SECTION ONE

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Piracy emanating from Somalia has dominated maritime security concerns of policy-

makers worldwide for the past five years. Sporadic attacks on commercial vessels have

occurred close to the coast of Somalia for more than a decade, but in 2008 concerns for the

security of the busy shipping routes running across the Indian Ocean and through the Gulf of

Aden grew, as the number of successful hijackings, the scope of the pirates’ area of operation

and the amount demanded in ransom payments rose dramatically. The year 2008 also marked

the start of concerted and wide-ranging international efforts to counter Somali piracy, and the

effects of these initiatives are now evident: in May 2013 UN officials noted that there had been

no successful hijacking in the Indian Ocean for a year.1International attention is now shifting

to the insecurity of waters off Africa’s west coast.

The Gulf of Guinea – the coastal zone stretching from Senegal to Angola – provides an

economic lifeline to coastal and landlocked West African countries, and is of strategic

importance to the rest of the world. Safe passage to ports in the region and security within its

waters are vital for global energy production, as Nigeria and Angola are among the world’s 10

biggest crude oil exporters; for West Africa’s fishing industry, which provides sustenance and

employment for a large swathe of the West African population; and for the prevention of the

trafficking of narcotics, people and weapons into Europe and into fragile regions that are

vulnerable to destabilization. In June 2013 the annual Human Cost of Maritime Piracy report

noted that more seafarers were attacked in West African waters than off Somalia’s coast in

2012.

Although maritime organizations, most notably the International Maritime Organization

(IMO), have followed the situation in the Gulf of Guinea for years, the UN placed a central

focus on the issue following appeals from the president of Benin for assistance in combating

maritime crime and drug-trafficking. In response to the UN Security Council’s adoption, in

February 2012, of Resolution 2039, which urged states of the region to counter piracy at

regional and national levels, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),

the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Gulf of Guinea

Commission (GGC) have convened joint meetings to draft a regional strategy. Documents

drafted at these meetings were endorsed at a summit of heads of state and government of

Central and West Africa in Yaoundé, Cameroon, in June 2013. UN Security Council

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Resolution 2039 also calls on international partners to provide support for regional efforts.

Countries including the United States, the United Kingdom, Brazil, France and Spain have

contributed to bilateral partnerships. The EU is soon to release its strategy for the Gulf of

Guinea, and INTERPOL and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) have included

Gulf of Guinea piracy in their analyses of organized crime in West Africa. This international

attention acknowledges that, like Somali piracy, maritime threats in West Africa exist as a

component of transnational crime and have an impact far beyond the immediate region.

There are a number of critical differences between maritime insecurity off Africa’s east

and west coasts, but the Gulf of Guinea’s littoral states and stakeholders further afield can

draw valuable lessons from the experience of combating Somali piracy to help shape their

responses to West Africa’s maritime threats.

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Figure 2. Actual and attempted incidents of piracy/armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea, 2012

Source: www.ics-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/live-piracy-map

1.1 MARITIME ECONOMY

Maintaining a vibrant national economy requires attention to the maritime economy, as

even landlocked countries depend on the maritime access of their neighbors for their own

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economies. Thus, a state’s ability to guarantee safe and secure maritime conditions is

important to the health of its overall economy as well as that of the region.

Nevertheless, it would be difficult to impossible to identify all the elements of a

national economy that have maritime characteristics or are influenced by developments in the

maritime sector. Accordingly, the Maritime Economy Function seeks to identify key, central

areas of maritime economic activity that utilize or depend on the maritime domain. These

areas of activity include a multitude of stakeholders and represent a range of responsibilities

that are important to any conception of maritime security. In addition, the Maritime Economy

Function includes reference to economic conditions that may have a significant impact on the

efficacy of the maritime economy.

The Guide identifies four Maritime Economy Sub-functions:

Economic activity regulation and management:

The tasks required to ensure a comprehensive maritime economic and regulatory

environment contributes to the sustainable commercial development of a nation, through the

promotion of safety of passage, compliance with international obligations, and improvement in

levels of competence, resulting in increased competitiveness of goods and services.

Commercial ports:

The tasks required to ensure a competitive position in the global economic marketplace

through the movement of imported and exported goods, both cost effectively and efficiently.

Ports and associated waterways are maintained in navigable condition, are accessible and

secure, have properly maintained facilities, and are supported by necessary infrastructure.

Transport:

The tasks required to promote the development of efficient, integrated maritime supply

chains, with a combination of personnel and equipment able to support broad national

maritime goals, development programs, and initiatives.

Market conditions:

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The tasks required to encourage markets to function efficiently and to prevent

(including through the establishment of incentive structures and enforcement mechanisms)

their exploitation.

1.2 STATEMENT OF PROBLEMS

To many observers “Maritime Security” appears to be a large and sometimes nebulous

concept. In fact it has become a large task involving many entities from international, public

and private sectors aiming at

preserving the freedom of the seas,

facilitating and defending commerce, and

Maintaining good governance at sea.

Transnational forces and irregular challenges continue to be the primary threat today

and in the foreseeable future, especially in the maritime domain. “Maritime Security” has to be

distinguished from “Maritime Safety”. “Maritime Security” is “the combination of preventive

and responsive measures to protect the maritime domain against threats and intentional

unlawful acts”. Key words are: preventive and responsive measures, aiming at both law

enforcement as a civilian and military requirement and defense operations as a military, in this

case naval requirement. “Maritime Safety” is “the combination of preventive and responsive

measures intended to protect the maritime domain against, and limit the effect of, accidental or

natural danger, harm, and damage to environment, risks or loss.”

The crucial distinction is between man-made and unintentional risks and dangers.

“Safety” refers to dangers for ships, its crew and passengers, cargo and navigation. It is

referring to the protection of the maritime environment through regulations and techniques,

whereas security is focused on operational requirements. Safety is a civilian responsibility.

And its achievements are based on common efforts between governmental and non-

governmental actors. The “International Maritime Organization”, IMO, is the guardian of all

regulations necessary to establish and keep appropriate standards. One example is the “Best

Management Practice”, BMP 4, published to advise all ship owners and masters to be able to

protect themselves against piracy attacks and armed robbery.

“Maritime Security” is a responsibility, which has no clear definitions when it comes to

Maritime Security Operations: it is a governmental responsibility, but the authority to act on

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behalf of a state is a sovereign decision with different options. This has a strong influence on

Maritime Collaboration. It has no universal legal or agreed definition due to the fact that it is a

broad topic, covering many policy sectors.

Elements, which are part of maritime security, are:

International and national peace and security

Sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence

Security of Sea Lines of Communications

Security protection from crimes at sea

Resource security, access to resources at sea and to the seabed

Environmental protection

Security of all seafarers and fishermen.

Referring to the responsibility for maritime security, all nations have a responsibility by

signing UNCLOS5 or by being compliant with this broad set of articles and regulations which

are offering a foundation for “Good Governance at Sea”. All maritime regimes, be they based

on UNCLOS or derive from this basic document, be they regional or local, must ensure or, in

critical situations, enforce compliance with this globally accepted document.

Having described the term “Maritime Security” and concluded that there is no universal

definition, it is of equal importance to think about the term “Comprehensive Approach”. The

character of the seas has changed. From an open space where freedom was the rule, they have

now turned into a shared, common domain, vast but fragile, needing world- wide management

and protection.

1.3 AIMS AND OBJECTIVE

Knowing that a sectorial approach has only limited success, the term “Comprehensive

Approach” seems, at least, to mean that more than one authority is engaged to contribute to

“Maritime Security”. Collaboration between different national and international authorities is

of equal importance. Having decided, for the time being, to focus on operational requirements,

ignoring technical ones, we concentrate on so-called “enablers”. These are maritime skills

developed through a combination of long experience, common exercise, common operations

and a common set of rules, which are provided by the military and civil community. “Rules of

Engagement”6 are available for both: maritime security and defense.

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1.4 PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY

1.4.1 DEFINITIONS

In article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)

“Piracy” is defined as follows:

any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for

private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and

directed: o on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or

property on board such ship or aircraft;

against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any

State;

any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with

knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;

Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described before.

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) in its 26th Assembly session defines

Armed Robbery in Resolution A.1025 “Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of

Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships” as follows:

“Armed robbery against ships,” means any of the following acts:

any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other

than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship or against a

person or property on board such a ship, within a State’s internal waters, archipelagic

waters and territorial sea;

any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described above.8

1.4.2 THREAT SITUATION

Looking at the threat situation generated by piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the

Indian Ocean, we can observe two different developments. In the last couple of years the good

cooperation between Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia has successfully combated piracy in

this region. Piracy, once rampant, has been largely exterminated because the littoral states in

the region have stepped up their anti-piracy efforts. These efforts include the operation “Eye in

the Sky” and Malacca Strait Patrols, involving coordinated and sometimes joint Indonesian,

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Malaysian, Singaporean as well as Thai air and sea surveillance operations, including a

considerable information exchange. They have also invited cooperation from outside powers

such as India, the United States and Japan.

