other industry inmore detail in the concluding section.</p><p>Our results that entrants originate more radical innovationsseem in line with the literature. Yet, they are based on a funda-mentally different mechanism than the findings in earlier studies:essentially, on the existence of a market for technology (e.g. Aroraet al., 2001; Arora and Gambardella, 1994; Gans and Stern, 2003;Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, 1999) between entrants and incumbents.In our model, the fact that entrants produce more radical innova-tions derives from the assumptions that (a) firms choose innovationprojects characterized by success probability (rather than effort orinvestment), and (b) entrants, if successful, need to be acquired inorder to commercialize their innovations. The incumbent neithercannibalizes its own product when innovating nor does it protect anexisting market. Our model also makes predictions that differ fromthose of established modelsin particular, that entrants choosepairwise distinct strategies and that the expected value of the mostsuccessful innovation increases with the number of entrants. Moregenerally, our approach suggests that the existence of a market fortechnologywhether technologies or entire firms are traded in thismarketplays an important role in explaining the stylized facts inthe innovation and entrepreneurship literatures.</p><p>The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In thefollowing section, we review the relevant literature. In Sections35 we introduce and analyze the model, and perform robustnesschecks and extensions. Section 6 provides a qualitative empiricalstudy of the EDA industry to illustrate our analysis. In Section 7 wesummarize and discuss our findings and conclude the paper.</p><p>2. Literature review</p><p>There is broad evidence from a number of high-technologyindustries that acquisitions of small, innovative target firmsfrequently pursue the goal of gaining technology access and of pre-empting technology competition (Hall, 1990; Lerner and Merges,1998; Bloningen and Taylor, 2000; Lehto and Lehtoranta, 2006;Grimpe and Hussinger, 2008, 2009).3 In line with our analysis,Granstrand and Sjolander (1990) show that start-up innovationsare more radical than those of incumbents, and they suggest adivision of scientific labor between entrants and incumbents thatestablishes their roles as targets and acquirers. This view is sup-ported by Lindholm (1996), who shows that small firms take activesteps to increase their odds of being acquired. A weak positionin complementary assets on the side of the entrant increases thegains from trade of technology, and well-established intellectualproperty rights and involvement of professional intermediaries arefound to increase the likelihood that these gains are realized byentrant and incumbent (Gans et al., 2002; Hsu, 2006).</p><p>R&amp;D competition between entrants and incumbents in thequired. Entrepreneurship as a contest yielding radical innovations.</p><p>3 It should be noted, though, that Desyllas and Hughes (2008) attribute less impor-tance to innovation-related variables, finding that from a target perspective theycontribute little to explaining acquisition by a large firm.</p><p>dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2014.09.004</p></li><li><p> ING ModelRch Poli</p><p>iosdRaafitafihbptfattc</p><p>siteapassFpttr</p><p>3</p><p>aakinkoif</p><p>iddsafiiilFtc</p><p>t</p><p>(i) If two or more entrants have higher realized R&amp;D values thanthe incumbent, then the incumbent acquires the entrant with the</p><p>5 When the incumbent negotiates with the most successful entrant, its threatpoint, or (maximum) willingness to pay, is the difference in value between the bestand the second best projects. This is also the negotiable surplus since the entrants(minimum) willingness to receive is zero. Our approach to modeling the negotiationARTICLEESPOL-3052; No. of Pages 16J. Henkel et al. / Resear</p><p>nnovation and showed how the acquisition price depends cruciallyn the strength of intellectual property protection and on the pos-ibility of the entrant to enter the product market. This, in turn,etermines the two firms payoffs from and incentives to conduct&amp;D. Kleer and Wagner (2013) model competition bet...</p></li></ul>