An Empire's Fraying Edge? The North Caucasus Instability in Contemporary Russian Geopolitical Culture
Post on 18-Dec-2016
<ul><li><p>This article was downloaded by: [University of Birmingham]On: 02 October 2013, At: 19:35Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK</p><p>Eurasian Geography and EconomicsPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rege20</p><p>An Empire's Fraying Edge? The North CaucasusInstability in Contemporary Russian GeopoliticalCultureVladimir Kolossov a & Gerard Toal ba Institute of Geography, Russian Academy of Sciencesb Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State UniversityPublished online: 15 May 2013.</p><p>To cite this article: Vladimir Kolossov & Gerard Toal (2007) An Empire's Fraying Edge? The North Caucasus Instability inContemporary Russian Geopolitical Culture, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 48:2, 202-225</p><p>To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.2747/1538-7184.108.40.206</p><p>PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE</p><p>Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the Content) containedin the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make norepresentations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of theContent. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, andare not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon andshould be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable forany losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoeveror howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use ofthe Content.</p><p>This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematicreproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions</p></li><li><p>202</p><p>Eurasian Geography and Economics, 2007, 48, No. 2, pp. 202225.Copyright 2007 by Bellwether Publishing, Ltd. All rights reserved.</p><p>An Empires Fraying Edge? The North Caucasus Instability in Contemporary RussianGeopolitical Culture</p><p>Vladimir Kolossov and Gerard Toal (Gearid Tuathail)1</p><p>Abstract: A Russian and a U.S.-based political geographer explore how geopolitical culturesand traditions function in imagining and discursively framing events in specific regions withina particular state. More specifically, this paper undertakes a focused examination of competingelite storylines in Russian geopolitical culture about the North Caucasus during an eventfulyear (October 2005September 2006) that encompassed the large-scale terrorist attack againstthe city of Nalchik, the change of leadership in Dagestan, and the assassination of the promi-nent terrorist Shamil Basayev by federal forces. The paper first summarizes Kremlin, left/Communist, national-patriotic, and liberal storylines on the basis of a content analysis ofmajor periodicals representing each of these viewpoints, followed by a survey of the opinionsof ordinary citizens in the North Caucasus (n = 2,000) regarding the validity of thesestorylines. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: H11, I31, O18, P30. 7tables, 66 references. Key words: Russia, North Caucasus, geopolitical culture, geopoliticalstorylines, critical geopolitics, international terrorism, corruption, criminality, Chechnya,Putin, public opinion, modernization, economic growth, separatism.</p><p>ritical geopolitics argues that the study of geopolitics requires the study of geopoliticalcultures and the interlocking networks of power that condition how these cultures oper-</p><p>ate and function ( Tuathail, 2006). Within this nexus, explanations for political instability,such as that characterizing Russias North Caucasus region, for example, are primarilydependent on the prevailing power structure at the center of the Russian state and hegemonicways of representing, narrating, and emplotting the meaning of events, personalities, andprocesses in the North Caucasus. Where vigorous open political debate exists, explanatorystorylines can be deeply contested and hegemonic meanings can be illusive. Geopoliticalmeaning is also dependent upon the narratives beyond Russia within the international com-munity that can affirm or challenge dominant Russian storylines. The Economist, for exam-ple, used the narrative image of an empires fraying edge to enframe a special report onpolitical instability in the North Caucasus, a conceptualization that most Russians would</p><p>1Respectively, Institute of Geography, Russian Academy of Sciences, Staromonetnyy perulok 29, Moscow119017 Russia (email: email@example.com) and School of Public and International Affairs, Virginia Polytechnic Insti-tute and State University, 1021 Prince Street, Alexandria, VA 22314-2979 (email: firstname.lastname@example.org). This research wassupported by a grant from the Human and Social Dynamics Initiative of the U.S. National Science Foundation, grantnumber 0433927, and by a grant from the National Geographic Societys Committee on Research and Exploration.The authors thank Alexei Grazhdankin of the Levada Center, Moscow for coordinating the public opinion survey ofthe North Caucasus, Edward Holland for translation assistance, and to PI John OLoughlin for comments and settinga Stakhanovite pace for field work in Russia.