The situation off the coast of Somalia is just opposite to that. Although the International

Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reported on

October 22, 2012 that, despite the fact that the number of ships signaling attacks by Somali

pirates has fallen this year to its lowest level since 2009, the greatest threat for international

shipping still comes from activities by Somali pirates.10

Updated on December 3, 2012 the IMB reported for Somalia the following figures:

Total incidents: 71

Total hijackings: 13

Total hostages: 212

Current vessels held by Somali pirates:

Vessels: 9

Hostages: 147

However, not a single case has been reported yet where a ship carrying armed

contractors was hijacked. This, combined with the naval activities of the multinational task

force, has made life very difficult for the Somali pirates. Also, pirate activities decreased

considerably along the Indian coast because last year, the Indian navy increased their patrols,

enhanced surveillance and joined NATO forces in joint patrols. However, analysts also believe

that the increased use of private security guards on ships, international naval patrols, bad

weather and growing efforts by local authorities in the Punt-land region of Northern Somalia

to arrest pirates have helped to disrupt piracy, but have pushed criminals onshore.

The number of worldwide incidents in 2012 is remarkable:

Total attacks worldwide: 278

Total hijackings worldwide: 27

Although acts of piracy in the waters around the Horn of Africa have fallen sharply in

2012, the threat caused by Somali piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Indian Ocean is

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and will remain of significance for international shipping in the foreseeable future, and will

continue to cause high economic costs. The U.S. think tank “Oceans beyond Piracy” has

published in February 2012 the report “The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2011”, where it

comes to the following conclusions:

The economic costs of Somali piracy have resulted in costs of between 6.6 and 6.9

billion U.S. dollars. Expenditures are distributed as follows:

2.7 billion dollars for higher oil consumption due to speed increases in high-risk

areas

1.3 billion dollars for military operations

1.1 billion dollars for security equipment and armed security guards

635 million dollars for insurance policies

486 to 680 million dollars for course changes along the West coast of India

195 million dollars for higher salaries and risk supplements.

The average ransom increased from four million U.S. dollars in 2010 to five million

dollars in 2011. Although the total ransom paid in 2011 amounted to 160 million

dollars, it only represents two percent of the total economic costs caused by Somali

piracy.

Organizations donated around 20 million U.S. dollars in order to improve the situation

in Somalia and other regions affected by piracy. This sum represents a fraction of the

funds spent on fighting piracy at sea.

1.5 LIMITATION OF STUDY

Looking at piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, the threat situation is becoming increasingly

dangerous – 34 incidents from January to September 2012, up from 30 during last year – and

has shifted westward from Benin to neighboring Togo. The attacks are often violent, planned

and aimed at stealing refined oil products that can be easily sold on the open market. Togo

reported more attacks this year than in the previous five years combined, with three vessels

hijacked, two boarded and six reporting attempted attacks. Off Benin, one ship was hijacked

and one boarded. Nigeria accounted for 21 attacks with nine vessels boarded, four hijacked,

seven fired upon and one attempted attack. Not all navies in the Gulf of Guinea have the

resources to fight piracy far out at sea, so criminal gangs shift to these areas. The Nigerian

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navy however reacted to a number of incidents, where their presence was instrumental in

rescuing vessels.

Causes for concern are the recorded 51 incidents in Indonesia in the first nine months of

2012, up from an annual 2011 total of 46. Thefts, mainly carried out onboard vessels at

anchor, were the main objectives of the attackers. Some ships have also been hijacked this year

in the Malacca Straits, South China Sea and around Malaysia. The IMB warned that these

waters are still not entirely free of piracy and armed robbery and vessels should remain

vigilant and alert.

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SECTION TWO

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 MARITIME ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES

The significant dependence of African countries on international trade makes maritime

transport a crucial factor in Africa’s economic development. Maritime transport provides a

gateway to international markets for Africa’s exports; port facilities play an important trade

facilitation role to landlocked countries; fishing and tourism are important sources of income

and employment to littoral and island economies; the sea is an important source of oil, gas and

minerals; and, the sea has been used for connecting cables and pipes for data services and

mobile telephone connectivity.

(i) Seaborne Trade – The continent is heavily dependent on international trade.

According to the WTO International Trade Statistics (2010), intra-Africa trade is

about 11.5 percent of total Africa trade. Therefore, the bulk of Africa’s international

trade (oil, minerals and agricultural products) is transported by sea.

(ii) Port Services – Coastal countries earn foreign currency by providing transit

services to landlocked countries. Countries such as Egypt, Kenya, Tanzania,

Mozambique, South Africa, Namibia, Cameron, Ghana and Nigeria are key

international gateways to the continent’s exports. The coastal countries earn much

needed foreign currency from the port services they provide. For example, the

Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA), has recently

published a paper entitled “Nigeria as an African Trade Hub” highlighting the vast

opportunities in the Nigerian maritime sector to include ship building and ship

repairs, human capacity development, ship breaking and recycle facilities amongst

others. In fact, besides being one of Africa’s most important oil producers, Nigeria

already accounts for over 65 percent of the total maritime trade traffic in volume and

value within the West and Central African sub-region. Egypt also provides vital

trans-shipment services to trade between Europe and Asia.

(iii) Fishing – According to the FAO, Africa's fishing industry earned US$1.73 billion in

2007. The industry also earns additional income through fishing licenses to foreign

operators. Besides being the main income-earning activity for many Africans, fish

also provides the most important source of protein to the majority of the African

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population, playing a vital role in nutrition and food security. Fish makes a vital

contribution to the food and nutritional security of 200 million Africans and

provides income for over 10 million.

(iv) Tourism - Africa has a large untapped tourism potential, and the industry has the

capacity to drive the continent's growth. Tourism is a major source of income to

island economies such as Seychelles and Mauritius. In addition to tourists who come

directly to the islands, the island countries also benefit from stopovers and refueling

from cruise ships.

(v) Oil, gas and minerals - The upstream oil industry in Africa is a key component in

the continent’s development. Africa holds an estimated 117 billion-barrel of oil

reserve, corresponding to 9.5 percent of the world’s reserves, and produces 12.6

percent of the world’s output. Five countries dominate oil production (Nigeria,

Angola, Libya, Algeria and Egypt) and account for 85 percent of the continent’s

production.

(vi) Submarine cables and pipes - Africa has seen a surge in the installation of

intercontinental submarine cables that aim to improve the region's connectivity. This

has created new business opportunities ranging from provision of data services and

mobile telephony services and has facilitated faster data transfer. For example,

SEACOM’s submarine cable is a fiber optic cable providing high capacity

bandwidth to Southern Africa, East Africa, Europe, and South Asia, went into

commercial operation in July 2009 after a delay of four weeks, due to “enhanced

pirate activities” on the route taken by its cable-laying ships. SEACOM's enormous

capacity will enable high definition TV, peer to peer networks, IPTV, and surging

Internet demand. The other is the SAT-3/WASC (South Atlantic 3/West Africa

Submarine Cable) submarine communications cable linking Portugal and Spain to

South Africa, with connections to several West African countries along the route. It

forms part of the SAT-3/WASC/SAFE cable system, where the SAFE cable links

South Africa to Asia. A number of other cables are also being planned for Africa’s

east and west coasts, and will massively increase connectivity to the region.

2.2 MARITIME THREATS IN THE GULF OF GUINEA

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While maritime insecurity in the Indian Ocean is dominated by piracy, threats in the

Gulf of Guinea manifest in a variety of ways. The territorial waters and Exclusive Economic

Zones (EEZs) of Nigeria, Benin and Togo are considered areas at greatest risk of the following

types of criminality.

Piracy and armed robbery at sea– Pirate activity in the Gulf of Guinea differs to that

in the Indian Ocean. Somali pirates focus on kidnap for ransom, capturing vessels and

holding their cargo and crew in order to extract money from a ship-owner. In the Gulf

of Guinea pirates launch attacks primarily from Nigeria, with the aim of stealing cargo,

equipment or valuables from a vessel and its crew. Kidnapping of crew-members

happens, but is rarer than in the Indian Ocean, and so levels of violence are high as Gulf

of Guinea pirates are less concerned with maintaining the wellbeing of hostages. Of the

58 incidents of attempted and successful piracy/armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea

that were reported to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) in 2012, 37 involved the

use of firearms. In the first three months of 2013 15 incidents (including three

successful hijackings) were recorded.

Theft of oil and other cargo– Attacks on chemical tankers and vessels carrying refined

petroleum are well choreographed, and demonstrate that hijackers have good

knowledge of how to operate these specialized vessels, as well as accurate intelligence

on ships’ locations and the type of cargo they carry. Tankers that are attacked are

usually moored or carrying out ship-to-ship transfers at sea, and so are vulnerable to

being detected and boarded. Their crew is held while the cargo is transferred to smaller

vessels by the hijackers to be resold onshore. It is estimated that 40 per cent of Europe’s

oil imports, and close to 30 per cent of the United States’ imports of petroleum

products, must travel through the Gulf of Guinea each year, and security concerns could

affect Nigeria’s and Angola’s exports of crude oil.

Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing–West Africa is one of the world’s main

locations for illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. Almost 40 per cent of

the fish caught in West African waters is taken illegally. This fact rarely features

heavily in discussions of maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, but it is of critical

economic significance for West African governments, who collectively lose as much as

$1.5 billion annually because of IUU fishing.10 It is also of importance to international

actors, as illegally caught fish is often destined for EU and Asian markets, and there are

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links between vessels involved in IUU fishing and other forms of organized crime at

sea – including drug-smuggling.

