"when does new science become a threat?". 

"When does new science become a threat?".

problem - experimentation - discovery

The scientific process

problem - experimentation - discovery - dissemination

The scientific process

problem - experimentation - discovery - dissemination

The scientific process

Where do …………….. intervene in the process to identify DURC

• Jackson et al. 2001: Expression of Mouse Interleukin-4 by a Recombinant Ectromelia Virus suppresses cytolytic Lymphocyte Responses and Overcomes Genetic Resistance to Mousepox

• Cello et al. 2002: Chemical synthesis of Poliovirus cDNA: Generation of infectious Virus in the Absence of a natural Template

• Tumpey et al. 2005: Characterization of the reconstructed 1918 Spanish Flu influenza Pandemic Virus

• Wein et al. 2005: Analyzing a Bioterror Attack on the Food Supply: The Case of Botulinim Toxin in Milk

• Herfst et al. 2012: Airborne Transmission of Influenza A/H5N1 Virus between Ferrets

• Imai et al, 2012: Experimental Adaptation of an Influenza H5 HA confers respiratory Droplet Transmission to a Reassortant H5 HA/H1N1 Virus in Ferrets

• Xiong et al. 2013: Receptor binding by a ferret-transmissible H5 avian Influenza Virus

• Bieringer et al. 2013: Experimental Adaptation of Wild-Type Canine Distemper Virus (CDV) to the Human Entry Receptor CD150

• Zhang et al 2013: H5N1 Hybrid Viruses Bearing 2009/H1N1 Virus Genes transmit in Guinea Pigs by Respiratory Droplet

Controversial biological publications

problem - experimentation - discovery - dissemination

The scientific process

Where do …………….. intervene in the process to identify DURC

Vanity publishing

problem - experimentation - discovery - dissemination

The scientific process

Where do …………….. intervene in the process to identify DURC

problem - experimentation - discovery - dissemination - repetition - adoption

The scientific processFunding Scientists Open innovation

Science is a moving target – good science identifies new ground

Engineer a new functional organism from scratch

Engineer an organism to do something completely new

Introduce new traits into an organism at the genetic level

Engineer an organism to modify to an existing pathway

Use an existing pathway to make something new.

1 2 3 4 5

The pace of change

The politics of 20/20 hindsight

Code of conduct – what is you want scientists to do differently?Security culture – responsible conduct

The pace of change

Can we prevent access to new sciences: e.g. oligonucleotide synthesis

Interferon gamma 17kDa, 166aa, 498 bp

problem - experimentation - discovery - dissemination

The scientific process

Where do …………….. intervene in the process to identify DURC

Constant vigilance!!

• Provide education – at all levels• Engender a community responsibility• Provide a reporting framework• Provide confidential contacts• Provide a knowledge base

Self policing

Categories of Experiments that might be DURC

1. Enhance the harmful consequences of a biological agent or toxin. 2. Disrupt immunity or the effectiveness of immunization without clinical

and/or agricultural justification. 3. Confer to a biological agent or toxin, resistance to clinically and/or

agriculturally useful prophylactic or therapeutic interventions against that agent or toxin or facilitate their ability to evade detection methodologies.

4. Increase the stability, transmissibility, or the ability to disseminate a biological agent or toxin.

5. Alter the host range or tropism of biological agent or toxin. 6. Enhance the susceptibility of a host population. 7. Generate a novel pathogenic agent or toxin, or reconstitute an eradicated

or extinct biological agent.

National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), USA, 2012; http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/biosecurity_documents.html

A problem

Emerging Science Makes Security a Moving Threat Beyond the 15 Key Pathogens/7 Core Experiments of Concern – moving target

No common framework in which to conduct sound risk/benefits analyses of science:

• In different countries• In different cultures• In different communities (e.g. science vs. security)

Therefore probability that too risky experiments yielding too little benefit will be conducted.

• However, can we apply universal rules? • Should the restrictions/expectations placed on a 3rd world be

the same as a developed nation? • Rather do we really need common ethical guidance?

A problem

• Convergence of science

• Divergence of scientists - in interest/expertise - who is doing the science - including “the public”

Safety

Risk Threat

Security

Quid est veritas: What is truth

Who provides the solution

Advise on risk/benefit assessment and risk mitigation • don´t do it • do it in another way

Dissemination• don’t publish it • publish it with balancing/redacted information

• Advise on supporting structures, e.g. local/regional ethical review committees

The language

What is the cost of security?

“The biological world is displacing the machine as a general world of design.”

DARPA – Living Foundries: Large U.S. investment in next-generation bio-based manufacturing

Unknown unknowns – horizon scoping and the pace of scientific development

• Most science develops iteratively and easy to map. • Some scientists work in a different way and think about where

they want to be and describe the route to get there, real scientific breakthrough

• Step change is often serendipitous, or is unrecognized at the point of discovery.

• Nature as a threat – biggest bioterroist.

Discussion between science, policy and security ….

Identifying a clear and present danger

Horizon scoping 10 years and beyond less reliable – pace of change

Coreponsibility …..

Dealing with potential issues in advance ….

How good at this are we?

Scientists are good at identifying where science is going in the near future