</p><p>C</p><p>Kolossov.fm Page 202 Wednesday, March 14, 2007 12:18 PM</p><p>Dow</p><p>nloa</p><p>ded </p><p>by [U</p><p>nivers</p><p>ity of</p><p> Birm</p><p>ingha</p><p>m] at</p><p> 19:35</p><p> 02 O</p><p>ctobe</p><p>r 201</p><p>3 </p></li><li><p>KOLOSSOV AND TOAL 203</p><p>reject (An Empires, 2005). Finally, geopolitical meaning is also dependent upon localstorylines from the region, which can constitute an alternative form of narrating the meaningof processes and the causality of events in the North Caucasus. Understanding political insta-bility in the North Caucasus, in other words, is not something that can be established objec-tively and independently from struggles within and across geopolitical cultures over politicalmeaning. It is not a singularity but a contested field of meanings and power, pitting compet-ing interests at the state center against each other, the state against other international actors,and the state center against localized meanings.</p><p>Critical geopolitics provides a series of concepts by which we can study the contestedgeopolitical meaning of regions like the North Caucasus. Tuathail (2006) distinguishesbetween geopolitical culture and, within geopolitical cultures, between more popular geopo-litical imaginations and elite geopolitical traditions. He defines geopolitical culture as thepractices by which states make sense of their identity, position, and role in a world of states.This culture is formed not only by the institutions of a state, its historical experiences, andgeographical embeddedness, but also by networks of power within society and how these con-dition debates over national identity, prevailing geopolitical imaginations, codified geopoliti-cal traditions, and the institutional processes by which foreign policy is made in the state.Geopolitical imaginations include the prevalent images, conceptualizations, and discourses inpopular culture and among the general population of where that state is positioned and locatedwithin the worlds community of states. Geopolitical imaginations are a mix of popular cul-ture geopolitics and the geopolitical orientations of a states population. Geopolitical tradi-tions are the range of relatively formalized and competing schools of geopolitical thought thatcomprise the high culture of a states geopolitical culture. Each tradition is a canon ofthought on state identity, the national interest, and normative foreign policy priorities.</p><p>Russian geopolitical culture has long been distinguished by a generalized split betweenWesternizers, who promote Western modernization of Russia, and Slavophiles, who arecommonly associated with national exceptionalist narratives about Russian identity. Severaldistinctive geopolitical traditions have been identified in post-Soviet Russia: liberal-Westernizers, democrats, democratic-statists, neo-communists, and Eurasianists (Smith,1999; Kolossov and Mironenko, 2001; OLoughlin, 2001; Tsygankov, 2002; 2003; OLough-lin et al., 2005). Simplifying greatly, liberals hold Western liberal democracy as the beaconfor Russia. To them, Russia should be part of an alliance of democratic states confrontingauthoritarianism and human rights abuses across the world. Russias national security isthreatened not by the West but by its own backwardness. Statists, by contrast, are politicalrealists who view international relations as characterized by self-seeking power-accumula-tion by state actors whose interests require constant balancing. The interests of the Russianstate are served by it remaining an independent civilization capable of resisting the hege-monic ambitions of other states and their allies. Neo-Communists believe in the need torestore Russias role as a great power. The main threat to Russias national security is the mil-itary, political, economic, and cultural expansion of the West. Ironically, far-right radical-expansionists, often called also national-patriots, share the vision of the neo-Communistsbut adhere to a Darwinian view of world politics as a constant struggle for territory betweenempires seeking to expand their spheres of influence (OLoughlin et al., 2004b).</p><p>How geopolitical cultures and traditions function in imagining and discursively framingdramas in specific regions within the state has not been the subject of systematic critical geo-political study. This paper seeks to do this through a focused examination of the competingstorylines in Russian geopolitical culture about the North Caucasus during a year, betweenOctober 2005 and September 2006. This period included the large-scale terrorist attack</p><p>Kolossov.fm Page 203 Wednesday, March 14, 2007 12:18 PM</p><p>Dow</p><p>nloa</p><p>ded </p><p>by [U</p><p>nivers</p><p>ity of</p><p> Birm</p><p>ingha</p><p>m] at</p><p> 19:35</p><p> 02 O</p><p>ctobe</p><p>r 201</p><p>3 </p></li><li><p>204 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS</p><p>against the city of Nalchik (1314 October 2005), the change of leadership in Dagestan(December 2005), which provoked a public discussion of the situation in this republic, and thedeath of the terrorist number one Shamil Basayev, assassinated by federal forces in August2006. The Nalchik attack and the death of Basayev were global news stories that generatedinternational diplomatic comment and response. In this paper, however, we do not have thespace to examine international discourses on the North Caucasus. Rather, we concentrate oncompeting domestic storylines on the region in Russian geopolitical culture, and juxtaposethese to select results from a regional public opinion survey on the area and its problems.