Trafficking of counterfeit items, people, narcotics and arms– Many of the busy

seaports in the Gulf of Guinea lack sufficient oversight. The apparent capacity can be

undermined by corruption, allowing smuggling routes to become established.

According to UNODC estimates, 50 tonnes of cocaine, destined for Europe and worth

$2 billion, transits West Africa annually. The potential destabilizing effect that the

transit of illegal goods could have on West African states where incomes are low and

law enforcement is not stringent is illustrated by Guinea-Bissau. Often referred to as a

‘narco-state’, the value of drug flows in this West African country rivals that of its

official economy. In April 2013 a former chief of the Guinea-Bissau navy was arrested

by the US authorities for his alleged role as a kingpin of the drugs trade.

Actual and attempted pirate attacks in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden, 2008–12.

2.3 IMPACT OF MARITIME PIRACY

Maritime piracy imposes direct costs on humanitarian assistance and has an impact on

maritime economic activities such as oil production and cost of energy, insurance and shipping

costs, tourism and fishing.

2.3.1 HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia Maritime piracy impedes the delivery of relief aid

necessary to sustain and nourish a substantial part of the population of Somalia. Civil war,

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combined with a series of devastating droughts, has created a dire humanitarian crisis in

Somalia. There are more than one million internally displaced persons in the country.

According to the World Food Programme (WFP), more than 2.6 million People in Somalia

were dependent on food aid in 2008; the number now stands at 3.25 million people. Between

80 and 90 per cent of food aid for Somalia arrives by sea.

In 2007 the WFP reported that the number of ships willing to carry food aid to Somalia

had been cut by half because of the increased dangers faced by humanitarian relief vessels in

Somali waters. Ship owners fear that their vessels would be seized by pirates and their crews

held for ransom. In response, seven NATO warships were deployed off the Somali coast as

part of ‘Operation Allied Provider’ to help combat piracy, and specifically to protect the WFP.

2.3.2 OIL PRODUCTION AND COST

Oil Production and Cost of Energy Threats to energy security from maritime piracy are

a concern. In November 2008, the Sirius Star carrying two million barrels of crude oil from

Saudi Arabia to the United States (worth approximately $100 million) became the largest oil

tanker to be seized by pirates. It was held for two months until being released upon payment of

a ransom.

The attack was of particular concern for two reasons:

First, other than being the largest energy vessel ever hijacked, it was also the largest

vessel of any kind ever taken hostage. Additionally, it was considerably farther offshore

than the Somali pirates had ever operated; it is estimated that the pirates must have

travelled three to four days out on sea to intercept the vessel. The attack showed that the

pirates were able to operate in an area of over one million square miles, well beyond the

reach of the international patrols in the Gulf of Aden.

Second, because of the nature of the cargo, there was concern that the hijacking might

represent an escalation in the goals and ambitions of the pirates. An oil tanker of this

size could cause significant environmental damage if run aground, sunk or set on fire.

More than 10 percent of all seaborne oil passes through the Gulf of Aden to the Suez

Canal. The alternate route, traveling around the southern tip of Africa, is significantly longer

and more expensive. Routing a single tanker from Saudi Arabia to the United States around

the Cape of Good Hope adds approximately 2,700 miles to each voyage and about $3.5 million

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in annual fuel costs. This could have an impact on shipping costs for imported raw materials

and oil. As world attention focused on the striking increase in piracy in the Gulf of Aden, and

dramatic hijackings such as the Sirius Star, the piracy situation in Nigeria was relatively

neglected.

IMO reports show that 2009 began with the capture of an oil supply vessel and a

subsequent attack on a Royal Dutch Shell tanker. Reports show that on 21 January 2010

militants from the Niger Delta region attacked the MT Meredith, a tanker carrying 4,000 tons

of diesel fuel, and kidnapped a Romanian crew-member (released a day later). As a result of

pirate attacks on vessels and other incidents, oil production in Nigeria is estimated to have

dropped by 20 per cent since 2006 costing the Nigerian economy US$202 million between

2006 and 2008.

2.3.3 TOURISM AND FISHING

Maritime piracy also imposes significant costs on local fishing economies. According

to IMO, pirates attacked tuna vessels at least three times in 2009 as they fished 650 to 800

kilometers beyond Somali territorial waters. One vessel was captured, leading to a ransom

payment that exceeded US$1 million. The threat of pirate attacks has prompted many vessels

to avoid some of the richest fishing spots in the Indian Ocean. Dwindling catches have raised

concern that the Seychelles and Mauritius could face severe economic problems. The

Seychelles chain's economic survival depends not just on its enduring appeal to tourists but to

a greater extent on the fishing industry. The Somali pirates are a direct threat to both.

Seychelles has 1.4 million square kilometers of ocean as part of its EEZ and 115

islands. Tourism and fisheries account for 65 percent of the country’s GDP, employs 36% of

the country’s workforce. Tuna and related industries, through re-export of fuel to vessels, port

services, electricity and water for vessels account for up to 40 percent of foreign earnings. It

has been estimated that the cost of piracy alone (not accounting other threats to maritime

activities such as pollution, illegal trade, etc) stood at approximately 4 percent of GDP in

2009. The threat of piracy has also led to reduced cruise ships which contribute to tourism in

the island countries of Mauritius and Seychelles. The Kenyan Cruise Ship industry has also

suffered from the effects of piracy and fewer ships dock in Mombasa. Fishing is the second

highest non-oil export industry in Nigeria, and pirate attacks on fishing trawlers have reached

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the point that many fishing boat captains refuse to sail. Nigeria stands to lose up to US$600

million in export earnings due to piracy threats to its fisheries.

2.3.4 COST OF SHIPPING AND INSURANCE

The dramatic rise of piracy in the Gulf of Aden is changing the insurance landscape.

While piracy is not a new insured risk, the increase in pirate attacks along the Gulf has

affected premiums and coverage. Ships that continue to pass through the Gulf of Aden and the

Suez Canal have to purchase a war risk insurance coverage. According to a recent report by

UNCTAD, insurance premiums for ships traveling through the Gulf have rose from between

0.05% and 0.175% of the value of their cargo, compared to between 0% and 0.05% in May

2008. Premiums for kidnap and ransom coverage have reportedly increased by as much as

1,000%. The additional costs due to piracy are passed on to consumers as shipping companies

recoup most of their losses through their protection and indemnity clauses. An increasing

number of ships are now avoiding the Suez Canal route and taking the longer route around the

Cape of Good Hope.

Denmark's A.P. Moller-Maersk, one of the world's largest shipping lines, is routing

some of its 50 oil tankers around the Cape of Good Hope instead of through the Suez Canal,

and the Norwegian firm Frontline, a major carrier of Middle Eastern oil, may follow suit.

Naturally, taking the much longer route around the Cape adds both time and expense to each

shipment. Diverting from the canal to the Cape on a trip from the Middle East to refineries in

the Mediterranean doubles typical transport time from 15 to 30 days. This naturally would lead

to an increase in commodities transport fees to more than 30 percent and lower

competitiveness of traders especially for perishables goods and time (fashion) sensitive goods

such as clothing. It is estimated that an extra US$7.5 billion would be triggered per year if one-

third of the Far East-Europe cargoes were geographically re-routed via the Cape of Good Hope

involving an extra 15 to 30 days to finish the service moving with the same knots. Egypt

benefits from its geographical position, and from the Suez Canal, which forms part of the

world’s busiest shipping route, connecting Europe and Asia. Rerouting via the Cape of Good

Hope will likely affect the Egyptian authorities (loss of foreign currency earnings), the Suez

Canal Authorities (loss of operating earnings and employment), Mediterranean port authorities

and terminals (e.g. reduced vessel calls and trans-shipments), and also industry and consumers

because of additional costs.

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Nigeria accounts for over 65 per cent of the total seaborne traffic for 16 countries in

West Africa. As warnings to mariners in and near Nigerian waters become more common,

increased shipping costs for Nigerian and Gulf of Guinea destinations are likely as shippers

begin to factor higher insurance premiums into their pricing.

2.4 MEASURES TO DEAL WITH MARITIME PIRACY

The increase in acts of piracy has led to enhanced cooperation at international and

regional levels. Joint efforts are being made in various forums to find adequate solutions to

piracy.

1. Capacity Building by IMO In 2009 the IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee approved

revised guidance to operators: “Recommendations to Government for preventing and

suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships’ and “Guidance to ship owners and

ship operators, shipmasters and crews on preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and

armed robbery against ships.” The Committee also agreed that a specific “Guidance on

piracy and armed robbery against ships in waters off the coast of Somalia” should

include “Best management practices to deter piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the

coast of Somalia” which was developed by industry organisations. As part of its

technical cooperation programme, IMO is assisting countries to build capacity, so that

they can effectively contribute to overall efforts to combat piracy, including through

relevant national legislations.

2. Regional Cooperation. The Djibouti Code of Conduct In 2009 a high-level meeting of

17 countries from the Western Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden and Red Sea areas met in

Djibouti and adopted a “Code of conduct concerning the repression of piracy and armed

robbery against ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden”. Signatories

to the code of conduct to undertake wide-ranging commitments to cooperate in seizing,

investigating and prosecuting pirates in the region, and to review their relevant national

laws. The code of conduct allows authorized officials to board the patrol ships or

aircraft of another signatory. Nine countries have so far signed the code of conduct.

These include: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, the Maldives, the Seychelles,

Somalia, Tanzania, and Yemen.

3. International Cooperation United. Nations Recognizing the seriousness of maritime

piracy in the Gulf of Aden, the Secretary-General of the United Nations has called for a

multifaceted approach to combating piracy “to ensure that the political process and the 18

peacekeeping efforts of the African Union and the strengthening of institutions work in

tandem”. The United Nations Security Council has been actively engaged in

formulating adequate responses to the issue of piracy. Several UN Security Council

resolutions have been adopted to address the delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia

and the protecting and escorting ships employed by the World Food Programme. In

January 2009 the Security Council (resolution 1851) established the contact Group on

Piracy off the Coast of Somalia to facilitate discussion and coordination of actions

among states and organizations to suppress piracy off the coast of Somalia. The contact

group periodically reports progress to the Security Council. In support of UN Security

Council resolution 1851 and the EU-NAVFOR Somalia set up in 2008 to improve

maritime security off the Somali coast, the European Union has established the

Maritime Security Centre (Horn of Africa) as part of international efforts to coordinate

efforts to deal with piracy. The Centre is part of the European Security and Defence

Policy Initiative which provides a service to mariners in the region.

2.5 ROLE OF THE BANK IN COMBATING PIRACY

The impact on sea borne trade and maritime economic opportunities pose serious

challenges to Africa’s development agenda. The Bank can play an important part in combating

piracy.

1. Producing Knowledge Products.

During the US Africa Command-organised maritime security conference in October

2010, the AU Commission deputy chairman Erastus Mwencha underscored that “the leading

threat to Africa’s maritime domain however remains the threat of ignorance. Until there is a

true understanding of the geostrategic importance of Africa’s maritime domain for Africa’s

socioeconomic development growth, until there is a true understanding of how central it is for

the wellbeing and prosperity of millions of Africans, the scope and magnitude of all the afore

mentioned threats and vulnerabilities will continue to grow and undermine Africa’s socio-

economic development growth”.

The Bank could monitor and report on the impact of piracy. Such knowledge products

could raise awareness of the importance of maritime security to Africa’s economic growth and

the seriousness of maritime piracy to economic growth in Africa. The Bank can work closely

with the IMO which records incidents of piracy.19

2. Contributing Financial Resources for Fighting Piracy

The Bank should support the African Union (AU) in the development of an integrated

maritime strategy to serve as a long-term multi-layered common vision to addressing seaborne

challenges and sustain more wealth creation from the oceans and seas. The long term solution

to the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia is through the creation of economic

opportunities so that the youth could be meaningfully employed. The Bank can also contribute

to capacity building efforts led by IMO.

3. Improvements in Port Security

Michael Baker observes that shipping companies send smaller, older, and cheaper ships to

Africa because the ports cannot handle modern fleets. As a result shipping companies deploy

their remaining smaller and slower ships for transport to and from Africa, increasing the

number of easy targets for pirates and further impeding Africa’s ability to export products

efficiently. The Bank can contribute by increasing resources to improve port infrastructure.

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SECTION THREE

3.0 MARITIME TERRORISM

3.1 DEFINITION

There is no universally accepted definition of maritime terrorism but the Council for

Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) Working Group has offered an extensive

definition for maritime terrorism: “…the undertaking of terrorist acts and activities within the

maritime environment, using or against vessels or fixed platforms at sea or in port, or against

any one of their passengers or personnel, against coastal facilities or settlements, including

tourist resorts, port areas and port towns or cities.”

3.2 THREAT SITUATION

Maritime terrorism, like all forms of terrorism, has mostly a political, ideological or

religious background. Terrorists will therefore ask themselves where they can hit the

infrastructure of the industrialized world most effectively. They may focus their attention on

so called choke points and mega-harbors, with 75 percent of all international sea transport

activities carried out by around 50,000 ships using 2,800 ports. The strategically important

Strait of Malacca is one of the critical choke points. It connects the Indian Ocean with the

South China Sea and the Pacific. It is the most significant trade route between the Far East, the

Gulf States and Europe. 90,000 ships use the Strait every year and one third of the world trade,

80 percent of oil exports to East Asia and two thirds of LNG exports pass through the Strait of

Malacca.

Should a super tanker be sunk in the Strait of Malacca it would block all traffic, and

ships would have to use the Indonesian Sunda and Flores passage. This would result in a

detour of at least 1,000 km and two extra days at sea. The resulting costs would increase to

approximately 8 billion U.S. dollars per year.19 As the largest ports of the world are in South

and East Asia, terrorists will focus their planning on ports such as Kobe, Tokyo, Yoko-hama,

Pusan, Shanghai, Kaohsiung, Hong Kong and Singapore. But also mega ports in the U.S.A.

and Europe, such as Los Angeles and Rotterdam, could be in the focus of terrorists.20

A number of successful maritime attacks demonstrate the intentions of terrorists:

21

October 2000: A successful attack was carried out against the U.S. destroyer USS Cole

in Yemen. 17 U.S. Sailors were killed, 39 wounded.

October 2002: The French oil tanker Limburg was attacked off Ash Shahir by a terrorist

group with connections to Al Qaida. One member of the crew was killed and 90,000

tons of oil spilled into the Gulf of Aden. The monthly container traffic in Yemen shrank

from 43,000 to 3,000. The economy of the country declined by one per cent of its GDP

and 3,000 dockworkers lost their job.

February 2004: The Abu Sayyaf Group attacked a ferry in the Philippines, 116 people

lost their lives.

November 2008: Mumbai attacks. Terrorists travelled by sea from Karachi, Pakistan,

across the Arabian Sea, hijacked the Indian fishing trawler “Kuber”, killed the crew of

four, and then forced the captain to sail to Mumbai. After murdering the captain the

attackers entered Mumbai on a rubber dinghy. 164 people were killed and at least 308

wounded.

July 2010: A suicide attack was carried out by the Abdullah Azzam Brigade against the

Japanese oil tanker M. Star in the Strait of Hormuz, a militant group with connections

to Al Qaeda. One member of the crew was injured and the hull severely damaged.

Blown-up container ships could block harbors for weeks – quite apart from an attack in

one of the mega harbors with a so-called dirty bomb. A closure of the Singapore harbor for

example would cost more than 200 billion U.S. dollars per year. Also, a terrorist attack of a

fully loaded gas tanker in one of the mega harbors would have a devastating effect on world

trade and provide terrorists with an event comparable to 9/11 – one of their stated goals.

Addressing the threat of maritime terrorism, excellent intelligence is a necessity. The

groups of greatest concern in the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, off the coast of Somalia are Al-

Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQ-AP), the Abdullah Azzam Brigades and to a reduced

extent Al-Shabaab. To combat maritime terrorism the Container Security Initiative (CSI),

initiated by the United States in 2002, is very helpful. The aim of this program is to identify –

out of the 230 million containers transported by sea every year – those containers with

weapons of mass destruction or dangerous nuclear substances, which could be used by

terrorists for their attacks.

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Also, in cooperation with state organizations and industry, technical means are used for

the protection against potential terror attacks. Scanning systems for large-size containers, the

use of Long-Range Acoustic Devices (LRAD), special anti-boarding systems, such as 9,000-

Volt-protective-fences for merchant ships making the boarding for pirates or terrorists more

difficult, are just a few examples. Unmanned ‘inventus systems’ with their cameras are

capable of searching large ocean areas and transmit data to a ship or a ground station.

In conclusion, we can say that world trade is potentially threatened by maritime

terrorism and piracy. This includes Asia and Europe. Any kind of cooperation in this field

would be well founded and could be the basis for anti-terrorism measures, but also for joint

anti-piracy missions. There are many reasons to believe that also in the future we will have to

expect maritime attacks of the kind, not limited to special regions, but on a world-wide scale.

There is no reliable information, however, that Islamist terror groups, structured and

institutionalized, cooperate with pirates in Somalia, although occasionally a few indications for

such cooperation seem to pop up.

What are the challenges for decision makers in fighting both maritime terrorism and

piracy? Decision makers need to understand that fighting piracy and maritime terrorism at sea

will not remove the threat. Suitable measures need to be taken onshore in order to achieve

success.

3.3 WHO ARE THE GLOBAL AND REGIONAL STAKEHOLDERS OF

"MARITIME SECURITY"?

In the previous chapters threats to Maritime Security have been described and

evaluated. In this part, the intention is to inform about operational requirements and successful

maritime collaboration.

A brief look at the global maritime community shows stakeholders of different

influence and power to enforce compliance in the maritime domain. Consensus has been

achieved between all stakeholders about the national territorial waters: 12 nautical miles (nm)

from the shore towards the sea, some nations are claiming up to 24 nm. UNCLOS offers this

as a “contiguous zone”31 with limited rights and responsibilities in comparison with the TTW.

More important today is the Exclusive Economic Zone, EEZ, up to 200 nm, but also

with the possibility to extend this zone for economic interests in relation to the continental

23

shelf up to 350 nm32. Here some of the elements of maritime security are touched, and the

existing and expected disputes about claims are risks and dangers to global maritime security.