</p><p>We begin by briefly noting the transformed image of the North Caucasus in the contem-porary popular Russian geopolitical imagination. A second section examines the officialPutin administration discourse on the situation in the North Caucasus and its reaction to themost important events in the region. For this, we analyzed all speeches, interviews, and pressconferences of the President of Russia available at his official site [http://www.kremlin.ru]and all the materials of the official government daily, Rossiyskaya Gazeta (Russian Gazette),which is printed in 31 cities across Russia and has a self-reported daily circulation of 482,000copies. In a third section we examine all newspaper articles on the North Caucasus in threefederal newspapers in order to sample the political spectrum of opinion within Russia on theregion and its dynamics. The first, Sovetskaya Rossiya (Soviet Russia), which has a circula-tion about 300,000 copies, represents the view of the Communist left opposition in Russia.Officially an independent daily, the newspaper maintains close ties to the Communist party.The Communist leader Gennadiy Zuganov, for example, writes regularly in its pages. Thesecond newspaper, Zavtra (Tomorrow), is known for its so-called national-patriotic per-spective and implacable opposition to the post-Soviet ruling system under Presidents Yeltsinand Putin which, it claims, represents the interests of a narrow stratum of bureaucracy andcomprador bourgeoisie. Lastly, Novaya Gazeta (New Gazette) also is defined by its sharpopposition to the current federal authorities. It tends to provide a Westernizing and moderniz-ing liberal perspective on international events and developments within the Russian stateand across its territory. It is the intellectual home of a series of critically minded Muscovitejournalists and observers who often reflect the modernizing impulses of the citys Western-minded business elite. The internationally celebrated journalist Anna Politkovskaya, mur-dered in October 2006, was a regular contributor to Novaya Gazeta and a fearless critic of thePutin administrations approach to Chechnya. Some regular contributors to this newspaperare close to the largest liberal party, SPS (Union of Right Forces).</p><p>Finally, as a contrast to the geopolitical storylines found within these various sources ofelite geopolitical thinking on the North Caucasus, we present the results of a public opinionsurvey that we organized in the region in NovemberDecember 2005, by coincidence justafter the killings in Nalchik. As far as we know, this survey of 2000 respondents was thefirst large social scientific survey in the region. These results offer an interesting counter-point to Kremlin discourse because Moscows policies are seen by a plurality of the peoplein the North Caucasus as a principal cause of instability and conflict in the region. We elabo-rate the significance of this finding in the conclusion.</p><p> THE NORTH CAUCASUS IN THE RUSSIANGEOPOLITICAL IMAGINATION</p><p>With the process of conquest and incorporation into the Russian Empire, the NorthCaucasus region acquired a special place in the Russian geopolitical imagination as a liminalzone between civilization and barbarism, a place of noble heroes yet also one of empire and</p><p>Kolossov.fm Page 204 Wednesday, March 14, 2007 12:18 PM</p><p>Dow</p><p>nloa</p><p>ded </p><p>by [U</p><p>nivers</p><p>ity of</p><p> Birm</p><p>ingha</p><p>m] at</p><p> 19:35</p><p> 02 O</p><p>ctobe</p><p>r 201</p><p>3 </p></li><li><p>KOLOSSOV AND TOAL 205</p><p>the brutalities of power politics. Lermontov, Tolstoy, Pushkin, and Griboyedov all madenoteworthy contributions to the regions romantic image in Russian literature. Russianschoolchildren, consequently, acquire a series of popular geopolitical conceptions of theregion from an early age. On the one hand, the Caucasus is a region of natural beauty, heroicwarriors, Islamic tradition, and mysticism. On the other, it is a region of ruthless bandits andracialized otherness, an unruly place that is opaque to the gaze of the central s...</p></li></ul>
View more >
TRANSFORMING THE GENDER REGIME: AN ETHNOSOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF MODERNIZATION IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS. Summary
The Arctic : Russian geopolitical and economic Arctic Russian Geopolitical and Economic Interests ... Route. That would weaken ... Russian geopolitical and economic interests
Contemporary Geopolitical Issues (tutorial) viewThe course will be focused on the contemporary resource based confrontations, issues of new divisions in the world order, geopolitical flashpoints, geopolitical order, geostrategic regions and contemporary challenges to world ...