International bodies have attempted to minimize, stop, or otherwise control threats to

security in the maritime domain. This includes actions from international organizations such as

the International Maritime Organization (IMO), public agencies/organizations such as law

enforcement, and naval forces, private industry such as shipping companies, ports, privately

contracted armed security personnel and entities from all nations to achieve maritime security.

This also includes safety regulations such as the International Ship and Port Facility Security

Code (ISPS Code), shipping protection practices, and naval patrols. Who are the actors on this

scene to develop the existing maritime regime in the future, able and willing to implement it

by all means, including the use of maritime and naval forces?

3.3.1 UNITED NATIONS (UN)

First we have the United Nations with its “International Maritime Organization” (IMO).

The IMO has a long experience in negotiating local, regional and global agreements and

treaties and has adopted a number of resolutions and conventions to this end. For example,

Resolution A.545--Measures To Prevent Acts Of Piracy And Armed Robbery Against Ships

was signed in 1983. In 1985 came IMO Resolution A.584--Measures to Prevent Unlawful Acts

Which Threaten Safety of Ships and Security of Passengers (this was later reviewed in

November 2001 with IMO Resolution A.924). In 1986 the IMO approved MSC/Circ.443--

Measures To Prevent Unlawful Acts Against Passengers And Crew On Board Ships. In 1988,

the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime

Navigation (SUA) treaties aiming at ensuring that appropriate judicial action is taken against

persons committing unlawful acts against ships.

Unlawful acts would include the seizure of vessels by force, acts of violence against

persons on board vessels, and placing devices on board a vessel which are likely to destroy or

damage it. The convention obliges contracting governments either to extradite or prosecute

alleged offenders. The SUA came into effect on March 1, 1992. Following the tragic events of

September 11, 2001, the twenty-second session of the IMO, in November 2001, unanimously

agreed to incorporate security regulations and approved the development of new measures

relating to the security of vessels and of port facilities for adoption by a Conference of

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Contracting Governments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea in

December of 2002 (the Diplomatic Conference).

This administrative capacity is of great importance and the IMO will remain the

“Guardian of Good Governance at Sea”. On the other hand, the UN and IMO have only very

little operational and tactical experience when it comes to the implementation and enforcement

of the law of the sea. The Operation “UNIFIL” in the Mediter-ranean Sea is a successful but

rare exception and no further maritime operation has been lead by the UN so far.34

3.3.2 USA

The United States of America has published a “National Maritime Security Strategy”35

a common effort by the Navy, the Coast Guard and the Marine Corps, a document which is

ambitious as a national document, but with a strong outlook for international cooperation as

well. The US Government has not signed UNCLOS yet, but is a long and strong supporter of

IMO and is acting in compliance with UNCLOS and the documents, which followed

UNCLOS. Here the strategic perspective is combined with operational and tactical

capabilities, which are vital for the enforcement of almost all elements of maritime security.

Navy, Coast Guard and Marine Corps are providing all necessary capabilities, which are

needed to project power: Intention and will, the appropriate level of ambition, a Strategy,

doctrines and naval capabilities.

Therefore, the US is projecting power by military forces, ensures maritime security

through the Coast Guard, and assumes its function as Law enforcement agency together with

the Navy and the Marine Corps whenever the situation calls for it.

3.3.3 NATO

The third stakeholder is NATO. NATO has a “Maritime Strategy”37 and is acting in

several Maritime Security Operations with great endurance and success due to its long-

standing experience on the operational and the tactical level. The member states of the

Alliance own all naval and maritime operational capabilities, which are needed to achieve and

endure maritime security.

The roles are providing a spectrum of strategic options:

Deterrence and collective defense

25

Crisis management

Cooperative security: outreach through partnership, dialogue and cooperation and

Maritime Security.

The operational requirements are optimized for serving the whole spectrum of tasks:

ranging from humanitarian assistance to training and to capabilities to fight wars at sea. All

these capabilities are operational and inherent in naval vessels from Frigate size on and above.

There is something that we can call “Operational Art”, which is the mixture of experience,

intellect, judgment, creativity, intuition and education. To find the right balance, time and

patience is needed.

NATO’s experience consists of its expertise gained from the build-up of its “Standing

Naval Forces”39 and its corresponding technical and procedural standards, which are

implemented with a common understanding. Command and Control, placing great emphasis

on Communication and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance are a common

achievement, which in US, NATO and EU maritime operations like anti-piracy operations

serve as the tool for coordination and cooperation. The most important operational

requirements for international collaboration are communications and information and

knowledge sharing, which are needed for ensuring an effective execution of operations.

NATO, through its “Partnership for Peace” program, has “exported” these basic requirements,

since the end of the Cold War, to non-NATO navies, which are partners in, and contributors

to, international naval and maritime exercises. Restricting operational requirements either to

military-technical or to naval aspects only would be ignoring the actual situation at sea.

This is the reason why NATO has expanded its roles and tasks into the area of maritime

security, focusing in particular on “conducting surveillance and sharing information” In

conclusion: NATO has all necessary operational assets and the appropriate training and

education to fulfill all maritime task requirements, together with other governmental and non-

governmental organizations.

3.3.4 EUROPEAN UNION

The fourth stakeholder in the maritime domain is the European Union (EU). It is a

Union of states with a political mandate, with its own maritime interests. The member states

are responsible for being much larger than their combined landmass and its economic interests

26

are global: trade and resources are the key words in this context. The “Highways of the Sea”

and the newly explored seabed resources are of vital interest for the European Union and its

member states.

With the “European Security Strategy” the EU has declared the framework and its

ambition to take its responsibility in Europe and beyond. But this strategy is lacking security

aspects, especially maritime security aspects. The Military Staff of the EU and the European

Defense Agency are taking care of security and defense issues. Up to now, almost all maritime

initiatives of the EU are dealing with a broad spectrum of the maritime domain, however they

are not including security and defense into their very well developed policies, like the

“Integrated Maritime Policy”.

The program of work includes, for example: maritime transport without borders,

national integrated maritime policies, a strategy for maritime research, a maritime surveillance

network, a network of maritime clusters and a strategy to mitigate the effects of climate

change. The EU is a strong contributor to all maritime aspects in the EU`s maritime domain

and beyond, but its operational capabilities are limited.

The European Naval Operation “ATALANTA” is an important step forward. The

positive experience with all aspects of the operation, including the fast process of

implementing this first European Naval operation, should encourage the European Parliament,

the Council, the Commission and the Military Staff to take more responsibility at sea in order

to achieve “Good Governance at Sea” through maritime security.

To sum up: the EU has great maritime interests, in Europe and beyond, the IMP and its

subsequent documents are examples of an excellent contribution to maritime affairs, but they

are still limited in scope and lacking comprehensiveness. Member states have recognized this

and have, through multilateral agreements, tried to compensate the situation. “Euro-Mar For“

is one example for this approach.

As an interim conclusion, it seems appropriate to focus on maritime surveillance.

Maritime surveillance is an important topic in the NATO Maritime Strategy and the EU

Integrated Maritime Policy. The EU Commission has developed a process to achieve a

“Common Information Sharing Environment”47 CISE, in the European maritime domain and

beyond. This is a great success, and it should be used as a blueprint for other maritime

domains as well. There are other initiatives, which are focused at a specific purpose, but are 27

urgently depending on a common picture of the maritime domain and on information sharing

based on the principle: need to share and responsibility to share information. One example is

EUROSUR48, a maritime surveillance system owned by Frontex49, the European Agency for

Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the

European Union.

In this context, the second example is “MARSUR”, a Maritime Surveillance Network

developed by the European Defence Agency and focused on the defense community, but with

the idea to be integrated into the CISE process.

3.3.5 AFRICAN UNION (AU)

In some regions, challenges for operational requirements in the field of maritime

security are growing more than in other parts of the global maritime domain: the whole of

Africa is such a region. Several regions: East Africa, Horn of Africa, and West Africa - Golf of

Guinea, are obviously facing severe maritime security challenges combined with poor

operational requirements and expertise. The African Union’s initiative to draft its own

“African Maritime Security Strategy” is of importance and should be supported by all means.

Assuming responsibility and asking for assistance in that process is an encouraging approach.

Coast Guard functions are required and should be provided by own national assets, be

they Navy or Coast Guard. Maritime collaboration between West African maritime services is

a challenge and needs more national and international support. Small and middle-sized

Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV) should be the answer to the regional operational challenges.

3.3.6 NON-ALIGNED NATIONS

Last but not least, it seems of great importance to draw the attention to some non-

aligned nations and their growing maritime ambitions: Brazil has taken the leadership of the

United Nations’ first maritime security operation, UNIFIL, in the Mediterranean Sea. This is a

contribution to international responsibility at sea. Russia has been involved in different kinds

of maritime security operations in the Baltic, in the Mediterranean Sea, in the Norwegian Sea

and in the Indian Ocean, as an independent contributor in the fight against piracy. India has an

ambitious naval and maritime program, with the aim to remain and become a regional

maritime power. And India will have its own voice in maritime security issues in the

international arena.

28

China’s naval and maritime ambitions are visible since several years and its operational

capabilities are already of a high professional standard. By being an independent participant in

the maritime security operations in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, China54, for the first

time since centuries, is engaged in an international effort to achieve maritime security: even

though this does not mean collaboration yet, it is certainly a form of coordinating operational

capabilities in a very pragmatic way.

3.4 EXAMPLES FOR SUCCESSFUL COLLABORATION

The agreement between India, Japan and China aiming at coordinating maritime

security efforts in the Gulf of Aden in order to avoid duplications of effort and to act more

professionally is one side of the coin, the encouraging one. It is the result of the SHADE

process, a successful series of meetings in Bahrain to achieve “Shared Awareness and

Deconfliction”.55 The SHADE process is an example of building mutual trust and confidence

and one way to achieve a real deconfliction.

It allows for more opportunities in other maritime regions as well. What has been

achieved by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand is of different, higher quality. Under

the sponsorship of the IMO, it took the littoral states some courage, patience and time to carry

out three joint operations to safeguard the international shipping in the Strait of Malacca and

Singapore. “MALSINDO”, an agreement concluded in 2004, deals with permanent sea

surveillance and advanced information sharing and is the air equivalent to the “Eyes in the

Sky” program with the same task and agreed “Terms of Reference” and “Standing Operational

Procedures”. It was extended by an Intelligence Exchange Group and, since 2008, together

with Thailand, is an open arrangement for other partners and can be used as a blueprint for

other regions. Another example of further collaboration is the “Djibouti Code of Conduct”57.

This agreement concerning the repression of piracy and armed robbery against ships lays the

ground for cooperation in line with international law. Regarding its ambition and development

under the umbrella of the IMO, it is similar to the agreements between the Asian nations, but,

until today, it has not reached the same pragmatic degree of implementation.

The implementation is supported by a resolution offering technical cooperation and

general assistance. A training center in Djibouti, an information-sharing center in Sanaà,

Yemen, a regional Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre in Mombasa, Kenya and a Sub

Centre in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, are already functioning.

29

Some of these initiatives by the IMO, supported by other UN organizations like UNDP

and UNODC, together with the EU and the maritime industry, are very encouraging. The basic

idea follows the good experience made in Asia. There the “ReCAAP–ISC”58 is setting a high

standard and ReCAAP, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed

Robbery in Asia, and the Information Sharing Centre are another proof of a successful

maritime collaboration in order to improve maritime security through a comprehensive

approach.

The conclusion of this chapter: it is obvious that the global maritime domain offers

inside looks with very different aspects. On one hand it is still an open space where freedom is

the rule with limited maritime regimes in force; on the other hand, there are increasing

examples of collaboration and regional maritime security initiatives and pragmatic processes.

The first steps for comprehensive approaches are encouraging.

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SECTION FOUR

4.0 COMPREHENSIVENESS – PRINCIPAL AND TECHNICAL ASPECTS

`Operations within the context of Maritime Security are those measures, which are

performed by the appropriate civilian or military authorities and agencies in order to counter

the threat and mitigate the risks of illegal or threatening activities in the maritime domain.

They are aiming at enforcing the Law, protecting citizens and safeguarding national and

international interests. A center of gravity analysis shows that critical vulnerabilities,

requirements and capabilities need to be addressed in cooperation with national/multinational

partners, agencies and organizations to co-operate effectively to deter, protect against and

counter hostile and illegal threats to safety and security in the maritime domain.

Naval services – civilian as military services – need to provide maritime security by

focusing on managing maritime security threats directly or indirectly. They do this by

providing security patrols, intercepting suspect vessels, and providing data for Maritime

Domain Awareness, and building partner capacity. Fine law enforcement skills, such as

minimal use of force in order to reduce disruption to society, knowing how to conduct

effective and legal searches, the knowledge to piece together case packages, and knowing the

difference between evidence and intelligence, have become incredibly important in maritime

interception operations.

4.1 OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCES

Military, first responder, and law enforcement personnel need to cooperate with a

comprehensive under-standing of enhancements to security in the maritime arena and the

unique circumstances and operational conditions that prevail therein in order to better perform

their duties and responsibilities in the port, maritime, and intermodal context, which may

include

inspecting vessels, terminals, and other facilities;

responding to crises involving threats of terrorism or actual attacks;

monitoring and controlling access to facilities and vessels;

interviewing, examining, and credentialing transportation workers and facility

personnel;

31

conducting surveillance operations and participating in undercover assignments;

tracking and interdicting suspicious cargo, persons, vessels, or vehicles;

recognizing and detecting the presence of bombs, explosives, and Weapons of Mass

Destruction;

interacting on security matters with Vessel Security Officers, Company Security

Officers,

Facility Security Officers, and relevant federal, state, and local agencies; and

Performing threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments; security planning; and

contingency planning.

Unfortunately, up to now there is a lack of overarching frameworks to bring nations’

civilian and military elements together in order to address threats to Maritime Security

efficiently, coherently and collectively. National actors are conducting Maritime Security as

part of routine, peacetime duties in response to the threats mentioned above. These operations

are generally either conducted independently by the armed forces and/or civilian agencies in

order to enforce legal powers and safeguard sovereignty or as part of multi-national military

operations, which aim to safeguard common defense and security interests. Yet, there are a

number of promising developments that highlight the benefits of providing multinational,

multiagency capacities and capabilities among those nations that participate in NATO’s

“Operation OCEAN SHIELD” and The European Union’s “Operation ATALANTA”.

4.1.1 OPERATION OCEAN SHIELD

In late 2008, when growing piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa

started undermining international humanitarian efforts in Africa and the safety of one of the

busiest and most important maritime routes in the world – the gateway in and out of the Suez

Canal – NATO started to provide escorts to UN World Food Program (WFP) vessels transiting

through these dangerous waters under Operation Allied Provider. This decision was taken on

the request of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, in full complementarity with the relevant

UN Security Council Resolutions and with actions against piracy initiated by other actors,

such as the European Union.

In addition, NATO conducted deterrence patrols and prevented, for instance, vessels

from being hijacked and their crews being taken hostage during pirate attacks. This initial 32

operation was succeeded in early 2009 by Operation Allied Protector, which continued to

contribute to the safety of commercial maritime routes and international navigation. It also

conducted surveillance and fulfilled the tasks previously undertaken by Operation Allied

Provider. This operation evolved in August 2009 into Operation OCEAN SHIELD59, an

operation approved by the North Atlantic Council on 17 August 2009 and recently extended

until the end of 2014.

Principally, operation OCEAN SHIELD has been focusing on at-sea counter-piracy

operations. NATO’s role has been to provide naval escorts and deterrence, while increasing

cooperation with other counter-piracy operations in the area in order to optimize efforts and

tackle the evolving pirate trends and tactics. NATO vessels conduct, for instance, helicopter

surveillance missions to trace and identify ships in the area. They help to prevent and disrupt

hijackings and to suppress armed robbery. NATO has agreed, at the request of the UN, to

escort the UNSOA - United Nations Support Office for AMISOM - supply vessels to the

harbor entrance of Mogadishu.

In order to respond to new piracy tactics, NATO has created greater synergies with

other initiatives, recognized the continued need for regional capacity-building, within its

means and capabilities, and focused on areas where it provides added value. It has broadened,

within its means and capabilities, its approach to combating piracy by offering to those

regional states requesting it assistance in developing their own capacity to combat piracy

activities. More recently, NATO has also taken on measures aimed at eroding the pirates’

logistics and support base by, among other things, disabling pirate vessels or skiffs, attaching

tracking beacons to mother ships and allowing the use of force to disable or destroy suspected

pirate or armed robber vessels.

To this point, Operation OCEAN SHIELD has contributed to providing maritime

security in the region and is helping to reduce the overall pirate attack success rate which has

been reduced from 44 percent in 2004 to 16 percent in 2011.

4.1.2 OPERATION ATALANTA

Operation ATALANTA is part of the European Union Comprehensive Approach in the

Horn of Africa. The political objectives of the EU are to prevent and deter pirates from

interrupting global maritime trade, but also to contribute to a sustainable and long-term

solution to piracy through building-up the capacity of the states in the region, including 33

Somalia, to take ownership of the fight against piracy. The EU being concerned with the

continuing impact of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia on international

maritime security and on the economic activities and security of countries in the region has

launched in December 2008 European Naval Force Somalia – Operation ATALANTA (EU

NAVFOR – ATALANTA) within the framework of the European Common Security and

Defense Policy in accordance with relevant UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) and

International Law.

The UNSC mandate has been providing for

protection of vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP) delivering food aid to

displaced persons in Somalia; the protection of African Union Mission in Somalia

(AMISOM) shipping;

deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the

Somali coast;

protection of vulnerable shipping off the Somali coast on a case by case basis;

In addition, Operation ATALANTA has been contributing to the monitoring of fishing

activities off the coast of Somalia.

To this end, EU NAVFOR ATALANTA has been operating in a mission area covering

an area from the southern Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Western part of the Indian Ocean

including the Seychelles. The area of operation includes Somali coastal territory as well as its

territorial and internal waters. Since its launch Opera-tion ATALANTA

has had a 100 percent success rate providing escorts to WFP vessels delivering

humanitarian aid to Somali people.

has provided protection to AMISOM shipments, which are critical to the success of the

AU operation in Somalia.

has ensured the protection of other vulnerable shipping within the Internationally

Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) and other assistance.

In order to address the root causes of piracy, the European Union has also been

contributing to the social and economic development of Somalia, concentrating on three

sectors of cooperation: governance, education, and the productive sectors, particularly rural

34

development. The EU actively works towards improving security on the ground in Somalia

through the empowerment of Somali capacities, with the EU Training Mission training Somali

soldiers in Uganda to contribute to strengthening the Transitional Federal Government and the

institutions of Somalia.

In addition, the EU offers substantial financial and technical support to the African

Union’s military mission to Somalia (AMISOM). The EU has been funding e.g. mission

allowances, medical care, accommodation, fuel, communication equipment etc. in order to

support dialogue and reconciliation and provide protection to key infrastructures, e.g.

government buildings and the Mogadishu International Airport.

4.2 FOCUS AREA: SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

With regard to national/multinational cooperation in such complex operations with

many different actors involved, maritime domain awareness is needed in order to create a

comprehensive picture of maritime activity based on accessible information – situational

awareness covering the deployment of layered maritime secu-rity from the high seas to

territorial waters, including littoral areas and port facilities. Already in the previous chapters

the importance to promote national inter-ministry, inter-governmental and multinational

cooperation for Maritime Security along with other actors involved has been highlighted,

taking full advantage of existing frameworks in order to

create the appropriate environment to promote the civilian-military aspects of

cooperation, information sharing and maritime surveillance

Coordinate the participation and actions of all organizations and partners. This includes

collaboration suites and integration of existing communication networks to an unified,

interoperable network

enable Maritime Security within commercial practices; providing for a better situational

awareness and understanding of how the commercial shipping sector might contribute

to and benefit from Mari-time Security, most notably in the energy sector

The availability and management of information, data and spatial planning is vital to

understanding the Mari-time environment, the compilation of a threat analysis and the

implementation of a comprehensive approach to Maritime Security. There are many sources of

information, from open source ‘white shipping’ such as AIS, commercially available databases

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such as Lloyds, to comprehensive ‘fused’ intelligence pictures, representing national, EU,

NATO and coalition interests only.

The latter also applies to dealing successfully with maritime cyber risks, as global

information exchanges for maritime cyber security-related incidents are badly needed. Like

many other critical infrastructures, maritime transport depends on information and

communicational technology (ICT). Without ICT, harbors, automatic identification systems,

navigation, logistics systems, and vessels do not operate. With the exception of dedicated

naval communication systems, maritime cyber infrastructures have so far not been at the

center of cyber villains. This could rapidly change. Coordinated cyber-attacks against

infrastructure operators such as PSA International, Hutchinson Port Holding, and Cosco, three

of the world’s biggest container port operators in the Asia-Pacific, would have rippling effects

far beyond the region. The main challenge for maritime cyber risks stems from the fact that the

International Shipping and Port Security Code (ISPS Code) is focusing on physical, rather than

digital security risks. By taking up this concern, nations and regions could help advance global

security for critical maritime infrastructures.

Numerous governmental, military and business organizations already possess valuable

inputs. However, no one source captures all of the maritime information needed or currently

available. The information exchange between government agencies and private industry, in

particular, sharing common databases, is the real power behind Maritime Domain Awareness.

The challenge is to effectively integrate and fuse the various inputs to achieve the synergies

offered by a comprehensive situational awareness picture, while being responsive to the

information needs of participating agencies. This also includes ports, as these are particularly

exposed to security, terrorism, emergency and operational events, which are related to national

governments’ supply chain. Government agencies, port authorities and associated

organizations must identify, collaborate, prioritize and respond to these events across

organizational boundaries and disparate business processes.

Related capabilities will be enhanced by the use of Operational Force Multipliers such

as

platforms, sensors, links, data and sensor fusion, change detection, decision support

tools,

open sources intelligence capabilities,

36

knowledge development and

C4ISTAR facilities in order to deliver an optimized operational contribution to

Maritime Security Of course, security aspects need to be embedded into commercial

practices. With most of world trade conducted by sea, the maritime environment

delivers many goods and services that are essential for society’s needs. As the need for

hydrocarbon-based energy grows, the need to safeguard maritime-related traffic is

becoming more acute. Cooperation and partnership with commercial shipping agencies

are vital in order to achieve a holistic approach to Maritime Security, which meets

mutually agreed objectives of all parties involved.

4.3 EUROPEAN BLUEPRINT?

The European approach to situational awareness may serve as reference how to

approach the complex issue. The EU maritime domain faces different and mounting threats

and challenges in all regional sea basins such as human or drug trafficking, marine pollution,

depletion of fish stocks and piracy. The integration of maritime surveillance as one of the

important strands of the Integrated Maritime Policy will provide for combating threats,

detecting vulnerabilities and illegal activities and increasing knowledge. It will ensure safer,

more secure and cleaner seas and boost sustainable economic growth through efficiency gains.

In its Maritime Policy the European Union aims at approaching all aspects of the

oceans and seas in a holistic and dynamic manner. The vision is to infuse cohesion and

commonality into offshore functions and provide interoperability in the surveillance systems.

It aims to safeguard Europeans' lives and interests by enhancing Maritime Security through the

integration of activities and systems associated with it. As regards offshore activities, there is

much room for the rationalization of the cross-border and cross-sector functions which the

Member States deploy on coastal waters.

CISE has been mentioned before. In October 2009, the European Commission set

guiding principles on how to achieve integration of maritime surveillance – a 'Common

Information Sharing Environment for the surveillance of the European Union domain'

('CISE'). It aims at creating a political, cultural, legal and technical environment to enable

sharing of existing and future surveillance systems and networks. Such interoperability will be

estab-lished in a decentralized way, using modern technologies. It will provide all concerned

37

authorities with access to the information they need for their missions at sea, based on the

'need-to-know' and 'responsibility-to-share' principle.

Within this context the objective of integrated maritime surveillance is to share

information across borders and sectors routinely and systematically throughout the EU. It is

supposed to provide public authorities, which are interested or active in maritime surveillance

at European Union (EU), regional and national level, with means to exchange information and

data across borders and across sectors to understand effectively activities and events at sea.

Currently, EU and national public authorities responsible for different aspects of

maritime surveillance – e.g. border control, traffic safety and security, fisheries control,

customs, environment, general law enforcement or defense – collect information and data

mostly separately and do not share them systematically. Cross-border sharing of data within a

sector has been advancing in the past years, often with the help of European Agencies, but

sharing information across sectors is still in its infancy. Sharing relevant cross-sectoral and

cross-border information and data would enhance the sectoral maritime situational awareness

of the public authorities and facilitate sound decision-making. Therefore, it would increase the

effectiveness and the cost-efficiency of maritime surveillance activities.

4.4 PRIVATIZING MARITIME SECURITY: A COMPROMISE OF STATE

SOVEREIGNTY

It is not an exaggeration that the level of insecurity in the maritime domain is on the rise

despite high deployment of the navy. For example, the Arabian Peninsula and Somali-sourced

piracy off the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden remain problematic regardless of

unprecedented presence of navy forces. This is because of all 439 attacks that occurred at the

high seas in 2011 alone, 236 reportedly happened in the African vicinity and this represents

53% the world over (International Maritime Bureau, 2011). Also, there was economic loss to

shippers in 2011 as a total of US$159.62 million was paid as ransom to secure the release of

31 ships hijacked by attackers, (The vessels hijacked include Irene SL, a Greek flagged vessel

and Samho Dream, a South Korean oil tanker) this apart from US$12 million which was paid

for the release of M/V Zirku (a Kuwait oil vessel) that was held for 73 days. Notwithstanding

the record and economic loss, privatization of maritime surveillance poses a lot of danger. The

commutative of the existing arrangement is between shippers and private security companies

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and it is not the government that engages the private security companies for monitoring and

enforcement of the law in the maritime domains.

It is observed that the role of private security companies does not involve enforcement

of the law and surveillance activities at all as the case in Nigeria’s situation. Despite the

engagement of these private security companies by shippers, Southeast Asia governments,

International Maritime Organization (IMO), etc. are strongly opposed to the activities of

private security companies in their maritime domain as this was considered likely to escalate

the already volatile region (Liss, 2007) and the same thing is applicable in the U.S. due to the

fear of proliferation of weapons (Pines, 2012). According to them, private security companies

carry weapons in the course of safeguarding the ships of their hirer based on the agreement

between them and where shoot out ensues between them and pirates, it could be disastrous.

More so, the exigency of weapons carrying by private companies brings about infiltration of

the region with weapons thereby threatening their sovereignty over the straits. In fact the stand

of the federal government of Nigeria on the issue is worrisome. Maritime surveillance and

enforcement have been firmed-out to Global West Vessel Specialist Agency (GWVSA), a

private security company owned and controlled by Chief Government Ekpemukpolo (a.k.a

Tompolo), an ex-militant in Nigeria whose antecedent ranges from oil bunkering to

kidnapping of expatriates, to mention but a few.

The perspective of engaging a private security company for maritime security has been

misunderstood and misapplied in Nigeria. Private security companies in the maritime domain

is not a new phenomenon because private companies like Glenn Defense Marine (Asia) was

established as far back as 1946 (Liss, 2007). The emergence of private security companies in

recent times in the region was a sequel to the 9/11 2001 attack. Even still, what is obtainable in

some parts of Asia and other jurisdictions like Australia could not be regarded as privatization

of surveillance and enforcement of maritime security. It is on record that Southeast Asia

homes important sea-lanes like the Straits of Malacca and criminal activities like piracy,

hijacking, kidnapping, etc. have brought about security concerns to governments and shippers.

For these reasons, shippers who wish to increase their security in the cause of traversing seas

engage the services of private security companies to avert any ensuing fraud and other

maritime insecurity. For example, Exxon Mobil was attacked in 2001 and the company was

forced to close down business for four months.

39

The same thing goes for Supper Ferry 40 in which more than 100 people lost their lives

to an attack (Liss, 2007). Some private security companies like Hart is based in the U.S and

the U.K and some of them do not even have permanent staff, hence shippers’ client based

agreements are the fulcrum of their operations. Some of the companies are owned by ex-

military personnel unlike the Nigerian ex-militant. The private security companies render

services like tracking of their clients’ ships, training of crew, provision of security personnel to

escort ships, investigation and recovery of missing or hijacked ships, negotiation with

attackers in the case of kidnapping and hostage of crews, etc. The privatization of maritime

surveillance and enforcement to a private security company is not the solution to maritime and

port insecurity, rather the government needs to undertake expansion and modernization of its

maritime agencies.

It has been maintained that the Navy as a government agency would have essential

roles to play in safeguarding the nation maritime zones and should therefore device a strategy

to increase security especially with regard to traditional security threats, while internal security

should be the business of the police (Bateman, 2005).

The questions that need to be asked with respect to privatization of maritime and port

security in Nigeria are captured as follows:

1. Since the government has privatized port and maritime surveillance and enforcement,

what would now constitute the constitutional roles of the Nigerian Navy and the likes?

2. In the case of traditional maritime security threats from other states, what roles can a

private outfit play to subvert the threats?

3. Is a private security outfit capable of protecting national security arising from port and

maritime borders?

4. Is it wise and reasonable for a government to enter into a concession in regard to its

national security with a private individual?

5. Would privatizing maritime security in the hands of a private individual not amount to a

country compromising its sovereignty to such individual?

The scheme of a private security company controlling the entire maritime domain is a

compromise of state sovereignty and would worsen the instability witnessed in the maritime

domain. If the policy embarked upon by the Nigerian government is allowed to continue, it

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will not only have adverse effect on the shipping business in Nigeria as the spate of

asymmetric threats is likely to increase, it would also affect the economy of the nation as well

as aggravate international instability. Expectedly, the private security company will not be able

to withstand the exigency of maritime security thereby making the domain to become the

center for trade of illicit drugs and arms, safe havens for terrorist organizations and breeding

grounds for bio-terrorism activities (Ottaway and Mair, 2004 and Patrick, 2006). The Nigerian

government needs to learn from the experiences of countries like Australia, United States of

America, Malaysia, etc. that have appeared more bounded with seas and whose maritime

domain is much higher. The government must also avert seeing security and surveillance in

ports and the maritime domain as a way of compensating political cronies as this will spell

doom for the entire country, because it is a matter of national security that must not be

compromised.

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SECTION FIVE

5.0 RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION

5.1 RECOMMENDATIONS

A comprehensive approach to Maritime Domain Security is indispensable to

safeguarding common prosperity and security interests as it effectively protects and supports

legitimate activities, while countering the threat of current and emerging terrorist, hostile,

illegal or dangerous acts within the maritime domain. By ensuring freedom of navigation and

commerce, it also has the capacity to promote regional, and contribute to global, economic

stability and protect maritime trade as the heart of regional and global economies.

Ensuring Maritime Security requires strong and enduring partnerships between civilian

and military authorities. This partnership can build on separate initiatives already in place and

the respective strengths of relevant actors in the domain of Maritime Security. Enhanced

cooperation concerning the Maritime Domain is in the immediate interest of any actor

involved in maritime trade and security. Capabilities are either already existent or can be built

up in an international co-operative manner. Criminal activities and terrorism could be deterred

significantly by concerted action that improves the presence of maritime security forces,

enables the boarding of suspicious vessels according to internationally agreed legal rules and

provides Maritime Security by Maritime Domain Awareness and integrated civil-military

capacities.

Particularly, the timely fusing of maritime information is an initial priority. Incremental

improvements in information sharing could allow operational cooperation to develop, as

mutual confidence grows correspondingly. For an inter-agency approach to work, the strengths

of the relevant organizations involved in addressing Mari-time Security must be combined. A

better use of the limited resources to address the omnipresent, multi-national threat in the

maritime domain would produce a most valuable result for governments, international

organizations and the commercial sector as well.

Situational Awareness systems have the capability of integrating a wide range of

emerging disruptive technologies that include: low cost sensors, IT architecture, video, robotic

vision, gaming, 3D/geospatial modeling, physical and virtual augmentation, autonomous

systems, simulation software, location-based service, social web life streams, and expert

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software learning systems. Of course, Situational Awareness platforms will require significant

integration to make it useful for users in a networked world. But eventually, it will cultivate

our capacity for increased awareness, mindfulness, and focus. It will force learners to expand

their collection of inputs, selectively identify their filters used in synthesizing and sense-

making, and help to mainstream systems- thinking and underline the imperative of

understanding structure, relationships and feedback loops in a glob-ally interdependent world.

The principles of situational awareness based on perception, comprehensiveness and

projection might soon support a wide range of applications that reach far beyond military

operations and crisis response. It is a user and outcomes-centric systems approach that could

integrate anticipated advances in mobility, ‘smart’ infra-structure, learning systems, policy-

making and business intelligence.

5.2 CONCLUSION

Maritime trade is key to prosperity not only of the Asia-Pacific region, but of the

European Union as well. Risks posed by pirates and robberies have already prompted several

countries to join forces and pool resources to address the respective consequences. Pooling and

sharing between public and private stakeholders could also help address two issues of growing

concern. With regard to combating piracy and armed robbery we propose the following:

A first step should be a new look at the Maritime Laws governing the use of force on

the high seas and within the territorial coastal areas. These laws need to be taken into

the 21st century and adopted to the threats of today.

The Rules of Engagement of naval units tasked with protecting the trade routes need to

be coordinated and agreed on. Furthermore, a close look needs to be taken at the kind of

naval vessels, which might be required to combat piracy more cost effectively.

The use of Private Security Companies (PSCs) should be regulated and agreed.

Shipping companies need to conform to the basic security requirements when operating

in danger areas and should at all times comply with due care for their crew and cargo.

They will need to invest in superior passive defense measures and adopt active

measures, if required.

Police and security services should actively combat those international crime groups

involved in piracy at the earliest possible point in time in order to reduce the

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attractiveness of piracy. They should also prevent piracy from being used by terrorist

organizations to advance their aims.

The banking community should take a much closer look at money laundering and report

all suspicious transactions to the authorities.

Long term plans to bring the beginning of stability to Somalia, and the establishment of

an effective Coast Guard needs to be drawn up and funding made available. This could

be a public-private partner-ship involving suitably qualified private security companies.

Regarding maritime terrorism, we provide the following recommendations

Although we could observe in the last 15 years only a few maritime terrorist attacks, the

potential threat should not be underestimated.

In spite of recent successes and a decline in successful terrorist attacks by Islamist

groups the security services need to continue to keep up the pressure and further

improve international cooperation to counter this global threat.

The security and intelligence services need to concentrate both on infiltrating the non-

Islamist terrorist groups in their relevant countries (HUMINT) and also step-up Open

Source Information (OSINT) Research, requiring relevant linguistic and intercultural

skills.

Governments should consider establishing a National Security Council in their

countries, if they have not yet done so, in order to further improve inter-ministerial

cooperation and provide a comprehensive security approach.

Governments should also consider the harmonized use of Armed Forces within the

European Union in the event of major terrorist attacks.

Governments should carefully consider their communications policy with the public.

Frequent warnings of impending terrorist attacks, which eventually do not materialize,

are not helpful in sensitizing the public.

Academia can contribute significantly to the activities of the security and intelligence

services by helping to analyze the motivation behind fringe terrorist groups and

separatist organizations. Such information would be helpful in building up profiles and

identifying potential targets of such groups.

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Businesses should realize that certain terrorist groups present a threat to their business

continuity. They should also realize that it is impossible for the state to provide

adequate levels of security at all times. Reliable private security organizations are in a

position to provide businesses with risk assessment and business continuity plans as

well as armed and unarmed close protection.

With regard to operational requirements and maritime collaboration, from a European

perspective, three recommendations come to mind:

A “Common Information Sharing Environment” offers national and international

collaboration challenges and opportunities and facilitates Maritime Domain/Situational

Awareness.

Civilian-Military cooperation should be enforced following the regional and step-by

step approach, using ongoing and future maritime operations like UNIFIL and anti-

piracy operations and their components of Maritime Capacity Building ashore and at

sea as another challenge and opportunity.

Hanging the mentality of information sharing from “Need to know” to “Need to Share”

and finally “Responsibility to Share”.

We know what we know: we have to disseminate what we know to all

stakeholders. (PUSH.)

We know what we do not know: we have to ask for information and we can do

this. (PULL)

We do not know what we do not know: it is vital to be part of comprehensive

information – sharing network. (PULL and PUSH.)

The mentality shift required clearly constitutes an enormous challenge and can only be

achieved by small steps and through an enduring process of building trust and confidence. The

purpose of all is Maritime Security.

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